CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A026400100001-7
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
21
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 4, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 7, 1974
Content Type:
REPORT
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Top Secret
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Top Secret
C308
May 7, 1974
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May 7, 197
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
WEST GERMANY: Brandt resigns as Chancellor. (Page 1)
ISRAEL-SYRIA: Israeli and Syrian aircraft active.
(Page 3)
USSR-EGYPT: Soviets appear to be applying pressure
on Sadat by halting arms shipments. (Page 5)
FRANCE: Resounding defeat of Chaban-Delmas further
divides Gaullists and clouds party's future. (Page 7)
USSR: New commander of Black Sea Fleet appointed.
(Page 9)
INDIA: Major rail strike expected tomorrow. (Page 13)
FEDAYEEN: Palestinian radicals try to undercut Sec-
retary Kissinger's negotiations. (Page 15)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 19)
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*WEST GERMANY: Chancellor Brandt resigned last
night in~the midst of one of the most spectacular
spy scandals in West Germany's post-war history.
In his letter of resignation to President Gustav
Heinemann, Brandt took "full responsibility for the
acts of negligence" that permitted an East German
intelligence officer, Guenter Guillaume, to rise to
the position of one of the Chancellor's three per-
sonal assistants. In tendering his resignation,
Brandt requested that Deputy Chancellor and Foreign
Minister Walter Scheel be named caretaker until Par-
liament can elect a successor.
The Chancellor's action followed an all-day
closed door session attended by Brandt, members of
the ruling coalition, and leaders of the opposition
Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union.
Earlier yesterday, the government postponed for 24
hours an official report on the arrest and security
implications of the Guillaume affair.
The embassy reports that Scheel will only serve
on an interim basis and intends to remain foreign
minister and head of the Free Democrats instead of
going ahead with his previously announced plans to
seek the presidency at the federal assembly session
next week. The embassy further suggests that Presi-
dent Heinemann may now be persuaded to seek re-elec-
tion.
The best bet to replace Brandt as chancellor
is Finance Minister Helmut Schmidt. Schmidt is a
member of the moderate wing of the Social Democrats
and as such, is acceptable to the coalition's minor-
ity partner, the Free Democrats. Despite periods
of friction with Brandt, Schmidt has long been con-
sidered the Chancellor's number one minister and heir-
apparent
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ISRAEL-SYRIA: Fighting along the Syrian front
yesterday was at a higher level than that of the
past few days. Both Israeli and Syrian aircraft were
active over the front. Israeli aircraft attacked
Syrian positions south of the salient, while Damascus
stated that its planes struck Israeli targets inside
the Israeli-held salient. A UN patrol observed four
Syrian MIG-17s bombing an area southwest of Sasa
around midday. Tank and artillery fire occurred in
several sectors of the front.
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four Israeli aircraft, while Tel Aviv claims to have
downed one Syrian aircraft.
May 7, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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USSR-EGYPT: The Soviets appear to be tightening
the screws on President Sadat by halting all arms
shipments to Egypt.
The last Soviet seaborne arms shipment arrived
in Alexandria on April 13. The absence of an arms
shipment over a three-week period is unusual. The
longest previous hiatus in seaborne military deliv-
eries in recent years was a 17-day period in the
spring of 1973. Soviet arms shipments began to slow
down in March, and only two deliveries were made in
early April.
The current hiatus in military shipments appar-
ently was decided on by the Kremlin in late March or
early April--perhaps in response to Sadat's intense
anti-Soviet polemics, which began about that time.
The interruption of deliveries is the farthest
the Soviets have ever gone in using their position as
a weapons supplier to apply pressure on the Egyptians.
They apparently began foot-dragging on military aid
questions late last year when it became clear that
Sadat was establishing a new relationship with the US
and was turning to the right in Egypt's internal af-
fairs.
Sadat has muted his anti.-Soviet polemics during
the last few weeks, and he and Brezhnev have exchanged
letters discussing their differences. It is possible
that, in this somewhat improved environment, Moscow
might be induced to resume limited shipments of mil-
itary assistance as an indicator of its good inten-
tions.
