NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A026800010018-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: July 27, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
Top Secret
27 July 1974
N2 631
DIA review(s) completed.
State Dept. review
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 27, 1974
CYPRUS: Turkish forces continue to increase their
hold on Nicosia-Kyrenia corridor. (Page 1)
GREECE: Defense Minister fears possible counter-
coup. (Page 4)
USSR: Supreme Soviet meets, elects government.
(Page 5)
PORTUGAL: Subcabinet members appear to have been
chosen for their competence rather than their poli-
tics. (Page 6)
USSR - SOUTH YEMEN: Moscow pledges military aid to
Aden. (Page 9)
USSR-BALKANS: Increased air and rail activity in
Balkans leads to speculation of Soviet buildup in
Bulgaria. (Page 10)
IRAN-ITALY: Shah may add Italy to Iran's growing
list of European aid recipients. (Page 12)
FRANCE: Justice Minister Lecanuet assesses Giscard's
legislative support. (Page 13)
BOLIVIA: Banzer attempts to defuse opposition.
Page 15)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 17)
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Mandria
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MEDITERRANEAN SEA
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July 27, 1974
Turkish forces yesterday continued to extend their
hold on the Nicosia-Kyrenia corridor, pushing westward
from Kyrenia on the coast and northwestward from Nicosia.
By evening, they had taken Myrtou, thereby, seizing con-
trol of the second major road between Nicosia and Kyrenia.
The Turkish push eastward toward the besieged Turk-
ish Cypriot enclave at Chatos apparently stalled when
it came up against a UN contingent. There were no re-
ports of firing between the Turks and the UN force.
The remainder of the island was quiet. UN offi-
cials report that Turkish Cypriot forces appear to have
surrendered to Greek Cypriots in all the larger enclaves
except Famagusta and the eastern portion of the Chatos
enclave.
In Nicosia, President Clerides again stated that
he could no longer restrain his National Guard forces
if Turkish troops continued to advance into Greek Cyp-
riot areas. He said that his diplomatic initiatives
to the Soviet Union, as well as to the US, the UN, and
the three guarantor powers, had been to no avail in
stopping the Turkish advances. Possibly warning of re-
prisals against the residents of Turkish Cypriot vil-
lages now held as virtual hostages by the National
Guard, Clerides said the consequences of continued cease-
fire violations would fall heavily on Turkish Cypriots.
Despite these harsh words, Clerides appeared to be
in a conciliatory mood and stressed that he was not
setting a time limit. In fact, his government appears
ready to accept Turkish gains over the past week, and
perhaps even a somewhat greater Turkish expansion west-
ward, if the situation can be stabilized.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 27, 1974
Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash, while obviously
relishing his strengthened position, also seemed con-
ciliatory in his attitude toward Clerides.
Meanwhile, the Cypriot government has called for an
emergency meeting of the UN Security Council to consider
continued Turkish cease-fire violations. A meeting was
scheduled for yesterday, but after a three-hour delay it
was postponed until today to await possible developments
at the Geneva talks.
The peace talks in Geneva came very close to break-
ing down yesterday. Greek Foreign Minister Mavros
threatened to walk out of the conference, and the after-
noon session was canceled. Mavros and Turkish Foreign
Minister Gunes agreed late last night to discuss their
differences again this morning.
The future of the talks appears to hinge on the
outcome of this meeting and on the British determination
to keep the negotiations on track. Foreign Secretary
Callaghan spent the afternoon and evening in a series
of private discussions with Mavros and Gunes. According
to press reports, Gunes presented Callaghan with mili-
tary and political proposals calling for a separate con-
ference to deal with the restoration of constitutional
order on Cyprus and maintenance of the cease-fire along
present lines.
The differences in Geneva seem to center on dis-
agreement over the terms of the cease-fire resolution.
The resolution, originally drafted before the Turkish
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July 27, 1974
invasion, called for withdrawal of foreign military
personnel. At that time, this reference was directed
at the Greek officers in the Cypriot National Guard.
The Greeks interpret the resolution, however, as
a mandate for the withdrawal of the Turkish troops which
have landed on Cyprus since the invasion began on July
20. The Turks favor a broader interpretation of the
resolution linking the cease-fire to a political set-
tlement. F7 I
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July 27, 1974
Greek Defense Minister Averoff fears that some mil-
itary leaders may be plotting to overthrow the Karamanlis
government, possibly as early as July 27, and has asked
for strong US intercession in support of the new civil-
ian government.
Many military officers, particularly lower echelon,
no doubt disagree with the decision this week to turn
over the government to civilians. Some of them are con-
cerned that the government may seek to punish those re-
sponsible for the repressive measures of the past seven
years.
Meanwhile, Karamanlis completed the selection of
his cabinet yesterday. The cabinet consists of center-
right politicians and technocrats and includes some in-
dividuals imprisoned by the previous military regime.
