TESTIMONY BY GENERAL VERNON WALTERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000700100002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 68
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 3, 1973
• Content Type: TRANS

11~~ p1~ -~ I~ STAT
RADIO TAppl~o ti FQ 21Pa(sJ%FS/07/01: CIA-RDP91-00901 -
4435 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016, 244-3540
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM Senate Watergate Hearings
August 3, 1973 9:30 AM
STATION WMAL TV
ABC Network
Washington, D.C.
TESTIMONY BY GENERAL VERNON WALTERS
FRANK REYNOLDS: The Senate Watergate Committee is about"
to hear from another very high-ranking member of the intelligence
community, Lieutenant General Vernon Walters, Deputy Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
.General Walters has a well-deserved reputation for speaking
clearly in several different languages. He has served as an interpre-
ter for President Truman, President Eisenhower and President Nixon
in conversations with foreign leaders, but the Watergate Committee
will be most interested today in his version of conversations with
John Ehrlichman, H. R. Haldeman, John Dean and L. Patrick Gray,
for it was General Walters who apparently was assigned by the White
House to discuss with Gray, then the Acting Director of the FBI,
the concern of the White House that an all-out FBI investigation
of the Watergate affair might lead to some secret operations of
the CIA.
General Walters has written a number of memos about these
conversations, memos that already have been filed with a subcommittee
of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and the Watergate Committee
will no doubt have many questions for hiiii about his written recollec-
tions of all those meetings.
John Dean testified that General Walters was selected
by the White House to carry on negotiations with Patrick Gray because
Walters was considered a good friend of the administration, who
had been placed in the CIA in order to give the White House r,iore
control over the agency. Dean testified that when he told John
Eh rl i chrian that General Wal ters was not wi l l i ng to implicate the
CIA in the Watergate affair, that Ehrlichman responded by saying
something to the effect that General Walters seems to have forgotten
how he got where he is today.
I f the committee is able to finish taking testimony from
General Walters at a reasonable hour today, it wi l l then move on
to the next witness, L. Patrick Gray, the one-time Acting Di rector
of the FBI, the man who John Ehrlichman once told John uean, "Well,
I think we ought to let him hang there, let him twist slowly, slowly
in the w i R~proved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
So both witnesses today can be extremely interesting,
as well as informative.
My colleague, Sam Donaldson, is standing by outside the
Caucus Room in the Old Senate Office Building....
SAM DONALDSON: Senator Weicker is going to, of course,
question General Walters this morning along some of the same lines
of questioning that he took with Director Helms yesterday, which
would be in a counterattack, really, to the questioning that Weicker
expects from Senator Baker. That may be a little confusing, but
you remember yesterday, Senator Baker kept making the point that
Director Helms ought to have investigated after the Watergate burglary
because there were so many people who had CIA connections and there
was so much, Baker said, CIA footprints all through, not only Water-
gate, the Ellsberg affair, because of the CIA's help to Hunt.
Weicker maintains it was not really the CIA's affair
to investigate the burglary on the 17th of June, and that was properly
the FBI's affair.
REYNOLDS: Wel I , we're going to hear a great deal about
the meetings of June 23rd -- that was the meeting at the White
House with Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Helms and General Walters. And
then on that same day, General Walters went to see Pat Gray, apparently
at the request -- the order -- of H. R. Haldeman, to talk to him
about possibly limiting the FBI's investigation for fear that it
might uncover some secret operations of the CIA.
DONALDSON: Yes. Helms said yesterday that at that meeting,
Mr. Haldeman didn't ask whether there was any covert CIA operation
in Mexico that might be uncovered -- ,you" 11 remember that it was
through Mexico that eventually we discovered money was channelled
to Bernard Barker's bank account -- iiixon campaign money. But
Haldeman didn't ask about that. He simply said General Walters
is to go and tell Pat Gray that the FBI -- Helms said not stop --
but at least reduce and be very careful in its investigation of
the things in Mexico. And Helms said that he told General Walters,
"All you say to Gray is that if you discover any CIA operation,
come tell us about it."
REYNOLDS: Well, you know, although the CIA has insisted
that it -- made it very clear that the CIA operations could not
in any way be compromised by a flat-out investigation, there are
still some i nteresti ng points raised in some of the mer,ioranda filed
by General Hal tens . For example , his conversation with Pr= Gray
on tine 23rd, that first talk -- I'm quoting from his memo now.
"Gray then said that this was the riost agj,,j,rard matter to come up
during an election year and he would see what he could do about
it. I repeated," -- this is General Halters saying -- "I repeated
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
that if the investigations were pushed South of the Border, it
could trespass on some of our covert projects, and in view of the
fact that the five men involved were under arrest, it would be
best to taper off the matter there."
That does sound as though General Walters was advancing
the idea that maybe they ought to go slow.
DONALDSON: That's right. And General Walters perhaps
will repeat that on the witness stand -- table today, which is
not exactly what Helms yesterday said he told Walters to say.
I think there's another contradiction that may be of some importance.
General Walters recalled that fir. Haldeman said that it was the
President's wish that this be done. Mr. Helms yesterday, who at
the moment, you know, is Ambassador to Iran, a post he assumed
after leaving the directorship of the CIA, said he doesn't remember
the President's name being invoked.
There's the gavel.
[Swearing in of General Vernon Walters]
SENATOR SAM ERVIII: General, suppose you give us your
full name and address for the purposes of the record.
GENERAL VERNON A. WALTERS: My name is Vernon Walters --
Vernon A. Walters. I am the Deputy Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. I am at the present time Acting Director until Mr.
Colby is sworn in after having been confirmed by the Senate. And
I live in Arlington, Virginia.
SENATOR ERVIN: Thank you, sir.
GENERAL WALTERS: I'm a lieutenant general in the United
States Army.
SAMUEL DASH: General Walters, how long have you had
the position as Deputy Director of the CIA?
GENERAL WALTERS: Since the 2nd of May, 1972 was the
day I was sworn in.
DASH: Prior to obtaining that position, what position
did you have?
GENERAL WALTERS: I was the Defense Attache to France.
DASH: And how long were you in that position?
GENERAL WALTERS: Four and a half years.
DASH: Now, prior to your joining the CIA, could you
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
just briefly tell us what contacts, if any, you'd had with the
President of the United States, President Nixon?
GENERAL WALTERS: My first contact with President Nixon
was when he was Vice President. I was detailed to accompany him
on a trip around South America. I went to eight countries with
him and served as his interpreter and translator and aide at that
time. In two of those countries, I was in the car with i?1r. Nixon
when extreme violence was encountered, mob violence. And if I
were to tell this committee that I did not feel admiration and
respect for the courage and calmness Mr. Nixon showed at that time,
I would not be telling you the whole truth.
Subsequently, I saw -- I did not work for fir. Nixon again.
During the period between the time he left the Vice Presidency
and the time he became President, I saw him perhaps two or three
years -- two or three times in those eight years. After he became
President, I went on two or three of the trips abroad he took to
countries where I spoke the language and could translate for him.
I have not had any private conversation with the President since
I became Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, that
i s , since Hay 2nd.
DASH: Did you, shortly, actually, after you became Deputy
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency -- did you attend a
meeting at the White House with Hr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrl i chman and
Director Helms on June 23, 1972?
GENERAL WALTE RS: Yes, I did.
DASH: Could you tell us how that meeting was arranged?
GENERAL WALTERS: During the morning of the 23rd of June,
I received a phone call -- I do not recall exactly how -- telling
we that I was to be there at Hr. Ehrl i chman's office on...
DASH: You say you received a telephone call.
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes.
DASH: From whom?
GENERAL WALTERS: I do not know whether I received it
personally or my sccrenry received it just stating that I was
to be at Hr. Eh rl i chwan's office with iir. H- lr,:s -- it may have
come from -,r. Helms' secretary -- at one-thirty that afternoon.
Hr. Helms and I went downtown. We did not know what the subject
of the meeting was. We had lunch tocether, and at one-thirty we
went to Hr. Ehrl i chman's office.
DASH: All right. molt, will you, to the best of your
recollection, relate the discussion that was had at that meeting.
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000700100002-1
By the way, who could you say actually was doing most of the talking
at the meeting?
GENERAL WALTERS: I be -- Mr. Haldeman was doing nearly
all of the talking. I do not recall 1-'1r. Ehrl i chman actually partici-
pating actively in the conversation.
DASH: All right. Now, would you relate to the committee
what Mr. Haldeman said and what you or Mr. Helms said?
GENERAL WALTERS: Mr. Haldeman said that the bugging
of the Watergate was creating a lot of noise, that the opposition
was attempting to maximize this, that the FBI was investigating
this and the leads might lead to some important people. And he
then asked Mr. Helms what the agency connection was. And Mr. Helms
replied quite emphatically that there was no agency connection.
And Mr. Haldeman said that nevertheless, the pursuit of the FBI
investigation in Mexico might uncover some CIA activities or assets.
Mr. Helms said that he had told Mr. Gray on the previous day, the
Acting Director of the FBI, that there was no agency involvement,
that none of the investigations being carried out by the FBI were
in any way jeopardizing any agency activity. Mr. Haldeman then
said, nevertheless, there is concern that these investigations --
this investigation in Mexico may expose some covert activity of
the CIA, and it has been decided that General Walters will go to
Director Gray -- Acting Director Gray -- and tell him that the
further pursuit of this investigation in Mexico -- and I wish to
emphasize that the only question of investigation involved was
Mexico -- the investigation in Mexico could jeopardize some assets
of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Again Mr. Helms said he was not aware of any activity
of the agency that could be jeopardized by this.
Mr. Haldeman repeated, nevertheless, there is concern
that the further pursuit of this investigation will uncover some
activity or asset of the CIA in 1exi co, and it has been decided
that you will go and tell this -- addressed to me -- you will tell
this to Acting Director Gray.
DASH: Well, now, Mr. Walters, could it have been that
Mr. Haldeman asked you or fir. Helms to go to Mr. Gray and to first
inquire at the CIA whether or not there might be some problem with
the CIA if there was an investigation in Mexico, rather than saying
'it was decided that you should go?
GENERAL WALTERS: I do not recall it being put in a question
form. It was put in a directive form.
DASH: In other words , you understood that to be a direction.
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
GENERAL WALTERS: I understood that to be a direction.
And since Mr. Haldeman was very close to the top of the governmental
structure of the United States, and as Mr. Helms testified yesterday,
the White House has a great deal of information that other people
do not have, I had been with the agency approximately six weeks
at the time of this meeting. I found it quite conceivable that
Mr. Haldeman might have some information that was not available
to me.
DASH: And you did not feel it appropriate at that time
to inquire of Mr. Haldeman why it was that he was directing you
to go to Mr. Gray and tell that to Mr. Gray?
GENERAL WALTERS: No, I did not. If I had felt there
was any impropriety in this request, I would have given him the
same answer I later gave Mr. Dean, that I would resign rather than,
do it.'
DASH: Did you wonder why it was that Mr. Haldeman said
it was decided that you, General Walters, should go to see Mr.
Gray, not Director Helms?
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, I did. A number of hypotheses
crossed my mind. I thought perhaps he thinks I'm military, and
a lot of people have the mistaken belief that military obey blindly.
I thought he might have heard reports that there had been some
friction in the past between the FBI and tine CIA, and perhaps since
Mr. Gray was new in the job and I was new in the job, that that
might be a good way to start out. I did wonder about it, but I
didn't -- this was his privilege to do it any way he wished.
DASH: General Walters, did there come a time when you
put in writing, in the form of a merorandum, your recollection
of that meeting on June 23, 1972?
GENERAL WALTERS`: There did, Mr. Dash, five days later.
When this thing started -- I do not habitually keep memoranda of
my conversations. However, when on Tuesday, the following Tuesday,
Mr. Dean put the question to me -- or he didn't put the question,
but explored the possibility of the CIA going bail and paying the
salaries of the suspects who were i n jail, I realized it was time
for me to start keeping a record. So following that second meeting,
on the 27th, I sat down and I wrote i ;iemoranda for myself. They
were not intended to be a verbatim account of the conversation
or to cover all aspects of the conversation, but notes to jog my -
own- memory. I wrote a memorandum on th 4 meeting with 11r. Haldeman
and Mr. Eh r1 i chman. I wrote a memorandum on the meeting with 11r.
Gray. I wrote a memorandum on my first r'teeti ng with 11r. Dean on
Monday the 26th, and a memorandum of my second meeting wi Vh 11r.
Dean on the 27th. On the 28th I met with 1-1r. Dean for the third
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
and last time, and I wrote a memorandum, I believe, the following
day. On the subsequent memoranda, namely, my calls on Mr. Gray,
I wrote those memoranda either on the same day that I had the talk
with Mr. Gray, or the following day.
If I may, I would like to make one point clear. I have
been alleged to have a splendid memory and so forth, and here I
must make a confession that I'm afraid will not fit in with it.
Mr. Helms was quite right in his testimony yesterday in that the
question regarding bail and paying the salaries of these people
came up on Tuesday. When I reviewed my notes and before I worte
the affidavit, I did correct this in my affidavit, namely, that
the the request regarding bail was...
DASH: General Walters, we'll get close to that, and
I think you can restate that when I ask you about the meetings
with Mr. Dean. I want to show you a copy we have of a memorandum,
purportedly from you, or written by you on June 28th, covering
the June 28th third meeting, and ask you if this is a correct copy
of the memorandum.
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, Mr. Dash, it i s .
DASH: Mr. Chairman, may that copy be marked as an exhibit
and introduced?
SENATOR ERVIN: Without objection on the part of any
committee member, it is ordered that this copy be marked appropriately
as an exhibit and received in evidence as such.
DASH: Now, General Walters, after you left the meeting
with Mr. Hal deman and Mr. Ehrli chman , did you leave it with Director
Helms, former Director Helms?
GENERAL WALTERS: I did. We walked downstairs and we
stood and talked close to the car, out in the West Executive Avenue,
and Mr. Helms said to me, You must remind Mr. Gray of the agreement
between the FBI and the CIA that if they run into or appear to
be about to expose one another's assets, they will notify one another,
and you should remind him of this."
DASH: And then what did you do?
GENERAL WALTERS: I do not recall whether I went back
to the agency or not. I don't think time would have allowed it
because the appointment had been made to see Mr. Gray at 2:30.
My recollection is not clear on this, whether I went back to the
agency or whether I stayed downtown. I have a feeling I stayed
downtown. And at 2:30, I went to see Mr. Gray.
DASH: Was Mr. Gray, by the way, expecting your visit?
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
my visit.
GENERAL WALTERS: Mr. Gray, I believe, was expecting
DASH: How do you know that?
GENERAL WALTERS: I believe he has subsequently testified
that 11r. Dean had told him that I was on my way down.
DASH: All right now, would you briefly relate, to your
best recollection, what conversation you had with Mr. Gray at that
tine? This was on June 23rd, 1972.
GENERAL WALTERS: I said to Mr. Gray that I had just
come from the White [louse where I had talked to some senior staff
members, and I was to tell him that the pursuit of the FBI investina-
tion in Mexico, the continuation of the FBI investigation in Mexico
might uncover some covert activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency. I then repeated to him what Mr. Helms had told me about
the agreement between the FBI and CIA, and he said he was quite
aware of this and he intended to observe it scrupulously.
DASH: Now, cid you tell him who gave you the direction
GENERAL WALTERS: I did not. I told him I had talked
to some senior people at the White House.
DASH: Now, did you -- was that the sum and substance
of that conversation? bid fir. Gray say anything?
GENERAL WALTLFS: Probably so. We expressed pleasure
at meeting one another. I had been intending to call on him, and
so forth, and anything else that occurred will, I believe, be covered
in the memorandum which is in your possession.
DASH: I think you've testified that you also, on June
28th, included a rneniorandum of the meeting with Mr. Gray on June
23rd, and I'd like to show you a copy of the memorandum and ask
you if this is a correct copy and does cover the testimony you've
just given?
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, it is a correct copy.
DASH: Mr. Chai rman , may that memorandum be r: iarked as
an exhibit....
flow, after you met wi th 1r. Gray, di d you return to your
offices at the CIA?
GE'4EE:AL Wl,I. T I:RS: Yeas, I did.
DDASH: And did you make a report of that meeting to former
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
Director Helms?
GENERAL WALTERS: I did. And I also started to check
on whether this was a fact. I talked to the people at our geographic
area that handles Mexico, and I'm not sure whether this was complete
on the Friday afternoon or whether it was completed Monday morning,
but it was soon clear to me that nobody who was responsible for
that area in the agency felt that the ongoing FBI investigation
could jeopardize any of the agency's s ources or activities in Mexico.
DASH: Well, now, did you subsequently receive any communi-
cation from anybody at the White House, after June 23rd?
GENERAL WALTERS: On Monday morning, the 26th of June,
I received a phone call from a man who identified himself as John
Dean, and he said he wished to speak to me about the matters that
Mr. Haldeman and Hr. Eh rl i chman had discussed with me on Friday.
I did not know Mr. Dean, and I expressed something to the effect
of "I don't know who you are." And he said, "Well, you can call
F'ir. Ehl i chman to see whether it's all right to talk to me or not.
DASFI : Did you call Mr. Eh rl i chman?
