DEMAND PLANE PROBE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 94
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 9, 1960
• Content Type: NSPR

MAY 9 1960
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Dein'iid Plane Pro
But the det$ r Wilt denied
kon Hi I 1 etiplut,rh,edheAvi;Zerteciti:111:g eild
Why Didn't
Ike Know?
By WEWARt HENSLEY ,
WASHINGTON, May 8'
(UPI)..--Angry CongteSsional,
leaders of both parties today
demanded a full investigation
into the flight of an American
plane over Soviet territory for
the purpose of obtaining in-
telligence information.
Several were particularly irked
that such a flight would be made,
as the State. Department said,
without the knowledge of Presi-
tent Eisenhower-- and just a week
'before the President goes to Paris
for the summit conference with
Soviet Premier Khrushchev. and
!British and French leaders.
One imktortant Republie,aarnem-
ber's (-magi-est, who inSiSted his
retalamitairosepiat. ' ex-
ploded when aSked abolfrthe in-
cident. "Dumb". and "stupid" were
:some of the milder expletives he.
used to describe the State Depart-
ment's handling of the affair.
AT THE SAME TIME, high Ad.'
ministration officials said ,the in-
cident, while embarrassing to this
country, would not deter the
President. from going to the Paris
conference.
There was a possibility the
rresident would make a nation-
wide raido and television address
This week as is his custom before
attending foreign conferences. If
be does, he could scarcely ignore
the plane incident.
Among those calling for
giie.?,?4wa1 investigation were en-
ate Democratic Whip Mansfield
(Mont.) and chairman Bridges
(R.-N. H.), of the Senate GOP ,
committee.
They said in separate inter- I
views that. they expect the appro-
priate Senate committees to call
in Administration officials for a
detailed explanation.
THE CONGRESSIONAL ang-
ger was prompted by the State
Department's Frank admission
yesterday that the plane doWned
over Soviet territory a week ago
"probably" was seeking intelli-
gence information. It said such
nights were designed to protect
tie West against a surprise Rus-
lair military attack.
? B. PoweM'ItIM A.s. night on
? W hi t
ordersftom as pn o ci a s.
It also cited as a ingating factor
i the Russians' vast' 'corollate ef-,
forts against the .West,'
: Bridges said the Russians are
constantly spying on this country
through their far-flung network
Jul ageflt(4014 he said 1-ho plane
I incident ''eertairily weakened- our
p0sition"44- the Nun-unit meeting.
The White House declined all
I comment on -the flights which
prompted Khrushchev to unleash
a new barrage
! Among other things, Press
refused to say
whel 1161-.11 t4iuld in any
WaYall r?len 's pia s
to visit t tlyTe- l'ol an in Juti,-.
0110111i HIGH officials 'Said the ,
President ?has no intentions of ;
canceling the surnmit meeting. I
Mansfield, a key Peynocratic
spokesman on foreign af fairs,
reed Eisenhower musE, abide by
his decision to meet with- the ;
leaders of Russia, France,. and I
Britain. %
13 u t administration--officials
said Khrushchev can etermine
die fate of the summit conference
within the next feW days:
If he turas the plane incident
into a public circus by staging
a pre-summit trial of the cap-
tured pilot, they said, it will dash
any hopes of narrowing the East-
West gap on such major issues as
1WJ1n. Germany, and disarma-
A '4r.t0 0 0
-
441k,g4;4,,S6k0 ? ??o
41 , no
'6. Their
ird tr,fi-
er and, other
Wasinngton officials knew noth-
ing" of this particular flight, they
hoped to keep the way clear for
the President and Khrushchev to
meet in apparent friendliness at
the summit. k411
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Symington Deplores Strife
Regrets Intraparty Personal Attacks
By ISABELLE sin," Senator Symington
Star Staff Writat said. 'All 50 States must
Senator Stuart_ Byrftagton have a; Vote in the selection.
of Missouri last.7?'?iateff de, The place to pick our :nomi-
plored the "seeds or,naity" flees is the national conven-
which he said are' beingSoWil tion."
in some Democratic prima- Several other Democratic
ries. hopefuls?"announced, un-
In an obvious reference to announced, favorite sons,
the West Virginia prffnary, avowed, and unavoWed," in
where his fellow-Democratic the words of Mrs. 'Katie
candidates for the presidency, Louchheim, Democratie vice
Senators Hubert Humphrey chairman and chairman of
and John F. Kennedy, hate the conference ? also were,
been slugging it otit. Senator parading their wares at the
Symington', tad the'190 three-day conference which
Campaign Conference ' f o r 3,000 women are attending
Democratic Women at the from, all 50 States.
Sheraton Park Hotel: ' Senators Humphrey and.
Kennedy were to fly from
West Virginia today long
enough to address the final
luncheon of the conference,
sharing billing with Mrs:
Eleanor Roosevelt. Thp two
Senators
"I know my colleagues Jack will be back in West
Kennedy and itibert Hum-
Virginia when the votes are
I
phrey well," the Missourian counted tonight.
continued. "They are fine,
loyal Americans. ' And they
are great Democrats. Any-
thing that has been said or .
done which might soil the
good reputation of these good
men should be retracted and
corrected.
"It saddens me?and I am
sure it saddens you?to read
where 'good Democrats ques-
tion the patriotism or ;per-
sonal integrity of other good
Democrats.
"Bemocrats Care"
The dinner also mark
the launching of the Demo-
crats' camPaign slogan foil'
1960: It is: "Democrats
-Care." ?
toisf
New
`Bind Up the Wounds" es votes as a favorite
"Once these popularity con: os n, charged that this Na-
tests are over." urgediti,- 4-Sion's conduct of foreign af-
Senator, who has refuied --fairs has been "liberally
enter any primaries, "Ietlistek-marked"` with "dis-
move swiftly to bind up the -heartening, dangerous blun-
Party's wounds and close ' ders."
ranks for the fall election. Zvents of the last several
"After all, the election that
you and I want to win?the
big one that must be won?
is a great Democratic victory
in Novernber," he said. That
includes every level of gov-
ernment, local, State and na-
tional, he added.
The West Virginia pri-
mary, where ballots are being
cast today, will not settle the
Democratic presidential nom-
ination "any more than it
was determined in Wised).-
days involving the United
States plane shot do o?
R be labeled.
the
suMMIceonference,' or 'How
to 'friends among the
nciaro:
tiirmS.,r,:the vernor de-
"It,: is clear tivisaggpis-?
through the ; Na-
t onal Aeronautics and Space
Agency aila-ti*- state De-
partment, - we violated
the territo "intogrity of
fhe Soviet Union': and we
have suffered a formidable
Rig? of prtige just before
the- - start FO the Summit
Conference," _c4n,y...,,,_1!yner
assetted.
Ifthat had _been a sorry
state a affairs one week be-
fore? the Summit Conference
has now been made even
more bleak," he coniplained.
"We knew .the conference
was corning (arid) its im-
portsnee;! Yet "there has
been no planning at all. It
almost seems as if we have
gone out of ota. way to under-
mine our unite:- to force the .
nations of the world to ques-
tion critically our motives
and our aims."
Williams Echoes
Men ilga Williams
of iChigan27tokeF srini
e administra-
tion's handling of the plane
incident in a press con-
ference before the dinner.
"It is wholly indefensible
that we should have been
dusetrapple.which
'IVAMPreirt e and cred-
ibility of the American people
in the government before the
whole world," he declared.
The governor, who will
have much to say about how
Michigan's votes will be cast
at the Democratic conven-
tion, repeated his insistence
that he is "completely neu-
tral" between the various
Democratic candidates, with
the exception of Senate Ma-
jority Leader Lyndon B.
Johnson of Texas.
The Texan, said Gov. Wil-
liams, 'Is not the, type of
Deiinocrat that conforms to
.,thinking og. Michigan. He
harSomething less than the
bold approach necessary, to
meet the challenge of our
times". .
Senator Johnson "could not
carry" Michigan in Novem-
ber, while every other pres-
ently mentioned Democratic
Presidential 'nominee could.
the Governor maintained.
Available for Veep
Gov. Williams acknowl-
edged hisnwn availability for
the vice presidential nomina-
tion, but said he is not a
"working candidate."
In his speech, the Michigan
governor said his party's job
is "to wake America up."
-He urged adoption of a "solid,
tough,, fighting liberal plat-
form' at the convention.
- Senator Johnson confined
his remarks at the dinner to
warm praise of Speaker Ray-
burn, whom he called "one of
the most beloved figures in
the Democratic party."
In a new twist for such a
gathering, Senator Johnson
himself was introduced by
his wife, "Lady Bird," the
wives of other speakers also
introduced their soouses.
Senator Johnson. said his
wife. is "an exciting man to
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EVANSVILLE kliviokOved For Release 2614/05/43RA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7
PRESS
Circ.: e. 46,720
Front Edit Other
Page Page Page
Date:l.111Y 1 0 at
Being Barred ?
From Hearing
irks Capehart
By DAN KIDNEY
re, WirhttrirtreVAlqiiindent
WASHINGTON ? Hodsters
have every right to know exactly
what went on in the Soviet shoot,
down of that U.S. sPS/-plane Sena-
tor Homer E. Capehart (R-Ind.)
told his Senate colleagues, in a
colloquy with Senator Frank IL
Lausehe (D-0.) on the Senate
floor.
Both senatbrs were taking the
position that, as members of the,
Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, they should hie been in-'
vited, when committee chairman,
.1 Wllhiai Fulbright
and ranking committee members
were given a "fill-in" on the mat-
ler by Secretary of State Chris-
inn A. Herter and CIA DIrectof?
Allan Dulles yet
"flip people of Indiana are en-
titled to know what is going oni
1in this case," Senator?I'Capehar(
'said. "As a/mernbek. of the Sen-
ate Eoreigh Relations Committee:
I am charged' *sith finding outt,
and telling; therMI '
Senator Lausche. backed up thisl
stand and said that if membersf
of the committee are to perform:
their duties properly, 'Bey must
he informed fully on the case.i
Showing, that he was angry ati
not being asked to attend the;
briefing, 4,j0,1,4?;:gapabart
"The EigethONVer administra-;
lion should take Congress into itsl
confidence. Perhaps we could be!
of some help. God knows they;
need help, if I can read the rec-!
oil( and the times correctly."
Lausche explained that he,went,
lo the 'VkIfing room, suppoa
Sin!
II committeemen were invited':
but he was told it was .a "closedi
meeting foY'the leaders.": '
"PI my embarrassment, I hadi
ia leave."?he concluded.".; I
S-na o t? Ca peha rt contended
I ha i this WaS a violation of "the:
fJO io know_
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CINCINNATI (vAproved For Release 2004/561 :-plriepP90T00782R000100060001-7
.ip
ENQUIRER
Circ.: m. 203,960
S. 277,547
Front Edit Other
Page Page Page
Date:
MAY 1 0 1A0
'Thrown Out' /
Embarrassed Lati,che
Leaves U2 Briefing
Enquirer Bureau Special Ohio's. other Democratic
, WASHINGTON, May 9? en. Senator, Ste h p. 1,1. Young.,
also took e oor-olf--triel
, Frank .1........LallSche (D. 10) U2 -7iii ., KM' i'Vnaiksj
',vas. in his owri wotds.
Th more
-i-e d- at closing--;
-thrown oat of 1A.1.? briefin We
g the-ransweri-1
forl
congressional eaciiiiThis
,afternocar:ton the spy-plane ingSt9.1.1.2=6.....
.crisis.
Lausche was told by a
'fellow Senator that Secretary
of State Christian Herter and
' Allan 1.nall.CUP-::, .._r_21 the
centrogence Agency,
'were about to brief members , Curtain In any manner-pos-
of the Foreign Relations Com- ;
sible .. -." Young declared. '1
i!1 ittee on the incident. ...
,Ilet,, then pointed out the
kausche. a member of thej
committee. rushed down to extent of Russia's espionage l
in(!eting room in the
activity, in "sub-
capitol but was informed it '
' ..arines off our shores." and
.
was a -closed" meeting, fin he fact that it is comp:. -1-.
House and Senate leaders tively easy or them to gc,
only. not for the Foreign Re- information' about rag mill-
Jations Committee. tarv effOrtS just by asking,
-To my embarrassment," reading or observing.
flu' Ohioan declared on the' "In the United pIt'Lltes, we
Senate floor, ''I had tolare confronted With a dif-!
leave." :ferent situatita" he said.;
Ho V' _disr.;_lond that ,The Senator' declared wei
newsman, curious of hislea va:.t; wouldn't have- any way of
iknowitig. what the.. Russian'
illg. asxed him .wliy lthreat all4toUnts to "except by
-I told him I' itlas thrownIthe enterte and Courage of
(All t," Lauscht Vie ffte CIA and
.:I suggestion at_trilkmorning't YOUltir Herter.
t.ossiun of the Foreign Rela-fwith ..ivlib :e served,
:tiaras Comrnittee they shouldin trk I-1611-se,,, esounding:
1 g'et the background of thelericithierhent, ITC-Said Herter',
'crisis. Senators having the re-,vas a 3ooteriRetetar7 wadi,
'sponsibIlities of foreign rela-bat he 4iltil1a: give "no'
Itions "ought to know to theithought iithAtt-eve'r V) appease-i:
.: ; . .,
; Iiillest degree pos asible Whatment . -?: ? ..t.??,%,?roluise" at!
is happening," he said.the 1,-0?, . - - Ing.
' - -. ' -:,r.
I "I AM DISAPPOINTED notThe _ ,
,tqr said" or coutsei:
1 being given the right to atAte sum It &rife-rex-ice should',
!tend this meeting," Lausch -OW JPrwaltd; trit4 Cciligres81'
lstated. 1111.47the nation should "closet
I He said he knew the Sovie Our ranks and back up with
lUnion was active in espionageetermination our leaders'
: jn this country but "that does!who participate . . ." He also f
not Mean I condone what haS'Predicted the U2 pilot, Francis;
happened . . . I'd like to} PciWers, would' be released by
hagHe concluded by say-,trrefterrerME-7, 7---- -
hng he hoped he still would!' - ...... .
'be given the right to know. !
I
"1 am. neither surprisedi
nor ?Nterlo . that . . .;
thoSet044,1ave the defense'
of this as their re-1
sponsfb11 ty should be com-
pelled to penetrate the Iron,
The Senattir,j,,1 he made
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St LOUIS Approved For Relehtg2b61111W3 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7
1O5T-DISPATCI-1
LOUIS PT-ilhiPATCii
tounded lyy JOSEPH PULITZER '?
December 12, 1818
MAtishel
Puittzer Ptth&Amp: Co_
MI Olive- 1.4 (.7I ? MAin I-111!
)uegrion ol Comr91
if it is really true that Secretary Herter and
1...17rThrector Allen Dulles still (16 not know
wTio authorized -the-spy *pitite"-4-'S flight over
Russia, then the need for a responsible eon,
gressiortzttltisastigUtOn is r,?nforced.
? ? mo tio were "briefed" by
?,.,?",.,.;?? the -es onse
the twa o
bility tar_tte._ flight s1 a no oe
pqjnied,,,, Yet it is nine days since the flight
was made and five days since Khrushchev
announced the plane was shot down. If
that period Mr. Dulles cannot find out who
decided to launch an espionage flight two Naturally, the existence of an irrernational
weeks before the summit conference, then agreement providing safeguards against sur
there is something Very wrong with the top
Prise attack would make it unnecessary to con
Policy control. over intelligence activities ca- ' duct espionage for that purpose. We are ail
able of plunging the world into war. -
leir such in agreement'. But.it will never he
We believe Congress ought not to be con-
attaineci)tO long purpose Is to legalize
tent with a hrring to liniesti ate. the OP,servation wiit1i we now try itt carrv
Tee inquiry should be oroug y o - Th t :principle of open Odes"
and objective for the purpose not of e
?httt we cannot expect the Rus-
bnrrassing the Eisenhower Administration-
but, 1nfl i1frF 't? mal and clottrr dd?c
a l-
of determining whether military intelligence,.0.ioti tO secrecytro_ t the kind p rkiPr
y activities are are sebject . to adequate polico n.Atio-wo Mirv esident
? control.
*
It is not enough to 'know that Pr'eSiclent#
Eisenhower did not persOnally atethOrize this
particular flight. Co hopli out
Itw?s ou ' at
safeguards" eiisf ?against irresponsible ? act ibn
at lower levels Of command that may have
the gravest international consequences. '
Secretary Herter's statement, in'which he
tried 1r) make the best of a bad sittql'on,
loaves much to be desired. While ft is Si
hat our Government has a responsibility' I
protect itself from surprise attack, Mr.'1-1e.rt
did not offer any evidence to show 'th't ?
was in fact the purposi of the U-2 flig t.
Of course it is true-that the Soviet Uri,
engages in 4pionage. ?? If it does not fly um
,-
parable missions over, the United States, Oaf
[nay be because it can get the desired infor-
mation without doing Yet the fact remai,r; :
that the same flight 'which one country re- !
-lt?Rs as a safequarctegainst surprise attnek
? Ap ,-prded by the other country as a
vir it. '
s'ffltiowei'nti;opos 'the 1955 stuininit Cr.
fett,:ence. 3prvallIttnce would have to bo
uinely rtlattbOt: probably operated en-
44010.1,,,by *and accompanied by real
, 4.4
, ? As'-for the pa ?,,r,clvpiture,Draiktr-2.
ques 'Whether -ithTlltar
,ifieltrAs iustity such flights, but wJier they
,
cy-
. There is no dissent to the
0-ty,AL ,_ vps disastrously
el? COngreSS ck out who timed
it and why.
......000.drit.
??101 ?
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An:D.101th SUN MAY 1 4-
Morse Talks Talks To Collegians;
2,000 117 Cheer Kennedy
"Neither can we justify having
1or the plane there. . . . Sooner or
3$g,
later we are going to have incident!
, .... .2, , i.....:?!4.4.,
its itwri,r B. Eviarits-bs. or' accident that will reelase the
I A7t staff CarriOpOndrnt] first. bomb, and the liolci,ultilwill
(liestertoWn, Md., May 1 .1-3--'',-1,1e0?nn.-4 teign polic litA ' '' Mr.
IT14*. -'' - "3.11Lwii4ilitmo-af.' -K8 -had
tinued his attaek on.Wtal, he-calls!,manship and s near-17
,IV
Senator John F. Kennedy' "re , the issues ha ?t'
ar
aetionary i;ecoed:',,today ,)..; nee -einting ' out the ballot oil ...#0
ding his Opponent on toreign poi- TilDP ,Administration's rcli,*0*'`Visr
icy, tax issues, Public power .and "a prcdated declaration :of war,!"
,.. , ,,tri the Formosa Straits and-11W
aid to educatio,h. -
Mr. Morse got warm reJ-iPoilsetNlid*.ga'sl, . ,
from about 300 students at WaSh.. fli4ittoponenV also differ Oh
ington ;College, where .Senat6r1,:bInt 1,40 approving'military 'el0`, tit
Kennedy began his Maryland' prificrteral Tvgjillo:ot-Lhe Doin ft
mary campaign two ,days tigo...,ki, epublic. he stated, , -
The MassechuSetts. Sern'ttor",-, . A ! !..Publies Rowel' IQ
crowd reached_nea0 ,.ti 1.000 with ' Mr, Morse zio said Mr.
the advantage of:i.sktityig h'ild at ttev- hart ,,,,Leit sill favor o
night. Senator tfel?2.0 !at. v a'" _changes bOnefititig7 bi ieic
this akternoon, and:. at:hinged on if saysate,ppioses in ain-
short notice.. ,t... -- -.,n, :?'!". - eottte tax ''exqMptfens ti
The two are the.prinvipal 'con..2,1the loss irif; revenii it
tenders tom Mary14. 's sopPoH.' yri
Tuesday's DerneerAt.is Presiden- "His p,tiVicerStfor revektu
Gal preferentee 'primary. .'lo. the; 'TreararrY 'fraly.
116,,The Oregon Sedaler also- sag
.--,whert;Ve are coasiderin ldt
he wanted to clarify bis-statdme tax Veatment for low all4i' mid
yesterday that he was in p..--`'stiaP- die- laccllate 14xPUarks' II'
Kennedy Thowetn?01-': ::.014-- is a char , ged ' ' 17.;t:-
.- . d ',Mt'. ,...,
k
one-manrt momovement,lt, %.-pt'lll-ior on 1-Ie also sai lctrl
agreed with the 1160-11lcati're by
behalflof nor in alliance With any
voting 'against : anacirdnient,
one else, he statecl. , I "whereby ' the JrcentIS of ?Iittblic
He :repcatet4 tdo, that he Was power were trying to heat hac';
l`no stalking hoc" for Mini E.' the Budget Bureau. and lbi, ap-
Stetkenson, whom he., 'fias desig- ministration ,;it. ?the crill'lmq of
nate&as his choice far President these'great;e0p,Ciess"
after himself.. Finally, ;he 2 declared, bi... oti.
Mr. Morse elaborated on this in ponent wori(ed againt inclpdii::;
a '-Baltimore televik.don talk to- grants to ervice men under the
till education bill and took the
night, Saying he would fav6r nay
position that Federal aid ;o
of the Major Democratic, +Ranch.
schools should cover only school
dates-'`. even Lyndon ,Inlinsqii-Ji- construction help. Mr. Kennedy
to Senatti Kennedy. All ru'e more did vqte for the entire education
liberal., he ' said..1 " ' hod, including teachers' pay pro,-
He previous134has said it would visions, he added Air
be a "mistake%for the party In
nominate Senator Johnson..
In his evening,tillt, fac,also said
"the onlY thing :that's gnged up
on Jack li:erintdilk.his own voting
record.- ;
Senator ,Miriv?.,?.alamk.4440,ghtt
mned this eptaltry
;tila? ? .naissance flights
over ussia. ttviet
Premier's reac[io in
denr- /
Russian fighter planes could
have "encircled it and forced it
down." he said', but,i45.14404,4faiwi
shoL4uatiii...4414,44iiiitolasli4g,,, pur-
poses
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INDIANAPOLIS (Ind.)
TIMES Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7
MAY I 0 19S0
Circ.: e. 92,756
S. 105,750
Front Edit Other
Page Page Page
; itAbs
Datei4.,
Tell All
About Spy:
Capehart
Times Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON, May 10 ?
Hoosiers have every right to
know exactly what went on in
the Soviet shoot-down of that
U. S spy-plane Sen. HCLMer ,
fiapehart, CB, Iner.1 told his
Senate colleagues,, in a collo-4,
guy with Sen. rank IL;
Lausche (D. 0.) on the Sen-41
ate floor.
Both senators were taking ,
the position that, as members
of the /Senate Foreign Rela-
? tions Committee, they should
have been invited, when Com-
mittee rjugrrrian Fullaright
Ark.) and rafiririEr COmmittee '
members were given a "fill-in"!,
on the Matter by Secretary of
State Her arid CIA Director:.
Dulles,.yest . """*.lbe
"THE PEOPLE of Indla.naL;
are entitled to know what is&
going nu in this case," Sen.;,
Capehart said. "As a member,
hi the Senate Foreign Rela4
ions, -Committee. I am charged
'..vitivoifinding out and telling',
them"
Sen. Lausche backed up this
stalfd-litici-laid"tnat if mem-
bers of the Senate Foreign Re- '
lathtins Committee are to per-
form their duties properly,
they must be informed fully
on the case.
Showing that he was an. .
gry at not being asked to.
at t end the briefing, Sen.
(.apehart said:
''The Eisenhower administra-
tion should take Congress into
its ebnfidence. Perhaps , we
could be of some help. God'
knows they need help, If I can
read the record and the times
correctly,"
Lansche explained that he.
went to the briefing room,
supposing all committeemen
were invited, but he was told
it was a "closed meeting for
the lsaders."
"TO MY embarrassment, I
had to leave." he concluded."
Sen. Cap ehar t contended
that this was a violation of
'the right to know."
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WMAL (Washington) 12 May 1960
REMARKS OF CONG. ASHLEY
Today in Congress at 6:45 P.M. over WMAL (Washington):
JOSEPH McCAFFERY: "Again the question today: what really happened to the
U.S. plane over Russia, and should the President now go to Russia?-were the
questions most often asked at the Capitol as elsewhere. It was revealed that CIA
Chief Allen Dulles came to the Capitol again yesterday to outline the situation
before a special House Armed Services Subcommittee. According to one who was
present, the latest Males briefing, the plane apparently suffered what's called
a flame-out(?) at about 70,000 feet, forcing the pilot to come down to a level
where he was then forced to the ground. This source reports also that CIA officials
have complete confidence in the integrity of the pilot, Francis C. Powers, and
they do not know what was involved in his apparent decision to admit that he was a spy.
',Members of the subcommittee voted unanimously to cemmend Dulles and the
CIA for their handling of the whole affair.
"Today too the House Rules Committee put on the shelf several proposals to
subject the CIA to closer Congressional scrutiny. Rules Chairman Howard Smith of
Virginia said the committee feels this is not the time to conduct public hearings
on the subject. Although no vote was taken, this decision too was apparently
unanimous. However, some committee members indicated that they favored a closer
look at this question at some future time.
"One of several members of Congress I talked to today about the spy incident
WAS Toledo, Ohio's congressman, Thomas Ashley. I asked him if, in view of the
Now situation that has developed, whether the President should go to Russia next month."
ASHLEY: "Well, I think if be has an opportunity to do so, it will be fine.
I hardly think that the Russians will have any reason to welcome him, however."
HOCAFFERY: "Do you think that our sky spy- incident has ruined any chance of
anything happening positively at the coming summit meeting which starts on Monday?"
ASHLEY: "I think that it is certainly?casts a very dark shadow over the
summit conference. It's perfectly clear, of course, that the position of the
United States at this time is far worse than it's been--well, in years, as far
as world opinion is concerned. We have lost the initiative as far as world public
relations is concerned?It's obvious?and I think that this recent U-2 plane
incident has really given them a tremendous iniative that is very very unfortunate
and will be for a long time to come."
McCAFFERY: "There seems to have been some kind of a coalition cohesing (SIC)
behind the administration on this incident. I noticed that in the news today,
for example, there's not going to be any effort to press for a joint committee
to keep an eye on our intelligence because the feeling seems to be on the Hill,
according to the stories, that the less said, the better, about our intelligence
service at this time. Looking a little ahead to November, do you -think that this
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will still be a political issue, even though there seems to be some unity on the
part of the Democrats behind the administration 6n their off-again, onpiaga policy/8
ASHLEY: Valls I think very definitely it will be an issue. You're q
right when you say that as far as intelligence work is concerned, the less said
the better--this is true. Now this is what makes totally outrageous the state-
ments of the administration with respect to the plane incident. They wastedno
-time whatever with respect to the plane incident. They wastedno time whatever
in first denying, then admitting, and finally revealing all as far as this activity
is concerned, and the opinion, both in this country-?the measure of opinion in
this country, And world-wide too, is that this JO totally unnecessay and uncalled for."
McCAFFERY: "It's not the incident so much, it's the handling of the incident
after it happened?"
ASHLEY: "Absolutely so. We're talkingabout intelligence work and intelligence
activity does require a certain amount of secrecy, but this is true when things go
wrong as well as when things are going right."
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Various radio stations MAY 15, 1960
in Louisiana:
SENATOR LONG COMMENTS ON SPY PLANE INCIDENT
Senator Russell B. Long, by tape recording, over various radio stations
in Louisiana:
COMMENTATOR: "Senator, this past week, probably the most important subject
on the national scene was the supposedly shooting down of an American plane by
the Russians. May we have your comments on that, sir?"
SEN. LONG: "I don't know whether they shot it down or brought it dawn with
a missile or whether the plane just ran out of oxygen in the high altitudes and
had to come down ,but, in any event, they have an American pilot there and they
have the remains of an American plane that this boy wasflying. The fact of
the matter is that a lot of us have reason to believe, not by virtue of it having
been given to us officially but by having heard informally or having heard rumors
about it, that this country was sending planes behind the Iron Curtain. Those
planes were unarmed and the purpose was to get information that we would need in
the event that the Soviet Union decided to attack the United States.
"Now, as you know, this country is so wide open and so are most of the free
world countries that it is very easy for Russia or anybody else to get all the
information they to know about where our defense installations areand
New where our Army bases are, where our cities are, where our major industries are.
For the most part, they can get it just by request, write the Chamber of
Commerce and get the information; but, in their country, they that
iron curtain and try to maintain such excessive secrecy that we have not been
able to find out for certain about a great number of things we would have to
know about the Soviet Union in the event that we were forced to go to war with
them. Now, you know and I know that we are not planning to start a war with
anybody, but if war is forced upon us and all these long-range missiles are
exploded upon our country and our people are killed by the tens of millions,
perhaps half of them killed in a single day, we would have to know how to go about
striking back. Now if we couldn't get the information any better way, than I
suppose the only thing to do was to do what we have been doing and, while it is
too bad that they shot this boy down and we would just as soon that they didn't
have the proof of it that we had been getting the information in the way that we
have been getting it, I would a lot rather have done that than not to have the
information. Now, there will be some problems about that in the future.
oI think the biggest asset about it is that we have been getting away with
it for four years and I think we have Russia pretty well photographed from the
air and we know where most of their things are right now. They tell me that in
a year or so we ought to have a space satellite developed which will circle in
outer space and give us the same information we are looking for without coming
quite as close to the Soviet Union. But, as a practical matter, what real
difference does it make whether you are taking the pictures from a space satellite
a hundred miles up or from an airplane that is 12 miles up?--it's still the same
principle. You need to know what is behind that Iron Curtain and we are finding
it out the best way that we canto
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COMMENTATOR: "DO you think at this time that it will do any harm to the summit
conference getting under way at this time?"
'ISBN. LONG: "I don't think it makes any difference. It certainly shouldn't
make any difference. It's all according to the state of mind that the people go
in there with. I certainly don't think that President Eisenhower is going to
let that prejudice him--he shouldn't. As a matter of fact, Mr. Khrushchev
knew we were doing this for the last four or five years and so did we, and the
only difference is that while he would say it, at a summit conference perhaps) or
in a conversation with President Eisenhower, and President Eisenhower would say,
'Well, I don't know anything about ti. I haven't been informed of anything
of that sort. It must be somebody else's airplane that you are complaining
about.' Well now, he knows it, but the fact of the matter is that both sides
know to begin with that those were American planes flying behind Russia and getting
those photographs and that information, and, incidentally, although we haven't
had the good .fortune of shooting one of theirs down--and didn't particularly try--
they have bean flying over our advanced bases, they have been over Alaska, they have
been over our bases at Thule, which is on Greenland, many ti as, repeatedly, and
these bases which we have on foreign soil have been flown over many times by
Soviet planes. How do we know it? Well, we see the vapor trails up there that
are left in the sky after one of these fast jet planes go through, if there is
a fair amount of vapor in the sky, so both sides have been doing some of this and
my only objection is that, frankly) the Soviet spy system knows a lot more about
us than we know about than even as it stands now."
COMMENTATOR: "Another news making event this past week, Senator Long, was
the Democratic primary--n
SEN. LONG: "Before that, I said 'my only objection'--let me say this. I
have great sympathy for that young Man Who is back there. He didn't go over there
on his own mission. He went over there because we wanted that work done and he
risked his life. If we paid him $2500 a month, which works out to about 30
thousand dollars a year, I still don't think that's any big pay for what he was
doing for this country, and, to the best of our information there are several of
our pilots that we were using on the same type of mission. They were not working
directly for the Department of Defense. They were working, as I understnd it,
for some other agency of the government, perhaps the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
but I don't regard those people as being anything other than patriots. That
was their job and I would regard them in somewhat the same sense as I look upon
Nathan Hale, whose statue is right down on ConstitAtion Avenue here in Washington
by the Department of Justice of the, government. His famous last words were,
'My only regret is that I have but one life to give for my country.' You know,
he was an American spy. He was a school teacher and he was trying to get
information as to where the British troops were for the aid of General Washington's
troops, and we don't regard him as anything other than agreat American who was
trying to help his country, and the same thing is true of this young man. It
takes a lot of patriotism far and beyond the pay, in order for a boy to do that
kind of work. You know, a pilot who is that well qualified could get himself a
good job at 15 thousand dollars or 18 thousand dollars a year for an airline
anyway, so those young men who have been doing that work, just as this young
man was doing, have been performing a great service to this country and the
fact that they have been doing it, I think, is just one more reason why the Soviet
Union will think a long time before they attack this country."
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TAB
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CONGRESSIONAL RECIatoved For Release 2004/N1131. hik-RDP9OT00782R000100060001-7
sTr,,aut!:orietr' Spy Ptr.o
- -3 of Aliki
FXTENSION OI o .U,EMARKS
OF
EON. J. CARLIOLLOSER
OF TENNESSEE
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 11, 1960
Mr. LOSER. I Mr. Speaker, under
icave to extei.d my remarks in the Ap-
pendix of thellecoao, I call to the at-
Lention Of.thejleSe 53 editorial appear-
one of
, pointing up a
ing in the
our great ? tie
nalor cold war
The editorial -!...'ollov,te:
?if NAITTETORIZED"`81.r 'PLANE IS POOREST KIND
Now that th.e.?-i*.;-st,ory of the spy-plane
over 5og4,:i6gasia, is coming to light,
).e American- pitbiii.; ii?entiticd to know who
was . responsible Ier thia. .nia-jor cold-war
`Tlie feet that iehave been trying to find
what we s going on behind the Iron Our-
i11 has been well Known. And we nifty Oe
ure that our eaults have been ma unne,
- 'iat Russia in .seeking out Arnerican.
But it vdlbhar4 _tO.,explain. why the
United States Ninci-Vtlok this latest venture
in Russian.4.10.3F,t bore the May 16 summit
meeting witilinin, ,,,Ilkoperly weighing the
chances of detectiO...a.rid exposure. ,
To say that this was an unauthorized ex-
ploit by a civilian filer is just another way
of muddling the picture. For It has been
. imacie clear that the supersecret U-2 single-
engine jet was chartered froin.the Lockheed
: Aircraft Co. by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, which in turn was be-
ing serviced by the Air Force.
One point that has been carefully skirted is
the part played by Mr. Alien Dulles' Central
Intelligence Agency, and this also involves
the part played by the ,,National Security
Counpianci?,President Eisenhower himself.
..?
There was a good deal of cunning in the
way Nikita Khrushchev misled the United
States in his first announcement of the
plane's destruction over the Ural Mountains,
far from the nearest free-world border, for
that led the State Department into a trap
and brought forth excuses-which later proved
to be without merit.
The solar plexus blow came when it was
revealed that the U-2 pilot has survived and,
according to the Soviets, confessed his spy
foie.
Never has Mr. Khritshenev had better
chance to denounce-the United Stajeti as an
aggresspr, and he is making the rhea of it.
Iris threat of a public trial for the tinfortu-
nate pilot may never be carried out, but it is
something for Washington to worry about.
Coming at the same-time as the summit ses-
sion, it could have a devastating effect.
Spying between the United States and Rus-
sia is old stuff indeed. For our part, there
is a need to guard against surprise attack;
but the Russians can say that they have
reason to react strongly when shadow planes?
traveling at great height, cross into Aheir
territory.
They are saying this now with a vengeance, ,
and the facts make it almostnyjposible for
our best friends to defend, our' course. The.
photographing of military instailatiLns,
which seems to have been substantiatEd,
cannot lightly be brushed aside.
What, it may be asked, wa.3 the great emer-,
gency that caused this infotirtaVier'r-gathering
flight? We know of none.
But we do know that its embarrassing fail-
ure has damaged the position of the United
States and its allies before the summit, and
may make any kind of agreement harder to
reach.
rom Russia's standpoint, the opportunity
leli(ven to make further boast of its rocketry,
-though this is the point on which their story
clOwn. For if the spy plane had been
ii 'by the first shot from a ground-to-air
*?uket,'It cannot be believed that the pilot
Wbitrt have had the chance to bail out.
Such- an inaccuracy, however, does not
carry too- much weight in view of the rash
of errors?-asttribUtetl. to the mate Depart-
ment.14 trying.to,confuse the issue.
Infortriatihr theriag, as it is termed in
Wash* is pccesffiry paat of the cold
it is
the h yoiryears to d,re But
leb! ihould be left in
war, an
o
-se actions, at times,
seers. ? 'risible.
talk Of unauthorized
0 when it is all too plain that
s dous venture Would never be
by an individual unless someone
hu echelons had given the word.
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CONCY
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FH 1960
NIFE1A-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7
Former Congressman Phillips Declared
U-2 Case Slums Need for Return of
American Ideals-
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON. FRANK KOWALSKI
OF' CONNECTICUT
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 11,190
Mr. KOWALSKI. Mr. Speak4, a dis-
tinguished former. Member of' this body,
Hon. Alfred N. Phillips, has sent me a
telegram on the U-2 case which I bring to
the attention pf my colleagues.
Fenner pongressman Phillips points
out how the honor of the United States
has been sullied by the mishandling of
this situation and pleads elo'qtiently for
a return to high ethics and lofty ideals.
Here is the text of Mr. Phillips' tele-
'-u'am to me:
Hon. FRAMS Hoven/Ala,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
Many people including the writer are utter-
ly shocked at the-photograph on the New
York Daily News fronorpw?Oant'Secretary of
State Herter andi?splraotor _of !Intelligence
Dulles las, slang_ river-the have
otten ug intom.. Was this by the orders of
the-PiSalderit Of the United States of Amer..
[Ca? How can these men or any American
isugh when they have sent possibly to his
doom an out.of-uniform, American held as
spy. who can justly be shot under interna-
tional law as a spy? ..Furthermore it is cer-
tainly lopAughing matter when the foreign
policy of our Olovernment has been proved
to be based on falsehood, misstatements, and
chicanery. It is hard to believe that anyone
directing the destinies Of our country could
guide it any way except through truthful
honesty and integrity and that goes for every-
one from the President down. I trust that
in the House of Representatives of the United
States you will do your part to see that those
responsible for the low estate into which
our country has fallen will be brought to
account for it and relieved of their responsi-
bilities no matter who they are and that the
historic high standing an honor and ideals
of the United States of America will be put.
back again as standards by which all of us
can Live best.
Personal regards,
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MAY '960
Hartford Courant
-f,ibrari-CCr411
-.7?' Under unanimous consent, I bring the:.
texts of these two, editori- Pr,b 'the* sati?
tentiOn, of !liay
Li-voin late U,1,9401.
1.7Norm sAs,r, a?py?',K.rro rusur?thom
AppeientlY the -efiteleit-Soviet 'line is that
the American sppplene mission was a piece ?
of deldeenate Peel 0,NLioje,rrienW,Yeeirevent
agreement at the sunnnl . But rinrely re-
spoiaselale statesmexi?ofiThoth sides of the
iron cUrtain. Tonvinik:VrEigiense.
There May be some doctrinaire Conuntmists
who stiliempeat ?the Alftexiatn. rItleal state-
ment tritgftell eeeitrectlibliste- 'axe
But feir the neeteentectetille IninaPPY inci-
dent shove:eel-4A:: ,Sean sq, mitelck.as
a warmonger as inept.
Why ad the liessZeOreree, geeternment
knows that every other government is en-
gaged in spying. Soviet .nussia presumably
more than most. After all, we have Russian
spies sitting in U.S. prisons right now. PrOb-
ably the incident sent tremors around the
world not only becauee of its :unhappy
timing just before the swami ut.top her
i:easone ecief;Fst, it eva
snectaeulat kind of spyin
.nore linmettitanie it caught th erri-
ment In_a.eie. And third and most Impor-
tant, ? F.0 8t43.1 una,nswero quesuoo.5
to lc, qiup's left hand lets Ms
ha ci at:it IS doing, -
riteAriftt:...r
11 icrvii'Pler'Edre tarSrld
hkitTwn, 'frOin(te asthe
t
efittitiede
-Orif o land in
teiikte; (Tie- ttgliiceofi'llbwn in the
inki1."Kr;Matili, *lb% rho lived to
tell ties? Then a;'ext down-
right irtuniliating'tli -imminent,
leader of the free hrough Re"!
'e tie 06p rtfle**n- t?met that"
eittElitieVait abt0-4444' a's- a lie. Let
/ treat 4.11: lieffereittdri has now learriede
eiteeleedlde eireetteielearned long ago:
it4itler isteit eitiething at all, tell the,
tiaidet. 'iAred, r3etariel; if you can't tell the
el-teethe dont r,ay anything at all.
=!vcn more distuebtrig is the hint of a lack
of dieeipline and control in our Government.
'ClecilPresideeee and Secretary of State should
certainly be aware of e,ny such intelligence
ectivities, though not necessarily of the de-
tails. But the CIA and Pentagon should
elot only know the details, but should be
serinitive enough to political arid diplomatic
overtone!: never to risk such a mission at
and Waterbury Re.
on U-2 Fiasco It is tlistressing tO Teter that an Air Force
menual claims the Nil/liege of flying infor-
mation missions without specific authority
from the President or 1T1S civilian advisers.
Thie reflects an appalling lack of discipline.
The prospect of thermonuclear war is so
frightening that no responstelle.goeternment
would allow one to Eitart, But -what if the
armed services or intelligenerseivices of any
nation, let alone the United States, feel free
,nioing,of Like rtconniuse!o4i.ci
wjelatkied4erier the front pages or ne,wspapen:
througlyM, pin world cou144?badiy be
better advantage to the &NEW Union near
the eve of the summit parley In Paris. One
can unfeeretweet Ruseian *ennui* elieitit
FehruelicteAets -ghee in annotraceng and de-
nouncing the American akeeeeipt to pi obe
the.) activity oC his ?Okuntry.
At iirsE:America was slightly enraged -the t
a U.S. pldne, supposedly under 'the
siLpel-
v%Qn of the National Space 044 Aeronautics
plinistration and engaged in weather oh-
servat,i'on,, should be downed or wandering,
filikeeviiatever` reason, across the border into
f*Sivist Ea:Spate. The State Department and
adrefiniatralibtenelltials misinformed the U.S.
public inadoettently, for the information
'given then, and the cause of much in our
discomfituroAtz ates from that hush-nth
agency ha..
teiligenceP
It noWi
that d
out ell
were
sledded
Allen Dulles, centre
the flight was ordered by
th ifin"-laye for ferreting
ikille,atitnt the Russians
. a epreeummit splurge,
e 'Soli-let target practice t the
ee,prier to. Khrushchev's
firdettaken was immense, and
know,_boomertinged.
Kremlin. as might be expected, han-
d11 tele incident With the best of its prone-
,galeifito lireeeetet. eherpening a ravor edge to
pare Wet:rine eprestige and purpose at the
coming eleedei of:- state meeting. The prin-
cipal hope: Of the world's peoples, the re-
laxation oLglobal tensions, has been some-
what dashed,- ? efee
Klirushchev Will doubtless use this wind-
'fen to preessure -Milt/es-term Allies on a stand
orriBerlin ancroary ftill summoning of
liftateriv moral anti military authority- will
detee? desession of reckless and relentless
bargaining by the Moscow agents.
'Arocticans were not only disturbed at the
spy atm', they were surprised. They ieldorn
realize that not only do we conienct highly
secret intelligence and counterintelligence
operations; lent we maintain a lethal ring
of airbases hitund the Soviet 'Union. In
times of militarj. or civil chagrin these in-
stallations eneragencies 8,re given inordinate
and ominotis pedelleity without the proper
perspective and haderstanding of their pur-
pose and necessit'Y.- - '
The cold war , a sud-
e our
mech. a delicate tixne,'
E,REMARKS
OF
litANK-OWALSKI
r .evy0 C011itigCTICPT
TN Teleil'ITOIISE OF REeaEsENTATIvES
117,34*^;e,lay, May 11, 1960 ? -tq play with dangerous military bardWare
eeelee Over another nation's territory? The risk
SPeakerotkvoV , of an unintended, eccidental launching irif
assment felt by ithe pushbutton war is 'already too great withOut
mos.
Government's: our adding to it.
eekel&ident are re- It might be well if President and Con-
gress were quietly and carefully to study
the whole subject afresh. The first nec-
essity is to make certain that nobody goes'
off half cocked. The second is to make cer-
tain that whatever is said on behalf of the
U.S. Govermnent is the truth.
Mr. K
shock en
American
handling ,* .14
fleeted ,in.. " 1
torials- carried yesterday
by two of Our leadinrlitgnieoticut news-
papers, the Hartford &Want and the
Waterbury Republican.
The Courant editorial is summarized
in its title, "Uncle Sam, Spy?and
Stumblebum."
The Waterbury Republican editorial
points out that "The spy in the sky
fiasco has shaken and embarrassed the
American public."
[Prom the Waterbury Republican, May 10,
The spy in the sky fiasco has shaken and
enibarrassed the American public.
den flash by the
chief agencies. *ke:n back.
"Spy," by consensus, is aj ty 44.41,Intel-
ligence is preferable. ni /tore, operate
an intelligence network- %be Wend!, over.
gleaning, as beet we can, informitti*
knowledge otherWise uabtainable f tiOrtiebe-
hind the Iron Curtain or, the' Bamboo Cur-
_
tamn. or any ()metal upaciuStless.
This data is demanded or a government
competing for the leadership of ihe free
world and the survival of democratic and
capitabar institutions in other areas of the
glolieez Communist spies in the Unitt.c1 Mates
have been caught in number. T,heir espio-
nage, Sabotage, and subversive activities make
mandatory counterintelligence. Sae].) sys-
tems are realities in international affairs,
however unpalatable they may seem.
The unfortunate error of judgment, and
the consequences it may have, should in
no way impugn the cardinal need of inkei-
ligence work in assuring the security of the
Nation. But it should prompt an examinit-
tion of the lines of authority in such mat-
ters and guarantee that similar action will
not be taken at so crucial a time .svitaout.
the consent of the President and titce Tesedi.
ness to answer to the public conicitnice.
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CONGRESSIONAL RINSitiqiiied For Release 2(1611/015q3196t1A-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7
Meriden (Conn.) Record Comments on
"Bad Blunder" in U-2 Case
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. FROLLQWALSKI
OF CONNECTICUT
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
' Thursday, May 12, 1960
Mr. KOWALSKI. Mr. Speaker, under
unanimous consent I present the text of
an editorial carried by the Meriden Rec-
ord in my hprrie State of Connecticut
on the U-2 incident and the handling of
it by our Government.
This editorial is another indication of
the extent to which the American people
are disturbed by the inept way in which
this entire matter has been handled.
Following is the text of the Meriden
ReQATALeatorial of May 11:
EXCUSES, UNLIMITED
The United States has been caught in a
bad blunder in the case of the plane and
pilot shot down over Russian territory and
the Reds are making the most of it. At a
Lime and in a place where the greatest eix-
,enispe4.;tion were inclicateii; we have been
;.thi.110t aay awk*Ki; a:acl =lieavyhandsd.
ovJt in Use.tws have handled our
responses to the Russian roars witki all the
finesse of a kid caught with jam on his face.
There is nothing very remarkable about
the Russians having caught somebody spy-
ing on them; it goes on all the time. on
both sides of the tense. There are plenty
of Red agents in this country and in Can-
ada, and every so often one of them is un-
covered amid a big flurry of publicity, tried,
and usually sentenced to prison. We may
safely assume that their counterparts exist
among our people on assignment in Russia.
But sending somebody in to investigate
the weather or anything else over Russian
territory in a jet plane, however unarmed, is
another and much riskier matter, and one
which we would certainly protest if it were
to happen against us. Sending a plane
across this particular bit of border, about
which the Soviets have been notoriously
touchy, makes the violation gratuitous. And
engaging in this sort of spying in the strato-
sphere at this particular time, when chances
of summit agreement deserve all the odds
they can get, is timing so bad as to be un-
believable.
All of which Wouldn't matter very much
If the Russians were determined, as they
seem to have been earlier, that the Big Pour
meeting be conducted in amity. Premier
Khrushchev has his own way of manipulat-
ing history and if his calculations had called
for warm winds at the summit he would
have held off on the cold blast here.
Unhappily, the incident seems to have
coincided with Red realization that no real
concessions were planned by the West on
Berlin and the general German situation,
for which Khrushchev was stubbornly -hop-
ing. It gives him just the excuse he needs
to charge bad faith, stir up public opinion
:igainst us, and generally sabotage the sum-
mit chances while putting the blame on us.
And while he probably could have found his
own excuses anyway, there's no need for us
Co supply them for free.
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1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDI
summer, in July 1959. Until that date
there were three different inches in use
in the world. By international agree-
ment, we shortened our inch by two-
millionths of a measurement, and the
British Commonwealth increased its
inch almost by the same amount.
These accuracies are all the more im-
portant in an age of scientific accom-
plishment such as ours. In the han-
dling of atomic energy, in the making
of guided missiles, we often demand ac-
curacies to five- or ten-millionths of an
inch. Albert M. Dexter of Pratt and
Whitney says this requires an accuracy
on the part of gages, therefore, to one-
millionth of an inch. Not long ago,
Pratt and Whitney participated with
the National Bureau of Standards in
pushing the frontier of precise measure-
ment to one-tenth of a millionth of an
inch. From Mr. Dexter's computations,
that is the thickness of one sheet of
newspaper sliced into 30,000 separate
sheets.
I should not pass this by without not-
ing that Pratt and Whitney is familiarly
called in the Hartford area by the name
and by the suffix?West Hartford?to
differentiate it from another firm of the
same name?the Pratt & Whitney Air-
craft Division of United Aircraft Corp.
Each descends from the New England
craftsmanship of Francis Pratt and
Amos Whitney, the pioneers in metal
working, but some time ago went sep-
arate business ways to become parts of a
different corporate family. Pratt &
Whitney Co. of West Hartford is a sub-
sidiary of the Fairbanks Whitney Corp.
To provide further information, I
submit an editorial from the Hartford
Times of Saturday, May 7, which traces
the industrial fame of the organization:
PRATT & WHITNEY, 100 YEARS O' INDUSTRIAL
FAME
Many a manufacturing company points
with pride to some outstanding contribution
it has made to industrial progress or for the
advancement of the general economy. At its
100th anniversay, Pratt & Whitney Co., Inc.,
would find it difficult to choose as its top
achievement any one success among its long
list of outstanding industrial triumphs.
Much of the time of generations of Pratt
& Whitney craftsmen has been devoted to
the establishment of uniform standards for
manufacturing precision. Fineness is taken
for granted in an age used to measuring and
working to a millionth of an inch. Before
P. & W. took up the challenge there was no
reliable standard measure of anything.
There was no machine tool that could main-
tain uniform quality in operation.
Would the leading P. & W. contribution
therefore be its devotion to precision and
refinement of the international inch? But
one must not forget that the company also
brought out the means to make possible the
introduction of standard threads on nuts and
bolts. Much of the modern world is literally
held together on the basis of this accomplish-
ment.
Jokingly, ours has been called a tin-can
civilization. Yet, except for a P. & W. inno-
vation, a special micrometer to measure and
help control the thickness of moving ribbons
of strip steel, the making of cans would have
been a wasteful and makeshift business.
The establishment of precision aids and
the making of measuring devices was inci-
dental to the main work of the shop. That
has been the manufacture of machine to0
used to produce other manufactured pr
ucts.
During the great industrial period of crea-
tivity 1900-1920, Pratt & Whitney contributed
more new machine development than all
other machine-tool manufacturers in the
world combined. The company was the
leader in design of entirely new types of ma-
chine tools and gages.
Out of its shops came the jig borer, thread
miller, spline miller, vertical shaper, vertical
surface grinder and reamers with right-hand
cut and left-hand spiral, all of them rep-
resenting major advances.
Pratt & Whitney still is unexcelled in the
field of design and innovation. It has auto-
mated many of its machines with use of
taped controls for their operation. Thurs-
day the company will dedicate its Centennial
Hall at the West Hartford plant with a
permanent exhibit of the latest P. & W.
products as well as of early products and
mementos.
It was no easy thing for Francis A. Pratt,
the salesman and promoter, and Amos Whit-
ney, the machinist and shop manager, to
start this business 100 years ago. They did
it in their own spare time after working
a full day at other regular jobs.
Their first large order was for production
of Spencer's automatic silk winders for use
in the Cheney Bros. mills in Manchester, and
by the Willimantic Linen Co. Manufacturing
had just been stepped up when Pratt & Whit-
ney were burned out. They started again,
and soon were producing arms for use in the
Civil War. This led to making the machines
by which armaments were produced.
Pratt & Whitney made the first silent type-
writer model, put together the Paige typeset..
ter in which Mark Twain invested a profit-
less fortune, and produced tabulating ma-
chines and envelope machinery among more
than 2,000 items for the worldwide market.
It would be impossible to sum tip com-
pletely the economic benefits that Pratt &
Whitney, Inc., has brought to Hartford and
all of this region in its 100-year history.
Certainly it has helped to make central
Connecticut a famous leader in the machine
tool industry.
Gathered here as an experienced labor
force in its factory were some of the world's
best craftsmen. Of Pratt & Whitney's nearly
3,000 present employes there are 597 who are
members of its Quarter Century Club. They
grew to proficiency under outstanding con-
ditions of production, excellence, and atten-
tion to detail.