Karamanlis also took steps to limit further the
power of Ioannidis. The military police, which Ioanni-
dis apparently still heads, has been restricted to se-
curity matters and may no longer engage in politics.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 27, 1974
The newly elected Supreme Soviet convened on July
25 for its opening session. On the basis of the party
Central Committee's recommendation delivered by General
Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, the Supreme Soviet re-elected
Nikolay Podgorny chairman of its Presidium and Aleksey
Kosygin, chairman of the Council of Ministers. All min-
isters, including embattled Minister of Culture Yekaterina
Furtseva, retained their posts.
The only organizational change announced by the
new Supreme Soviet thus far was the creation of stand-
ing commissions in both of its houses to supervise pro-
duction of consumer goods. The move emphasizes the
continued interest of the leadership in improving the
consumer sector of the economy.
First Deputy Premier Mazurov and Kazakh First Sec-
retary Kunayev were not among the leaders listed as at-
tending the opening session, but both were reported
present for the second day. Kunayev has been ill and
was unable to make his election speech in person last
June. Mazurov missed the Nixon-Brezhnev summit as well,
as he was on an official visit to East Germany and then
went on vacation in Yugoslavia. Mazurov was re-elected
to his post as first deputy chairman of the Council of
Ministers, however, and there has been no sign that he
is in political trouble.
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PORTUGAL
July 27, 1974
Prime Minister Goncalves' choices to fill the 26
subcabinet posts suggest that he was motivated by a de-
sire to appoint competent individuals who will get the
country moving again, rather than by political consid-
erations.
The Communists appear to have retained only one
representative--.Secretary of State for Labor Carvalhas,
who was reappointed. He is believed to be a Communist, al-
though there is no recent information on his affiliation.
The exclusion of the Communist-dominated People's Demo-
cratic Movement from the government suggests this coali-
tion may soon disappear. because of growing disenchant-
ment on the part of the Socialists and centrists.
The Socialists have at least four representatives
in the subcabinet: the foreign affairs, housing, edu-
cation, and justice posts. The liberal technocrat
group that existed in pre-coup days-- the Society for
the Study of Economic and Social Development--has sev-
eral representatives.
The group of 26 is almost exclusively male, largely
in the 30-40 age group, and technically trained. Ten
are engineers or architects, two are military, and most
of the remainder are lawyers. None is nationally promi-
nent, and many were active in circles opposed to the
old regime. Some were even arrested by the former re-
gime on charges---perhaps trumped up--of communist ac-
tivities.
Two subcabinet positions are still vacant--the
newly created under-secretary slots in the ministries
of internal administration (interior) and mass communi-
cations.
Some of the new appointees
I Imay turn out to be Communists or
Socialists, but their numbers are not sufficient to
shift the balance of power in the new government clearly
to the leftists.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 27, 1974
Moscow has apparently promised Aden additional mili-
tary aid.
A communique marking the end of the visit to the
USSR last week by the general secretary of the South
Yemeni National Front stated that "measures were outlined
to strengthen the defense capability of South Yemen."
Moscow, Aden's primary source of arms and training,
probably made the commitment in part to allay Adeni con-
cern both over Iranian military involvement in crushing
the South Yemeni - supported rebellion in Oman and over
the intentions of the new regime in North Yemen. The So-
viets, as they have several times in the past, probably
cautioned against any rash action.
In the communique,. the two countries expressed sat-
isfaction with their relations and took special note of
Moscow's contribution to the economic development of
South Yemen. Agreements on economic, technical, and
cultural and scientific cooperation were also signed
during the visit.
Aden's praise of Soviet economic assistance may
have been more for effect than a reflection of true
feelings. Comments by Adeni officials indicate that the
country has not been very pleased with the extent of So-
viet economic aid. Indeed, Aden has recently sought as-
sistance from Arab and Western states to help bolster
its declining economy. With this in mind, the Soviets
probably reaffirmed their continuing assistance to Aden's
economic development.
The visit and the signing a short time before of
the Soviet-Somali Friendship Treaty indicate the Soviets'
continuing strong interest in the area. As the reopening
of the Suez Canal comes closer to achievement, Moscow
appears to be attempting to consolidate its foothold in
the Gulf of Aden area. The Soviets undoubtedly want to
forestall any expansion of Iranian, Egyptian, and Saudi
influence in the area.
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975A026800010018-5
July 27, 1974
Air and rail activity in the Balkans during the
past two weeks has prompted speculation that the USSR is
covertly introducing military forces into Bulgaria.
Although there has been some unusual air transport ac-
tivity near Budapest, there is no information from in-
telligence sources to substantiate a Soviet buildup in
Bulgaria.
NATO attaches in Hungary first noticed an increase
in flight activity near Budapest on July 11. They re-
ported "streams" of aircraft--mostly turboprop trans-
ports--flying at altitudes of 6,000 to 8,000 feet in the
corridors near the city at the rate of 20 to 30 aircraft
per day, considerably more than normal levels.
The attaches speculated that the Soviets could be
using these transports to fly Soviet troops to a point
somewhere in the Balkans, possibly Bulgaria, but the
relatively low altitude of the aircraft suggests they
did not have a destination far outside Hungary. A num-
ber of these aircraft have been observed going toward
Yugoslavia and Romania, and at least 30 were seen flying
into Romania on Thursday.