GENERAL WALTERS : I called Mr. Ehrl i chman. I had some
difficult in reaching him, but finally I reached him and I said,
"A Mr. John Dean wants to talk to me about the matters which I
discussed with Mr. Haldeman on the preceding Friday." And he said,
"Yes, it's all right to talk to him. He's in charge of the whole
matter."
DASH: All right. Did you then meet with Mr. Dean?
On that day, the 26th?
GENERAL WALTERS: I then called l1r. Dean again and he
asked me to come down and see him, I believe, at 11:30 or 11:45.
I believe it's indicated or, the memorandum I wrote.
DASH: All right. Would you relate to the committee
the conversation you had with jr. FDean at that time, on June 26th,
1972?
GENERAL WALTERS: Hr. Dean said that he was handling
this whole matter of the Watergate, that it was causing a lot of
trouble, that it was very embarrassing, the FBI was investigating
it, the leads had led to some important people. It might lead
to some more important people. The FBI was proceeding on three
hypotheses, namely, that this break-in had been organized by the
Republ i can ilati onal Comnii ttee , by the Central Intelligence Agency,
or by someone else. 'Whereupon I said, "I don't know who else organized
it, but I know that the Central Intelligence Agency did not organize
i t. I said, "Furthermore, I " I related to i,my conversation
with Hr. Dean -- Mr. Hal d c m an and IIr. E h r 1 i chman on the previous
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
Friday, and told him I had checked within the agency and found
that there was nothing in any of the ongoing FBI investigations
that could jeopardize CIA activities or sources or compromise them
in any way in Mexico.
Ile then said, "Couldn't this have happened without your
knowledge?" Well, I said, Originally, perhaps, but I've inquired.
I've talked to Mr. Helms, and I an, sure that we have no part in
this operation against the Democratic National Committee."
He kept pressing this. "There must have been. These
people all used to work for the CIA." And all of this thing.
did it."
I said, "Maybe they used to, but they weren't when they
And he pressed and pressed on this, and asked if there
wasn't some way I coulc help. And it seemed to me that he was
exploring, perhaps, the option of seeing whether he could put some
of the blame on us. It wasn't any specific thing he said, but
the general tenor was in this way. And I said to him -- I did
not have an opportunity to consult with anybody. I simply said,
1r. Dean, any attempt to involve the agency in the stifling of
this affair would be a disaster. It would destroy the crcdibl i ty
of the agency with the Congress, with the nation. It would be
a grave disservice to the President. I will riot be a part to it,
and I am quite prepared to resign before I do anything that will
implicate the agency in this matter."
This seemed to shake hire somewhat. I said anything that
would involve any of tr:ese government agencies like the CIA or
the FBI in anything imp roper in this way would be a disaster for
tie nation. Somewhat reluctantly, ne seemeu to accept this line
of argument, and then I left.
DASH: Genere.l Walters , since you :lad made the check
prior to seei ng [1r. De n, concerning whether in fact any FBI investigation
in Mexico would seriously or not serf ousy involve any covert activities
of the CIA, and you reported that to in. Dean at this meeting,
did you believe that yc.u were responding at that meeting, then,
to the concern that you had received at the earlier meeting from
the statement from Hr. Hal deiman?
GENERAL WALTE:i S: Yes, Mr. Dash, I did. And at the risk
of perhaps seeming naive in retrospect, it did not occur to me
at that time that Fir. Lean would not tell Mr. Gray, since Iir. Gray
had told me he was in touch wrwi th Mr. Dean; i r. Dean had told sae
he was in touch with iHir. Gray. In retrospect, I should, of course,
have called Mr. Gray directly. I regret that I did not.
DASH: And you had oeen informed by M,r. E:hrlichman, when
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
11
you checked as to whether you should talk to Mr. Dean, that Mr.
Dean was a person you could talk to, that he was handling the matter,.
GENERAL WALTERS: That is correct.
DASH: Now, I think when you were testifying just a
little while ago, you said that you may have incorrectly put in
your memorandum of the June 26th meeting something that should
have been at another meeting. I want to show you your memorandum,
or a memorandum that appears to be a memorandum prepared by you
on June 28th, dealing with the conversation you had with Mr. Dean
on June 26th, and ask you if you want to make a correction as to
that memorandum for the record. You'll notice, General Walters,
that there is an excised portion of that memorandum, which has
been cut out. On our receipt of that, that appeared to be matters
which dealt with national security and therefore was excised.
GENERAL WALTERS: I'm very appreciative of the committee
for doing this. Yes, it does. If I were to make a correction,
it's somewhat complicated. It would really be that one, two, three the fourth paragraph, the sixth and seventh paragraphs belong to
the conversation of the 27th, rather than the conversation of the
26th.
DASH: And that dealt with the question of bail money
from the CIA.
GENERAL WALTERS: That is correct. This is a correct
DASH: It is a correct copy, though, of the memorandum.
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, it is.
DASH: Mr. Chairman, could we have that memorandum marked
as an exhibit....
Now, after that meeting with Mr. Dean on June 26th, did
you report back to former Director Helms?
GENERAL WALTERS: I did. I told Mr. Helms what had generally
-- what had transpired, and he approved of my firm stand with Dean,
and I related in some detail the various things that I had discussed
with Mr. Dean and the fact that I had told MM1r. Dean that no agency
assets would be compromised by the pursuit of the FBI investigation
in Mexico.
DASH: I think you mentioned earlier that you did again
.meet with Mr. Dean. When did you next meet with Mr. Dean?
GENERAL WALTERS: On the following morni rig, the 27th
of June, I received another telephone call from Mr. Dean summoning
me down to his office. I went down to Mr. Dean's office -- I believe
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
12
the time is indicated in the memorandum, 11-11:30.
DASH: I think 11:45.
GENERAL WALTERS: 11:45. And Mr. Dean said that the
investigation was continuing, that some of the suspects were wobbling
and might talk. And I said, "Well, that's just too bad, but it
has nothing to do with us because nothing that they can say can
implicate the agency." So he again said, "Haven't you discovered
something about agency involvement in this matter?" And I said,
"No, I have not discovered anything about agency involvement in
this matter." And he said, "Isn't there something that the agency
can do to help?" I said, "I don't see how we can be helpful."
And then he said, "Well, would there be any way in which you could
go bail or pay the salaries of these defendants while they're in
jail?". And I said, "No way. To do so would implicate the agency
in something in which it is not implicated. I will have no part
in this."
Again I went through the reasoning of the appalling effect
it would have. I made plain to him that if the agency were to
intervene in this, it would become known in the leaking atmosphere
in Washington, that it would be a total disaster.
And I would like to say, if I may, at this point that
I have not spent the whole of my adult life in the Central Intelligence
Agency. I joined it for the first time in May of 1972. But I
am convinced that an effective CIA is essential if the United States
is to survive as a free and democratic society in the rough world
in which we live. And I was determined that I would not see it
destroyed or implicated, as might be desired, in this business.
I further told Mr. Dean that when we expended funds, covert funds
within the United States, we were required to report this to our
congressional Oversight Committees, and this seemed to cool his
enthusiasm considerably.. We had a few more discussions and at
the end he asked me if there was anyway we could be helpful, and
I said no, we could not. be.
DASH: Did you, by the way, on the meeting on the 28th
of June -- have you a copy of your memoranda wi th you?
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, I do. This is the meeting of
the 28th or the memorandum written on the 28th?
DASH: No, the meeting of the following day, the meeting
you've just testified to, on the 28th.
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, I do.
DASH: Yes. First let me show you your copy of the memoran-
dum you prepared on June 29th of your meeting on June 27th, and
ask if this is a correct copy of that meeting.
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000700100002-1
13
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, it is.
DASH: Mr..Chairman, if we can have that marked for identi-
fication and received....
All right. Now, General Walters, the very next day it
appears that you had another meeting with Mr. Dean.
GENERAL WALTERS: That is correct.
DASH: By the way, did you report to former Director
Helms on your 27th meeting?
GENERAL WALTERS: Mr. Helms was extremely interested
in this whole business, and I reported to him immediately on returning
to the agency on each occasion.
DASH: Now, on the 28th is when you began to write these
memoranda. Is that right? Could you then tell the committee what
caused you to begin to put this down in writing?
GENERAL WALTERS: Well, as soon as he broached the question
of bail and paying the salaries of these defendants, I realized
that for the first time, this was a clear indication that something
improper was being explored, and I discussed this with Mr. Helms,
and we agreed. Again, I don't know whether he or I suggested that
we write the memoran -- that I write the memoranda on these meetings
and keep a record of them. And that is how the memoranda came
to be record. It will be noted that I wrote five of them, practically
on the same day, to catch up with the past.
DASH: Yes. All right now, the meeting on the 28th,
it appears, was a fairly significant meeting because it was a follow-
up again to that third meeting that you had with Mr. Dean. Do
you have a copy of that memorandum?
Walters?
GENERAL WALTERS: Of my meeting on the 28th? Yes, I
DASH: Prepared on June 29th.
GENERAL WALTERS: That's correct. I do have it.
:;ASH: Would you read that memorandum in full, General
GENERAL WALTERS: "On the 28th of June, at 11:30, John
Dean asked nae to see him at his office in the Executive Office
Building. I saw him alone. Ile said that the Director's meeting --
that is, Director Hel nmis' meeting -- "with Patrick Gray, FBI Director,
was cancelled and that John Ehrlichman had suggested that Gray
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
14
deal with me instead. The problem was how to stop the FBI investiga-
tion beyond the five suspects, leads to two other people, Ken Dahlberg
and a Mexican named Gayna (?). Dean said that $89,000 was unrelated
to the bugging case and Dahlberg was refusing to answer questions.
Dan then asked hopefully whether I could do anything or had any
suggestions. I repeated that, as Deputy Director, I had no indepen-
dent authority. I was not in the channel of command, and had no
authority other than that given to me by the Director. The idea
that I could act independently was a delusion and had no basis
in fact.
"Dean then asked what might be done, and I said I realized
he had a tough problem, but if there were agency involvement, it
could be only at presidential directive and the political risks
that were concommitant appeared to me to be unacceptable. At present,
there was a high explosive bomb, but intervention such as he had
suggested would transform it into a megaton hydrogzen bomb. The
present caper was awkward and unpleasant. Directed intervention
by the agency could be electorally mortal if it became known, and
the chances of keeping it secret until the election were almost
nil. I noted that scandals had a short life in Washington and
other new spicier ones soon replaced them. I urged him not to
become unduly agitated by this one.
"He then asked if I had any ideas, and I said that this
affair already had a strong Cuban flavor. Everyone knew the Cubans
were conspiratorial, anxious to know the policies of both parties
would be towards Castro. They therefore had a plausible motive
for attempting this amateurish job which any skilled technician
would deplore. This might be costly, but it would be plausible.
"Dean said that he agreed this was the best tack to take.
It might cost a half a million dollars. He also agreed for the
second time that the risks of agency involvement were unacceptable.
After a moments thought,, he said that he felt that Gray's cancellation
of his appointment wit-iii Director Helms might well be reversed in
the next few hours .
"Dean thanked me and I left."
DASH: First, General Walters, what was this meeting
to be held on June 28th which was cancelled?
GENERAL WALTERS: I did not know, Mr. Dash. I did not
know what he was talking about. Ipresumed that some arrangeru -
outside of me had been made for Director Helms to see Mr. Gray.
DASH: But in any event, as your memorandum shows, that
Mr. Ehrlichman had indicated that he had preferred that Gray meet
with you on an ongoing basis.
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
15
GENERAL WALTERS: This is what Mr. Dean said to me.
DASH: Now, could you tell the committee what your impres-
sion was concerning that part of your memorandum where you say --
well, you say this might be costly -- concerning a Cuban conspiratorial
plot, and Dean's statement that he agreed that this was the best
tack to take, but it might cost a half a million dollars?
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, Mr. Dash. Dean went back at this
point in the conversation, as I remember it, to the three hypotheses,
and he was sort of saying, "Who could have done this? Who could
have done this?" He did not indicate at any time that he knew
where the origin of this was.
Quite frankly, at this point my principal purpose was
to divert him from pursuing the option of involving the agency
in this. I had read, I believe about that time, an article in
the newspaper which put out a hypothesis that the Cubans might
have been at the origin of this in order to try and find out what
the policies of the Democratic Party would be if it were elected
in 1972. This is what I basically said to Dean, that the Cubans
had a plausible motive for doing this.
Mr. Dean obviously understood this as a suggestion of
mine that he should try and blame the Cubans. In retrospect, as
so often's been said here from this table, I should have corrected
him. Frankly, I was so relieved at seeing him apparently abandoning
the idea of involving the agency, or at least retreating on the
idea of involving the agency, that I did not correct his impression
when he said he obviously thought I was suggesting he could buy
the Cubans.
DASH: Would that be the inference that Mr. Dean's statement,
it might cost a half a million dollars, would require actually
paying somebody off in order to take this position?
GENERAL WALTERS: I believe so, but I would like simply
to state that just as I believed agency involvement could not be
hidden, false implication of the Cubans could not be sustained.
I should have corrected Mr. Dean at this point and said this is
not what I was meaning. I was advancing a theory, but I did not.
DASH: Now, General Walters, I'd like to -- you've read
your memorandum, and I have an exact copy of the memorandum here.
I'd like to show it to you, dated June 29th, covering your meeting
with Mr. Dean on June 28th, and ask you to look at it and indicate
if this is a copy.
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, it i s .
DASH: Mr. Chairman, may I have this memorandum marked
as an exhibit....
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
16
Now, did you receive, General Walters, a call from Mr.
Gray on July 5, 1972?
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, Mr. Dash, I did at ten minutes
to six in the evening.
DASH: And could you tell us briefly what that call was
GENERAL WALTERS: I believe that Mr. Gray said to me
at this point that the pressures were mounting to continue the
investigation, and that unless he received a written letter from
Mr. Helms or from me to the effect that the further pursuit of
this investigation in Mexico would uncover CIA assets or activities,
he would have to go ahead with the investigation. I did not wish
to discuss this with Mr. Gray over the telephone. I told him I
would come down and see him the first thing the next morning.
This was at the end of the business day. It was at ten minutes
to six in the evening.
DASH: And did you go down the next morning and see him?
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, I did.
DASH: Would you briefly tell the committee what the
nature of your conversation was with Mr. Gray at that time?
GENERAL WALTERS: I told Mr. Gray right at the outset
that I could not tell him, and even less could I give him a letter,
saying that the pursuit of the FBI's investigation would in any
way jeopardize CIA activities in Mexico. I told him I had to be
quite frank with him. I recounted the meeting with Mr. Haldeman
and Mr. Ehrlichman. I told him that I had seen Mr. Dean on three
occasions, that I had told Mr. Dean what Mr. Dean had told me.
Mr. Gray seemed quite disturbed by this and we both agreed
that we could not allow our agencies to be used in a way that would
be detrimental to their integrity.
Since I am discussing what someone else said, I would
like to refer here to my memorandum. Now, this memorandum, unlike
the others, was written, I believe, on the same day that T saw
Mr. Gray.
DASH: Yes, would you refer to the memorandum and read
what you want from it, General Walters?
GENERAL WALTERS: Well, I think basically this was it.
I said I could not give him a letter to this effect, I could not
tell him this, and I could not give him a letter to the effect
that further investigation would compromise assets of the CIA.
He said he understood this. He himself had told Ehrlichman and
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
17
Haldeman that he could not possibly suppress the investigation
of the matter. Even within the FBI there were leaks. He had called
in the components of, his field office and chewed them out for these
leaks. I said the only basis on which he and I could deal with
absolute frankness, and I wished to recount my involvement in the
case.
I told him of the meeting at the White House with Mr.
Helms. I did not mention Haldeman or Ehrlichman's name. -I told
him that I had been directed to tell him that the investigation
of this case further in Mexico could compromise some CIA activities.
Subsequently I had seen Mr. Dean, the White House counsel, and
told him that whatever the current implications -- unpleasant impli-
cations of the Watergate were, that to implicate the agency would
not serve the President, would enormously increase the risk to
the President. I had a long association with the President and
was desirous as anyone of protecting him. I did not believe that
a letter from the agency asking the FBI to lay off this investigation
on the spurious grounds that it would uncover covert operations
would serve the President.
Such a letter in the current atmosphere of Washington
would become known and could be, frankly, electorally mortal.
I said, quite frankly, that I would write such a letter only on
direction from the President and only after explaining to him how
dangerous I thought this action would be to him, and if I were
really pushed on this matter, I would be prepared to resign.
Mr. Gray thanked me for my frankness. He said he could
not suppress this investigation within the FBI. He had told Mr.
Kleindienst this. He had told Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman
that he would prefer to resign but that his resignation would raise
many questions that would be detrimental to the President's interests.
He did not see why he or I should jeopardize the integrity of our
organization to protect some middle-level White House figure who
had acted imprudently. He was prepared to let this go to Ehrlichman,
to Haldeman or to Mitchell. He felt that it was important that
the President should be protected from his would-be protectors.
He had explained to Dean, as well as to Haldeman and Ehrlichman.
He's explained this.
