NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010014-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 14
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National 1 ntel l igen~e
bulletin
State Dept. review
completed.
DIA review
completed.
Top Secret 25X1
N? 639
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 25, 1974
CONTENTS
FEDAYEEN-EGXPT-JORDAN: Interpretations of tripartite
communique. Page l
OIL: World reaction to President Ford's and Secretary
Kissinger?s speeches concerning oil price rigging.
(Page 3 )
PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN: Islamabad's operations against
the Baluchi insurgents may lead Kabul to step up anti-
Pakistan propaganda. (Page 7)
CYPRUS: Makarios'' role. (Page 9)
TURKEY: Democratic Party rejects Ecevit's ofd"er.
(Page 10 )
GREECE: Ban on Communist Party lifted. (Page 111
PORTUGAL: Spinola to play a direct role in nE:gotiations
affecting Angola and Cape Verde. (Page 12)
ETHIOPIA: General strike called. (Page 14)
SOUTH KOREA: Opposition stirring once again. CPage 18)
JAPAN: Oil supply plan. (Page 20)
JAPAN-CHINA: Tokyo approves loan to Peking. (.Page 21)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 22)
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N~tIOP'1~1'1ltC~~iC~e!~lCe ~t.J~~G'tli"1 September 25, 1974
Palestine Liberation Organization spokesmen are
interpreting the Egyptian-Syrian-Palestinian com~;uniq.ue
issued in Cairo last weekend as a rejection of ar.~.y Jor-
danian role in negotiations on the future of the occupied
territgries. They contend that the designation of the
PLO as the only representative of the Palestinian people
denies Jordan the right to represent any Palestinians
and therefore the right to negotiate with Israel for a
withdrawal from the West Bank.
Moderate Palestinian .leaders are promoting this
embellished version of the communique primarily t:o con-
vince the Arab states and the major powers that t:he PLO
must be included in future sessions of the peace talks.
They are also trying to counter the arguments an~i re-
duce the appeal of the more radical fedayeen leaders,
who have been criticizing PLO chairman Yasir Arafat and
his supporters far pursuing a conciliatory coursE;.
PLO leaders are meeting in Damascus this w~E~k to
debate future strategy. They are likely to focus; on a
response to Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahrni?s ca_ls for
expanded Arab consultations to include representatives
of Egypt, Syria, the PLO, and Jordan.
PLO officials have so far declined to enter into
formal negotiations with the Jordanians. They may now
conclude-?-in view of Amman?s summary rejection lest
weekend of an invitation to participate in four-party
talks--that a private expression of willingness ~.o un-
dertake informal consultations with the Jordanians as
part of a general Arab effort to coordinate policy would
demonstrate Palestinian '?respansibility" and woueLd fur-
ther isolate King Husayn. Should the moderates 1~ake
this step, it would increase the likelihood that the
more radical fedayeen groups would withdraw from the
PLO.
The Egyptians, for their part, are arguing _Ln pri-
vate that their concession to the Palestine Libe.~ation
Organization does not negate their earlier agreement
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S'lfatlOl'le"a~ ~~t~~llc~' er~~~ BU!letin September 25, 1974
with King Husayn that Jordan represents Palestinians
living in Jordan. The Egyptians are developing their.
own interpretation of the tripartite communique?s key
word, ?'only,?' that limits its application to Palestinians
who have not pledged allegiance to Arab governments.
In Cairo?s view, the concession to t:he P]LO extends
only to the form, not the substance, of t:he dispute that
has prevented Arab agreement on who will negotiate for
the return of the Israeli--occupied West Bank. The Egyp-
tians are insisting they have not conceded t~f~ key
point: that Jordan should. take the lead in those nego-
ti ati ons .
Cairo's calculated ambiguity has angered the Jor-
danians. Nonetheless, recent Jordanian public state-
ments give some evidence that Amman understands the
critical difference between form and substance. An
Amman radio commentary on Monday rejected as a "sterile"
exercise the argument over who represents ~,ahorn. It noted
that the key problem centers not on who represents the
people, but on who in fact "liberates" the Zarld--on who,
in other words, can realistically expect to sit opposite
Israel at the negotiating table.
