CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A026900010018-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 18
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
N2 641
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 7, 1974
CONTENTS
CHINA: Chou's health. (Page 3)
SOUTH KOREA - JAPAN: Seoul-Tokyo tensions high. (Page 4
ETHIOPIA: Government radio accuses Emperor of mishandling
funds. (Page 10)
ALGERIA-LIBYA-EGYPT: Algeria may seek rapprochement with
Tripoli. (Page 12)
VIETNAM: Military situation. (Page 15)
SOUTH KOREA: Pak strives for naval balance with North
Korea. Page 17)
OAS: Early removal of sanctions against Cuba foreseen.
Page 19)
UK-MBFR: London urges West to stand fast in MBFR nego-
tiations. (Page 24)
WEST GERMANY: Bonn contends it alone cannot cover other
EC members' deficits. (Page 25)
OPEC: Oil money to LDCs. (Page 27)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 28)
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I I
National Intelligence Bulletin September 7, 1974
The flurry of news reports from Peking Thursday night
that the health of Premier Chou En-lai had taken a dra-
matic turn for the worse has proved to be misleading.
This speculation. was fueled by press reports that several
high-ranking Chinese officials were summoned away from
a banquet hosted by the visiting US congressional dele-
gation. Actually, the Chinese leaders in question--two
Foreign Ministry officials who do not hold high positions
in the party--had explained in advance that they would
have to leave the banquet early.
Last Wednes ay,
Chou missed Mao's meeting with the visiting Togolese Pres-
ident, the first time the Premier has failed to attend
a meeting between Mao and a visiting head of state. How-
ever, there is no evidence at present that he has had
another acute seizure of the sort that idled him earlier
this summer.
Chinese media seem anxious not to alarm the populace
about Chou's condition. The official party newspaper
carried the Togolese President's wish for the Premier's
speedy recovery and a toast to his health. Vice Premier
Teng Hsiao-ping was careful to say he was hosting the
Togolese visitor on Chou's behalf, a formulation used
last spring when Chou first began to cut back on his
activities, but abandoned over the summer. In the past
few days, the media have carried a number of messages
to foreign governments signed by Chou, an obvious effort
to convey, the impression that the Premier is still func-
tioning.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
SOUTH KOREA - JAPAN
September 7, 1974
The government-sponsored raid yesterday morning on
the Japanese embassy in Seoul by a group of South Korean
youths and a large demonstration there early today--the
latest features of a continuing anti.-Japanese campaign
by South Korea--were probably triggered by recent
statements by Japanese Foreign Minister Kimura which were
regarded as provocative by the South Koreans. These inci-
dents are the most dramatic of a series of developments
likely to intensify growing strains in relations between
the two countries. There is a schedule of events--in
Japan, in North Korea, and in the US as well--which
seems likely to keep the tense relationship in the head-
lines for some time.
Foreign Minister Kimura's initial response to the
August 15 attempt to assassinate President Pak was viewed
in Seoul as unsympathetic. But over the past week, Kimura
has become the focus of South Korean anger because of
other statements which, in Seoul's view, cast doubt on
Japan's commitment to the security of South Korea and,
more important, on the continuing primacy of the South
in Japan's policy toward the two Koreas.
Seoul is pressing hard for redress from Japan in
the form of public statements and diplomatic actions,
including policy expressions from Prime Minister Tanaka
himself before he leaves, late next week, to visit
Brazil, Mexico, and Canada and to confer briefly on
September 21 with President Ford.
Other events will affect the situation, probably
adversely. A Japanese Socialist Party delegation ar-
rived in Pyongyang on September 5 and can be expected
to provide, from that platform, loud support for the
North Korean cause. There is also an anti-Pak campaign
under way in Japan which is pointed toward a massive
leftist rally in Tokyo on September 19. Problems in
Japan will be compounded by the expected arrival there
on October 2 of a high-level North Korean delegation to
attend a meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the
first time North Korea has participated in the work of
that body.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 7, 1974
Clerides met yesterday with he Turkish Cypriot
leader, Rauf Denktash, and the two set up arrangements
for the relief of prisoners and detainees on both sides.
Priority would be given to the sick and wounded, as well
as those under 18 years of age and those over 50.
The two leaders also agreed to exchange lists of
missing persons and make every effort to trace them.
In compliance with the Geneva convention, they agreed
to forward lists of prisoners and detainees to the In-
ternational Red Cross.