Finally, I said that if I were directed to write a letter
to him saying the future investigation of this case would jeopardize
the security of the United States and covert operations of the
agency, I would ask to see the President and explain to him.the
disservice I thought this would do to his interests. The potential
danger to the President of such a course far outweighed any protective
aspect it might have for other figures in the White House, and
I was quite prepared to resign on this issue.
Mr. Gray said that this was a very awkward matter for
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
18
us to come up at the outset of our tenure. He looked forward to
goad relations between our two agencies. Thanked me for my frankness,
and that was it.
DASH: All right. General Walters, I'd like to show
you a copy we have of your memorandum of July 6th covering your
meeting with Mr. Gray on July 6th and ask if this appears to be
a correct copy.
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, it does.
DASH: Mr. Chairman, may we have this exhibit marked
and received in evidence....
Now, General Walters, did there come a time shortly after --
several days after -- that you met with Mr. Gray again -- Acting
Director Patrick Gray?
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, I did.
DASH: Could you tell us the purpose of that meeting
and what was discussed at that time?
GENERAL WALTERS: We had been passing...
DASH: by the way, when was this?
GENERAL WALTERS: It was on the 12th of July, Mr. Dash.
In the meantime, the CIA had been cooperating fully with the FBI
investigation, passing them all the material we had on these former
employees of ours, and any other matters that were of interest
to them. We were continuously passing them memoranda, and I believe
that on this day I was still Acting Director. Mr. Helms was in
Australia or on his way back from Australia. And, as I recall
it, I gave him another memorandum on this date, covering various
things that had been brought out, that we had given Hunt -- concerning
the assistance given to Hunt, which had been terminated in August
1971.
DASH: Now, during this meeting with Mr. Gray, did Mr.
Gray tell you that he had received a call from the President?
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, he did.
DASH: C o u l d you read that part o your memorandum where
he discussed that call?
GENERAL WALTERS: He said last Friday -- I beli4v,c that
may have been the day of my previous conversation with him. -
do not have a calendar in front of me. This was written on the
12th. It was the preceding Friday -- he had received a phone call
from the President. The President had called him to congratulate
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
19
him on the FBI action which had frustrated the airplane hijacking
in San Francisco. Towards the end of the conversation, the President
asked him if he had talked to me about the case. Gray replied
that he had. The President then asked him what his recommendation
was in this case. Gray had replied that the case could not be
covered up. It would lead quite high, and he felt the President
should get rid of the people who were involved. Any attempt to
involve the FBI or the CIA in this case would only prove a mortal
wound -- and then I put in brackets, he used my words," because
these were the words I had used in talking to Mr. Gray.
The President then said then I should get rid of whoever
is involved, no matter how high. Gray replied that this was his
recommendation. The President asked what I thought, and Gray said
that my views were the same as his. The President took it well
and thanked Gray.
In all fairness, I must say that Mr. Gray did tell me --
I did not put it in here -- that the President had told him to
go ahead with his investigation. Do you wish me to go on reading,
Mr. Dash?
DASH: Does that complete Mr. Gray's statement to you
concerning his call from the President?
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, it did. We again philosophized
some more, as is shown in the memorandum concerning the need for
the President to be protected from his would-be protectors.
DASH: All right. General Walters, I'd like to show
you your memorandum of July 13th , which deals with this meeting
with former Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray, and ask if this
is a correct copy.
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, it is.
DASH: Mr. Chairman, may we have this memorandum marked
as an exhibit and received in evidence....
Now, General Walters, did you have occasion on July 28th,
1972 to call on Mr. Gray again?
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, I did.
DASH: And could you tell us briefly what the purpose
of that visit was?
GENERAL WALTERS: Briefly, I came down to give him additional
information, for which he had asked, relating to one of our people
who had been in contact with Hr. Hunt during August of 1971 . I
gave him additional data concerning this and concerning contacts
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
20
with Mr. Hunt. I believe they are identified in the memorandum.
Towards the end of the conversation, Gray asked me -- and I am
here reading -- if the President had called me on this matter,
and I said that he had not. Gray then said that a lot of pressure
had been brought him on this matter, but he had not yielded.
I can't read my... There's very poor reading here.
But anyway, anything to destroy the integrity of our two agencies
would be the worst disservice we could do to the President, and
I would not do it. He said that he would not either.
Then he made some reference to money, which was not totally
clear to me. I then told him that we would terminate a phone which
we had which had been a number that had been given to Hunt to contact
us two or three years before. And he then said, "This is a hell
of thing to happen to us at the outset of our tenure in our respective
offices." And I very heartily agreed.
DASH: Now, did this refer to -- did you know what this
reference to Mr. Hunt and any assistance that had been given Mr.
Hunt from the CIA was all about?
GENERAL WALTERS: As you know, Mr. Dash, all this occurred
a year and a half before I came to the agency. I really wasn't
familiar with it. The agency was continously passing to the FBI
material that was uncovered concerning this contact or assistance
to Mr. Hunt, I believe. One of the memoranda I took to f 1r. Gray
really summed up the whole series of shorter memoranda we had sent
him. And this was just an ongoing process. After this date, the
28th of July, I no longer participated in this process. It was
done directly through our liaison with the FBI, through Mr. Colby
and various others.
DASH: But I take it that the memorandum and the references
to the contacts with Mr.'Hunt related back to the prior year, July
'71...
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, they did.
DASH: ...meetings that General Cushman had with Mr.
GENERAL WALTERS: That is correct.
DASH: I'd like to show you a copy we have of your memoran-
dum dated July 28th, covering your meeting with Mr. Gray on that
same date, and ask if it's a correct copy. And you'll notice there
are some excisions there of names that were excised because of
security reasons -- national security reasons.
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes , i is as bad a Xerox copy as mi ne .
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
21
DASH: Mr. Chairman, may that memorandum be appropriately
marked and received in evidence....
Now, when was your next contact with anybody at the White
House, General Walters? Was this your last series of meetings?
I think you said from there on in the contacts with the CIA and
the FBI were taken up by somebody else.
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes. On this matter, certainly. Obviously,
in my job I attended meetings at the White House relating to foreign
policy and so forth that had nothing to do with this, in the meantime.
DASH: But did there come a time sometime later, and
could you tell us when, that you had another meeting or call from
Mr. John Dean?
GENERAL WALTERS: I did not have a call from Mr. John
Dean. I think Mr. John Dean had gotten my message loud and clear.
The next time he had business with the agency, he didn't call me.
He called the new Director, Dr. Schlesinger. I believe that was
on the 9th of February, 1973, if I am correct. And Dr. Schlesinger
has, I believe, submitted a memorandum for the record covering
this call from Mr. Dean. I was not in Dr. Schlesinger's office
when Mr. Dean called, and my only knowledge of this is the memorandum
and what Dr. Schlesinger told me about Dean's call.
DASH: And do you have a copy of that memorandum from...
GENERAL WALTERS: Dr. Schlesinger's memorandum?
DASH: Yes.
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, I do.
DASH: Let me -- can I show you a copy -- it's a February
9, 1973 memorandum, I think, which you're referring to -- and ask
you if this is a correct. copy.
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, it is. It, too, was made on the
same poor duplicating machine.
DASH: Could you briefly tell us what was the nature
of that contact that Mr. Dean had with Mr. Schlesinger?
GENERAL WALTERS: I believe he -- and here I go from
the (word unintelligible) memorandum. He referred to a package
of material that had been sent by the CIA to the Department of
Justice in connection with the Watergate investigation. He suggested
that Justice be requested to return this package to the agency.
The only item that would be left in Justice would be a card in
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
the files indicating that the package had been returned to the
agency, at its request, since the material in the package was no
longer needed for the purposes of the investigation. He indicated
that the agency had originally provided these materials to the
Department of Justice at the request of the Attorney General and
Mr. Howard Petersen. Then he referred to some IT&T documents,
which is unrelated.
DASH: Do you know -- although this was not your memorandum,
do you know what the package of materials is referred to here that
the agency had given to Mr. Petersen?
GENERAL WALTERS: I don't have personal knowledge of
it, Mr. Dash, but my understanding was it was all the written material,
and I believe also the photographs that had been taken with the
camera,, which is why it was called a package.
do you...
DASH: Under what circumstances? Taken with a camera --
GENERAL WALTERS: I believe when it was furnished to --
after it was furnished to Hunt by whoever used the camera at that
time.
DASH: Were you informed by Mr. Schlesinger of others
that this dealt with the Ellsberg matter?
GENERAL WALTE:RS: I don't believe Mr. Schlesinger was
familiar with the package. Mr. Schlesinger just -- incidentally,
I would like to say at this point that when Mr. Schlesinger came
to the agency in late January or early February, I did briefly
go over these various approaches that had been made to the agency
and to myself, so that he was generally familiar with the background
of this. I do not believe Mr. Schlesinger knew the details. I
do believe that he and I.agreed that for the agency to request
the Department of Just=ce to return these materials would simply
leave an arrow in the files pointing at Langley.
DASH: Either at that time or afterwards, have you been
informed as to whether the package of materials which you say,
either written materials and photographs, did deal with the attempt
to get information from Mr. Ellsberg's psychoanalyst?
GENERAL WALT17RS: I really do not know, Mr. Dash. As
far as I understand it, I understood the package to mean all of
the material that the agency had passed to the Department of Justice
from the beginning of the inquiry and all of the material, all
of the assistance, all of the equipment that had been given to
Hunt.
DASH: All right now, were you asked by Mr. Schlesinger
to take any action with regard to f-1r. Dean's request?
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
GENERAL WALTERS: Dr. Schlesinger and I discussed this
and. agreed the request was out of the question. Dr. Schlesinger
then asked me to go down and tell Mr. Dean this.
DASH: And did you?
GENERAL WALTERS: I did.
DASH: And could you tell us when did you meet with Mr.
Dean and have this discussion?
GENERAL WALTERS: When I called Mr. Dean, he was in Florida,
and it took me quite a while to get hold of him. I left word at
his office saying that I wished to be in touch with him, and I
finally got a call and an appointment was laid on, I believe, for
the 21st of February. On the 21st of February -- and this is a
very short memorandum. If the committee will bear with me, I'd
like to read it.
DASH: Why don't you read the memorandum.
GENERAL WALTERS: At the request of the Director, Dr.
Schlesinger, I called on Mr. John Dean at his office in the White
House at 1430 -- that's 2:30 in the afternoon. I explained to
him that in connection with his request that the agency ask the
Department of Justice to return a package of material that had
been sent to them in connection with the Watergate investigation,
it was quite impossible for us to request the return of this as
this would simply mean that a note would be left in the Department
of Justice files that the material had been sent back to the agency,
and we had been asked not to destroy any material in any way related
to this case. I again told him there was no agency involvement
in this case and that any attempt to involve the agency in it could
only be harmful to the United States.
He seemed disappointed, and I left.
DASH: Now, General Walters, I'd like to show you a copy
we have of your May 11th memorandum and ask if it's a correct copy.
Mr. Dash?
GENERAL WALTERS. May I say one word about this memorandum,
DASH: Oh, yes. Of course.
GENERAL WALTERS: I did not write a memorandum on this
conversation. In early May, Dr. Schlesinger, who was having a
thorough inquiry made into all the aspects.of this case, asked
me whether I had made a memorandum on it. I said I had not. He
asked me to make one, and that is the memorandum I wrote, which
was written some two months subsequently.
DASH: Now, may I show you the memorandum that you did
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
prepare on May 11th, 1973, at least our copy of it, and ask you
if it's a correct copy?
GENERAL WALTERS: It is.
DASH: Mr. Chairman, may we have that memorandum appropri-
ately marked and received in evidence....
Now, General tvalters, did there come a time, shortly
after, actually, you prepared that memorandum, when you put all
of the recollections you've had concerning your meetings in the
White House and with Acting -- former Acting Director Gray -- in
the form of an affidavit.?
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes.
DASH: Could you tell us the circumstances that led you
to put your recollections of these meetings and discussions you
had in the form of an affidavit?
GENERAL WALTERS: I was in the Far East in early May,
and when I came back, Dr. Schlesinger -- in fact, Dr. Schlesinger
called me back. He had asked anyone in the agency who had had
any connection with this case whatsoever to write an affidavit.
I did so, and those are the circumstances of the writing of the
affidavit.
DASH: And that affidavit does include, in substance,
all of the matters that you've testified here concerning your meetings
with the White House and with (Mir. Gray.
GENERAL WALTERS: 1o the best of my knowledge, it does.
DASH: Now, I show you a copy that you have of the affidavit
dated May 12, 1973, and ask you if it's a correct copy.
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, it is a correct copy.
DASH: Mr. Chairman, may we have that affidavit appropriately
marked for identification and admitted in evidence....
Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.
SENATOR ERVINN: Mr. Thompson.
FRED THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Walters,
as I understand it, it was your feeling that -- and is your feeling --
that on June 23rd you were being asked to, in effect, deliver a
message which would, in effect, limit the Watergate investigation
with regard to the Mexican part of it because of a possibility
of either compromising some covert Clii acitivities or CIA employees.
Is that correct?
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, it is.
THOMPSON: ' Well , now, it seems to me that the crucial
question is whether or not you were being told to deliver a message
to limit the investigation in any other respect. Were you or were
you not?
GENERAL WALTERS: I was not, Mr. Thompson.
THOMPSON: All right. Now, as of June the 23rd, did
you know the names of the people who had been apprehended inside
the Democratic National Committee Headquarters?
GENERAL WALTERS: I had read the names in the newspaper,
THOMPSON: Did you realize that Mr. McCord, for example,
was a former CIA employee?
GENERAL WALTERS: I believe I did know this, yes.
THOMPSON: Did you know Mr. McCord personally before?
GENERAL WALTERS: I did not.
THOMPSON: Did you realize that Mr. Hunt was a former
CIA employee?
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, I did.
THOMPSON: Did you realize that Mr. Sturgis was? Did
you realize that Mr. Martinez was still on retainer by the CIA?
GENERAL WALTERS: I don't believe I knew that he was
still on retainer at that time.
THOMPSON: Did you know that he had been on retainer
or an employee at any previous time?
GENERAL WALTERS: I believe that it came out within discussions
within the agency that these men had previously been employed by
the agency.
THOMPSON: Did you realize that Mr. Barker had been a
CIA employee in the past?
GENERAL WALTERS: I believe I knew that all of these
men that you've mentioned were...
THOMPSON : With regard to the Mexi can aspect , i f I remember
correctly, certain checks were, in effect, funnelled through, I
t!-,ink allegedly at this point, funnelled through Mexican banks
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
and they wound up in the bank account of Mr. Barker in Miami.
Have you since understood that to be the case, or allegations at
this stage?
GENERAL WALTERS: I have since understood it, but at
the time I was not aware of what the Mexican investigation was
pursuant to.
THOMPSON: I see. But you now realize that there were,
at least according to the best of your information, that there
were checks funnelled through a Mexican account, which I think
involved Mr. Ogario (?), whose name has been itmenti oned, which were
funnelled to the bank account of Mr. Barker in Miami and that some
of those funds from that account, I believe, were taken from some
of the defendants apprehended in the ONC. Is that correct?
GENERAL WALT.ERS: I'm aware of this, but I do not know
the details.
THOMPSON: All right. But you were not aware of that
at your meeting on June the 23rd.
GENERAL WALTERS: No, I was not.
THOMPSON: In regard to your memorandum of June the 28th,
which recounts your meeting on June the 23rd, I believe you've
stated, since writing that memorandum, in a covering note at the
time -- I believe this was submitted to the Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee -- dated May 1 8, that although there's a reference
in your memorandum of June 28 that Mir. Haldeman said it was the
President's wish that this be done, that you now believe that he
did not in fact say that. Is that...
GENERAL WALTERS: When I showed the memorandum to Mr.
Helms, he said it was not his recollection that the President's
name had been used. I did not correct the memorandum. The memoran-
dum was for my own personal use and I did not use it. I did not
feel strongly one way or the other about this. I'm not sure whether
Mr. Haldeman has testified to whether he used it or not.
THOMPSON: If you'll pardon me a minute, I'm skimming
your covering note dated May 18th. It's my understanding that
as of the time you wro".e the note that if you had to come down
on one side or another, as of that ti one, it was your belief that
he did not in fact say that. Would that Le correctly stated?
GENERAL WALTERS: I think that v;o.:1 d probably be correct.
GENERAL WALTERS: If I may, just for a second, :.:r. Thompson.
As I say, I do not have a strong recollection one way or th ether.
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
We were in Mr. Haldeman's office and presumably his power derived
from this. Mr. Helms said he didn't recollect it. I didn't recollect
it strongly enough to challenge Mr. Helms. I accepted Mr. Helm's
saying that no, he did not...
THOMPSON: Well, Mr. Haldeman has testified that this
matter was discussed with the President, so that's not really an
issue. It's really a matter of memory, I think, more...
GENERAL WALTERS: And I did not feel strongly enough
to challenge Mr. Helms' statement that he did not recall the name.
THOMPSON: All right. And you believe also that, according
to your testimony this morning, that the discussion of bail occurred
on Tuesday...
GENERAL WALTERS: Tuesday the 27th.
THOMPSON: ...the 27th. And I believe you have it here
in your conversation of the 26th. Is that correct?
GENERAL WALTERS: That's correct.