And although the company has its vast
plant in West Hartford, employees come from
97 Connecticut communities and more than
a dozen towns in nearby States, an indica-
tion of the widespread economic importance
of the enterprise. The company's annual
payroll is some $16 million, its purchase of
supplies amounts to about $12 million, it
pays annual town and State taxes of $558,000,
and the company's gifts to charity and edu-
cation are on the order of $50,000 annually.
Such figures count heavily in the support of
Connecticut prosperity.
Governor Ribicoff rightly has called the
company one of the foundation stones of
this State's industry. Importantly, the Pratt
& Whitney story and its success should serve
as inspiration to the scores of struggling
small new industries in Connecticut. Some
of them, too, will become giants in their
fields.
To Pratt & Whitney Inc., industrially, fa-
mous for 100 years, we pay our respects and
look for the company to increase its fame in
the years to come.
A4077
oviet Deception Demands Drastic Sur-k,
veillance Steps
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. SIR
WOMOND
OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Thursday, May 12, 1960
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on
May 10,1960, cs1,,yaakip
published an e? ? ?
mou ? ..igaich merits the
attenro-E7r..tirrearrm-and all Amer-
icans interested in our national security.
It is entitled "Soviet Deception Demands
Drastic Surveillance Steps."
I ask unanimous consent that this ex-
cellent editorial from this outstanding
newspaper be printed in the Appendix of
the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD.,
as follows:
SOVIET DECEPTION DEMANDS DRASTIC
SURVEILLANCE STEPS
Nikita Khrushchev's timely, propaganda-
charged report to the Supreme Soviet is a
reminder that global war has not ended.
He told a shouting, applauding Parlia-
ment that a U.S. jet plane had been shot
down and that the American pilot had con-
fessed that he was on a spying mission,
photographing Soviet military bases and in-
dustrial installations.
The Soviets have resisted all efforts to
establish effective disarmament controls.
Even President Eisenhower's "open skies"
proposal has been flatly rejected. It would
merely permit international aerial inspec-
tion to assure against a buildup for surprise
attack.
The United States and her allies cannot
take a chance on the secret mounting of a
Soviet sneak offensive. To avoid this pos-
sibility the United States has developed,
from a weak beginning early in World War
II, what is said to be the world's best in-
telligence system.
State Department spokesmen admitted
that planes have been making reconnais-
sance flights along the frontiers of the free
world for the past 4 years. It is a reason-
able guess that these forays might extend
into possible Soviet staging areas.
In order to defend ourselves intelligently,
we must know what our potential aggressor
is doing. That involves certain risks, such
as those faced when Francis G. Powers set
out from Pakistan on a flight across the
breadth of Soviet Russia.
Even the fact that the Soviets had em-
placements in the mountainous heart of the
U.S.S.R. equipped to shoot him down from
an altitude of 12 miles is valuable military
information.
Unless the pattern has changed recently,
the Soviets are making almost daily feints
by squadrons of planes against our Alaskan
defenses. It is likely that they are carrying
on similar probing operations all around the
free-world perimeter. Soviet warplanes are
flagrantly invading the airspace over Japan.
Soviet submarines prowl off our Atlantic
shores. One of their spy trawlers recently
watched our submarine rocket tests 60 miles
off the coast of Rhode Island. A pretty good
indication of the effectiveness of Soviet spy-
ing activities in this country is the fact
that the Reds stole most of our hush-hush
atomic secrets.
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A4078 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX
On the other hand, there are strong indi-
cations that we know what is going on be-
hind the Iron Curtain. We are aware of
many Soviet military strengths and weak-
nesses. We know that certain of their rocket
claims are hoaxes. We have made some mis-
takes in intelligence that have cost billions
of dollars, such as the Arctic dew line that
was erected to stop a Soviet bomber armada
that did not exist. Proper intelligence avoids
such expensive blunders in defense,
The United States has been criticized be-
cause the ill-fated Powers expedition came
just before the summit meeting, taking an
unusually big propaganda risk. But we know
from experience that Khrushchev uses his
major peace gestures to cover up some big
political or military excursions. While wav-
ing an olive branch over the upcoming meet-
ing, he has been able to establish an ideologi-
cal beachhead in Guinea on the west tip of
Africa. He could also use the conference to
cover up military preparations inside Russia.
The worst Khrushchev can say about the
incident of the unarmed U.S. photographic
plane over the Urals is that he caught us try-
ing to find out what mischief his regime
lksc
ight be concocting.
Petition
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. THOMAS J. LANE
laws of physics and economy and without
true moral aspects we can build only moral
and political chaos.
Looking at the 40 years of the history
of communism, at its conquests and rob-
bery, at its murderous and bloody march,
not heeding any laws of God and morality
and taking under consideration the false
communistic philosophy, we must sound the
alarm and call upon the conscience of the
leaders of the United States to change their
tactics and politics because the false com-
munistic philosophy must be fought with
a philosophy based on moral assets. There-
fore all agreements made with the Commu-
nists must come to an end and their false
promises must be ignored. Conferences with
Bloody Khrushchev must stop. Murder and
communistic tyranny will remain forever a
murder and an enslavement, an outrage
against moral laws.
Communism based on material and Marx-
ist ideas for 40 years has not changed or
altered its ideas, seldom does it change its
strategy but very easily and according to
need and necessity, it changes its tactics.
is the reason for the latest travels, visits
and revisits of Khrushchev. That is the rea-
son for calling of the summit conference,
for behind all this undercover is the polit-
ical policy of Khrushchev; namely, to deaden
the opinion of the world in regard to their
communistic oppression.
Therefore in writing this petition to the
leaders of the United States, guiding myself
not only with a feeling of loyalty to my
native land, and with a fear of the future
of Poland, but also taking under considera-
tion the fate of the entire world, I plead
with you leaders of the Nation.
America, in protecting and defending the
freedom of the enslaved nations, is protect-
ing and safeguarding at the same time its
own freedom and happiness as well as that
of the whole world. We call today for an
alarm; for tomorrow may be too late. We
must put an end to communistic action and
to its leader Khrushchev. We must destroy
the diabolical plans of this Red Nero and
this Bloody Butcher of Budapest.
It must be done today?for tomorrow may
be too late.
Besides the danger of communism, there
arises in the world today another reviving
power, Germany, which destroyed and now
again rebuilt by America, begins to voice its
opinion and perhaps tomorrow in unity with
communism may endanger the peace of the
world.
The Germans, with specialized officers,
falsify facts and they take every opportunity
to portray the American way of thinking
and outlook for their own benefit.
The result?that along with the com-
munistic danger there appears another, that
of Germany.
Against these two dangers we must arouse
public opinion and make realistic plans for
a world peace.
The fate of the enslaved nations is a
steppingstone and a key to peace in Europe
and in the entire world. The matter of
freedom for Poland is precisely linked with
the problem of peace. If today I permit
myself to petition the leaders of the West,
I do it out of duty and love for my country
and those to whom I am indebted; namely,
those who still remain on the fighting front
and to those who work in the underground.
I am informed that the most tragic deci-
sions about Poland in the last years were
made without the consent of the Polish
people and outside of Poland. * * * "There-
fore, let decisions of hope and peace come and
arise today in the West. * ? * Let the voice
of the Polish people reach the conscience of
the American leaders through the efforts of
our friend, Jozef Mlot-Mroz. * * *" This is
the plea I receive from my friends: "We
know of your protests through hunger
strikes and if you are able and strong
OF MASSACHUSETTS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, April 21, 1960
Mr. LANE. Mr. Speaker, under leave
to extend my remarks in the RECORD,
I include the following petition from the
Anti-Communist Confederation of Pol-
ish Freedom Fighters in U.S.A., Salem,
Mass., April 11, 1960:
PETITION TO THE HONORABLE STATESMEN,
DIPLOMATS, AND MAKERS OF AMERICAN
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY, WASHING-
TON, De.
In a few weeks, in Paris, there will be
held the so-called summit conference. The
leaders of great nations will meet. The
reason for the conference is, naturally, to
talk over peace terms, especially the elimina-
tion of fear for the new methods of warfare
which may arise in a modern war situation.
At the conference both sides will speak
of peace but words are also a means and an
effort of bringing about a realization of the
fact. President Eisenhower, for instance,
a leader of the Western Nation with true
apostolic and missionary zeal will speak in
favor of a just peace based upon friend-
ship, justice, freedom and respect of human
rights. Khrushchev on the other hand
thinks only of peace in the terms of pos-
sessing the world, thus making it impossible
to hinder any communistic activities.
Khrushchev's peace is the enslavement of
millions of people through communistic op-
pression, it's the desire to possess the entire
world.
There is then no reason for useless opti-
mism.
Secondly: Not long ago, an average Amer-
ican thought that all American problems
may be solved through the help of money
and technique, since with money and mod-
ern technique we won the war??That is
true. But what is worse, we lost the peace.
Therefore it is evident, that peace can-
not be bought! Neither with gold nor the
enslavement and captivity of nations.
Peace is based on moral laws, justice, trust-
worthiness and respect. The moral laws
are as realistic and unchangeable as the
May 12
enough to perform another such a hunger
strike to protest against inhuman treatment,
Poland once again pleads for it. * * ? Poland,
with hopeful eyes, looks toward America
and pleads for help."
This appeal had been made by the leaders
of the Polish fighting nation; therefore,
their plea I will certainly realize and as my
strength permits, I will carry out.
This is the reason of my neW decision: a
protest and hunger march to Washington,
which a month before the summit confer-
ence in Paris I will put into action. April
17, Easter Sunday, on foot I leave from
Boston to Washington which I hope to reach
within a span of 2 weeks. Then in Wash-
ington for a number of days preceding the
summit conference, I will continue my
hunger strike, calling forth in this manner
for freedom of Poland and the other enslaved
nations, protesting against any negotiations
with communism and with its bloody leader,
Khrushchev.
My decision is the result of my great love
for my mother country, Poland, my loyalty
to American happiness which my brethren
in Poland do not possess. My decision is
also a command of underground benefiting
from the welfare and happiness of America.
I take this step to remind the West of the
Polish right to freedom and to arouse
Americans to the near and grave danger of
communism.
West awaken. Today's S 0 S of Poland
and the enslaved nations is a warning for
you today and tomorrow. West, awaken
today. Tomorrow may be too late.
With respect,
JOZEF MLOT-MROZ,
President, Anti-Communist Confed-
eration of Polish Freedom, Fighters
in U.S.A.
The Problems of Africa
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. EDMUND S. MUSKIE
OF MAINE
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Thursday, May 12, 1960
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, on Feb-
ruary 20, 22, and 26, 1960, Mrs. May
Craig's column "Inside in Washington,"
which appears in several newspapers in
my State, contained material of general
interest to any thoughtful American who
has an interest in foreign affairs.
In the column which appeared on Feb-
ruary 20, Mrs. Craig explained the im-
portance of the foreign-aid program, as
it might apply on the Continent of Afri-
ca. At this time, Mrs. Craig was about
to embark on an extended visit to that
great continent.
On February 22, she shared with her
readers the ninny practical problems
which face a reporter about to undertake
such a journey, and she was also able to
communicate the sense of excitement
that one feels in approaching such a
journey.
On February 26, she summarized the
briefing given by State Department per-
sonnel who are experienced in African
affairs.
I ask unanimous consent that these
three articles be printed in the Appendix
of the RECORD.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
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1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX
itself up 60 percent over last season with
116,500 people on the slopps. Nearly 14,000
people have used the ice rink, not counting
the thousands upon thousands of spectators.
"An old standby in the winter sports field
is Yos te's Badger Pass. Superintendent
John Pre writes that there have been
126,718 visit 4, by early April and they still
were coming. A% average of 500 persons use
the facilities on eekday and 1,800 to 2,600
on a typical Satur. or Sunday. This does
not include 6,232 vis :.rs who ice skated on
the valley floor. Badg ass opened In 1933
and the use has been gr ing constantly.
"Stanley R. Zeger, ac supervisor at
Eldorado National Forest, sa the year there
was substandard as far as s conditions
were concerned, but that did no low down
the skiing enthusiasts. About 95 'rcent of
the approximately 106,000 people g the
Highway 50 and South Tahoe snowfie are
skiers. The use was up about 7 per t.
"The last two snow seasons have been poo
says Supervisor Zeger, "but the trend
steadily increasing."
"The people on the east side of the moun-
tains are sharing in this activity and Mam-
moth Mountain of the Inyo National For-
est is one of the fastest growing snow re-
gions in California. Supervisor Joe Radel
reports a 32 percent gain with more than
100,400 snow visits to the Inyo.
"Although skiing is a major sport at Las-
sen National Forest and Volcanic Park, Forest
Supervisor V. A. Parker and Park Superin-
tendent Edward Freeland say heavy family
fun use attracts groups from all over north-
ern Canifornia, including the San Francisco
Bay region.
"About 22,000 traveled to Lassen Forest,
half of them going just to romp in the snow
with the rest doing the skiing. Another
15,000 toured Lassen Park's snowfields.
"There is a tremendous potential for fu-
ture development in both the Lassen and
Inyo regions as well as some of the lesser
used forest lands.
"Plumas National Forest's La Porte was
one of the first ski areas to develop in north-
ern California many, many winters ago.
With that facility and the new Johnsville
State Park coming in, the potential winter
sports development is considerable.
"I look for development of the Plumes,
Cedar Pass, Nnion Valley, and many other
regions similar to Mount Shasta's Ski Bowl in
the Shasta-Trinity National Forest. Ob
serving its second year of winter sports, For-
est Supervisor Paul Stathem says Shasta
Bowl use is up 25 to 50 percent this year
over the initial season there and Snowman's
Hill continues to provide an excellent com-
munity place to play in the snow, which
means most of the increase consists of visi-
tors from outside the immediate region.
"The reputation was spread this year to
the benefit of all the Sierra Nevada, and
everyone concerned must continue to work
together to provide the facilities to meet this
demand. The investment will be repaid
many times."
Medical Care for the Aged
-XTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON,, RAY J. MADDEN
\el' INDIANA
IN THE HOUSE iLkF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, y 16, 1960
Mr. MADDEN. Mr'peaker, one of
the major issues whicli this Congress
must act upon before adjournment, is the
problem of practical legislation whi
will provide hospitalization and medica
care for millions of folks in the upper age
bracket.
The following letter from Benjamin
Saks, president of the Northwest In-
diana Jewish Welfare Federation, 708
Broadway, Gary, Ind., reflects practical
thoughts concerning this problem which
involves so many millions of our elderly
citizens throughout the Nation:
NORTHWEST INDIANA JEWISH
WELFARE FEDERATION,
Gary, Ind., May 2, 1960,
Representative RAY MADDEN,
House Ways and Means Committee,
House Office Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR REPRESNTATIVE MADDEN: At a meeting
of its board of directors held on the evening
of April 27, 1960, the following resolution
was passed by this organization, with the
instruction that it be submitted for your
attention and study:
"Whereas medical care for the part of our
opulation 65 years and over is a major con-
rn of the Nation and of this welfare fed-
e tion; and
areas the admission rate to hospitals
is t e as large as for persons who are
young( and whereas they stay longer after
adrnissio ? and
"Wherea many of them have incomes of
$3,000 or le and
"Whereas e-half of the residents of
homes for the ed require medical care in
residence; and
"Whereas 80 per t of residents of homes
for the aged are par lly supported by pub-
lic assistance funds; a
"Whereas less than 40 ercent of the per-
sons over 65 are covered 15y. private medical
insurance: Now, therefore, be Itt
"Resolved, That we favor the use of the
mechanism of the old-age and survivors pro-
gram of the Social Security Act to provide an
expanded program of health services for per-
sons 65 and over."
We earnestly hope that you will give this
resolution and the sentiment that it ex-
presses your very earnest consideration in the
debate on this issue in the current Congress.
Sincerely yours,
BENJAMIN SANS, President.
?
144144,
Reflections on the U-2 Plane Incident
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JOHN J. WILLIAMS
itaingled. Each of these emotions is under-
ndable, and it is not easy to strike a bal-
nce among them.
The causes of pride are simply stated.
Ever since sputnik the American people have
had a vague but strong uneasiness that
somehow we were falling behind the Rus-
sians in the struggle. There was not merely
the concern over the scientific competition
and basic military capabilities; there was also
worry about intangibles, that we were soft.
bungling, lacking in initiative, energy and
alertness when compared with tly ruthless.
monolithis Communist empire.
Then suddenly we learned that our de-
fense forces were not so listless after all.
Hearts were bound to leap with pride at the
knowledge that an American reconnaissance
plane had penetrated deep into Russion ter-
ritory, and that furthermore this was but one
of many. Here is tangible evidence that our
Government is not "asleep at the switch,"
that our intelligence forces have diligence
and the equipment and skills to apply it.
And not the least of our pleasure at events
is the way in which this incident has shaken
the Russians. For make no mistake about
it, the fact that their vaunted defenses can
be so readily penetrated is not something
that Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues can
blithely dismiss.
Reflect for a moment on the dismay, and
the fear, we would feel if we discovered that
Russian planes had been flying over the
United States for months undetected. This
country would suffer a psychological trauma
of major proportions; it would be a national
scandal and heads would roll all over the
place,
Something like this may be happening in
Russia now. Because of that, Mr. Khru-
shchev's anguished outcries are not all tears
and flapdoodle. His military men have a lot
of explaining to do to him, and he has a lot
of explaining to do to the Politburo and to
the Russian people. Whatever posture Mr.
Khrushchev puts to the world, his arrogance
has been humbled.
That, in turn, is bound to have an effect
on the affairs of the summit conference
which begins this morning. For all that the
spy plane incident has given Mr. Khru-
shchev something to scream about, he can-
not now be so cocksure. The repercussions
of this affair are by no means all to Mr.
Khrushchev's advantage in the realms of di-
plomacy.
In a world that everyone knows is perilous,
there is comfort and reassurance in all this.
Not only has our side scored on their side,
but when this incident is added to our recent
successes in space and under the sea we can
feel less intimidated by Russian prowess and
more confident in our state of preparedness. .
As President Eisenhower put it, "no one ;
wants another Pearl Harbor" and so we re-
joice at anything that increases our knowl-
edge of military forces that might launch a
massive surprise attack in which survival '
would be the prize.
This being so, then, why should there be
any cause for uneasiness over the events of
the past 10 days?
It is not simply stated. For it stems from
less readily apparent consequences, and in
some cases not so much from immediate
consequences as from anxieties about the
future which have here been sowed.
Part of it, perhaps, comes from the per- .
formance put on by the State Department 7
that famous weekend. Either the State De-
partment was ignorant of what was going on,
which is quite possible, or else it had given
no thought to anticipating that a plane
might be caught and planning what it should
do then. In either case, the Government of
the United States was caught not only spying ?
but lying. It did not make a pretty spec-
tacle.
Part comes, perhaps, from the fact that
the confusion extended all the way to the
A4135,4?
OF DELAWARE
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Monday, May 16, 1960
Mr, WII2Ljare. Mr.
as iMmimmcinsent to
have printed in the Appendix of the
RECORD a very timely editorial entitled
"Reflections on an Incident," which was
published today in the Wall Street
amaku. MormoilOnMea...".6.24,,
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
REFLECTIONS ON AN INCIDENT
The pTitinT8rgtrirranta181,1t,rd the
major affairs of life we all have moments of
ambivalence, that we can suffer all at once
the mixed feelings of joy and anxiety.
If we can judge by the samplings of pub-
lic opinion, and by our own feelings Ameri-
cans have had something of this same
ambivalence in their reaction to the spy-
plane incident. Pride, relief, uneasiness of
mind, and even dismay, have been inter-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? AP
White House. It's very clear that although
President Eisenhower had authorized the
(
.,, .1. to do "whatever is necessary" to obtain
lrformation, he was as surprised by this
, particular plane incident as everyone else.
But bureaucratic bungling is something
to which, sadly, we have grown accustomed.
The anxiety strikes much deeper. It comes
precisely because we do all know this is a
perilous world and that the prize in the
next war will not be victory but survival.
And for some of the older among us, because
we do indeed remember Pearl Harbor.
Whatever mystery lies behind that naval
1. disaster, it was no fault of military intelli-
gence. We had the-Iaraffebe'ciille; we knew
4' what they were doing, even unto the hour.
' Besides, Pearl Harbor was no moment's in-
spiration of the Japanese; it came as the
culmination of events in which our own
mistakes played some small part.
The next world war, if it comes, can come
as well from bungling as from design. An
adventurous American, a trigger-happy Rus-
sian, a moment of panic?these can easily be
the seeds of holocaust. And just because we
can understand the panic that would come
from Russian planes over Kansas City, we
need have anxiety about American planes
over Sverdlovsk.
It is all very true when we say we have
no aggressive intent but it wholly misses
the mark. For fate depends on some Rus-
sian with his hand on a button believing
that that plane overhead is not on a warlike
mission. It also misses the mark, though
true enough, to see the hypocrisy of Mr.
Khrushchev crying out against spies. We
ourselves would see a difference between a
Colonel Abel, spying in Brooklyn, and those
planes over Kansas City.
So the uneasiness of mind has nothing to
do with spying; we all accept the necessity
for it and desire that it be done diligently.
Mr. Khrushchev's self-righteous screams on
that score can be dismissed for what they
are. The concern is over an adventure
which, by its very nature, risks bringing on
the very thing against which it is supposed
to be guarding.
Yet even all this, we think, might be
accepted as a hazard under different cir-
cumstances, anxiety has become a daily
habit which we have learned to wear pa-
tiently. But it would be one thing to
know that these risks were recognized,
measured, and accepted by the highest elec-
tive officers of the State into whose judg-
ment we have put ourselves. It is quite
another thing to feel that things are done
by subordinates left free to do "whatever
Is necessary."
Here is the Government of the United
States engaging in an act that by its very
nature must carry always the sparks of an
explosion, and yet so far as anyone can see
it was an act thought up, initiated, and car-
ried out in secret not only from the enemy
but from ourselves.
Their zeal is commendable; perhaps even
their judgment in this case may be right.
But if they have done this, unknown, what
else is unknown? And if subordinate offi-
cers, not responsible to the people, are to
have in the future a blank check to fill in
as they please, who can know what de-
mands their zeal may put upon the world
tomorrow?
And there is one other matter. The
strength of this country in the free world
has always been that, unlike the Russians,
we could be trusted not to do provocative
things and that whatever our Government
said was true. We hope that image is too
strong to be shattered by any one incident,
but we think it too precious to risk having
it sullied.
So for our own part,c.,
in discovering that here,711-1511YMbre-WW,-
\we are not being outdone by the Russi.Ans,
NDIX
and we do not .hide our human natIsfa.
tion at the consternation that must now be
wide among them.
And yet for all of that, we confess that in
this incident we, too, have anxieties that
will not down.
Health and Medical Care for the Aged
? EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON. JOHN W. McCORMACK
OF MASSACHUSETTS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 16, 1960
Mr. McCO MACK. Mr. Speaker, in
my remarks I elude an informative let-
ter sent to me sy the Honorable Patrick
A. Tompkins, mmissioner of Public
Welfare of the irnmonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts, in. co ection with the ad-
ministration's plan s provide health and
medical care for the ed. The letter of
ComMissioner Tompki to me points out
the weaknesses in the clministration's
;
Proposal. The views oit Commissioner
Tompkins are worthy of rofound con-
sideration because he is o of the best-
qualified persons in the fi Vtcel of public
welfare throughout the Uri d States:
THE COMMONWEALTH Tik
OF MASSACHUSETTS..4
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELF E,
Boston, May 1 1960.
Hon. JOHN W. MoCottmacx,
House Majority Leader,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
MY DEAR CONGRESSMAN MCCORM FE:
Thank you for the copies of the stateIlnt
by Mr. Arthur S. Flemming, Secretary of te
Department of Health, Education, and W
fare on presentation of the administration
plan to provide health and medical care foia
the aged. I have, up to this point, only
been able to devote my observations, as to
the impact of these proposals upon the aged
of the Commonwealth and upon the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts and the constit-
uent cities and towns, in a limited manner,
as no data seems to be available on the pre-
mium' costs that would be charged by either
commercial or nonprofit insurance carriers
for the coverage proposed in Mr. Flemming's
statement.
We do, however, have some facts as to
potential eligibility that we can draw from
Mr. Flemming's statement on page 4, under
item 1, "Eligibility for Participation in Pro-
gram." Apparently, all persons receiving so-
cial security benefits over the age of 65 would
be eligible, plus others on whom I cannot
secure up-to-date data. This would mean
at least 350,000 persons over 65 currently
receiving old-age insurance benefits, either
primary, or dependency, or survivor benefits,
would be eligible.
We also know that the standard monthly
budget of an aged person living alone is
$127.80 under our old age assistance program.
We also know that the means test to be
applied for participation in this program Is
to be rather liberally interpreted and
applied. If not so applied, it would mean
that these 350,000-plus persons, if given the
opportunity by State legislation and if desir-
ing to participate in the administration's
insurance health program, would, in fact,
have to apply? for and be subjected to the
Indignities of the old-age assistance means
test. Moreover, I think that, in view of our
old-age assistance standard, all such persons
May 16
applying for old age Insurance under the
administration's proposal would have to have
their personal portion of the premium paid
for by the State governmental agency with-
, out any matching fund from the Federal
Government. As this _involves 350,000 per-
sons, it would amount to a new unmatched
expenditure of $8,400,000. For the current
80,000 recipients of old-age assistance, it
would amount to an additional cost of
$1,920,000, or a total of $10,320,000 as the
individual's share of the premium at $24 per
person per year.
Since Mr. Flemming suggests on page 2
of his statement under paragraph 4 that less
catastrophic policies on major medical ex-
penses available to persons over the age of
65 called for annual premium payments
ranging from 860 to 8130 a year, it would
appear obvious that, since most major medi-
cal expense insurance policies are limited to
60 days of hospital care, the full coverage
for nursing home care for the entire year
and for one-half year of hospital care plus
the other itemized benefits for surgery, drugs,
X-rays, home care, etc., would result in a
prohibitive premium and certainly one at
$250 per year per person upward. If the
premium were $300 a year and under the
financial formula that the State govern-
ment was to pay $200 or two-thirds in Massa-
chusetts?one of the wealthier States accord-
ing to the Hill-Burton formula employed in
this insurance plan?the .State's share of the
premium matched by the Federal Govern-
ment would be 875 million. This, added to
the absorption of the individual's premiums,
represents a total of $85,320,000. I have
checked with both the Blue Cross and one
commercial carrier, and there are no rates
available for year-round nursing home care
for persons over 65 or under 65 in operation
or even contemplated at this point. There
are no policies available for 6 months' care
In a hospital for persons over 65. ,
However, to apply this proposal to the
typical expensive hospitalization of a per-
son over 65, as we know it in Massachusetts,
the hospital costs for the acute illness or
accident will run about $1,000. To have
this bill paid in accordance with the admin-
istration's formula, the breakdown would be
s follows for the sick patient over 65:
(a) Initial premium, $24.
(b) Initial payment for sick patient, $250.
c) Twenty percent of the remaining hal-
a e, $150.
( Paid by the insurance company, $600.
T refore, for the privilege of electing to
be I red for the usual catastrophic hospi-
tal bi under the administration's proposal,
the in vidual over 65 must pay $424, and
the ins ance company pays only $600---
pretty e ensive insurance.
It shou be pointed out that, under the
Forand bi the entire $1,000 hospital bill
would be id at no premium, deductible
payment, o oinsurance obligation on the
part of the k elderly person over the age
of 65.
In short, th cost to the Individual and
the cost to the ndividual States and their
municipalities b omes prohibitive.
(a) No indivIdl, dependent solely upon
old-age and survi rs insurance, can find in
free money the inial $24 premium and the
initial $250 to be iaid against a hospital
bill?a total of $274 lus 20 percent of the
cost of the illness.
(b) No State can a rd to spend $85 mil-
lion to save 831,600,006,k-, the present old-age
assistance expenditure filtr hospital care and
nursing home care on annnual basis; and,
also note, that not all okthe hospital bills
of $11,250,000 would be paW, as $21/2 million
for annual chronic hospit care would not
be paid, as only 180 days of ospital care are
Included in the administrati 's proposal.
In short, the proposal is nc a health in-
surance plan for the aged as its costs are so
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD MAY 16 1960
Congress Must Reassert Its Right
To Know
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. FRANK KOWALSKI
-cbi,x4kairred,r
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 16, 1960
Mr. KOWALSKI. Mr. Speaker, I
know that no Member of Congress
wishes to say or do anything that might
interfere with the President's freedom
of action at the summit meeting.
However, once the summit conclave
has been concluded, I believe that the
Congress must move quickly and decis-
iVely to reassert and reaffirm its right to
know _what goes on in the executive
branch of the Government.
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c ficall the legialative branch
"t its 'Constitutional powers
infringed upon by any depart-
r agency including the Central
e CongresTgliould further insist that
foreign policy be conducted by the De-
partment of State, under the supervi-
sion of the President, and that extreme
care be taken to prevent the making of
decisions in this critical field by the
military.
The dangers of the present situation
'are pointed out in an editorial printed
Friday, May IL in the Wall Street Jour-
nal.
I commend this editorial to the careful
perusal of all Members of the House.
The text follows:
A NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE
In all its recent statements, the State De-
partment has been careful to note, . that
President Eisenhower had not "authorized'
the particular flight of the U-2 plane 'that
penetrated more than 1,200 miles into Russia
before it fell into Russian hands.
At his press conference the other day Mr.
Eisenhower made plain that this was a mere
quibble; the gathering of any information
that will protect the United States was
"authorized" by him long ago. Intelligence
operatives are to use "whatever means neces-
sary short of the use of force" to learn what
Russia may be up to. Implicit in his state-
ment was that while he had not "author-
ized" the specific flight of May 1, he had
"authorized" any and all such steps.
His statement clearly backed up Secretary
of State Herter's announcement that the
United States would continue to do what it
had been doing for some time past about
aerial reconnaissance of Russia. But it did
nothing to clear up his own statement of
just a year and three months ago that "the
orders were very strict" about flying near
Russia's borders.
In answer, to a question in 1959 whether a
missing Air Force research plane had been
lost testing Russian preparedness procedures,
the President then said; "Actually now, I
have forgotten the limit, but I established
it personally some time back a couple of
years ago, and I am sure this happening is
accidental." It is hard to see how anyone
can infer from that statement anything ex-
cept that U.S. planes were under orders not
to cross Russian borders.
Perhaps the President means to make a
distinction between using Air Force planes,
which could be considered as the "use of
force" he has said will not be employed, and
using National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration planes engaged only in
gence. It is a distinction, however, that wilVP
escape the Russians.
And it is a distinction that certainly will:.
continue to escape some Members of Con--
gress. The other day Speaker RAYBURN de-
manded firdr---erts'atate Elepartment and the'
Central Intelligence Agency tell Congress
wile ordered that pilot into the air over
Russia. Senator WILLIS ROBERTSON said he.'
had attended many meetings of the Appro-
priations Committee, but nobody had ever: 4
said anything about flying planes over
Russia; certainly CIAgjAlleIl
Dulles, hadn't. Senn't STYLES BRIDGES de
mantled that the State Department and grA;
explain the whole story to Congress. A dayt
or so later Representative .r,i,,mayipitiaaraimpsis,,,
chairman of the House Appropriations Com!.
mittee, said right out that the aborted flight
over Russia was one of a series planned br
4, approved by the White House, and
to a few Members of Congress as well.;
So to say that Congress is somewhat con-
fused-over- -the-operations, as well as the
role, of the CIA is, to nete,aia obvious. Even
tilititleflOte.- -Herter nolirt -says that our "ex-
tensive aerial surveillance by unarmed civil-
ian aircraft" was apparently not a secret to
the Soviet leadership, it was obviously a sec-
ret' to many Members of the House and
Senate.
But if the President's orders of 15 months
ago liPter at:Tiled to tiagaf,?1.,A? if the limits
have been lifted, and if flight's into Russia
are no longer accidental happenings and
drily a handful of Congressmen knew about
the changes, Congress is in poor position to
complain about the matter.
For Congress has consistently declined to
keep itself?or even its leaders?responsible
for_,A19,yyp&what goes on lii the CIA. Sen-
ators antritepresentalives have acted as
though this Agency, whose farthing opera-
tions are answerable only to one man, is
somehow not only beyond an accounting but
also above the errors that are common to all
men.
What Congress learns of CIA's activities
Congress learns only if and when Mr. Dulles
is inclined to disclose some information, and
then only what he wishes to tell.
The sole missien_ol....the_cut is to gather
intelligence and assess it, and it may very
well be doing this job in an able manner.
The point is that Congress does not know
vaelaisr, CIA is or not.
Therefore Congress should require that
Mr. Dulles give an accounting of his steward-
ship so that it will know wh4e,r,SIA is
soundly,mathied and directed' or whether it
is perhaps more adventurous than it ought
to be to serve the Nation best. In a word,
Congress ought to choose a committee of
responsible men to whciiA,,,,C4A is, inade re-
sponsible by statute. And Congress should
waste no time doing so.
It is not our purpose here to pillquAir.
Dulles individually, for his responsibilities
dirrery-great. But tbe fact is that in a
country where, by the Words of the Consti-
tution, only Congress has the power to de-
clare war, Mr. Dulles' responsibilities seem
to us to be far greater than they ought to
be and his power of decision far broader than
it ought to be. '*!*
We are not suggesting that Mr. .Dulles
iihdtilrbe forced to expbse hts';espionage
apparatus to the full gaze of the American
public and thus to its enemies. But clearly
an agency whose enthuisiasm for gathering
intelligence and whose lack of judgment in
doing so can actually endangef-our oversea
bases, our alliances and our reputation for
candor and truth shall no longer be per-
mitted to remain almost a law unto itself,:0,
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MAY 1 6 1960
iFlight on the Eve of the Summit Was
a Colossal American Blunder
ExTENfaitV tit*" REMARKS
HON: ji JI9fLitS
imlAuo
IN THE HMI* Ctiq.E.PHESENTATIVES
Ma2ia3MVIcty 16,1960
Mr. ROGERS:Of Colorado. Mr. Speak-
er, I ask unanimous COnSent.t0 have in-
serted in the APPendio of the Race:MD an
editorial "SPY Flight On the Eve of the
Summit Was 0, COlOSSal American Blun-
.1Pr" that appeared in the Denver Pest,
Colo on Tuesday, feffrifirritO?
I know this will be of great interest to all
the Members.
'the editOrjal is as follow:
The may plane incidt brings home to
Americans as never heaure what the cold war
is really like. adt 'ia a a' ?
It shows how difficult ft is .for a free and
open society to operate openly and honorably
against the secretive, monolithic Communist
empire.
It shows how badly coordinatid our na-
tional leadership is, with the peace-seeking
right hand knowing little or nothing about
what the war-deterring left hand is up to.
It shows how a calculated risk can back-
fire when the risk is not properly weighed.
Por the tragedy of this incident goes be-
yond the fact that we got caught.
The tragedy is t that we lokt 'Mar more,
at this delicate rconat in history, than we
stood to gain by heaocelixig the spy-
plane flights some thagattago 'until the summit
meeting and other,negotiations were over.
There is a military argument that recon-
naissance flightsi'llsound and over Soviet
territory give is data thafmakes it easier for
us to deter or repel. aggreSsion. It is a valid
argument. ? .a, ?
The flights 'tellrt about the buildup of
Soviet missile potential, wherelhe pads are,
Which are cornhat7ready, etc..
They also serve aa part cf.; free world's
warning line agaiaaa,Opurpr ile strike.
This information Vatalci frike back
quickly and acetirty a " missilet
bases, to knock th,ek put e a accond
strike could be lauriChecl,
From a strictly mtary iita point, this
information, so essential both? to defense
planning and striking ability, 16,worth risk-
ing the loss of a few planes...
But as a contribution to deterring world
war III; this spy-plane technique has gravel
disadvantages, too.
Iu his. era of pushbutton War, the neces-
sity oil split-second decisionmaking to avoid
annihilation, a misinterpreted spy-plane in-
, 1E/OD of _Russian airspace could touch off
ever-widening exchange a:if missiles.
Evell more likely, if the United States con-
tinue to probe the Soviet periphery, would
be constant clashes of American aircraft and
Soviet air defenses, with possible Soviet re-
prisals against American air bases in nearby
nations. This in turn could spread into gen-
eral War.
WAR BY ACCIDENT?
presuannit period, sugg 'ta.ati*.?
store need, closer mincOnoy.fa
Our right hand has obviouSly
afgalst our left hand, iinettno CSl L ea
confusion over what our itrategy prior. it-
really are as we head for the summit.
Nor is this the only recent occurrence
creates this impression. ,
Two others are the announcement thin
weekend that we shall resume Unti,nTr?o 07), .
nuclear testing, despite the Geneva caa.
ence now dealing with the problem; and r,r
President's recent armouncernent that Vie
President NIXON might aSsumc his snip
seat if the meeting lasts more than 7 day.
Both showed not only a lack of fait: la
international negotiation, but also a. wili;.ii-
ness to take action that could make ; aa.
negotiation even lead likely to bear fruit.
The spy-plane incident shows the aan,
attitude.
What about the effect of the expos-or
these ht s on our cold war position?
e long-range effect is consid re.
r: In preparing for the wa
to fight, we have injured
oualy in the political, econorrar
al war we are already fighting.
? SGTE/MIT POSIT/ON /TORT
have put ourselves on the defensive
an we are about 'to step into an impor-
taftt cold war encounter?that is, the sum-
intF conference.
We have lost the solid ground of fairness
and' bpennese from which we could have
negotiated.
We have given Khrushchey a solid issue
against us, in which international law is all
on his side.
= We have opened the way for him to reap
as? propaganda Coup bigger than anything he
,Ilas yet accomplished.
ut perhaps even more important is the
age done to the U.S. ultimate cold war
thin
we this pasterated aboveboard, in contrast to
til weekend, we could still say
ercover Soviet activities. We could claim
that we tell the truth and the Soviets lie.
Now we can no longer assume that pose.
and the consequent damage to our moral
leadership of the free world has suffered,
especially from the point of view of the un-
committed new nations of Asia and Africa.
This shows hoW thortsighted is the argu-
ment that we can justifiably engage in spy-
plane flights because the Soviets engage in
much more farflung spying activities.
UNITED STRATEGY NEEDED ?
If we, like the Marxists, argue that the
end justifies the means, it makes the war of
ideas--which the uncommitted nations take
Very seriously?all the harder to fight.
If we 'adopt techniques similar to those of
our enemies, how are bystanders to appre-
ciate the vast difference between us?
For all these reasons, the game turns out
to be not worth the candle.
We must now take all precautions possible
to keep from threatening our summit posi-
tion more than we already have, lest world
opinion blame us for the failure of the
meeting.
We must also insist that our leaders de-
fine cold war priorities, and make sure that
the pursuit of one does not endanger the
pursuit of others.
.(
thi
Iio
Finally, the spy-plane flights could lead to
ever-increasing tensions, and just when some
relaxation seemed possible.
The more tense American-Soviet relations'
become, the more likely one side or the other
orht, by design or accident, pass the point
no return.
It is precisely because of this danger that
the United States?or at least part of our
Government?has been trying to bring about
a relaxation of tensions.
It was why the President had Khrushchev
visit him, and why he' l,planning to return
the Visit.
It was the reasefaca the 1955 summit con-
ference, and fore tlisarmament confer-
ences now in progress.
It is the reason far this month's summit
conference, too. ?
Though tbere may be military justification
for the spy-'plane flights, it would have been
merely prudent to suspend them just before
the summit meeting, and act as the little
boy, who "jes' before Christmas" was as good
as he could be.
In short, the military objectives should
have been put aside, because of the threat
they posed to moreimportant political ob-
jectives. niLsfl In
This lack of commeittense precaution, to-
gether with the evidence from Washington.
that the President had not specifically re-'
viewed such a dangerous technique in this
sts ti he Central In-
, V'hlch
favor a hard line a n mum 6f inter
national negotiation, r re icy
in an does thq
.
'este That the White House has
been unable to reconcile the objectives of
these two camps.
If American public opinion can now force
a new effort to unify national strategy, then
we ray have salvaged something out of anis
c/,laraial blunder.
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1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?APPENDIX
of a talk I made to the Clinton (S.C.)
Kiwanis Club's annual farmers night
program, April 14, 1960:
FARM PROGRAM
(Address of Congressman WILLIAM JENNINGS
BRYAN DORN at Kiwanis Club's annual
farmers night, April 14, at Clinton, S.C.)
The most serious domestic problem facing
the people of the United States is the farm
situation. Farm population in the United
States has dropped to 11 percent of the total,
the lowest percentage in the history of the
United States and the lowest of any major
world power in the history of the world.
This is a dangerously low percentage.
The United States was founded by. men
with a rural philosophy. The Declaration
of Independence, the Constitution, and the
Bill of Rights were largely written by rural
men. Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and
Monroe were all outstanding farmers. The
fact that Washington and Jefferson were
great farmers made them good Presidents.
Nearly all of the Presidents in the history
of the United States were born and reared
on a farm or associated with a farm. The
membership of the Congress for 130 years
was overwhelmingly rural. Farmers have
initiative. They are independent. They
think for themselves. They cannot be
herded or coerced to the polls by goons and
ward bosses. It is difficult to get up a mob
or overthrow the Government with busy,
contented landowning farmers. A man who
is busy milking cows and tilling the soil is
not going to lead a march on the Nation's
Capitol to overthrow representative gov-
ernment.
We do not find Communists and Socialists
engaged in the pursuit of agriculture. Our
rural areas are no breeding ground for juve-
nile delinquency. Rural people go to church
and support good schools. The rural home
is the bedrock of a democratic society.
Under the price-support and acreage-con-
trol programs, the American family-size
farmer has been reduced to a state of peon-
age. One-half of the burley-tobacco growers
in the United States, under this Government
program, are permitted only one-half acre
or less?in a nation that originated the cul-
ture of tobacco. Under these Government
programs, cotton acreage has fallen off in
the United States 60 percent since 1930. We
have lost cotton markets at home and abroad.
One-third of the cotton farmers in the United
States grow 5 acres or less. The percentage
is even greater in the Southeast. It is im-
possible for a farmer to clothe, support, and
send his children to college with less than
5 acres of cotton or one-half acre of tobacco.
What opportunity is there for a young man
with an ambition to be a farmer? He cannot
possibly become a farmer unless he inherits
a farm or marries into one with allotted
acres. Farming is the only business in this
so-called free nation that a young man can-
not go into?he is not permitted to do so
by a government of free people. Under these
Government programs, the situation gets
worse and worse. Surpluses mount and the
rural population decreases, with more and
more people on the welfare rolls and more
looking to Washington paternalisfn.
These farm programs could not have served
Russia's purpose more if they had been writ-
ten by the Kremlin's planners of world con-
quest. America's population is being con-
centrated in the great cities, easy to annihi-
late with the atomic bomb, easy to herd into
political machines, and easily subjected to
propaganda and agitation. In fact, the first
farm program inaugurated in the United
States was written by questionable charac-
ters?one of whom has since served a term
In the penitentiary. The farm program was
written by Alger Hiss, Nathan Witt, Frank
Shea, Rex Tugwell, Lee Pressman, Henry A.
Wallace, and Felix Frankfurter, presently a
Justice of this notorious U.S. Supreme Court.
These E were principally bright young attor-
neys, most of whom knew nothing whatever
about agriculture.
Under the programs these men inaugu-
rated, we grow less and less, our farm popu-
lation shrinks, while Russia grows more and
more and every nation in the world increases
her farm acreage. Soviet Russia since 1955
has added over 100 million new acres to agri-
cultural production. Rhodesia exempts her
farmers from land taxes to grow more and
more. Turkey exempts her farmers from in-
come taxes to grow more and more. In this
country we passed a soil bank to get our
farmers to grow less and less. Incidentally,
the average farmer in Rhodesia plants 65
acres of tobacco; in Canada, 30 acres; and in
the United States, may I repeat, half of the
tobacco farmers are permitted to plant only
one-half acre or less. The same is true with
cotton and wheat. Foreign nations grow
more, with American foreign aid, while we
grow less. We send them marketing experts,
fertilizer experts, and the net result is to
put our own people out of business.
Under the cotton price-support loan pro-
gram, in the year 1958 358 farmers in the
State of California received $50,000 or more;
Arizona, 194; Mississippi, 237; South Caro-
lina, 1; Georgia, none; North Carolina, 2;
Alabama, none. Here in the Southeast we
are not only being forced and tricked off
the land, but we are paying the bill for
others to become bigger and bigger. The
atmosphere is being carefully created so that
someday a campaign of land reform will ex-
plode in the United States along the lines
of China's and Cuba's agrarian reform. The
only segments of our farm economy holding
its own, growing, free, and with hope, are
those outside of Government control an
price supports?for example, livestock, pine
trees, citrus fruits, and vegetables.
On ray farm I grow beef, pine trees, and
grass, because I can do so without Govern-
ment regulation.
The pressure was put on Congress to put
price supports on livestock, but I am so
glad today we resisted these pressure groups.
The beef surplus simply vanished through
increased consumption. Livestock today ac-
counts for 54 percent of the farm intome.
Yes, we need a farm program, a new farm
program, a positive program, one that looks
to the future, one that will offer hope to
the youth of this country, one that will
beckon to the teeming millions in the
crowded cities, one that can assure us food
and part-time employment for the unem-
ployed during times of depression.
1. The No. 1 plank in this farm program
should be gradual elimination of price
supports and all acreage controls. Our free
Nation cannot long survive as long as its farm
population is regimented, controlled, and
paid to do less and become weaker.
2. The Government subsidizes certain
business operations to stay in business, to
expand, grow, and to employ more people.
On the other hand, we subsidize the farmer
to plant less and less, to employ fewer people
and to buy less fertilizer, machinery, and
supplies. We are simply paying him directly
to go out of business. It would be much
better for the Nation if we paid the farmer to
grow more, not less, and if we paid him
directly to stay on the farm instead of mov-
ing toward the overcrowded cities.
3. Get rid of the surplus by promoting
markets abroad and expanding our markets
at home.
4. Develop new crops and new uses through
expanded research and advertising. Dr.
Herty kept thousands of farmers in business
by research on the pine tree.
5. Expand the rural development program.
6. Give the farmer more Federal tax ad-
vantages so he can compete with the tax
exempt farmers of foreign nations. Give
him a break with local taxes by making him
pay less for improved rural property. The
A4163
policy now is to tax a farmer if he paints his*
house and improves the appearance of his
farm. The local taxes of many farmers have
doubled since improving his place by sheer
initiative and effort.
7. Imports?the farm problem could be
solved in one stroke by prohibiting imports
of livestock, cotton goods, and other farm
commodities we already have in surplus.
Over 100 million new acres could be used in
the United States to produce the beef, wool,
sugar, cotton, tobacco, grain, and other farm
commodities now imported from foreign
countries.
South Carolina needs new industry, but
more than anything else we need to save our
old industry which consumes cotton from
our farms. We need new industry, but we
also steed a South Carolina Planning and De-
velopment Board for Agriculture. South
Carolina's agriculture development must
keep pace with its industrial development.
It will be tragic for the future political and
social welfare of our State if we become all
industrial. We must have a balanced econ-
omy. We must preserve our South Carolina
rural heritage, traditions, and philosophy.
We have a great agricultural college at
Clemson. Clemson's agricultural program
needs the full support and backing of all
of our citizens, both urban and rural.
Through research and planning, South
Carolina was able to switch from indigo to
rice, to cotton, and now to livestock and pine
trees. South Carolina must and can con-
tinue to be largely agricultural.
Congress Shod .11.4040404.0I4
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
jasikalliS
OF TENNESSEE
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 16, 1960
Mr. EV1NS. Mr. Speaker, the events
of the past week on the international
scene are highly disturbing. They point
out dramatically that in the delicate
state of relations between the nations of
the world it is necessary to maintain the
highest degree of responsibility in all
actions we take that might affect our
international relations.
Mr. Speaker, in view of these recent
developments I want to join with others
in expressing the hope that Congress will
take a look at the CIA and its operations
in the public interest as suggested in
the editorial of the_N_Ashyllle_Tenpsean
441*killi which rfflgrMIRMMr6Fill
kit in the Appendix of the
RECORD. The editorial follows:
IF CIA CHIEF IS, 0 IS? WN V,,oyartnss
Days afte in Russia,
the truth is beginning to come out in Wash-
ington, and to that extent the United States
position is being improved.
Having been mouse-trapped by Mr. Khru-
shchev, Secretary Herter has clarified the
question of authority for the gathering mis-
sion which came to such a calamitous end.
The broad policy of aerial espionage, we
are told, came from President Eisenhower,
acting in accord with the National Security.
Act of 1947. Since the beginning of his ad-
ministration, Mr. Herter said, the President
has put into effect directives "to gather by
every means possible the information re-
quired to protect the United States and the
free world against surprise attack and to
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enable them to make effective preparations
for their defense."
Under the President's directives, therefore,
various programs have been carried out, in-
cluding "extensive aerial surveillance by un-
armed aircraft," it is revealed. In a burst of
candor, it is emphasized that flights over and
near Russia will continue as needed.
The earlier claim that there was no
sponsibilit for the U-2 flight as as
a g on-Txra-s?eo"TiCerlieCtritertrevealed
as double4=ige of a kind that
has IiWed tb.5:aminieMtion's claim to
open dealing in international matters.
We can believe that the President did not
press the buttom, as it were, for this par-
ticular flight, and, that brings up the question
of hozap...coutpllettthe Central Intelli epee
Agency Tay:beust berr:Tp .
irel; has not
been enter= VIrrPret for: s Part in the
colos nder, it would be surprising. For
i s o vious at even if he had not been
told to cease his activities lest the summit be
wrecked, he should have acted to this end
on his own.
Yet there is a good deal of evidence that
when.Nr,Dulles acts ezr1.4,_aid..ine,nt,
yesz_attiWtrong- Albhg-Vr ...-en-
eral MacArthur, he is charged with having
goofed on the Chinese C9,painunist participa-
tion in ,Tika,s? and his organization allegedly
was taken by surprise when ._a_s_Eo? seized
the sikkmagilg, Other instaneer31" missed
signals could be listed.
Regardless, therefore, of wItsai.4?,.01),[fr.
Dulles becomes the goat of thIS-Tarticular
brilitifiW, there is ample reason for Congress
to revive the proposal that a permanent joint
committee be established to make continuing
studies of th CI 's secret activities, for
which it is no acccititerreEr-body
which created it and appropriates operating
funds estimated at from $100 million to $1
billion annually.
While there is general fear lest mistakes
lead to nuclear war, a free-wheeling intel-
ligence agency calls for some sort. of scrutiny
and direction.
Confidence in White House direction has
been hard hit by the latest turn of events.
And for this development Qp,L1
Resto,nof,the ;slew York Times has a sirrige
ekpranation:
"He [the President' is not even managing
his own departments preliminary to the
summit, and this, of course, is precisely the
trouble."
Insofar as it can help correct this strange
situation, the Con ess has eve
eason for inves
Washington Report
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
ov
HON. BRUCE AL
OP TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 2, 1960
Mr. ALGER. Mr. Speaker, under leave
to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I
include the following newsletter of May
14, 1960:
WASHINGTON REPORT
(By BRUCE ALGER, Fifth District, Texas,
11.1494a)..,
The Department of Agriculture appropri-
ation bill, just enacted, presented the con-
tradiotory though not too unusual spectacle
of Congressmen debating and agreeing to
the expenditure of public money for a pro-
gram that practically everyone, for varying
reasons, thought wrong, yet the bill passed
IONAL RECORD ? A
make-
andily without a record vote. The bil
called for approximately $4 billion in vari-
ous agriculture subsidies. The Appropria-
tion Committee's own report on the bill
highlights the inconsistencies. Here are
some quotes: "The Federal Government is
now spending far more in the name of agri-
culture than ever before in history *? ? * yet
farm income in 1959 was at the lowest level
since World War II. * * * Since 1953 the
following 'cures' have been offered, tried,
and from the record found wanting, so far
as solving the problem is concerned." Then
are listed reduced price supports (lower as-
sured prices), soil bank (to pay farmers for
acreage left untilled) , Public Law 480 (to give
surpluses away at home and abroad), Agri-
culture Department personnel increase of
28 percent, appropriations increase of 300
percent, and producticin controls lowered
(reduced acreage control). And still the
problem remains unsolved. "The cost to the
Federal Treasury since 1952 now totals $25.8
* * * Farmers tend to increase their
production as farm prices are reduced."
The soil bank failed, according to the re-
port, because we paid farmers for land that
already lay idle; further; that if 56 percent
of all farms were retired at $10 per acre per
year, costing us $2.75 billion, we would cut
production only 9 percent. The problem, as
the report states, "will never be solved until
Congress attacks the problem at its base,
which is overproduction." The report then
shows that the $13.5 billion in food given
away at home and abroad under Public Law
480 since 1951 has not eliminated the sur-
pluses, but rather "has contributed to a con-
stantly deteriorating situation for Americ
agriculture by getting these huge surpluses
out of sight abroad and thereby postponing
action to prevent the increase in the surplus
problem." Also, the report states that Pub-
lic Law 480 "should be considered a foreign
aid program and should be paid for in the
mutual security bill." Speaking of acreage
controls, the report states, "while efforts to
control production through acreage controls
have not been effective, it appears unwise to
eliminate them." Under the heading, "Cor-
rective Action Urgently Needed", we find,
"the situation becomes progressively worse.