One line of speculation concerning the flights
sees the Soviets as seeking to intimidate the Greeks by
making a show of force near the Greek border. If that
were the Soviet intention, however, it could more easily
be accomplished by other means, such as open movement
of Bulgarian tank brigades and motorized infantry divi-
sions to the border. US attaches in Sofia who made a
thorough tour of Bulgaria last weekend found no evidence
of Soviet troops there.
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Attaches in Sofia report that a low-level alert
seems to be in effect among some Bulgarian units, and a
few units apparently have taken up positions near Bul-
garia's borders. Bulgarian aircraft have conducted re-
connaissance flights near the borders of Greece and
Turkey. With two of Sofia's neighbors on the verge of
war since July 15, Bulgarian reactions appear to be
within the bounds of normal precautionary moves.
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The Shah of Iran now appears somewhat more willing
to provide financial assistance to Rome.
The Shah recently extended loans to London and Paris,
but only a few weeks ago he categorically refused to
assist Italy, which he considered a poor financial and
political risk. Now he says that he may help if he is
given an assurance that the government will not share
power with the Communists.
Italy's dominant Christian Democratic Party could
probably provide such a guarantee. Although its recent
responses to Communist overtures have lacked the final-
ity of earlier rejections, the party is still clearly
negative to including the Communists in the government.
The Communists, moreover, appear reluctant to accept
coalition membership under present circumstances.
If the Shah's attitude continues to soften, aid
may take the form of some prepayment for a $3-billion
deal an Italian state company recently concluded with
Iran. The prepayments could occur as interest-bearing
deposits, as they did in Iran's deal with France.
The agreement with the Italian company covers con-
struction of industrial plants in the Bandar Abbas re-
gion in southern Iran. Plans include construction of
rolled steel plants with a capacity of around 3 million
metric tons and a thermoelectric power plant that can
produce 550 megawatts. Also included in the deal are a
methane pipeline, a desalinization plant, a railroad,
and a shipyard.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 27, 1974
Justice Minister Jean Lecanuet early this week
frankly discussed with the US ambassador his views on
some of the problems faced by President Giscard's sup-
porters in consolidating their political control.
Lecanuet said Gaullist influence in the National
Assembly would have to be "liquidated" before a solid
Giscardian majority could be created. The Gaullists
presently control about 183 of the 490 seats. Lecanuet
considers it doubtful that Giscard could gain the un-
qualified support of all the Gaullist deputies. Interior
Minister Poniatowski, Giscard's right-hand man, told the
ambassador on July 23 that the President now can generally
count on the support of all but 20 to 25 "irreducible"
Gaullist deputies.
Both men expect the President to call legislative
elections in 18 to 24 months, and both link his chances
of winning a solid new majority to the health of the
economy and progress on social change. The new majority
desired by Giscard's followers would leave only the hard-
core Gaullists and the Socialist-Communist coalition in
opposition,
Lecanuet indicated that Giscard hopes to eventually
rally some Socialists to the government. He cited the
recent appointment of Secretary of State Francoise
Giroud as an example of "bridge-building" to the moder-
ate left.
The Justice Minister added that the government's
immediate political problem is to block former-foreign
minister Jobert's efforts to build a center-left move-
ment. Lecanuet said he personally believes Jobert must
be taken seriously, despite widespread skepticism in
French political circles about his chances. Jobert is
trying to carve out a political niche for himself by
appealing to the nationalism, anti-Americanism, and
radicalism of a small but influential segment of the
public. The Justice Minister believes Jobert will try
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 27 , 1974
to unite these elements and force an election before
the Giscard forces are able to reduce to a minimum the
number of seat's the hard-.core deputies can wino Lecanuet
said he is personally attempting to head off Jobert by
trying to rally the center-left to himself.
Lecanuet added that his centrist party will retain
its separate identity for the near term, but that it
will eventually join a confederation with Giscard3s
Independent Republicans and other centrist groups. In
conclusion, he said that he did not foresee a major
cabinet shuffle before the next legislative election,
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 27, 1974
President Banzer has taken additional steps to im-
prove his sagging position with the military, in the wake
of the attempt last month to oust him. He has also prom-
ised his opponents a share in the government by reaffirm-
ing his intention to hold elections next year.
The President has reportedly proposed a 70-percent
raise in military pay for all ranks. Such an increase
could ease the immediate pressure on Banzer but would
seriously strain the country's financial resources. It
would also cause future problems, both political and fi-
nancial, when other groups began to press for equivalent
increases.
Despite these efforts, Banzer is unlikely to suc-
ceed in eliminating serious opposition to his adminis-
tration.
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PRC-Ja__n__: The Japanese Foreign Office announced
on July 24 that a military attache' exchange agreement
has been reached with China. Tokyo is already seeking
Peking's approval of the appointment of an army colonel,
and a Japanese newspaper claims the mutual exchange will
occur "shortly." With Sino-Japanese shipping talks
stalled, and discussion on a new fishing pact recently
recessed until this fall, Tokyo and Peking may use the
military attache agreement to indicate that both sides
are continuing to push for improved relations.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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