THOMPSON: So that would be an error in that regard.
GENERAL WALTERS: I had straightened it out in my affidavit.
THOMPSON: Yes, sir. I understand. Let me ask you this.
When you had this conversation on the 23rd, what time of day was
i t?
GENERAL WALTERS: I believe it was 1:30 in the afternoon.
THOMPSON: 1:30? And you...
GENERAL WALTERS: It was postponed, and I recall that
it was postponed either an hour or a half an hour.
THOMPSON: And then you had your meeting later that same
afternoon with Mr. Gray.
GENERAL WALTERS: About an hour later.
THOMPSON: At 2:30, I believe, according to your memorandum.
Do you recall about how long your meeting lasted with Haldeman
and Ehrlichman?
GENERAL WALTERS: Ten-fifteen minutes.
T110F1PSON : Iii d you go directly from your meeting with
Haldeman and Ehrl i chman to your meeting with Hr. Gray?
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
GENERAL WALTERS: I think I testified already, Mr. Thompson.
I don't really remember what I did. I don't think I would have
had time to go back *to the office. I know I separated from Mr.
Helms at this point, and he went back to the office.
THOMPSON: Where is the CIA office?
GENERAL WALTERS: It's way out at Langley. It's 8 or
9 miles out of Washington.
THOMPSON: You would have had to gone back 8 or 9 miles,
travel back in 8 or 9 miles to the Justice Department.
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes. As I recall it, I just killed
time downtown in Washington.
THOMPSON: But your memorandum states here that upon
leaving the White House, I discussed the matter briefly with the
Director. Upon returning to the office, I called Gray and indicated
there was a matter of some urgency, and he agreed to see me at
2:30.
So that evidently is incorrect. Would that be a...
GENERAL WALTERS. I would say it was perhaps incorrect.
I can't guarantee that it's incorrect. I may have driven straight
out and called from the office and driven straight back.
THOMPSON: What was your normal practice with regard
to following up meetings or particular events, which you participated
in, with memoranda?
GENERAL WALTERS: When I was an interpreter, I wrote
long memoranda, Mr. Thompson. Since I have been at CIA, generally
there is someone else present who makes note on the meetings.
These are the only memoranda for the record, I think almost, that
I wrote since I've been with the CIA.
THOMPSON: These that you've submitted to us are the
only ones that you've written since you've been there.
GENERAL WALTERS: That's right.
THOMPSON. I notice that the memoranda of the June 23rd
meeting was not written until June 28. Is that correct?
GENERAL WALTERS: That is correct.
THOMPSON : but when you started wri ti ng memoranda , they
became very prompt, I noticed. On the. July 5th meeting -- well ,
first of all, the June 28 meeting you wrote up June the 29th; July
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
5th meeting you wrote the same day; July 6th meeting you wrote
th same day; July 12th meeting you wrote the next day, the 13th;
the July 28th meeting you wrote the same day. What caused you
to start systematically writing memoranda of the events that were
taking place?
GENERAL WALTERS: Mr. Dean's exploration of whether the
agency could produce bail and pay the salaries of the defendants
while they were in jail.
THOMPSON: You refer in your memoranda dated July 6th,
1972 that you did not see why he, referring to Gray, or I should
jeopardize the integrity of our organizations to protect some mid-
level White House figures who had acted imprudently. Who were
you referring to?
GENERAL WALTERS: I don't think we had anybody specific
in mind. I certainly didn't know who might be behind this.
THOMPSON: Well, who were you dealing with that you might
consider mid-level at-the White House?
GENERAL WALTERS: The middle-level figure, I would say,
would be Mr. Dean, but there may have been other middle-level figures.
I did not know who these middle-level figures might be. I did
not know who was behind this.
THOMPSON: Would you consider Haldeman middle-level?
THOMPSON: What was your feeling with regard to Mr. Dean
when you were dealing with him, when you were talking about these
matters with him?
GENERAL WALTERS: At which point in the conversation?
THOMPSON: Well, start from the beginning. Start with
the first meeting you had with him on the 26th and tell us what
your thoughts were, based upon those conversations, as you began
to meet with him, what his interest might be.
GENERAL WALTERS: Well, I, first of all, was struck by
his insistence that the agency was in some way involved. He pursued
this with "Well, couldn't it have been without your knowing it?"
And, "Isn't there some way?" llrnd, "It must have been," and, "Look,
all these people used to work for the CIA." And so forth and so
on. This is the first thing that struck me -- his insistence on
trying to drag us into it, which made me think that he was exploring
this option, which is what made me tell him that I would resign
rather than have the agency to participate in any attempt to stifle
this.
THOMPSON: Did you conclude in your own mind that possibly
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
that some of the people directly involved might be working for
some of Mr. Dean's friends who were intermediaries?
GENERAL WALTERS: This thought did cross my mind.
THOMPSON: I don't believe I have any further questions,
Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
SENATOR ERVIN: Senator Montoya.
SENATOR JOSEPH MONTOYA: General Walters, you indicated
that you, and other witnesses have similarly indicated, that have
certain memoranda with respect to the investigation in-house at
CIA was given to the FBI. Am I correct in that statement?
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, Senator.
SENATOR MONTOYA: Would you tell us what was in that
particular memoranda or in any other communications to the FBI?
GENERAL WALTERS: I believe that most of these memoranda,
Senator, referred to matters that had occurred before I came to
work at the agency. There are, I believe, several memoranda in
the possession -- the memorandum, for instance, which I gave Mr.
Gray on the 6th containes a recapitulation of the various pieces
of information we had been steadily sending to the FBI, I believe
since the 20th of June.
indicate?
SENATOR MONTOYA: In capsule form, what did this memoranda
GENERAL WALTERS: I believe it indicated Hunt's call
to the agency, the equipment that had been furnished to him, and
so forth.
SENATOR MONTOYA: What kind of an investigation did you
conduct in-house after you were called to the White House for this
conference with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Eh rl i chman?
GENERAL WALTERS: I talked to the people in the agency
who were responsible for operations in Mexico, and it was through
them that I received the assurance that the FBI inquiries in Mexico
would not jeopardize or compromise any of the CIA's operations
in that area.
SENATOR MONTOYA: What kind of investigation did you
conduct with respect to the possible background and possible connection
of the defendants who had been arrested at the Watergate?
GENERAL WALTERS: I believe that kr. Helms ordered our
security and personnel people to provide all necessary information
to the Department of Justice and the FBI -- I'm sorry -- to the
FBI on this.
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
31
SENATOR MONTOYA: And did you, as a result of this investi-
gation, uncover the fact that Eugenio Martinez was on retainer
at that time?
GENERAL WALTERS: I believe we did, Senator.
SENATOR MONTOYA: And did you communicate this to the
Department of Justice and to people in the White House?
GENERAL WALTERS: I personally did not. A great deal
of communication was going on, Senator, between our personnel and
security people and the Department of Justice and the FBI. Whether
it was communicated to the White House or not, I am not in a position
to answer.
SENATOR MONTOYA: Were there any communications with
respect to this investigation delivered to the White House?
GENERAL WALTERS: I'm not aware of any, Senator.
SENATOR MONTOYA: Why did you omit this, in view of the
fact that you had been in contact with Mr. Ehrl i chman, Mr. Haldeman
and Mr. Dean? Didn't you feel that the White House should know
about the possible involvement of a man on retainer to the CIA
by the name of Eugenio Martinez?
GENERAL WALTERS: I believed that the FBI was being kept
fully informed, and I believed that the FBI would keep the White
House informed of the pursuit of this investigation.
SENATOR MONTOYA: Now, I'm not trying to cross you up
or anything like that, General Walters. I'm merely asking you
to see if you can recall whether or not anyone in CIA communicated
with anyone in the White House with respect to the in-house investi-
gation and what you uncovered with respect to these individuals.
GENERAL WALTERS: I personally have no knowledge of any
such communication, Senator. The FBI was the investigating body,
and, as I understand it, all the information that became available
to us was furnished to them.
SENATOR MONTOYA: Now, with respect to your conversations
with Mr. Gray, was there any wention made in your conversations
with him that possibly the information which you were imparting
to him might be communicated to the White House?
GENERAL WALTERS: No, sir. I thought it would be inappro-
priate for me to try and tell 1M1r. Gray how to run his agency.
SENATOR MONTOYA: Now, as you look back to the conversations
starting on June the 23rd and the subsequent conversations with
White House people, including Mr. Dean, is it your feeling, as
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
you look at this thing in retrospect, that the White House -- those
individuals with whom you talked -- were trying to use you for
some ulterior motive,?
GENERAL WALTERS: I would say I must draw a distinction
between the two contacts I had with two different people in the
White House. As I have testified earlier, I have no reason to
doubt that Mr. Haldeman might not have information to which I was
not privy that the further conduct of the investigation in Mexico
might jeopardize covert agency activities.
SENATOR MONTOYA: Are you being charitable there, General?
GENERAL WALTERS: Senator, I don't believe so. As I
testified earlier, if 1. thought that Mr. Haldeman was asking me
to do.something that was improper, I would have made the same threat
to resign to him that 1. did to Mr. Dean the first time Mr. Dean
made a suggestion I considered was improper.
SENATOR MONTOYA: How did you interpret the mandate which
he gave you to go to Mr. Gray and to tell Mr. Gray, when you had
no information, for you to tell Mr. Gray that an FBI investigation
in Mexico might endanger CIA activities?
GENERAL WALTERS: I interpreted this as meaning that
Mr. Haldeman had some information which I did not have. I would
like to go back to this tine and say that the idea of impropriety
or improper actions -- I had no reason to doubt the word of a very
senior official of the United States Governi.ient.
SENATOR MONTOYA: Did you think at that moment about
asking him what his background information night be, as a premise
for the directive or mandate which he had given you?
GENERAL WALTERS: No, sir. I did not.
SENATOR MONTOYA: Had you thought about it since?
GENERAL WALTE:RS: Obviously, there='s no sight like hindsight,
but given the relative nature of our positions, I still have somewhat
of a feeling that it might have been inappropriate to ask him.
The White House bears a great responsibility. They (word unintelli-
gible) things other people do not.
SENATOR MONTOYA: Why would it have been i nappircpri t--;
General ? Why?
GENERAL WALTERS: Si r, i f i n al 1 our dealings wi th the
White House we doubted what they told us , w, would have a very
difficult time. I did not feel it was appropriate to ask him because
1 did not think there was anything improper with it.
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
SENATOR MONTOYA: Well, on June the 23rd, you had been
reading the newspapers. You knew that some of these people were
involved with the Committee to Reelect the President and that they
had been arrested. They were in jail, and that they had connections
with -- previous connections with CIA. You knew the whole context,
and still you did not think of asking for some kind of clarification
with respect to the mandate which had been delivered to you by
Mr. Haldeman?
GENERAL WALTERS: Sir, Mr. Haldeman indicated to me that
he might have information which I did not have. What I would really
have been asking him is White House sources, how he'd found something
out, had I asked him where he got this information from.
SENATOR MONTOYA: Did you, in your conference with Mr.
Gray, try to develop a dialogue with respect to possible reasons
that the White House might have in giving you this directive?
GENERAL WALTERS: No, sir. I transmitted the message
to Mr. Gray. He made some reference to some people whose names
meant nothing to me, like Ogario and Dahlberg.
SENATOR MONTOYA: General Walters, in view of the experience
of CIA in this particular matter and the attempts made by some
people at the White House to involve CIA in tasks which were ultravirous
(?), or outside the scope of the agency, what recommendations do
you have to make to this committee so that this might not occur
in the future?
GENERAL WALTERS: Senator, I think it would really be
presumptuous of me to try and tell this committee what legislation
could be effective in this respect. I must, however, associate
myself with what Mr. Helms said in reply to your question yesterday,
Senator, that I don't know how you legislate honesty and decency.
You've got to pick the right people for these jobs, above all else.
There is obviously some legislation that could be effective, but
I think the most important thing is the selection of the right
people for positions of trust.
SENATOR MONTOYA: Well, do you feel that there should
be some provision in the law governing CIA requiring the Director
or Deputy Director, or any other employee, to report to an oversight
committee in the Congress when someone in the executive department
or any other department tries to use CIA for political purposes?
GENERAL WALTERS: That could be one solution to prevent
a recurrence, Senator, yes.
SENATOR NOUTOYA: Thank you very much, General That's
all the questions I have.
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
SENATOR ERVIN: There's a vote on in the Senate, so we'll
have to suspend for the members of the committee to get over and
vote and return. .
REYNOLDS: ...General Vernon Walters -- Lieutenant General
Vernon Walters, who entered the Army as an enlisted man some 32
years ago, enlisted as a private, now, when he wears his uniform,
has three stars on each shoulder, has been the witness this morning.
He's in civilian clothing because his current assignment is Deputy
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
He has testified at length about a number of matters
that have already been quite thoroughly gone over, at least in
terms of publicity, because the various memoranda that General
Walters wrote about his conversations with John Dean, with Patrick
Gray, with Haldeman and Ehrlichman, and the June 23rd meeting,
very shortly after the Watergate break-in, all of these have already
been published. They've been submitted to other committees of
the Senate, and the main purpose of Sam Dash's questioning this
morning was to take him over the various points that he made in
all those memoranda.
Well, the committee is out now, and we'll have more to
say and more to hear about the Watergate in just a moment.
REYNOLDS: ..Lieutenant General Vernon Walters, Deputy
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency has told the committee
today that his suspicions were aroused, at least he decided that
he had better start writing covering memoranda after a conversation
he had with John Dean. He has made the point that he did not suspect
any impropriety. He did not believe there was any in H. R. Haldeman's
suggestion to him, which he took to be a directive, that he go
to the Acting Director of the FBI and inquire whether an all-out
FBI investigation of the Watergate might in some way compromise
or interfere with CIA covert operations in Mexico.
He insisted, in response to a question from Senator Montoya,
that you cannot assume impropriety on the part of very senior officials,
high officials, of the government of the United States, that you
cannot automatically mistrust what an official of the White House
tells you. However, he did, as I say, have his suspicions aroused
because John Dean, he said, seemed to be pressing him to try to
establish some link between the CIA and the Watergate break-in.
I want to call in my colleague Sam Donaldson, who's standing
by. Sam, something has struck me this morning. In the questioning
of General .falters, he was asked -- he wade this point, of course,
that John Dean seemed to be pressing hire, seemed to be looking
for sonic way to tie in the CIA to the Watergate break-in, and that
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
Dean had recounted all the various connections, some past, indeed
one present, this fellow Martinez who was on the payroll at the
time, and why didn't. this -- apparently Dean was saying, "Isn't
all this sufficient evidence to believe that there might be a CIA
connection?"
Senator Baker yesterday, in questioning Dick Helms, made
much the same point. Why didn't you, when you saw all these people
that had been involved, in one way or another, with the CIA, at
least assume that maybe there was some sort of a connection? Do
you agree?
DONALDSON: ...I got the gist of what you were saying
generally. Perhaps Senator Baker will press that line of questioning
today.
I think something you said earlier was the key to General
Walters' testimony this morning, and that is that he didn't really
think that he was being asked to do anything improper by tiessrs.
Haldeman and Ehrlichman -- Ehrlichman was in the -- in fact, it
was Ehrlichman's office that the meeting took place on the 23rd --
because, he said, Haldeman may have had information that he did
not possess. It was only John Dean that, he makes clear this morning,
was asking him to do things that were improper, and he's told us
that on February 9th John Dean called Mr. Schlesinger, who succeeded
Richard Helms as CIA Director, trying to get the CIA to take back
its material from the Justice Department.
Running through the Walters story, then, is the thread
that John Dean was the man who was asking the CIA, or suggesting
that the CIA do improper things. And if you'll recall, Frank,
the White House has branded John Dean as the principal conspirator
and has told this through a number of witnesses here and memos
that it was in fact John Dean who was keeping everything from Mr.
Haldeman and from Mr. Ehrlichman and from President Nixon.
REYNOLDS: Yes. General Walters made the point that
Mr. Haldeman might well have had information that was not available
to him. This was corroborated in some degree yesterday by the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
It may come as a surprise to people to realize that the
two highest officials of the CIA may not be aware of things that
are going on, and that perhaps assistants to the President have
information that is not available to the two top spies in the country,
but apparently that's the way it is.
DONALDSON: Wasn't it a delightful answer also to Senator
Montoya when he asked, "Well, why didn't you press him to ask where
they got their information?" And General Walters said that would
have been to try to ask hr. Haldeman what his sources were, and
I didn't want to uncover his source. And there was a sort of an
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
audible agreement at the press tables around me that the reporters
were also for the principle of not trying to uncover sources.
REYNOLDS: Yes.
DONALDSON: Frank, there was, of course, in General Walters'
testimony this morning a prelude of what we're going to hear from
L. Patrick Gray about that July 6th phone call Gray is going to
tell us he had with the President. General Walters has told us
what Gray told him about it, that Gray warned the President on
July 6th that people around i4r. Nixon were trying to wound him
by trying to involve the agencies, and what the President said --
well, then your recommendation is that we fire whoever's involved,
after Gray had told him that perhaps some senior people were involved,
and Gray said yes, and that's General Walters recommendation also.