" * It is imperative the present approaches
to this problem be reversed if the agricul-
tural industry of this country is to survive
and if we are to prevent a bankrupt agricul-
ture from pulling down the rest of our
economy." Yet the bill passed perpetuates
e present programs.
The forthright report stopped just short
of the truth. The truth is that Federal sub-
sidy (Federal money and Federal control)
will kill private enterprise ultimately. True,
to a degree, industry can live on, through
accumulated productive strength, against the
debilitating Federal regulation, much as a
ship nioves despite barnacles. True, tax-
payers can survive economically despite the
weight of taxation much as a strong man
can carry a heavy burden and still do other
tasks. But in either case or in combination
of the two, subsidy and taxation, free enter-
prise, private initiative, and individual free-
dom go down the drain. We are now wit-
nessing the struggle of a dying, free industry,
originally a free industry?agriculture?be-
cause of the Federal Government. The solu-
tion? Get the Federal Government out en-
tirely. Only then can normal market sup-
ply and demand react and result in the right
prices, which in turn will result in a good
income to the farmer, balanced against the
costs of other commodities. So the effort of
Congress should be directed toward freeing
the farmer, not regulating and subsidizing
him deeper into trouble. The bill passed
Without a record vote. I voted against it
and desire to be so recorded. I predict that
if Congress will not take the statesmanlike
position, then the people will force action,
May 16
just as happened in the labor reform bill,
passed despite House leadership opposition.
It would be better, and hurt the farmers less,
it seems to me, if the Congress and the farm
industry effected the changes voluntarily
than to have it forced on them.
Russia'sEirozaistisl .31ustering con-
cerrffittite Amefffan "SPr-was answered
forthrightly by the chairman of the Appro-
priations Committee in a floor speech. Mr.
our failure to ae-
'Dft nt
at
ejaCgittirtgunist Korean attack which
cost our own unready troops dearly. So it is
that for j,years _QI41.Sgen:LE,g2Ittelligence
A y
ovelt-trussia to observe in order to protect
ourselves, so far as possible, against buildups
for surprise attacks. He likened the appro-
priation of funds for this work to the secret
atomic work at Oak Ridge which preceded
the atom bomb, unknown to all but a few
of the Members of Congress. Es=?Zsigg is
a part of,modern warfare an9Lpurtavar. Ours
is hardly comparable to Fetts-sTa's infiltration
and subversive efforts. It was a refreshing
statement. Russia needs to be told once and
for all that we are deadly serious in our
intention to protect freedom-loving nations,
and if they don't like it, that's just too bad.
Tough and direct action is all that blusterers
understand. Only as we are strong, tough-
minded, and tought-talking, will we prevent
war and strengthen and attract the only
kind of allies we want, specifically those
equally dedicated to preserving freedom for
mankind against the godless, slave-state
alternative of communism.
''Pensions for World War I Veterans
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. AL ULLMAN
OF OREGON
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 16,1960
Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, it seems
to me that the time has now come when
Congress must take action to fulfill its
obligations to the veterans of World War
I. A most important step toward obtain-
ing a World War I pension is support
from the major veterans' organizations.
It will therefore be of great interest to
the Members of Congress that Willamette
Heights Post No. 102 and Ontario Post 67
of the American Legion and Willard An-
derson Post 2471 of the Veterans of For-
eign Wars, have endorsed the passage of
a separate pension program for World
War I veterans. Their resolutions fol-
low:
RESOLTJTION ASKING THAT THE AMERICAN LE-
GION Go ON RECORD AS SUPPORTING A SEPA-
RATE PENSION FOR THE VETERANS OF WORLD
WAR I
Whereas veterans of the First World War
did not participate in the generous postwar
benefits afforded veterans of World War II
and Korea, nor comparably in social security
or retirement, health and insurance plans
which were not generally available prior to
World War II; and
Whereas it does not seem fair to such vet-
erans of World War I now of an average age
level of 65 years, that they be lumped to-
gether with the younger veterans of later
wars in a single pension program that does
not take into consideration their particular
needs as is the case with the War Pension
Act of 1959; and
Whereas the veterans of First World War
now number only a small segment of the
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BriIlsurt Cont.). Sunday Herald Calk
Announced yin Policy Provocative,
and Dangerous
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON FRANK _KOWALSKI
OF CONNECTICUT
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 16, 1960
Mr. KOWALSKI. Mr. Speaker, I
bring to the attention of my colleagues,
under unanimous consent, an editorial
published yesterday in theatal.a.Her-
ald, of?pActoport, Conn.
The Sunday Herald has one of the
largest circulations in New England, and
its editorial on this critical subject is
worthy of close attention.
Following is the text of the Sunday
Herald's editorial: ,
UNITED STATES it,' 110 ?=NUB POLICY
Presiden .er'& defensive and/or
aggressive cxplsalatift. of the "whys" and
"whereforea7 .41._?.6iir :spy plane, which was
brought down over Russia, makes our an-
nounced future_pt1ge4r bdtla provocative and
dangerous. ,?-? ?
Walter Lippitatiti, in analyzing "rhe Spy
Business" Writes that "our position now
seems to be that because it's so difficult to
collect information iiiside the Soviet Union,
it will be our alloWeirpelicy to fly over Soviet
territory, illAng tile territory of our allies as
bases. ?
"Although the intention here is to be can-
did and honest and also to make the best of
a piece of very bad luck," he continues, "the
new policy, which seems to have been impro-
vised between Saturday and Monday is quite
unworkable.
"To avow that we intend to violate Soviet
sovereignty is to put everybody on the spot.
It makes it impossible for the Soviet Govern-
ment to play down this particular incident
because now it is challenged openly in the
face of the whole world.
"It is compelled to react because no nation
can remain passive when it is the avowed
policy of another nation to intrude upon its
territory."
? An American broadcaster, repeating what
an English commentator said, summed up
the lessons which we should have learned
long before the American spy plane crashed
* inside Russia.
The Enzlishman, dwelt_cm.. two rules of
eltttcrA 'tlinirsi" is never to be
and the second?in an unfortunate
eventuality?is never to admit anything.
Because the Eisenhower administration
seems to have kat?Tr'- .,?airwel fit min- '0-
proach to the intrigue' of-esioTitige, Our
natitthal and international embarrassment,
we hadn't learned either lesson.
And the unforgivable third mistake was to
permit thrifirYTIMrireeVrarifie summit
meetings.
The summit meetings might as well be can-
celled because the only dubious advantage
they will give us is to answer Mr. K's propa-
ganda.
And as for President Eisenhower's visit to
Russia, he can only invite national humilia-
tion by going after he's been told to stay
away.
Finding ourselves trapped, we are trying
to extricate ourselves by improvising a new
and unprecedented policy of openly declared
sedret spying on Russia. Can it work?
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1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX
phere of cooperation and mutual under-
standing.
I am pleased by these recent develop-
ments and am hopeful that major labor-
management "explosions" over increased
automation can be avoided through con-
certed and sincere efforts along these
lines.
I want today to call attention to a
forthcoming top-level conference on au-
tomation to be held in Cooperstown, N.Y.,
from June 1 through June 3. It is spon-
sored by the State of New York and ac-
tively championed by Governor Rocke-
feller. The program for this conference
is indeed impressive. Those chosen to
address the delegates are among the top
people in their respective fields. They
include educators, labor leaders, and
business executives.
I am certain that all who are able to
attend will benefit greatly and that those
who are in a position to read and study
the various conference reports will find
them valuable and'enlightening. To this
end, I hope in the next few weeks to
bring to the attention of the Members
various papers and addresses printed in
conjunction with the New York State
'Conference on Automation.
Mr. President, I should like today to
ask unanimous consent that an an-
nouncement containing the schedule of
events to take"place at the Cooperstown
Conference on Automation be printed in
the Appendix of the RECORD.
There being no objection, the program
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
STATE OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE CHAMBER,
ALBANY, MAY 10, 1960
Details of the conference on automation
which Governor Rockefeller has called in
Cooperstown June 1-3 were announced today
by the Governor's office. More than 50 lead-
ers in business, labor, education, and gov-
ernment will participate in the discussions.
The conference will open with a dinner
Wednesday evening, which Governor Rocke-
feller will address. Three sessions will fol-
low, at which four major aspects of automa-
tion will be examined iin depth. Paper on
each of these aspects will be circulated to the
participants in advance of the conference,
and will be summarized by the authors at
the Thursday and Friday sessions.
The program follows:
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 1
Reception and dinner, address by Gov-
ernor Rockefeller.
THURSDAY, JUNE 2,4
Morning session: "Automation, Its Mean-
ing and Dimensions," prepared and sum-
marized by John T. Dunlop, professor of eco-
nomics, Graduate School of Business Ad-
ministration, Harvard University. Discus-
sion leader, Dr. Thomas Hale Hamilton,
president of the State University of New
York.
Afternoon session: "Basic Economics of
'Automation," prepared and summarized by
John Diebold, John Diebold & Associates,
Inc., management consultants, New York
City. Discussion leader, Charles Stauffacher,
executive vice president, Continental Can Co.
"Manpower for Automation," prepared and
summarized by Eli Ginsberg, professor of
economics, Graduate School of Business, Co-
lumbia University. Discussion leader, Ar-
thur J. Goldberg, general counsel, United
Steel Workers of America.
Dinner: speaker, Lt. Gov. Malcolm Wilson.
FRIDAY, JUNE 3
Morning session: "The Community and
Automation," prepared and summarized by
Solomon BarkIn, director of research, Tex-
tile Workers Union of America. Discussion
leader, Prof. Frederick Harbison, director, in-
dustrial relations section, Princeton Univer-
sity.
Summation: Dr. William J. Ronan, secre-
tary to the Governor.
The conference will conclude with a
luncheon Friday noon.
Arrangements for the conference are be-
ing handled by a committee composed of In-
dustrial Commissioner M. P. Catherwood,
Commerce Commissioner Keith McHugh, and
Dr. Ronan.
Primary Boost for Nixon Election
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ROBERT H. MICHEL
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, May 17, 1960
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, under
leave to extend my remarks in the REC-
ORD, I include the following article from
the Evening Star, May 13, 1960:
PRIMARY BOOST FOR NIXON ELECTION?KEN-
NEDY PEEN WINNING NOMINATION AND DE-
FEAT BY VICE PRESIDENT
?
(By David Lawrence)
Analysis of traditional habits in politics
and the habits of thought of organization
leaders tells far more about who is going to
be nominated at a political convention than
do polls or primary elections.
Based on just such an analysis this cor-
respondent wrote on March '7, just before
the New Hampshire primary, that Senator
.KENNEDY "is likely to win the Democratic
nomination" and that, "if he is blocked, the
compromise candidate will be Adiai Steven-
son."
On April 7, after the Wisconsin primary,
this writer said in these dispatches:
"The Wisconsin primary, by all the rules
of politics, should mean that Senator KEN-
NEDY will be regarded as the front-runner
fr9m now on. This means that the other
Candidates will tend to combine against him.
There are other primary contests, to be sure,
but Senator KENNEDY will gain ground in
all of them, as he has the organization and
the finances back of him to win the neces-
sary delegate strength.
What is really meant by "the organization
and the finances"? Certainly there is not
the slightest basis for any implication that
votes are bought. Nor is it to be assumed
that the word "organization" means the reg-
ular party machinery. In preconvention
campaigns, each candidate develops his own
organization and, if he has money enough,
he will engage precinct workers everywhere
to get voters to the polls, transporting the
in autos when necessary. More important
still, the organization will know where to
find the indifferent voters who can be per-
suaded by friends to vote for the candidate
such friends favor.
These "organization" workers carry sample
ballots printed in advance, and in a State
like West Virginia, where there are few pre-
cincts with vothig machines, it means that
the citizen takes the sample ballot into the
voting booth and is not bewildered when
confronted with a long list of -state and
local candidates. He is enabled to go right
to the spot on the ballot and put his mark
down.
4.1611111114. mid. mit. us,.
A4173
This is an old pattern in American politics,
and it takes a lot of money to pay for a big
organization that really gets out the vote.
The total Kennedy vote in West Virginia was
about 220,000, which is less than half the
Democratic vote cast for Adlai Stevenson in
1952, when he carried the State against Gen-
eral Eisenhower. It isn't difficult to line up
a minority bloc in any State primary if you
have the money and the organization. The
Kennedy forces can do it hereafter in every
primary, and they will confront the Demo-
cratic National Convention with the legiti-
mate query: "Since we have won most of the
primaries, ho W can you turn us down?"
This correspondent believes the West Vir-
ginia primary result not only has helped
Senator KENNEDY toward the Democratic
nomination but actually has helped toward
the election of Vice President NIXON.. who is
certain to be the Republican nominee.
Once the so-called religious issue is out
of the way?and it now will be so viewed by
many politicians because West Virginia has
a relatively small number of Catholics in its
voting population?the tendency will be to
appraise the Massachusetts Senator on his
merits.
The Republican strategists, for instance,
don't want to see the religious issue raised,
either. They would rather go before the
country with the argument that, in these
fateful times, "You don't elect a boy to be
President of the United States."
The biggest point the Republicans think
they will have in their favor is that Vice
President NIXON is trained In and intimately
familiar with the tasks of the White House
and that Senator KENNEDY would have to
start from scratch to learn how to function
In the Presidency.
But doesn't the voting in the primaries, it
will be asked, indicate that Senator KENNEDY
is popular and a good vote-getter? As
against a less colorful and less known candi-
date, such as Senator HUMPHREY, it has not
been difficult for Senator KENNEDY to win
the primaries thus far. But the real reason
the Massachusetts Senator upset so many
observers who were forecasting the outcome
of the West Virginia primaries is that they
paid more attention to hit-or-miss polls
than to two key factors?"the organization
and the finances."
In a national election, "the organization
and the finances" tend to be balanced as be-
tween the parties. As of today, it seems very
likely that the Nation's voters will have to
choose between Senator KENNEDY and Mr.
NIXON next November. This writer believes
that?on the basis of, first, satisfactory eco-
nomic condiitions in the major part of the
country next autumn, and, second, the argil-
ment as to the executive experience that the
Republican nominee will offer to the public,
and, third, the active support of President
Eisenhower?the Republicans will win a de-
cisive victory.
atement of Hon. Robert Lo tt to Na-
tional Policy Mac mery u committee
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
. HON. JACOB K. JAVITS
OF NEW YORK
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Tuesday, May 17, 1960
Mr. JAVITS. Mr, President, earlier in
this session, Robert A. Lovett testified
before the SdIrelffifffirttot-National
Policy Machinery, of which Senator
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174
4
JACKSON is chairman, and of which I
have the honor to be a member. This
testimony attracted widespread interest
and comment when it was subsequently
released, but a number of articles pub-
lished subsequently interpreted certain
comments of Mr. Lovett as being critical
of . President EisenhOwer. In order to
make clear that Mr. Lovett's testimony
was both in word and intent directed at
the institution of the Presidency and not
at President Eisenhower personally, Sen-
ator MUNDT, ranking Republican mem-
ber of the subcommittee, wrote Mr. Lo-
vett and received a reply making this
intent completely clear.
I ask unanimous consent that the ex-
change of correspondence between Sen-
ator MUNDT and Mr. Lovett, and an ar-
ticle on the subject by Arthur Krock
printed in the New York Times of April
14, 1960, may be printed in the Appendix
of the RECORD.
There being no objection, the letters
and article were ordered to be printed in
the RECORD, as follows:
MARCH 30, 1960.
Mr. ROBERT LOVETT,
Brawn Bros., Harriman ex Co.,
New York, N.Y.
DEAR MR. LOVETT : During March you gra-
ciouslY appeared as the leadoff witness before
the Subcommittee on National Policy Ma-
chinery, of which I am a member. At the
close of your appearance, the subcommittee
went into executive session to receive your
comments_ogirtheldattonal
Sectififir-e'ciune .
?Thrtnrghotlr-TOur discussion of the NSC
you referred to "the President." At the time,
it was my impresstolt mar/Mr-Were analyzing
the position of president. Subsequent pub-
lished articles have been based on the as-
sumption that you described the activities
of the present incumbent of the Presidency,
Dwight D. Eisenhower.
One of these articles was a column by
Mr. Walter Lippmann on March 1. Several
days later I attempted to clarify the matter
through a statement for the RECORD. At-
tached is a copy. -
Unfortunately my clarification statement
seems to have clarified nothing. Your testi-
mony still is be interpreted as applying to
President Eisenhower. I would appreciate
very much having a short note from you as
to the meaning you intended to give the
phrase "the President" in your executive
testimony. I hope to insert it in the com-
mittee record.
Again may I say that your basic statement
before our subcommittee was most interesting
and pertinent. With kindest regards, I am,
Cordially yours,
KARL E. 1)./formr,
U.S. Senator.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX
ROBERT A. LOVETT,
New ,,York, N.Y., April 4, 1960.
Senator KARL E. MUNDT,
U.S. Senate, -
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR MUNDT : On my return to
the office today from the Pacific coast, I
found awaiting me your letter of March 31
requesting clarification of the meaning of
certain language in my comments on the
National Security Council given in executive
session before the Subcommittee on National
Policy Machinery.
You are curect Ix your understanding that
my use of the expression "the President"
meant "a President,nrmtffirrfrfs Mt' and
not specifically the present incumbent. I
e stBtans -n-caremrtray,
special assistant to the President, who made
the same inquiry of me by telephone while I
was in California.
You will recall that, in my opening state-
ment, I said (last sentence, p. 12, of the
subcommittee printed record, pt. 1) that
"It should be clear, therefore, that none of
these observations is intended to be critical
of any individuals or of operational deci-
sions." The few paragraphs I had written
dealing with NSC were excised from my
public statement and were given in executive
session in accordance, I am informed, with
the terms of an understanding reached at the
request of the White House regarding the
handling in executive session of questions
on NSC matters, The sentence quoted above
naturally applies, as you rightly understood,
to all my testimony in both open and execu-
tive sessions.
In view of the public interest shown in
the subcommittee's hearings, it is wit sur-
prising to find some agencies or individuals
who feel that the shoe might fit. I know of
no way to keep them from -dying it on for
size.
With my thanks for your kind letter and
cordial personal regards, I am,
Very sincerely yours,
ROBERT A. LOVETT.
HOW TO MAKE A SHOE FIT ANY FOOT
(By Arthur Krock)
WASHINGTON, April 13.?Since Robert A.
Lovett testified before Senator JACKSON'S
subcommittee several weeks ago, the impres-
sion has been growing that he definitely
subscribed to some of the harshest criti-
cisms of President Eisenhower and the Na-
tional Security Council in their mutual
relationship. Some news dispatohes and
analyses of Lovett's testimony, and a Senate
speech by Senator FULBRIGHT, are important
sources of this public understanding.
The chairman of the Foreign. Relations
Committee concluded that the former Sec-
retary of Defense "indicated that the Presi-
dent (meaning Eisenhower) leads a danger-
ously sheltered life as Chief Executive."
Also, that Lovett "said * * * the NSC pro-
tects Mr. Eisenhower from the debates that
precede policy decisions."
The transeript of Lovett's testimony, both
in open and executive session, does not es-
tablish either of these conclusions, or the
assumptions in the press that when Lovett
referred to "the" President, he always
meant Eisenhower. What the transcript
does establish is this:
1. At the outset of his testimony Lovett
stated a caveat. It was that his remarks
would be "based for the most part on notes
made" during the Truman administration,
and that he intended "no direct reference
to any individuals or specific decisions."
2. But he did not regularly repeat this
caveat. Therefore, when he answered, mid
agreed with, questions about
cli...g.:tile-gr.eaMe.17.t.'! so para,secl they
cm?frd?have been taken to apply to the
Eisenhower tenure, it was possible to assume
that the witness replied in kind.
3. But close inspection of the transcript
shows that the former Secretary of Defense
conceived he was discussing "a" President
and the National Security Council as an in-
stitution, and he has since said as much.
Apparently he relied on his opening caveat
to prevent hypothetical exchanges in execu-
tive session from being interpreted as ap-
plying specifically to Eisenhower and the
current procedures of the National Security
Council.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
The following are such exchanges:
Mr. JACKSON. Do you think the Security
Council can operate effectively, as it was de-
signed originally, if you have a large number
of participants?
May 17
Mr. Low:Tr. I Would have very great doubts
about its ability to operate in a mass at-
mosphere. I think it would inhibit fair dis-
cussion * * * [and] be an embarassment as
regards the vigor with which a man might
want to defend his position. I think It would
limit the quality of the debate which the
President ought to hear.
Mr. JACKSON. You do not necessarily light-
en the load of the President by bringing to
him a reediaoLaapats,where deciaon is
Ig_aay, "we will go ahead
s.' Don't you think there is confu-
sion on the point that there is a tendency
to help the President, to lighten his load,
by trying to do his constitutional work for
him?
Mr. LovErr. I think the President in his
own protection n9,4tdJasiat Ra, being in-
formed nier,e1LprotECTed,by his aides.
[it 'Being; a tenden.cy of younger assistant -
* * * to tsy:to jis,cp ,tha4) thersome,probiems
away from the'desk.
Pro-IA-try- it was because the witness did
not steadily invoke his caveat, like takers
of the fifth amendment before racket in-
quiries, that many concluded Lovett had con-
ceded the points of criticism involved as cur-
rently applicable. But if he fears that Presi-
dent Eisenhower's temperament, his military
preference for having issues intensely
screened for him, and his awesome renown,
inevitably have diluted the essential concept
and function of the National Security Coun-
cil in this administration, Lovett neither
"said" nor "indicated" this. And the Na-
tional_Qiin il's tatistical rOCord?
ortre Presidentli ec arG Percent
of the National Security Council meetings,
sharp debates in his presence over fundamen-
tal eillereliceh trrtfttrtcrpttparr--4trutes many
assumptions on which major criticisms are
founded.
Tribute to the Eagle Rock Sentinel
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, May 17,1960
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Speaker, the
24th Congressional District of California,
which it is my privilege to represent in
Congress, possesses a number of top
quality local newspapers which make an
important contribution to the district in
reporting news of special interest to the
community, expressing area views on
matters affecting it, undertaking cru-
sades in behalf of the community where
its interest is concerned, and generally
performing many other valuable serv-
ices in behalf of the residents of the
community. The 24th district is very
fortunate to have these public-spirited
institutions.
One of the line community newspapers
serving the 24th District, the Eagle Rock
Sentinel, is celebrating its 50th anni-
versary this year. The Sentinel is a
source of pride to the district and I wish
to add my heartiest congratulations on
this important occasion.
There was no doubt as to what kind
of newspaper the Sentinel was to be from
the very beginning. When it first ap-
peared, in March 1910, the Sentinel an-
nounced that it would defy the then
existing trend toward journalistic sen+
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Addresses of Congressman John Brad-
-.
eines, of Indiana, and Martin c-
Knpally,_ jiational Commander of the
American Legion, at Dedication of New
Post Home of James Lowell Corey Post
68, Americaetiltitin Argos, Ind., May
.15, 1960,,,, -
EXThTS m
4AF HEMARICS
HON'ffellitrOADATASL--"IA
. ?1.
qtViii?ThisTA'
IN TILE Hca,asz 1)19 REPIalliSAFIWP4VMS
Thurtelttrifirart; f1,6114
t ,
Mr. BRAIMI/fs. , SPeakgr, on
Sunday, NI if- "go,s Ind., meMbers
of the Jan1 r, .4;14 Corey Post' 68 of
the Aineric
t bk tart in cere-
monies 44,04 bf a new
post 'that burned
in 1958`.
?
Among thp_peLsons ,partipipakint in
this everif-Wile. clistirigUiShed former
ntit r
Gover %tate a Indiana, the
Honorable Henry,:. Schricker; the In-
diana department commander of the
Arrterican'Legion,1Donald Hynes; and the
commander Of-the -James Lowell Corey
Post, BruCe Vattrier Weele.
Of pa4p etest to the Legion-
,.
mores. Fillies was the moving
addre? cornmarikr,of
the- ion, Martin B. 'Mc-
Kneall 4 ork, who dedicated the
new post" home. ,
CONGRESSMAN PfRADEMAS PRESENTS AIVIERICAN
FLAG
It was my honor 9n 'this occasim to
to present to the members of the James
Lowell Corey Post a 49-star flag whi
had flown over the Capitol of the Unte
States on July 4, 1959, the day when4lafo
49-star flag became the official nag-of
our country. I was aLsOpleased to pre-
the post with four pencil drawings
r .til(i "Four Fortresses of Freedom," the
WI:1,o House, the Capitol, the Suprenv
Cc uft, and the Declaration of Inclepond..
,ice. -etreA14
Mr. Speaker, under unanimous C6
I include my own remarks on this oc7
casion and those- of .National Ameilea4
Legion Commander McKrieally :
der Hynes has been named by the Governor
of Indiana to serve as Indiana State chair-
man of the observance.
The recognition of Armed Forces Week is
therefore a. splendid symbol of the continu-
ing devotion of the American Legion to the
? security and defense of our country and to
the cause of freedom.
The slogan of Armed Forces Week is "Power
? for Peace." All Americans want -peSeel
Democrats want peace. Republicans want
peace. :You want peace and I want peace
Yet yeti and I know that today the world- is
standing on a tightrope, with peace depend?;
inxSn !large measure on the capacity of a
(PLYKSjel wqr/d to maintain its balance and
?40- 44, intO:lhe volcano cif nuclear war.
. REPUSLICANS AND DEMOCRATS ereerres ARMS ?
It is encouraging to see tnat political lead-
ers of both our great politieer Parties are now
discussing the problem of arms control more
seriously than it has ever been discussed be-
fore. For as Secretary of State Christian
Herter made clear in February in his famous.
speech to the National Press Club in Wash-
ington, D.C., the only sure longrun way to
defend ourselves in this troubled world is to
Work out an effective disarmament agree-
ment with our adversaries in the Soviet
Union, an agreement which, I hasten to add,
will of course require effective inspection
guarantees.
WE MUST BE MILITARILY STRONG IN ORDER TO
DISCUSS DISARMAMENT
But I am sure Commander McNeally would
agree with me that We in America must be
strong militarily if we are to have bargain-
ing power in dealing with the Soviet Union,
even on the subject of disarmament.
We ca:nnot lead effectively from a position
-
of military weakness.
That is the meaning of the slogan, '''Power
for Peace."
We must be strong not only militarily but
economically and diplomatically as well, for
our Communist adversaries do not fight the
cold -war on one front alone. We have al-
ready seen, for exellnple, howIcheitsbchey has
la en,exploiting the unhappy blunZAT'orts
all 'the anti-American prcip-
agenda lie can make of it.
I have no with to exploit this matter for
partisan gain for we want our President to
enjoy the united support Of. the American
people as he goes into tatilks at' the summit
which may directly affect the destiny and
peace of the entire-World. We nonetheless
nattat. recognize how our Government has
.laced, 9n t4 si3Ofitt,trOrttalii61-
, by heway in which Khrhshchev
iting it.
MERICA FACED WITH POWERFUL CHALLENGE IN
SOVIET UNION
We must realize more than ever by the
events of recent days aterby the trip which
Ithrushrhev made across our country last
year that, in him and in the Soviet people
wheartehe left& we are confronted with the
rahstPoWerhil challenge to our survival as a
free a'ealety, in all the history of the American
Re!pulalte":-.377e' Must be prepared to under-
irta?nd the nature- of the challenge we face.:
We believe .in a free society. The Com-
munists believe in a slave society.
We believe' in an. Open societyi The Com-
munists believe in a closed society.
If we are effectively to meet the challenge
of the Communist world, we must be pre-
pared to sacrifice. We must understand
why we must be strong if we are to con-
tinue to be free.
WE MUST HAVE POWER IF WE ARE TO HAVE
PEACE
Better than most organizations in our
country, the American Legion understands
the dangers of the Communist challenge to
freedom, understands why we must have
power if we are to have peace.
tEMARKS OF CONGRESSMAN
MAY 15, 1960,ftg"
Governor 'Sehrtieget, Commander McKneal-
ly. Commander Hynes, Commander VaneDer
Weele, fellow Legionnaires and friends, today
is a great day not Only for Members of the
James Lowell Corey Pest of the diner/Call
Legion but for all Hoosier Itgionnaireee algt
often do we have an opecartwilty tobrae 9.1.1r
distinguished national cOininand_er,
McKneally, in our midst and We vielcOnie
here today. ?- a -
I want to congratulatalCcanznandar. Van
Der Weele and all the mtrnbers of ;Ames
Lowel Corey Post 68 of Airgos for theirded-
icated efforts which babe made possible the
construction of this fine new home.
ARMED FORCES WEEK SLOGAN: POWER FOR PEACE
It is fitting and proper that we should ded-
icate this new home on the eve of Armed
Forces Week, which begins tomorrow and
runs through May 22. Commander McKneal-
ly has asked all Legionnaires to support the
11th observance of this week and Comman-
. / therefore deem it a high honor and a
privilege, as your Repr,,,erii,ativ in Oongfess,
in the presence of our national and State
commanders and of Commanclef Van D,:r
Weele and all my fellow . Leginimairee to
present to 'tlie members of- the James
nerell Corey-Pnst.88 'of the American Legion
this America& flag which was Fowl) over the
Capitol of thefftrilited --3-tates on July 4, 1059,
the day the glafaataar flag became the official
flag of our catantey.
I have anet - ift which I am plesed
a
' at this time te reaent to you, four paned
drawings of .tnb'. Our Fortresses of America a
Freedom: TheAWIfiite Douse, the Capitol, the
Supreme Cokiltt /Wilding and the Declare-D.0e
of Badepe.zulatits;: -..
May these,cifeaviingh and may this fie ,s
serve as an ever constant reminder to Cl.
members of the,,,anaerican Legion of Um.
greatness of our -dbun try and the freedom :
which, is the birthright of the America:
,
people.
REIVIARICS OF trA,TIONAZ COMMANDER D.2ARTTIT B.
MCKNEALLY ?- I _ AEU:RICAN LEGD5Nrrit 'TTIE:
, .E.NEW HOME OF THE JAME...?
LOWELL CO=? POST. ARGOS, IND., MAY ID,;.'
,I 441 delight:04j? 'be in Argos and to as cia t
Ifi the declicatfOtt of thio beautiful new bu1ld .
ing wherein Allhe housed not only the men
and women of James Lowell Corey Post OW,
their ideals eel Well. This new post home R s a
fulfillment of the hopes and labors of the
men and women of Argos for 40 years. It la
a monument and at once a milestone 01
progress in the history of the Amen ear
Legion.
The American Legion stands solely as :,he
architect of the rehabilitation program With
Its rietwork of hospitals across the lane
wlfth is monument' enough for any group
of founders, but what of the millions 01
hours spent in hospital visitations? Arial.
of the millions of dollars spent in child wel-
fare? What of the original thinking Dial
chartered the course of the country in way::
Of preparedness or national security? Wilat
of the GI bill, vrritten by the American '.,e-
gion and sponsored (aver the protest of pro-
fessional educators? What of the develop..
ment of a strong, ant-hex:Ale voice in the
field of Americanism? What of the mul-
tifarious arts nf. charity that have become a
legend in the land? What a heritage?what
a perfect description of this heritage of char-
ity was written ,by the immortal Shakespeare
when he penned the lines which read: "Ihear
far that. little candle throws its beams so
shines a good deed in a naughty world."
THE PURPOSE OF THE AMERICAN LEGION
I have said on previous occasions that I he
American Legion purpose in our day was t he
sustaining of the doctrine of belief upon
which this Nation was founded and witheut
which it must perish, and that is the beeef
iri the, existence of God and in the dignity
of human personality. I need not point out
to YOU that today it is those twin beli,f.F.
Which are under the mast relentless and ine
Most powerful attack in the history of ras 0-
kind.
CALLS OR CONTINUED ATTENTION TO U.S.
GRAVES ABROAD
The American Legion holds in high es-
teem the profession and the office of t mt.
soldier. If it were not for the soldier the (:
would be no America and there would be ee
hope for men who love freedom. Ii ma. ".
ceaseless struggle to be free, he r at
willing to pay the enormous costs of a-, r
It is the melancholy record of fallen ini. .
that his motivations conflict and coin. !.
His will to do evil and his baseness me ;t
be reckoned with and the reckoning some-
times enslaves and it very frequently kills.
I commend to your most reverent attention
the thousands of graves abroad in ecru,
teries cs; ed for by the An-writ-en Coven,
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merit and I direct you to the fact that five
new cemeteries are to be dedicited -Una
year. Hardly a word is wr,itn, a picture
published concerning this subject and I ani
informed that this is eo because the pres-
ent-day rationale of the American people ili
not to be reminded of the ugliness of the
cost of freedom.. Freedom and the cause qf
America we say to you, must never be com-
puted in the terms of dollars and cents. 'glib
only item to be considered is the cost or
men's lives. Remit-11800;ot and reminders
of this fact Most laectlie /40. 1 item on the
agenda Of *out flaily lives; depression, and
sadness tole 4ontrary notwithstanding.
"WE Ann ifrtittit'ir-IflitgeOlit OR WE ARE
AGAINST Et"
For we have an enemy, an enemy that
opposee eterything 'that we hold dear and
that entrayenakes .our age one of tremen-
dous risks. And in this age there is no neu-
trality, we ores-either for freedom or we are
against, it Peer, of. atomic destruction does
not provide us with the solution of the di-
lemma.. There is a considerable body of
intellectuals whem the fear of atomic was
has obsessed. They have made their ob-
jective Ili lite only the preserving of exist-
ence. Mee reads of their thinking with a
certain horrifying fascination. Phillip
Toynbee states as follows: "In the terrible
contest of nuclear war even the vital dif-
ferences between communism and western
freedom become almost unimportant."
The West he declares should, "negotiate
at once with the Russians and get the best
terms that are available." Since Russia in
his estimation is now and will continue to
remain stronger there is nothing to do for
the West "but to negotiate from compara-
tive weakness." He admits that this may
well set up the total domination of the
world by Russia in a few years. The Soviets
would impose on us a regime which most
of us detest but this is better than allow-
ing the human race to destroy itself. And
one of Toynbee's confreres observes, "I might
not much mind living under Soviet domi-
nation." ?
These men are not Communists but they
have lost their will; they have lost it to fear
and to despair, in the pursuit of existence.
They have lost sight of the truth which is
simple enough and, that is that we in our
day are faced with taro destructive forces
of incredible dimensions. The bomb repre-
cents material devastation, the Communist,
party political CIESIMEII0II.
THE SOLEMN enzmivr./i OF OUR TIME
?This is the solemn dilemma of our time
, and this is the foremost 'consideration of
our people this afternoon. The administra-
tion in Washington has chosffiftri* eon-
titillation of nuclear testing, by t e flight of
the ,T.772,ipyg the seeret-AM , rtire`ti=
victs to pursue the Wel, q poll cal free
dM '1101tat" kind of a nation with the holy
intston of preserving Ltd, sovereignty, its
people, and its freedom, WOuld do less in the
face of the gigantic dilemma? To sit by
knowing what we know, facing what we
face, and do.nothing, would make the ceme-
teries of Europe where Otir honored dead are
enteenhed, find the whole history of this
Republic a gargantuan jest. The adminis-'
tration lifiLirgecl thro? Ca
service .,4)1.ty. ,,z re -i. iiitiiiii I. pviding
fdrelfaeff&Y of Itse; s ? uty is plain?
and it lit to gather the facts With which it
inthy AiSeharge that duty. Must we act as
\if Up dikty were less? Must we act as if the
ohtairgia Of information necessary to our
Owb. defense against a Secretive and threat-
ening Power was to commit a sin? Are we
to assume the abasing role of the boy calight
with his hand in the cooky jar when we
know the food there obtained is the only
I means of sustaining freedom and hope,,..I
t tila?One American, suffer no. erahatrasament
=. and highly praise all those in authority wile
aril' the bitter dilemma of these days.
We of the American Legion do not seek to
impose our views but we do propose to ell
that there is no flight from the serious TYLISi-
ness of cidr days and that is the survival of
Me malt_
um/ or cotnigre, iaifn, IDEALS NEEDED
- The late -Albert Carnes tells us, "with
'every dawn an assassin slips into Setae cell,
murder is the question before.tuf..":,:This is
the solemn-keynote of =Alum ihitimircier
of men and the murce,4l3lM. 40 Arne--
leans, let us conduct efik %ten. Men
of courage, men of fai ppm of ideals.
There is no other way op n to up, for Amer-
icans may not be craven, they may not be
pacifistic, they may not be mefi of despair.
In the world there is but one city in
which we can dwell, it is the city of the
halt, the blind, the maimed, but it is the
city of charity, and it is the city of courage,
the city of freedom. It is the City of God.
Outside It is the night.
060
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1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?APPENDIX
This is in line with what the local council
now proposes to do.
The strength of this campaign to bring a
transformation to La Crosse lies in its appeal
to everyone?those able to buy one share and
those able to purchase multiple shares of
stock
bor significantly is taking an active part,
joi ng with all forces in the community to
see is investment plan through to ultimate
succ Ss.
-M ing industrial park sites available has
been der consideration by the council for
many oaths, yet it has been unable to move
for la of!80Drporation financed and auth
ized t aer,. 4tlph a corporation now is in
exists
It is to la'e hoped that support for its
efforts ay be readily enlisted, and that the
hopes have envisioned for years may take
a turnin toward realization.
conservation program represents the
finest kind of cooperation in research,
educati ublication and constructive
action betwe Federal, State and local
units of gover ent. But even as we
commend the soi nservation districts
of Colorado, let us e forward to fur-
ther the cause that th ye thus far
so nobly advanced.
Soil S wardship Week in Colorado
SION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. YRON L. JOHNSON
IN THE HO
OF COLORADO
OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wedn day, May 18, 1960
Mr. JOHN 'N of Colorado. Mr.
Speaker, the c servation of topsoil is
essential. We o live with aridity and
wind erosion kn this. Those who live
with abundant inf all also know the
erosive power of ter.
Next week is So Stewardship Week in
Colorado. I take is opportunity to pay
tribute to those w i more than 25 years
ago saw the great ed for action to con-
serve the Nation's oil. As a result of
their vision, some 1/2 million farmers
and ranchers have ited to form 2,822
soil conservation d tricts. These dis-
tricts include 1.7 bill acres of land, or
a major portion of e United States.
These soil conservat" districts repre-
sent groups of land ners who have
joined together to pr ect our land so
that future generatio may enjoy its
blessings. All Americ owes them a
debt. We are not real the owners of
the land?we are but ustees for this
generation, and we sho view our ob-
ligation as involving ste rdship.
The work is not fin' ed. It may
never be finished. But i is going for-
ward. This Congress or he next one
should establish a soil mo ture conser-
vation laboratory to help dvance this
work. The soil moisture onservation
laboratory would study the inciples in-
volved in increasing the int e of water
from the soil, improving the oisture re-
tention characteristics of the s il and in-
creasing the efficiency of so moisture
use by plants. In the great ins area,
holding 8 percent of the mo ure that
now .evaporates back in the s until it
can be put to work growing crops is
equivalent to adding 3 inche to the
scarce rainfall.
Such a laboratory could well b ocated
at Fort Collins, Cola, but wher er lo-
cated, it is needed.
Similarly, research in weather Aiaodi-
neaten can contribute toward imprqving
the productivity of our soil. The -soil
he Quest for Safeguarded Disarmament
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. HUBEWimulTailaNX
.40101101.11
OTA
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Wednesday, May 18, 1960
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent to have printed
in the Appendix of the RECORD an ad-
dress entitled "The Quest for Safe-
guarded Disarmament Must Be at the
Heart of. 'U.S. Foreign Policy," which I
delivered in Washington, D.C., April 27,
1960.
There being no objection, the address
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE QUESI.s...24
egr ,ELzrz
Mett- A'rYHE RT OF .S. FOREIGN
POLICY
(Address delivered by a - :Lutror_1;11,11 H.
Democrat,
of tinnesota,at
Washington, D.C., az...*ll Ala.=
It may seem a long way from the real
mountains of West Virginia to the metaphor-
ical summit of next month?but it is not.
Like the people of Arizona and Alabama, Wy-
oming and Wisconsin, like people everywhere,
the men and women I have been talking with
In West Virginia are deeply concerned with
peace.
I have no crystal ball, and I will not at-
tempt to predict what the outcome of the
summit meeting will be. I do earnestly hope,
however, that the four leaders will give seri-
ous and thoughtful consideration to the
problems of arms control and disarmament,
and will be able to achieve real, even if lim-
ited, progress.
I recognize that the armament race and the
lack of political settlements are as closely
related as, for example, racial prejudice and.
racial discrimination. Both are vicious cir-
cles, and it would be easy to sit down and
give up trying on the theory that you can't
eliminate one unless you eliminate the other.
As a practical and optimistic people, how-
ever, we Americans like to break in on these
vicious circles somewhere. For example, in
recent years we have been enacting laws
against racial discrimination. That does
not mean that we fail to recognize the need
to banish prejudice by education; it does
mean that we recognize that education
alone would take a long, long time to achieve
results, and that having to cease some acts
of discrimination by law has in itself an ed-
ucational effect.
So it is with disarmament and political
settlements. The Soviet leaders have given
little ground for hope that they are ready to
consider a practical political settlement for
Berlin, let alone Germany as a whole, The
same is true of other political problems
which clutter the international agenda.
OUR MAJOR EFFORT SHOULD BE IN DISARMAMENT
That does not mean that we should forget
them, or cease trying. It does mean in my
view, however, that our major effort should
be in the field of disarmament?a field in
which, during recent years, the Soviet leaders
have done rather less propaganda and rather
more serious negotiation than over political
questions. If we do manage to achieve some
real progress in disarmament, we can return
to the political questions with greater hope
of success.
There are obvious reasons for this. Un-,
fortunate as it is that there are?for exam-
ple?two Germanies, two Koreas, two Viet-
nams, peace can conceivably survive this
division. We can live with it for the time
being, even if we do not condone it. But
the armaments race threatens both sides
with the imminence of mutual annihilation.
Furthermore?as the recent news of strikes
and riots among Soviet workers emphasizes?
the Soviet leaders have urgent domestic rea-
sons for seeking to beat some of their swords
into ploughshares.
SOVIET UNION NEEDS PEACE
Over a year ago, on returning from' my
visit to the Soviet Union, I noted Chairman
Khrushchev's urgent need for peace, and pre-
dicted that he would launch a big push for
disarmament. We should have been pre-
pared?but we weren't.
The four leaders at the summit might well
take their text from Shakespeare?who, I
understand, is in Boris Pasternak's excellent
translations as popular in the Soviet Union
as in the Western World. Be might have
been speaking directly to the summit when
he wrote:
"There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the full, leads on to
fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
' Is bound in shallows and in miseries."
Such a tide is running now for disarma-
ment?and I profoundly hope that the sum-
mit leaders will take it at the full.
TWO STEPS AT THE SUMMIT
There are two major steps that they can
and should take. One of these is to resolve
the most difficult obstacle standing in the
way of a nuclear weapons test ban agree-
ment?namely, the number of onsite inspec-
tions. The second is to give directions for
the future course of the 10-nation disarma-
ment negotiations.
DEFINITE POSSIBILITY OF TEST BAN AGREEMENT
There is a very definite possibility that a
test ban agreement?the first real break-
through toward peace?may be achieved this
year, even if it is not concluded in time to
be submitted to this session of Congress.
Most of you in this well-informed audience
are familiar with the broad features of the
proposed test ban treaty. I shall review
them briefly:
1. The treaty would ban permanently all
nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under
water, and in outer space. It would ban
underground tests down to a certain level?
the level suggested by the United States
being 4.75 on the earthquake scale, that is
19 kilotons of TNT in magnitude, roughly
the size of the Hiroshima bomb.
2. A minimum of 180 control posts would
be erected around the world to monitor
shocks to the earth's surface, and to iden-
tify them as earthquakes or as nuclear ex-
plosions.
3. Up to a certain number of times each
year, a mobile inspection team could make
an on-site investigation of an event reg-
istered at the control posts which could
not be identified as being natural in origin
or an earthquake.
4. A coordinated program of research
would be conducted by the three nuclear
powers to improve the techniques of de-
tecting and identifying nuclear explosions.
There is also the possibility of a separate
agreement that, while this research is going
on?and at least for a 2-year period?the
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10570 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE May
Mr. McCORMACK. The only bill I was
going to put down for Tuesday was the
recla tion project in Oklahoma.
The PEAKER, pro tempore (Mr.
JONES of issouri). Is there objection
to the re st of the gentleman from
Massachuse ?
There was o objection.
PROGRAM FO WEEK OF MAY 31
Mr. HOEVEN. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent ? roceed for 1 min-
ute in order to ascerta the program for
next week.
The SPEAKER. Is th e objection to
the request of the gentlem from Iowa?
There was no objection.
Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. aker, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. HOEVEN. I yield.
Mr. McCORMACK. On Tues next
I have calendared the bill S. 1892, ;eal-
Ing with the Norman reclamation pr ct
in Oklahoma.
Let me say, frankly, that if the pr
ponents of the bill would prefer that
not bo brought up Tuesday I will accom-
modate them. I have been trying to get
In touch with the author of the bill to
have a talk with him so I could have
definite information about Tuesday.
I talked with him yesterday, and my
impression is he was agreeable to it
coming up on Tuesday. I want to get
rid of these bills as fast as we can be-
cause I know what is going to happen on
the other end 4 or 5 weeks from now.
I want the Members to have their day in
court. I am putting consideration of
that bill down for Tuesday with the
qualification I have stated.
Wednesday is District day, and there
Is one bill to be considered, H.R. 12036,
relating to sewage disposal in the Dulles
International Airport. It involves au-
thority to connect up with the District
of Columbia system.
Then there is House Resolution 530,
giving the Committee on the Judiciary
power to investigate certain compacts.
That is out of the Rules Committee.
Mr. HOEVEN. That will come up on
Wednesday?
Mr. McCORMACK. I am setting that
bill down for Wednesday. If the pro-
ponents of S. 1892 for any reason prefer
not to take advantage of my assignment
of that bill for Tuesday I cannot guar-
antee that the bill will come up on
Wednesday because the District bill has
been, agreed to by unanimous consent
and Im putting the Committee on the
Jud1eiati bill, House Resolution 530,
down for at day.
Mr. A . Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yid?
Mr. HOEVEN I yield to the gentle-
man from Karts
Mr. AVERY.
said he would want
sponsor of S. 1892 as
would come up on
e majority leader
o confer with the
whether or not it
sday. If that
does not come up on Tu day will there
be any business schedul before the
House on that clhy?
-Mr. McCORMACK. No. am glad
the gentleman asked that question.
For the remainder of the week,
Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Sat-
urday, and of course I do not expect there
will be any Saturday meeting, but in
case anything arises I mention Saturday,
the following bills will be considered:
H.R. 10572 relating to forests out of
the Committee on Agriculture. That
was on the program this week but we did
not reach it.
H.R. 1176:1, Farmers Home Adminis-
tration.
House Concurrent Resolution 661,
Joint Committee on National Fuels
Policy.
House Joint Resolution 402, transit
regulation compact for the Washington
metropolitan area.
The consideration of some of these
bills is dependent on whether or not a
rule is reported out. As far as I can see
at this time there is no major bill to come
up next week, that is, of a national na-
ture. These are important bills, of
course. I d.o not want to downgrade
them.
There is the usual reservation that any
further program will be announced later
and conference reports may be brought
at any time. There was one reported
terday on the Post Office and Trees-
Department's appropriation bill.
the gentleman in charge will want
g that up I am unable to state now.
HOEVEN. Can the majority
us what progress we are mak-
propriation bills?
oRMACK. There is one bill,
onstruction bill, that is still
gentleman will remember
hen that came up con-
ostponed because au-
t been finally passed.
onferees on that bill
er, even if the con-
d to and the Presi-
h it is reasonable
refer to the au-
erstanding is
ber handling
me up until
ereabouts.
to b
Mr.
leader
Ing with
Mr. Mc
the militar
pending. T
that last wee
sideration wa
thorization had
I understand the
have agreed. Ho
ference report is ag
dent signs the bill, w
to assume he will, an
thorization bill, my
that the desire of the
the bill is that the bill not
week after next, June 9, o
That bill will not come up nt week. It
will be week after next.
The other appropriation bill, of course,
is the bill referred to by my friend from
Iowa, the mutual security appropriation
bill. Or, as my friend, says, the foreign
handout bill.
Mr. GROSS. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. HOEVEN. I thank the gentle-
SUMMIT CONFERENCE COLLAPSE
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from Illinois [Mr. Pocumal is rec-
orgnized for 15 minutes.
(Mr. PUCUNSKI asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
ardignagii? Mr. Speaker, the
other has launched an in-
vestigation into the collapse of the sum-
mit conference and what effect this col-
lapse will have on international rela-
tions.
The wire stories this morning carried
this item as to the purpose of this in-
vestigation and the four points or the
four areas that the other body will con-
centrate its direction or attention on:
First, the events and decisions resulting
from the 13-2 incident; second, the effect
of these events and decision upon the
summit; third, the policy of our Govern-
ment regarding the summit meeting;
fourth, the policy of the United States
in the future and possible improvement
In the execution thereof.
Now, I think a great deal can be
learned from these hearings and this in-
vestigation, and certainly I am very
happy to learn that the other body has
undertaken this type of investigation.
However, I am disappointed, in reading
from this agenda, that apparently no in-
vestigation is going to be made of the in-
cidents leading up to ,?Icilpastrous mo-
ment when the U-2 MT into Corthrturdst
hafield' on the ?Of the summit confer-
ence.
I would like to make clear one thing:
I do not support the criticism being
hurled against our Government for send-
ing these flights over the Soviet Union
at a time so close to the summit meeting.
I would say, on the contrary, I think that
our Government would have been dere-
lict if it had not sent these flights over
the Soviet Union as it has been doing for
the last 4 years. I believe that we are
living under great tension and at this
time, more so than any other time, we
should know what the Soviets are up to.
We know that Mr. Khrushchev did not
expect any success at the summit meet-
ing. We know that Mr. Khrushchev
realized that he was going to have to
leave the summit a defeated man since
the Western Powers had agreed on any
number of occasions previous to the sum-
mit meeting that they would not yield on
Berlin because the people of their re-
spective nations did not want the West-
ern Powers to yield to Khrushchev.
Mr. Speaker, I myself had written the
President a letter on the eve of the sum-
mit conference, on the eve of his de-
parture for Paris, in which I told him
that in a survey made in my awn district,
90 percent of my constituents replied
"No" when I asked "Should the United
States yield to Soviet Russia's demand
that we abandon our position in West
Berlin?" And also I wrote the President ?
pointing out that 85 percent of my con-
stituents answered "Yes" when I asked
them if they believed that the President
ought to take a firm stand in demanding
freedom and liberation of the captive
nations behind the Iron Curtain when
he met with Khrushchev at the summit.
I sent President Eisenhower this letter
to let him know that the people of my
district will support him in a firm stand
against the Communists.
Certainly, prior to the summit meet-
ing, the Western Powers unequivocally
agreed that they were going to remain
firm in their position. Khrushchev
knew this, and there is no question but
what Khrushchev needed a provocation
to torpedo the summit conference before
it got started.
I think it behooves us, all of us, as
Americans, to go beyond the scope of
normal assumption in evaluating all as-
pects of the events that preceded the
summit collapse.
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1960 CO RESSIONAL RECORD ?HN,SE
sped
in the
second
the nature
and to their
by no means 1
Selfishness, softn
and disinterest ca
America's future as
power. The crises of t
patriotism of the highest o
pie understand this fact, I
that they will rise fully to the
demonstrate that the strength o
is far superior to that of any system
huma, subjugation and slavery.
requirements of any one group wit
mework of our citizenry must take
e. They must fully understand
the total threat to their security
dam and that this threat is
ted to the military sphere.
lack of understanding
e just as deadly to
lack of military
e times demand
If our peo-
e no doubt
asion and
ee men
sed on
ESPIONAGE IN EMBASSIES
aamiraretootireapoin"..Akee4o0.,
(Mr. PF,T,LY asked and was given per-
mission to address the House for 1 min-
ute and to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
AlritfirliasT , Mr. Speaker, yesterday
Ai Lodge revealed to the Se-
curity Council of the United Nations a
Soviet gift to our Moscow Ambassador
which had contained a clandestine lis-
tening device to enable the Soviet intelli-
gence agents from outside of our Em-
bassy to listen in to the U.S. Ambassa-
dor's conversations. Unless one is very
naive, it is conceivable that this Rus-
sian "Trojan Horse" is only one of hun-
dreds of similar acts of espionage being
practiced in our American Embassies in
Iron Curtain countries.