What Jordan fears, the commentary noted, is that
the Arabs will ignore the heart of the issue in their
concentration on applying labels. Amman?s dismissal of
the representation issue as of minimal importance sug-
gests that the Jordanians might, with pressurE: from
Cairo, be brought to tolerate the PLO nominally as the
"only" representative of the, Palestinian people, so long
as Amman retains the right to negotiate the da_sposition
of West Bank territory and to govern Palestinians re-
siding in Jordan.
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I~lational Intelligence Bulletin
September 2:i, 1974
Governments everywhere appear to be trying to as-
sess the implications of President Ford's and Secretary
Kissinger"s speeches Monday on artificial rigging t~f oil
prices. Few have reacted so far; many of them are prob-
ably looking for ways to avoid offending either thF~ US
or the oil exporters.
The West Germans, for example, have informed the
press that they would have no comment because the ~~ov-
ernment is "striving to improve relations with the Arabs."
The British Department of Energy urged consultatio~is be-
tween producers and consumers, keeping the needs o:E de-
veloping countries in view.
The Oil Exhorters Respond
Oil exporters were defensive. Most, like Ira~zian
Prime Minister Hoveyda, justified high oil prices `with
references to the high cost of Western-manufactured
goods. Representatives of OPEC were most aggressi~~e,
denying that oil prices had been used politically ~~r
that inflation began with oil price hikes . TYiese :~pokes-
men argued that oil rates had been adjusted because o~
inflation. OPEC, they said, had acted only to red~~ace
"windfall profits made by international companies, mostly
American companies."
Sheikh Zayid, President of the United Arab Em:i~'a~es,
was more conciliatory, supporting cooperation to c~a.t
prices of all products in international trade. He
claimed that oil--exporting states are ready to lower
their prices in return for lower prices on manufactured
goods and food. Saudi Oil Minister Yamani initially
endorsed President Ford's appeal for interdependen~~e in
world resources, but in a later interview cautioned3,
"as a friend," that the US should avoid actions th~~t
oil producers and developing states will view as "~~co-
nomic imperialism." Kuwaiti Oil Minister Abd-al-R,~hman
a1 Atigi warned that consumer states could hurt th+~ir
own interests by forming a front. He explained th,~t it
would put the oil states on alert to protect their own
interests.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 25, 1974
Twice within the past week Venezuelan President
Carlos Andres Perez has pub7_icly criticized President
Ford's remarks on the world energy crisis an,d aggres-
sively defended the right of Venezuela and other coun-
tries to get a better deal for their raw materials on
the world market. In a public statement yesterday,
Perez again defended his administration's oil-pricing
policy. Some officials are saying Venezuela plans new
taxes that may have the effect of raising the price of
Venezuelan oil. Perez has made clear that his adminis-
tration is not picking a fight with the US and wants to
maintain cordial relations with Washington.
Middle East Reaction
The Arab press has reacted sharply, giving wide
circulation to an Iraqi-controlled Beirut newspaper's
headline charging that President Ford had threatened
to seize Arab oil by force of arms. A Syrian--subsi-
dized paper in Beirut claimed that the US threatened
nuclear war over petroleum.
Only one commentator has cautioned that the Arab
states cannot win. a food-versus-oil confrontation with
the US. Amman radio highlighted President Ford's call
for a comprehensive world energy plan and cooperation
between exporters and importers.
One Israeli commentary has appeared in the influ-
ential paper Ma?ariv, saying that US leaders -are wrong
to assume thatt tYiere is any usefulness to approaching
Arab oil producers.
Communist Reaction
The Soviets have avoided reporting proposals on
global food and energy policies and econom%c interde-
pendence contained in President Ford's speE~ch to the
UN last week. Tass has reported only that the Presi-~
dent's speech in Detroit "contained a warning" to pe-
troleum-producing countries that had increased their
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(~lational Intelligence Bulletin September ~:5, 1974
prices. A Radio Moscow broadcast in Arabic last night
quoted the Kuwaitis as viewing the President's dill for
a conference of Western oil-consuming states as t:he
first step toward creating a bloc "hostile" to tYie oil-
exporting countries.
As of this morning, there has been no mention on
Peking Radio of either President Ford's speech in De-
troit or Secretary Kissinger's speech at the UN. Radio
Hanoi called the tone of the President's speech Yiarsh,
but its report was brief and relatively straightj=ooward.