And we've had this hearsay evidence from Walters as to
what Gray told him. Later today, with Gray on the stand, we may
hear from Gray's own lips what he told the President.
REYNOLDS: Yes. General Walters said that the President
told him -- told Gray to go ahead with the investigation, at the
conclusion of that telephone conversation, and then there was this
interesting quote from General Walters. "I told Gray" -- he's
recounting the conversati on he had with Pat Gray on the 1 2th of
July -- "I told Gray of the need to protect the President from
the self-appointed protectors who would harm him while trying to
cover their own mistakes."
DONALDSON: We'll just have to wait and see what Gray
testifies to.
Let me go back to that February 9Lh phone call which
Dr. Schlesinger got as Director of the CIA, reportedly here, from
John Dean.
You' l l recall earlier testimony from John Ehrl i chman
that he had been told by John Dean that the Justice Departmet had
a lot of material on the Ellsberg break-in, a year before now,
roughly, and that they had photographs showing E. Howard Hunt and
G. Gordon Liddy standing there and one of them inside with the
remnants of Ellsberg's psychiatrist's files all around hire. We
have gotten testimony this morning to the effect that perhaps there
were photographs that were in that packet sent to the Justice Depart-
ment, and it was this packet that Dean was trying to get the CIA
to take back, and, of course, General Walters said Dr. Schlesinger
and he agreed that would be out of the question because it would
point a finger directly at the CIA to have in the Justice Department
files a memo that the CIA had requested bac that packet of information.
REYNOLDS: Fla said that would be in arrow pointing straight
to Langley, I believe, reference to the wooded area across the
river here where the CIA has its headquarters. It used to be marked
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
by a sign "Bureau of Public Roads," or something, but now they've
finally admitted the CIA is there...
DONALDSON: I was going to throw in the same irrelevancy
because I drive that route every day, and for the years the building
sat back -- or sits back from the George Washington Memorial Parkway
on the Virginia side. You can't see it in the summer because of
the leaves on the trees. In the winter, there it is. It's not
just one building -- a complex. The CIA for years would not admit
it existed there, and they would have the sign saying Bureau of
Public Roads, because there is such a building that is behind their
installation. But Dr. Schlesinger has come out in the open, and
he has said here is the Central Intelligence Agency.
REYNOLDS: Thank you, Sam, we're going to come back to
you very shortly....
SENATOR ERVIN: The committee will come to order.
I'm informed by counsel that Senator Montoya had finished,
except he wanted to have read into the record a memorandum, and,
without objection, I'll let counsel read that memorandum and then
recognize Senator Weicker.
DASH: General Walters, Senator Montoya asked you about
when the CIA i nformed the FBI concerning the enpl oyment of Mr.
Martinez, and I understand you've been shown a copy of a memorandum
for the Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Attention Mr. Arnold L. Foreman (?Subject (Mlr. Martinez, From
the Director of Security.
GENERAL WALTERS: Mr. Osborne.
DASH: Yes. Now -- Mr. Osborne. Now le.t me -- I'd like
to read that into the record wich would indicate that there was
on -- and it's dated, I think, June 20, 1972.
"Mr. Martinez was born on 3 July 1922 in" -- it's a bad
Xerox, but it looks like Artemisa -- A-R-T-E-M-I -- and I think
it's S-A -- "Tina (?) Del Rio, Cuba, and he is a naturalized United
States citizen. He was educated at the University of Havana and
he has a B.S. degree. He also has two years additional work in
the School of (ledicine. Previously riarried to a Cuban from whom
he is divorced, 1,1r. Martinez is currently married to a United States
citizen.
Hr. Martinez was recruited by the agency in January 1961
in connection with Cuban operations. The project to which he was
assigned was terminated in 1969.
Since that time, I.1r. Martinez has been on a parttime
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
retainer to report on the Cuban exile community. In connection
with this activity, he was last met on June 6th, 1972, and has
been unable to be co,ntacted since June 14, 1972. For these parttime
activities, Mr. Martinez has received a retainer of $100 a month
since 1969. Prior to that time, he received $8100 per year for
his full-time operational activities. It is to be noted that Mr.
Martinez is a real estate partner of Mr. Bernard L. Barker.
The above information is for use only, and should not
be disseminated outside your bureau. Please transmit any information
on this matter to the attention of the Director of Security."
And you have seen that memorandum just prior to your
returning...
GENERAL WALTERS: And I think in part, it answers one
of the questions Mr. Montoya asked me.
SENATOR ERVIN: Senator Weicker.
SENATOR LOWELL WEICKER: Well, can I ask counsel, because
I'm quite interested in that. Now, either counsel or General Walters,
when was this information acquired and was it transmitted to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation?
GENERAL WALTERS: I believe this is a letter transmitting
it to the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the 20th of June,
1972, that is, two days after the break-in, Senator.
SENATOR WEICKER: All right. Fine. I'm not disputing
it. As a matter of fact, it's just one of the questions that I
had in the back of my mind -- is what did the CIA do insofar as
these persons were concerned, and I would gather that you went
right to work in investigating the status of these various people.
This is, what, the 20ti of June? Is that the date on this? Yeah,
2.0 June, 1972. That's within, what, three days of the break-in.
The CIA had completed -- is this -- had all the other individuals
also been investigated by that time?
GENERAL WALTRS: I don't believe the investigation --
I think it was an ongoing project,Senator. I believe I testified
earlier that starting on June 20th, we began feeding to the FBI,
as fast as we acquired it, any information on any of the defendants
or anybody in any way ;.onnected with this matter.
SENATOR WEICKER: I think it's a very important point,
as far as the agency is concerned, that it did its job and did
it pretty darn fast, so that insofar as those persons that have
been ex -- with the exception of ilr. Martinez, everybody else was
an ex-CIA agent -- well, I'ii not saying they all were, but they
were not in the employ of the CIA. Is that correct?
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
GENERAL WALTERS: That is, Senator. If I may make a
minor distinction, only two of them -- Hunt and McCord -- had ever
been CIA full-time etnpl oyees , and the others were contract employees
for a short duration or a long duration.
SENATOR WEICKER: You and I can make that distinction.
I think in the minds of the American public, contract or full-time
really wouldn't make any difference. But, in any event, the rest
of the personnel, with the exception of Mr. [1artinez, had left
the CIA, were no longer in the employ of the CIA at the time of
the break-in, except for Mr. Martinez, who was on a retainer, contract,
or whatever term you want to go ahead and use. And yet, I gather
your investigation still did include, since they had been ex-employees,
either full-time or contract, these other individuals. Is that
true?
GENERAL WALTERS: As I understand it, Mr. Helms directed
our personnel and security people to communicate all information
available on these people to the FBI.
SENATOR WEICKER: And by the time the 20th rolls around,
the one person who was on a parttime basis, even a report on him
had been sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
GENERAL WALTERS: I believe the agency made a very genuine
effort to cooperate with the Department of Justice and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Senator.
SENATOR WEICKER: So, that it was with some basis of
fact arrived at after investigation that when r 1r. Helms talked
to the Director on the 22nd and said that there is no CIA involverent,
he wasn't just pulling something out of the air. I mean, he had
some fact before him. Is that correct?
GENERAL WALTERS: My experience with Mr. Nelms -- he
never pulls things out of the air, Senator.
SENATOR WEICKER: Right. And when you walked in on the
23rd, with the Director, you were cognizant of these investigations,
that they had been going on.
GENERAL WALTERS: I had not seen this particular memorandum.
I knew that these people had been former CIA employees, and I knew
that we were furnishing all the available information on them to
the Department of Justice.
SENATOR WEICKEI.: Again, I want to repeat the importance,
I think, of what's being stated here and the impressions that we
give I think are equally important to the facts that committee
elicits, that I think there might have been an impression left
that in the meeting of the 23rd, when you and the Director sit
down with 1M1r. Haldeman and ;"Ir. Lh rl i chman and state that there's
no CIA involvement, that this, as I say, just wasn't something
that you were saying categorically, without knowledge that the
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
agency itself had gone into this matter in the previous days.
GENERAL WALTERS: I believe Mr. Helms said -- was talking
on the basis of what he knew on that day, on the 23rd and the result
of all of these, which were communicated to him.
SENATOR WEICKER: Have you ever counted up, incidentally --
I thought about this when you were testifying -- between you and
the Director, how many times in this period did you say there is
no CIA involvement to various individuals? Have you counted it
up?
GENERAL WALTERS:. I couldn't possibly count it. As Mr.
Helms stated yesterday, with some warmth, it needs constant repeating.
SENATOR WEICKER: Well, I think it does need constant
repeating. We know that the Director turned to Acting Director
Gray and said there is no CIA involvement, on the 22nd, and, I
gather, in the meeting on the 23rd it was made again clear, both
by yourself and the Director, to Mr. Haldeman and t 1r. Ehrl i chman,
there is no CIA involvement. Now, I gather, when you met with
Mr. Dean, you were very forceful , as I would imagine, saying it
in a variety of ways, there is no CIA involvement.
Now, let me -- and I gather that the final chapter in
"there is no CIA involvement," being transmitted -- and this is
only as to the knowledge that you acqui red from Mr. Gray, and we' l l
have Mr. Gray before us later on -- to the Presi dent, actually.
Is that correct?
GENERAL I,ALTERS : Sir, I did not have any personal contact
with the President.
SENATOR WEICKER: i,o. I'm saying in your recollection
of the conversation -- your conversation with Mr. Gray, where he
reported to you...
GENERAL WALT::RS: I could only assume that he had told
that to the President.
SENATOR WEICi:Eit: All right. Now, let's go to June the
23rd in your memorandum because I do have some questions as to
statements made in that. The first part there where you describe
the beginning of the meeting. On June 23rd at one o'clock, I
called with Director Helms on John Ehrlich man and Robert Haldeman
in Ehrl i chman's office at the White [louse. Haldeman said the bugging
affair at the Democratic National Committee Headquarters at the
Watergate Apartments had made a lot of noise and that the Democrats
are trying to maximize it. The FBI had been called in and was
investigating the matter. The investigation was leading to a lot
of important people, and this could get worse. He asks what the
connection with the agency was, and the Di r:: ctor repeated that
there was none. Haldeman said the whole affair was getting embarrassing
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
41
and it was the President's wish that Walters call on Acting Director
L. Patrick Gray and suggest to him that since the five suspects
had been arrested, this should be sufficient and it was not advanta-
geous to have the inquiry pushed, especially in Mexico, etcetera."
Now, my question to you is, right at that point, don't
you consider this to be a rather strange conversation for CIA officials
to be involved in. I mean, with the exception of that one sentence,
"He asked what the connection with the agency was, and the Director
repeated there was none." All the rest of those three paragraphs
deal with a political situation here in the United States. It
has nothing to do with the CIA. I mean, didn't it occur to you
at that time that this was a rather strange conversation for you
to be involved in? It sound more to me like a meeting of the Republican
National Committee than the meeting of the CIA. Did this occur
to you that this is a rather strange subject for us to be sitting
around here talking about?
GENERAL WALTERS: In my mind there was a distinction
between the agency being involved, in the sense of having had any
participation in the operation against the Democratic :national
Committee. What I understood Mr. Haldeman to be referring to was
CIA activities outside the United States.
SENATOR WEICKER: But I know, but that's not the context
of these comments. This is strictly -- it is focusing on -- "This
is an embarrassing political situation. The investigation is leading
to important people. Haldeman said the whole affair is getting
embarrassing, and it was the President's wish that Walters call
on Acting Director Patrick Gray and suggest to him that since the
five suspects had been arrested, this should be sufficient."
GENERAL WALTERS: I may not have been complete in that.
As I stated at the outset, this is not the totality of what is
said. He gave these general considerations, and then the concern
he expressed was that the FBI investigation in Mexico might jeopardize
some assets or some activity of the CIA. He was talking in a philo-
sophical sense about what had happened in the United States, and
then the other part that I understood referred to the possibility
of compromise of CIA assets or personnel outside the United States.
SENATOR WEICKER: All right. So you leave the meeting
and, as Director Helms said yesterday, and I'd like to ask you
whether you had the same feeling, that he frankly was uneasy with --
uneasy with what were the orders that had been given to you from
Mr. Haldeman, and that he stated yesterday -- I'rn trying to paraph rase
his testimony -- that he suggested to you that you might call on
Gray and indicate to him the normal arrangements as between the
FBI and the CIA, and that was quite sufficient. Do you recall
any such conversation?
GENERAL WALTERS: I recall such a conversation, but I
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
did not recall it was being quite as limitative as Mr. Helms mentioned
yesterday. At no time did he tell me that I was not to deliver
the message I had been given to deliver. He did emphasize that
I should remind Mr. Gray of this agreement between the CIA and
the FBI not to interfere with one another's operations.
SENATOR WEICKER: So now you go to the Acting Director
and you state to him, "I repeated that if the investigation were
pushed South of the Border, it would trespass on some of our covert
projects, and in view of the fact that the five men involved were
under arrest, it would be best to taper off the matter there."
Now, General Walters, I'm trying to phrase this as best
I can, because I certainly believe you to be a man of integrity,
and I think your career speaks for that. This wasn't really exactly --
this concept that you left with the Acting Director really wasn't,
the truth , was it?
GENERAL WALTZERS: I had no way of knowing, sir. I presumed
Mr. Haldeman had information that I did not have, that something
in this investigation would uncover assets of the CIA. I had been
with the CIA six weeks at this time. I did not know the details
of this operation in Mexico. 11r. Haldeman was a very well informed
man, close to the top of the u:iericari structure of government.
I had no reason to doubt him. I had no reason to doubt any of
the senior people in government with whom I was talking at this
stage of affairs.
SENATOR WEICKER: Well, all right. Then may I just ask
you this question? When you said this to Mr. Gray, did you say
to Mr. Gray Mr. Hal deman has told. me to tell you these facts, or
did you deliver this to Mr. Gray as if this were your own idea.
GLNERAL WALTERRS: I believe, to the best of my recollection,
Senator, that I told h'm. that I had come from the White [louse,
that I had talked to some senior people there, and I then proceeded
to deliver this message to him.
SENATOR WEIC[KER: Well, as sir. Grays sees you standing
before him as a representative of -- the Assistant Director of
the CIA, would he have every right to believe that this was the
opinion of the CIA, or that this was coming from the White House?
GENERAL WALT[:L;S: I believe that he had the right to
thin[; that the message that I gave to him, that this could jeopardize
assets of the CIA;, was essentially correct.
SENATOR WEICRE[,: And at what point in time did you disabuse
Mr. Gray of this concept that you had left with hire on the 23rd
of June?
GENERAL WALTLRS: Directly, or, the Gth of July. Hlowever,
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000700100002-1
on the next working day -- this was a Friday evening -- on Monday,
I told Mr. Dean, who I was informed was in charge of this whole
matter, that there w,as no agency involvement, that this would not
jeopardize any activities of the agency. As I stated earlier,
perhaps naively, I believed MMtr. Dean would tell him, since they
were obviously in contact with one another. In retrospect, I should
certainly have called Mr. Gray and told him myself.
SENATOR WEICKER: Now, do you -- I want to get back to
the basis of the belief that Mr. Haldeman would know something
about the operations of the CIA that you and the Director didn't
know. I find that to be rather unusual. I'm not saying that there
are things in the White House, in a broad general way, in the way
of policy, that they wouldn't know or that wouldn't be in your
knowledge and would be in theirs, but as far as the actual operations
of the CIA, is there anything that you feel the White House knows
that you don't know, you and the Director?
GENERAL WALTERS: We could know if we went into it, but
there are cases where the White House is sometimes supported or
something is done for them in foreign countries by members of the
CIA, and it would be awkward for me to go into details...
SENATOR WEICKER: And without the knowledge of the CIA?
GENERAL WALTERS: Well, I think if it's clearly evident
that it's coming from the White House, at least at this time, without
the knowledge is difficult to say, without the knowledge of the
CIA. This is why I felt someone in the CIA might know and why
I checked with the geographic people.
SENATOR WEICKER: Well, then, my last question is very
simply this. Is it possible for Mr. Haldeman or Hr. Lhrlichman
to give direction to a CIA agent without the Director or the Assistant
Director knowing?
so, sir.
GENERAL WALTERS: To give instructions, I don't believe
SENATOR ERVIN: Senator Talmadge.
SENATOR HERMAN TALMDAGE: General Walters, for how long
and in what capacity have you known President Nixon?
GENERAL WALTERS: I have known President Nixon, I believe,
Senator, since 1957. As I testified earlier, I served as his inter-
preter during a trip he made through eight countries in South America.
Subsequently I saw him only on the anniversary of the stoning in
Caracas, where the car was attacked by a mob. He used to give
a party during the time -- the many years he was Vice President,
he used to give a party once a year. I went to that. In the years
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
between Mr. Nixon's departure from the White House and his reelection
as President, I saw him perhaps three times in those eight or nine
or whatever it was years. After Mr. Nixon became President, I
accompanied him on two trips around Europe. I saw him on an occasional
basis. As I have testified earlier, I have not seen tir. Nixon
privately to talk to since the 2nd of May, 1972 when he swore me
in as Deputy Director of the agency. I've had one phone call with
him in that time frame. He called me for something concerning
his trip to Fioscow. Nothing else was discussed.