All of which, Mr. Speaker, leads me to
refer to remarks I made on the floor of
the House on 12?g, Attila time
I criticized We personnel procurement
policy Of the State Department in em-
P11:0-1W.. -141411s,of ?Xnaa;;Curtakk;,..KW,11-
trim,-1444x4X4311100$444.44.41.4947.,Goun-
tries. In view of recent events i should
like to again urge that the State Depart-
ment divest itself of any nationals of
Communist countries in their employ in
Iron Curtain country Embassies.
A year ago when I took this matter up
with the State Department it defended
its personnel policy, but I felt the argu-
ments advanced to me were extremely
weak. In the first place, I was told that
the employing of Communist nationals
In these sensitive spots created no risk
to national security. I was also told that
from a budgetary standpoint it was not
possible to employ American citizens in
the positions presently occupied by for-
eign nationals, and finally I was told that
Americans would not be willing to accept
many of these positions now filled by
aliens either by reason of inadequate pay
or because of the character of the em-
ployment.
' I said then and I say now such argu-
ments do not hold water. Certainly, with
our national security involved, Congress
would furnish whatever funds were nec-
essary to support employment of Ameri-
can citizens in these spots, and further-
more, I am sure that there is an abund-
ant supply of American youth who upon
graduation from the colleges and univer-
sities of this country?especially lan-
guage students?would jump at the
chance to spend a year or so working in
our Embassies, regardless of the so-called
menial character of the positions that
.rt%.e available.
No. 97-7
10569
In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I atate foreign handout bill is going to come
again this policy presents a real risk to before the House?
the security of the United States and I Mr. McCORMACK. I do not know
suggest in light of recent events that the anything about the handout. The gen-
State Department reexamine its person- tleman r eans the mutual security bill?
nel policy with reference to the employ- Mr. G OSS. That is what President
ment of these aliens in our Embassies Eisenhow r calls it, the handout bill.
behind the Iron Curtain. 4e Mr. Mc ORMACK. You can call it
the hando t bill if you want to, but I
cannot go long with that designation.
THREAT OF SOVIET POLITICAL AND Mr. GRO S. I want the gentleman to
ECONOMIC EXPANSION understand 'at is-not original with me;
that comes ? om President Eisenhower,
the handout.
McCO ACK. That was w/gen
he was runn for the Presidency.
Mr. GROSS. That is right.
Mr. McCOR CK. But now that he
is in the Office o resident, responsibility
has caused him change his mind.
Mr. GROSS. ut they are still his
words.
Mr. McCORMA K. But he said it;
JOHN MCCORMACK d not say it; he said
it when he was candidate for the
Presidency.
Mr. GROSS. Yes.
Mr. McCORMAC But not now that
he is President.
Mr. GROSS. Yes; ell, I will not ac-
cept that amendment.
I am still waiting to d out when the
handout bill is going t come up.
Mr. McCORMACK. to the mutual
security appropriation b , from the best
information I have it 1 s as though it
would be ready for fl action about
June 13. I cannot give t e date specif-
ically but I had inquiry ade within a
day or two because I wan d to get in-
formation myself, and the st informa-
tion I have is that it will robably be
ready for floor action abou June 13.
Mr. GROSS. I thank th gentleman
and withdraw my reservatio of objec-
tion.
The SPEAKER. Is there o ection to
the request of the gentleman om Mas-
sachusetts that when the HousOadjourns
today it adjourn to meet on" Tuesday
next?
There was no objection.
(Mr. BATES asked and was given per-
mission to address the House for 1 min-
ute.)
Mr. BATES. Mr. Speaker, I am con-
fident that the events of the past week
have given many Members of the House
caus to reflect on the position of the
Unites.States and its role as a bulwark
against the threat of Soviet political and
econom
Man
that per
of a new
one of IN
ferred to
common t
Khrushche
was prompt
at peace wi
Now we k
and the pat
contempt for
the American
throughout the
In a few day
opportunity to
American people
tives in the House
may prove to be a
relations with the
I refer to the comi
priations for the m
gram. This progra
troubled times as
weapon in arming, mi
nomically, the free wo
were summarily torn
actions of Mr. Khrushch
cal power-hungry group i
for whom he speaks.
I hope that the deba will be one
which will hearten rather an dismay POSTPONEMENT OF ROLLCALLS TO
the nations which today st d athwart WEDNESDAY
the Soviet Union's approach to the free
world.
I pray, that the results of t coming
debate will reflect a determina on by the
House to support the Presiden his able
Secretary of State and Secretaw of De-
fense, and the Joint Chiefs of at aff and
their estimates of the minimut needs
of this vital adjunct to our lational
defense?the mutual security p ogram.
Let not the pruning knife weaken he tie
that binds4 us to the rest of the free
world.
c expansion.
if us I am sure shared the hope
aps we were on the threshold
ra. Some called this new era
ceful coexistence?others re-
as a nuclear stalemate. But
all was the hope that Mr.
s visit to the United States
d by a burning desire to live
the rest of the world.
w that beneath the smile
n the back was a cynical
he peaceful yearnings of
people and their allies
orld.
the world will have an
ge the reaction of the
nd their Representa-
o these events which
uming point in our
oviet Union.
debate on appro-
ual security pro-
looms in these
most powerful
tarily and eco-
whose hopes
under by the
and the cyni-
the Kremlin
ADJOURNMENT TO
MAY 31
TUESDA
Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I
ask unanimous consent that in the event
of a rollcall on Tuesday next in connec-
tion with the passage of a bill, a motion
to recommit, or any amendment, such
rollcall be postponed to the following
day, Wednesday, because there is :a pri-
mary in Alabama.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, reserving
the right to object, what is the legislation
to be called up on Tuesday next?
Mr. McCORMACK. The only bill I
have on Tuesday that might be called up
in the event of a rule being reported by
the Rules Committee, is S. 1892, the Nor-
man Federal reclamation project in
Oklahoma.
Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker I Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I withdrew
ask unanimous consent that when t e my reservation of objection.
House adjourns today it adjourn to mee Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr.
on Tuesday next. Speaker, reserving the right to object,
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, reserving the gentleman, I understand, expects
the right to object, could the gentleman nothing of any great importance on
give us any information as to when the Tuesday?
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1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
real meaning in life to many of our
hard-of-hearing citizens.
Angone who has studied this problem
is aware of the great need for specialists
to help the deaf. The national shortage
of trained personnel in this field has
been critiCal in recent years. It will be-
come desper te if steps are not taken
soon to over
It is my un
mated there wil
350 classroom te
the 1959-60 school
help is not provided.
proposal before 'us prov
cut into this backlog of
It is important, in evalu
for this legislation, to note
of the deaf are probably mo
to obtain than are teachers in a
field of special education. In a
the training and preparation of tea
in this complex field is an expen
undertaking, thus bolstering the case f
providing special scholarship help for
those who enter this profession.
The grants-in-aid authorized by Sen-
ate Joint Resolution 127 will serve as a
powerful incentive for more young people
to enter this great field of humanitarian
endeavor. It is hoped that the financial
assistance made possible by this legis-
lation will result in the establishment
of much needed regional training centers
geared to the special requirements of
each particular area.
The authority contained in this meas-
ure will certainly go a long way toward
providing the trained personnel so des-
perately needed to assist our deaf citi-
zens. It represents a unique opportunity
for the Congress to approve an invest-
ment in human resources of incalculable
worth.
The reduction in the severity of the
handicaps with which the deaf are af-
flicted through expert therapy, the ac-
quisition of special skills such as lip-
reading, or through the miracle of
learning to talk?these are some of the
fruits which can follow enactment of
this measure. There are literally mil
lions of Americans who can benefit fr
Senate Joint Resolution 127 and who In
therefore become more happy and -ful
members of our society.
Surely the tremendous hum prob-
lems involved in this field, ombined
with the demonstrated i equacy of
present training facilities nd the in-
ability of States and lo ities to meet
the need, argues eloq ntly for sound
Federal assistance, is measure has
the backing of Ie ing organizations
'which deal with t deaf and its enact-
ment is strong recommended by the
various instit ions which are now
plagued with shortage of trained per-
sonnel to p .vide help.
It is m ope the Senate will approve
With a V this measure, so that the Fed-
eral ernment can play its part by
maki a lasting investment in the
burn. resources of our deaf citizens.
The ncouragement of the recruiting and
training of teachers of the deaf, speech
pathologists, and audiologists is a vital
step in minimizing these tragic handi-
e it.
standing that it is esti-.
a shortage of some
ers at the start of
ear if additional
Fortunately, the
s the means to
s,
g the need
teachers
difficult
other
ion,
caps and better preparing those afflicted
with the means to contribute more fully
and more happily to our society.
Mr. President, I have received a great
many communications from my con-
stituents about this resolution. They
have come from private individuals,
from parents and friends of deaf people,
and from leaders in the field. They argue
most persuasively for the pressing need
to enact this measure. I ask unanimous
consent to have a few of these many fine
communications printed at this point
in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the com-
munications were ordered to be printed
in the RECORD, as follows:
NEW YORK SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF,
White Plains, N.Y May 9,1960.
Senator KENNETH B. KEATING,
U.S. Senate, Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SIR: I am writing to ask your support
for the Senate Joint Resolution 127, which
we hope will come up for the consideration
the Congress during its present session.
is bill deals with the problem of pre-
p g desirable young people to beco
tea rs of the deaf. Like all schools
the ? in this country, we, too, have en
deeply ncerned by our inability to ? :in
teaching ersonnel. The parents the
children e lied in this school ar kewise
concerned. of us hope that en pre-
sented for c ideration, the b will meet
with approval.
Thanking you or your sideration of
this important pli, of lel ation, I am,
Sincerely you
T. CLOUD,
Superintendent.
ROCHESTER S OL F
Rochester .Y Nov
Senator KENN B. KEATIN
MS. Senate,
Washington C.
DEAR SE OR KEATING: Thank ou again
for seein e in your office in Roc-star on
Friday, ovember 27, and giving m ppor-
tunit o bring to your attention S.J. so-
luti 127, sponsored by Senator HILL nd
co. .anion resolutions introduced in ? e
se by Senators ELLIOTT and FOGAR
ich would alleviate the critical shortag
of trained teachers of the deaf, speech, and
hearing pathologists and audiologists.
I am? particularly interested in title I of
S.J. 127 which relates to teachers of the deaf.
For over a decade it has been impossible
to get more than 150 trainees into our ac-
credited training centers in the 'United
States, when our annual need for trained
teachers has been at least 500. This has
resulted in a deterioration of programs in
schools for the deaf to a point that is actu-
ally alarming. Something must be done to
motivate young people to come into this
field. The U.S. Department of Education
has stated that it is harder to obtain
teachers for deaf children than for any other
kind of handicapped child except the deaf-
blind child.
S.J. 127 and its companion resolutions are
heartily endorsed by the Conference of Ex-
ecutives of American Schools for the Deaf,
the Convention of American Instructors of
the Deaf, the Alexander Graham Bell Asso-
ciation for the Deaf, the American Hearing
and Speech Association, the American Hear-
ing Society as well as parent organizations.
After 2 years of hard work on a national
level, it is finally in a form satisfactory to
everyone.
I would very much appreciate your study-
ing this bill, as I am very sure that you will
THE DEAF',
bar 28, 1959.
10539
find it worthy of your wholehearted support
Very truly yours.
J. H. GALLOWAY,
Superintendent.
ST. MARY'S SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF',
Buffalo, N.Y., May 14, 1959.
The Honorable KENNETH B. KEATING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR KEATING: A proposed reso-
lution is being prepared to alleviate the
shortage of teachers of the deaf through
Federal legislation. Sptiator Hui, is expected
to introduce the bi this month, we hope,
with the names o enator KENNEDY, Sena-
tor SALTONSTALL, d Senator CLARK on It RS
cosponsors.
We wanted ou to be familiar with this
problem?to alize the great need for teach-
ers of the . f. The nationwide shortage of
trained c room teachers of the deaf has
been cr al over a period of years, but has
now b me desperate. A shortage of 350
class m teachers faces this profession at
the art of the 1959-60 school, year.
e problem is national in scope, so the
tion must be approached from a national
vel, since training centers for the prepara-
tion of classroom teachers of the deaf must
be regional. At present there are 22 ap-
proved training centers equipped to train
at least 300 teachers of the deaf per year,
should this incntive legislation be enacted
and the expected flow of applicants ma-
terialize.
May we solicit your valued support in this
endeavor? It would be most helpful if you
would go on record as being in favor of this
bill when it is introduced. We shall con-
tact you again when we receive a copy of
the bill.
Your help in this problem that seriously
affects children afflicted with deafness will
be deeply appreciated.
Most respectfully yours,
SISTER ROSE GERTRUDE,
Principal.
BUFFALO, N.Y., April 20,1960.
Senator KENNETH KEATING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.:
Shortage qualified personnel in field dic-
tates we urge your support of speech path-
ology and audiology graduate program de-
scribed in title 2 of Senate Joint Resolution
127.
ELMO KNIGHT,
President, Speech and Hearing Asso-
ciation of Western New York.
PARENTS' ASSOCIATION OF
INGTON SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF,
ew York, N.Y., September 9,1959.
H B. KEATING,
Hon. KEN
U.S. Senate,
Washington, C.
DEAR SIR: S organization, which repre-
sents 220 sets o .arents of deaf children, is
writing to ask r help in securing the
passage of Senate tint Resolution 127.
This legislation designed to help al-
leviate the national ortage of classroom
teachers of deaf child , speech patholo-
gists and audiologists t ugh scholarships
and grants to training cent
As parents of deaf chil we are par-
ticularly concerned with the acher short-
age. The Department of Hea , Education
and Welfare states that the Ere.' est teacher
shortage exists in this area of exoikptionality.
Approximately 500 additional teffehers are
needed for next fall, and training, centers
have turned out only-125 this year.
As parents, we are vitally concerned that
our children not be denied educational op-
portunity because of the teacher shortage.
There are some 30,000 deaf children of school
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10540 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENA
age whose parents are anxiously concerned
about the increasingly desperate teacher
sh tage. With proper education we can
exp ct that our children will grow up to be
use 1, productive citizens. Over the past
10 s enrollment of deaf children in
school for the deaf has increased about 400
per yea Last year the increase was 900.
Provi g trained teachers of the deaf
must be ? e a Federal concern because in-
dividual ates have no training facilities.
There are accredited training centers in
this countr With additional funds they
could provide substantially greater number
of teachers.
Organizatio which have united to se-
cure the pass.ag f the proposed legislation
are the Alexande Graham Bell Association
for the Deaf, the ference of Executives of
American Schools f the Deaf, the Conven-
tion of American I tructors of the Deaf,
and the 'Parents' Se on of the Alexander
Graham Bell Associatio
We would appreciate ur support of this
legislation.
Sincerely yours,
MILDRED SHAROFF,
President.
THE CENTRAL NEW K
SCHOOL FOR I AF,
Rome, N.Y Janua 15,1960.
Hon. KENNETH KEATING,
U. S. Senate,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
Sm: May I respectfully suggest thaI. ouse
Joint Resolution 494 (13.3. Res. 127) is o tal
importance.
I have joined with parents, teachers,
the deaf of America in presenting Infer
tion before the House of Representati
Subcommittee on Education and Labor a
the public hearing in New York on Octobe
28, 1959.
The stated purpose of the legislation is"
help make available to those children in o
country who are handicapped by deafn
the specially trained teachers of the
needed to develop their abilities and to elp
make available to individuals suffering s ech
and hearing impairments those spI tally
trained speech pathologists and audi ?gists
needed to help ORM overcome the i andi-
caps."
While I speak on my own behalf, con-
fident that what I say essentiall expres,ses
the views of the following groups nd organ-
izations working in the interests the deaf:
The Conference of Executives f American
Schools for the Deaf; the Alex der Graham
Bell Association for the Deafj the Conven-
tion of American Instructorj of the Deaf;
the Empire State Associatiti of the Deaf;
and the National Associatio of the Deaf.
These bills would provici grants-in-aid to
training centers which uld enable them
to recruit and train )4 fessional workers
for the presently seriouiry understaffed area
of special education, thtspeech handicapped
and hearing handicadaped. Grants-in-aid
would be a powerful rabruitment boost in in-
teresting young people to enter this special
field. The main fa tor that keeps them out
is money, for special training programs
means an. extra liege year, so the easy
alternative is to ter the regular teaching
field immediately after graduation.
Believe me, please, this has had consider-
able study, and to my way of thinking there
Is considerable merit to the bills. Those for
whom I speak strongly support the bill in-
troduced by Mr. ELL/OTT, House Joint Resolu-
tion 494, and its counterparts House Joint
Resolutions 488, 503, 507, 512, 516, and 526
introduced respectively by Congressmen
FOGARTY, BOLAND, THORNBERRY, LOSER, BAKER,
and MOORHEAD.
The degree of effectiveness with which one
is able to communicate with one's fellow man
has a profound influence on one's whole so-
cial and economic life. The reduction of the
severity of a speech handicap through expert
therapy, the acquisition of ski in lipreading
by one who is hard of hearing or the miracle
of learning to speak by one ? orn deaf who,
because he cannot hear, wo never learn to
speak unless specially taug , makes it pos-
sible for those so helpe to meet more
equally the challenge of o r competitive so-
ciety, and broadens the ?ase of their con-
tributions as citizens. ? ere are millions of
Americans and childr with varying de-
grees of speech and h ing difficulties who
need the services of s daily trained people
to help them reach t is higher level of per-
formance. Many o these are denied this
help because of th ery serious shortage of
trained workers in is field.
Financial ass's ce would definitely im-
prove a most desirable condition?the
great teacher ah tage that exists in the area
of the deaf--a would undoubtedly make
possible the blishment of regional train-
ing centers i the different sections of the
country whi mild more effectively meet
the needs o ach particular area.
Only tra ed speech pathologists can prop-
erly serve is vast group. A serious short-
age of tr ed personnel exists in this field
of excep nality, and detailed studies of the
conditi were presented to Mr. Ertiorr and
memb of the House of Representatives
Subc mittee on Education and Labor at the
publ hearing; this detailed statistics and
stu s will be furnished you if you wish it.
ish to thank you for giving me the
rtunity to bring to your attention the
cal nature of the shortage of trained
sonnel in the field of the speech impaired
d hearing impaired, and express the hope
hat our combined efforts to relieve this con-
dition will be successful.
Sincerely,
FRED L. SPARKS, Jr.,
Superintendent.
Sen r K. NESTING,
Sena Office Building,
Wash on, D.C.:
Stro y urge your support of Senate Joint
Resolut 127. Title 2 in that resolution
should a aterially in training more speech
pathologi and audiologists who are in
much too s1.rt supply.
3r. KATHERINE P. THORN,
Director, niversity of Buffalo Speech
Clinic.
BUFFALO, N.Y.,
April 20, 1960.
OVERALL LIMITATION ON FOREIGN
T CREDIT
Mr. MANSFI
ask. unanimous co
proceed to the cons
. Mr. President, I
exit that the Senate
eration of Calendar
No. 1456, H.R. 10087.
The PRESIDING OpFICER. The bill
will be stated by
The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R.
10087) to amend the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 to permit taxpayers to elect
an overall limitation on be foreign tax
credit.
The PRESIDING onacro,. Is there
objection to the request of the Senator
from Montana.
There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to consider the bill, which had
been reported from the Committee on
Finance with amendments.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
bill will be the pending business.
May
LEARN FROM TORPEDOING OF
SUMMIT CONFERENCE
ur_yippwctot, Ohio. Mr. President,
th- Piete 661Tapie of the vaunted
summit conference before it took place
is now a matter of history. It has shaken
the free people of the world as nothing
has since the dark days preceding the
Second World War.
Nobody is against expressions of sym-
pathy for President Eisenhower on this
unfortunate conclusion to his efforts.
The cruel fact is that our humiliation
and diminished prestige left in the wake
of the breakup in Paris are such that
little can be gained by closing our eyes
to the true situation and wishing it had
never happened. To do so would only
prove to the world that our mistakes are
not to be corrected and that Americans
are satisfied with slipshod leadership. It
is evident there should be a demand for
better administration, both domestically
and in the conduct of foreign relations.
This is not likely to take place if we
Indulge in self-pity or, even worse, self-
deception.
What is required Is, not divisive parti-
sanship, but a rational, free, and open
discussion of the situation and of what
can be done to correct it.
It is our duty, as Senators of the
United States, to clarify the issues, clear
the air, and take steps toward restoring
the damage that has been done to the
prestige of our country and to hopes for
world peace.
I commend the chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, the dis-
tinguished Senator from Arkansas [Air.
PULER/CHI'] and our distinguished major-
ity leader [Mr. JonNsoN of Texas] for
the statesmanlike course they are follow-
ing in connection with this matter.
The occurrences and statements just
before the summit conference was to be
held and the series of sensational events
that followed point out?as nothing else
has done?the inherent weaknesses in
President Eisenhower's concept of the
Presidency. Despite the fact the Presi-
dent conducted himself with dignity and
restraint, quite in contrast to the bully-
ing tactics of Klirushchev, we know now
that at this critical time, important and
often vital decisions cannot be delegated
to subordinates. At a time when Presi-
dent Eisenhower needed them most, some
appointive officials let him down.
Mr. President, our citizens generally
are questioning the series of incredible
blunders and the almost unbelievable
administrative confusion that both pre-
ceded and followed the disastrous U--2
flight. What excuse is there for the fact
that the Central Intelligence Agency did
not coordinate the timing of those flights
with the summit plans of the State De-
partment?
DI, the President ordered
tha ? stop, after the downing
of one o our planes? If the flight was
so necessary 2 weeks before the summit
conference, it seems peculiar that there
s no need for such aerial reconnaissance
rom now on.
The President went on to say that he
directed the flights be stopped because..
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A
with the downing of the U-2, their use-
fulness was impaired. Why? The So-
viets had known of these flights all along.
No secret was involved. If the flights
were useful 2 weeks before the summit,
wh .....y1Lrel_tliey_not useful War
li?ii 7rVil.': '0? W1177that the
administration's alibis do not hold water.
Appointive officials erred in risking the
U-2 flight so near to the date of the
summit conference. What justification
an there be for considering the U-2
jtlights unnecessary after May, but for
onsidering them advisable on May 1?
Khrushchev eagerly? seized upon the
panic of Eisenhower administration of-
ficials and their ineptness and sought to
diminish the esteem with which our
country is held by the heads of state of
friendly nations. Let us hope Khru-
shchev failed. i i d ( our Pres-
j) 175 who apparen kined by appointive aofeggr. s airnnno 6n l'hne-
At ?
gStiaetaetceespDAgye;nLganr,ctpya;aetdnItduinnrttthtfirmsxhoeeffir Ccinieandlsticraa:t1deIdmifti,tetilleaid-t
the policy of aerial reconnaissance over
the territory of the Soviet Union would
continue, as it was, so they stated, the
only way by which we could secure in-
formation to expose any Soviet buildup
at missile bases and airfields for a nu-
clear attack. Even the Vice President
made a public statement along the same
line. He was justified in doing so on the
basis of declarations which came from
State Department officials.
Then, too late, officials of the State
Department backtracked; and the Presi-
dent, while in Paris, announced that
such a policy would not be continued.
Unfortunately, that development came
after Premier Khrushchev's blustering
and demands for apology and punish-
ment. Due to the lateness of Presiden
Eisenhower's statement, it even ap-
peared that America quailed before
Khrushchev's shouting, which was not
a fact.
The confusion has been unequaled.
One wonders whether leaders of our al-
lies had not every reason to lose respect
for us and confidence in us. We gave
the Kremlin dictators a propaganda vic-
tory of great magnitude. The adverse
effect on our prestige throughout the
world is great, and is due almost entirely
to the co used efforts te .e?....plain the
iU-2 nci en . 6.---? =-Tilierby
' Iffdirerfir78- own enough to remain
silent. The apparent panic of officials
in Washington and the issuance of con-
flicting statements impaired President
Eisenhower's usefulness in Paris. That
situation was made to order for Premier
Khrushchev, and he took maximum ad-
vantage of it.
Now that President Eisenhower has
returned, we may well consider the
policy questions involved in aerial re-
connaissance, the resultant differences
of opinion among the leaders of our
allies, and the possibility that hereafter
the leaders of neutral nations may be
less inclined to trust us. Who can blame
them if their faith and their confidence
In a strong America are diminished?
In reality, there probably is no in-
creased danger of war between this Na-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
tion and the Soviet Union. But, in truth,
the tension of the cold war has been
aggravated, at least temporarily.
Unfortunately, also, here in our-own
country the very small minority who, in
reality, favor preventive war against the
Soviet Union, and who are so opposed
to the Communist system of Russia that
they abhor face-to-face conferences in
an endeavor to work out disarmament
and permanent peace, have been heart-
ened by our failure. This is a tragic
aftermath; but President Eisenhower
personally cannot be blamed. He dele-
gated authority which other Presidents
have customarily retained; and the offi-
cials he appointed proved unable to cope
with a sudden mischance.
We would like to forget, if we could,
the 13-2 plane incident, and, in particu-
lar, the utterly untruthful statement is-
sued by a high administration official?
that the plane was in the air, investigat-
ing weather conditions, and mechanical
trouble developed. In many parts of
the world, we are on the defensive,
among officials of friendly and neutral
nations, largely because of that state-
ment. This is muck, to our regret. Our
President must have seethed inside over
he ineptness of officials he had caused
o be placed in positions of responsibility.
Mr. President, although awkward
handling in that emergency gave the
Soviet dictator an opportunity to scuttle
the conference, and to rant and rave,
as if he had no knowledge of our spying,
and as if the Soviets had no spies of
their own, there is still the hope that
we shall pick up the pieces and shall
resume peaceful negotiations.
Our ship of state has plowed along un-
damaged through heavier seas. We, in
America, will ride out this storm. In
fact, it will abate with time; and it is cer-
tain that beginning in January, there will
be in the White House, a strong leader, a
President who will not delegate much of
his authority. Above all, we shall then
have a Chief Executive who will devote
full time to his duties as President, and
will have personal knowledge and direc-
tion of the conduct of all parts of the
executive branch of thhe Government.
The Paris fiasco of a summit confer-
ence that failed to "get off the ground"
proves that it is essential that there be
complete coordination of the activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency and
the Secretary of State. Above all, it
proves that the demands of the time call
-for a vigorous, strong President who will
devote full time to his duties as Chief
Executive.
It seems to many that if it was safe to
discontinue the 1172 flig1WW May 13,
it thirely would have been safe to.pancel
tifiTtY-2 fliartn. May 1.. But that was
litettolitfitiorthelinne that face-to-face
conferences with Khrushchev might re-
sult in steps toward ending the arma-
ments race, plus adequate safeguards,
plummented downward with the U-2.
Perhaps a great lesson for us to learn
from this setback is that there must be
strong leadership in the White House, in-
stead of too much delegation of authority
to underlings, and that we must proceed
with the greatest speed to close the mis-
sile gap between this Nation and the So-
.1111.1111* nalabx .0.41.11.* Olt
10541
viet Union. Then we should easily re-
gain respect and confidence of the lead-
ers of the free world.
SEISMIC WAVE DAMAGES
Mr. LONG of Hawaii. Mr. President,
the seismic waves which rolled across the
Pacific following the earthquakes in
Chile d
mous 1
in Sout
Philipp'
damage
Tahiti,
mosa.
by the f
spread
earth's su
In 1946
ing down
Hawaii wi
159 perso
lion of pr
time, ther
waves, or
assaults, ev
Pacific and
I call the
the followin
Tribune-Hera
Hilo was crus
waves. Mana
raised the que
the present sys
ings. Without
work which our
ing in detecting
which cause thes
If a more extensi
Ing service might
I ask the same
why the Congress
?
the funds necessa
Federal Flood Ins
That act sits on th
piece of deadwood.
appropriated the mo
vate the program, th
the people of other
wail, California, and
fered damage from
wave would have re
with which to restore
business properties.
As it is, in Hilo alon property losses
are estimated at more an $25 million.
Since it is impossible t obtain regular
insurance against tide., wave damage,
only a tiny portion o the destroyed
property is covered by urance. We
must appropriate the fun necessary to
put the Flood Insurance to work.
I ask unanimous consen that the edi-
torial from the Hilo Trib e-Herald be
printed at this point in t RECORD.
There being no objection, e editorial
was ordered to be printed in he RECORD,
as follows:
[Prom the Hilo Tribune-Hera
1960]
IT'S A SMALL ISLAND
(By A. E. P. Wall)
I walked down Kamehameha .A nue this
morning, and what I saw looked e a city
on its knees.
I looked for Walakea Town and wasn't
there. I looked for the handsome w Cafe
100, where Sally and I enjoyed lunci Satur-
day, and all I could find was broke dishes
aid broken hearts.
ring the past week caused enor-
s of life and property damage
America, Hawaii, Japan, the
es, and Okinawa, and lesser
in California, Alaska, Mexico,
stralia, New Zealand, and For-
e death and destruction caused
rfully powerful waves were
ound virtually half of the
face.
a series of seismic waves emi-
r= the Aleutians also hit
catastrophic force, killing
and causing some $25 mil-
rty damage. Since that
have been smaller tidal
arnings of possible wave
few years in the central
ng our western shores.
ention of the Congress to
editorial from the Hilo
, printed the day after
by the recent seismic
g Editor A. E. P. Wall
on of how adequate is
m of tidal wave warn-
nsaying the wonderful
ientists have been do-
he earth movements
ayes, he asks whether
international warn-
e developed.
uestion. I also ask
as not appropriated
to implement the
ance Act of 1956.
statute books as a
Had the Congress
y required to acti-
people of Hilo and
unities of Ha-
laska which suf-
e recent seismic
ved some funds
heir homes and
May 23,
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10542
The manager of the Hilo Theater invit
me in for a look at the swampy desolat
of his auditorium. He was looking for
organ but couldn't ilnd it.
The theater and the street on both des
of it looked like something out of a nuclear
war film that might have shown there.
The damage, desolation and death raise
important questions of State and Federal
aid to meet immediate needs of the people
who have suffered?although everyone who
lives in Hilo and loi)ks it has suffered.
It raises another important question, and
perhaps an international one.
It was nearly lunchtinie yesterday when I
first heard that a tsunami- might be headed
for Hawaii.
I drove at once to the Volcano Observatory
to see what Dr. Jerry Eaton's seismographs
had to say about it.
The story traced in thin lines 'on long
sheets of paper was a startling on. The
paper wasn't big enough to tell it.
There were three quakes in Chile. The
third one registered at the Volcano Observa-
tory at 8:56 yesterday morning. It weal,
recorded with such violence that the seismo-
graph needles bounced back and forth in
arcs wider than the cylinder on which they
write.
The Volcano Observatory doesn't track seis-
mic waves and doesn't have the responsibil-
ity of forecasting them. That is the job of
the Coast and Geodetic Survey at Barber's
Point on Oahu.
It does keep track of earthquakes. It
found that yesterday's Chilean quake regis-
tered 8.25 on the Richter Scale.
I asked Dr. Eaton how high the scale goes.
He said all newspapermen ask that ques-
tion?but there's no answer. He said the
largest ever recorded was 8.6 and that the
Sunday morning quake was about as strong
as the one that shook San Francisco to
pieces in 1906.
Can a plane observe a wave in action and
give warnings of its strength?
No, Dr. Eaton said, because it doesn't show
that clearly on the ocean's surface.
He said it is something like dropping a
pebble into a pan of water. There's a great
train of ripples spreading out from the point
of disturbance. The strength of the ripples
or waves depends on the depth of the water.
When a wave approaches an island with a
sloping ridge drifting down into the water
it gains force.
So it might be only 5 feet high in the broad
open sea, but 50 feet high in shallow water.
Waves from Chile have caused trouble in
the past.
Hawaii was hit hard by tsunamis originat-
ing there in- 1837 and 1877. Chilean waves
struck here but caused no damage in 1906,
1922, and 1943.
Nobody really knew whether to expect a
wave, even after examining seismograph re
ports and checking the gages in Chile a
the Canal Zone.
In view of the fact that several wave ve
headed this way from Chile, includin vere
ones in the last century, it seems t the
time has come to set up an in ational
war g service to cover the are
lack of such a system have con-
tr d to an incredible I of lives and
ey.
lilt happen again?
ATTITUDE OF T RUSSIAN PEOPLE
Mr. WILEY.
"Meet
r. President, on the
program of May 22,
awrence E. Spivak, the
guest was ..,.!_: , I, azaPS e 1.9-5,.= a
fo 8. -I4Ilbld
jfel"19,DT I' -
my t e ques ions which were
asked d the answers which were given.
Tho who questioned him were Ernest
K. indley, of Newsweek magazine;
04/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7
SSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May kit
arry Schwartz, of the New York Times;
Fletcher Knebel, of the Cowles Publica-
tions; and Herb Kaplow, of NBC News.
I wish to call attention to some signifi-
cant information which the former
Soviet intelligence agent supplied.
Mr. Knebel asked:
Mr. Kaznacheyeev, I understand that last
fall after the Khrushchev and Eisenhower
exchange of visits was settled upon, you
predicted then that you doubted that Ike
would ever go to Russia, because Khrushchev
would find some reason to cancel the visit.
Is that true; and, if so, what is your
reasoning?
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEEV. Well, yes. It is a com-
pletely logical doubt. Definitely the Soviet
government and the Communist Party?in
other words, the Soviet Communist regime--
are in no way interested in allowing so
popular a man as the American President to
come to the Soviet Union.
He continued to say:
I am going to say that there are several
,factors which constitute the stability and
strength of the Communist regime inside the
thkviet Union. The first factor is cold war,
thaInternational tension and the armaments
racea, The second factor is successes of in-
ternaltonal communism abroad, and the suc-
cess of soviet foreign policy. And the third
factor, and I think primarily and above all
is 'the ignarance of the entire Soviet people
of reality, oltiife abroad, of the real reasons
Inc armaments tace
?
This ignoranceVs created by two kinds of'
*x
Iron Curtain. Ili first Iron Curtain is
physical which all oI ou know about, an e
second Iron Curtain al am going to is
inside the brains of ' -Ue majority 4 the
Soviet people, created consta propa-
ganda and ideological ind rinatl
I continue to read:
The Soviet government way can be
interested in allowing for sts, espe-
cially one so prominent as. Ame n Presi-
dent, to bring some liglfnto this orance
and in this way under e it.
They are definite afraid of the ? act
such a visit can rq on the Soviet pe e.
The other d , when I was speaking
the floor of ti Senate, before I had th'
particular ater brought to my atten-
tion, I s that Khrushchev was afraid
of the esmanship of the President of
the ed States, that that was why he
ca ed the visit. .
the conclusion of this particular
eet the Press" session, this young man
as, in answer to a question, about to
give some very important information;
but the time for the broadcast was up.
He said:
My mental processes were very compli-
cated and long. I was abroad. At the last
of this. But I think I will reply to the ques-
tion in another way. I am going to bring to
your attention the fact that there is very
little known in the West, that is the new
Soviet generation, the new generation of
Soviet youth. This is people born in the
thirties. They are strikingly different from
elder generations of our fathers and the
generation of our brothers.
Mr. Rash said:
I am sorry to interrupt.
I asked someone what he was driving
at. That person said just this: The new
generation is not satisfied with the
standard of living, with the wages. They
are not satisfied with their opportu-
nities to have something to say about
government. They are feeling the fer-
ment that is evident all over the world.
That undoubtedly was what the young
man was about to say.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the entire "Meet the Press"
broadcast be printed in the RECORD fol-
lowing my remarks.
There being no objection, the broad-
cast was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
MEET THE PRESS
(Produced by Efitittiti&--E. Spivak, pl. 22,
Moderator: Brysor,r1960)01.
Guest: Alexander ,msler(or Kaz-
nacheev) , Lopae,?x-f3O'Viet inte ?ice agent.
Panel: Ernest K. ewsweek maga-
zine; Harry Schwartz, few York Times;
Fletcher Knebel, CowlettiPublications; Herb
Kaplow, NBC News.
The ANNOUNCER. Ladies and gentlemen, we
invite you to "Me--4,r the Press," the unre-
hearsed programragiich has won every major
award in its field:
Our guest toteay is a former Soviet intelli-
gence agent,- Alexander Kaznacheyeev, who
is now liv14 in this country. In just a mo-
ment, Mr,Xavnacheyeev will meet the press.
Remeigber that the questions asked by the
merabati of the panel do not necessarily re-
flecteir point of view. It is their way of
ge,t3lig the story for you.
a And now here is today's moderator of Meet
-We Press, Mr. Bryson Rash.
Mr. RASH. Welcome once again to "Meet
the Press." Three weeks ago today an Amer-
ican U-2 jet ,plarle, was brought down deep
4ortfelitYltik Soviet Union. Premier Khru-
shchev made the startling announcement in
a few days that this plane was on a spy mis-
sion. The U.S. Government some days later
finally admitted the Charge.
Now in a complete, or feigned, or real rage,
Khrushchev seized upon this particular in-
cident to insult and also humiliate the Pres-
ident of the United States. The Paris sum-
mit conference was wrecked in the process,
the background and practice of espionage
became a subject of intense discussion.
Our guest today is thoroughly familiar
with espionage from the Soviet Union's side
of the Iron Curtain. He is Alexander, Kaz-
nacheyeev, born in Moscow 28 years ago. He
ebaine a specialist in Eastern affairs and
as assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Ran-
Burma. Ile was recruited as, an valkt
of ,5oxint Intelligenceakiervice and worked
in Communist espionage system in
south t Asia.
Eight ars of hostility to the Communist
regime i Moscow culminated in June of
1959 when Kasnacheyeev defected to the
West and ught asylum in the United
States, where e now makes his home as a
private citizen.
Seated around e press table to question
our guest today a Mr. Ernest K. Lindley of
Newsweek magazin r. Harry Schwartz of
the New York Times, r. Fletcher Knebel of
the Cowles Publicatio Mr. Herb Kaplow of
NBC News.
Mr. Lawrence Spivak, gular member of
the "Meet the Press" pane , ill be back with
us 2 weeks from today.
And now we will start the estions with
Mr. Kaplow.
Mr. KAPLOW. Mr. Kaznachey v, in de-
scribing the activities of Soviet telligence
agents in Rangoon, Burma, you sa1pr wrote
somewhere rather recently that ort of the
main functions was to penetrate find
out precisely what was going on in thii for-
eign embassies in Rangoon, especially- tile
American Embassy.
Did the Soviet agents find much out?
Mr. KASNACHEYEEV. In Rangoon, no. At
the time when I was working in the Soviet
Embassy as a diplomat and as an agent of
of the intern Venal tension, cold war and
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u. s. News g w6wirimplifor Releasej1004/0/1960CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7
OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE U-2
AND THE "SUMMIT" BREAKUP
The Record as Told to a Senate Committee
Details of the U-2 episode and its aftermath were pro-
duced in the questioning of Secretary of State Christian A.
Herter and his Under Secretary, Douglas Dillon, as the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee started its inquiry on
May 27, 7960.
The Committee chairman, Senator Fulbright (Dem.), of
Arkansas, opened the questioning of Mr. Herter by asking
when the decision was made to halt the U-2 flights. Follow-
ing is from the official transcript of the testimony before the
Committee:
Secretary Herter: My impression is that it was taken on
the Thursday before the President went to Paris.
Senator Fulbright: That would be Thursday, is that it,
the twelfth?
Mr. Herter: Yes.
Senator Fulbright: What were the considerations which
led to this decision?
Mr. Herter: Mr. Chairman, I think I answered that in my
own statement, in which I said that, since the U-2 system
had been compromised, it was discontinued?as any other
intelligence mission would be in such a case.
Senator Fulbright: It had been compromised some time
before the twelfth, wasn't it?
Mr. Herter: No, sir.
The examination then turned to whether or not it had
been agreed some time earlier to halt the flights in May.
Senator Fulbright continued the questioning:
Q: Was any moratorium on the flights agreed upon prior
to May 1, to be effective at any time after May 1?
Mr. Herter: I have heard reports to that effect, but, of my
own knowledge, I do not know.
Q: Was such a moratorium ever discussed or considered
by anyone in the State Department?
Mr. Herter: Not by Mr. Dillon nor myself.
Q: Or anyone?
Mr. Herter: I don't know of anyone.
Q: Do you know whether the CIA [Central Intelligence
Agency] considered such a moratorium?
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68
Mr. Herter: I do not, sir.
Q: Did Mr. plaa,Lxitiavp,0144.41P44,,of,..g43,9nyone
else order arKUSliension of flights after the loss Of the plane
on May 1?
Mr. Herter: That, sir, he will be able to testify to. I can't
tell you as of what date he did that.
Q: Were any other planes lost on these same ventures
prior to May 1?
Mr. Herter: Not over Soviet territory.
Q: None had been shot down or lost over Soviet territory?
Mr. Herter: No.
Q: The flight referred to, that Chairman Khrushchev re-
ferred to on April 9?you were aware of that, were you?
Mr. Herter: Yes.
Q: It was a successful fly-over?
Mr. Herter: It was.
Q: If the President decided to suspend the flights prior
to Monday, May 16, which you stated he did on the twelfth,
why was this announcement delayed until the meeting with
Chairman Khrushchev on the sixteenth?
Mr. Herter: Because the President reserved that decision
to make the announcement in Paris.
Q: What was the reasoning for doing that?
Mr. Herter: I cannot give you the answer, sir.
In an opening statement to the Committee, Secretary
Herter said he was convinced Nikita Khrushchev went to the
Paris conference determined, in advance, to wreck it. Sena-
tor Fulbright asked the Secretary if the U-2 episode contrib-
uted to Khrushchev's decision.
Mr. Herter: Yes, I believe it did. It was one of the factors,
as I tried to explain in my statement.
*
Q: Mr. Secretary, why do you think Chairman Khru-
shchev left a way out for the President by suggesting in one
of his earlier statements that he believed the President did
not know about these flights?
Mr. Herter: I can there, of course, only speculate that he
had himself committed himself very strongly in Russia with
regard to his friendship for the President, and wished to,
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REPORT, June 6, 1960
U.S. News & WorIAPPYPd For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7
idea of what to expect from costs noted
at this time in key resorts.
Bahamas and Cuba. Nassau, in the
Bahama Islands, is one of the resorts
especially attractive to Americans. Seven-
day cruises from New York start at $170
a person. The ship is your hotel while
you are on the island.
By air, a night-coach flight costs $135,
round trip. You can count on spending
about $15 a day per person for a first-
class hotel room, with breakfast and
dinner provided. A rental car will cost
you $10 a day, or $60 a week, but you
must supply the gasoline.
Cuba, once a favorite vacation spot
for Americans, is offering inducements
to lure back tourists who have been
frightened away by the anti-American
attitudes of Fidel Castro's Government.
A double room in one of Havana's lux-
ury hotels now costs $12 to $15 a day,
and in first-class hotels, with air condi-
tioning, such a room can be found for $9.
On request, the luxury hotels will pro-
vide you with free tickets to the horse
races. Costs of lodgings and food outside
the capital are considerably lower.
In the best night clubs of Havana,
minimum charges for food and drinks
range from $3 to $5.50, depending on
whether you prefer an early or late show.
Puerto Rico, Haiti. From now to De-
cember, the cost of a comfortable hotel
room in San Juan, Puerto Rico, is
shaved by as much as 45 per cent. You
can expect to spend about $25 a day for
first-class accommodations, including all
meals. A fashionable hotel at Dorado
Beach, 20 miles west of San Juan, has
lowered its rates for a double room, with
breakfast and dinner, to $28 a day. The
same accommodations cost up to $60
during the winter months.
Puerto Rico has about 3,000 miles of
good roads? many of them offering un-
usual scenic attractions. You can rent a
car for $8 a day, or $40 a week, plus 10
cents a mile.
Haiti's distinctive music, art and at-
mosphere combine to provide a big draw-
ing card for American tourists. A car can
be rented for $10 a day, plus 10 cents
a mile. You can fly from place to place
on Haiti at low fares.
Port-au-Prince, Haiti's capital, is a free
SOUTH AMERICA?For the most part, visitors will find modest prices and political
calm and modernized hotel facilities. Above: view of Rio de Janeiro Harbor, Brazil.
THE CARIBBEAN?Improved air and sea transportation makes "island hopping" in-
creasingly easy for U. S. tourists. Below: Caneel Bay Plantation, St. John, V. I.
Photos: Monkmeyer, Canadian National Railways, ITSN&WR
;RD
port. Such items as watches, china, Irish
linens, gloves, sweaters, French perfumes
and liqueurs can be purchased at bargain
prices.
About hurricanes: These occur in the
Caribbean most frequently between Au-
gust and October. About four or five hur-
ricanes a year is the average, but new
warning systems now in effect help ships
and planes to avoid the big blows and
reduce the dangers.
SOUTH AMERICA
Americans who elect to visit South
America in 1960 will find that hotels are
improved as a result of a modernization
program. Prices in most places?Vene-
zuela being the gold-plated exception--
are lower than in the U. S., Canada, Eu-
rope and the leading resort areas of the
Caribbean.
As a tourist, you need have no real
worry over getting caught in political un-
rest, although some revolutionary excite-
ment is a possibility this year in Bolivia
and Ecuador.
Hotel prices vary from country to
country and from city to city, but the
average cost for a double room in a first-
class hotel is $13 to $16 a day.
Meals are inexpensive in most parts of
South America. In Buenos Aires, for ex-
ample, a steak two inches thick and nine
inches long is served in the best restau-
rants for $1.25 to $1.75. A complete din-
ner can be obtained for $3 to $4.
The average daily expense for hotel,
meals and use of a car with driver runs
between $25 and $30 a day per person,
including taxes and tips. For top luxury
accommodations, figure on $50.
Leave auto home. Travel by car on
a drive-yourself basis is not recommended
in South America. Local drivers have a
dangerous propensity for weaving in and
out of lanes and speeding through inter-
sections. Also, unless the visitor can speak
Spanish or Portuguese, he can easily get
lost for some time.
Hiring a car with a driver is relative-
ly inexpensive. In Brazil, for instance,
you can arrange with the hotel door-
keeper to get a car for as little as $1.25
an hour. However, if you want an Eng-
lish-speaking driver, it will cost more.
For sportsmen, South America abounds
in good fishing and hunting of all kinds.
Skiing in the Andes is at its peak when
it's summer in the U. S.
One f)recautionary note: Sot nrncr
ended in March in the lower half of the
continent, and a cold, wet winter is due
in June. For those who are looking for sun
and beaches, plan to stop in a place like
Rio de Janeiro, where the weather is
balmy the year around.
Latest on U. S. and Canadian dollars,
page 109.
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U. S. News & World Report
. . . "Telling truth was better than fabricating excuses"
in that way, continue the possibility of the President dis-
claiming any responsibility for the flight.
Q: What was the reason for not accepting this way out
on our part? Why didn't we accept that suggestion?
Mr. Herter: Mr. Chairman, that was a question, as you
know, of judgment.
Q: That was what?
Mr. Herter: It was a question of judgment. As to when
the essential facts had been revealed by the capture of the
pilot and the plane with all its instrumentation intact, the
United States Government should admit the fact that this
overflight had taken place, that it was an intelligence over-
flight, and that decision was made, of course, by the Presi-
dent himself.
Senator Fulbright noted that President Eisenhower had
assumed personal responsibility for the U-2 flights? and
asked Secretary Herter if there was any precedent in history
for a head of state to assume "personal responsibility for
espionage activities."
Mr. Herter: No, I do not know of any firsthand. It may
be that there have been some. On the other hand, I would
point out, Mr. Chairman, that this particular incident was of
a very unusual nature.
Q: As a general policy, do you believe it is wise for the
head of state to assume responsibility for espionage activi-
ties?
Mr. Herter: Well, very frankly, I don't think it makes a
great deal of difference from the point of view of what the
public believes.
On the other hand, I believe in a ease of this kind the tell-
ing Of ? the truth was the better course than getting deeper
into fabricating excuses or disavowing responsibility.
"The Unusual Circumstances"
Q: What precisely were the reasons that persuaded you
to depart from precedent in this case? What were the Un-
usual circumstances you referred to?
Mr. Herter: The unusual circumstances were the facts
that the materiel and the statement of the pilot?not every
bit of which was accurate, but a great part of which was ac-
curate?had been revealed, and were being presented to im-
partial tribunals for examination.
Under those circumstances, which was very different from
the ordinary espionage case, I think it would have become
extremely evident, and was extremely evident, that this in-
cident had taken place.
Senator Green (Dem.), of Rhode Island, said that division
of authority within the Government appeared to have cre-
ated "a great many misunderstandings" at the time the U-2
flight was exposed by Russia. He asked: "How far did the
President act alone and how far the State Department acted
alone before they came together and agreed on the situa-
tion?"
Mr. Herter: I would say there was consultation right
through in this period.
May I make this observation, Mr. Chairman: From the
point of view of firsthand knowledge on these matters, I
asked Mr. Dillon to come up with me because for the--until
May 6, I was out of the United States, he was Acting Secre-
tary of State, and some of the questions that may be di-
rected to that period
rbVed9n6PfRtkenet2004/05/13
U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 6, 1960 0
answer from firsthand information, whereas I would have to
do it only from secondhand information.
Senator Green: Mr. Dillon, then will you take up the an-
swer to my question?
Mr. Dillon: All I can say is that, in the period that I had
responsibility, we were in contact regularly with the Presi-
dent with full co-ordination.
Senator Humphrey (Dem.), of Minnesota, opened up a
new line of questioning by asking the Secretary of State
what agency of the Government was in charge of such
things as the U-2 flights.
Mr. Herter: The_Central Intelligence Agency,,
Q: Do you have constant information?do, you have con-
tinuing information as to the number of these flights, the
course of these flights, the purpose of these flights, in the
State Department?
Mr. Herter: The general programs had been gone over
with the Department. Obviously, it is impossible to tell when
these flights are going to take place because they are so
dependent on the season of the year and on weather con-
ditions.
The agency has to plan numbers of alternatives, so we
never know at any particular time of any particular flight.
But the general approval of the program has been received
from the State Department, of course, as one of the advisers
to the President in this matter.
Q: Did you kaiak of this specific flight ahead of time?
Mr. Herter: I did not. No, I didn't know it was in the air
even When I was overseas, nor do I think any of us did until
it came down.
Q: Is that your understanding, Mr. Dillon?
Mr. Dillon: I was not aware that it was in the air until
was informed that it was?it was overdue, as I stated pre-
viously.
Q: When something goes wrong on one of these flights,
who is responsible to give the cover story, the cover-up
story, so to speak?
Mr. Dillon: Centrat-lut-effigence-Agemyl-But we are also
responsible for agreeing with them that this is a reasonable
story, and it is proper in the circumstances. But they have
the responsibility for executing it.
If Red Plane Flew Over U. S.?
Q: Mr. Secretary, what do you think would happen in
the United States if, on our radar screen, we should dis-
cover a plane flying at high altitude in this age of the fear
of surprise attack, over our territory?
Mr. Herter: I think we would do everything we could do
to identify it right away.
Q: Just identify it?
Mr. Herter: Yes, identify it. We have 11
wherewithal,
I think, to do that.
Q: In other words we?would we dispatch interceptors?
Mr. Herter: I think so.
Q: What would be our view of such a flight?
Mr. Herter: Certainly there is very little that such a flight
could ascertain that would worry ,us much. Every bit of in-
formation that we have got in this country seems to be avail-
able through public means to anyone who wishes to collect
documents. In fact, in the whole Russian espionage system
they have collected maps, documents, and photographs of
every part of the United States.
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U. S. News & World Report
. . . Flights over Russia "were of very great value to us"
[continued from page 69]
Q: I realize this, but, in light of the danger of surprise
attack, this is what I am getting at: This is a little different,
may I say, from a spy working the railroad yard or taking
photographs or even a submarine off our coast, even though
this gets to be a little serious, too. But, in the light of danger
of surprise attack by air power, there is some difference, is
there not?
Mr. Herter: There is some difference. On the other hand.
I think we could identify it very quickly. This is the type of
plane that no one could possibly mistake for a bomber when
you get close enough to look at it. This is entirely an unarmed
glider type of plane.
Q: Have we ever shot down any Soviet planes over Amer-
ican territory or over any friendly territory in which we have
bases or alliances?
Mr. Herter: Not that I am aware of.
Q: Have we ever intercepted any Soviet planes?in Ko-
rea, for example?
Mr. Herter: I think we have been able to identify them
from time to time. Whether we could say that they were
deliberate espionage planes or whether they wandered over
the line from the border or not, I can't tell you.
Senator Hicken/ooper (Rep.), of Iowa, asked whether the
high-flying U-2 was shot down from its maximum altitude,
as Khrushchev claimed, or developed engine trouble that
dropped it down to the point wherqS1 became an easy
target for the Russians.
Mr. Herter: Senator, there has been a good deal of specu-
lation on that point. I think that we are very skeptical as to
whether it was shot down from a very high altitude.
Q: Well, I think there is considerable difference in a
situation where this plane might have been shot down at
60,000 or 70,000 feet, or whether it was shot down or shot
it at 5,000 or 7,000 feet.