Hanoi has broadcast a long and reasonably factua_. ac-
count of Secretary Kissinger's speech, character=_zing
it as an attempt to intimidate oil exporters whi_Le prom-
ising to help them increase agricultural product__on.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 25 p 1974
PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN
Recent and projected Pakistani military opex?ations
against tribal a,nsurgents in Baluch~,stan Provinces will
probably lead Afghanistan to step up its anti~Pak:istan
propaganda, but there has been li~.tle evidence sc~ far
that either count~?y is getting ready to initiate hostil-
ities.
According to the US army attache in Pakistan, who
toured Baluchistan last week, the Pakistani army recently
made at least two sweeps in the area. There havE~ been
conflicting reports as to how successful these o~~erations
were; the army?s claims that it captured or killE~d large
numbers of rebel tribesmen are probably exaggerat~edo
In Afghanistan, where sympathy is strong for Pak-
istani dissidents both in Baluchistan and irs the neighm
boring North-West Frontier Province, there has bE~en
considerable official criticism of Pakistan's la?~est
actions. President Daoud has sent a strong lettE~r of
protest to the UN sec~?etary general.
An irrational move or escalation of a local inci-
dent cannot be ruled out, but both sides seem t.o want
to avoid a war. Daoud has strong feelings about the
long-standing dispute over the status of Pakista:~'s two
frontier provinces and is apparently convinced that they
will eventually come under Afghan control, but hw knows
that his army is-much weaker than Pakistan?s. H? also
knows that, although Moscow has been giving Kabul sub-
stantial economic and military assistance and relations
with India have improved steadily, he cannot be sure
either wquld come to Afgk~ax~istan's rescue in the event.
of a war with Pakistan. He may step up propaganda and
even move some troops around, however, particularly if
a major Pakistani offensive against the Baluchi rebels
materializes.
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National Intelligence Bulletin 5eptem:ber 25 ~ .1974
Pakistan, for its part, wall probably continue to
try to avoid violating the Afghan border as it seeks to
bring the Baluchi rebels to heele Afghanistan has long
been giving sanctuary and some material help to dissi~
dents in both of the Pakistani frontier provinces, but
this assistance has not been so extensive that Islamabad
would be likely to view a strike against Afghanistan as
a military necessityo The two countries have never
actually gone to war over their border dispute, although
they came close in 1962, In that year, strong protests
against Pakistan's frontier policies by the Afghan pub
lic and the government of then-prime minister Daoud led
to a sharp deterioration in relations that did not ease
until after Daoud had been replaced the following year
by more moderate leaderse
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I\l~tional intelligence Bulletin September 25, 1.974
CYPRUS
Archbishop Makarios has been giving mixed signals
regarding his future role in Cyprus. His appearance at
the UN this week will provide him with a forum from which
to explore the various possibilities open to him.
He has not given up the idea of returning to the
island, but it is not clear in what capacity or at what
time he would do so. In Belgrade last Monday, Makarios
said he might return to the island in two or three weeks.
He said he would decide the exact date after the UN
General Assembly debate later this month.
Makarios said earlier he would not return until all
the Greek officers who participated in the coup against
him left the island. The rotation of these officers
will not be completed f_or several weeks.
Makarios' activities have complicated actinc~ Greek
Cypriot President Clerides? efforts to achieve a Cyprus
settlement. .The Turks prefer to deal with Clerides and
would probably stiffen their negotiating positions should
Makarios return to the island.
Recently, both Greek Foreign N[inister Mavroa and a
Makarios-Clerides go-between have privately floated the
possibility that Makarios might return to the island
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~~tIQ-t'1~I rl"1t~'~e1C~Gt1~~ ~lAf'E,''~Ir'1 Septernber 25, 1974
solely in an eccelesiastical capacity. It is unlikely
that he would be long content with such a role, nor
would Clerides welcome his return in such a capacity.
Although Clerides does not want Maka:rios back, ~e
does not want him to resign either. His :resignation
would require new elections at a time when no one is
sure what kind of government Cyprus will have. Clerides,
therefore, continues to support P~akarios' plan to ad-
dress the UN as President of Cyprus, even though he re-
alizes the archbishop may use the opportunity to upstage
Clerides' efforts to secure peace.