SENATOR TALMADGE: Would you say that your relationship
was personal as well as professional?
GENERAL WALTERS: I would say yes, Senator. When you've
shared the kind of danger that I mentioned this morning, there
is a certain element, Dut I would like to bring out that I have
also served as interpreter to President Truman, to President Johnson,
and to President Eisenower.
SENATOR TALMADGE: We've had some testimony, General,
before the committee here that the White House was making efforts
to make all the agencies more responsive to the White House. Would
you say that your appointment as Deputy Director of the CIA was
an effort to make that agency more responsive to the White House?
GENERAL WALTERS: I would say, Senator, that normally
a President appoints people, presidential appointees, because he
has confidence in them. There has been some testimony that I've
heard to the effect that someone had said that I was put in the
agency in order to influence agency policy. In all fairness, I
would like to say that with the single exception of the events
about which I am testifying today, no one in the White House, the
President or anyone else, has ever sought to influece agency policy
through me.
SENATOR TALMADGE: I'm told that you have a very outstanding
background for the position that you hold. Is it true you speak
eight different languages?
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, Senator, it is.
SENATOR TALMADGE: I'm also told that on one occasion
when the President was in France, when you were there as military
attache, that he made a 15-minute speech, you listened to it and
repeated it verbatim in French. Is that correct?
GENERAL WALTERS: That's very flattering, but I doubt
if it was verbatim, Senator.
SENATOR TALPIADGE: I wondered if your memory was that
phenomenal. Now, General, there's one very important point here
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
in your testimony. I don't know whether it's escaped the attention
of others, but it's important from my standpoint. You have a memo
dated here July the ,13th, 1972, and in that memo -- do you have
it before you? You read it into the record, I believe. It's on
the occasion that the President called P lr. Gray to congratulate
him on the FBI action which had frustrated the aircraft hijacking
in San Francisco, and I picked up your exact language at that point.
"The President asked him,." referring to Gray, "if he had talked
to me about the case." What case are you referring to?
GENERAL WALTERS: The Watergate case, I would presume,
sir. That was my understanding of it.
SENATOR TALMADGE: I had assumed that that was what you
had reference to in this memo. "Gray replied that he had." That
meant that you and Gray had conferred, of course, about the Watergate
case,Tand Gray at that point, the Director of the FBI, was reporting
that fact to the President of the United States.
GENERAL WALTERS: That was my understanding from what
Mr. Gray told me.
SENATOR TALMADGE: All right. Go on down further now.
"The President then asked hire what his recommendation was on the
matter. Gray had replied that the case could not be covered up
and would lead quite high and that he felt that the President should
get rid of the people that were involved. Any attempt to involve
the FBI or the CIA in this case would only prove a mortal wound,,"
and you say that was your words, "and would achieve nothing. The
President then said, "Then," I'm quoting direct the President
now, "'I should get rid of whoever is involved, no matter how high . '
Gray replied that was his recommendation. The President then asked
what I thought," meaning you, "and Gray said rimy views were the
same as his. The President took it well and thanked Gray. Later
that day, Gray had talked to Dean and repeated the conversation
to him. Dean said okay."
Is that a correct verbatim quotation from your statement?
GENERAL WALTERS. That is a correct verbatim quotation,
Senator. But as I added earlier, I do recollect -- I did not put
it in the memorandum -- Gray saying that the President had told
him to go ahead with his investigation.
SENATOR TALMADGE: Now, am I to conclude from that that
at that point, and that was July, early July 1972, the President
of the United States had the opinion of the Acting Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Deputy Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency that there was something going
on wrong i n the Whi to House staff and he ought to correct i t?
GENERAL WALTEI;S: This is i,iy assumption from rdy recollection
of what Mr. Gray told 111C..
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
SENATOR TALMADGE: That would be my conclusion from reading
your remarks here. Now, arrr I to assume from your testimony that
you felt that these.repeated efforts from the White House staff,
on the part of Haldeman and Ehrlichman, and subsequently Mr. Dean,
when they tried to get you involved in a cover-up, against your
best judgment, against your own will, that it was an effort on
the White House staff's part to get you and Mfr. Gray, the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to act in concert to cover
up this case?
GENERAL WALTERS: Senator, I would like to draw a distinction
between the three people you have mentioned. As I have testified
earlier, I believed at the time that 11r. Haldeman asked me to go
to see Mr. Gray that he did have -- could have some information.
Mr. Ehrlichman, as I recall it, in all fairness, did not take part
in this conversation.
My first conversation with Dean on the 26th made me suspicious.
When he asked me if the agency could pay bail and to salary of
these people when they were in jail, I became convinced that the
option of doing something improper was being explored. I would
remind, however, that I had no further conversation with 11r. Ehrl i chman
or Mr. Haldeman at any time after the 23rd of June, so there was
really a differentiation in what the threepeople were asking me
to do. As I have said before, if I had thought Fir. Haldeman was
asking me to do something improper, I wouldn't have done it.
SENATOR TALMADGE : Yes, I'm certain you would not have,
sir. There's one final thing I would like to ask you, sir. You
have been on a professional basis with the President of the United
States, as well as a personal basis. You saw what was happening
in his staff to get two of the most important agencies in the United
States involved in obstruction of justice. Why didn't you, sir,
ask for an appointment with the President and go over and tell
him frankly what was happening?
GE(;ERAL WALTERS: Sir, I felt that would have been ci rcur;r-
venti ng my channels. I reported it to my superior, i? r. Helms,
and I reported it to tie Acting Director of the FBI.
SENATOR TALNNIADGE : You di dn't thi nk you should go hi gher
GENERAL W ALTEkS: If I had been pus:ied, i f I had been
told to do something i iiproper, I would Gave. I grade this quite
plain to Dean. He was exploring with mE. I made quite plain to
Trim, from the very first greeting, that if he attempted to order
or direct me to implicate the agency in any way, I would resign
and I would go and tell the President, and I didn't hear much from
Mr. Dean after that.
S; *Ii\TOR TPA LNAD GE: You've had a loner and distinguished
career in the Army now. If you saw something going on as a first
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
lieutenant that you knew was absolutely inherently wrong and ought
to be corrected, would you ever have the occasion to bypass the
captain and go see the major in an effort to get it corrected?
GENERAL WALTERS: If I saw something going on wrong,
I believe I would, Senator. But I must repeat that what Mr. Dean
was asking me to do -- he wasn't asking me. It was all tentative
exploration. Had Mr. Dean at any time ordered me to do something
improper, I would have asked to see the President.
SENATOR TALMADGE: I'm not talking about that. There's
no reflection whatever on your conduct, General. I commend you
for it. You were asked to get involved in the obstruction of justice
and you didn't do it. But you did know that some of the closest
confidants and advisers to the President of the United States were
involved in that conspiracy, and you didn't inform the President. v
Why not?
GENERAL WALTERS: I don't quite take the same assumption
on the question that you do, Senator, but I will try and answer
it.
First of all, to go back to the climate of this time,
the agency was under attack with various unjustified accusations.
My interviews with Mr. Dean were alone. It was his . word against
mine. If I had gone out and simply accused him of trying to involve
me in something, and he had said no, the environment in the United
States at that time would not necessarily have been favorable to
my unsupported word. I would have simply involved the agency in
further publicity in support of something I could not prove, other
than by my statement.
My overwhelming concern, Scnator, at this time, as it
is today, because I believe that an effective CIA is essential
to the United States. Had I gotten us involved in a donnybrook,
which I couldn't prove other than by my unsupported word, I would
not have served the purpose that I was attempting to serve.
SENATOR TALMADGE: General, I have no further quesions.
I want to compliment you on your long and distinguished service
to your country and your absolute candor in testifying before this
committee.
GENERAL WALTERS: Thank you very much, Senator.
SENATOR ERVIN: Senator Gurney.
SENATOR EDWARD GURNNEY: General , there are two different
versions about what fir. Haldeman said to you at that first iineeting.
In your memo, and I read from the memo, it says, "Haldeman then
stated I could tell Gray that I had talked to the Whi to House and
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
suggested that the investigation not be pushed further."
In your testimony before the Appropriations Committee,
you had this to say, and this from, the record of the Appropriations
Committee, "Mr. Haldeman said this, 'It has been decided that you,
Walters, will go to ilr. Gray and tell him that if the investigation
of tie Mexican finance part of this thing is pursued, it may uncover
some CIA assets.'"
That is somewhat different. Which order did he actually
give you, or what did ie say to you?
GENERAL WALTERS: Senator, being a lesser man than Matthew,
Mark, Luke and John, I also occasionally -- I do not, in retrospect,
in thinking it back and refreshing my memory, I do not recall him
mentioning money.
SENATOR GURNEY: I'm not trying to trip you up, General,
please believe. But there is a tremendous difference between these
two versions. One version is that Haldeman is ordering you to
order the FBI to stop. The other one is to inform the FBI that
if they pursue this Mexican money business, it may uncover some
CIA assets. And those are two diametrically different things.
GENERAL WALTERS: My best recollection, Senator, as I
see it, was that the pursuit of this investigation in Mexico --
in Mexico, and l i rimi ted only to Mexico -- could endanger CIA assets.
Whether the money aspect came into my mind because Gray mentioned
it when I talked to him, which was prior to my testimony before
the House Appropriations Committee, but long subsequent to the
memorandum I wrote, I ,could rather, in this case, trust the memorandum
I wrote five days later than the testimony I might have given a
long time later, influenced by what I knew subsequently that the
Mexican thing involved money. Right presently, my recollection
is that money, specifically, was not mentioned.
SENATOR GURNEY: Well, that really isn't the thing that
I'm talking about. The money is kind of incidental here. What
I'm talking about is whether Hr. Haldeman directed you to go to
the FBI and tell them not to, let's use your own words here, "push
the investigation further."
GENERAL WALTERS: That is correct, Senator.
SENATOR GURNEY: That really is ordering the FBI to stop.
The other one is saying to the FBI that if you pursue something
in Mexico, whether it's money or anything else, that's unimportant,
that it may interfere with the CIA.
And one of the reasons why this is so important and why
I'm asking it is that one version, the version you gave before
the Appropriations Committee, coincides, I think, with what the
Presi dent told Hal deman to do . The other one, in your memorandum,
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
coincides more with what apparently was going on in the White House
that we've learned before this committee here in these last several
weeks, and that was,a cover-up. That's why it's important to get
this thing pinned down, if we can.
GENERAL WALTERS: The only thing I can tell you, Senator,
is to the best of my recollection at the present time, in all the
light of what I know, I was told, "You will go to Mr. Gray and
you will tell him that if the investigation in Mexico is pushed
further, it may" -- I didn't say stop -- "It may uncover some CIA
assets."
SENATOR GURNEY: Well, that coincides more with the testimony
that you gave before the Appropriations Committee and less with
your memorandum here. Now then, after you finished this meeting
with Haldeman and Ehrlichman, you and Director Helms, you mentioned
that you left the meeting and you chatted together for a moment
and Mr. Helms reminded you to tell Pat Gray that there was a rapport
between the two agencies.
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes, sir.
SENATOR GURNEY: But didn't you and Director Helms discuss
this very unusual meeting and this very unusual order? Here is
Haldeman, the presidential assistant, ordering you to go to the
FBI and instruct them to do something and not do something. Didn't
you and the Director discuss that unusual meeting?
GENERAL WALTERS: I think we both felt that Mr. Haldeman
might have some information to which vie were not privy.
SENATOR GURNEY: Well, did you ask hiri?
GENERAL WALTERS: Did I ask who, sir?
SENATOR GURNEY; Mr. Haldeman.
GENERAL WALTERS : I did not ask Mr. Hal deman what information
he might have. I felt that if he wanted to tell me, he would have
told me.
SENATOR GURNEY: But isn't the mission of the CIA to
find out for the President, as well as the Defense Department and
the State Department and any other interested agencies, all manner
of foreign intelligence that may be dangerous or detrimental to
the United States?
GENERAL WALTERS: I believe that is the general mission
of the agency, yes , sir.
SENATOR GURNEY: Who would, in this governrment, be better
able to have that kind of information than M??r. Helms and General
Walters ?
A&r 6~&6kor4' 1i 2051'7/(10 i I i - F f u P y00961ROM7oo1 o'0oo - i d a c c e s s
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
to our sources on this matter. The CIA is quite a large agency,
and I do not believe that ilr. Helms, after six years, and I, certainly,
after six weeks, did not know the details of all the agency operations
in Mexico.
SENATOR GURNEY: I wouldn't expect that either, General,
and I'm not really talking about that. I'm saying that it strikes
me as though you might have been curious and said, "Fir. Haldeman,
what are we doing down in Hexico that you're afraid is going to
be interrupted?"
GENERAL WALTERS: Perhaps, in retrospect, I should have,
sir. But the nature of the direction that was given to me was
quite explicit.
SENATOR GURNEY: Well, but that impresses me, too. It
was extremely explicit, and I wonder why there wasn't some question
of it or some further inquiry by either you or Director Helms there
of Mr. Haldeman.
GENERAL WALTERS: Sir, as soon as I talked to Mr. Gray,
I went back to the agency and attempted to check up to see whether
this was a fact or not.
SENATOR GURNEY: You mentioned also that -- I think it
was in this first meeting, or it may be in one of the Dean meetings.
No, it was the first meeting. "The investigation was leading to
a lot of important people." Who were these important people?
GENERAL WALTERS: I was not told, sir.
SENATOR GURNEY: Did you ask?
GENERAL WWWALTERS: No, sir.
SENATOR GURNEY: Did Director Helms ask?
GENERAL WALTERS: I do not believe he did.
SENATOR GURNEY: In a later meeting with Dean -- I think
that was the 27th -- Dean said that some of these suspects might
talk. Talk about what?
GENERAL .1ALTERS: I thought he was telling me they might
talk and involve the CIA, and it didn't worry me one iota because
I knew that there was nothing that they could say which would involve
the CIA.
SENATOR GURf1EY: Didn't it occur to you that he might
be saying that they might talk and involve somebody in the government
other than the CIA?
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
GENERAL WALTERS: No, sir. That was not the understanding
I had of it. The understanding I had was that they might talk
and involve the CIA. -
SENATOR GURNEY: Maybe in the Committee to Reelect the
President?
GENERAL WALTERS: My understanding was that it referred
to us, sir, that it was a veiled form of a threat.
SENATOR GURNEY: It didn't occur to you that it might
be people in the White House?
GENERAL WALTERS: Well, by the time I had...
SENATOR GURNEY: They might talk about people who were
in the White House.
GENERAL WALTERS: This thought did cross my mind. Yes,
sir.
SENATOR GURNEY: Did you ask him?
GENERAL WALTERS: No, I did not.
SENATOR GURNEY: This business about the letter from
the CIA to the FBI, that the FBI should not go ahead with this
investigation because it might compromise security interests.
Who asked the agency to write a letter to the FBI?
GENERAL WALTERS: On the 5th of July, Senator, Pat Gray
called me and said, "I can't stop this unless I get a letter from
you, or the Director, from Helms or from you saying that the further
pursuit of this investigation in Mexico will jeopardize CIA assets."
That was the first mention of it.
SENATOR GURNEY: Did he indicate that somebody had asked
him to talk to you and ask for a letter?
GENERAL WALTERS: I do not have any recollection of that,
SENATOR GURNEY: Did you ask him?
GENERAL WALTERS: Ho.
SENATOR GURNEY: It was your impression that he was going
ahead and only that could stop him from going ahead,
GENERAL WALTERS: That was my impression, Senator.
SENATOR GURNEY: I won't repeat the question that Senator
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
Talmadge asked. I had it here to ask myself, about the long association
with the President, and all of these very unusual events that occurred
between the White House people and CIA and the FBI that would certainly
lead to indicate that all was not well in these requests made of
you, and, of course, you realized that, and you didn't do anything
about it, and I share Senator Talmadge's feeling that you acted
properly. I do indeed, and I don't want to question that. And
I won't ask you why you didn't go to the President. He already
has done that. But did you ever discuss this with Director Helms
and say, "Now, Mr. Helms, all this is going on here. Something
really must be very strange. Do you think that we ought to advise
the President?" Did you ever discuss that with Mr. Helms?
GENERAL WALTERS: I don't think we did, Senator. I think
one of the reasons for that, which is difficult to see in retrospect,
is this was compressed in a very short period of time. The whole
span of this was from the 23rd to the 28th, in a period of five
days. After that, after I told Dean that if he pushed me any further
I would go to the President, I never heard from him again.
SENATOR GURNEY: Yes, and I can understand that, and
that occurred to me also. But then in February of the next year,
here comes a call from 11r. Dean saying, "Now, there's some material
over there in the FBI that you gave the FBI -- the CIA gave the
FBI. I want you, that is, the CIA, to request that material be
returned to you and simply a card put in there with that advice,
that it had been returned, without any reference to what the material
was."
Now, what did you think Mr. Dean was trying to do then?
GENERAL WALTERS: Well, as I -- you will recall, Senator,
he called Dr. Schlesinger, not me. I thought that he was trying
to, as I put it, leave an arrow in the Department of Justice files
pointing at Langley.