Mr. Herter: We are very skeptical and there are certain
evidences that it was not shot down from that altitude.
*
Requests to See U-2 Pilot
Q: I understand that we have requested in Moscow .that
representatives of this Government be permitted to interview
the pilot. Have we had any replies from those requests?
Mr. Herter: As yet they have not given us that permission.
They have said that when "we have finished interrogating him
we will give consideration to it."
Q: Do we have a reasonable idea as to where he is held?
he is being held?
Mr. Herter: That I can't tell you. We have been assured
that he is in good health, and beyond that I can't tell you
whether we know where he is held or not. Perhaps one of my
colleagues knows that. I don't think we have any information
on that.
Q: Would you care to give an opinion on the value to
this country, in our defensive posture, of these flights, this
series of flights which have gone on over Russian territory for
the last several years?
Mr. Herter: Yes, sir, I will give you this opinion. It is a
layman's opinion rather than an expert's opinion, but I think
they were of very great value to us.
Senator Morse (Dem.), of Oregon, turned the inquiry to a
line of questioning_ about what knowledge the U. S. has of
Approved For Release 2004/05/13:
Soviet missiles, and the censored transcript as released
showed that the hearing had moved into highly sensitive
territory.
Senator Morse: Mr. Secretary, do our experts believe that
Russia has a land-air missile?
Mr. Herter: I think you are having both the Secretary of
Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency that can testify
to that better than I could.
Q: Have they ever informed you as to what their opinion
is as to whether or not Russia has a land-air missile?
Mr. Herter: We, I think, assume that they do.
"For Security Reasons"
Q: We assume that they do. Is it on the basis of that as-
sumption that they have been asking Congress for some time
for a speed-up in our land-air-missile program?because of
the assumption that Russia may have one?
Mr. Herter: Yes, sir. I am being purposely cautious for
security reasons, as you understand.
Q: I understand. And yet, I think, from the standpoint of
our own security, it is rather important that we have some
information as to the possibility, on the line of Senator Hick-
enlooper's question, the possibility of whether or not this was
shot down by a land-air missile.
[Whatever the reply was to this observation, it was de-
leted in its entirety for security reasons.]
Q: What international-law rights do we have, Mr. Secre-
tary, over capture of American spies captured by foreign gov-
ernments?
Mr. Herter: We have no rights over them that are in con-
travention of domestic law. We have no international right.
Senator Carlson (Rep.), of Kansas, asked whether, despite
Khrushchev's tactics at Paris, the U. S. would continue ne-
gotiations on disarmament and a nuclear-test ban.
Mr. Herter: Yes, sir. I have indicated in my prepared
statement that we will continue to do this.
As you know, however, the condition that we have always
adhered to is that the controls have got to be controls that one
can rely upon. In other words, reliable controls on both sides.
I think that with the very real danger that exists in the
world today of accidental events that may lead to a nuclear
war, that we should pursue the course of doing whatever
we can to minimize within the bounds that we have stated;
namely, that of reciprocal and effective control.
Q: Mr. Secretary, do you feel that we are making any
progress on these nuclear-test suspensions at the Geneva
Conference and other places?
Mr. Herter: During the last few weeks, really the last
few days, they have been meeting in Geneva examining a
co-ordinated program of research for improving instrumenta-
tion so that small shots can be detected underground.
Those conferences have moved, I think, pretty satisfac-
torily. They are halted at this moment, awaiting some in-
structions from Moscow.
In the next few days, we should know better whether or
not there has been any radical change of position on the
part of the Russians or not. There is some chance of reach-
ing agreement. It will be a limited agreement at best, but
that again depends on full agreement with regard to the
control mechanisms. As you know, those talks have been
going for a long time. Until they are shown to be hopeless,
I think we will continue with them.
CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7
o U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 6, 1960
Approved For Release 200445/11:*irRDP90T00782R000100060001-7
yolw
4FR.k E. TRIBITNTI-
Fr
ared
? AssoCiated Press WirePhot,o
IllfSH-TITTSFI?MiN 'Dune' dir er tor of the Central Tntellizera T' A gency,' arriving at
1.1-2 probe vester...ay. 710e0/11/11$ 2r, nno.,Nnifie
- ? ? ?
ii SJlr(
se
Iis 5i Hrs.
At Inquiry
Kept Secret
iieit onatkisoo
For the Flight
By Rowland Evans Jr.
WASHINGTON, May 31..
The chairman of the genate
Poi eign Relations Committee
cleared the Central Intelligence
Agcricy today of all ? respOn-
sibility for controversial policy
decisiOns in. the U-2 spy-flight
affair.
Sen. J. Wiliam Fulbright, D.,
Ark.. talked' to reporters after
one of the most secrec:v-
shrouded briefings in congres-
sional history. The witness wan
Allen W. Dulles, director of the
C. 1. A.
All Is Secret
Not a single ward uttered in
the five-and-a-half hours of
Mr. Dulles' testimony will be
released to the pUblic. 'Sealed
and bound, it will be locked uo
in committtee files, and the
stenotype tapes and duplicating
master sheets will be burned.
Sen. Fulbright, while refus-
ing to give reporters a shred of
hard information on the all-
day testimony, said:
!. That "Me;;Mulles "was
candici.as tCltiliri in his position
, could tle7Atti4 gave' the corn-
mittqitili4ch clearer .under ?
standire_oi the agency's role
his whole platter."
Gave Flight Details
g That Mr. Dulles cleclinRe
b y precisely why the fliknt
of pilot Francis Gary Power
w...s ordered, although "he vol-
unteered quite thorough detP11?.
abolit the May 1 hieht "
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NEW YORK TIMES MAY 2 8 1960
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7
SovietEx lains Preservation /
rediage Despite Fall
Survival of Fragments Is Laid to Light!
Weight of Germanium Metal?Parts
Are Said to Have `F loatedyIown
By MAX FRANKW a
spectrtntioro'i.:k ;eim
MOSCOW yay 27?The sur-
prising survival of so much of
the American U-2 reconnals-
- sance plane that was forced
down in the Urals on May 1 is
being explained in some detail
at an exhibition of the wreckage
here.
The question how the plane's
wings and tail assembly and
, much of its equipment could be
:preserved after it had been hit
by a rocket at an altitude of
, more than 60,000 feet, as re-
ported here, has titiZzled many
who have seen the eX4hibition in
Gorky park. Sortie vialtOrs have
.now received the follOwing ex-
!planation
The high-flying' ahigle-engine
plane was not hit directly by a
rocket but by fragments from
a roet that exploded in the
air nearLby. As a result the U-2
?rapidly lost altittida and began
to "disintegrate." This appar-
ently meant that it began to fall
, apart.
Because most of the plane's
parts were made with extremely
lightweight germanium, the
wings and other sections did not
hurtle to the ground, but floated
down and were not smashed on
impact. Parts of the plane were
retrieved in an area of about
eight square miles near the city
of Sverdlovsk.
Francis Gary Powers, the pilot
of the U-2, is presumed to have
found that his automatic ejector
mechanism had been damaged
beyond use. He therefore worked
to free himself from the de-
scending fuselage and bailed out
from an altitude of about 30,000
feet. ."He was very lucky," vis-
itors are told at the exhibition.
Only pieces of the fuselage
of the U-2 are shown in the sons daily.
Gorky Park display, presum-
ably because it was weighted!
down by the Pratt Whitney
/
J-75 engine and suffered most
in the crash. The jet
remains in recognizable shape.'
So do other parts of the plane's'
equipment.
A tape recorder that the
plane carried to pick up Soviet
radar signals was still usable
when it fell into Soviet hands.
The plane's high-altitude cam-
era was badly 'smashed but is
usable. The Russians say the
equipment was built to with-
stand a crash.
Holes in the wings that hang
in the Gorky Park display had
led laymen to believe from the
start that projectiles tore
through the plane's skin. The
new explanation supplements
but does not contradict official
accounts of the incident given
by Premier? Khrushchev on
May 7.
The Premier said the plane
had been brought down by a
single rocket, and it was pre-
sumed he had meant a rocket
fired from the ground. A group
of Soviet artillery officers and
enlisted men were decorated for
their part in bringing the plane
down,
Mr. Khrushchev said the pilot
had been brought to Moscow
"alive and kicking," but -no
foreigners have been permitted
to see him so far. He is said to
have confessed to espionage and
an early trial is expected. Mr.
Khrushchev said Mr. Powers
would be tried "severely."
The Gorky Park display,
whose opening on May 11 was
attended by the Premier and
other Soviet officials, is said to
be attracting 8,000 to 9,000 per-
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Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RD
MAY 2 7 1960
ASHINGTON STRR
Following is the text of Secretary of State Herter's
analysis of the Soviet actions at the Paris summit confer-
ence and his comments -on the outlook for the future de-
livered before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
this morning:
We have naturally given a
great deal of thought to the
reasons for this extraordinary
action by the Soviets in corn-
ing all the way from Moscow
to Paris for the sole purpose of
sabotaging the conference.
I should like to say right off
that there are many obsc
aspects of this Soviet behavi
and that we do not know et
considerations a n d factors
which went into its deterMina-
lion. We probably, 'sever
I hardly need to -emphasize
!here to the members of this
Committee the complete se-
crecy in which decisions are
arrived at in the Soviet Gov-
ernment and in the hierarchy of
the Communist Party, which is
the effective ruler of that
country.
It is only possible to try to
deduce .from Soviet actions,
after they are taken, the con-
siderations which brought them
about. What I give you now,
therefore, is at best a tenta-
tive estimate of why the Soviet
Union behaved as it did, an
estimate which may have to be
revised in the light of further
Information and future events,
dent and with President de
Gaulle, with only interpreters
present.
The best guess as to the sig-
nificance of this new factor is
that (1) in view of the brutal
and threatening attitude he
(itde .ft eris it was con-
y;
cif a e to have some
g 1:?19 e ,n.ce - of Soviet
armed strength' in' liq person
of Marshal Mal' Sec-
ondlyGrolpyko ', linov-
, 4
sky wp ,,, be able Uri testify
upon iiii1 ' to Moscow that he
had etbck strictly to the agreed
position.
Decided in Moscow
' There is one thing, however,
that can be regarded as cer-
tain: This is that the decision
to wreck the conference was
made prior to Khrushchev's de-
parture from Moscow.
At no point during his OW
in Paris?neither when he:dis-
closed his true intentions to
Gen. de Gaulle at. 11 a.m. on
Sunday, the 151 is nor subse-
quently?did Khrushchev devi-
ate 1 inch from his demands
that the United States: (1)
Denounce the overflights; 2)
apologize to the Soviet Union;
(3) punish those "directly re-
sponsible," and (4) promise not!
to repeat these flights.
Neither the statement made
by the President at the one
meeting held on Monday nor,
the serious and responsible ef-;
forts of Gen. de Gaulle and Mr.
Macmillan in bilateral talks
with Mr. Khrushchev before
and after the President's an-
nouncement of suspension of
flights could persuade him to
withdraw these unacceptable
demands. Indeed, it is a logical
deduction from his behavior in
Paris that he had no authority
to modify his position to any!
significant degree.
The fact that he was accom-
panied everywhere, and lit-
erally everywhere, by Foreign
Minister Gromyko and Marshal
Malinovsky is an interesting
sidelight on this point. There
is much speculation as to this
change from his previous atti-
tude during his visits both to
the United States and France,
when he insisted upon having
meetings alone with the Presi-
F
It also
the decis
vita tion to
made before
Moscow.
Decision
"certain that
scanned the in-
nt was
rushehev left
As to what led the Soviets
to this extreme position, in
regard to the summit meeting
which had previously appeared
so much desired by Mr. Khru-
shchev, we enter into the realm
of pure speculation, as I indi-
cated earlier. The most we can
hope to do in the absence of
reliable information is to eval-
uate the elements and factors
which appear to have entered
into this decision. I shall try
to list them briefly.
1. There was considerable in-
dication, particularly during
April, that Mr. Khrushchev
had concluded that there was
little likelihood of his having
his way, particularly in regard
to Berlin, at the summit. Evi-
dence of Western determlna-
ton and unity on this point in
speeches and statements by
Western leaders appears to
have brought him to this eon-
elusion. Thus in his Baku
speech on April 25, he not only ,
reiterated with the utmost fi-
nality his position on Berlin.
including his intention to con-
clude a separate peace treaty
with the East German regime.
but he also began for the first
time seriously to cast doubts
upon the success of the sum-
mit. By this, of course, he
meant success on Soviet terms.
2. Although the evidence is
highly inconclusive, there are
a numer of indications that
Mr. Khrushchev's conduct of
Soviet foreign policy, particu-
larly his over - personalization
and in Communist eyes over-
commitment through personal
visits to the United States and
France, was arousing at least
serious questioning if not op-
position in the Soviet hier-
archy. It would seem a logical
deduction that some of the
opposition to his conduct of
foreign relations which was
openly voiced by the Chinese
!Communists found a .sympa-
thetic response among some of
SPORT OFJOTER $ PLAZA SPORT SHOP
his ass tates, an very prob-
ably among the Soviet miii-
tarY.
3. It was against this back-
ground that the U-2 incident
occurred.
Basic Miscalculation
, A combinatlof these three
factors in our judgment is
what resulted in the definite
and brutal decision to cti4upt
the Paris conference. To?ceiter-
mine how each of the st factors
should be weighed is, for the
moment, beyond our reach.
-"rii4 'U-2 incident was most
certainly. seised upon and mag-
nified beyonit. its true propor-
tions as a justification for this
decision. It is.debatable wheth-
er?it would have been possible
foi Mr. Khrushchev to devise
another pretext for so radical
and violent position.
It might well be that a lack
of success at the sumrhit would
have confronted Khrushchev
with a much more difficult
choice, from his point of view,
than no conference at all. He
and his associates may have
therefore much preferred to
avoid facing the consequences
of failure of negotiation by the
simple expedient of torpedoing
the conference.
It may seein incredible to
you that responsible leaders
of a great power should have
come all the way to Paris mere-
ly for the purpose of wrecking
the conference, thereby incur-
ring worldwide condemnation
of, the., !Alnion,',and en-
hancing,the of unity and
purpose a the
Western Pnwlit* -retiresented
there but also the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization and
free nations everywhere.
I believe the answer lies in a
basic miscalculation in Mr.
Khrushchev's and the Soviet.;
thinking.
Hoped to Divide West
Mr. Khrushchev undoubtedlyi
hoped?and this explains his;
early arrival in Paris?to dividel
the allies and isolate the United
States. He anticipated that the
United States would refuse the
demands-;.he .bad set forth and
that the conference would then
collapse, with the United States
bearing responsibility for the
rupture before World opinion.
His plan miscarried because
our two allies stood solidly and
loyally
and refused to be partners to
Mr. Khrushchev's scheme. The
result, as the whole world
knows, was that the position
which Mr. Khrushchev brought
to Paris resulted in the com-
plete isolation of the Soviet
Union rather than the United
States and in placing the re-
sponsibility for the disruption
of the conference squarely
where it belongs?on his own
shoulders.
This estimate of the reasons
for Mr. Khrushchev's behavior
is strongly supported by the
attack which he made at his
press conference on Gen. de
Gaulle and Prime Ministei
Macmillan for What he termed
their lack of objectivity. lack
of will and subservience to the
allied relationships?in other
words, in plain 'English, for
their solidarity with the United
States, their loyalty to our
common 'Purposes and their re-
Mad to play the Soviet game.
The Future
What conclusions should we
draw for the future?
I believe the signs are that
there has been as yet no rad-
ical alterations in Soviet pol-
icy, so we can expect the con-
tinuance of a propaganda ef-
fort designed to split off the
United States from its allies.
This conclusion is .suptiorted by
Mr. Khrushchev's Paris state-
ments, including those at his
press conference. It is sup-
ported, somewhat more zpecif-
ically and definitely, by the
statements which he made in
Berlin on his way home.
We must remember, how-
, ever, that given the nature of
the Soviet state, the men who
run it can meet in secret at
any time and change existing
policy without public debate or
even foreshadowing any such
change. It is for this reason
that any statement about a
phase of Soviet policy must be
regarded as qualified, with no
certainty that it will remain
valid in the future.
Thus, though the world's
hopes have been keenly disap-
pointed by the fact that the
summit conference was not
held as planned, the signs so
far are that the basic realities
of the world situation have not
been greatly changed. Whether
this continues to be so depends.
as I have indicated, on actions
of the leading Communist
countries.
Main Policy Sound
Provisionally. however. I con-
cluded that the implication for
United States policy is that the
main lines of our policy remain
sound and should be continueci.
The lesson of Paris is that we
should prosecute those lines
with renewed effort. Propo-
nents within the Communist
bloc of an aggressive course
must not be encouraged by
signs of weakness on our part.
Proponents of a peaceful course
should be encouraged by our
readiness to get on with out-
standing international business
in a sober and rational man-
ner.
We must remain prepared to
, withstand aggressive pressures
not only in Berlin but also else-
where. I trust that our evident
readiness will deter such pres-
sures.
Stresses Aid Programs
; Among the lessons of Paris.
the most important, for the
free world including ourselves.
:it seems to me, is fresh realiza-
tion of the dangers we face
and consequent need for clos-
ing of ranks and moving ahead
:with our own and our allies'
!programs for strengthening the
free world. We came back from
;Paris with a keener sense of
what it means to have a We
and I am sure that our
ances will take new life from
this experience.
At the same time I would
stress equally the need to ex- :
nand imaginatively and gen-
erously our collaboration with
the newly developing countries.
I Union. To do so is not only
to deflect our gaze from the
grim reality that confronts us,
but even more to plunge us
inevitably into fruitless and
'damaging domestic recrimina-
tion. We mitt 'now, as in the
, future, maintain a vigilant,
:calm and resofute posture and.
insofar as it lies in our power
,to do so, be accurate in our
estimates and effective in our
actions.
I would close in expressing
the hope that we will not be-
come so fixed in preoccupation
with the Soviet challenge as to
lose sight of our own construc-
tive purposes?which are larger
and more important that-
. merely resisting or reacting ti
1 external threats. We have 011
own vision of the future tows:
which we want to see the woi
On both accounts I hope the
Congress will give whole-
hearted support to our mutual
security programs as author-
ized by this committee, which
are now more important than
ever.
We must continue, as the
Presi
has said, to seek in a
businesslike way to make prog-
ress on outstanding problems
with the Soviet Union. We in-
tend to go ahead with existing
negotiations, to stand by our
commitments, and to foster
open communication and peace-
ful exchanges. Above all, we
shall not cease from the most
!ful endeavor to find ways to
bring the arms race under con-
trol and thus to meet the nu-
clear menace that hangs over
mankind.
, I believe in this period it is
incumbent upon us, all of its,
to keep a calm and steady gaze
on the world scene and to avoid
actions, statements and atti-
tudes which might tend unnec-
essarily to increase international
tension. If such an inrrep
is to occur,
clearly the faun of thc \
and we should not do Clem
favor of providing pretext for
action by them which would
have this effect.
Cites Constructive Goats
We should not dene
'hard'' or "soft" our at:
or policy toward th 5-4m ;et
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evolve.
We have our own progrs
for helping to bring that flit)
bOut?for holding high
!light of freedom, for shai
its message and rewards
emerging nations, for tryin
create an international c
munity in which the rul
law will replace the rul
force. It is to these prof
that our talents and en
should be rededicated it
uncertain times.that lie
0111001111.111100.11.01111?11.1111111114411?111
Trtt,, itvcm,4pr0ved For Release 404114/p5A13961:11A-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7
You, Too
?
You, too, you, too, whoever you are,
Wherever you are, now must decide ?
Dare we let these anti-human mechanisms,
Brains wired to bank accounts,
Trembling with every tremor of stock rise,
The procreating of generations of paper profit
Their ecstacy, orgasm, psmotic absorption,
The tegument, tissue, cartilage of their being;
Dare we let these ex-human univacs, -
Make their October, 1929 decisioh?
Tumble ,thernselves (and us)
Out their 20th story window?
U-2 U-2 is their symbol and cr
Dealing from iii-e---foTran ottom of the deck,
The supreme, perfect, triuniphant gamble:
Heads you win a :gestiare for peace,
(Withdrawn at their Whim and convenience)
Tails they min a?cold war manouver,
, Prices rising, ticker racing, business as usual,
? While, swag over shoulder, they run
Shouting through the streets, "Stop, thief!"
You, too, you, too, now must decide:
Will our united voice and action%
Atomize, in a puff, their U-2's and outlawry,
Or silence and acquiesence push us
One step nearer that 20th story window?
t-2 or you, too, you, too?
4.....M3...4".0,,,.....410ftroas.011,101/0?1100?00411?Minf
Saul Gross
.4
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7
NEW YORK TIMES
All Ay 2 el 1960
Approved For Release_2004/05/t3 :_c_IA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7
II-2 Case Perils Project
For Higher-Flying Plane
1;y HANSON W. BALDWIN
The future. of a new reconnaissance aircraft capable of
cruising at an altitude of-more than 100,000 feet has been
jeopardized by the U-2 incident, in the opinion of Wash- .iout? or fali etf thousands of
ington experts. The loss in a of the 1.7-2's planned successor feet below tneni. Some of the
flight over the Soviet Union in doubt. interception attempts were pho-I
' ()gra ,
May 1 of a Lockheed, 13-2 The Lockheed U-2, which had ' phed.
authorities are
plane had led to indefinite
stoppage 9f 4..nte1lige ,
gathering "overflighta;'_whi
had been going on With
major incident for four /eikrs.
The II-2 planes, capable q OP If?e vulnerable even at graphs
altitude of about 70,009 feet, 0;000 feet. argument
'
have not penetrated betycmd 'herefore a successor to the bower s
Communist frontiers sinCe'MAy t-2, described by some writers ? ',,_,,
t. President Eisenhower htt?:tlb` as the U-3, had been designed
and was being built. It was ex- They
other flu
hely promised that these 4497
t)raphic flights will not be re- lected to cruise at altitudes
future
than 100,000 feet. Thc, .,....suences,s,f,d1,,. a
timed during . his Achzeiniptra- of this plane, and in fact ',."-`", 1-IttS,
tion, ? ., t), of the entire air reconnaissance,um?11 4
t Iprogram, is now in doubt 4military'tec
Soviet Aim Aceodired '
Y intelligence l
? From the-militar int ? stat
Senator John F. Kethe4y, a,point of view the halting of the at the
leading candidate for
,!' flf ht " i viewed as
f tressed about a -
.oeratic nomination fOV,'..Rresi.filiticulable ince importae,be at
least all the
dent, has said he will_noi aP-It*two or three years before re-
ore so s it willnc
Prove their resumption it itlebe-IrAtinaissanet satellites are avail-
come? President. ' , 1, ,iable to replace piloted planes. preasion, is
During repeated flightI$:iit, the,l The II-2 program Of recon- vaunte nOwe
i last four years the U-3%....ha,vetna ssa.nce was the roost Impor-IA v ga, T- Ico..p---
photographed Moscow, Peiping.- ? . . Release
flying
'tart secret source of informa-
/ton about the Soviet Union' ot ?
rt flying over the Soviet Un-
0..high 'altitudes for four
'faced increasing risks as
e wertt?on. Anticipated ad-
?in the capabilities of So-
, fenSe 'weapons would
time that the U-2
Wash'
debati
leasing
the -
Soviet
tail an
so at
dylsability of re-
Ifektion some of
'en 6Vei The:
do-
said to he
:the. ?Vboio-:
As povverful
d? Visen-
Rlan for
rprise
serve au-
on of the
-continued
e Soviet
'American
Ad' scientific
tries that
re dis-
n's han-
dling of the U- ?
Soviet Pow
In these cqu
to Washington
Von
Abrding
,
The im-
Vat the
A Soviet
and found
the photo-I
, it is believed, would
1Soviet nuclear, explosgwri:?so-available to the Central Intelli-'m
provide it
of United States
viet missile-launcilainsi-. air- gence,Agency. The data it pro.
:
icolds ?and some, of the ,,Area. ?vided vied in importance iingenuity and power and might
th e.ompen. sate somewhat in pay-
supposedly most . heavily , de. that collected by the National
. cnological gams for the halting'
I ended in "04 SOViel Vnion, Security Agency, a separate Mil
of the flights.
ligente - gatherin organiza4t
g ? On the oIthe'r hand those who
t3hina and the satellite en un tion, 'which intercepts, analyzes _ ,
,? re arguing again,st publication
tries. and, if possible, decodes Sovic
. nterid that release of the pho-
Washington experts feel that 4pmmunieations.
^remier Khrushchey's exploita- The 15-2's were flying his would compound the
over4thcilteP
tion of the 13-2 incident na %lett a the. U-2 mc!-
In and during his visit to Paris toecyithLedreAuoidinitedc f
-mni ,.' viet -Union, since it would strike
lias thus accomplished one oi pgordtiicginu,
a. record of elfgaineerTir; P
another blow at the prestige of
its objectives?the halting of an and production skill that dem- moth remier Ithrushchey andthe Sev.iet Army.
air intelligence operation that onstrated what ample funds, In striking a balance sheet of
had provided the United Statesifull? support. and elimination of U-2 gains and losses, with information of tremendousired tape could mean._ . ton experts, though disturbed
Washing-
value that could be acquired in 13-2 Defied Interceptor6 at the Government's handling
r
no other way. The Communists had detected (h?, the case after May 1, are be-
Moreover, the public "corn- by radar some, but by no means ginning to think that in the
long view of history the l'resi-
,irtielising' of i it. ,iii intern- all, of these flights, but had not
been dent's frankness in assuming
tiee prOg alli leavt's Ole iiiiiiiro able to stop them. T.J-2 pi- personal responsibtlity for the
lots had seen Soviet intereep- flights may pay dividends Th
tors rise to attack them, only to
their ceilings and 'mush add, too, that Allied unit3
'Witch
-1......... -b.-en strengthened.
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YORK TIMES
MAY 3 0 1960
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ar This prioritylargeting list was
. S. Ti work was reduced to a mini-
me Flight of u.2 4 'MUM in the interests of security.
I,
I closely held, however. Peeler
-
J?Few subordinate officials knew
tthat the U-2 reconnaissance pro-
gram existed.
Dulles in Charge
Thus, in this sense- every U-21
mission received the policy ap-,
Pr oval of top officials of the
Government before the flightl
not known perscihally of th.'.! was authorized. Once a flight'
Worth the Dangers flight on May 1 until he sub- was placed on the,priority list, I
sequently heard news that the however, the management and
plane had 1?egii; downed, but hei direction of the program neces-
By HANSON W. BALDWIN , defended the Continuation ?of sadly was, to a large extent
Favorable weather and the, the flights in the pre-surnmitdecentralized
In. Washington, 4Vr. Dulles
advent of long periods of day-1 period as 'a "sound" policy. wat the over-all manage, and
light over northern Russia Much criticisin has been ley- director. A group of Al I. F:orce
were important factors in the eled at the Administration be Stehnicians was assigned *o bis
decision to send a U-2 recon-1 eauee the Lockheed U-2 that'
naisance plane over the Soviet' was 16at Wa;s permitted to fly office and their was close hal-
Union May 1, just prior th the OW Soviet territory so short son erce. and the Air,
Fo
projected summit conference. a ?time before the scheduled
Washington experts explained, Die :Four meeting in Paris. In the efd, operational
part !of the program was the
to this reporter last week the The policy decision to eon- res ofisibility of the Air Force
significance of these two fac.-; tinue the flights despite the a 4119;Cteritral Intelligence'
tors and described the man -I scheduled conference was taken .A ey The pilots who flew'
agement system that carefully Weelts before 'May 1, it was ?"'r'theliloviet Union, working
controlled the reconnaissanceiexPtaked. The IT-2 overflights, on thesek- flights in rotation,1
were civilians, though. most or
To Weather, Not Summit
?
Aides Say In ormationCo'rp, ig
team Come* tce, said h
Sought by Plane Was
flights.
Any scheduled flight could
he stopped before the take-of
by a simple order from Wash-
ington to halt all flights. In
the case of the May 1 flight,
ai@ich had been gbing on for
four ,years, were temporaril3z,
suspended just prior to, during
ancIoafter Premier Khrushchev's
visit to' the United States, last
Septet-fiber.
all of them were, former mem-
bers of the jrA Force. The
slIpporting organization was
largely draWn,? from the Air
Force, ! .
Once the list of target priori-
ties, which was constantly un-
the imminence of the summit Summit Meeting Delayed I der revision, reached 2the van-
conference had not been over-n But with the subsequent?}13.. !ore IT
looked, these experts said. It del4 of .l
the summit meeting t t obnaesde s t Ir I 1 cd-msmander
was believed that the informa; and of President Eisenhower's had 1 a oe'rtain amount of lati-
tude about the timing of the
tion to be gained was so im-
portant that it outweighed the
political -risks involved.
Secretary of State Christian
A. Herter indicated last Friday
that there had been no Admin-
istration policy review on the
of continuing TT-2
wisdom
schedaled visit to the Soviet
Union, it was felt that the
flights should be resumed. An
flights.
He could, for instance, under-
take any one of the top two or
indefinite susrlension, it was three flights listed on the prior-
held, would close off to Wash- ity list, it was explained. His
'Ington a source of major in- decision 'as to which flight to
formation during a vital period, undertake, and when, was die-
Air For
satisfactory cut-off date?" one eepOrti, the availability of day- an overflight started, it was
e officials whenevef
"Anyway, what wauld be a tatod in large part by weather
observer asked last week. "One light over the areas to be photo-
s month, one v.ei k one day be-igraphed and by other mtefli
fore the summit?" !gence Information.
The U-2 reconnaissance pro-l. The advent of long: spring and
grain was under the direction summer days in the northern
and control of the Central Intel- latittides after a *inter of dark-
ligenee Agency. Allen W. Dulles, ness Was ,an iitiportalit ele.rnent:
director df the agency, suggest- influencing. a .resurtiption of
ed after the Ma' 1 incident that flights over such areas.
he should take full responSibir- In the case .of the May 14
ity for the program, it was disr flight that ended with the loss
closed. However, the PreSident
explained. However, neither the!
President nor the Secretary of
State would necessarily be in-
formed' of the start of each
flight.
Washington authorities thor-
oughly familiar with the I.1-2
operation feel *ere can be no
justifia,ple criticism of the pro-
gram oil teeMAcal and intelli-
gence grounds, 'though some of
observe that the Govern-
decided to assume full respen- of, the ciirst 1.1-2 destroyed over nil
sibility after variouS inaccurate any Communist 'country, there 111-ell;., ..:_talkecl. tip, , ,much after
had been indications that the iv16-Y ,.1
Statements hd been made by Russians were prepsfring a Mrisl Plans Not Known
.minor official S litho had norspectaeular space shot for May
Actually, it was learned, .the' DaY' There were' specific tar- x .1:-,
Major interest in Washington
knowledge of the program.
policy responsibility was widely gets to be photographed, rang- ontifivrs to be focused on
distributed. E very IT-2 fligh t ? ing from the borders of Afghan- ;rraneis Gary Powers, pilot of
was scheduled in Washington. to
b al sass;
istan to the Arctic Ocean. FthieRiAdyowinTneidtedU-4ateUsp E
Tilt scheduling wtts done by a Clear Skies Important officials hi Moscow had had no
ts4TPowers Washington does
spgaiSe to their request to see
ieareful determination-in which . The U.-2's cameras, which
?
ithe Air Force, the Central Intel- take pictures ite great precision . th
h,1
` ere
lig,ence Agency and ttther agen- no even know w e pilot
Associated Press
Allen W. Dulles
cieS joined?of the Objectives to
e photographed by the high-
flying planes.
Each flight was listed on a
priority list, with specific rout-
ing and objectives shown. This
list, constantly revised, was ap-
proved not .only by Mr. Dulles
but by top officials in the Air
lights over Soviet territory as Force and the Pentagon and, as
the summit conference ap- secretary qf State Herter indi-
cated in his testimony last week,
? proached. by senior officials in the State
Approved For
.1WA
and clarity from 70,000 feet up,
require daylight and freedom
from cloud cever for effective
results. Good weather?a pre-
diatom of either clear skies or
scattered clouds over the route he is -tried publicly, Washington
to be taken?wag therefore believes, the Seviet Gevernment
may littempt to stage a papa-
ganda eirchs.7
The pilot, already -probably
brainwashed and subjected to
eing held, although he is
presumably in Moscow.
_Whether he will be brought
to-iniblic trial is not known. If
'always a major factor in
timing. This was a factor that
could not possibly be controlled
, from Washington.
! The local commandeer dect. psychological and perhaps,phys-
IsiOn on precise scheduling of 44 ical tdeture may be expected
!flight ,was accompanied by a to answer questions exactly a
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the Russians wish. It is believed'
;that he will, probably be pre-
sented as a.. typical representa-
tive of "deeadenty capitalism."
Though this COMAittniet cari-
cature of the be dis-
counted, the question of moti-
vation, be rv. Mit': Powers
acted at. he did When, his plane
was etdowned, cbntinues to
trouble some Washington ob-
servers.
Mr, Powers Is a new, kind of
spy, if indeed he can lee defined
as a spy Eit all. He wore no uni-
forte and Was got in active
military service. He i;Ild net
penetrate the territory" Of the
Soviet Union, as Such.
He did fly at, high altitude
over the Soviet ..13:nipin and by
his own admission, as reported
by the Russians, he Operated
cameras and electronic record-
ing instriments. But no defini-
tion of sovereignty as ? far as
air space is concerned has ever
been agreed upon. Pragmati-
cally, sovereignty extends up-
ward as far, as a nation can en-
force 'it?in other. words, to the
limit of the range of its anti-
aircraft rockets,
Pilot a Skilled Technician
Nevertheless, Mr. Powers was
a kind of modern spY7a Skilled
technician trained to. operate
technological instrftents. of
espionage.
The embarrasSment to which
the United States was sub-
jected when the ,ti-2 was
downed arose , frairthe fact
that the Russians recovered
irrefutable' evielence of Mr.
Powers' espionage mission.
Large parte of his plane, earn-
eras, films, equipment, and the
pilot himself atteSted to what
normally are clandestine activ-
ities. Mr. Powers. apparently
has told the Russians about his
assignment and thus hag added
to the physical evidence they
collected.
Yet the downed U-2 was
_
fitted with a self-destructidn
mechanism and Ar. Powers
himself carried with him means
of killing himself- -a way out
for many espionage agents in
the past.
The main questions teeing
asked 4n Washington and else-
where itre;:p
giWhy id the plane and
equipment escape destruction
and the pil et shrylve ?
ilWere Mr. Powers and his
fellow "spies in the sky" care-
lully, selected and well &allied?
IlWhat are the qualifications
of a good intelligence ageftt?f
The inadequacy of evidence
available to Washington and
the inability of. men to predict
the reactions of other men
makes complete answers to
these questions impossibe; to-
day. But some suggestive in-
formation is available.
No Communication With Bases
was never pressed n: was in-he teas to tell it, -"By and large,l
operative, as far -as we krinig, he hasn't!
'The pilot c'
's subsequent ac anything', they don't know ,"i
tions, iesofar as they are la spokesnlan Said.
known, are defended by Wash-1 What about the hypodernticj
ington pfficials. Gem ge V. Al needle with deadly poison that!
len, cifeector of the United the pilot carried?
States Information Agency, de -I This, Washington authoritiesi
fended ,.the pilot wipe li, saidindicated, Was Mtended to be
en a televisicrii program:, ;used only in a last resort -1.43
When he went dowel: he told escape torture. But how the;
exactly what his missian was pilot could have used it, once he
and exectly what he was ex- was captured and searched, was
pected 1;10, and he was under unekplained.
instruction ' to do that - The pilot had no hard and!
014r?-? solutes in Washington Cast instructions to commit sui,
mare oreleas verified the gist'cide to avoid capture, an au-
tof't,Mr. 'Allen's statement. As thoritative spokesman declared. t
the authorities explained it, if You tell a Japanese to do
circumstances were such that it: maybe a Ruesianebut not an
the pdot had to tell the truth. American," was one observation.;
On the quesen io of, why the
U-2 plane and its equipment
Were not destroyed in the air,
Washington has no answer.
Contrary to published reports,
the U-2's never communicated
with their bases while over So-
viet territetry, since to 'do so
would r'eyeal their presence to
the Ruseians.
There Is official skepticism,
bolstered by the visual evidence
of what appear to be bullet
holes in the wings of the U-2 on
display in Moscow, that the
plane was struck by a rocket'
at a65,000-foot altitude. Offi-
cals believe a "flame-out," or
engine failure, coprimon in rare-
fied altitudes, they have oc-
curred and that the pilot may
'have been forced to descend to
lower altitudes where the U-2
could easily have been brought
down by interceptors or ground
missiles.
In any case, the "destruct"
button, which would have blown
up the plane in 'thee air after
the pilot had escaped, either
? -- -
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Some Thoughts on the SAM, ?
EXTENStON'OF REMARKS
HOY:IMULDAF
or PENNSYLVANIA ftpii OA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 18,1960
Mr. DAGUE. Mr."Speaker, like every
patriotic American I 'am incensed over
the treatment accorded our President at
/,be now wrecked. Paris, Conf erence . and
herewith set down my reactions;itioint
by point, to the news reports ,Eifi they
have rValed us by Press and rio.. .
First Presidth Eisenhower 'under
eAlitt
the firmconns - 6 la-16: :;'31111 roder
Dulles, steadfaOty isted the idea 01
summit /neap* Until he Was finally
pressured fittiOtt by Macmillan.,
Second. inlet British are criticizing
Ike not beeatigeltdAYSied on Russia but
becaute-varmrt ...t it.
rfirirti. - .1-11F,MrIlflptilatin, the Olym-
plan:Oraele,;, Oitibizes Ike not he-Cause we
got caught at, spying -but rather because
he refused to lie 04out it
Volarth.....De,bat,e.' oil our ``.right " to
make reconnalsaiiinglits over -aril-Other
(lotion is acadenild WI the light of the
liussian space Vehicle presently passing
over most of the CddfitrieS of the world
every 90 minutes, phis the obvious fact
that in a few short months we will have
)n orbit observer satellites that, can col-
lect all the inforritation, to be gleaned
by a U-.2 plane and no one will be able
to do a thing about it.
Fifth, Mr. Khrushchey came to the
summit with his own hands ied, with
ltloody repression of free people and with
,i, record of infiltration and espiona,ge
,1T HT, matched by, any riatiiii in history.
Irt spPairint of .aelritir surveillance, how
,.. Russian observer planes find their
way over our Sixth Fleet in the Medi-
1-erranean without violating the air cor-
-,,dors of other poWers?
1#11.1Lis_reilatnring to have con-
tinned by most editorial writers my firm
1.:onviction that Mk. K. is not the unfet-
tered dictator, somt.,-.believe him to be.
The wily .RuSsi te evidently has
been brought to -b by the military
22-td political hierarchy in back of him
-2-nd told by them to baek away from
the summit.
Sevcrith. Khrushchev, in my opinion,
'never intended that anything- construc-
tive toward peace should come out -of
the Paris Conference. He lives on cen- .
troversy and unrest and he weitild slib
a peaceful world. The ne in-
eident.gave him an easy.
ElgAtILThe effect o
lase? should ,be the enlia f the
stature of RICHARDt next
Presideutt.sliame-ket.haS 'alrea mon-
Arated ,his -.-a.billtr,to slug it oiit with
';.hrusheheV That 'Dem-
ocrat front uipp ither
temperam ,Such
.1, slugging con
for former
one ? con!.'
back to...0k.
to his
lk 4 11S never for-
get at ?e not, rea-
sonable Men,. ,They: ehmpletely
ruthless iii flae fulimeaning of that term.
They are a4enable only to force and as
a result it behooves _us to keep our de-
fenseeintact and rOur bombers and Mis-
siles on the alert.; And then as reason-
able people let lit abandon tills fiction
of international'bdiffity and let's forth-
with sever diploinatip r,elatio.a.3 that we
should ncYcg hae:4.b.tered into in the
first instance:
T n nd .as a final thought, it
gra i y ng o see the alacrity with which
the American people arre_iti!,y bacl-
of their 'President, that ,crats t?,n6
Republicans have closed rani.s, 4_14,
back of Ike then in opposition tcia 'dab-
agog who in-.111ts our intelligfrice and
casts aspersions on our integrity and na-
tional honor.
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MAY 1 996O
1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX
Comparison of area redevelopment bills
A4273
Subject
..,
S. 722 as passed and vetoed
H.R. 4878, original form
H.R. 12290, H.R. 12291, and H.R. 12298
,
I. Organization ,...
Separate Area Redevelopment Ad-
ministration.
Department of Commerce
Department of Commerce.
2. Division of redevelop/ilea areas
Administrator to designate industrial
Only industrial and public facility loans in areas of
.
Same; removed reference to rural.
''':?
3. Revolving fund loans
and rural areas,
75
persistent and substantial unemployment.
Note technical assistance can cover.
Industrial
$100,000,000
$100,000,000
$75,000,000.
Rural
$75,000,000
None
None.
Public facilities
$$$J,00Q
$25,000,000
$25,000,000; reference to machinery
removed.
4. Federal participation in loans
65 percent-I...
331/4 percent class I areas, 50 percent class II areas,
and 75 percent class III areas.
35 percent; area classifications removed.
5. Maximum loan period
40 years; 10 percen e contribution.
25 years; not less than 15 percent State contribu-
tion.
Same.
O. Grants for public facilities
$35,000,000 N.,...?..,
$25,000,000; Federal participation 33J,a percent
class II areas, 75 percent class III areas.
None.
7. Retraining subsistence payments
$10,000,000
000,000
$5,000,000.
8. Vocational training grants
$1,500,000
Re y of Labor to determine needs; Secretary
of Education, and Welfare to provide
through facilities.
Same.
9. Technical assistance
$4,500,000
$3,000,000
$3,000,000.
10. Criteria of unemployment
At least 6 percent at time of applica-
tion and 12 percent for 12 months
preceding, or 9 percent for 15 of 18
months preceding, or 6 percent for
18 of 24 months preceding.
An average of 6 nt, excluding seasonal,
throughout qualifyin 'od, and 50 percent
above national average for 14 of 5 years pre-
ceding in class I areas, or 75 pertentobove no-
tional average for 3 out of 4 years preceding in
class II areas, or 100 percent above national
average for 2 out of 3 years preceding in class III
areas.
Same; area classifications removed.
11. Interest on loans
Maximum permitted, 2 to 7 percent...
To be determined by Secretary based on going
rates.
Same.
12. Cost
$251,000,000
$158,000,000
$108,000,000.
The Nation's Agriculture
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ARCH A. MOORE, JR.
OF WEST VIRGINIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, May 19, 1960
Mr. MOORE. Mr. Speaker, there is
Increasing evidence that this Nation's
griculture is being more severely hit by
politically inspired adverse publicity
tout the farming business than by the
reopgnized economic pressures which the
present administration is striving to
ease
(xis of the Nation's leading farm mag-
azines,, the Farm Journal, is currently
conducting an admirable campaign of
advertising promotion.
The Farm Journal is attempting to
put farm, economics into a reasonable
perspective by refuting some of the dis-
tortions.
Taking note of this was the Charles-
ton (W. Va.') Mail which treated the
subject editorially in its issue of April
11. Under urlanimous consent I insert
the editorial the RECORD:
THE MYTHS OF /HE FARM PROBLEM DO A
GREAT INJUSACE TO MOST FARMERS
The farm situatton, as it is called, is bad
enough as it is, bu't, it is not so bad as it is
generally misrepresepted. So says Carroll P.
Streeter, editor of tip Farm Journal in its
current issue.
Take, for exampl the myth that all
farmers are living o a generous handout
from the Government Livestock farmers,
who account for more an all farm income,
have never accepted GQvernment supports.
And to clarify the pictu a little more, less
than one-fourth of all akricultural produce
gets so much as a cent f 1 cent of price
supports.
Well, then, what is all th talk about farm
subsidies costing the Unit States billions
of dollars every year? That gure, says Mr.
Streeter, is the amount in tl Federal Gov-
ernment set aside for all agri lture, includ-
ing research and education, foc grading and
inspection, soil conservation, nrket report-
lng, and he Forestry Service. Of this total
says Mr. treeter, "probably not more than
one-half n be charged to farmers alone,
and not al 31 that to subsidies."
Twice in,-cent years 55 percent of the
farmers polle by the Far& Journal have
voted to elimi te subsidies entirely. Who,
then, is responsi e for maintaining a system
which most far s regard as both unfair
and unsuccessful? "Three groups," says Mr.
Streeter: "a substan al minority of farmers,
politicians who come om subsidy crop area
and?surprise--busine men in the wheat
and cotton belts who s farm supplies, proc-
ess the crop and mar t it. This is the
combination which mak it so hard for the
will of the majority to pre 1."
There are other myths ich Mr. Streeter
disposes of just as factuall but these are a
fair sampling and enough to, ake his point:
Sure there is a farm problem, but at its
worst it does not arise with or seriously
affect the great majority of American farm-
ers. Most of them, with no subsidy from the
Government, go right ahead making their
maximum economic and social contribution
to the Nation's welfare.
rushchev's Behavior at the Summit
Does Not Create the World Cleavage;
It Only Makes It More Apparent to
All?His 'Tirades Came From His Weak-
nesses Which U-2 Flights Had Re-
vealed
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. WALTER H. JUDD
OF MINNESOTA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, May 19, 1960
Mr. JUDD. Mr. Speaker, under leave
to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I
include the following article by ,We
gazAnoal-Mowrer:
SUMMIT FAILURE WAS VICTORY FOR WEST
(By e
PARIS.?Essentiam conference
that died aborning was great victory for the
particularly or Eir.J.111Meeor,, Ad-
y fieVerZyfeMItted any
knowledge of the fateful 17-2 wliose detec-
tion by Moscowistliteff trouble. alitsince
then the President, so irritable?Iii-small
matters, has revealed statesmanlike dignity
and patience that won him the e t ad-
miratlnil and support of De Gaul e ab-
infrfttiVag -Well as the Prefich peaple.
iir `pieitIction that
thanks to the downed plane, this conference
would be concerned with situations and
not with verbal cobwebs labeled relaxing
tension. By torpedoing the conference, once
he became sure that he would get no sub-
stantial concesions on Berlin or any Ameri-
can scalps, the Soviet boss in an excess of
sustained vituperation and insult, simply
created the stink behind which he backed
out altogether.
But with a bloody nese Mr. , ow knows
ca.u.nalthej?) .1,49,1wojd or a Igate the
.son` wont be lost at the next
United Sta .? ws...5, Digit time he learned
?amnia conference after the American elec-
tion?if there is such summit.
For Khruwhchey's policy of political pres-
sure through public tantrums reveals not
strength but weakness. The best observers
here are convinced that what, Wart Nikita
mosgojpj1Teirwaas the shrieking
relTItbn 9,.f goviet vuTheralpility. Ever since
the firefIputfrIrteditethreets to destroy
Paris and London by missiles, Nikita'has built
up a legend of an invincible U.S.S.R. It
could?according to the legend?crush any
enemies while remaining impervious to their
counterattacks. Such a story, endlessly re-
peated, found credence throughout the world.
People accepted Soviet claims, first of parity
with, then of superiority over the United
States. Such boasts were the basis for Soviet
threats against Berlin.
Then what happened? wnd
American plane revealed that f niteffig
iff4tTerrititte, the 17E.E.E7' conlerbe pene-
trated and overflown at any spot away from
chief centers. Not only could it be overflown
but such flights had been undetected for 4
years. This meant that militarily the Iron
Clatailas.a.s a irWh?tha Yaders
uriraibTrifeteltie fullest possible list
of all necessary Soviet targets in case they
were compelled to reply to Soviet sneak at-
tack. Far from being stronger than the
United States,..tigKe,&.vsa,lur?sluce
airplanes neerhfUrge-rwould more than
cancel out Soviet superiority?if any?in hal-
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A4274 CO RESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX
listic missiles. Moscow's ability to terrorize
the world was henceforth severely limited.
,64,u,s,,,the..constematiOn of the So-
vi t people, officially doped with illusion of
suprtiOrity. It also explains why other Bol-
sheviks, especially military, must have _be-
come extremely critical of Nikita's manage-
mmt of Soviet affairs. What else could
DT kita do but bluster and threaten? _,J44.talLe
mastfr spy and liar overplayed his hand.
'IT'S weakness was not lost upon America's
allies.
His threats and his intolerable attempt to
humiliate Eisenhower created full allied
unity. For if the West yielded to Khru-
shchev on such points it would never again
be able to resist his ultimatums. For the
first time since he succeeded Stalin, the wily
Mr. K. was caught in his own noose.
Whatever politicians at home say about
the failure of the "conference that never
happened," officials here, both American and
allied, agree that responsibility for failure
rests upon Khrushchev. Rather than face a
meeting where he could win nothing, he
sought to mobilize public opinion against the
United States and talk himself out of his
embarrassment by insulting Eisenhower.
The attempt has completely backfired. Even
the eager British who arrived sure that the
U.S.S.R. was ready for conciliation are now
convinced that Russian Communists are
enemies of both the West and real peace. In
this sense the Paris summit has been a
real success for the West.
Medical Care for the Aged
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. THOMAS B. CURTIS
OF MISSOURI
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 18, 1960
r. CURTIS of Missouri. Mr. Speak-
er, ran across an article appearing in
the ewspaper Labor, dated May 14,
1960:t eacllined "Says United States Lags
in M ical Care." This article purports
to q te our colleague Congressman
Moss follows:
The ited States is the only large indus-
trialized ountry in the world where the
Governm t does not, in some form or other,
provide in ical care for most of its citizens.
All Euro n countries, with the exception
of Finland, perate some type of gover
ment health and maternity program,
most of the countries of the globe w ch
have such p rams provide medica care
benefits under ome sort of a social:nsur-
ance program.
I think this ticle lets the t out of
the bag, just as ? 'lar state ents made
by other propon ts of th orand bill
call attention to at th people really
have in their bag ers.
Our society has est health pro-
gram, and this incl s health care for
the aged, of any, ciety in history.
t/t/
These other syste ave the Govern-
ment in some r other provide
medical care f of its citizens.
This results in system inferior health
care for the itizens, as study of the
health pro " ams of the other indus-
trialized s cieties reveals.
Shoul that not suggest these other
societie that socialism is the wrong way
to ac eve success in this area, even if it
does not convince some of our own po-
litical theorists?
I must add a further statement to try
to forestall what the Forand bill pro-
ts usually fall back on to answer
ritics. Their critics, they say, are
tters and want no progress. This
Any program, no matter how
good it iy be, can be improved. There
is plenty room for improvement in the
health pr am our society has, even
though it i the best program ever set
up. Howeve to improve it and not
damage it, must first understand
what it its. The,Forand bill supporters
Imply th at thek is no program even
though the Feder Government today is
spending over $12 illion a year on care
for the aged. Let first lay the facts
of our present prog m for health care
out on the table, th?ebate the issue
of how we can impro it. Is this such
an illogical suggestion.
The article follows:
SAYS UNITED STATES LAGS MEDICAL CARE
"The United States is the y large indus-
trialized country in the world there the Gov-
ernment does not, in some or other,
provide medical care for most o ts citizens,"
Congressman JOHN E. Moss, mocrat, of
California, noted last week.
..f!All European countries, with e excep-
n of Finland, operate some t of gov-
ment health arid maternity pro m," h
said. "And most of the 59 countri of
globe which -have such programs
medical care benefits under some so f a
social insurance program."
Moss prednie that Congress thi
also enact al insurance leg
those over 65 years Of age.
Descendants of Israel rmount Over
whelmin dds
EXTENSIO F REMARKS
OF
HON. CH ES C. DIGGS, JR.
OF MICHIGAN
IN THE USE OF REPRESENTATIVES
hursday, May 19, 1960
Mr IGGS. Mr. Speaker, the 12th
e sary of the rebirth of Israel,
2, recalls a saga of a suffering peo-
as potent, fraught with drama as a
ovie spectacular, and as intensely his-
trionic as the journey of Moses and his
followers to the Promised Land.
Fiction writers would not dare the
literary license of depicting the trials
and tribulations of the wandering tribes
of Israel. It is unbelievable to conceive
the perpetuity of the dream of indepen-
dence for Israel as it has coursed through
generations of exiles without loss of one
spark of its original fire.
Descendants of Israel, surmounting
overwhelming odds in pursuit of their
dream of a homeland, have worked to
build Jewish pride and world respect,
and clung tenaciously to the idea of re-
building a Jewish commonwealth in the
face of international manifestations of
anti-Semitism and Nazi cruelty. For
2,000 years the vision of a new Zion has
spurred a decimated people, tottering
under the yoke of bloodthirsty attacks,
yet faithful to the vow that "their
hands would lose their cunning and their
tongues cleave to the roofs of their
mouths" if they forgot Jerusalem.