According to the US embassy in Nicosia, senior UN
officials are hopeful that Clerides and Denktash will
begin to examine political questions after a couple of
meetings on humanitarian and relief matters.
If representatives of Greece and Turkey can be
brought into the talks at that stage, UN officials hope
that it may be possible within a month to formulate the
outlines of an overall solution which could then be
ratified at a reconvened Geneva conference.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 7, 1974
The agreements on humanitarian problems came on the
heels of a comprehensive survey of conditions on the is-
land compiled by representatives of the Red Cross. The
report concludes that the Turks have failed to meet even
the minimum requirements of the Geneva convention.
It notes that the 20-25,000 Greek Cypriots in Turk-
ish-controlled areas have almost no freedom of movement
and lack food and medical attention. Most of the
35-40,000 Turkish Cypriots in the Greek side of the is-
land were found to be leading reasonably normal lives.
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I I
National Intelligence Bulletin
ETHIOPIA
September 7, 1974
According to press reports, the government radio
yesterday accused Emperor Haile Selassie of improperly
diverting public funds for his own purposes and of funnel-
ing large sums of money to members of the aristocracy.
Such charges would be the first accusations leveled di-
rectly against the Em~erpr by the military-controlled radio.
The broadcasts are probably designed to diminish
the Emperor's support in rural areas. Some members of
the military committee may be apprehensive over the pos-
sibility of clashes between the Emperor's traditional
rural supporters and those elements determined to deal
harshly with him. It is also ossible that the charges
may be designed
i-n fnrcc? the Emperor into exile 1n the near future.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 7, 1974
Algeria may be planning to improve its relations with
Libya in the near future in an effort to capitalize on
the recent Libyan-Egyptian rift and cause difficulties
for Cairo.
Relations between the two neigh hors have
en especially poor since last January when Libyan Pres-
ident Qadhafi angered the Algerians by the surprise an-
nouncement of his ill-fated merger agreement with Tunisia.
Algerian President Boumediene is unhappy with Egyp-
tian President Sadat's approach to Middle East peace
negotiations, especially Egypt's agreement to allow
Jordan, rather than the Palestinians, to negotiate for
the return othe West Bank. Boumediene, who has long
been a leading supporter of the Palestinians, fears such
an approach may be part of a move to avoid establishment
of a Palestinian homeland.
In a speech last month Boumediene asserted that
Arab solidarity depended upon an honest agreement to
help the Palestinians without "backstage tricks," an
apparent reference to the Egyptian-Jordanian agreement
last July. The Algerian President rejected a role for
Jordan in the current Middle East talks and insisted
that the Palestinian problem must be resolved by Egypt,
Syria, the Palestinians, and Israel.
For his part, Qadhafi would almost certainly welcome
an Algerian overture for improved bilateral relations.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 7, 1974
Battlefield action has lessened throughout the coun-
try during the past few days, but substantial fighting
probably still lies ahead.
The focus of present Communist attacks is still in
the northern provinces where North Vietnamese troops
are threatening government positions south of Hue; some
outposts on high ground several miles south of the city
have been lost. Although this area has been the scene
of repeated and somewhat inconclusive combat since last
spring,
the North Vietnamese may try to rollow
up their latest successes and make a major push toward
Hue
One of the purposes of the Communist attacks may
have been to force just such a shift of government
forces. The government units involved had been on opera-
tions designed to recover ground lost earlier to the
enemy in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai. With their logistic
position substantially improved since the cease-fire,
the Communists are now apt to attempt such whipsaw ef-
forts against the government with greater frequency and
impact.
North and west of Saigon, a new round of Communist
attacks is still expected in September. Government
positions near Tay Ninh cit and north of Bien Hoa cit
are likely targets.
The Communist strategy in the Tay Ninh area appears
to be to gain new footholds relatively close to the city
and along key logistic routes from Saigon. The Commu-
nists would then be in a position to harass these routes
during their next military campaign and to bring sub-
stantial pressure on the relatively populous areas nearby.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 7, 1974
The weather still is a factor in determining both
the level and the location of military action in Vietnam.
Heavy rains are under way in the central highlands and
will start next month along the northern coast. On the
coast, this period initially favors the Communists be-
cause the cloudy conditions hamper government air opera-
tions but will not deter ground action until the rains
increase. In the southern half of the country, where
weather conditions will soon begin to favor air opera-
tions and troop movements, the government's capabilities
should improve gradually.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 7, 1974
SOUTH KOREA
President Pak seems determined to counter Pyongyang's
current naval superiority and achieve an eventual naval
balance between the two countries. Thus far, his efforts
have met with only limited success.