Nevertheless, it seems likely that the Soviets
will continue to seek to pressure Sadat into poli-
cies more favorable to Moscow by foot-dragging on
May 7, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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military aid.
In particular, the USSR may
hope that its military aid policies will trigger
significant misgivings within the Egyptian military
concerning the consequences of Sadat's present pol-
icies.
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FRANCE: The resounding defeat of Jacques Chaban-
Delmas on Sunday has further divided Gaullist ranks
and could lead to the end of Gaullism as the prime
political force in France.
Regardless of which candidate wins the runoff on
May 19, the legislative electoral law, which now favors
the Gaullists, is likely to be amended. Both Giscard
and Mitterrand have come out in favor of more propor-
tional representation in the National Assembly based
on population. They would both reduce the number of
rural districts where the Gaullists are strong and in-
crease urban districts where the other major parties
draw their strength. Both Giscard and Mitterrand
would expect to gain a significant number of seats at
Gaullist expense.
Most Gaullists will probably unite behind Giscard
for the presidential runoff, although they have appar-
ently split into three factions. The first faction,
led by Interior Minister Chirac, embittered other
Gaullists by aiding Giscard during the first-round cam-
paign. This group claims the allegiance of about 70
of the 183 Gaullist deputies.
The second group is led by Housing and Development
Minister Olivier Guichard, who was close to both De
Gaulle and Pompidou. It claims 80 deputies. Guichard
has been widely touted as a possible prime minister
under Giscard. Guichard, whose major aim is to save
the party from total disintegration, hopes to be able
to negotiate with Giscard as spokesman for all the
Gaullists. He is likely to gain the support of at
least Chirac's faction.
The smallest group, which controls only about 20
deputies, is led by such hard-liners as Michel Debre
and Maurice Couve de Murville, who have deeply dis-
liked Giscard for years. Moderate Gaullists reportedly
began last week to try to woo the hard-liners over to
Giscard for the second round of the election. The
May '7, 1974
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early endorsement of Giscard by the hard-line Gaullist
party secretary general after the first round indicates
that most of this group will line up behind Giscard in
preference to Mitterrand.
Chaban has not yet endorsed Giscard, as some lead-
ing moderate Gaullists had hoped,
Chirac
uic ar , W115 never supported a an s presidential
campaign, are not likely to back him for such an im-
portant post. Continued intense political fighting
within the Gaullist ranks would further reduce the
party's already seriously weakened political influence.
I
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USSR: The Soviet Navy has appointed Vice Admiral
Nikolay I. Khovrin as commander of its Black Sea Fleet.
Khovrin's selection for this sensitive position and
his previous appointments suggest that the Soviet naval
command is grooming him for a higher post.
Khovrin, 52, is representative of a crop of post -
World War II Soviet admirals who were too young to have
served as commanders in World War II but who have sub-
sequently gained experience in. distant naval operations
and flag-showing port visits. Khovrin served as the
senior officer of several Soviet naval task groups in
the Indian Ocean between 1968 and 1970. From 1971 un-
til this year, he was second in command of the Soviet
Northern Fleet, Moscow's most powerful fleet, which
has a large force of nuclear-powered submarines.
As commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Khovrin is
charged with providing surface warships and logistic
support to the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron on a reg-
ular basis. In a crisis period--such as another flare-
up in the Middle East--he would be responsible for re-
inforcing the Mediterranean Squadron on short notice,
and perhapq even ing on-the-scene command of the
squadron. 1 -1
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*INDIA: A major rail strike expected to begin
tomorrow is the latest in a series of trials facing
the government of Prime Minister Gandhi. The "Indira
Wave" swept aside opposition to the Prime Minister
in 1971 and 1972, but it has since receded and left
her exposed to her enemies and to a nation bewildered
and irritated by successive policy failures and un-
fulfilled promises.