In the pilgrimage to Israel exiles came
from 4 continents and 70 countries?
singly, in single family groups, and in
May .19
patriarchal clans; from behind the Iron
Curtain; from behind store counters in
the United States and Canada; from the
remote Atlas Mountains and the bazaars
of Casablanca; from the foggy grotes-
querie of England and the parched des-
erts of the east. They came to pool
their skills, their knowledge, and their
finances, to be the forerunners in the
creation of a great country, culled out of
barren, acrid land; the earth to be tilled
and cajoled into verdancy with loving
hands and willing, if not strong, backs.
Exiles seeking the promise of this new
frontier taxed the sparse,resources to the
bursting point.
Prime Minister -Gurion, on the
10th anniversary o e rebirth of Israel,
commended the ws of the world for
embodying the le ally of infant Israel,
"when the ted Nations and all the
nations of e world failed to come to
Israel's " They sent money, and
arms, d fighters, from 60 different
coun es to suckle and nurture the
nes g state.
rael has met in 12 years every threat
national security and integrity--com-
munism, economic struggle, domestic
strife, and the necessity for living within
its narrow borders and absorbing all who
wanted to come to Israel.
The people of Israel and the Jews of
the world have the right to flex their
muscles with pride of accomplishment
and tenacity of purpose.
It is our hope that Israel in its struggle
will serve as a criterion for African na-
tions, now straining at the leash of colo-
ialism and near to breaking the yoke of
rvitude.
n a century when man has mastered
?physical hospice, and his struggle is
ted toward the human barriers of
diee, hatred and poverty, igno-
and intolerance, Israel represents
stone to the United States from
t may renew its standard of jus-
rty, and the pursuit of happi-
11 its citizens.
Po
pre
ran
a to
which
tice, 11
ness for
American inng Congress Convention
EXTE ION OF REMARKS
O
HON.. IIN P. SAYLOR
OF NNSYLVANIA
IN THE HOUS ? F REPRESENTATIVES
VVednes ,May 18, 1960
Mr. SAYLOR. r. Speaker, last week
I had the honor accompanying the
Secretary of Interi ? on a visit to a coal
mine. At the inst ce of our mutual
friend, Stephen F. unn, president of
the National Coal A ()elation the Sec-
retary's party toured the Thomas Portal
area of Mathies Mine, *hich is operated
by the Pittsburgh Coal Division of Con-
solidation Coal Co. Other members of
the group included Michael J. Widman,
assistant to the president, United Mine
Workers of America; Marling J. Ankeny,
Director of the Bureau of Mines; Royce
A. Hardy, Assistant Secretary of the In-
terior; Consolidation Coal executives
George A. Shoemaker, 'Walter F. Schul-
ten, S. M. Cassidy, and D. L. McElroy;
and G. Don Sullivan and Mr. Dunn, of
National Coal.
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1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SEN
by this afternoon, he was as hard as Vyach-
eslav M. Molotov and as vivid and vitupera.-
' *se as Andrei Y. Vishinsky.
4141011 The last time Mr. Khrushchev saw Paris
he was the benign and jovial Mr. K. He
made a special point then with President de
Gaulle that their conversations should be
held without anyone present except the in-
terpreters.
JOVIALITY IS PUT ASIDE
This week all was changed. The jovial
Mr. K became the arm-waving naughty Nik,
and Marshal Malinovsky was there as a wit-
ness of his every word and move, even when
Mr. Khrushchev said goodby to President de
Gaulle.
None of this was missed by the press of
the world or the diplomatic corps of Paris,
and the inevitable reaction, was not only
that the giants were quarreling?which al-
ways terrifies the world?but that they were
blundering in a most extraordinary way.
This was particularly true of Mr. Khrush-
chev after he got well into his new role. He
overplayed every card he had. He was rude
and primitive. He was not only a boor, but
what is worse in Paris, he was a bore. And
instead of splitting the allies, he even drove
the press of London and Paris to the Presi-
dent's support, which is not easy to do.
There are the things that have spread
the feeling of uneasiness about the leader-
ship of the great powers. The two men who
started out to reduce tensions ended up by
increasing them here in Paris, and the ques-
tion now is how far the present "dukes-
up" attitude will go.
About this, no one really knows, probably
not even Mr. Khrushchev. For until he gets
back to Moscow and reports to the 'Central
Committee, there is no way of knowing what
will happen to Berlin, or for that matter
what will happen to Mr. Khrushchev.
[From the Washington Post, May 19, 19601
IKE'S HOPES CRASHED WITH U-2
/
(By
It is apparent that a lot more than a for-
mer Air Force officer and some photos of
Soviet airplanes came down with that U-2
plane May 1 flying 1,300 miles inside Rus-
sian borders. With it came down Ike's great-
est ambition and, more important, man-
kind's hopes for better understanding and
eventual world peace. Also gone aglimmer-
ing may be the Republican chances of elect-
ing a President in November.
Mr. Eisenhower's greatest ambition after
40 years as a military man was to go down
in history as a builder of peace.
This became more and more apparent to
those who talked to the President weekly at
his legislative conferences in Washington
and to Republican Party leaders. One of
them confided shortly before the summit
conference here that it was difficult to get
the President to concentrate on domestic
problems any more. When the subjects of
water pollution, education, and taxes were
raised in conferences Ike would listen impa-
tiently and then change the subject to for-
eign aid or international problems.
When THRUSTON MORTON, Republican na-
tional chairman, tried to persuade Mr.
Eisenhower to take Vice President NIXON
to the summit, he urged that NIXON go from
its start to the finish. Ike flatly refused,
finally compromised that Nnrox come as a
standby, all of which caused the frank GOP
chairman to exclaim to friends: "This guy
doesn't seem to know that we've got to win
an election. All he's interested in is peace!"
HOPES GO GLIMMERING
All this of course has now gone glimmer-
ing?both political hopes and personal peace
hopes?gone with the flights of Pilot Francis
Gary Powers over Russia.
Regardless of the considerable fumbling
of the Eisenhower administration there are
two great things Ike has had as a salesman
for peace. One is his background as a mili-
tary man which made it possible for him to
sell better relations with Russia to the iso-
lationists and the GOP doubters as could
few other American leaders.
Second, Ike has had the smile, the per-
sonality, the gestures that won millions of
people to his support. The Spaniards have
a word for this contagious charm: sympatico.
Ike had it and used it effectively to win
friends for the United States all over the
world. Recently he confided to ace leaders
that he planned two more trips abroad fol-
lowing the scheduled, now canceled, trip
through Russia before his term ended. He
loved this type of international salesmanship
and wanted to devote to it the rest of his
months as President.
However, big dreams are sometimes upset
by small details. And bad administration
shows also that no man can serve as Presi-
dent of the United States on a part-time
basis.
LOOSE ADMINISTRATION
For '7 years extremely efficient Press Secre-
tary Jim Hagerty plus a sympathetic Ameri-
can press have been glossing over the fact
that President Eisenhower doesn't know what
is going on in a large part of his administra-
tion and that it is impossible for any man
to be an effective President yet spend several
days every week away relaxing at golf and
almost every evening relaxing over a bridge
table.
Franklin Roosevelt spent almost every
night until 1 a.m. in pyLvate study. Mr.
Truman knew the intimailb details of gov-
ernment as few others in his administration.
On the eve of such an important conference
as the summit here, with great hopes for
permanent peace at stake, they would have
required that all flights over the Soviet
Union be,cleared with the White House. But
the looseness of the Eisenhower adrninistra-
tion permitted the left hand to do what the
right hand knew not.
The tragedy of this great anticlimax to
President Eisenhower's fine work for peace
is that we have been posing as moral leaders
of the world and as custodian of honesty and
righteousness. We have caught many Soviet
spies, but catching spies doesn't absolve us
from getting caught spying. And once we
were caught, all the Madison Avenue tech-
niques which had been so effective in selling
Mr. Eisenhower in election campaigns seemed
to evaporate.
We have let the Russians outpropagandize
us at every turn. Even here in Paris the
Russians got the first headlines Monday by
issuing their ultimatum before Hagerty, sup-
posedly trained in the best newspaper and
Madison Avenue techniques, could get his
statement to the American press.
THE DEPARTMENT OF MODERN A
CLASSICAL LANGUAGES, UNIVER-
SITY OF WYOMING
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I have in
my hand a summation of the record of
a very outstanding department of the
University of Wyoming, the department
of modern and classical languages. The
dynamic head of this department a the
university is Dr. A. J. Dickman.
This summation records the partici-
pation of the special students in the Ful-
bright exchange program during recent
years. Considering the relatively lim-
ited numbers of students coming under
Dr. Dickman's tutelage at the university,
one is at once impressed by the high per-
centage who have met the severe require-
ments of the Fulbright program and who
have represented both our University of
2R000100060001-7
TE 9897
Wyoming and the United States very
ffectively overseas.
r. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the summation be printed in
the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the summa-
tion was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
WYOMING FOREIGN LANGUAGE BULLETIN
(Editor, Adolphe J. Dickman)
(Published by the Department of Modern and
Classical Languages, University of Wyo-
ming, Laramie, Wyo., spring 1960)
GOOD NEWS: FeULBRIGHT AWARDS OF LANGUAGE
STUDENTS FOR 1960-61
The department of modern and classical
languages is happy to announce that three
of our students have been granted Fulbright
scholarships for the year 1960-61.
Miss Kay Kepler, from Laramie, Wyo., ma-
jor in zoology and minor in French, will study
at the University of Melbourne in Melbourne,
Australia.
Miss Katherine Ann Wells, from Kansas
City, Mo., major in art and minor in Span-
ish, will study at the Central University in
Caracas, Venezuela.
Miss Patricia O'Melia, from Rawlins, Wyo.,
major in French and minor in Spanish, will
study at the University of Besancon, France.
These students are proof that the Univer-
sity of Wyoming graduates continue to re-
ceive excellent preparation in their studies
and are able to compete with the best in the
country.
We are listing below those University of
Wyoming graduates who have received pre-
vious Fulbright awards in foreign lands:
Byrl D. Carey, Jr., University of Glasgow,
Scotland, 1950-51.
Michel Hoch, University of Paris, France,
1952-53.
Beverly Rogers, University of Nancy.
France, 1952-53.
Elizabeth Beresford, University of Rennes.
France, 1952-53.
Virginia Evans, University of Bordeaux.
France, 1953-54.
Stanley Brooks, University of Rennes,
France, 1954-55. Appointed recturer, 1955-56.
Sally Jackson, University of Bordeaux,
France, 1955-56.
Robert J. Hall, University of London, Lon-
don, England, 1955-56.
Larry S. Slotta, Delft Technical University,
Delft, Holland, 1956-57.
Thomas L. Hanks, University of Paris,
France, 1956-57.
Robert ahoney, University of Oslo. Nor-
way, 195 8.
Don Ericksen, New South Wales Uni-
vers of Technology, Sidney, Australia,
19 -58.
ary Lee Herman, University of Durham,
England, 1958-59.
John B. Morgan, Delft Technical Univer-
sity, Delft, Holland, 1958-59.
Barbara Smith, University of Clermont-
Ferrand, France, 1958-59. Appointed lecturer.
University of Grenoble, France, 1959-60.
Don M. Ricks, Bri:stol University, Bristol.
England, 1959-60.
Joan Anderson, University of Oslo, Norway,
1959-60.
Robert Sullins, Ecole des Beaux-Arts, Paris.
France, 1959-60.
We should like also to mention that Dar-
lene Huhtala, graduated in 1950, won a
French Government award as as.sistante
d'Anglais at the College de Jeunes Filles at
Amiens, France, for 1951-52. Charles Sar-
gent, Jr., graduated in 1958, received a
Rotary scholarship for the year 1959-60 to
study economics at the University of Lyons.
France; his major was economics, his minor,
French. Hjalma Person, graduated in 1958,
won a Scandinavian seminar scholarship for
1959-60 to study in the Scandinavian coun-
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9898 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
tries; her major was art, her minor, French.
James Couch, who graduated in 1947, won a
Mexican Government award for 2 years of
stu at the National University of Mexico _
a r obtaining in 1948 his master of arts de-
ee in Spanish at the University of Wyo-
ing.
HOW TO TUNE IN ON THE WORLD
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the im-
portance of an informed public opinion
in all the countries of the free world
is emphasized by the recent collapse of
summit talks in Paris. In this process
of getting the facts to the people of all
the countries, including those behind the
Iron Curtain, radio is an indispensable
instrument. Nier.,twe radio partigu-
larly makes possibrztercuritiriental
--aarctiauJaigartioaat By this means there is
an exchange between our people and
those of the rest of the world on points
of view, approaches to international
problems and also their cultures and
characters.
I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD an article which
emphasizes the importance of listening
to worldwide shortwave broadcasts, en-
titled "How To Tune in on the World,"
by Arthur Settel, which appeared in
P s' me for 60.
There being no o ec ion, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
How To TUNE IN ON THE WORLD
(By Arthur Settel)
If ? 'd like intelli ence
"iralmslikihriiiWarjalemeolilernsrplaining those
incomprehenifErreTheadlines from Laos and
the Chinese-Indian border?
If you enjoy live entertainment from such
exotic spots as Nyasaland, Quito or Cairo, a
ringside seat at a real-life drama of rescue
at sea, a listening post in the war of nerves
as the great powers hammer away at one
another?
All you need are:
17-2rirrivettro set.
2. The patience of Job.
3. The stamina to go without sleep in-
definitely.
4. An ever-loving wife willing to go visiting
alone, sleep alone, virtually live alone.
5. A soundproof den where you can fiddle
with static-laden frequencies without bring-
ing the house down on your head.
These are the requirements of the bona
fide shortwave radio listener who seriously
undertakes to become an eavesdropper. You
will not need:
1. Knowledge of any language except your
own?English.
2. A skyscraping antenna built at stagger-
ing cost on the roof of your home.
3. An initimate knowledge of electronics.
The rewards for the conscientious listener
to shortwave are varied. Whether it's tom-
tom music from Ng'oma, hot jazz from Mos-
cow, or the chimes of London's Big Ben?
it's all for free, available in unlimited
volume. There are analyses of political prob-
lems from sources of every hue in the spec-
trum; commentaries on architecture, reli-
gion, rock 'n' roll; folksy chatter and banter-
ing tidbits; anniversary celebrations, inter-
views and book reviews--from every corner
of the globe. You can eavesdrop on fatuous
chit-chat among radio hams, ship-to-shore
telephone calls, exchanges between com-
mercial airline pilots and their control
towers.
Shortwave listening has been compared to
photography: you get as much out of it as
you put into it. You can buy a short-
wave receiver for as little as $25 (RCA), or a
shortwave transistor portable for as much as
$275 (Zenith). Shortwave listening corn-
bines the features of travel without motion,
rubber-necking without fear of detection.
But perhaps its greatest dividend is the
power it gives you to ransack the world's
most elaborate and expensive storehouse of
ideas?elaborate because virtually every cul-
Vine known to man is ceaselessly airing its
views there days; expensive because sending
shortwave--as opposed to receiving?costs
a very pretty penny.
The United States, for instance?one of
the smaller spenders?has appropriated
$22.3 million this year to operate the Voice
of America 84 hours a day in all languages.
The Soviet Union and its satellites are on
the airwaves 387 hours a day in all lan-
guages, at an estimated annual cost of $170
million. European, Latin American, African
and Asian Governments have lower time
and money budgets, but all consider short-
wave broadcasts vitally important to their
information, propaganda and communica-
tions programs.
So within the span of a single-evening's
the folloWTh , your-SiTtintotrfor.V111
Asff ,prOgrafh-
ing: German language lessons; a Bible les-
son from the Andes; a biography of Nikita
Khrushchev from Moscow; a discussion of
country houses from London; yodeling from
Switzerland; a talk on astrology from Ma-
drid, and a police call from your own neigh-
borhood.
The most important listening usually
comes after dark, when the air is suddenly
shot through with verbal fireworks. The
not-so-cold war warms up perceptibly as
ords and ideas rather than bullets and
?ornbs fly crazily in the great artillery duel
between East and West. With your dials
twirling, you hear the most dramatic strug-
gle in history for the minds of men.
Although there are no nerve-rasping corn-
mercials an international shortwave, there
Is hardly a broadcast without a hard or
soft sell behind it?sometimes shyly peeping
out from under a thin veil of kultur. At
other times, the propaganda is so obvious
that it will send your blood pressure soar-
ing.
particularly madden .
to 24 frequencies simultaneously, Radio
Moscow can perform breathtaking acrobatics
in its policy postures. Take, for instance,
the case of RICHARD MXON.
Until his visit last year to the Soviet Un-
ion, where he officially opened the U.S. ex-
hibition, the Vice President was among the
top 10 on Moscow's hate parade, second only
to J. Edgar Hoover in the number of times
he was de:nounced for his views on Soviet
expansionist aims and communism in gen-
eral. But when it served the Kremlin's pur-
pose, NIXON'S name was dropped from anti-
American broadcasts, and his statements
paying tribute to Russian industrial prog-
ress and the people's desire for peace were
freely quoted. For the time being, Nixon
was no lo:nger included among the ruling
circles bent on atomic war. The erstwhile
"missile rattler" was now "well informed,"
"a believer in coexistence."
But once he had returned home, NnioN:
again?on Russian radio?resumed his role
as provocateur, supporter of the policy of
encirclement, and a member in good stand-
ing Of the ruling circles driving America
toward the, brink. Moscow Radio was back
in form.
While others
thammaiiiiGhw
tRigliminscow.
for ins jO
:
May 1'9
the United States last September. Amer-
ican shortwave listeners were told of the
Soviet Union's peaceful intentions, but every
broadcast included a clear threat that the
Kremlin was ready to fight to have its way,
and had the means to do so.
And what did the programs beamed to
Russia say? (This is an advantage of short-
wave listening?not even the Kremlin can
prevent eavesdropping.)
"America is a rich, capitalist country,"
said a Captain Vasiliyev over Radio Volga
early in September in a program intended
for Russians. "But it is a paradise only for
a small number of imperialist magnates.
The billionaires use the money they make
from sucking the blood of the workers for
golden bathtubs, swimming pools filled with
champagne, and carousing."
Such statements were somewhat different
frcim those Premier Khrushchev was deliver-
ing in New York, Washington, Los Angeles,
San Francisco, and Detroit.
What are the short-wave broadcasts- -most
of them government-sponsored?trying to
sell us that we don't already have? The Rus-
sians, the Red Chinese, the Czechs, the Ru-
manians are all, of course, trying to sell us
communism. But what about the naughty
songs coming to us over the airwaves from
Paris; the opera from Rome; the symphonies
from West Germany; the folk songs from
Mexico; the travel talks from Montreal?
Chiefly, they are designed to acquaint lis-
teners with the broadcasting country; per-
haps entice us ,to go there one day and
spend a vacation?and some dollars.
With all this mass persuasion going on,
language is no clue to the identity of the
country whose broadcast you're hearing. A
Russian-language newscast is usually the
Voice of America trying to catch some ears
in the Soviet Union. Polish-language broad-
casts come from London, Greek-language
broadcasts from Warsaw, discussions in
Turkish from Bucharest in Rumania.
Radio National de Espafia in Madrid broad-
casts in Chinese; Radio Luxembourg in
Hungarian. Radiotelevision Italiana trans-
mita in 24 European languages, plus Hindi,
Urdu, Bengali, and Esperanto. The Vatican
City Radio?perhaps most logically of all?
programs in Latin. Radio Cairo broadcasts
in Hebrew to Israel, although the Egyptian
Government, which owns the station, doesn't
are officially recognize Israel's existence.
onsvp,??, But you can't twirl the dial without
bumping into a program that is perfectly
understandable to you, because nearly every
country in the shortwave business broad-
casts part of the time in English.
se
heard about it secondhand,
V toured
.""*.ss,,ssiosswaisasoso,simas,:ssusdititsweSsigskteeler4alet
So, if the corny comedy and the contrived
drama of domestic television begins to pall,
if you become weary of giant, economy-size,
commercial commercials?get a shortwave
radio set. You'll find uncontrived drama,
unconscious comedy, and a wide, wide world
ready to entertain you, confound you, or
invite you to visit lovely Tanganyika and r
exotic Singapore.
A GARDEN
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, why do people put a geranium,
or a lily, in the window instead of a book,
or a p tograph, or an article of cloth-
ing? do people plant morning
glories an c bushes and rose bushes
In their meat yards? Why do men
who have ach d a degree of inde-
pendence and a c etence buy a place
in the country? is there about the
country which draw e majority of
mankind like a magnet, n if all their
ys have been spent in roar and
t and smoke of a great c
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MAY 7 97960
1960 CONGRSc?rAL RECORD ? APPENDIX
Nobody can be sure in any industry that
a competitive fight will be won. But you
can be pretty certain that no industry will
win the fight for world markets hiding be-
hind a domestic barricade.
emorandum Decision?Khrushchev
Versus Powers
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HilkLiklausomf-famita.
OF WASHINGTON
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 18, 1960
Mr. PELLY. Mr. Speaker, last night
as I watched television and listened to
the irresponsible and unstable ravings of
the egomaniac, Khrushchev, during his
unbelievable press conference in Paris, I
was carried back 20 years into the past
to the height of Adolph Hitler's bid for
world domination. Only the physical
appearance of the two speakers was
different.
I witnessed the same hysterical and
vitriolic name calling and saber rattling
and I said to myself, Here again the
peace of the world and the very future
of mankind is at the mercy of a phycho-
pathic dictator.
144epeatecl references to the
flight as a spy mission and his an-
nounced intention of trying its coura-
geous pilot, likwitring4,Rwer?-,KIA_sPy
prompts me to iiitrude-with my remarks
the following ledik944kignisigLIAMPAAILUY
Judge Raymond Royal of the Swerior
Colfittate orWaShIngton.
-Judge 'Royal is one of the most highly
regarded jurists in my State and is an
authority on international law. He tells
me that this memorandum decision is
a joint effort of the entire class of inter-
national law which he teaches at the
Naval Reserve Officers School at Sand
Point Naval Air Station in Seattle,
Wash.:
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF WORLD OPINION
FOR KING COUNTY--KH USIICHEV V. PO'-
ERS-144.1=141,410 bk y
13,
RdirflOy-al, judge:
"The headline writers and the columnists,
together with the man on the street, seem
to assume without equivocation or question
that we were caught redhanded in acts
which make us guilty of the crime of spying.
The small voices of the wife and the father
of the pilot who flew the plane cry out that
'our husband and son is not guilty of being
a spy.' Has no one thought to look up the
law and to see what is the law with regard
to snying?
"As a lawyer and judge trained and ex-
perienced in the common law approach, and
also as a student and teacher of interna-
tional law, I have researched this question.
My ultimate conclusions follow in a form
typical of a trial judge's informal memo-
randum decision."
It is contended by the Russian Com-
munists that the free independent and
sovereign people of the United States have
committed the offense of spying and have
also broken international law because one
of its citizens flew in the stratosphere above
the surface of the sovereign nation without
the consent of its government. Let us take
a look at what the law of nations says about
espionage and about the law of territory.
There is no simple clear-cut document
codifying international law such as one
would find with reference to the ordinances
of a city or ? the statutes of a State. Inter-
national law arises out of custom and usage
over a long period of time or by mutual
agreement and consent, and has been defined
In various ways by the legal scholars
throughout the ages. Among the definitions
which have been generally and widely ac-
cepted iy the persons dealing with interna-
tional law is that of Sir Henry Maine:
"The law of nations is a complex system,
composed of various ingredients. It con-
sists of general principles of right and jus-
tice, equally suited to the conduct of in-
dividuals in a state of natural equity, and
to the relations and conduct of nations; of
a collection of usages, customs and opinions,
the growth of civilization and commerce;
and a code of positive law" (International
Law, 1883, p. 33).
Another is Black's definition of the term,
as follows:
"International law. The law which regu-
lates the intercourse of nations; the law of
nations. The customary law which deter-
mines the rights and regulates the inter-
course of independent states in peace and
war.
"The system of rules and principles,
founded on treaty, custom, precedent, and
the consensus of opinion as to justice and
moral obligation, which civilized nations
recognize as binding upon them in their mu-
tual dealings and relations."'
As a corollary to the definition itself,
Commander Brittin, in his book "Inter-
national Law for Seagoing Officers," at page
48, makes this statement with regard to the
process of international law:
"As is so often the case in the develop-
ment of international law, the insistence of
so many nations upon a Similar right and
their vigorous Measures to enforce the
claimed right evolve into a rule of customary
international law."
There are many authorities who have
commented upon the rule of law among the
nations with regard to spying. There has
been a general agreement and concurrence
among the family of nations and the schol-
ars in this field that The Hague regulations
of 1899 expresses the customary law in this
regard. The essence of article 29 which deals
with this subject is that spying consists in
acting "clandestinely or on false pretenses",
having the objective of obtaining informa-
tion in the zone of operations of a belliger-
ent, and of communicating it to the enemy.
It is a further part of this customary law
that soldiers not in disguise, properly known
as "scouts", might penetrate the enemy lines
to obtain information without being con-
sidered spies. Dispatch bearers, whether
soldiers or civilians, have not been consid-
ered spies if they carried out their missions
openly. The occupants of balloons who
might find themselves over enemy territory
for the purpose of delivering dispatches or
maintaining communications came within
the same class.
Where is the cloak and dagger? The clear
undisputed facts are outside the definition
of a spy. It is clear that the wife and father
Of this American pilot are correct when they
contend that Pilot Powers has not engaged
in the crime of being a spy.
The evaluation of whether or not we have
offended the territorial rights of a nation
is more complex. We cannot dismiss this lat-
ter charge by simply citing the definition.
The rule of law regarding the extraterri-
torial rights of nations is far more complex
and currently in a state of flux. There Is
no clear-cut agreement among the experts
as to where it is or where it is finally going
to develop.
A4315'\.
There had been a general concurrence
among the nations that the air space above
a nation's territory is subject to the exclusive
sovereignty of that nation. This general
and uniform insistence upon such a right by
the various nations, of course, was in light
of the facts with regard to the use of the
air in existence at the tme of the general
concurrence. It also took into account the
hard, cold, practical fact of international
life that the nation over which the airspace
lies had an effective method of controlling
those who might desire to use that airspace.
The antiaircraft defenses generally had been
able to give some substantial enforcement in
that the range of aircraft did not exceed the
range of antiaircraft defense. Undoubtedly
this contributed to fixing of the rule just as
the 3-mile rule of territorial extension into
the high seas grew out of the range of a
cannon ball. Prior to the 3-mile rule evolv-
ing, many nations asserted sovereign rights
offshore without limit. Due to lack of agree-
ment or uniform acquiescence by custom
and usage, these claims ultimately failed.
However, in the past few years the space
above a nation's territory has been invaded
by manmade objects at a far greater alti-
tude than can be controlled by the nations
whose territory is under the particular air-
space. We know today that there is a con-
currence among the nations of the world
that nations have the right to put satellites
into space. Various nations have done so,
thereby asserting their rights in that regard.
There has been no voice raised against the
assertion of this right. While this use of
outer space cannot be said to be a custom of
long standing, it nevertheless has all the ear-
marks of a custom except antiquity.
The law with regard to extension of ter-
ritorial sovereign rights into airspace must
be limited to the actual use and ability to
control which existed at the time the custo-
mary rule evolved. This generally follows
the practice emnloyed in the development of
the extension of territorial rights which in-
fringe upon the freedom of the seas. The
nations of the world for a number of years
have been whittling away at the long-
established customary 3-mile rule to the
point now where the rule is regarded as un-
certain. But this does not mean that none
of the seas are free and open. Similarly at
some height above a nation's territory, the
exclusive territorial sovereign right over
space ends. The fact that the nations have
not agreed as to where it ends does not mean
that the rule of law is that the nations be-
low have the right to airspace ad infinitum.
Nor do they have it above that which they
can control and is currently used by all na-
tions.
Even though there exists no concurrence
as to the boundary between free airspace
and territorial airspace, there in fact is a
portion which is free and open to all. It is
clear that the altitude at which this ..Amer-
!can plane was flying was above that which
was current practice when custom and usage
established the present rule of the sov-
ereignty of airspace. It is also clear that the
altitude at which this. plane was flying was
above the practical ability of every nation to
effect significant control. Therefore, be-
cause of the vacuum of positive law pro-
hibiting the flying at this altitude, the free-
dom of the airspace applies to the altitude
at which this plane was being flown before it
was either forced to seek a lower level by
reason of either being shot down or suffer-
ing mechanical difficulty. The United
States and the pilot of this plane were no
more violating a rule of international law
than do the Russian submarines when they
lie outside of the 3-mile limit of the coast
of continental United States and engage in
peacetime reconnaissance and scouting. We
had the right to use the freedom of the air-
space above that which was fixed by positive
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/4316
custom and usage in international law just
as we have the right to exercise freedom of
the seas. The general concurrence about the
use and projection of satellites clearly indi-
cates that there is a limit to this doctrine of
absolute sovereignty of the space above the
territory. Where that limit lies we do not
know, but we can safely say that it is some-
where lower than the elevation at which this
plane was flying. The legal ceiling to the
airspace subject to territorial control was
fixed by (1) the then current usage and (2)
ability to control the occupancy of airspace.
There is another area in which the rules
of international law relative to airspace
rapidly are being modified. Even within the
recognized territorial sovereignty control
upon airspace, virtually all of the major
nations of the world involved in air travel
have by treaty agreed to a limit. There ex-
ists by treaty among these major nations the
privilege of flying across territory of the
country without landing. There also is the
privilege of landing for nontraffic purposes.
The International Air Service Transit Agree-
ment arising out of the 1944 Chicago con-
ference so provides.
While this cannot be considered a rule of
law it does give evidence of a substantial and
growing dissatisfaction with the rule. It is
such dissatisfaction and resultant treaties
which give rise to new customary law and
define areas of uncertainties in the old.
In summary, it is clear that the flight of
the 11-2 single-engine jet piloted by Francis
Powers was not spying. The undisputed facts
cry out against bringing the case within the
definition of a spy as customarily fixed by
International law.
There was no illegal invasion of the cus-
tomary sovereign territorial rights because
the territorial airspace could only be estab-
lished by c,ustom and usage under interna-
tional law:
1. The scheduled operating altitude was
above the air customarily used.
2. The scheduled operating altitude was
beyond the ability of the sovereign territory
to effect any semblance of control.
3. The rule relating to exclusive sovereign
territorial rights of airspace related only to
the airspace to which a continued used could
establish a custom, and of necessity this
customary rule of law had to fix the exclu-
sive airspace at an altitude below that in-
tended to be maintained by this plane.
SSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX
This is indeed a dangerous period in
the history of our country and the world
and every precaution should be taken to
see that we are prepared for all eventual-
ities. No appeasement, please?ap-
peasement wherever and whenever prac-
ticed holds for the world only a catastro-
phic nightmare.
Under leave to extend my remarks, I
include an editorial from the New York
Daily News of May 19, 1960, which gives
a good summation of tke situation:
IF KIIRUSHCHEV WANT IT THAT WAY
For reasons best known o himself, N. S.
Khrushchev this week re wed the East-
West cold war by torpedoin the Paris sum-
mit conference which had be set up chiefly
because Khrushchev had insi ed on it.
Speculation as to why he ecked the
parley is interesting but not ? erly useful,
it seems to us.
What matters in this ugly situa on is that
the cold war is on again at full last, and
that Khrushchev wants It that ay.
Since that is the Red czar's h, the
Western Allies can choose one of two urses.
They can knuckle under to this ant,
beg him for another summit, han him
some more concessions, and thereby ush
communism a long way toward the id
conquest which the Communists never h ve
ceased to intend.
Or the West can stand up to Khrushch
as it did at Paris this week, go on calling h
bluffs, and defy him to do his worst. Sue
a position, of course, calls for intensified
Western preparation to fight in case Khru-
shchev, by accident or design, triggers a war.
Judging from the disgust and indignation
Khrushchev's wrecking of the summit has
kicked up all over the free world, the West?
except perhaps for a few weak-kneed neutral
nations--will accept Khrushchev's challenge
and take up the cold war with renewed vigor
and determination.
Khrushchev's obvious effort to divide
Americans has flopped on its face, at least
for the time being. Yesterday four leading
Democrats cabled to President Eisenhower
in Paris a message for the Red Czar, snubbing
his demand that the summit conference be
pc? tponed until after our 1960 Presidential
ction.
The four were Adlal Stevenson, Senators
Lyndon B. Johnson, of Texas, and J. Wil-
liam Fulbright, of Arkansas, and House
Speaker Sam Rayburn, of Texas.
PATRIOTIC CABLEGRAM
These gentlemen thus made it clear that
U.S. political differences, as always, stop at
our shorelines whenever we are threatened
by outsiders. We think they deserve na-
tionwide applause for a patriotic and realistic
gesture.
As for various smaller-minded Democrats
who hope to make political capital by a
Congressional investigation of the spy-plane
incident, we think Vice President RICHARD M.
NIXON answered them adequately at a news
conference yesterday in Syracuse, N.Y.
Go ahead and investigate, NIXON told these
politicos in effect?if they think Eisenhower
should have yielded to Khrushchev's insult-
ing demand for an apology for the spy-
plane affair, and if they think the admin-
istration should have left a gap in our in-
telligence operations. We'll be interested in
hearing what these would-be investigators
have to answer to that NIXON challenge.
Now that the cold war is on again, let's
make our next move at Geneva by pulling
out of the long palaver with the Russians
about stopping nuclear weapon tests.
Khrushchev is 'willing to keep this con-
ference going?arid for an obvious reason.
He hopes to stop our nuclear weapon de-
velopment while his goes right on, and
ICKhrushchev Wants It That Way
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ALBERT H. BOSCH
OF NEW YORK
IN ? HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, May 17, 1960
Mr. B SCH. Mr. Speaker, the spec-
tacle in is this migek put on by Nikita
Khrushch has "appalled all self-
respecting ericans. I think that any-
one who had ? rffidence in the good faith
of this man as now seen his true
colors?people o good faith cannot deal
with him.
The United Stat ust be ever vigilant
so that another P rl Harbor cannot
happen. We must re ember that at the
very moment of Pear arbor negotia-
tions were allegedly ng on in this
country supposedly to ? out the dif-
ferences between Japan and the United
States?negotiations are no assurance
against aggression.
May 19
eventually to trick the West into scrapping
all its nuclear arms under an agreement
containing no safeguards against Red cheat-
ing.
We've been suckered at Geneva these 18
months. That's 18 months too long. Now
that Khrushchev has renewed the cold war,
we should call off this particular sucker
operation of his as fast as we can get our
Geneva representatives back home. What
with jet planes cruising at just under 600
miles per hour, that can be a fast pull-out
indeed.
Central American Economic Integration
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
Or
HON. CHESTER E. MERROW
OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 18, 1960
Mr. MERROW. Mr. Speaker, as a
member of the Subcommittee on Inter-
American Affairs of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee and as one who feels
that Central American peace and secu-
rity is a crucial link in the chain of an
effective inter-American system, I have
for some time followed developments in
that area with great interest.
The movement toward Central Amer-
can economic integration, which is tak-
ng place under the leadership of Gua-
mala's courageous and forward-looking
esident, Gen. Miguel Ydigora,s Fuen-
, is most encouraging and worthy of
o support. The recent consolidation
of ti-Communist forces in that coun-
try as strengthened free forces not only
in s atemala but in the other Central
Arne an countries as well at a critical
time Latin American history.
Ano er great and enlightened Latin
Americ leader is Dr. Ramon Villeda
Morales President of Honduras. Dr.
Villeda p viously served as his country's
Ambassad to the United States, dur-
ing which signment he gained many
friends in t United States. As Presi-
dent of Hon as, he is working hard
for his people. Much progress has been
made, but muc emains to be done.
The progress d problems of Hon-
duras are describ in the following ar-
ticle by Virginia well entitled "Hon-
duras New Regim rogresses," which
appeared in the Ap 11, 1960, issue of
the Washington Dail News:
A young democracy no getting underway
in Honduras is a hemisph c bright spot.
In a little over 2 years, a rd-working con-
stitutional regime there h cleared away a
great deal of the underbrus that has hin-
dered national growth for g erations, and
has taken concrete steps aid Central
American economic union.
Honduras is a mountainous aauritry that
lives by exporting tropical prolcts grown
on narrow coastal plains.
The size of Pennsylvania, it has.about 127
million inhabitants, mostly of mixed Span-
ish and Indian descent. In the decade 1947-
57, Honduras made the stormy passage from
dictatorship to constitutional government.
President Ramon Villeda Morales, the Hon-
duran physician who took office in late 1957
with moderate liberal backing, had to start
building from the constitution up.
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'MAY 2 3 1960
1960
CONySIONAL RECORD APPENDIX
ganization and ours are interested in a com as the basis for sober reflection for ev-
mon cause."
Jesse Clark, president, Brotherhood of
Railway Signalmen of America: "You may
be assured that we are in full sympathy
with the Eagles in your actions regarding
the practice of many employers in invoking
job discriminations against men and women
over 40 years of age."
Ray Ross, president, Ohio CIO Council:
"We are very much interested and highly
elated that the Fraternal Order of Eagles
is turning its attention toward eliminating
job discrimination in the hiring of men and
women over 40."
T. C. Carroll, president, Brotherhood of
Maintenance of Way Employees: "You are
-to be complimented on this endeavor?an
all-out Eagle campaign to enact State and
Federal legislation barring discrimination
against men and women over 40 years of
age. We will be glad to cooperate in any
way we can to make the campaign a success."
Mitchell Sviricioff, president, Connecticut
State Labor Council: "It is most gratifying
to learn of the Eagle concern with the prob-
lem of discrimination in hiring against men
and women over 40. Our State organization
will cooperate with your local chapters with
respect to this program."
Ed S. Miller, president, Hotel and Restau-
rant Employees and Bartenders International
Union: "I am familiar with the long history
of support on the part of the Eagles for
social security. The order Is certainly to be
congratulated for its present campaign on
behalf of workers over 40."
Statement of the Honorable James F.
Byrnes on Summit Conference
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. STROM THURMOND
OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Monday, May 23, 1960
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on
one?Orilirinost outstanding
6outn Carolinians of all times, the Hon-
orable Jaw?p&Z?..4,1"kgsr, delivered an
address Wore the annual South Caro-
lina Medical Association Convention at
Myrtle Beach, S.C. Governor Byrnes'
record of exemplary public service is
proudly remembered, not only by South
Carolinians, but by Americans every-
where. His dedicated service to our Na-
tion includes top positions in all three
branches of our Federal Government
and to his beloved State.
With his background in every branch
of our National Government and in the
position as chief executive of his beloved
State of South Carolina, the observations
of Governor Byrnes command the atten-
tion of all Americans. In his role as
Secretary of State, James Byrnes' con-
tributions to the cause of peace will al-
ways be remembered by grateful Amer-
icans. He has had great opportunity to
observe the sincerity of the Russians as
to their alleged desire to effectuate a
genuine and lasting peace. He is, there-
fore, well qualified to speak on the sub-
ject which he chose as the text of his
speech to the convention to which I have
previously referred. His comments on
t reeent disastrous summit conference
should beirea-Oralicrefititt serv-e
eryone who desires a lasting peace with
honor and dignity.
I ask unanimous consent that this
speech be printed in the Appendix of the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the speech
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the State, May 20, 1960]
TEXT OF BYRNES SPEECH BEFORE MEDICAL
?irgrginivro toylor 11
(Following is the text of an addre s which
Gov. James F. Byrnes, formerly Secretary of
State, Supreme Court Justice, and Assistant
President during World War II delivered be-
fore the South Carolina Medical Association
convention at Myrtle Beach Thursday night.)
Nikita Khrushchev sabotaKed the summit
nrcerii -d-oTirr
a ar o millions of people who are more
interested ha having war tensions lessened
than any other question.
For 5 years Khrushchev expressed the de-
sire for a summit meeting. The President
doubled his sincerity and showed little in-
terest. About 2 years ago the British Prime
Minister, Mr. Macmillan, became an en-
thusiastic advocate of a meeting at the sum-
mit to lessen tensions, and other European
allies expressed the hope we would agree.
Because we have bases within the territory
of our European allies and they are on the
firing line, we finally agreed to go along with
them.
My personal opinion was that even though
we had little hope that any good would be
accomplished, we should confer. We could
not refuse even to talk with the Soviets
and it would do no harm provided we
stood firm and realized that they would not
keep their promises and provided we main-
tained and increased our military defenses.
Khrushchev after his visit to this coun-
try stopped jamming our radio broadcasts
to Russia in the Russian language, and gave
other evidence of a conciliatory attitude to-
ward the Western powers. But a few months
ago there was a change of attitude. Khru-
shchev for the first time in many months
repeated his threat that if the Western Pow-
ers adhered to their position of not with-
drawing from West Berlin, the Soviets would
make a separate treaty with East Germany
and would insist upon the withdrawal of our
troops.
He threatened that if we failed to with-
draw, war would follow. We cannot be sure
of what caused this change of attitude. We
do know in a general way, that Red China
was bringing pressure upon Khrushchev
fearing he had become too friendly with
the West. There was evidence of unrest
among his people and also evidence of some
dissension in the Soviet high command. The
recent removal of several men holding im-
portant positions in the Government, gave
proof of this.
Then Khrushchev learned that recently
there had been complete agreement among
the United States, Great Britain, France, and
West Germany, that there would be no modi-
fication of our position as to West Berlin.
In view of his continued threats, this una-
nimity of the West as to Berlin posed a seri-
ous problem for him. He did not know how
to retreat gracefully, and was not prepared
for the consequences of carrying out his
threat. He saw little evidence of accom-
plishing anything at the summit and feared
that if the President made his promised visit
to Russia and in his sincere and earnest
manner assured the Russian people that we
want only to live in peace, they might be
convinced and that might cause trouble for
Mr. Khrushchev.
11.'pitu ? cjy_fpx.1.1g,_tke r9wers Incident
oc-6.?irred-Tust at this time, and rtjaire"thltr=
A4329
shchev n se to sabotage the summit
meeting. aving thousands oegigro
world, was cainly not the
reason for his aTtkin. It was only his excuse.
If Mr. Khrushchev did not intend to con-
fer with the Western leaders unless the
United States apologized for the Powers mis-
sion, why did he go to Paris?
He was the first to arrive in Paris. He
asked to call on President deGaulle and
Prime Minister Macmillan. He deliberately
refrained from asking to see President Eisen-
hower.
For propaganda purposes, he wished in
a formal meeting to demand a formal apology
from the United States. He knew full well?
or he should have known?he would receive
no apology, but decided it would give him
an excuse to blast the meeting. If, to his
surprise, the President should have apolo-
gized, then Khrushchev would have made
no agreement as to West Berlin or disarma-
ment, but would return to Moscow with the
prestige of having humiliated the United
States.
In his mind and heart there is no gratitude
for the $11 billion loaned them during the
last war and they have not repaid. There is
only the hatred born of the knowledge that
our economic and military strength prevents
them from dominating the world.
Because the worl of ?.Ze.,r?y-
ice necessarirrh-Faria ee inad---Ciiiibfic, it
fs''TirtersTaldaVg were dnaw?
of our spying, and it accounts for some of
the criticisms of our Government. How-
ever,v- )L_Lkeeam.1,1sect tlie_c_aticisrp
toe or o "es.ntir-dff know for what
purpose he was appropriating vast sums of
money for intelligence he could have learned
by makin: in uir of 7n?crarrinaii?Or tile
Ap o.rat.n. m.i s.
_
few days after Khrushchev announced
the capture of Powers, when some petty
partisans criticized the President for per-
mitting a plane to fly over Soviet territory
without the knowledge or authority of Con-
gress, congsessmary 11,43.nicgai .091,jagg.0.7 a
Democrat-,'End chairman of the Ho-use--- Ap-
propriations Committee, told the House that
Allen Dulles, direc...r tuv g_eatrig nitoii-
delitrA!ency, haeptillazzozez,,,tompri-
a 0-0114,,te ?tilliiitttaci of the spy pro-
gram. e sairthalliferttin met with the
approval of both Democrats and Republi-
cans on the committee, who a imes h
plolyleiLkadies to make
to- sec.'n .ritta on nit a
tions in the Soviet Republic. He said they
knew of the reconnaisance missions of the
IT-2 planes over Soviet territory and felt the
information obtained would be effective in
deterring the Soviets from making a sur-
prise attack against the United States or
its allies in Europe. The House gave him
a hearty ovation. His statement was
candid and courageous, but CLARENCE CAN-
NON always places the welfare of his country
above political partisanship.
Unfortunately, all politicians are not like
Congressman CANNON. Some think only of
the coming election. They say we must do
some spying and the reconnaisance program
is justified by the secrecy of the Soviets, but
the timing was bad.
The only thing wrong about the Powers
mission was that Powers was caught. Fo
4 years we have sent similar planes ove
Soviet territory. If 'Powers had not been.
caught, there would now be no criticism of-
the timing. It was just our misfortune that
he should have been caught. That was bad
timing.
We have had only limited experience in
spying, but during World War II we came to
realize the extent to which governments
engaged in spying and we resorted to it our-
selves.
Donovan7476---iiiia inchW="1.ce-of
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX May 2,
Strategic Sefselwe to a re.xecmik
VirSaliallIfekk: chiefThf
police of Shi1. It was an amazing
show. It was referred to as the "Cloak and
Dagger" service. Men volunteered for the
work, not for -the compensation, but for love
of country, and sometimes for love of adven-
ture.
Later when President Roosevelt advised
me of our eitorti?frZe-Wfi3P1ie atomic
bomb, he told me that Germany was engaged
in a similar effort and isys_lWall-
ence service we Were ens7Ta
ugon"the'aernian project al=aliTtor-
m ?ess. They had?
started first. The race was close, and our
fear was that if Germany won the race, we
would lose the war.
Now it is difficult to recall conditions
existing at the close of the war. Most of
us thought the peoples of the world would be
so weary of war that no government would
take steps calculated to bring about an-
other world conflict and we could look for-
ward to a half century of peace.
Three months after the surrender of Japan
we joined Great Britain and Canada in an-
nouncing to the world that we would volun-
tarily surrender the military advantage of
our exclusive possession of the "know-how"
to produce atomic weapons. We agreed to
ask that the United Nations establish an
International Commission having the power
to see that the atomic bombs in existence
were destroyed; that all nations renounced
the right to produce bombs and that atomic
energy should be used solely for peaceful
purposes under the supervision of the Inter-
national Commission.
At the meeting of the Foreign Ministers
In Moscow, in December 1945, I introduced a
resolution asking for the appointment of
such a Commission and providing that the
use of atomic energy should be subject to
inspection by the International Commis-
sion, with safeguards to guarantee there
would be no violation by any government.
The Sovi&s agreed to this resolution. The
Commission was appointed but when it met
a few months later, the Soviet objected to
the provision for international inspection.
.Breamea jjekernber 1949 whea_illea_had
agreed to the resolialter -ea t& meeting of
the Commission in_ early 194q, Soviet ambi-
tions had changed. ?77hange probably
was due to informationsalned t117.ii their
spies in. thgrriVMSTe'tes a.-i7FaT1SiTarn,
siMEnrolITaliseilrihMlo firdruce -atomic
bombs. They decided international inspec-
tion would interfere with their policy of
secrecy.
Early in 1946 several Soviet spies' were ar-
res. "TromIliallifrie
country and in Britain, there have been
thousands of Soviet spies. We do not forget
Judith Cp?nlos, who was tried for spying,
nor Klaus Fuchs, who was sentenced to
prison for .6757 atomic secrets to Russia,
and is now in East Germany, after being re-
leased from prison. Later Harry Ueld was
arrested as a Soviet spy. In June 1950 David
Greenalass confessed to giving certain mili-
tary secrets to Russia. porrtssorees secured
atomic secrets from the British and then
disappeared behind the Iron Curtain. So did
Burgess and Maclean. The Soviet spies,
Julius and Ethel taseilikerg, were sentenced
to death for spying in the United States.
Several employees of the Soviet Embassy in
Washington who were found to be spies, were
forced to leave this country. Another Soviet
spy, Col. Rudolph_Abewas sentenced to 30
years for espionagrThnly a few weeks ago
that sentence was upheld by the U.S. Su-
preme Court.
All Soviet spying was not done in the long
ago. t a few weeks ago aSoviet trawler
was off the bOasriSrli
CeoneCtiait-earfreon
the experimental tests of a new submarine.
And on the very day Khrushchev was criti-
cizing the 'United States about the Powers
case, two Russian officials were expelled from
Switzerland for ,.spying on. Swiss
activities andirelr"tter-
snal*
SOVIET TI-IREATS
Stalin first, and later Krushchev, have
continuously threatened to make war upon
the United States, while erecting an iron
curtain around the Soviet Republic and her
satellites. They have made progress in the
development of new weapons of war and have
succeeded in keeping secret, detailed knowl-
edge of those weapons. With their secret
weapons and bellicose threats, they menace
the peace of the world.
In spying, the Soviets have an advantage.
They do not have to spend much time or
money spying on the United States. Ti eir
en xligig,gon?s.an learn from o cia
aps the location of our military installa-
tions and from the daily press can read even
the confidential statements made to congres-
sional committees.
Because of Soviet secrecy, President Eisen-
hower at Geneva in 1055, pleaded for what
was called an "open Ins" agreement. He
offered to grant Teaftission for Russian
planes to fly over the United States, taking
pictures wherever they wished, if the Soviets
would grant the same privilege to the United
States. The Soviets refused and have con-
tinued to refuse. In the light of this his-
tory, what is the duty of our Government
to its people? Should we sit idly by and
await a surprise attack that would destroy
our lives and our freedom?
We can never forget Deco,'. 41,
when this Japanese by a i ? . ack de-
stroyed our fleet at Pearl ? ? .r an. used
the death of hundreds of American boys.
Thereafter we succeeded in breaking the
Japanese code and by intercepting naval
messages, were able to destroy most of the
Japanese fleet. It was retaliation for that
surprise attack.
Nor can we forget the !prjae attack,in
Koran ireeted by the Soltts, which caused
e death of thousands of Americans. We
know that if the Soviets ever carry out their
threats to make war on us, they will do it
by surprise.
There was a time when by ordinary espr-
onage, a government could learn of the mo-
bilization of an army in the territory of a
government threatening war. But in this
day of atomic weapons, missiles and rockets,
the situation is different. A missile fired
from Soviet territory, in less than 30 min-
utes, can hit a target in the United States
and utterly destroy that target and the in-
habitants of the area. The only thing that
deters the Soviets is the fear of immediate
and massive retaliation.
To retaliate successfully, we not only must
have bases in Europe, but we must know the
location of Soviet military installations. We
cannot wait until a missile has devastated
a great area and then make a reconnais-
sance to locate military installations. That
would be too late. Because tlls9uJ.in-
tern e ce_essWat for Jwyears as een send-
g unarmed pTanes over 46oviet territory,
solely for the purpose of securing informa-
tion.
Regardless of the information we secure,
the Soviets are in no danger of attack from
us. But Khrushchev now howls with rage
because he learns that in his Iron Curtain
there is some glass, and 65,000 feet in the air
a pilot has taken pictures which he believes
has lessened the secrecy with which he has
surrounded the Soviet Republic.
a.r.11,21ici1ev makes...act also y for sending
to1ii taed-e-oun s S viet Lpies.
But in Paris he dema e e Plesident
apologize and promise to punish those re-
sponsible for the Powers mission. That
would include the Republican President and
the Democratic congressional leaders, who
provided the money, knowing how it was to
be used.
President Eisenhower refused even to dis-
cuss the demand. I am proud of the manner
in which he represented our country, with
dignity and courage under trying circum-
stances. He was subjected to intolerable in-
sults by the bragging bully from Moscow.
A man of less stature might have lost his
temper and walked out of the-conference
room. The President preferred to suffer the
Insults rather than give excuse for the charge
that he had broken up the conference. Time
and again he agreed to return to the confer=
ence to discuss with Khrushchev the subjects
that had been agreed upon prior to the
meeting. He thus prevented Khrushchev
from shifting to the United States the re-
sponsibility for failure of the meeting.
He left unnoticed and unanswered Khru-
schchev's contemptible insult that he would
be willing to confer only when there was a
new President. Every loyal American resents
that insult. It was an inexcusable effort to
interfere in our election. It was stupid of
Khrushchev to think the American people
will elect as President any man approved by
him. His crude insults in Paris Wednesday
only serve to unite our people. He will
learn as did the Kaiser and Hitler, that while
we divide politically on domestic affairs, we
are truly united in foreign affairs.
Heartening indeed was the news report this
morning that several influential Democratic
leaders wired President Eisenhower assur-
ance of their support.
While that was comforting, / hope the
President and the Democratic congressional
leaders, in a practical way, can prove our
unity by diverting to our defense programs
some of the billions of dollars now earmarked
or recommended for controversial social pro-
grams. In this crisis we can postpone even
meritorious social reforms but we should not
postpone even for a day, any expenditure
that will contribute to the defense of our
lives and liberties.
The Times of Havana?A Brave News-
paper Cries Out
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. CHARLES 0. PORTER
OF OREGON
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, May 19, 1960
Mr. PORTER. Mr. Speaker, freedom
of the press is essential in a democracy,
as is the freedom to elect those we wish
to govern us and the freedom to worship
and speak as we please.