Seoul has been actively seeking an anti-ship missile
system for some time. South Korea's first choice, the US
Harpoon system, which has a range in excess of 30 nautical
miles, will not be available until 1977. Negotiations to
purchase missiles from both France and Norway apparently
became snagged when Seoul concluded it would not receive
the missiles quickly enough. In July, a US firm con-
tracted to supply the shorter range Standard missile as
an interim system to be installed aboard four South
Korean patrol boats. Test firing for the missile is not
scheduled until next August.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 7, 1974
Latin American governments on both sides of the is-
sue foresee the early removal of OAS sanctions against
Cuba, probably at an inter-American foreign ministers
meeting at Quito on November 11.
Even governments still hostile to the Castro regime
have come to believe that a point has been reached where
holding to the crumbling sanctions policy only furthers
Castro's goal of destroying the OAS. Panama's recent
resumption of relations with Cuba brought to seven the
number of OAS members that now have diplomatic ties with
Cuba. The sort of defiance of the Rio Treaty, under
which the sanctions were imposed, has heightened con-
cern for the continued integrity and clout of the OAS.
Widespread. Latin sensitivity about outside inter-
ference in matters of national policy leaves the anti-
Castro forces in a somewhat awkward position of ob-
structing sister republics that obviously want to open
the door to Cuba.
Governmental changes in Washington, moreover, have
added to the anxiety. Many are nervous that the US
will alter its Cuban policy and leave the few dedicated
anti-Castro governments diplomatically isolated.
The sponsors of a review of the sanctions policy
have been careful to couch their rationale in terms of
a changed world situation and a spirit of detente.
They recognize a continuing difference of opinion
within the OAS regarding the Cuban subversive threat.
For this reason, as well as to avoid provoking Castro
by holding his government up to judgment, they hope to
sidestep any discussion of whether Havana is continuing
to export revolution.
Using the coexistence argument, the sponsors are
confident that they can, in the absence of a strong
diplomatic counterattack, secure the necessary two-
thirds vote of the 23 OAS members. They expect that a
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 7, 1974
number of the governments that once constituted a block-
ing one third plus one (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Haiti,
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, and the US) will now de-
cide to abstain.
The Castro regime can see no benefit to a reactiva-
tion of its suspended OAS membership and, despite Castro's
stated interest in reconciliation with the US, the Cubans
want no part of the OAS. They reject it as a tool of
the US for suppressing Latin America and will continue
to work toward its destruction. They would prefer to
secure further diplomatic recognition in defiance of
standing OAS sanctions' so as to weaken the organization.
The debate and disposition of the Cuban case will
affect the new dialogue between the US and Latin Amer-
icans--an exchange very much in the testing stage.
Those governments advocating a new attitude toward Cuba
would be gratified to see the US yield to their views;
if the US maintained firm support of the sanctions, they
would gravely doubt its flexibility on other issues.
The countries that have supported the sanctions
along with the US, particularly Brazil and Chile, are
more anxious to test US willingness to consult and
would be slow to forgive a surprise US change of heart.
A sense of betrayal would color their attitudes toward
the US for a long while.
All Latin American governments would be pleased
to have the OAS rid of the contentious sanctions prob-
lem so that other pending questions can be grappled
with.
A number of political and economic questions re-
main unanswered: Is the OAS--particularly an OAS with-
out Cuba--a useful instrument for inter-American coop-
eration? Are informal meetings of foreign ministers a
more serviceable vehicle for dialogue? Do the Latin
Americans need or want a separate council excluding the
US?
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 7, 1974
The foreign ministers of OAS states are set to meet
in March 1975, and an OAS General Assembly is to follow.
Next spring, too, a new secretary general of the OAS
must be elected, a task which will help focus Latin
American attention on what kind of future they would
like for the inter-American system.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 7, 1974
British officials remain skeptical that there will
be much progress when the force reduction talks resume
in Vienna later this month. They also continue to advo-
cate that the West make no concessions before the Soviet
side does.
In a conversation with a US embassy official on
September 4, Sir John Killick, a deputy undersecretary
in the Foreign Office, stated that he takes a dim view
of the prospects for progress in Vienna. Killick, whose
views are shared by other Foreign Office officials,
doubts that the Soviets will be more forthcoming in the
negotiations until there is a "successful" conclusion to
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Most Western participants at the Vienna talks agree
that the Soviets have established a connection between
the two sets of talks, and that Moscow will not offer
concessions in Vienna until the security and cooperation
talks in Geneva conclude with a summit-level meeting.