The government was slow to react to earlier
threats, but it is willing to risk a showdown--pos-
sibly bloody--with militant railway unions. The
army has been called out, to guard, and possibly run,
key rail lines in order to keep essential freight
moving. Uninterrupted deliveries of coal are partic-
ularly essential; many important power plants and
factories have less than a week's supply on hand.
Some 3,000 railway union members have been ar-
rested in the past week, and the unions are now re-
fusing to continue negotiations with the government
until their arrested leaders are released. The gov-
ernment, for its part, says it will not negotiate
unless the strike is called oi_f. Employees of the
rail system, which is nationalized, have been warned
that participation in the strike could cost them
their jobs.
Not all of the 1.7 million railway workers plan
to go out on strike. One of the union federations
is associated with Mrs. Gandhi's Congress Party and
will not take part, and some of the smaller unions
are likely to be intimidated by the government. The
large federation of communist and socialist unions,
however, which represents more than one third of
railway workers, has issued a "final bugle call" for
the strike.
(continued)
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Other problems have compounded Mrs. Gandhi's
difficulties. These include: a scarcity of food,
rising petroleum prices, a politically volatile un-
employment situation, and government corruption and
lethargy. Newspapers have been sharply critical of
the government in recent weeks, and reports are cir-
culating that military leaders are increasingly dis-
turbed by political and economic trends.
*Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the
analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the
Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
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FEDAYEEN: Palestinian radicals, acting through
their recently formed "Rejection Front," are attempt-
ing to undercut Secretary Kissinger's negotiations
and forestall Arab acceptance of any proposal for a
peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The front
consists primarily of fedayeen splinter groups that
favor terrorist tactics; they receive financial and
operational support from Iraq and Libya.
Spokesmen for the Rejection Front have publicly
threatened the life of Secretary Kissinger, and mem-
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Ominous Threats
The most ominous threats have come from Ahmad
Jabril, whose Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine--General Command is cooperating with other
small fedayeen groups in the Rejection Front.
I
Unlike much fedayeen,rhetoric, these threats
from the normally reticent Jabril must be taken
seriously. He has a small but disciplined and well-
trained organization which has admitted responsibil-
ity for the murder last, year of the Israeli assist-
ant defense attache in Washington and for the attack
last month on the Israeli town of Qiryat Shemona.
(continued)
May 7, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin 15
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The Qiryat Shemona attack gained the General
Command and other fedayeen radicals a degree of in-
fluence among Palestinians that is vastly out of
proportion to the radicals' limited numbers and nor-
mally
d political following,
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Another group in the Rejection Front, the
Pop-Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),
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I Ihas in the past hijacked airliners
a.n rist strikes within Israel to
dramatize the Palestinian cause.
Political Goals
The Rejection Front's basic aim is to prevent
Arab endorsement of any settlement that acknowledges
israeils right to exist. Its immediate tactics,
including terrorism, are designed to forestall a
Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement and to dis-
rupt plans to reconvene the peace conference in
Geneva.
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May 1, 19 74
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Portuguese Africa: Armed, forces chief of staff
General Costa Gomes, in press conferences in Lisbon
and in Angola, has offered a cease-fire to the insur-
gents in Portugal's African territories. Some insur-
gent leaders are under heavy pressure from militant
wings in their organizations to reject the Spinola
regime's program for a political settlement in Africa
as nothing more than continued Portuguese hegemony
under a different guise. Indeed, two major insurgent
groups publicly rejected Costa Gomes' bid for negoti-
ations in statements yesterday.
(continued)
May 7, 1974
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North Vietnam: Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap
yesterday delivered a lengthy address to a large pub-
lic gathering in Hanoi marking the 20th anniversary
of the victory at Dien Bien Phu. General Giap, who
appeared in public last week for the first time in
six months, has been reported by several sources to
be seriously ill. His presence at the commemorative
festivities apparently indicates, however, that he
is vigorous enough to stand the strain of an occa-
sional public appearance.
May 7, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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