Today in Cuba the essential freedoms
of a democracy are being stifled. We who
are friends of the people of Cuba regret
these confiscations of democracy, be-
cause they leave only fear, confusion,
and oppression.
There is today in Havana a brave
newspaper publisher who twice weekly
prints his English-language tabloid, the
Times of Havana. Publisher Clarence
"Poppy" Moore is a friend of mine. His
courage in printing the truth gives hope
to those Cubans who see too well what
can happen when democracy gets side-
tracked.
An article describing Peppy Moore's
work appeared in the Wednesday, May
18, 1960, issue of the Washington Daily
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?????????.11111011?????
Saysilow Is the Time T.o, 2,
? Swelling Questions
4,
EXTENSION Or. REMARKS
HON. CHARLES' O. PORTER
or OttEt.=
IN THE HQUSE 1:* ItEPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, May 19, 1960
Mr. PORTER. Mr. Speaker, my able
friPnd, "mei= t, IVIarqlgs,political
sowek prollMrlit the `Univerpty_ of
Oxe.tron, Asserts that now is the time for
ostatitifi and that now is the time for
Congress to ask searching questions
about administration policy. A number
of us have just addressed such questions
to the President. We await his replies.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPE IX
Under a previous unanimous consent,
I am including the entire text of the
letter written to me by Professor Mar-
quis on May 13, 1960:
EUGENE., OREG., May 13, 1960.
Rspresentative CHARLES 0. PORTER,
House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR REPRESENTATIVE PORTER: r am writing
to you out of deep concern because of the
U-2 pl incident and because of the ad-
n s On's anouncement of the proposed
.resumption of underground nuclear testing.
As a teacher of political science I realize
that intelligence activities are one of the
hard facts of life. At the same time I won-
der whether we can afford the luxury of this
type of intel11gen75:-Teliar`arPowerarrif-sAC
tens- us Ifitrt nussians have the capacity
to strike at American targets and to destroy
them. What assurance do we have that the
Russians do not misread the incursion of a
single plane? Are the gs,ins,,of sucton in-
telligence inislioirgiv-orth the risk of nuclear
war?'---"`"
When some years ago a Soviet spy was ap-
prehended in Brooklyn, the Russian Govern-
ment could and did completely dissociate
itself from his activities. Aerial i tegence,
on the other hand, direct y an mmediate-
ly implicates the sponsoring government.
Eqtrally-distiffbrng is the question of re-
sponsibility. While the administration in
Washington acknowledges its general policy
decisions on this kind of flight, it was not
aware of the particular timing. The disturb-
ing implication is that immediate decisions
which could be of the most far-reaching
consequences, viz the unleashing of nuclear
war, are made at some lower echelon. Quite
apart from this irresponsible delegation of
power what might be the tactical conse-
quences? Were our SAC bases alerted to the
possibility of a Soviet reprisal to the 13-2 in-
cursion? Would President Eisenhower have
been available to make an urgent decision?
On the basis of the evidence (including the
unpreparedness of the administration to give
any decent explanation of the incident) we
were in no way prepared. This in the face of
the administration's argument that through
these flights we wish to avoid another Pearl
Harbor.
As to the ramifications of this incident?
the impact on world opinion prior to the
summit, the ace it places into the hands of
Soviet negotiators, the distrust is engenders
among allies w120,,Aave not.. beka SCinajaled
(witness Norway's protelt to our State De-
partment)?are these to be subordinated to
the possible VMS to intelligenet?'-'-.
'The- administration's justification of its
policy is couched in the most fanciful
doubletalk. It is saying to the Russians in
effect?If you weren't such bad boys, ring-
ing down your Iron Curtain, we wouldn't
have to fly over your territory. What would
be the administration's reaction after a
Soviat,P1a4e 1184 been shot down over Kansas
and the Russians will-ftrremsi?thst 'They
were compelled to such illegal flights because
we barred their diplomats from large parts
of the United States?
And finally, in a kind of postscript to this
sad affair, the administration announces the
resumption of underground nuclear testing
at a moment when some slight but hopeful
progress had been made at Geneva?the
Russians having agreed to holding joint
technical tests. What justification can be
given for this decision? May this not appear
to the rest of the world as a desperately
spiteful act?
It has been argued that this is no time
for criticism. But if we do not criticize
now, if theagA-mp. now ask
sear_ehang questans abotittration
policy then when else is the time? Are we
blindly to accept administration decision to
continue such flights? Are we entitled to
know who Makes Immediate policy deci-
sions which can have such far-reaching
consequences for us and for the world?
What justifications are there for the resump-
tion of nuelear testing? These are not
carping questions. Unless they are asked
now it may be too late. I should like re-
spectfully to urge you to further bring these
sentiments, which are not merely confined to
myself, to your colleagues in Congress and
to continue to exercise to your fullest power
your constitutional prerogative of checking
the executive branch.
Truly yours,
LTJCIAN C. MARQUIS.
Iowa Citizen Praises Birmingham
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. GEORGE HUDDLESTON, JR.
OF ALABAMA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, May 10, 1960
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. Speaker, re-
cently there appeared in one of Birming-
ham's two daily newspapers a letter to
the editor which was, in effect, a thank
you note to the citizens of our fine com-
munity and a refutation of a widely pub-
licized false impression of the city ema-
nating from a New York newspaper.
This letter was from a citizen of Water-
loo, Iowa, Mr. Edward J. Jacobson, who
in a time of crisis and in a strange city,
found in Birmingham and her people
what he calls a needed "warmth and
comfort."
In addition to his eloquent expres-
sion of commendation and appreciation
of the people of Birmingham, Mr. Jacob-
son, in his letter, praises the facilities
and personnel of an institution in which
we in Birmingham and Alabama take
great pride, the University Hospital &
Hillman Clinic of the University of Ala-
bama Medical Center.
I am pleased to insert a copy of Mr.
Jacobson's letter in the CONGRESSIONAL
REcortu, under leave heretofore granted,
and earnestly commend it to the atten-
tion of my colleagues:
VOICE OF TIIE PEOPLE?IOWA MAN TELLS
STORY OF BIRMINGHAM'S HELP
I read the article in the Birmingham
News which appeared in the New York
Times. If that reporter had come to Bir-
mingham under the circumstances Mrs.
Jacobson and I did, I am sure his version of
Birmingham and the very good people there
would be entirely different.
On Saturday, April 9, my wife, our daugh-
ter Jean and I were having our lunch when
we were interrupted by a phone call. It was
a long distance call from University Hos-
pital in your city to inform us that our
older daughter Joan was there and had
been involved in an auto accident. She was
thrown out of an overturning car and seri-
ously injured. She was en route to Florida
with friends for Easter vacation from Rock-
ford College at Rockford, Ill.
Several of your kind citizens who were
passers-by made it possible for her to be
assisted and brought to the hospital. The
doctor requested we come, and plane con-
nections being poor, we started driving. I
stayed behind the wheel for 20 hours while
my wife studied road maps and signs.
The cups or coffee and one piece of pie
our limit on food, only to reach Bir-
A4371
mingham, it place we had never been or
even had any idea of what It was like.
We arrived on Sunday, April 10, at 12:30,
at the edge of Birmingham, asking our way
around. Everyone went out of their way to
help us' find the hospital. We arrived there
at 1 p.m. to see our daughter. We had not
been there long when we could see she had
the care and love of the best doctors and
nurses available.
We were strangers in this big city but
yet we felt like this was a sort of home. We
knew our daughter would be well again.
Later, we rented an apartment and our
,,landlady was just like a mother to us. The
minister called on our daughter, and we
attended the church of our faith on Easter
Sunday. It was wonderful to be in church
a thousand miles from home and feel the
warmth and comfort that we so needed at
that time.
When our daughter was out of danger, we
went _shopping, only to be treated royally
again by the good people of Bfrmingharn.
We will never forget the fine meals we were
So graciously served in the various eating
establishments. The service stations and
garages, too, afforded us the same courte-
ous service.
Then the good word came that we could
start home, taking our daughter with us.
This meant a great deal to us knowing that
in 5 or 6 weeks she will be able to walk
again. As we stood on the 10th floor of the
hospital the night before we left, we were
somewhat saddened looking out at the
beautiful lights of the city. It is a second
home to us and there will always be a
warm place in our hearts for the good peo-
ple who made our life so wonderful while
In that big and beautiful city.
Can this be Birmingham? It sure can.
EDWARD J. JACOBSON.
WA , IOWA.
Being IntelikentAtairtteDiAnce
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. EE19.2.2911RJO
OF CONNECTICUT
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 2, 1960
Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Speaker, a good
many words have been spoken in recent
days about this Natilrice op-
el:41w glad thgr e,....siigLYLEErn_ireffec-
tIvenew, When pMETa?ecis ort.s
ineffe on the basis of secret intelligence
material, there is a conflict which can
be settled only by full and frank discus-
sion of these policy matters by the re-
sponsible political authorities without
disclosure of agencies, sources, or
methods. When political authorities
allow the impression to gain currency
that they are not in full command of
their decisions, or that their information
may have been faulty, they encourage
speculation and comment which is not in
the national interest.
In that connection, I would like to sub-
mit for the RECORD an editorial which
appeared in the and
which containsyi pAmder-
standing, of tha_inigence Cygle The
editorial states that one reason why in-
telligence activities of this Nation often
appear to be both inept and amateurish
Is that there has seldom been an ade-
quate appreciation of the importance of
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CO RESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX
intelligence on the part of responsible
Persons in the Government.
It seems to me that the recent events,
when coupled with incidents that have
occurred over more than a decade now,
Indicate a need for a continuing reyiew
ant-6.1=1:1=trEVICC-11405.,,,,_rialjiel-
ligewAPJAUXADerY. The article which is
cited in the editorial, and which I have
not included at this point, believes that
cazt,42.11Ljae? 4v4R,Avagi.,the res onsi-
bilites assigned its Diredor are'too
greailffJ746-tonvio. 51r6r6
art?iiilTThtMs W le eserv On-
gres v.tudy Ancl decision. e en-
t is i e field, deserves con-
tinuing congressional supervi I by a
committee organized
along the lines of the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy.
Zile editorial follows:
BEING INTELLieerp-Ittotrr INTELLIGENCE
Elsewherrarttirpage today appear some
penetrating comments on the organization
of the Central Intelli ence A ency, and per-
haps , whole ap-
proach to the subject of military intelli-
gence. The article, which shivered in the
London? vtac?retwith, was Wri/I by
D /laid ac lan-,-IiirneeTra'Briiish intelli-
gence ur ng World War II.
Although Mr. McLachlan's article is rea-
sonably comprehensive, it fails to mention
the principal reason why our intelligence
activitielfire often both 111'915rIlifffertina-
tete& Trier reason is there-is not
now nor has there ever been an adequate
appreciation of the importance of intelli-
gence on the part of responsible persons in
the government, whether in the armed
forces or in high elective positions. During
the entire period between World War I and
World War II, aside from such routine tasks
Irs-sstfriZinitmed by the attaches, military
intelligence received little attention from
anyone. And the intelligence commanders
of the various corps area commands, the
0-2 assistant chiefs of staff, were principally
public relations officers and nothing more.
Even today, in the Department of the Army,
all of the top General Staff officers but one
have the title of Deputy Chief of Staff and
the rank of lieutenant general. The one
officer who does not have this rank is the
director of intelligence, who is only an As-
sistant Chief of Staff, with the grade of
major general.
Perhaps Washington's failure really to
understand and appreciate the importance
of military intelligence is a reflection of the
attitude of the Amalgan_nsople who, gen-
erally, look with distaya_upon es ionage
of any,. lcind.-15TEr Ili this wor n ch
we live our national existence demands that
we make every effort to learn all we can of
what our potential enemies are up to.
Whether we like it or not, we must have
well-trained and efficient intelligence agen-
cies, and the sooner we realize that fact the
better It will be for all of us.
It might be pertinent here also to suggest
that all intelligence activities must of neces-
sity be conducted with the utmost secrecy,
and that all governmental agencies con-
cerned give consideration to what_ they are
to say or not to say should anything resem-
bling 14,e,...1/7-2 ingtilsot4e again. Here,
too, we can rnkaaj4 n ou.a.sjar1Lirsh.
After the U-2 inciden a leen- discussed
by Prime Minister .,1)4acrAillan and Selwyn
the Foreign Secretary', the British
Foreign Office spokesman was asked for
comment. : "It would appear to be
an intelligen e operation and it is not the
habit of the British Government to comment
on operations of that nature either of its
Chances for Milk Sanitation Legislation
Have Become Brighter
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. LESTER R. JOHNSON
OF WISCONSIN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 16, 1960
Mr. JOHNSON of Wisconsin. Mr.
Speaker, the Dairy Record, one of the
Nation's leading publications in the
dairy field, has commented editorially
on the ever-increasing support for my
national milk sanitation legislation.
Under leave to extend by remarks, I
would like to include this editorial from
the May 4, 1960, issue of this magazine
in the RECORD:
BEHIND THE NEWS
While the possibility of passage of the Na-
tional Milk Sanitation bill did not change
materially as a result of the House hearings
last week, its chances are brighter today
than they have ever been. The nominating
convention of the two parties will call for
an early adjournment of Congress which
makes it appear doubtful at this time that
the bill can be passed at this session. How-
ever, there is the remote possibility that it '
could be brought up for action on the floor
of both Houses before adjournment.
Last fall it appeared almost hopeless that
the measure would receive much attention at
this short session, but it is evident that pro-
ponents of the bill introduced by Repre-
sentative LESTER Jonwsox, of Wisconsin have
been extremely busy in gaining supports for
the legislation.
A major victory was won by backers of
the bill when Arthur S. Flemming, Secretary
of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, in a letter to Representative OREN
HARRIS, chairman, Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, reported favorably
on the bill and Assistant Surgeon General,
David E. Price of the HEW, at a commerce
subcommittee meeting of the House endorsed
the measure.
Secretary Flemming stated that the objec-
tions of the Department to previous sanita-
tion bills had been eliminated in the Johnson
measure and he pointed out that HEW has
consistently held that health regulations
should not be used as domestic trade barriers
to the interstate shipment of milk and milk
products of high sanitary quality.
He stated further that despite the vast
impravernent that has been made in the
sanitary quality of milk accruing from State
and local milk sanitation programs, there
still remain many areas where the sanitary
quality of milk and milk sanitation practices
do not meet presently accepted standards.
For this reason, he declared that the bill
would result in? added health protection for
a substantial segment of the Nation's pop-
ulation.
Appearing at last week's hearing, speaking
in favor of the bill, were representatives of
consumers groups, State health boards, agri-
cultural groups, Congressmen, Governors,
and State agriculture departments from the
Midwest, the East and the Southwest.
All presented strong arguments why the
bill should be passed and one of the
strongest offered was that in actuality the
measure is for the protection of the con-
sumer. It was pointed out that in many
areas when there is a period of shortage,
milk is purchased from outside sources and
It is in many cases of dubious quality.
Appearing in opposition to the Johnson
own or of its friends." bill were for the most part representatives of
/That should be our policy, too, producer groups, principally from the East,
May 23
South, and Southwest. Philip Alampl, New
Jersey Secretary of Agriculture, stated in his
brief that the milk markets in the Northeast
have very adequate milk sanitation regula-
tions and that health standards can best be
determined at the local or area level. He
declared that enactment of the bill would
tend to lower the quality of milk shipped
into receiving States and that lowering of
quality standards would be detrimental to
the promotion and expansion of market out-
lets for milk. He also argued that the pur-
pose of the bill is to permit the shipment
of milk for fluid use from States of surplus
production into distant markets but that
goal would not be accomplished because the
price differential between surplus States
such as Wisconsin and Minnesota and
northeastern importing States is not suffi-
cient to induce the movement of a perma-
nent supply of milk from the surplus pro-
ducing areas.
Also appearing in opposition to the
measure was Paul R. Jackson, executive
officer, Milk Inspection Association of the
Oranges and Maplewood, N.J., who repre-
sented the New Jersey Health Officer Asso-
ciation. He argued that the bill will give
authority to the Surgeon General to promul-
gate and amend the Federal Milk Sanitation
Code and that this would be an unwarranted
delegation of authority. He also declared
that the bill would abrogate the home rule
of local agencies.
Libraries, Education, and Society
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JOHN E. FOGARTY
OF RHODE ISLAND
IN tilt. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 23, 1960
Mr. FOGARTY. Mr. Speaker, under
leave to extend my remarks I include
an address which I delivered at the
Drexel Institute of Technology, Phila-
delphia, Pa., on May 17, 1960:
LIBRARIES, EDUCATION, AND SOCIETY
(Remarks made by Representative JOHN E.
FOGARTY at Drexel Institute of Technology
on May 17, 1960, on occasion of his re-
ceiving the Distinguished Achievement
Award from the Graduate School of Li-
brary Science and the Library Alumni
Association)
Today I saw for the first time the impres-
sive new quarters of the library school here
at Drexe1.1 I am sure they bring to you a
deep sense of pride and gratification?much
as your Distinguished Achievement Award,
and this opportunity to meet with you have
given me. It is a fine thing to feel that one's
efforts have played some part in strengthen-
ing the American heritage.
A library school?or legislation to aid li-
braries?can do just that: It can enrich
society and strengthen the Nation. It does
this mainly through the enduring contribu-
tion of libraries to education.
America's strength was once felt to lie
predominantly in her agricultural and geo-
graphic advantages. Since the turn of the
century, industry and natural resources have
been paramount. Both, of course, remain
essential to our country's strength and her
1 The Graduate School of Library Science
(third oldest in the United States and among
the first five in enrollment) and the Drexel
Library are housed together in the Library
Center, opened in the fall of 1959, and the
latest addition to the physical plant in the
current expansion program.
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7- 1960
Under a previous unanimous consent,
I am including the entire text of the
letter written to me by Professor Mar-
quis on May 13,1960:
EUGENE., OREG., May 13, 1960.
Representative CHARLES 0. PORTER,
House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR REPRESENTATIVE PORTER: I am writing
to you out of deep concern because of the
U.,2 plane incident and because of the ad-
ministratibrit anzhincement of the proposed
resumption of underground nuclear testing.
As a teacher of political science I realize
that intelligence activities are one of the
hard facts of life. At the same time I won-
der whether we cAllafford the luxury of this
type of intelligence: treittla Powers of SAC
tells-us-that the Russians have the capacity
to strike at American targets and to destroy
them. What assurance do we have that the
Russians do not misread the incursion of a
single plane? Are the gains of such an. in-
telligence inissiGer Weit'E-"the'rlair` of "nuclear
war?
When some years ago a Soviet spy was ap-
prehended in Brooklyn, the Russian Govern-
ment could and did completely dissociate
itself from his activities. Aerial intelligence,
on the other hand, directly and imniedlae-
ly implicates the sponsoring govermnent,
Equally disturbing is the question of re-
sponsibility. While the administration in
Washington acknowledges its general policy
decisions on this kind of flight, it was not
aware of the particular thning. The disturb-
ing implicaticErcirthat immediate decisions
which could be of the most far-reaching
consequences, viz the unleashing of nuclear
war, are made at some lower echelon. Quite
apart from this irresponsible delegation of
power what might be the tactical conse-
quences? Were our SAO bases alerted to the
possibility of a Soviet reprisal to the.U-2 in-
cursion? Would President Eisenhower have,
been available to make an urgent decision?
On the basis of the evidence (including the
unpreparedness of the administration to give
any decent explanation of the incident) we
were in no way prepared. This in the face of
the administration's argument that through
these flights we wish to avoid another Pearl
Harbor.
As to the ramifications of this incident?
the impact on world opinion prior to the
summit, the ace it places into the hands of
Soviet negotiators, the distrust is engenders
among allies who have not been consulted
(witness Norway's-a Treirdiir 'ter crar StKto De-
partment)--are these to be subordinated to
the possible gains tointelligertee?
-Yile?adralrilatration's Justification of its
policy Is couched in the most fanciful
doubletEdk. It is saying to the Russians in
effect?If you weren't such bad boys, ring-
ing down your Iron Curtain, we wouldn't
have to fly over your territory. What would
be the administration's reaction after a
Soviet plane had been shot down over Kansas
and theRussians were to reply that they
were compelled to such illegal flights because
we barred their diplomats from large parts
of the United States?
And finally, in a kind of postscript to this
sad affair, the administration annouhces the
resumption of underground nuclear testing
at a moment when some slight but hopeful
progress had been made at Geneva?the
Russians having agreed to holding joint
technical tests. What justification can be
given for this decision? May this not appear
to the rest of the world as a desperately
spiteful act?
It has been argued that this is no time
for criticism. But if we do not criticize
now, if the Caugreaa does not .now - ask
searching questions about administration
policy then When else is the time? Are we
blindly to accept administration decision to
continue such flights? Are we entitled to
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? A NDIX
know who makes immediate policy deci-
sions which can have such far-reaching
consequences for us and for the world?
What justifications are there for the resump-
tion of nuclear testing? These are not
carping questions. Unless they are asked
now it may be too late. I should like re-
spectfully to urge you to further bring these
sentiments, which are not merely confined to
myself, to your colleagues in Congress and
to continue to exercise to your fullest power
your constitutional prerogative of checking
the executive branch.
Truly yours,
LIT,CIAN C. MARQUIS. Air
,400V-
Iowa Citizen Praises Birmingham
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. GEORGE HUDDLESTON, JR.
OF ALABAMA
IN THE HOUSE OF' REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, May 10, 1960
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. Speaker, re-
cently there appeared in one of Birming-
ham's two daily newspapers a letter to
the editor which was, in effect, a thank
you note to the citizens of our fine com-
munity and a refutation of a widely pub-
licized false impression of the city ema-
nating from a New York newspaper.
This letter was from a citizen of Water-
loo, Iowa, Mr. Edward J. Jacobson, who
in a time of crisis and in a strange city,
found in Birmingham and her people
what he calls a needed "warmth and
comfort."
In addition to his eloquent expres-
sion of commendation and appreciation
of the people of Birmingham, Mr. Jacob-
son, in his letter, praises the facilities
and personnel of an institution in which
we in Birmingham and Alabama take
great pride, the University Hospital &
Hillman Clinic of the University of Ala-
bama Medical Center.
I am pleased to insert a copy of Mr.
Jacobson's letter in the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD, under leave heretofore granted,
and earnestly commend it to the atten-
tion of My colleagues:
VOICE OF THE PEOPLE?IOWA MAN TELLS
STORY OF BIRMINGHAM'S HELP
I read the article in the Birmingham
News which appeared in the New York
Times. If that reporter had come to Bir-
mingham under the circumstances Mrs.
Jacobson and I did, I am sure his version of
Birmingham and the very good people there
would be entirely different.
On Saturday,. April 9, my wife, our daugh-
ter Jean and I were having our lunch when
we were interrupted by a phone call. It was
a long distance call from University Hos-
pital in your city to inform us that our
older daughter Joan was there and had
been involved in an auto accident. She was
thrown out of an overturning car and seri-
ously injured. She was en route to Florida
with friends for Easter vacation from Rock-
ford College at Rockford, Ill.
Several of your kind citizens who were
passers-by made it possible for her to be
assisted and brought to the hospital. The
doctor requested we come, and plane con-
nections being poor, we started driving. I
stayed behind the wheel for 20 hours while
my wife studied road maps and signs.
Three cups of coffee and one piece of pie
was our limit on food, only to reach Bir-
(
A4371
ingham, a place we had never been or
even had any idea of what it was like.
We arrived on Sunday, April 10, at 12:30,
at the edge of Birmingham, asking our way
around. Everyone went out of their way to
help us find the hospital. We arrived there
at 1 p.m. to see our daughter. We had not
been there long when we could see she had
the care and love of the best doctors and
nurses available.
We were strangers in this big city but
yet we felt like this was a sort of home. We
knew our daughter would be well again.
Later, we rented an apartment and our
-landlady was just like a mother to us. The
minister called on our daughter, and we
attended the church of our faith on Easter
Sunday. It was wonderful to be in church
a thousand miles from home and feel the
warmth and comfort that we so needed at
that time.
When our daughter was out of danger, we
went shopping, only to be treated royally
again by the good people of Birmingham.
We will never forget the fine meals we were
so graciously served in the various eating
establishments. The service stations and
garages, too, afforded us the same courte-
ous service.
Then the good word came that we could
start home, taking our daughter with us.
This meant a great deal to us knowing that
in 5 or 6 weeks she will be able to walk
again. As we stood on the 10th floor of the
hospital the night before we left, we were
somewhat saddened looking out at the
beautiful lights of the city. It is a second
home to us and there will always be a
warm place in our hearts for the good peo-
ple who made our life so wonderful while
in that big and beautiful city.
Can this be Birmingham? It sure can.
EDWARD J. JACOBSON.
WATERLOO, IOWA.
Being Intelligent Mout Intelligence
,wSikitif01.314
.E.,/s-CENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. EMILIO Q. DADDARIO
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 2, 1960
Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Speaker, a good
many words have been spoken in recent
days about this Nation's intelligence op-
erationCWel their efficiency and effec-
When policy decisions may be
makre`on the basis of secret intelligence
material, there is a conflict which can
be settled only by full and frank discus-
sion of these policy matters by the re-
sponsible political authorities without
disclosure of agencies, sources, or
methods. When political authorities
allow the impression to gain currency
that they are not in full command of
their decisions, or that their information
may have been faulty, they encourage
speculation and comment which is not in
the national interest.
In that connection, I would like to sub-
mit for the RECORD an editorial which
appeared in the Hartford Couwt and
which contains an litftreirtatlie under-
standing of the intelligence cycle. The
editoilal States that one reason why in-
telligence activities of this Nation often
appear to be both inept and amateurish
is that there has seldom been an ade-
quate appreciation of the importance of
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A4372 C GRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX
intelligence on the part of responsible
persons in the Government.
It seems to me that the recent events,
when coupled with incidents that have
occurred over more than a decade now,
Indicate a need for a continuing review
and supe . .5.1,:ftiv.114,) ; in-
ice Anil is
JIt -44t.e.c1.41t ul. rial, and which I have
not included at this point, believes that
, CIA is far too 1 44,,,,tcaP9,1107
igiAlbe Ir or are too
great to peri?i e ec ive co p. `ese
are reb nlarrilttter8 which .eserve con-
ress cly and decksioeritreti-
re field, if is 115VaTelt, deserves con-
tinuing con ressioilal vision by a
committee w ich miglif we I be organized
along the lines of the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy.
'44111"-The4,?wen,, ...:t451t?1114416?941?.;,,, ..._
............-., ...,...1Z?ontrr ABOu a INTELLIGENCE
,
Elsewhere on this page today appear some
Ipenetrating comments on the organization
of the Central Intelligence _Agency, and per-
haps nitire 1rip6ftant; ori our whole ap-
proach to the subject of military intelli-
gence. The artiele.. WV:c1:1_11Ppeared in the
London baily Telegraplai_yes, written by
Donald: Meinehletti,- hirhs'dlrb,Iiritish intelli-
gtitelatifffeer 'dining World War II.
Although Mr. McLachlan's article is rea-
sonably comprehensive, it fails to mention
the principal reason why fa Igence.
act1=1ty.c.?9/ten lepttLinep_ an ama-
ft-U.1.141T- That reason is tlia---tiLere'TC not
'new- trill* has there ever been an adequate
appreciation of the importance of intelli-
gence on the part of responsible persons in
the government, whether in the armed
forces or in high elective positions. During
-the entire period between World War I and
World?War II, aside from such routine tasks
as were performed by the attaches, military
intelligence received little attention from
anyone. And the intelligence commanders
Of the various corps area commands, the
0-2 assistant chiefs of staff, were principally
public relations officers and nothing more.
Even today, in the Department* of the Army,
all of the top General Staff officers but one
have the title of Deputy Chief of Staff and
the rank of lieutenant general. The one
officer who does not have this rank is the
director of intelligence, who is only an As-
sistant Chief of Staff, with the grade of
major general.
? Perhaps Washington's failure really to
understand and appreciate the importance
of military intelligence is a reflection of the
attitude of the Aseet0616661.1fecvle who, gen-
erally, look w4Atik Allgfaypr upon espionage
.01.., kind. But in this World in which
we live our national existence demands that
we make every effort to learn all we Can of
what our potential enemies are up to.
Whether we like it or not, we must have
well-trained and efficient intelligence agen-
cies, and the sooner we realize that fact the
better it will be for all of us.
It might be pertinent here also to suggest
that all intelligence activities must of neces-
sity be conducted with the utmost secrecy,
and that all governmental agencies con-
cerned give consideration to what they are
to say or not to say should anything resem-
bling the- 1.1.-2 incille,44,...axisa again. Here,
too, we can take a ArS0413., gro,rn the, British.
After the U-2 iiitillent had been discusled
by Prime Minister Macnialex and Selwyn
the Foreign 86617Tary, the British
"ni?eign Office spokesman was asked for
comment. JIA.sa,j,(1: "It would appear to be
an intelligence operation and it is not the
habit of the British Government to comment
on operations of that nature either of its
own or of its friends."
That should be our policy, tot).
hances for Milk Sanitation Legislation
Have Become Brighter
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. LESTER R. JOHNSON
OF WISCONSIN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 16, 1960
Mr. JOHNSON of Wisconsin. Mr.
Speaker, the Dairy Record, one of the
Nation's leading publications in the
dairy field, has commented editorially
on the ever-increasing support for my
national milk sanitation legislation.
Under leave to extend by remarks, I
would like to include this editorial from
the May 4,1960, issue of this magazine
in the RECORD:
BEHIND THE NEWS
While the possibility of passage of the Na-
tional Milk Sanitation bill did not change
materially as a result of the House hearings
last week, its chances are brighter today
than they have ever been. The nominating
convention of the two parties will call for
an early adjournment of Congress which
makes it appear doubtful at this time that
the bill can be passed at this session. How-
ever, there is the remote possibility that it
could be brought up for action on the floor
of both Houses before adjournment.
Last fall it appeared almost hopeless that
the measure would receive much attention at
this short session, but it is evident that pro-
ponents of the bill introduced by Repre-
sentative LESTER JOHNSON, of Wisconsin have
been extremely busy in gaining supports for
the legislation.
A major victory was won by backers of
the bill when Arthur S. Flemming, Secretary
of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, in a letter to Representative OREN
HARRIS, chairman, Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, reported favorably
on the bill and Assistant Surgeon General,
David E. Price of the HEW; at a commerce
subcommittee meeting of the House endorsed
the measure.
Secretary Flemming stated that the objec-
tions of the Department to previous sanita-
tion bills had been eliminated in the Johnson
measure and he pointed out that HEW has
consistently held that health regulations
should not be used as domestic, trade barriers
to the interstate shipment of milk and milk
products of high sanitary quality.
He stated further that despite the vast
improvement that has been made in the
sanitary quality of milk accruing from State
' and local milk sanitation programs, there
still remain many areas where the sanitary
quality of milk and milk sanitation practices
do not meet presently accepted standards.
For this reason, he declared that the bill
would result in added health protection for
a substantial segment of the Nation's pop-
ulation.
Appearing at last week's hearing, speaking
in favor of the bill, were representatives of
consumers groups, State health boards, agri-
cultural groups, Congressmen, Governors,
and State agriculture departments from the
Midwest, the East and the Southwest.
All presented strong arguments why the
bill should be passed and one of the
strongest offered was that in actuality the
measure is for the protection of the con-
sumer. It was pointed out that in many
areas 'when there is a period of shortage,
milk is purchased from outside sources and
t is in many cases of dubious quailty.
Appearing in opposition to the Johnson
bill were for the most part representatives of
producer groups, principally from the East,
r.110116111411111111.11111111.111, r
May 23
South, and Southwest. Philip Alampi, New
Jersey Secretary of Agriculture, stated in his
brief that the milk markets in the Northeast
have very adequate milk sanitation regula-
tions and that health standards can best be
determined at the local or area level. He
declared that enactment of the bill would
tend to lower the quality of milk shipped
into receiving States and that lowering of
quality standards would be detrimental to
the promotion and expansion of market out-
lets for milk. He also argued that the pur-
pose of the bill is to permit the shipment
of milk for fluid use from States of surplus
production into distant markets but that
goal would not be accomplished because the
price differential between surplus States
such as Wisconsin and Minnesota and
northeastern importing States is not suffi-
cient to induce the movement of a perma-
nent supply of milk from the surplus pro-
ducing areas.
Also appearing in opposition to the
measure was Paul Ft. JaclEson, executive
officer, Milk Inspection Association of the
Oranges and Maplewood, N.J., who repre-
sented the New Jersey Health Officer Asso-
ciation. He argued that the bill will give
authority to the Surgeon General to promul-
gate and amend the Federal Milk Sanitation
Code and that this would be an unwarranted
delegation of authority. He also declared
that the bill would abrogate the home rule
of local agencies.
Libraries, Education, and Society
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON. JOHN E. FOGARTY
OF RHODE ISLAND
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 23, 1960
Mr. FOGARTY. Mr. Speaker, under
leave to extend my remarks I include
an address which I delivered at the
Drexel Institute of Technology, Phila-
delphia, Pa., on May 17, 1960:
LIBRARIES, EDUCATION, AND SOCIETY
(Remarks made by Representative JOHN E.
FOGARTY at Drexel Institute of Technology
on May 17, 1960, on occasion of his re-
ceiving the Distinguished Achievement
Award from the Graduate School of Li-
brary Science and the Library Alumni
Association)
Today I saw for the first time the impres-
sive new quarters of the library school here
at Drexel.! I am sure they bring to you a
deep sense of pride and gratification?much
as your Distinguished Achievement Award,
and this opportunity to meet with you have
given me. It is a fine thing to feel that one's
efforts have played some part in strengthen-
ing the American heritage.
A library school?or legislation to aid li-
braries?can do just that: It can enrich
society and strengthen the Nation. It does
this mainly through the enduring contribu-
tion of libraries to education.
America's strength was once felt to lie
predominantly in her agricultural and geo-
graphic advantages. Since the turn of the
century, industry and natural resources have
been paramount. Both, of course, remain
essential to our country's strength and her
1 The Graduate School of Library Science
(third oldest in the United States and among
the first five in enrollment) and the Drexel
Library are housed together in the Library
Center, opened in the fall of 1959, and the
latest addition to the physical plant in the
current expansion program.
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1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX
Unfortunately, the study was started;
?nen progress was interrupted and post-
poned.
Today, I was pleased to receive from
Marvin Fast, Executive Director of the
Great Lakes Commission, a resolution
urging that the study of water level prob-
lems of the lakes be resumed, and that
adequate appropriations be provided for
carrying out the study.
Representing the thinking of this fine
organization on a major problem of in-
terest to the Great Lakes region and the
country?the resolution, I believe, de-
serves the consideration of Congress. I
ask unanimous consent to have the reso-
lution printed in the Appendix of the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the resolu-
tion was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
GREAT LAKES WATER LEVEL STUDY?RESOLU-
TION OF THE GREAT LAKES COMMISSION
MAY 11, 1960
Whereas the water levels of the Great
Lakes fluctuate in irregular long-range
cycles in a range of approximately 5 feet;
and
Whereas extreme high levels result in in-
undation of shore lands and beach ero-
sion, difficulties in the docking and loading
of vessels and damage to clock facilities, in-
terference with land drainage, and aggrava-
tion of floods on tributary streams to the
Great Lakes; and
Whereas extreme low levels reduce the
cargo-carrying capacity of vessels on the
lakes, require extensive harbor and dock
improvements, expose unsightly flats, de-
crease the area of waterfowl nesting
'grounds, and cause excessive shoaling; and
Whereas following extensive damage from
high water levels to Great Lakes shoreline
properties officially estimated by the U.S.
Corps of Engineers at $61 million in the
single year 1951-52, the Committee on Pub-
lic Works of the House of Representatives
on June 28, 1952, directed the U.S. Corps
of Engineers to make a comprehensive study
of survey scope to determine;
1. The feasibility of a plan of regulation
of the levels of the Great Lakes which
would best serve the interests of all water
uses, including the reduction of damages
to shore properties, the use of the Great
Lakes for navigation, and the use of the
storage and outflow from the Great Lakes
for power development;
2. The advisability of adopting local pro-
tection flood .control projects for areas along
the shores of the Great Lakes and tribu-
tary streams that are subject to inunda-
tion as a result of fluctuations in the levels
of the lakes where such projects are found to
be feasible and economically justified; and
Whereas the report on this survey, origin-
ally scheduled for completion in fiscal year
1957, still has not been completed because
of lack of funds; and
Whereas the great significance and im-
portance of the report and its findings to
the further development and optimum
utilization of the waters of the Great Lakes
underscore the desirability of its comple-
tion at the earliest possible date: Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved by the Great Lakes Commission
at its semiannual meeting in Detroit, Mich.
on May 11, 1960, That it strongly urge the
Congress, the President, and the Bureau of
the Budget to provide sufficient funds to
meet the capabilities of the U.S. Corps of
Engineers in fiscal year 1961, stated to be
$65,000; for furthering work on this survey;
and be it further
Resolved, That the Commission urge the
President, the Bureau of the Budget, and
the Congress to provide the additional funds
which will be required after June 30, 1961,
in order that the report win be completed
without further delays; and be it further
Resolved, That copies of this resolution
be transmitted to the President, the Bu-
reau of the Budget and the Great Lakes
States' delegations in the Congress.
GREAT LAKES COMMISSION.
ANN ARBOR, MICH.
America Could Use More Patriotism
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JOHN DOWDY
OF TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 23, 1960
Mr. DOWDY. Mr. Speaker, Charles
Walton Evans, son of Dr. and Mrs. C. W.
Evans, of Lufkin, Tex.' is the owner of
a large U.S. flag, a gift to him last year
from his grandmother.. Since becoming
the flag's owner, he has flown it each
national holiday during the year. This
young American is living proof that pa-
triotism is not dead in the United States
by any means.
The Lufkin (Tex.) News, for May 17,
1960, had a story about this young Texan
who is proud to fly his U.S. flag, and the
next day an editorial, each of which I
request be incorporated in the Appendix
of the RECORD:
YOUTH FLIES FLAG, AND PROUDLY, Too
(By John W. Moody)
"It's the Star-Spangled Banner. Long may
it wave, o'er the land of the free and the
home of the brave."
These words are part of our national an-
them. The man who penned them would
be mighty proud today of a Lufkin lad on
Southwood Drive.
The lad is Charles Walton Evans. He i
the son of Dr. and Mrs. C. W. Evans of 10
Southwood Drive.
He is also one living example that pat -
otism in the United States is not dead?yet.
For the last year, he has been the owner
of an Old Glory almost as big as he is. And
he hasn't missed a chance to display it.
He has seen to it personally the Nation's
symbol flies proudly from a staff in his front
yard each national holiday.
"Well, I did miss San Jacinto Day," he
said. "But that is a State holiday instead of
a national one." Federally, he hasn't missed
once.
In Lufkin, you may be certain of seeing
the 'U.S. flag on Veteran's Day, Abraham Lin-
coln's birthday, Armed Forces Day, George
Washington's birthday and other national
holidays.
"The day that everyone forgets is Mother's
Day," he said. "The flag is supposed to fly
that day, too."
Young Evans is particularly proud of the
flag he flies. It is large and looks like one
owned by a school, government or large
corporation rather than a private individual.
However, it is easily handled.
The staff is about 10 to 12 feet long, about
2 feet of which is stuck in the ground, ac-
cording to young Evans.
"The flag is a gift from my grandmother
In Apple Springs," he said. "She gave it to
me about a year ago."
NATION COULD USE MORE PATRIOTISM, FLAG
FLYING
Heart-warming indeed was the story pub-
lished on the front page of the Lufkin News
...01111111.1111111111101111111.110011.? 1111.1.1.
A4337
Tuesday about the youth who is proud to
fly the U.S. flag.
Charles Walton Evans, son of Dr. and Mrs.
C. W. Evans of Lufkin, places the U.S. flag
in the front yard of his home on every na-
tional holiday.
Sometimes the very young show the way.
With each passing year it seems that Ameri-
cans have become less aware for the need of
proudly displaying Old Glory, the symbol of
freedom in the world.
Such organizations as the DAR have con-
ducted drives in recent years in Lufkin in
an endeavor to get business firms and indi-
viduals to fly their flags on designated na-
tional holidays. Only scattered response is
usually obtained.
Certain elements in this Nation have con-
tinually pooh-poohed anything that smacks
of patriotism. Perhaps this attitude by
many people who live off the fat of the land,
yet condemn it with word and action, has
had some effect on a dying patriotism.
Apathy among American citizens has been
another factor.
There is no doubt that what this Nation
needs and needs badly is a resurgence of
patriotic spirit?the kind of spirit which
brought pioneers to this country in the face
of dangers, the kind of patriotism that the
early colony settlers exhibited in fighting
for this country's freedom from England.
We face one of the most crucial periods in
the long and storied history of the United
States at this moment. Khrushchev has sa-
botaged the summit meeting and insulted
our President. There is now no doubt that,
compromise with the Communists is virtu-
ally impossible, and Americans must be pre-
pared to back the principles which they hold
to be true and upon which this Nation Was
founded.
Patriotism, which is just another word for
love of country, is an element we need more
of in this day and time. We need more
people like the Evans youth who are proud
of his Nation and proudly displays the U.S.
flag at every opportunity.
Let's Trade Quemoy and Matsu for Bishop
Walsh
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HUSL-1-WiN144}EALL-
OF MARYLAND
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Monday, May 23, 1960
Mr. BEALL. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the Appendix of the RECORD an article
appearing in the May 13, 1960, issue of
.1.11.3m...grza.ld, a weekly labor union
paper published in timore, the arti-
cle being entitled, " e s Trade Quemoy
and Matsu for Bishop Walsh," and writ-
ten by Charles S. Bernstein.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
LET'S TRADE QUEMOY AND MATSU FOR BISHOP
WALSH
(By Charles S. Bernstein)
President Eisenhower at Wednesday's press
conference was asked by Holmes Alexander
of the McNaughton Syndicate--"Mr. Presi-
dent, Sir, this is a question about Quemoy
and Matsu; and two of the Democratic can-
didates have said that if elected they would
try to get rid of that responsibility."
The President's answer is open to all who
want to read it. But the issue this writer
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M338
Xishes to point to is that of humanity. Eve
a lowly scribe can understand such an ele-
mentary subject, although he may not un-
derstand the military importance of the two
islands.
One should be willing to sacrifice political
prestige for human values. If by giving the
Communists in China an opportunity to get
satisfaction in having the two islands re-
turned to them, we can secure the release
of Americans from torture and life imprison-
ment, it is worth our try. If the United
States could accomplish this exchange of a
little real estate for human beings, we will
have done an act of mercy and justice.
According to the New York Times of
March 19, 1960, there are in Red China
prisons, besides our own Marylander, Bishop
James Edward Walsh, a group of other 2tnier-
ic5Thri is The account:
The charge against Bishop Walsh, Hong
Kong; /reported March 18 was: Bishop James
Edward Walsh, of Cumberland, Md., was con-
victed today in Shanghai having directed a
group of Chinese Roman Catholic priests in
plots, majavage, and other counterrevolu-
tionary activitier against Communist China.
Of course, there is not a man, woman, or
child in America, other than a Commie or
fellow traveler who believes this charge. Yet
Bishop Walsh and other Americans are kept
in prison.
Since the Communists took control of
China in 1949, they have imprisoned or held
158 Americans under arrest.
Five died in prison from maltreatment.
The rest have been released, except for
Bishop Walsh and the following four:
Robert Ezra McCann, of Pasadena, Calif.,
arrested in 1951 and sentenced to 15 years;
John Thomas Dopy, of New Britain, Conn.,
arrested in 195T and given a 20-year sentence;
Richard George Fecteau, of Lynn, Mass., ar-
rested in 1954, ancr sentenced .to life im-
prisonment; and Hugh Francis Redmond,
Jr., of Yonkers, N. Y., arrested in 1951 and
given a life sentence.
All were charged with e:spionage.
.1vfefoi: Ttiha filVe all to gain
and nothing to lose, by trading some real
estate for these lives mentioned above. Not
only that, but, if we are forced to defend
these islands, with our fleet and our Air
Farce, it will mean many thousands more
lives of Americans. All that can be avoided
by a graceful offer by the President to ex-
change a little real estate for human beings.
Right now, when there is a lull in the in-
ternational situation in the Far East, let us
try to test our scheme of trade. Surely we
will get the best of the bargain.?Labor
Herald.
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CO
nactivation of 449th Fighter-Interceptor
Squadron, at Ladd Field
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. RALPH J. RIVERS
OF ALASKA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 23, 1960
Mr. RIVERS of Alaska. Mr. Speaker,
I consider it my duty to call to the at-
tention of my colleagues in the House
an alarming development with regard to
our national defense. I refer to the in-
credible decision of the Air Force, re-
cently armoulfeRMIVIrinfrin;
and phase out the 449th Figh er- n er-
ceptor Squadron at Ladd Field, near
Fairbanks, Alaska, iii-Treenntmorr: This
unit, which is the only one of its kind in
KIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX
ska north of the Brooks Range?the
nly other fighter-inceptor squadron in
Alaska being at Elmendorf Air Force
Field near Anchorage, Alaska?has for
many years been regarded by the high-
est military authorities as anlramensa-
ble s:hiskj_kgajzsti, izotential _assression
Write :=?2,ans. Ladd Fierd, only- 100
nitrern Siberia, is a part of our
northwest bastion of defense; a vital link
in our perimeter of national defense,
which includes Alaska as the corridor
between Asia and North America, being
an area once characterized by the late
great Army officer, William "Billy"
Mitchell, as "the most important stra-
tegic place in the world."
As :recently as last March the Air Force
programed replacement of its 25 F-89
aircraft at Ladd AFB for F-101Bs, in line
with strengthening the defensive power
of the 449th Fighter-Interceptor Squad-
ron. This occurred at a time when in-
ternational tensions appeared to be re-
laxing. Now in the midst of a wors-ed
,fum, our
observation flight ver Russia, we are
canfrolTeriiithlte Alr?Paiee's sudden
plan to withdraw from Ladd Field,
soundly established on American soil in
the shadow of the Iron Curtain, as con-
trasted with many of our foreign air-
bases which are built on political quick-
sand.
On July 4th last, at Auburn, N.Y., I
had the privilege of speaking at a cere-
mony honoring our 49th State, in which
I extolled the foresight and wisdom of
former Secretary of State, William Henry
Seward, in effectuating the purchase of
Alaska from Russia, and noted the dis-
advantage the rest of North America
would now be suffering if Alaska were yet
in the hands of the Russians. Both the
audience and I visualized the idea of
Russian bombers and missiles being lo-
cated in Alaska pointed toward the great
industrial centers of the older States
and Canada, and we did not like what
we saw, which lent enhanced meaning
to the memory of William Henry Se-
ward.
Now we are told by Gen. Curtis LeMay,
ho :requested the construction of Eiel-
son AFB a decade ago as a launching
ground for SAC bombers just 26 miles
from Fairbanks, that Alaska is now of
subordinate strategic importance and
that for economy reasons the risk of
phasing out the 449th Fighter Intercep-
tor Squadron may be taken. This, in
the face of the fact that said squadron
has been on the alert for years to defend
not only Ladd Field and environs against
the possibility of a Russian paratrooper
attack or destructive bombing mission,
but to likewise defend the great SAC
installation and runway at Eielson APB
with resultant protection of our whole
country.
Since long-range missiles presently
under development are presumably not
yet operational, the Russian airpower
according to Gen. Thomas D. White,
Chief of Staff of the Air Force, is still
Russia's most dangerous weapon. To
my mind this makes the problem ele-
mentary and the answer apparent?this
is no time to inactivate any part of
May
our manned fighter-interceptor forcer
Comes the day when East and West wi
have each other thoroughly pinpointed '46
with adequate arrays of ICBM's, there
may be no further use for Air Force bases
as we know them today, but the time is
not now, any more than it is time to
phase out the Air Force itself.
I realize that the Air Force is hurting
because of the recent congressional ap-
propriation cutback on Bomarc widely
regarded as an extravagant fifth wheel
in our overall missile program, but do
not think this justifies the economy re-
action displayed in the plan to chop
down our manned fighter strength. This
reaction is equivalent to saying to the
Congress, "You want economy so we will
give it to you?where it hurts." Instead,
the money saved on Bomarc should be
made available to strengthen our manned
fighter defenses. Such approach would
be consistent with the fact that the top
stratum of the Air Force has turned
down the request of Lt. Gen. Frank A.
Armstrong, Jr., Commanding General of
the Alaskan Command, for intermediate
range missile installations in Alaska to
offset the 27 Russian missile installations
in Siberia across the Bering Strait. If
Alaska is not an area usable for ex-
changing missile blows with the Rus-
sians, it must be regarded as an area
vulnerable to attack and attempted oc-
cupancy by the Russians for use against
the rest of our country as a nearby
launching platform.
An excellent and more complete treat-
ment of this whole subject is found in "4**.
the remarks of Senators BARTLETT and
GRUENING of Alaska set forth in the CoN-
CRESSIONAL RECORD of May 17, 1960, be-
ginning on page 9665 with the speech
of Senator GatiENTNc. I invite all of you
to read the able presentations of the two
Senators, for the vital interest of all the
people of the United States is at stake.
a400"
World Refugee Year?Resolution of Na-
tional Council of Protestant Episcopal
Church
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. PHILIP A. HART
OF MICHIGAN
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Monday, May 23, 1960
Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the Appendix of the RECORD a resolution
on World Refugee Year, adopted at the
Greenwich, Conn., meeting of the Na-
tional Council of the Protestant Episco-
pal Church.
There being no objection, the resolu-
tion was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
WORLD REFUGEE YEAR--RESOLUTION ADOPTED
BY THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE PROTES-
TANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH APRIL 26-28, 1960
Whereas World Refugee Year, as estab-
lished by the United Nations and cospon-
sored by the United States of America, comes
to an end on June 30, 1960; and
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1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
know no reedom from want, can know
no freedo from fear, so long as the
grim specter sudden and costly illness
hovers over th
We in the Sen faced with the re-
alities of the intern nal situation, ac-
knowledge the need fo onomic aid to
the peoples of other lan ut how can
we expect the older people our own
land to understand why, in same
breath, we deny millions of the ny
real opportunity for medical care
their old age? This is especially shock-
ing in view of the far greater sacrifice
other countries of the free world make
to assure adequate medical care for
their elderly people.
This is the question posed in many
of the letters we receive. I ask unani-
mous consent to have one letter of this
sort printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
DEAR Sin: Was wondering if and when
you fellows are going to do something about
giving those on social security hospitaliza-
tion and doctors care. Maybe you can tell
me what we are supposed to do when we're
sick. The hospitals charge from $15 to $25
a day and that's only for board and room
and the doctors bills are extra. I had ray
wife in the hospital last year one afternoon
and overnight and the hospital charged $49.
Do something to get hospitalization added
to our social security. They raise the taxes
on gas and parcel post and everything else
and give to the foreign countries but never
anything here at home.
Sincerely,
EDGAR E. W[TT, OF TEXAS, HAS
OUTSTANDING RECORD OF DE-
VOTED PUBLIC SERVICE
Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President,
a dedicated, able, faithful public official
Is soon to leave the Washington scene.
Edgar E. Witt, of Waco, Tex., Chief
of the Indian Claims Commission, has
written a record of fairness, of diligence,
and of successful service with that Com-
mis, which could serve as a model for
any p 'lie official serving on any com-
mission Washington.
Govern Witt?as a former lieuten-
ant Gave of Texas, he is called
"Governor" his native State?was a
leading Public cial of the State of
e to ?Washington.
Texas before he
After having serve on other Govern-
ment commissions, h ecame Chief of
the Indian Claims Cofiission at the
age of 68, an age at whJi most men
have retired.
In the 13 years he has serv. Chief
of the Indian Claims Commi--...?n, he
has written as many opinions as h all
the other justices of the Comm n
combined. In every case in which
has dissented, his dissent has been up
held on appeal.
When Edgar E. Witt retires to Texas,
he should take with him the thanks
of officialdom of Washington and the
appreciation of the citizenry of this Na-
tion for a job well done.
In the Dallas Morning News for Mon-
day, May 16, Mr. Walter C. HornadaY,
the able chief of the Dallas News Wash-
ington Bureau, has written a very fine
article entitled "Retirement Due for
Claims Chief." ' As a long-time friend
of Edgar E. Witt, I am glad to see him
receive this recognition, and I ask unani-
mous consent that the article be printed
in full in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
[From the Dallas Morning News, May 16,
1960]
RETIREMENT Dux FOR CLAIMS CHIEF
(By Walter C. Hornaday)
SHINGTON.?When Edgar E. Witt of
Wac as named Chief Commissioner of
the In s Claims Commission in 1947, he
had reach n age when most men are tak-
ing it easy s tirement.
Witt, a for ? Lieutenant Governor of
Texas and a le d and skilled lawyer,
assumed his duties e age of 68.