Earlier this week, Moscow again called for a summit meet-
ing before the end of this year.
Killick, like other British officials, suggested
that the West should hold fast to its present position
when the talks resume, and advocated that the West offer
no concessions until the Soviets show a willingness to
end the impasse in Vienna. He also made a strong plea
that the US consult with the other Western participants
if the US intends to offer new ideas to get the talks
moving.
Killick gave the impression that London still wants
joint US - British - West German talks concerning the
nuclear aspects of MBFR. West German officials also de-
sire another round of trilateral talks. The British and
West Germans wish to discuss how and when the West should
introduce the nuclear element into the talks, the weapons
and delivery systems to be included, and the concessions
the West should attempt to get from the East in return
for offering to remove its nuclear wea ons.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 7, 1974
WEST GERMANY
Bonn is contending that economic and political fac-
tors prevent it from single-handedly covering the deficits
of other EC members for an extended period. It feels
strongly that international action is needed to cope with
payments problems such as those confronting Italy.
With backing from Bonn, an EC-guaranteed loan to
assist hard-pressed countries now appears possible, but
the amount of the loan will fall far short of that needed
to finance EC member countries' deficits. Finance
Minister Apel thus sees no alternative to meeting each
problem on a case-by-case basis, which means that Bonn
is not ruling out future bilateral German credits to Italy
or other EC countries with financial problems as a sup-
plement to multilateral action.
To the extent that Bonn is willing to extend credits
to deficit countries, it will do so partly out of concern
that problems in other European countries are beginning
to affect German exports, the only source of recent eco-
nomic growth. Fear that Rome would impose further import
restrictions affecting German goods may have been an
additional factor in Chancellor Schmidt's favorable deci-
sion last week to lend Italy $2 billion; the loan is
secured by a portion of Rome's gold holdings. Bonn is
in a strong financial position--$35 billion in reserves
and an expected $11-billion current account surplus this
year--to shore up demand for its exports by assisting
other EC countries' economies. Finance Minister Apel
nevertheless doubts that German credits will be adequate
tcs meet the needs of Italy and possibly other EC members.
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Estimated Bilateral Aid Pledged to Less Developed Countries
her
Pakistan,
0&
India
Algeria.
Other
North `'?
Vietnam
aS%a
"
Vndon_
=SDtdh Vietnam
Western Europe Kuwait
Saudi
Arabia
-c'emmtttee
United States
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 7, 1974
Major oil exporters are, for the first time, playing
a major role in supplying economic aid to developing states.
During the first half of 1974, members of the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries pledged $5.4 billion of
a total of $13.4 billion in aid committed worldwide to the
less developed countries.
Western nations and Japan remain the Third World's
principal source of bilateral aid, but their new com-
mitments of $6.1 billion accounted for less than half
the total.
Multilateral institutions, largely the World Bank and
the International Development Association, have added at
least $2 billion to the $13.4-billion figure.
Iran provided one half of the oil exporters' total.
Its commitment of $2.6 billion makes Iran a donor of equal
rank with the US, although in some cases US aid is provided
on easier terms. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia extended about
$1 billion and $700 million, respectively.
Forty percent of the oil producers' aid was allocated
to Egypt and Syria. Another 35 percent went to India and
Pakistan.
The aid'to Egypt and Syria was largely grants for war
reconstruction and development. Aid to other states was
largely for agriculture and industry. Only a small part,
possibly as little as 5 percent, was to help the less de-
veloped countries cope with the high price of petroleum.
The enormous commitments of the oil producers provide
opportunities for Western industrial sales of technical
expertise, equipment, and institutional support. The size,
geographic concentration, and emphasis on project aid of
the oil exporters will almost certainly cause Western
donors to re-examine the scope and magnitude of their aid
programs.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 7, 1974
Mozambique: An accord giving Mozambique a transi-
tional government and early independence is scheduled
to be formally signed early today in Zambia, according
to press reports. Samora Machel, head of the Front for
the Liberation of Mozambique, and Portuguese Foreign
Minister Soares reportedly worked out the final details
last night. The agreement is expected to provide for a
transitional government to rule until next June, when
Mozambique will become fully independent. Portugal is
to appoint a high commissioner, and a prime minister
will be named by the rebel front, which will hold two
thirds of the cabinet posts in the new government.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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