SENATOR GURNEY: But, again, didn't that occur to you
and Director Schlesinger, and I do remember now the call was to
him. But you and he discussed it, and you also discussed it, did
you not, in reviewing all these other facts that had occurred in
1972? Weren't those brought up again? Didn't you say you talked
to Di rector Schlesinger about that?
GENERAL WALTERS: I talked to Director Schlesinger before
Dean's call.
SLAIATOR GURNEY: But he knew about those things.
GE JERAL WALTERS: He knew, about tiie events that had gone
before. Yes, sir.
SENATOR GURZNLY: Well, in your discussions about this
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
latest request from Mr. Dean, did you and he raise the question
that this looks like a cover-up over there at the White House that
Mr. Dean may be invo.lved in?
GENERAL WALTERS: No, sir. I think we regarded it as
making an improper suggestion to us that would incriminate the
agency, which was not implicated. We refused to do this, and Mr.
Dean asked nothing further of us.
SENATOR GURNEY: But why would he want to incriminate
the agency? That wouldn't do him any good, or the cause that he
was so eagerly working at at that particular time, would it?
GENERAL WALTERS: I don't know what his motivation was,
SENATOR GURNEY: Motivation to me looks like he wanted
that material out of there so that it wouldn't be seen by the prosecutors
or somebody in charge of prosecuting the case. It was definitely
a part of the cover-up.
sir.
GENERAL WALTERS: That could have been the case. Yes,
SENATOR GURNEY: But anyway, there wasn't any discussion
about that.
GENERAL WALTERS: No, sir.
SENATOR GURNEY: Well , I think my time has elapsed, and
I certainly agree, as I say, with Senator Talmadge, that the CIA
is clean in not involving themselves in this messy business that
we've been discussing here for several weeks, but I do wish that
somebody had warned the Presi dent of the United States. It would
have been very helpful, I think. That's all.
SENATOR ERVIN: I'd just like to announce that Senator
Montoya is floor manager of the pending bill before the Senate,
for that reason cannot be here.
General , at the first approach of John Dean to you was
to inquire whether or not the CIA was involved in the Watergate
break-in, wasn't it?
GENERAL. WALTERS: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
SENATOR ERVIN: And you assured him, as well as everyone
else you conversed with, that the CIA had no part in the Watergate
burglary.
GEi;ERAL WALTERS: That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
SENATOR ERVIiI: Then he told you that he had a problem,
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
and his problem was to stop the investigation with the five men
that were caught in the Watergate, and he wondered whether the
CIA could afford him-any assistance, and you informed him that
the CIA could not afford him any assistance in the solution of
that problem, and would not.
GENERAL WALTERS: That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
SENATOR ERVIN: And, as you state, this whole -- your
communications about this matter with either Mr. Dean or anybody
else covered a period of only the period from June the 23rd to
June the 25th.
SENATOR ERVIN: 28th, I mean. And that no further approaches
of any kind were made to the CIA, and that you assumed that whatever
problem -- that the communications you had made to Dean had put
an end to any effort to enlist any aid of any kind on the part
of the CIA.
GENERAL WALTERS: That was my impression, Mr. Chairman.
SENATOR ERVI.I: Now, you were asked whether you thought
that you should have made any communication to the Presi dent, but
you were aware of the fact that on July the 26th -- July the 6th,
you were later acquainted by Hr. L. Patrick Gray, the Acting Director
of the FDI , that he had communicated with the President,. and that
he had informed the President that SOME of his aides were doing
him mortal injury.
GENERAL WALTERS: That was what he told me.
SENATOR ERVI:`d: Now, you have testified so clearly that
I have no further questions. I just wish to make two comments.
I assume from your evidence that you accompanied President
Nixon when he was Vice President on a tour to South America when
he was -- suffered attacks by individuals or groups down there.
GENERAL WALTERS : Yes, sir.
SENATOR ERVI:1: And you testified that he displayed great
courage, and I would like to say that, from that time, from hearing
what I heard over the medi a and what I read in the newspaper, that
I certainly concur in that opinion. I would also like to say that
I could concur in your opinion teat in the precarious in which
our nation now exists, that one of the best ways to make it certain
that our nation can remain a free country is to have an efficient
and viable organizatiof like the CIA.
GENERAL WALTERS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
SENATOR ERVIA: Senator Baker.
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
SENATOR HOWARD BAKER: General, I've told a number of
witnesses, almost every witness,I guess, that they should not assume
from my questions that I believe or disbelieve their testimony,
or that the nature of the inquiry signifies anxiety or concern
on my part or satisfaction, but rather, my questions are designed
to elicit particular information, and in some cases, to test that
information against the testimony of other witnesses, documentation
and circumstances. I'm sure you understand that.
GENERAL WALTERS: I do, Senator.
SENATOR BAKER: It may be that some of the questions
I'm going to ask you, you have no personal knowledge of. If that's
the case, I'd be happy to be directed to a better primary source
of information.
I have today received three bound copies of documentation
which I understand was supplied by the CIA to the staff of this
committee. I have not yet had an opportunity to examine it. [Inaudible
conversation]. I understand from Mr. Dash that the material was
supplied by the CIA to the Appropriations Comriiittee and by the
staff of the Appropriations Committee to the staff of this committee.
But, in any event, the significant thing is that I've only just
seen it, and there has not been an opportunity to read it and digest
it, so if I skip around a little, it does not mean that F am trying
to pinpoint a particular item of being of significant importance,
but rather that that's what I've been able to run across so far.
Let me state one other thing in preamble. I am in no
way trying to buttress the idea that the CIA was involved in Watergate.
I'm making no such allegations. I have a great respect for the
CIA and a great appreciation for what it's done, for you, for Director
Helms, for all of those other great gentlemen who serve this nation,
I believe, very well and very diligently. So, with that preamble,
I'd like to ask you a few questions.
I notice in this document a whole series of letters from
McCord to the agency. Are you familiar with those letters?
GENERAL WALTERS: I became familiar with therm I would
say, in the beginning of June of this year, Senator.
SENATOR BAKER: Now, to begin with , fir. Chairman, I might
note, as we have on previous occasions, that these documents are
nominally classified "top secret, handle via CO ,'H'111' control system
only," and marked inside on several pages, "for administrative
use only" and "sensitive." IIle understand -- I understand, 1'1r.
Chairman, that insofar as the evidence that may be -- the material
that may be contained in these documents is clearly relevant to
the inquiry of this commi ttee, that we have the authority, by communicatior
from the White House and by the inherent authority of this committee
of the Congress, to put therm it) the record notwi tits tandi ng .
SENATOR ERVIN: I so construe our authority.
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
SENATOR BAKER: Would you bear with me just for a moment,
General, while I go back and try to find the McCord letters.
I'm sorry for the delay, 11r. Chairman, but, as I say,
it's only while questioning began that I've had an opportunity
to look at these documents, and I've noted their location by paper
clip, and that turns out not to be the very best form of indexing.
Maybe you can tell me, General, while we're still looking
for these letters, how many letters were there from Mr. McCord
to the CIA after he was arrested on June 17th that are reflected
in these documents?
GENERAL WALTERS: It's quite difficult for me to answer
this question since I had no personal contact and knowledge of
them until I heard about them in a general way about a month ago.
mentioned..
SENATOR BAKER: But you are aware that there are a number
GENERAL WALTERS: Yes. I've heard that discussed and
SENATOR BAKER: Have you read the letters?
GENERAL .ALTERS: No, sir. I have not.
SENATOR BAKER: I'm referring now to what appears to
be copy number two, TaL N, and the first entry is a letter dated
January 5th, 1972, which simply says, ",dotes," and is unsigned,
but which has accompanying it a Xerox copy of an envelope addressed
to Paul F. Gaynor, G-A-Y-.d-O-R, 4G29 35th Street, North Arlington,
Virginia. Do you recognize that name?
GENERAL WALTERS: I believe that is a member of our organi-
zation, yes.
SENATOR BAKER,: Is that a standard method of reaching
or conveying information to your agency?
GENERAL WALTERS: I wouldn't know, sir.
SENATOR BAKER: Do you know who Mr. Gaynor is?
GENERAL WALTERS: I know that he is an agency employee.
I do not know him...
SENATOR BAKER: Do you know why Mr. McCord would be writing
GENERAL WALTERS: I have heard it said that he knew Mr.
LicCord when ,1r. McCord was still workki nr with the agency.
SENATOR BAKER: Can you tell us what I-Ir. Gaynor's function
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
is at the CIA?
GENERAL WALTERS: I believe he works in the Office of
Security, Senator. I'm not'sure of that, but I believe he works
in the Office...
SENATOR BAKER: Did he work with Mr. McCord when Mr.
McCord was in the Office of Security?
GENERAL WALTERS: I have been given that to understand.
I have no personal knowledge of it.
SENATOR BAKER: Much of this is information we already
have from the testimony of Mr. McCord, and I guess an additional
preamble might be in order. I'm not trying to contradict the testimony
of Mr. McCord. As a matter of fact, much of this corroborates
it. But I want to do this to reach a final area of inquiry.
The January 5th, 1972, quote, note says, "The outfit
tried to lay the operation at the feet of the CIA this week and
failed."
Paragraph 2. "Yesterday, they tried to get all the defen-
dants to plead guilty, thus protecting those higher up from involvement,
and that failed. Barker and Hunt allegedly were willing to plead,
so it is said, NcCord and Liddy refused.
"3. In revenge, now the prosecution is planning to state
that the motives of at least some of the defendants was blackmail.
This came out in the ACLU hearings today in which the ACLU lawyer
said that he was told this by the prosecution, that blackmail was
the motive.
"4. The outfit is even getting predictable. It was
anticipated that when I refused to implicate CIA they would undertake
a massive character assassination attempt.
"5. The judge is not buying this ploy. He indicated
as much this morning, referring to it as a cover story and indicating
that the world was watching this case, the Democrats were criticizing
its handling, and that the jury was going to get to the bottom
of it. He said that he would personally examine the tapes of testimony
and send any of the grand jury that involved higher-ups or lower
figures involved. Some of the newsmen say they are scapegoats.
We are scapegoats. They are right."
"Corrected telephone call data. Call to Israeli Embassy
September 21st, 1972, 8:35 A.M. Telephone [phone]. Call to Chilean
Embassy Octobcr 10, 1972, 4:50 P.M. Telephone number the same."
There are ditto marks under it.
Do you have any idea why Mr. McCord would be passing
on that information to the CIA?
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
GENERAL WALTERS: I have no idea why he might, sir, except --
what I've read in the newspapers, I gather he still felt a sense
of loyalty to the CIA, and he was anxious that it not be blamed
for something for which it was not, responsible.
SENATOR BAKER: And once again, I'm not trying to put
you on the spot, but is the fair inference to draw from that information
that Mr. McCord was at least hoping that you would investigate
whether or not those calls to those two embassies were recorded?
GENERAL WALTERS: I do not know what he was thinking,
Senator. As I told you I had no knowledge of this letter until
June of this year.
SENATOR BAKER: Thank you, General.
GENERAL WALTE:RS: The existence of it.
SENATOR BAKER: The next page. "It would appear that
we headed them off at the pass -- It would appear that we've headed
them off at the pass. The crisis appears to be over." Also addressed
to Mr. Gaynor.
Are you familiar with that statement?
GENERAL WALTERS: I believe these were published in the
newspapers, unless I'm mistaken.
SENATOR BAKER: These letters?
GENERAL WALTERS: I don't know whether they were, but
I have read them somewhere and I have heard that statement before.
Yes, sir.
SENATOR BAKER: "We took them up to the brink on this,
but I don't believe they'll try it again." I'm reading parts of
it because it's very long.
Mir. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the collection
of McCord letters, together with the cover envelopes, might be
received in evidence as an exhibit.
SENATOR ERVIN: 'Without objection, it is so ordered.
SENATOR BAKER: The next item is unaddressed, but it's
dated December 29th, 1972, and it appears to have been transmitted
in an envelope also addressed to Mr. Paul F. Gaynor, postmarked
from Rockville, i-laryland on the 29th of Dec_. tuber, at the same address.
"!What is needed," is the salutation, "evidei deice of i l legal
governr'i; nt k-,,i retappi rig of our tel ephones , e ii tiger of -- on nati onal
security grounds or domestic security nouns, both of whi chi are
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
done on authority of the Attorney General's signature alone. There
were two national security calls by me from our home phone, 762-
0187, one was made to the Israeli Embassy on blank., and the other
was made to the Chilean Embassy on blank. Both calls were witnessed
by my wife. I am convinced that from at least June 17th-early
July, there was a wiretap on our home and office phones on authority
of the AG's signature alone.
"0n June 26th, 1972, the Supreme Court declared such
wiretaps illegal, and several cases have been dismissed on these
grounds recently, rather than disclose the adversary proceeding --
in the adversary proceedings, the contents of such calls and conver-
sations and the names of the party involved. There is no question
but that our home and office phones are still being tapped. It
is being done without a court order. We are in an excellent position
to have the cases dropped. What I need is proof -- logs, transcripts
or testimony from an FBI agent or two who had monitored such calls.
Evidence of perjury or false swearing by Gary Bittenbender (?),
the 1HPD" -- I take it to mean the Metropolitan Police Department
officer -- "I know he is lying. Some additional evidence, even
circumstantial, would help."
Going on and reading other portions of the thing -- I
think in fairness to some semblance of completeness of this thing,
since I am omitting parts of the letter, but they will in their
entirety be included in the record, I might say that also on this
tab there are statements as follows by Mr. McCord.
"I released Gerald Alch as my defense attorney in the
Watergate case. In meetings recently in which plans for our defense
in the Watergate trial were discussed, he persisted in a proposal
that I claim that the Watergate operation was a CIA operation.
That is flatly untrue, and when I rejected it, he then went on
to r,,ake a second proposal.
"The second proposal then was that I claim that the four
Cubans and I cooked up the bugging operation on our own. This
was also untrue.
"When the hundreds of dedicated fine men and women of
the CIA can no longer write intelligent summaries and reports with
integrity, without fear of political recrimi nation, when their
fine director is being summarily discharged in order to make way
for a pol iti cian who wi 1 1 w r i t e o r rewrite i n t e l l i g e n c e the -,iay
the pol i ti ci ans want them written, instead of the way the truth
and best judgment dictates, our nation is in the deepest of trouble
and freedom itself was never so imperiled. flazi Germany rose and
fell under exactly the same philosophy of governmental operations."
Now, I understand that I'm imposing on you, General,
but do you -- can you give us any insight into why Mr. McCord was
passing on these reports to the CIA on a regular basis, addressed
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
to this person? Have you ever inquired into it or can you give
me any insight?
GENERAL WALTERS: I haven't really inquired into it.
I've just heard it discussed. I gather that Mr. McCord, at least
in this period, still felt an intense feeling of loyalty towards
the agency. He did believe that somebody was trying to frame it.
SENATOR BAKER: But it did seem like he was asking for
help from the CIA.
GENERAL WALTERS: He may have been, sir, but, as I say,
I did not see these letters.
I would like to make one comment, however. It is perfectly
obvious that anyone who thinks Dr. Schlesinger can be pushed around
or made to write anything that will suit anybody has never met
Dr. Schlesinger.
SENATOR BAKER: I enti rely agree with you. I have met
Dr. Schlesinger. I've had some rather heated debates with Dr.
Schlesinger when he was Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission,
since I'm on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and I must say,
wecame away, neither of us claiming victory, I think, but I came
away with a very, very heightened respect for his integrity and
also for his toughness.
GENERAL WALTERS: Six months of working for him gave
me the same feeling...
SENATOR BAKER: I wouldn't imply for a moment, nor would
I condone the implication that that description would fit Dr. Schlesinger.
I don't believe it for a second. Now, I've just violated the rule
that I put on myself that I won't comment on the testimony, but
in that one I will.
GENERAL WALTERS: Sir, if I may, I'd like to say that
my statements apply to James Schlesinger.
GENERAL WALTERS: Hy statements apply to James Schlesinger,
who is the Secretary of Defense.
SENATOR BAKER: That's right. And he was once head of
the CIA and before thai, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.
And who knows what he may be next.
[Laughter]
SENATOR BAKER: I'm reading now from the memo of December
29th, 1972, also in an envelope addressed to Paul Gaynor. One
paragraph reads :
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
61
"Their persistence in wanting to let Gary Alch call Helms
to testify and to call Vic Marchetti to lay the background re.
CIA employees once caught in the act refusing to admit it, also
re. custom and tradition of CIA along this line."
Reading now from paragraph 4:
"The fixed police officer's report, that of Gary Bittenbender,
not Carl, as previously reported. The impact of his statement
is one which can be read two ways, giving them a fallback position.
One, that I claimed to him at the time of the arraignment that
this was a CIA operation, and B, that this was an operation that
we, the Cubans and I, cooked up on our own. No such statements
were made. They're absolutely false."
Now here is a simple sheet of paper that has the words
"Mitchell, Dean, Magruder, Colson and Liddy" on it, attached to
that memo with no explanation. And beyond that:
"The MPD officer's name is Carl Bittenbender. The pressure
is still on. They can go to hell. Any time you need me to testify
before a congressional committee in your behalf, just yell."