The Democratic Party yesterday rejected Prime Min-
ister Ecevit's offer to join in a coalition government,
but left the door open for further negoti~.tions.
The wording o.f the rejection announcement by Demo-~
cratic Party leader Bozbeyli indicated that it was
Ecevit's insistence on elections this December that
prompted the party council to reject the coalition pro-
posal. Leading Democrats :have suggested, however, that
the party was ready to overlook ideological differences
with Ecevit and, if he drops his insistence on holding
elections in 1974, they might agree to join a coalition.
Ecevit, in fact, appears to have little choice now
but to give up the idea o.f immediate elections. The
Democrats were his best chance to obtain the parliamen-
tary majority necessary to approve early elections.
Ecevit?s next effort to form a new government will
probably be another proposal to the Democratic Party,
possibly calling for elections next spring. The Demo-
crats would be more likely to accept such an offer?
If Ecevit fails to entice the Democrats into a co-
alition, he may try to form a minority government. If
both efforts fail, President Koruturk could burn to
Suleyman Demirel, leader of the opposition Justice Party,
to try to organize a coalition. In any event, Ecevit
will continue to head the caretaker government until a
new government is formed.
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National Intelligence bulletin
GREECE
September 25, 1974
The Greek government's announcement on September
23 lifting the ban on the Communist Party is the latest
step the civilian government has taken toward a national
election. The ban on the Greek Communist Party, imposed
in 1936, was reaffirmed during Greece's civil war in
1947. Last week, the cabinet approved a new law on pro-
portional representation; another law now being prepared
will outline the requirements necessary to qualify as a
political party.
Prime Minister Karamanlis must now set an election
date. Most reports indicate the election will be in late
November? An early election has the advantage, for Kara-
manlis, of capitalizing on his image of a returned hero.
It will also get the Greeks to the polls before the badly
fragmented left can organize.
The Communists, for example, are split into three
groups: the Moscow-backed Communist :Party (the KKF;-.
exterior}, the dissident Communist Party (the KKE-
interioz), and the United Democratic Left (EDA), a Com-
munist front group which represented the Communists in
parliament from 1952-1967. EDA won 11 percent of t:he
vote in the 1964 elections.
The legalization of the Greek Communist Party will
intensify the current debate over which group i~ trie
legitimate one and may lead to a court fight betweE~n
the two sections of the party over the title of thE:ir
respective organizations. The Moscow-backed faction has
thus far shown great unwillingness to join with otr~er
leftists, and this should harm the left's showing ~~t
the polls.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 25, 1974
President Spinola apparently plans to play a direct
role in the negotiations involving the decolonization of
Angola and Cape Verde.
An aide of the President told a US embassy officer
that Spinola is not entirely pleased with the settlements
achieved in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. Spinola's
displeasure presumably centers around the concessions
that granted power to one guerrilla group without hold-
ing a referendum to test a variety of other options,
including a federation with Portugal.
Spinola would like to see Angola, the richest of
the overseas territories, handled in a way that will
allow Lisbon to play the various guerrilla groups vying
for power a ainst each other accordin to the ;President's
aide. Spinola
will no a emp o a er a eco onization ormula
for P!tozambique, but will caricentrate on ensuring that
the referendum route is followed in Angola.
Spinola's personal involvement in Angola also was
endorsed by the Portuguese president of the territorial
junta on September 23, prior to his departure to Luanda.
He said Spinola had "decided to take in his hands all in-
ternational matters bearing upon the future of .Angola."
In a speech that day at the swearing-in ceremony of the
new governor of Cape Verde, Spinola warned that Portugal
will use force if necessary to guarantee freedom of
choice for the people of Cape Verde.
Spinola's new assertiveness may be related to in-
dications of a campaign for a pro-Spinola, anti-extrem-
ist rally. Press reports indicate that some 50,000
posters calling for such a rally on an unspecified date
appeared in Lisbon on September 19.
The leftist-dominated press is billing the campaign
as a maneuver by "reactionary elements" to discredit
Spinola. The known involvement of at least one junta
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 25, 1974
member, however, suggests that the campaign has ;apinola?s
approval. The press has refused to print the details of
the rally,
The brochures advertising the rally indicate that
one of the themes of the demonstration will be the return
to the original Spinola decolonization formula, i.e., the
referendum. Spinola's position on this point seems to
have hardened, and his unyielding attitude could polar-
ize forces within the establishment;, and particularly
in the armed forces, on this issue.