Now, this was addressed to Mr. Gaynor of the CIA. Was
there any thought that you know of in the CIA of calling Mr. McCord
to testify on behalf of the CIA?
GENERAL WALTERS: No, sir. Not that I've ever heard
SENATOR BAKER: Another one, handwritten to Mr. Paul
Gaynor, postmarked Washington, D.C. The post date is illegible,
and there's none on the typed memorandum.
"Jack. Sorry to have to write you this letter, but felt
you had to know. If Helms goes and if the WG operation is laid
at CIA's feet, where it does not belong, every tree in the forest
will fall. It will he a scorched desert. The whole matter is
at the perci pi ce right now. Just pass the message that if they
want it to blow, they're on exactly the right course. I'm sorry
that you wi11 get hurt in the fallout."
Another one, December 22nd, 1972, addressed to 1.11r. Paul
Gaynor at a different address, 1 005 South Quebec, Arlington, Virginia.
"Dear Paul. There is tremendous pressure to put the
operation off on the company."
Is the CIA referred to internally sometii:mes as the company?
GEI~I:RAL WALT%_itS : Sometimes
.
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
SENATOR BAKE:: "Don't worry about me no matter what
you hear. The way to head this off is to flood the newspapers
with leaks or anonymous letters that the plan is to place the blame
on the company for the operation. This is of immediate importance
because the plans are in the formative stage now and be preempted
now, if the story is leaked so that the press is alerted. It may
not be headed off later when it is too late. The fix is on one
of the police officers in the MPD Intelligence Department to testify
that one of the defendants told him the defendants were company
people and i6 was a company operation. He has probably been promised
promotion for changing his story to this effect. Be careful in
your dealings with them. I will do all I can to keep you informed.
Keep the faith."
And another one, addressed to Mr. Richard Helms, Director,
Central Intelligence agency, Langley, Virginia, and a postmark,
I believe, of July 3Otn, 1972, marked personal.
"From time to time I'll send along things you may be
interested in from an info standpoint. This is a copy of a letter
which I sent to my lawyer. With best regards." Unsigned.
And another one. There is no accompanying envelope,
as far as this compilation indicates.
"Dear blank. A few interesting bits of information you'll
be interested in. When Paul O'Brien was engaged by the committee
as their lawyer in this case, the committee told him that the operation
was a CIA operation. -{e says he did not learn otherwise until
one of the defendants told him the facts and he says he blew up
over it. The prosecution under Silbert had, of course, begun that
line with Judge Belson from the very first hearing, although never
coming right out and saying so, it was inferred by him in every
hearing that I witnessed, and learned that he did so with the other
defendants in the bond hearings. Now that the CIA story has not
held water, or more correctly, will not be allowed to stand by
the CIA, the prosecution is now planning to charge that Liddy stole
the money for the operation from the committee and in turn bribed
McCord and Hunt to participate, giving McCord a .$16,000 bribe on
one occasion, witnessed by a participant who had turned state's
evidence. Rest assured that I will not be a patsy to this latest
ploy. They'll have to dream up a better one than this latest story.
The state's witnesses not only be impeached on the stand, be charged
with perjury before the grand jury and the federal official if
it has to be such a statement to thee; [sic]. If the committee
officials have alleged that Liddy stole the funds for such operation,
they also have perjured ther,selve-s. They're subject to such a
prosecution. Liddy may stand still for this, but 1 ti:-i11 not."
And a f i n a l paragraph, and f i r . Chairman, I ' l l stop reading.
"As I have mentioned before., I don't think a fair trial
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
is ever going to be obtained in Washington for the reasons I have
heretofore stated -- the prejudicial press coverage, the high percentage
of registered Democratic voters from whom the jury would be picked,
and the pro-government leanings of such a jury, most of whom would
be employed by the government and subject to a bias or duress from
the prosecution -- are only some of the reasons. The matter of
timing of a change of venue motion is, I realize, best left in
the hands of the lawyers. The fact remains that I have lived in
Washington since 1942 and know certain things about. the District
of Columbia from firsthand knowledge, having lived there in the
past, that I wanted you to be aware of."
Now, General , as I say, I haven't had time to read all
this. There's a veritable forest of paper clips that I've put
on this thing already, and I'm gonna read it over the weekend,
if I can, and I want to talk about it some more. It would appear
obvious to me that since you came on board in your present capacity,
or your service in other capacities to the agency, that you do
not have firsthand knowledge of this.
GENERAL WALTERS: I was on board at the time, but I do
not have firsthand knowledge of it.
SENATOR BAKER: I'd appreciate your advice on who would
have firsthand knowledge of it so that I can talk to them.
GEIJERAL WALTERS: I would say probably the best man to
talk to would be 11r. Osborne, who is our Director of Security.
SENATOR BAKER: Can you venture any estimate, based on
your examination...
GENERA!.. WALTERS: Or Mr. Helms.
SENATOR BAKER:, All right, sir. Thank you.
Can you venture any estimate, based on your knowledge
of CIA operations of 11r. Hunt, or the facts, as you've found them,
since June 17th, on any reasonable basis, as to why iH1r. flcCord
would be giving you this information periodically and regularly?
GENERAL WALTERS: I tried to explain it previously, Senator.
I believe Mr. Hunt felt a very strong sense of loyalty to the agency.
I believe he felt there was a conspiracy against the agency, to
involve it and discredit it, and this is what I believe, and this
is purely my own personal opinion, and I can't substantiate it
with anything other than my judgment, that he wanted...
SENATOR BAKER: Would you conduct an investigation or
cause one to be done at the CIA on why McCord was in touch , and
certain other matters that I'd like to discuss with you privately
about this?
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
GENERAL WALTERS: Had it come to my knowledge at the
time, I would have, Senator.
SENATOR BAKER: Yes, sir. And the one to address that
to now would be Mr. Colby?
GENERAL WALTERS: Mr. Colby. Well, technically, it would
be me today, but if he's sworn in tomorrow or the next day, it
would be him.
SENATOR BAKER: Why don't I ask you and you pass it on
to- Hr. Colby.
GENERAL WALTERS: I will, Senator.
SENATOR BAKER: All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SENATOR ERVIN: These letters would indicate -- or rather,
these letters, in my judgment, would corroborate certain testimony
given by McCord to this committee to the effect that there was
a plan among some people to try to blame this on the CIA, and that --
including his own lawyer -- and that he resented it and knew, I
believe, with all the intensity of his nature, that the CIA was
not implicated in any way in the matter. Is that not a correct...
Chairman.
GENERAL WALTERS: That would be my assumption also, Mr.
SENATOR BAKER: Mr. Chai rrnan, I might say, since that
represents a commentary on my interrogation, which I appreciate,
but that is certainly one interpretation, and that's why I went
to some pains to explain that I am not making charges. I am simply
inquiring for information. But I'rn afraid it is not the only possibility,
and I think I owe it to myself and to the corninittee to try to find
out as much as I can, and in addition to talking to Director Colby
or possibly to Ambassador Helms or 1Jr. Osborne or others, I think
I'd like to talk to iMir. Gaynor. I think I'd like to know whether
he ever answered those letters, and what, if any, action he took.
Thank you.
GENERAL WALTERS: Very well , Senator.
SENATOR ERVI1: Well, I certainly concur in your opinion.
We ought to get as muca light on this subject as we can. Senator
Weicker, do you have any further questions?
SENATOR WEICKER: I have a few more questions , Mfr. Chairman.
General Walters, you've indicated that Hr. Haldeman gave
you a direction -- mayor that's the best way to phrase it -- to
carry to the Acting Director of the FBI -- and let me quote exactly
from your memorandum here.
"Haldeman said the whole aff it as g ttt~~tq mbarrassing.
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 :CIA-RD91-~0901R0070~?0002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
It was the President's wish that Walters call on Acting Director
L. Patrick Gray and suggest to him that since the five suspects
had been arrested, this should be sufficient and that it was not
advantageous to have the inquiry pushed, especially in Mexico,
etcetera. Director Helms said he had talked to Gray on the previous
day and made it plain to him that the agency was not behind this
matter and that it was not connected with it."
And as I gather, when you and I were talking before,
you indicated this well could have been based on something that
was within his knowledge that might not be in your knowledge or
the knowledge of the Director. Is that correct?
GENERAL WALTERS: That's correct, Senator.
SENATOR WEICKER: Well, if that was the case, why wouldn't
he tell you what it was, if this was something within his knowledge?
GENERAL WALTERS: I don't know why he wouldn't tell me.
SENATOR WEICKER: Just one quick question, in passing
here. That same paragraph. "And suggest to him that since five
suspects had been arrested, that this should be sufficient."
Sufficient for what? Did that ever occur to you?
GENERAL WALTERS: Not really. No, sir. I didn't draw
any particular assumption from it.
SENATOR WEICKER: Now, both you and Director Helms have
testified that there was a discussion of Mexico. I'd like to leave
it in a broad way. I don't know whether it was Director Helms
who referred to money. You've indicated it didn't cone up then,
but there was discussion of Mexi co, Mexican relationship, etcetera,
rather than anything as specific as money. Is that correct?
GENERAL WALTERS: That is correct, Senator.
SENATOR WEICKER: Do you think that that discussion was
substantial enough so that a man of normal recall would remember
it. I mean, did it form a part of the discussions that morning?
GENERAL WALTERS: It did, Senator. The way I understood
it was he felt that if the FBI continued its investigation in ilexico
in some way which was not clear to me, it would uncover either
personnel or activities of the agency in Mexico.
SENATOR WEICKER: So that it did come up in more than
just a casual way.
GENERAL WALTERS: Oil, it was quite specific.
SENATOR WICKER: It was quite specific.
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
GENERAL WALTERS: And the request to the FBI to, in a
sense, not push the investigation to that point, was limited only
to Mexico, nowhere else.
SENATOR WEICKER: Now, may I read to you from Mr. Haldeman's
testimony before this committee? On page 6202:
"Mr. Dash: Do you recall discussing at that meeting
that one of their concerns was that the CIA might want to have
an investigation by the FBI with regard to the Mexican money?
"Mr. Haldeman: No, I did not.
"Mr. Dash: Mexican relationship?
"Mr. Haldeman: I don't recall the Mexican question being
raised either by the President that morning in his instructions
to me to hold the meeting, or by me in the meeting."
Do you dispute fir. Haldeman's testimony on that point?
GENERAL WALTERS: I must stand on my own recollection
of the matter, Senator.
SENATOR WE-ICIER: I have no further questions, Hr. Chairman.
SENATOR ERVIN: General, on behalf of the committee,
I want to thank you for your appearance here and for the testimony
which you've given to he committee.
GENERAL WALTERS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SENATOR ERVIN: The committee will stand in recess 'til
two o'clock.
REYNOLDS: ...I assume, from Senator Ervin's comment
there, that General Walters is now excused from further testimony.
He is presently the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency. Throughout his testimony this morning, there was very
little in the way of conflict with what we assume to be the White
House position, if the White House position is best expressed by
Haldeman and by Ehrlichnan. but at the very end, Senator Neicker
did raise the question of whether the money and the Mexican money
had been discussed in that June 23rd meeting in Mr. Eh rl i chman's
office in the White House. General Walters said the money mention
was quite specific, and then Senator Weicker quoted from kr. Haldeman's
testimony, stating that the money and the Mexican question had
not been raised. The question then was put to General Walters,
"Are you disputing Hr. Haldeman?" And he said, with that special
air of a diplomat, "I stand on my own my recollection." Which
means, in fact, he was disputing Mr. Haldeman on that one point.
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
Sam Donaldson is standing by outside the Caucus Room.
Sam, do you agree generally with my interpretation that General
Walters did no real disservice, or no damage, to the White House
position this morning?
DONALDSON: Well, I agree with what you've said concerning
the fact that General Walters certainly supported the position
that John Dean made improper suggestions and advances, and that's
the only person that he's indentified in the White House that did
so to him. He continues to maintain that Mr. Haldeman did not,
and you correctly pointed out the conflicting testimony between
Haldeman's version of that meeting and Walters'.
There was another line of questioning ofThat interested
me, pursued, I think, by Senators Talmadge and Gurney. That is,
"Why didn't you tell the President?" It's the line that's come
up before with other witnesses, Frank. And I thought at that point
General Walters squirmed just a little bit. lie said he thought
it would be improper for him to go outside of channels, that his
main concern was to keep the agency out of all of that mess, and,
by implication, he left then the concern that once he had done
that, he wouldn't do anything more.
As a matter of fact, just to wind up, Frank, he said
that he feared that it would be his unsupported word against John
Dean's, and maybe people wouldn't, believe him.
REYNOLDS: Senator Gurney and Senator Talmadge, too,
I gather, are simply not entirely satisfied with the instructions
that were given being accepted by Director Helms and by General
Wal ters . Senator Gurney kept insisting that these instructions
were quite unusual, and he said, "Why didn't you know then that
there was a cover--up underway?"
DONALDSON: Well, also, Senator Weicker brought out,
I believe, that when Walters went to see Pat Gray at the FBI, he
did not tell Pat Gray that he had been instructed to tell him that.
Ile simply told him, that he had been talking with senior White House
officials, and then delivered the message that he claims he got
from Haldeman, and did not tell Gray that it was really just a
message, but left the impression that it was Walters speaking for
the CIA.
REYNOLDS: And, as Senator Gurney pointed out, it's very
important to try to get the correct version here. What was the
impression that Pat Gray had? That this was General Walters' state-
ment, or that he was merely relaying a message from the Whi to House.
Well , Pat Gray wi 11 be the next wi tness and perhaps wi 11
have some further information on that subject....
Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700100002-1
 Approved For Relea*R M9ofp15- QLA-RDP91-0099
2 AUG 1973
By Oswald Johnston
? S&ar?Ntws Staff tinter -
Former CIA Director Richard M. Helms dis-
closed today that one of the Watergate burglars
was still on retainer with the CIA to monitor
Cuban refugee arrivals when. the break-in. oc-
curred.
helms, appearing before the Senate Watergate
committee to explain the complex CIA connection
with the case, made this disclosure under cross-
examination by Fred D. Thompson, committee
minority counsel.
U-- 'IIELMS revealed that Eugenio R. Martinez,
One of the tour Cuban emi ;roes involved in the
break-in, was on a retainer contract with the CIA
at the time of the break-in.
",When it was ascertained he was involved in
the break-in," Reims said, "he was cut off right
then-- Is soon as his name was reported to its by
the
Helms explained that Martinez' assignment
was to keep the n;:cncy informed on racent arriv-
als from Cuibra.
Two of We other Cubans, Bernard L. Barker
and Frank A. St:;l? is, ave previously been re-
ported to h.i;fy'e 1 een contract employes of the
agency at the tirl;e of the 13ay of Pigs invasion
and for a ?,^rt lino afterwards.
'l'}IU:11P: ()\, re. diila from ltrevious;1v secret
test li:.: had given to the Senate Armed
Se rt'ire< Coi11i11ittee invcstip;ation of the CIA
\\'atcr,:.:to lil,k in app;lrellll}' was socking
to (hscludit version of an apparent White.
Iloo:
to ul-e the a, cl:cy in blocking lit-
\'e tl;'atltf'lot \.rla lip:.
p!t: r c 1... :r . tr4tiir.: ! _ which has been t., r,;,ted by the C 1A a: l
I I. 1: l i .' 'r n >'J .John 1). i:f; 'l ?
CIA t,itl-_.:415 \?1'~ ;"!,ter the !n- ;,,-!11 that the
ui'i','d to ;1o\e drip, n an
fur fear
d.'ot''.., it t:nuld jeopar
ed lt:. 1 al' Sil!il^;;VtiUOt-
1:;11t' r.l: 'x:t'
:'rtillt; at which llaldcn iti and
Approved For Release 2005/07/01
LI
Ehrlichman tave their orders.
Helms said under questioning today that his
recollection of a reference to Watergate as a po-
tential embarrassment to the administration
came only after Beings reviewed a mer;o of the
conversation Walters had prepared shorty cu'a t,
it occured.
Helms, who has been
ambassador to Iran since
March, was called back to
Washington in May to testi-
fy before Armed Services
and other coimlittees, and
he admitted today that he
did not study the Walters
memo until after his Armed
Services Committee testi-
mony.
"Is your testimony based
on your memory of Mr.
Walters' memory?" Thomp-
son demanded at one point.
Earlier, Iictrns was insist-
ed that the CIA had been
guilty of no involvement in
any of the wrong-doing
imputed to White Rouse
aides.
Referring to a series of
conversations he had with
their actin,, 1,131 director L.
Patrick Grav in the imm_'di-
fte aftc rina tit of the Juno 17
break-in. 1Ielnts reca!led he
repeatedly insisted t},e CIA
"had no in'.'oleerrcnt in the
break-in, no involvement
whatsoever'."
Then, raisi!his voice,
repcate-.l for ti:.' b n
efit of the roo:il
"the 17:^SSn,;t! doesn't soon
to ';et acrosss. 11i ;e ;igt Il%y
had t!ntl:in ; 1o do t;:ill the
\`~'ater,;atc I~rea':c-in. C~,n all
the newsmen in the room
hear file now?" \V' hen lie
finished, Reims was 1n'acti-
cally shouting.
/ ko
U~-~~t~n1