A political rally could also present other dangers.
A large turnout might trigger violence which eventually
could lead to an attempted take-over by ext:rernists of
the right or left.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 25, 1974
ETHIOPIA
The Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions has
called a general strike for today. Union leaders have
asked workers to remain home, but disord~:rs are possible.
An extended strike would produce serious economic dis-
location and increase chances for more unrest. The
strike call came at the same time the military government
faced problems with ethnic dissidents out:.side the capital.
The canfederation?s demand last week for a quick end
to military rule resulted in a public condemnation of the
labor leadership by the armed forces, Subsequent nego-
tiations to resolve differences between the two sides
were unproductive, and this week, the military arrested
three confederation leaders ? Other labor. officia]_s then
called for a general strike to last until the three are
released.
The confederation, which claims over. 100,000 mem-
bers, is ably led and has close ties with European and
US labor organizations. Organized labor's militancy
contributed to the overthrow of the cabinet last Febru-
ary. A disciplined general strike by thE~ confederation
in March culminated in an agreement with then-prime
minister Endelkatchew to return to work in exchange for
a labor law sought by the confederation.
The military may be compelled to use force i_f vola-
tile students and others demonstrate in ~cupport of the
confederation? A prolongE~d strike could result in
shortages of fuel and other necessities. This would
add to urban tensions and the already considerable hard-
ships of Ethiopian city dwellers.
The military is also being confronted by signs of
opposition outside the capital. In Tigre Province, a
popular aristocrat, Governor General Ras Mengesha
Seyoum, has eluded the troops sent to keep him under
control and has taken to the countryside with a few
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The military regime is also reported to ha~re pro-
voked the Danakils, a large warlike group of nomads in
the northeasternmost part of Ethiopia. The military
ordered the group's traditional leader to turn ~iimself
in, along with the rest of Ethiopia's aristocrai:s, but
backed down in the face of threatened armed trik~al re-
sistance to any arrest attempt.
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Nc'~$I~r'1~d mrl$E'~~~Ig~1lCe ~l.l~I@$if'1 September 25, X974
SOUTH KOREA
Opposition forces in South Korea are stirring once
again in the aftermath of the Seoul-Tokyo diplomatic
dispute. President Pak has already taken a number of
steps aimed at heading off domestic criticism, and he
reportedly is planning to take a more conciliatory ap-
proach toward opposition elements--if only as a temporary
tactical maneuver. Nevertheless, there is likely to be
a confrontation with the government, perhaps including
action in the streets, before President Ford visits
Seoul in late November.
During the past few days, relatively small student
and Christian groups have resumed signature campaigns
and protest prayer meetings aimed at obtaining the re-
lease of comrades imprisoned during the spring and sum-
mer under the government?s emergency decrease Govern-
ment security forces have moved quickly to pick up th.e
leaders of these activities for questioni.:nga In the
National Assembly, the newly elected leader of the major
opposition party is planning a vigorous attach: pn gov-
ernment policies, which reportedly will include demands
that the emergency decrees remaining in effect be re-
scinded, that the constitution and criminal code be re-
vised to restore individual liberties, and that the role
of the Korean CIA be sharply curtailed.
The government?s position is complicated by eco-
nomic problems Last weep the largest and most. violent
strike since 19'72 took place in Ulsan, and officials
fear that a predicted 30-percent shortfall in this
year?s harvest could cause food shortages
President Pak, in moves aimed in part at satisfy-
ing opposition claims, last month lifted two of the
four emergency decrees imposed earlier this year, and
last week he carried out a cabinet shuffle. The cabinet
changes did not presage any significant policy shifts,
but they did bring in a number of new faces, ~>reempt a
planned opposition attack on government corruption, and
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National Intelligence Bulletin September: 25, ].974
remove education and information ministers who wf?re un-
popular with students and the press. A desire tc~ deflect
popular resentment was one factor behind Seoul's harsh
anti-Japanese campaign of recent weeks.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
JAPAN
September 25, 1974
Tokyo has just completed the annual revision of its
five-year petroleum supply plan. The plan for 1974 to
1978 provides fors slower growth. in consumption; in-
creasing stocks to 90 days of supply; dirE~ct deals with
producers when possible; and reorganization of the do-
mestic oil industry to strengthen exploration and pro-
duction capabilities.
Crude oil consumption in Japan is expected to de-
cline by about 2 percent this year. It i.a projected to
grow during 1975 to 1978 by about 4 percent a year, com-
pared with annual growth of about 12 percent in recent
years. In place of mandatory conservation measures in-
stituted last winter, a cabinet--level. committee has been
established to monitor consumption by large energy users.
The committee has no enforcement powers, but can request
firms to use restraint if their consumption is judged
to be excessiveo
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry
is prepared to submit legislation requiring private oil
firms to maintain 90-day stocks by 1978? A minimum of
60 days of supply will be :required when the law is en-
acted, probably by next spring at the earliest. Addi-
tional storage facilities and oil purchasEa will be fi-
nanced largely by the government. The Ministry of
Finance is balking at the cost of this plan--estimated
at about $5 billion--.but Trade Ministry oi=ficials are
confident of eventual approval.
Tokyo intends to pursue bilateral supply arrange-
ments, but has decided against setting up a public cor-
poration for that purpose. Procedures for handling
government-to-government deals will be determined on a
case-by-case basis, If price negotiation~c with Baghdad
later this month are successful? for exams>le, the oil
will be resold to private companies, with the semi-
governmental Japan Petroleum Development Corporation
providing the necessary financing.
The International Trade Ministry is convinced that
most of the 40 to 50 small? poorly financed Japanese
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I I
National Intelligence Bulletin September 25 , 19 74
refining and exploration companies must merge if J~ipan
is to have much. chance of competing or even working in
conjunction with the large international oil firms in
developing new sources of supply.
Because industry opposition probably would prE~clude
legislative action, the ministry will try to persu~ide
companies to cooperate, using stockpile requirements as
leverage. Since each company will be obligated to main-
tain stocks proportionate to its productive capacii_y,
the financially weak will be forced to merge or go under.
JAPAN-CHITIA
With a view toward boosting sales to China, Tokyo's
Export-Import Bank has, after protracted negotiations,
formally approved its first loan to Peking in ten ~~rears.
The $30-million credit carries an annual interest :rate
of 5.5 percent and is repayable in five years. It will
help finance Peking's purchase of a 300,000-metric?-ton
ethylene plant, worth nearly $50 million. Japanese com-
mercial banks will finance part of the remaining c~~sts
at 8-percent interest.
Over $80 million in other Exim Bank loans to .Peking
are due for final approval this year. These credits
will help finance the purchase of two more chE~mical
plants, a fertilizer plant, and a thermal powf~r plant,
having a total value of some $130 million. More loans
are likely to be approved next year.
Japanese exports to China, although relativelX
small, are growing rapidly. Sales totaled over $1 bil-
lion in 1973 and are likely to reach $1.5 billion this
yearn Japan has run a small surplus in its trade with
China, but large imports of Chinese crude oil will prob-
ab ly reverse this trend by the end of the decade, unless
sales are substantially increased. With Exim Bank fi-
nancing now availab le to Japanese exporters, further
expansion of Japanese plant sales to China appears
likely ,
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National I ntelligence Bulletin September 25 , l9 74
Israel: The Israeli military command announced
that Israeli aircraft struck Arab guerrilla camps in
southeast Lebanon yesterday in a "preemptive" strike
aimed at foiling terrorist raids planned for the Yom
Kippur holiday. Press reports from Lebanon indicate
that six Israeli aircraft were involved in the attack,
which lasted about 15 minutes; there were no reoorts
Syria-USSR:
the US R wi egin to expand facilities at
e port of Latakia in Syria by the end of the year,
The project will double the number of berths to 12 and
expand cargo handling capacity to accommodate the large
flow of goods coming over the nearly completed 420-mile
rail line connecting Latakia. with northeastern Syria.
Port construction will take three years to comp:Lete,
Soviet participation in the project was arranged under
an economic agreement signed Burin President Asad's
visit to Moscow i.n April.
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25X1
25X1
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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