He has been the Co ission's only head
during its 13 years of exi e. He and his
two colleagues on the lesion have
wrestled with some tough qu ons involv-
ing Indian tribes who claime ? ey were
cheated and otherwise financially sed in
years gone by.
Witt is retiring from his job on Ju 0
at the age of 81. It was time and the ru
of bureaucracy, not ill health or lack of
physicl and mental vigor, that is causing
him to step down.
Under the regulations, Chief Witt should
have been moved out some years ago, but
no one noticed his calendar age as the Com-
mission continued to function as well, per-.
haps even better, than it ever had.
The Indian Claims Commission, under
Witt's direction, charted new courses in the
law as ft handled the cases brought before
the agency.
The act creating the Commission gave It
authority to settle claims in law and equity
and on other bases and then added: "Claims
based upon fair and honorable dealings that
are not recognized by any existing rule of
law or equity."
"This means applying the yardstick of
fair and honorable dealings by our Govern-
ment with the Indians," Witt Said. "No
other act I know of writes that into law."
The Indian tribes had 5 years in which to
file claims. The cutoff date was in August
1951. Through 1959, the Commission al-
lowed claims involving 20,602,341 acres of
former Indian land and final judgments of
$17,655,606 out of claims amounting to
$123,824,395.
Some of the cases go back more than 100
years and a:re steeped in history at the time
the white man, frequently backed by the
Federal Government, was seizing Indian
lands and paying the tribes little, even
threatening them with disaster if they re-
fused to accept the offers.
Edgar Witt was born near Salado, Bell
County. He received his academic and law
education at the University of Texas and
began practicing law in Waco in 1906. He
served as a State senator 12 years and was
elected Lieutenant Governor in 1930 and
1932, serving under Ross Sterling and Mrs.
Miriam Ferguson. In seeking his second
term without opposition, he received at that
time what was the largest vote any person
seeking State office had ever piled up.
Witt made an unsuccessful bid for Gover-
in 1934.
ortly atter leaving the Lieutenant
Go pr's office, Witt was employed by the
Dall' ;hamber of Commerce and other in-
terests ?work for a $8 million legislative
appropria n to help finance the Texas
Centennial. t,Witt's efforts were successful
and Congress Wowed with a similar appro-
priation.
Witt's long-time friend, Senator Tom Con-
nally, told then President Franklin D. Roose-
10007
velt about Witt, and the Waco man was
named chairman of a special Mexican Claims
Commission to distribute $5,500,000 the
Mexican Government had offered to make
available to settle claims resulting from de-
struction of American property during revo-
lutions. The Commission finished its work
ahead of time. When Witt asked Roosevelt
to terminate the agency, a shocked Presi-
dent said:
"I never heard of a Democrat quitting office
before his job terminated."
Witt returned to Waco to resume the
practice of law but was recalled to Washing-
ton in 1943 as chairman of the American-
Mexican Claims Commission. This was an-
other agency to settle claims of American
citizens against Mexico due principally to ex-
propriation of American-owned land. This
job ended in 1947.
Senator CONNALLY and President Truman
decided Witt was the perfect man for the
job of heading the Indian Claims Commis-
sion when it was cerated. Witt knew little
If anything about Indians, and a mild ob-
jection was raised against his Senate con-
firmation on that score. One group thought
an Indian should be picked but the Senate
believed otherwise.
Connally, with a twinkle in his eye, told
Witt at the time that he thought, when he
had urged his apoointment to the Mexican
aims agencies, that he was lining him up
a job that didn't require any work.
a lot of lawyers who have seen you
e urging me to recommend you
job," Connally added.
others having contact with
n Claims Commission ur-
s want him to remain
opera
for this
Lawyers
Witt on the
ing the last 13
in spite of his 81 ye
They have pointed t that during the
last 2 years he has rend almost as many
opinions and findings of f t as have been
rendered by his two colleagiles. They also
refer to the fact that when the 'Chief Com-
missioner dissented from his colleagues, the
1.7.8. Court of Claims has agreed with Witt's
viewpoint in every instance.
Chief Judge Marvin Jones of the Court of
Claims, a Texan, has indicated he would tell
President Eisenhower that Witt shouldn't be
allowed to retire if the White House asked
his opinion.
Witt and his wife, the former Gwyn John-
stone of San Antonio, plan to live in either
Austin or Corpus Christi when they return,
to Texas. Witt said almost all of his friends
in Waco are dead
EAKUP OF THE SUMMIT
CONrEVENCE
President, many corn-
mM".& have been made about the breakup
of the summit conference, and we can
expect many more comments to be made.
I doubt whether we can expect any more
reasoned or more moving comment than
that made in an editorial published on
yesterday in the Detroit News. The title
of the editorial is "Requiem for a Sum-
mit?Innocence Age Ended."
I hope the editorial will receive very
wide reading, and I ask that it be printed
at this point in the REcoso.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
From the Detroit N 9601
REQUIEM FOR IIMMIT?INNOCENCE AGE
ENDED
Man must always look up, but today we
look up to a summit that no longer is there.
/t is lost in a sky red with abuse. Yet the
angry storm clouds that have made a mock-
ery of our hopes do not have to be the shroud
for our good intent.
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10008 C GRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
,.. The forecast is for more storms. But in
I the winter of our discontent and demolished
hopes we cannot retreat to the foothills. We
must go on, persevering for peace. We have
failed, but we must still look upward.
We learn from failure. What have we
learned this time?
We have learned something about our-
selves. -
We have learned that we have spy planes.
We learned that we had violated another
nation's aerial sovereignty and that because
of equipment and men and luck we had been
doing so unscathed for some time. We have
been engaged in a dirty business which is
made no more clean by the fact that neutrals
who plan no war are engaged in it, too. Our
age of innocence is past.
We were glad to think that the men who
lead us had taken this elementary precaution
to give us somewhere near an even break in a
nuclear world where surprise attack and evil
are concomitant. We were sorry we had been
caught. But also we were dismayed by the
Washington bungling that followed the de-
nouement.
WeJlpat sux V-2 arrow in the 11%,,alld,
w1W fell we wereffeedrrIt`eWere just
plilTrallrfer Neveir in l'Ebnield of human
handouts have so many owed so little to
the few in authority who confused ourselves,
our allies, and the uncommitted world by
saying what they did not mean and meaning
what they did not say. -
We and the world have learned about
Nikita Khrushchev and what he represents.
The last few yards to the summit for us
were the toughest. Yet when we got there
it was the bully boy who had baited the
propaganda trap for us, who saved us from
a fate worse than obloquy.
He who professed to want a world with no
arms threatened to unleash his. He whose
protestations of peace had given hope to the
smaller NATO nations so near his frontier
shattered his own loving cup. In fact, the
only spirit of Camp David left in him was
a raging hangover. He tore off his own
mask. He was revealed as a Santa Claus
with horns and an empty sleigh when the
world had been led to expect from him the
priceless gift of peace.
If we 11aLUmagled with a 17-.2 he fell fiat
ori 111rWin expinithirMirfor. Some
of our allies, nervous at being involved in
our spying, were fortified in their will to
maintain the Western alliance. We didn't
get them back into line. Khrushchev
clubbed them back.
He had won neutral goodwill by being a
prime organizer of a meeting to reduce
world tensions. He lost it by breaking up
the meeting. He had nothing to offer but
tears and blood.
Where do we stand now?
It is the tragedy of a generation that can
split an atom that it cannot splice a divided
world. We have created a nuclear terror
and now are scared at living with it. And
we know that if our ring finger was not on
the pushbutton marked "retaliation" we
might not even be living to be scared.
We and the Communists talk of uncom-
mitted nations in the cold war, forgetting
that in a hot one we commit all mankind
because radioactive fallout knows no fron-
tier of neutrality. We must, therefore, still
press on to try to save ourselves, the neu-
trals and the Russian people themselves.
All this we know as the requiem for a
summit begins. Yet it is not a time for
morticians. We may beat our breasts, but
we need not bury our hopes. Man never
has, and that is why he can still look up
even when no summit is there.
e role of the trade-union movement in
political action, and the role of business
in political action, have been hotly de-
bated. Because ours is a society which
requires the broadest possible under-
standing and participation in developing
the answers, to our public questions, I
have alway felt that participation by
both groups wa.s proper and to be en-
couraged. Ii recent months, a great
American cor oration, the Ford Motor
Co., has plann d, and has now put into
action, an irna mative and responsible
program which vill encourage political
action and par ipation by all of its
employees. It is y hope the program
will prove most e I tive. The manage-
ment of the Ford otor Co. must have
devoted much time a d effort in the crea.-
tion of this program, hich is known as
Ford effective citizen p program.
I ask that a speech hich Thomas R.
Reid, of the Ford Mor Co., gave at
Detroit, Mich., on May outlining the
program be printed in t RECORD fol-
lowing my remarks. I this in the
hope the speech may come i the atten-
tion of others who share tht concern of
Ford, and who may be mov to under-
take a comparable effort. S e politics
is .the housekeeping job of a ? ocracy,
it is imperative that this free pr ple pay
close attention to this housekee g job,
lest we fail the test which is our this
20th century.
There being no objection, the a ess
was ordered to be printed in the RE D,
as follows:
POLITICAL PA-RTICIPATION: THE 1960 SI
TION?MAHAGEMENT PROGRAMS TO ENCOU
AGE PARTICIPATION
(Remarks of Thomas R. Reid, of Ford Motor
Co., at Industrial Relations Research Asso-
ciation, Detroit, Mich., May 6, 1960)
The great game of politics in America has
become a spectator sport. It is like base,
ball?everybody loves to read about it an
talk about it, but only a few of our million,
of people participate actively for the
season in the two major leagues of el er
politics or baseball.
I have no plea to offer today for/ ore
sandlot baseball players desirable that
may be, but I do urge that factory rkers,
farmers, housewives, businessmen, d other
citizens of whatever occupation pJ a more
active role in public affairs and itics.
The encouragement of politi participa-
tion is not a union-manag nt matter.
This is something which cle y should be
outside the realm of labor- siness contro-
versy and just as clearly is inatter of tran-
scendent importance to aA ',of the American
people.
Anyone who approach this subject in the
context of business ve us labor reflects an
tli
attitude already far tod-prevalent in America
that practically eve#thing in the public
domain, including even the American system
of representative gnvernment itself, has a
labor side and a management side.
I say these things so bluntly at the outset
of my remarks Abecause I have been con-
cerned from ti time I first was invited to
appear on this rogram about the wisdom of
duling separate treatments of the labor
int of vieWrand the management point of
view on this subject. The format itself sug-
gests a debate or a disagreement.
In spite Of this concern, I wanted to accept
the invoicrion. to partioipate in your pro-
gram t y because:
1. Tints abject of encouraging political par-
ticipation is of such vast importance to the
American people that free and open discus-
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: THE
1960 SITUATION
Mr. HART. Mr. President, American
political history reflects periods when
May 23
sion of it should take place wherever the
opportunity is presented.
2. There is active participation of the aca-
demic profeS-sion in the association. The
widespread influence of what professors and
teachers will be saying on this subject in our
schools and colleges is so vital to a clear
understanding of the topic for years to come
that every opportunity to present the facts
to the academic world should be welcomed.
The course of public affairs customarily
has been shaped by the professiona ' poli-
ticians and a relative few interest indi-
viduals. This has come about not fnly be-
cause they have had so much to on the
subject while others have remaineifapathetic
and silent, but because the pol cians and
these individuals too, oftentime ave taken
the trouble to inform themse s and work
at this business of governmei while others
have not. I would be the t to while,
those who are active and art4ulate in public
affairs. My contention is imply that there
should be more activity, *re participation,
more voices raised from ag segments of Amer-
ican society, if we are r retain government
of, by, and for the peo e.
Government in thi untry cannot be the
private preserve of t professional elite, the
political elite, the i ancial elite, or the or-
ganized elite of a' category. In this age
of specialization, is interesting that two
of the most fun ental responsibilities we
have in a demo cy?parenthood and polit-
ical participat ?are largely entrusted to
amateurs. P ents have no choice. Once
the offsprinrives he has to be taken care
of?and pa ts learn by doing. It is differ-
ent with 41,, political responsibilities, how-
ever. No e really is forced to assume them..
We can ays let George do it?let him and
Sam a Bill make the decisions and run
our to or our country, for us.
It s far less important to me who does
the ?ouraging of citizenship participation
th hat there be a great deal of encourage-
ie all quarters. I don't think of
as a question at all of whether unions
usiness should encourage participation--
imply think that everybody who loves his
untry should encourage participation.
lis movement toward greater interest in.
ical affairs that we have seen just in the
pa
year or so should not be confined to
bus
ess people. Everybody belongs in the
act,
is every bit as desirable that lawyers,
doe
housewives, bricklayers, and bank-
ers be
ncouraged toward more active eiti-
zenshi
articipation by the organized groups
to whic
hey belong.
In sho
there is absolutely nothing wrong
In any gt
p in our society with organize-
tional infl
flee over any category of citizens
encouragin
more active participation by
such citize
There is everything right
about it.
Now, I reco
alone will not
ticipation In pu
to see the great
battering down
clubhouses seekin
always be with us
their human shortco
But I am not too
hold to the optimistic
ful measure of
achieved by:
1. Creating a climate
agement;
2. Repairing the unfavo
of politics and politicians;
3. Making politics fend
and convenient for people.
Business, and in particular e public rela-
tions and advertising !rate ty, likes to
think it knows something stout shaping
public images. Probably no grottp in America
is in a better position than business to do
something to correct the unfavorable publics
image of politics. One reason is that busi-
ness is itself partly responsible for creating
ze full well that exhortation
uce wholesale citizen par-
e affairs. We are not going
ss of the American people
doors of their political
dmission. Apathy will
long as men retain
ngs.
ouraged by this.
ew that a meaning-
newticipation can be
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positive encour-
le public image
, acceptable,
r?Fbt Release 2004/05/1 00060001-7
ofiE-STIONS ON NATIONAL POLICY
(Mr. KOWALSKI asked an.d.was given
permission to address the 140use for I
minute.)
To Mr. Speaker.
speaking on behalf of a large number of
MeMbers of this body who last Friday
asked the President to answer. a series
of questions on the U? cident and re-
lated subjects,
tA te
remarks made by the chaknlan- of the
Republican C ,o1 igressi :,Qampaig n
Committee. ??
The questi,)n, which, , .1.aised
are questions which the Kiheic:--,1 pee-
ple have been tiskring. They are ques-
tions of naden,:i polley affect
every American.
When the ublican
Congression1,1 Caikipalgn cjonirnii,Lr ac-
cuse-5'1T1 -frolloWing closely..the .1,.Thrti-
shchev line," he ,
patriotism and cait),ng, an mai:ranted
reflection on us as ihdi'vidnals ,:and
elected representatiiies o' 1 ie aeiicau
people. ^
I suggest, Mr. Stre*Mil.Mat apologY
is in order.
I suggest further, Mr. Speaker, that
the answers to our questions should come
from the President of the United States.'
The Congress and the p
right to know.eqpje haVe
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x1NGRESSIONAL REWARved For Release 2004/05/13%IA-L1P96900T00782R000100060001-7
it/
Farley Critical of Stevenson's
"Crowbar" Talk
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. CHARLES B. HOEVEN
T' bIWA-
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 23, 1960
Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. Speaker, ? under
leave to extend my remarks in the Ap-
pendix of the RECORD, I include the fol-
lowing hews story which appeared in the
Washington Sunday Star on May 23,
1960:
PARLEY CILITAL Or STEVENSON'D
"CROWBAR" TALK
NEW YORK, May 2l.-44114,esAa1ity today ?
called upon the forthcoming Democratic Na-
tion Convention to condemn and repudiate
incident.
Mr. Farley, former Democratic national
AdliFILZ?Sthyenson's criticism of the Eisen-
hower administration over the U-Z spy plane
chairman, accused Mr. Stevenson of "at-
tempting to use the incident to 'sledgeham-
mer and crowbar' another disastrous nomi-
nation for himself as the apostle of appease-
ment out of the Democratic Party."
Mr. Farley supported and campaigned for
Mr. Stevenson In both the 1952 and 1956
presidential campaigns.'
Mr. Stevenson had said, that Premier
IChrushchey of Russia wrecked the summit
conference but that the United States gave
ikm the sledgehammer a,nd crowbar to do it.
'UNWARRANTED ATTACK
Mr. Farley said, the unwarranted attack
by Mr. Stevenson "on the President's con-
duct of the summit negotiations, in my
opinion, in no way represents the thinking
of the Democratic Party."
He called on.Damocrats "to keep the sym-
bol of our part, the Democratic mule and
not Mr. StevenOn's umbrella," and added:
"For Mr. 3tievenson to state that the ad-
ministration gave the Soviet a sledgehammer
and a crowbar to wreck the summit confer-
ence indicates te, me that Mr. Stevenson Con-
tinues to be as Misinformed on the facts as
he is infatuated with his own writing style."
The Postmaster General in the late Presi-
dent Franklin,D, Roosevelt's Cabinet said, "It
has been my experience that adroit phrase-
making does not necessarily indicate sound
policymaking, a view which I find fortified
by the rejection of Mr. Stevenson on two oc-
casions by the American electorate."
giMtil;0414:
"It is a pity that the course of history
cannot be reversed by a well-turned phrase,
in which case hundreds of .millions of en-
slaved people mad at least 3 .captive coun-
tries, liberafed by Mr. Stevenson's apt
phrases, would have occasiOn to think pro-
fusely about this overpolished literary com-
bination of Don Quixote, Pagliacci and Ri
Van Winkle."
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD MAY 23 1960
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On 1.1--2 and Its Summit Collapse After-
math Let's Have the Inside Facts
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON. WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD
OV-I,ENNSYLVANIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 23,1960
Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Speaker, today
at United Nations Headquarters in New
York there opens another chapter in the
U-2 incident and its summit collapse
aftermath.
Again, for propaganda purposes, the
American people and the American Pres-
ident are likely to be attacked by spokes-
men for that same nation which came to
the summit with the now all too appar-
ent purpose of wrecking it.
AgailaSt such propaganda attacks and
against efforts to intimidate the Ameri-
can people by fanatical saber rattling,
we should demonstrate our unity as a
nation.
rorthe past week this spirit of unity
has tarvAiled as it should have. Very
soon, 4401Vprer, Congress and the Ameri-
can people must take a critical look at
events leading up to the;sumnq it collapse
to determine why and how it was that
the administration apparently gave
Khrushohev the tools for his summit?
wreeking job. -
Yester4ay, the Pittsburgh Press, an
Influential nowspaAer In t7s c , said
editoria14: '`Ccongrig?kiguituscLto know
the 'inside baSett1r Of the events lead-
ing up to the Paris debacle and pf all
the incidents and policies which figure
In the story."
Under leave heretofore granted to in-
sert my remarks in the Appendix of the
fl
RECORD, I include a copy of the editorial
for I also believe that the "inside base-
ball" of this grim affair should be made
known:
LET'S NOT pup A LID
Ike came home from his dismal experience
in Paris to a warm and cheering welcome by
thousands who turned out for his arrival in
Washington, plus flag flying and other dem-
onstrations around the country, All this
was highly appropriate as evidence of
American unity.
The country shortly will hear a TV talk
by Ike, centered on the summit collapse. We
hope he will lay it on the line, as to Just
where we stand, and that his audience will
be the biggest ever.
And then let us go about our business in
dead earnestness?the everlasting business
of staying strong. If Khrushchev pipes
down temporarily, that is no excuse for an-
other spasm of dreamy thinking that the
cold war is over. No more than his explosive
rantinas should set us off on reckless and
feverish crash programs.
This is a continuing problem and there
is only way to deal with it?on a steady,
continuing basis.
This is an election year, always a time for
partisan excesess. There is no cause for
muffling any issue, or gagging any platform
orator.
But there is such a thing as reasonable
restraint, and our politicians can get across
their messages and achieve their purposes by
making use of it.
Congress is entitled to know the ,,,inside
baseball" of the events leading up to the
Paris debacle and of all the incidents and
policies which figure in the-Z(5'41".
If there are differences in Judgment, let's '
hear them. But let's not merely Indulge
In the old political game of all brag or all
blame.
And let's not forget whose side we are on.
he:?cold war has been taxing our resources
for 13 years. It will be with us for an in-
definite time to come. We will best live with
it if we manage our strength consistently
and with alert responsibility. .
There is nothing like a level head, and a
sensible tongue in it.
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1960
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Luckily for the citizens of New York
State, and for all Americans because of
the precedent it may have set, the
lioekefeller hideaway project is now in
a. s of innocuous desuetude.
*IPtiatippears to me it is our duty, Mr.
esident, to put an end to the super-
uated, boondoggling national civil
nse agency.
he entire character of warfare has
drastically changed since the end
orld War II?since 1945. We are
living in the jet-missile-space age,
age of challenge. Civil defense as
ow conducted in this country is as
ded as
allow dips, mustache cups,
e flintlock musket and the cannon-
the Civil War period.
fact that since the end of World
civil clefense in this country has
taxpayers of the United States
billion; and yet today our civil
rogram is a myth. This bil-
r waste of taxpayers' money
stopped.
ident, the only sensible cour
to abolish the entire present
its place we should depend
s of our Armed Forces to
civilians in any war waged
Finally, Mr. President, we
e a vigorous and continu-
of first-aid education on
in the event of any at-
Nation, using all media
ion at our command?.
an
de
?
bee
of
now
ane
it is
outm
and t
ball o
It i
War I
cost t
over $1
defense ?
lion do
should ?
Mr. Pr
of action
setup. I
upon lead
defend o
against us.
should initi
ing campai
self -protectio
tack upon th
of communic
television, rad4 newspapers, magazines,
and our schools1
Hundreds of /chousands of patriotic
Americans havelvolunteered their time
and efforts, ofted,at great risk to them-
in times oftiloods, fires, and other
1 disasters. I pay tribute to these
I
peo , who perfO ed valuable service
while paid Civil efense officials di-
rected them . front behind safe desks.
These fine men and women can, and
will, render equally'fine services as aux-
iliary firemen, policemen, and special
deputy sheriffs. In 'time of disaster by
fire or flood, our citizens have always
come to the aid Of their neighbors.
That is our AmericantwaY.
Mr. President, a p posed appropria-
tion for the Office of ivil and Defense
Mobilization will be fore us shortly.
I urge that every Se tor scrutinizing
such request with utm t care. Here is
a place where we can eally save tax-
payers' money by for bly wielding a
meat ax.
The Administrator o the Office of
Civil and Defense Mobili tion, ex-Gov-
ernor Hoegh, of Iowa, s ed one term
at a $12,000-a-year salar We do not
need to feel sorry becaus he was de-
feated at the end of his fir term, when
the people of his State e ently were
not satisfied with his ad istration.
Following his defeat, the Pr ident im-
mediately appointed him Ad inistrator
of the Office of Civil and Def e Mobili-
zation, at a salary of $22,50 He is
now serving as the head of a utterly
useless organization with ma thou-
sands of men and women feedin at the
public trough, but rendering no -useful
ervice.
Fjnally, Mr. President, I urge that
:al of my colleagues individually scru-
No. 99-4
tinize the request of the Office of Civil
and Defense Mobilization for additional
appro 'atm o of millions of dollars.
rytki
This or ization always seeks increased
appropri Ions. Here is one place where
we Can reallysave the taxpayers' money,
without doi any harm whatever to the
public and vithout doing any harm
whatever to t safety and welfare of
our country. Nv is the time to put an
end to this wasf of money for an in-
ept, utterly worth ss, outmoded boon-
doggle. ...
All of us know thatin a time of grave
1...,
national emergency, dee Armed Forces
of our country will defend the citizens
of the United States at, they always
have. Surely the defenskof our citi-
zens is too important to be'left to any-
one other than the trained and expe-
rience, men of the armed services?the
me the Army, the Navy, and -the Air
F e of this Nation.
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMIT-
TEE INQUIRY INTO THE SUMMIT
MEETING
the
MT
elitirhs*? d347gr. Mr. President,
expressed some mis-
givings about the inquiry by the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations into the
summit meeting. Of course, I meant
no aspersions on the competence of that
committee. But I felt, and feel, that
most of the iiii.,12,_eXotth1117-?g_ad-
?iggrroir-A-4-94?111115-a-r1, Q. arCintenigence
c area' and therefore ought toismain
cire importantrt-feltzLand
a great mischief will be done
by any investigation which proceeds un-
der the assumption that there was an
American "failure" at Paris, and that
those "responsible" must be brought to
book. Now that the inquiry has begun,
I think all of us are obliged to try to put
into proper perspective the events of re-
cent weeks, so to keep the mischief to a
minimum.
The decision to inveStigate flowed di-
rectly out of the contention that the
American Government bears a large part
of the blame for the collapse of the
Paris talks. This contention was based,
in turn, on the theory that two American
acts? P 04:lent's afflp.Mpttgli, pf re-
v
sponsi i ?rine-4M flights, and the
stet-eft& 15ii Viii and Mr. Herter, im-
plying that the flights would continue?
left Khrushchev no choice but to break
up the summit. This theory, in its es-
sentials, has been adopted by several
authorities: by Khrushchev himself, of
course; by Governor Stevenson; and by
a number of lesser American person-
ages. The copyright, however?at least
in virtue of first usage?belongs to Mr.
Rillictittil da,ys before the summit
alaraW.09, ,,A,Peaa t_
cl 'Iout in
bItt*sbirtritet token, if Mr. Lipp-
mann is not the ar_if A,22,ki,c.Y
critici jie is at? .1 , - 'Mean
Pr and continuing counselor.
It is not my habit to take public issue
With newspaper columnists; but this is
not an ordinary occasion, and Mr. Lipp-
mann is not an ordinary columnist. He
Is, in addition to being a columnist, a
political force, I have never quite un-
derstood why this shOuld be so, but I
11410?11111111.111111r
\`*
10699
have been around long enough to know
that it is. Some people seem to be im-
pressed by the solemnity of his writing,
and heaven knows it has that. Others
say that he is "wise." Whatever the
reason, he is quoted all over the place
with a deference one ordinarily reserves
for one's superiors. His words carry
undoubted weight in strategic quarters,
including strategic corners of this Cham-
ber. I do not say these things in criti-
cism of Mr. Lippmann, or to suggest
that there is anything sinister about his
activities or influence; but I say them by
way of explaining why I am discussing
his theory.
Mr. Lipprnann's campaign to picture
the United States as the offending party
in presumnalt diplomacy began on May
12. That was the day after the weekly
Presidential news conference at which
the President confirmed his own respon-
sibility for the flights, and implied that
they would continue. _.11.:!resident's
poiqi, L. mann advieed'ii, un-
He continued--and this is
the key passage, the kernel of the Lipp-
mann theory:
To avow that we intend to violate Soviet
sovereignty is to put everybody on the spot.
It makes it impossible for the Soviet Gov-
ernment to play down this particular inci-
dent because now it is challqnged openly in
the face of the whole world.. It is compelled
to react because no nation can remain pas-
sive when it is the avowed policy of another
nation to intrude upon its territory.
Mr. Lippmann has repeated this argu-
ment, in one form or another, each time
he has written since that day. Last
Thursday, for example, he again be-
labored the President for not having
taken what he called "the conventional
way out which Mr. K. offered." The
"conventional" response, Mr. Lippmann
explained, would have been to disclaim
responsibility for the U-2 flight, and to-
accompany the disclaimer "as Senator
KENNEDY has quite properly suggested,
by a formal and perfunctory expression .
of regret." Miga.....Vosicl,any.,k so
loajik.ancl?,,act aTtriorcigize was,
hided, "a fatal erro ?
reparable mistake."-
NeelY these assertions, for if
they are correct?and if the Stevensons
and Kennedys were correct in endorsing
them?then Khrushchev was fully jus-
tified in blowing up the summit. If it
is true, that is to say, that it was "im-
possible" for K. to play down the inci-
dent, and that the Kremlin was "com-
pelled" to react violently in order to
preserve its self-respect, then it is also
true that we, not the Soviet Union, bear
the responsibility for the collapse of the
Paris talks.
Note, too, that Khrushchev himself
fully appreciates the"-ranrerthis argu-
ment. It has been his central propa-
ganda theme for 2 weeks It in
lItittitrtefore he left for the summit
meeting. He used it in his opening state-
ment at the Elysee Palace. He used it
again in the course of his vile tirade
against the President during the Paris
press conference. As late as last Satur-
day, the argument was the cornerstone
of Khrushchey's official report to the
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, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Soviet Union. Here are Khrushchev's
words: Numwoompokapast*
We * ? ? resolved rafter the Soviet dis-
closure of the U-2 flights] to do nothing that
would prevent the United States President
from getting out of this embarrassing pre-
dicament. We even declared that the United
States President harcUy knew or approved of
such actions and that evidently t 0,?theVs
from the Pentagon and Alle s' his
rill'Oretsional spy, "they are to Maine.
Eisenhower did not 'taie -advantage of the
opportunity granted him. He declared that
the spy flights had been approved by him
and made with his knowledge. *? * That
is when it became obvious that the purpose
of the aggressive actions by the United States
was to torpedo the summit meeting.
Now, it does not follow that because
the Lippmann line corresponds with the
official propaganda line of the Soviet
Union, it is the wrong line. All of the
presumptions, however, run strongly in
that direction. Especially is this so
when, as we shall see, the line is incom-
patible with some of the major facts of
the case.
The first fact on which the Lippmann
theory runs aground is that it wa
the United States, but the Soviet UTt
tat' rilade an inteinational incident out
of Me 1r-2 ePisode. The subsequent
brealtatNIT Of the Paris talks will never
be understood unless this initial event is
kept clearly in mind: that Khrushchev
deliberately chose, in a flamboyant
speech before the Supreme Soviet on
May 5, to publicize the American spy
flights, and the fact that one of our
planes had been shot down. Now let us
be sure that we understand the magni-
tude of this decision to draw public at-
tention to the flights; that we appretiate
the great risks Khrushchev was running
and therefore the high stakes for which
he was playing.
For many months Soviet propaganda
had traded heavily an the claim of So-
viet military invincibility. The claim
that the 'U.S.S.R. was as strong, or
stronger, than the United States, was a
key propaganda tool in Soviet attempts
to intimidate the uncommitted nations,
our allies, and ourselves. The Kremlin
knew, of course, that the claim was false.
Soviet leaders knew, among other things,
that for 4 years American intelligence
aircraft had roamed at through
Communist airspace?over_China as well
?aswgzes t2?4?ssia. The Kremlin knew that
it had neither the rockets nor the air-
craft to prevent this activity. During
these 4 years, however, Khrushchev did
not make a public issue of the flights?
for the obvious reason that to do so
would be to expose and acknowledge the
astonishing weakness of the Soviet air
defenses.
On May 5 the Kremlin decided to
abandon this policy. ILlaw,,wag_cf...our
plam.?_ga,?slied?and I MiThonvinced it
was definitely not shot doyila#,,pruis-
inft,Altitude, as Khrushehev eltilined?
Ithrushchev chose to blow up the matter
into a full-scale international incident,
thereby admitting to the world that So-
viet air frontiers were indefensible.
Let us postpone the question of what
Khrushchev hoped to accomplish by
creating this incident, and note, simply,
that it was Ike not we who created it.
It was "impossible," Mr. Lippmann wrote,
"for the Soviet Government to play down
this particular incident." How absurd.
Having created the incident, Khrushchev
quite obviously had no desire to "play it
down" until he had achieved the purpose
for which he had originally played it up.
Khrushchev, above all, is not a frivolous
man. We may be sure he did not create
an international crisis that involved
great damage to his country's prestige
and the possible loss of his own power,
only to let it die?as Lippmann suggests
he would have?by accepting President
Eisenhower's disclaimer of responsibility
and regrets. Khrushchev had other fish
to fry, as his conduct in Paris was soon
to make clear.
The second fact that makes trouble for
Lippmann's theory is that Khrushchev
refused to go ahead with the summit?
even after President Eisenhower an-
nounced the U-2 flights would be dis-
continued and would not be resumed.
Before the Paris meeting Lippmann had
written that his only criticism was that
the President had made spying our
"avowed" policy. The further recom-
mendation?that the President should
have apologized?did not find its way
intoihe?Lippinann doctrine until after
Khrushchev had demanded an apology
irc Whs. It was the avowal that had
made it "impossible" for Khrushchev to
play down the incident. Well, the Presi-
dent disavowed the policy: I cannot
Imagine a plainer disavowal than a
promise to discontinue a past policy.
And still Khrushchev blew up the sum-
mit. My personal judgment is that it
was unwise to have disavowed the policy
once it had been avowed. The point,
however, is that once it was disavowed,
there as no further excuse, under the
Lippmann theory, for Khrushchev to re-
fuse to hold the summit talks.
Let us now approach the problem
along a somewhat different route. Sup-
pose the President had done exactly what
his leftist critics Wanted him to do?that
he had carried out the Lippman theory
to a "T." Suppose he had taken "the
conventional way out which Mr. Khru-
shchev offered," and had made some such
statement as this:
The U-2 flight was conducted without my
knowledge or permission, and the U.S. Gov-
ernment regrets that it took place.
And I emphasize that this is only a
hypothetical statement.
Does anyone seriously think?in the
light of what had already happened and
of what was to follow?that Khrushchev
would have let the matter drop at that?
Having persuaded the President to eat
that much crow, he would surely have
tried to force him to eat the whole bird.
It is not difficult to imagine Khrushchev's
rejoinder to such a statement by Eisen-
hower, if he had made such a state-
ment--which he did not; and this is a
hypothetical rejoinder that I ascribe to
Khrushchev:
We are delighted to learn that President
Eisenhower had no part in the infamous
spy mission, and that he has not known any-
thing about these aggressions against Soviet
territory that have been carried on for 4
years by his subordinates. Moreover, we are
pleased that he regrets he has been unable
June 1
to prevent these flights. It is therefore with
great sorrow that the Soviet Government
finds itself unable to accept the U.S. state-
ment. How is it possible for a self-respecting
power to do so? If the President
master of his own house, what as
have we that these fights will stop'neipi.e-
ly it is intolerable that these international
bandits should remain at large. The So-
viet Government cannot be satisfied with
anything lees than public exposure, trial, and
punishment of those who perpetrated these
outrageous crimes. We know in the inter-
est of peace the U.S. President will take steps
to assert his constitutional authority, and
so forth.
Would not Khrushchev have replied in
this vein had Eisenhower followed Lipp-
mann's advice? The logic of the sit-
uation demanded it. Having deliberate-
ly created the incident, Khrushchev was
bound to squeeze out the last drop of rid-
icule and scorn. Thank goodness our
President and his advisers had the good
sense to stand where they did instead of
allowing the situation to deteriorate
further.
I repeat: Once it was clear that
Khrushchev was determined to exploit
the plane incident as far as he could,
and once it was clear that he was in
possession of physical proof that the spy
flight took place, nothing could have been
more foolhardy than for the President
to have tried to deny it, or to have pre-
tended he did not know what was going
on, or to have apologized for it.
This brings us to a point which has
disturbed many people?many who re-
ject the appeasement aspects of the
Lippmann thesis. Would it not have
been better, it is asked, for the United
States slnipiy_ to have remained so -nt
during'WEMEtheir'itiradeS in M
Could we not, by that course
at To have avoided the ernbar-
avoidediompromising the CIA opera-
MEM public acknowledgment that w
were violating international law? Was
there not something unprecedented and
unusual in our behavior when we decided
to talk openly about our spy 'policy?
I believe the answer to these questions
Is to be found?once again?in Khru-
shchev's original decision to blow up the
? U-2 incident. Mr. Lippmann writes
grandly about the "conventional" way
of handling such incidents and indicts
the U.S. Government for being un-
conventional. But was, _really the
United States whtli hte the convert-
titriirr ltfht: LIPpmann tes .knowingly
artht "double life" nations lead?the
hidden life of spy operations, and the
open life of normal diplomacy?and he
accuses the U.S. Government of ripping
off the veil from the hidden life. But was
it really the United States which tore
off the veil?
Look at it this way. Can anyone re-
member a previous instance in modern
history in which the chief of state of a
major power has gone before his coun-
try's parliament to make a public expo-
sure of another great power's spy activi-
ties, and has coupled that exposure
with a demand for public satisfac-
tion? Spy incidents, to be sure, have
been publicized before. When a Colone'
Abel?or any one of scores of Soy;
spies?is apprehended, our Justice L
partment announces it to the pres1r?
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A6 0 CONGRESSION AL RECORD ? SENATE
speeches commenting on the arrest may
be made in Congress; he is tried by the
courts, and he may be convicted. But
de, he President of the United States,
irt,%i an instance, go before Congress
aiw7Frave documents in the air purport-
ing t,? prove Abel's guilt, and demand
before the world that Khrushchev ex-
plain whether he was personally involved
in sending Abel here? Such a perform-
ance would, indeed, break the conven-
tions. 'ef.s..91
401Y ad attolawx atagut,,spy,
op-
eltThi-not unless one of them deliber-
atelYIntends to kick over the traces.
But this is precisely what Khrushchev
did. It was he who broke the conven-
tions by insisting that the American
Government make a public accounting
for a spy operation, the proof of which
was already in Soviet hands.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator yield?
Mr. GOLDWATER. I am happy to
yield.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Does the
Senator have any doubt in his mind that
it is a aption of internatiollal *.W to
overfly an6tEer country's territory and
to systematically photograph for intel-
ligence purposes?
Mr. GOLDWATER. I have no ques-
tion in the world as to that fact. In
fact, I have4i6expressed myself on that
point.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I assume
It is the Senator's answer that he would
agree it is a violation of international
law to conduct spy flights over another
nation's territory.
GOLDWATER. I must assume
ii I do not recall having seen that
down. That is the point to
which I am addressing fflrbif.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The point I
am getting at follows in a second ques-
tion. Does the Senator know of any in-
stance in history where any major
power has conceded and admitted it was
engaging in espionage activities either
in or over another country's airspace?
Mr. GOLDWATER. I cannot recall,
from my limited knowledge of history?
and particularly with respect to modern
history, where aircraft have been used?
that a similar instance has ever oc-
curred before. Anticipating the Sen-
ator's next question, I believe that had
such an incident occurred, and had the
situation been as I have been describ-
ing it, we would probably have found the
same type of incidents occurring.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Does the
Senator believe that any agent for espi-
onage purposes can be successful if he
proceeds to admit things and tell the
truth when he is asked any particular
given question under all circumstances?
Mr. GOLDWATER. I would say we
would not expect them to have any suc-
cess. If another fellow knows someone
is spying on him, he is going to take
steps to see that the person does not
spy the way it is reported he is spying
at the time. I would suggest that the
Senator is correct in his assumption that
'lis would lead to a disruption of that
aticular spy technique.
LONG of Louisiana. The point I
--IZd in mind is that in espionage activi-
ties the agent who is operating can
never afford to admit he is a spy. The
moment he does so, if he is in another
country's territory, he will be appre-
hended, and his usefulness will be ended.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Yes.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Regrettably,
spying is against international law, and
spying also is an activity which requires
that the agent must lie, certainly so
long as he is operating where he can be
apprehended in some foreign country.
Most major powers do conduct such
procedures, but so far as I know, when
agents are caught they never admit and
never confess what they have been do-
ing. At times an agent might be tor-
tured into confessing,' but any confes-
sion as a result of torturing, according
to our system of law, is not a valid con-
fession. The Senator knows that, does
he not?
Mr. GOLDWATER. I think the re-
cent incdent was a little bit different
from the usual Mate Hari type of spy
who might be picked up in a saloon or
a hotel as a result of suspicion.
In my State we say that when some-
thing has feathers like a duck, flies like
a duck, and makes a noise like a duck,
it is a duck.
If a U-2 plane came down because of
engine trouble and landed on Russian
soil, any aerodynamic expert who looked
at it would pretty well know the purpose
for which it was built. If the cameras
were intact?and we must assume they
were?I would assume the Russians
would have brains enough to say, .`"I'hiS
is an espionage plane., It is certainly
not a plane engaged in pleasure flying
over Russia. It is in the air to spy on
us."
Having the evidence on hand, which is
very unusual, as the Senator must -ad-
mit, I think Khrushchev took advantage
of this, as I have related, and as I shall
further relate, to accomplish a certain
purpose, whieh I am afraid he has al-
most accomplished and will accomplish
if we allow ourselves to be carried away
much furthep.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The
thought which occurs to me is that we
did an unprecedented thing. In fact, so
far as I know, no major power which
was sovereign at the time, without
enemy troops on its territory to compel
a confession, has ever confessed or ad-
mitted it has engaged in espionage
activities. Perhaps Khrushchev thought
his case was so strong that we could
not get out from under, but the im-
pression I have gained is that we would
have been a lot better off if we had con-
tinued to insist this was a flight not au-
thorized by anyone, not even by the
man's immediate superior, and if we had
taken the attitude that, if the Soviets
wanted to investigate spying activities,
we have knowledge of some events of
that sort on their part we want to pre-
sent, to be investigated also, so that we
could both go to trial together.
.41,CALMA=R. I think the Sen-
atoirinTaThlrfEheard my earlier remarks
In which I took a similar stand.
The incident has happened. Because
It has happened, I am afraid the Ameri-
can people are being "wishy-washed" in-
10701
to a position of operating from fear
rather than pride in what has been ac-
complished. As I have said, this is a
most unusual ease of espionage being
found out. Usually the spy disposes of
himself. For some reason, that was not
done in this instance, and the aircraft
was not destroyed.
We know for certainty that the radar
capabilities of Russia are such that for
4 ears the Russians _must have been
rac **These i3lana-acieS4 the skies. I
imagine the Russian air forces and air
defenses were about ready to tear out
what hair they had, when they realized
they did not have defensive capabilities
of getting these planes down.
They must have known from observa-
tion that it was not a B-52 or a B-4'7, the
only aircraft that we have capable of
approaching a height slightly exceeding
50,000 feet. The Russians knew it was
not either of those two aircraft because
those planes do not have the necessary
speed. I believe they knew all along
what we were up to.
I have never believed in the efficacy of
summit conferences, but the incident
came at an unfortunate time for those
who believe in them. The U-2 plane
came down. The Russians knew pre-
cisely what our country was doing. We
admitted it. There is a question as to
what the Senator from Louisiana would
have done had he been in the place of
:..tlie,#resident, but, as I have recited, this
sAlitp.flrst time in history that I recall
the Chief hf State considered
'10.4,14 question.oi psr it would
hi'Ve seemed to thr9M-7147,75r any of our
Presidents 'at thegtnt:lif the detection
=
of any hf the renTteroils Russian spies
trhttm--We have , t*Cted, to come to a
joint- session 0 Congress, waving
pn.6".rPftIld -a'...tellianttlng a ul1 in-
veStitatiMi y i.e:(Ittlexi?country.
Mr: .11514d art'iiiiiSiatia. I suspect,
and I believe I could, enpport my suspi-
cion if need be, 'that there have been
other occasions on which agents of this
country have been apprehended, and
this country denied any knowledge of
them. That is the manner in which
every major power operates. We do not
like to operate in that way, but we are
compelled by circumstances to do so, I
assume. When the executive of our
Nation says, "Yes, this was spying; I
knew about it; I authorized it," it seems
to me that he leaves us in no position to
be self-righteous when we plead guilty.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I am not at-
tempting to be self-righteous. I have
had enough experience in the military to
realize that a nation cannot carry on
day-to-day peaceful military operations
without as full a knowledge of the enemy
as we can possibly get. There is no ques-
tion in my mind that the Russians have
as good information on our military
capabilities as we have, if not better.
This action was merely an effort during
the 4 years in which the activities were
carried on to give us an even break.
I am proud of this incident.
vlAmslu
ea a: out It. y great respec
American ingenuity skyrocketed even
higher when I realized that we were able
:,;;;(1154-
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702
to produce an airplane to accomplish this
objective.
As one who knows a little about
aerodynamics, I say that if anybody had
told me the U-2 airplane was doing what
we now know it accomplished, I would
have said, "I doubt it. I do not think it
is possible." Now we know it is pos-
sible.
I am addressing my remarks today to
those who wish to make out of this
incident either a political issue--and I
am sure the Senator is not one of those?
or an issue that can bring weakness to
the American people instead of the pride
that should be in their hearts. I speak
not necessarily of the pride of spying,
because all of us dislike the word. But
tel4,4Ct that we Aave been able to keep
up with the military capabilities of the
Soviet and ahead of them mili-
tarily is a Fea, sourceb-freasS-urahbe to
the $eri Arizona.
'Ffaslana. So far as I
am concerned, I regret we do not have
more information with respect to what is
going on behind the Iron Curtain. I
wish we had more. But I feel that when
the decision was made in advance that if
and when one of the U-2 planes came
down over enemy territory it would not
be admitted to be a spy mission, having
made that decision, it would have been
better to have stayed with it.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Once Khru-
shchev had decided on this extraordinary
course, the United States had no choice
but to react in kind. Once Khrushchev
decided to make spy operations a factor
in international diplomacy, the United
States had to assume that his real pur-
pose in creating the incident was diplo-
matic in nature; that the decision to
publicize the U-2 flight and the summit
meeting were, in other words, inextrica-
bly intertwined.
What, then, was Khrushchev's pur-
pose? What were the high stakes for
which he was willing to sacrifice the
myth of Soviet air invulnerability?
Paradoxically, the fact this question
must still be asked is evidence that
Khrushchev has partially achieved his
purpose. What is Pie mystery here?
Why do we fumble for an answer that
fairly leaps out at us? We are witness,
surely, to a classic case of a failure to
see the forest for the trees.
Khrushchev wanted Berlin.
Khrushchev told the world that if Ber-
lin were not given to him, he would take
it.
CONGRESSIONAL
Khrushchev became convinced, as the
summit meeting drew near, that Berlin
was not going to be given to him?that
the United States had decided to call
his bluff.
Khrushchev thereupon decided?
should the United States remain ada-
mant?to torpedo the conference under
circumstances that would conceal the
fact his bluff had been called.
The U-2 mishap was seized upon as
a weapon with which to blackmail the
United States into making last-minute
concessions on Berlin or, if that failed,
to be used as an excuse for blowing up
the conference.
In other words, because of the West's
firmness on Berlin the Soviet Union was
RECORD ? SENATE
on the threshold of a major diplomatie
defeat. It was Khrushchev's last-min-
ute strategy to prevent that defeat, or, if
it could not be prevented, to throw sand
in the world's eyes so that the defeat
would not be recognized or appreciated.
Thanks to the steady nerves of our Gov-
ernment at the critical moment, Khru-
shchev failed in his efforts to pry loose
concessions on Berlin.
But Khrushchev's alternate objec-
tive?that of diverting attention from
the fact his bluff was called?is today
close to realization. For far from cele-
brating our victory, we are cringing be-
fore the criticism and are haunted by
the doubts of those spiritless creatures in
our midst who ask, plaintively, whether
we should have dared to win. Instead
of taking to heart the lesson of the past
few weeks, and proclaiming it to the
? world, we are?ourselves?trembling be-
fore it. We cannot quite accept, even
now, the moral of the recent ordeal?
that firmness pays off.
Is it not time to say that the summit
has come and gone, and that there is no
shooting, nor any danger of it, and that
Berlin remains free?
I do not mean to suggest that victories
will always come so easily for the West?
that we can always avoid shooting. But
when the happy event occurs, and we are
vouchsafed such a triumph, let us, for
heaven's sake, recognize what has hap-
pened. Let us not fall under the spell
of our American Hamlets. Let us not
collapse of shock for having made a right
decision.
1Acve. .4.119;Ahr sec' summit meet-
the gFOUrdS that the onlyprog=
r ss they can produce is progress toward
Communist domination of the world.
Either summit meetings must fail for
having achieved nothing, or they must
fail for haying yielded to communism
something of value to the West. The
only summit meeting that can succeed
is one that does not take place. Let us
not forget that either.
Mr. Lipprnann has hinted broadly that
the Nation is obliged next November to
turn out of office its present leadership,
and to replace it with men more talented
in the art of accommodation. He implies
that the major Issue between the two
parties may be precisely this: Whether
the administration was correct in hav-
ing refused to appease Khrushchev. I
feel sure he is wrong. I feel sure, that
both parties will nominate candidates
who will support the minimum require-
ments of firmness that were demon-
strated in recent weeks by the Eisen-
hower administration. But if I am
proved wrong, then to the extent I can
make it so, I promise the coming political
campaign will be immersed in foreign
policy right up to its ears.
Mr. President, in connection with my
remarks, I ask that there be printed at
this point in the RECORD an excellent
editorial entitled "Thanks, Mr. Khru-
shchev," written by Mr. David Lawrence
and published in the U.S. News & World
Report of June 6,1960.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the REcoab,
as follows:
June
THANKS, MR. KninialiCativ.
(By David Lawrence)
Sometimes rroin unexsff quarters we
are handed a benefit. Hence we oft-- say
that "it is an ill wind that blows m
Nikitie Khrushchev may be surprivt to
learn the true consequences of his reiess
action in Paris recently as he torpedoed the
summit conference and publicly insulted the
President of the United States.
We are, indeed, indebted to the Soviet Pre-
mier for the following consequences:
1. The credulous, naive attitudes adopted
by various groups among us in their advocacy
of summit conferences were revealed as hope-
lessly impractical. No longer will we listen
to the argument that these meetings can
override the historic ways of diplomacy,
supersede the United Nations, and leave it to
four men to settle the disputes which threat-
en the world with nuclear war.
2. The appeasers, who have thought that
the way to get peace is by making concession
after concession to the enemy, now have been
proved illogical, misguided, and without per-
suasive influence.
3. The leaders of thought who have urged
that America maintain its strong defenses
and place its reliance on the maintenance of
deterrent strength have been vindicated and
will now have an increasing influence with
American public opinion.
4. The tactics of the Soviet Government,
as it has sought to divide the Western allies,
weaken NATO, and cause a crumbling of
morale in the West, have been successfully
thwarted. The Western alliance today has
a redoubled strength?it has faith in the
rightness of its cause and in its military
power to deter war.
5. The world has at last been told many
unpublished facts in the story of Soviet
espionage. The opportunity to do this might
never have been forthcoming if a counter-
measure, undertaken by the United States,
had not been detected and exploited b- Mr.
Khrushchev when the U-2 was forced 1.
6. The knowledge of what really xsion g
on in the cold war may have come as a7litck
at first to the peoples of the West, but slowly
they are beginning to understand the realistic
truth. They now will read and be influenced
by the facts revealed about Communist
infiltration as well as aggression.
7. Publication by the United States of
the list of Soviet spies arrested within our
own territory as they sought military infor-
mation has exposed the hypocrisy of the
Soviet protestations concerning the plane
piloted by Francis Powers. For Powers was
merely taking pictures. His plane was un-
armed and clearly marked with the initials
of the National Aeronautics and Space Ad- .
ministration, well known as a civilian
agency of our Goverment. Is flying 12
miles or more above any country really a
violation of international law? If so, then
why have the Soviets launched space ve-
hicles which can take photographs of U.S.
territory?
8. Attention has been dramatically focused
on picturetaking from the skies. In 1955
President Eisenhower made his open skies
proposal to the Soviet Union as a means of
providing "against the possibility of great
surprise attack." He proposed that the two
countries give each other a complete blue-
print of their military establishments "from
one end of our countries to the other," and
then provide ample facilities for aerial re-
connaissance and picturetaking of each
other's territory. This plan was rejected
out of hand by the Soviet Government and
generally attracted little interest. Now,
however, the world has been made aware of
the importance of the plan and of the satel-
lites already in orbit which can take pi,
tures at great heights.
9. Emphasis has been placed on the "
prise attack" issue. It has been difficult
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ttlie Western governMent4 to alt111.60 World
opinion on this contingency even though
, everyone knows the West would not strikle
the first blow. The world now, has had
brought forcibly to its attention the vitit1
necessity of preventing or intercepting
"surprise attack." The,,Kouse of Represent-
atives, through one , its _ appropriation
committees, has given larvial sanction to
such a policy. -
10. The outcry of the Sollet Government
about "aggression" and "spying" must In-..
evitably cause the world to ask when the
Soviets will withdraw their agents from
Cuba and other Latin-American countries.,
as well as from Europe, ,Asia and Africa, and
really cease their "aggression."
11. Last but not rt, the Soviet chief,-
tain has asserted a right to tell the Amerlr
can people the kind of administration he
wants to see elected 1t this country in No-
vesnber. Let's grant, him that privilege on.
the condition that..fme elections be held In.
the Soviet Union and. that our radio mes-
sages no longer be jammed as we exercise a.
shriller right to tell the Soviet people whom
they shall choose ns their ruler.
Tee, we can say, "Tanks, Mr. Khrul
shchev" for having opened not only our eyes
but the eyes of free peoples everywhere to
the simple feet that there can be no safety
for any country as long as an arbitrary, au-
tocratic regime, with the power to make
sudden war., rules in MOBCOW.
Mr. /I:MATING. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. GOLDWATER. I am happy to
yield.
Mr. KEATING. Unfortunately I was
absent from the Senate during the early
part of the remarks of the distinguished
Senator from Axixona [Mr. GOLDwATER],
and heard only a part of what he said.
Certainly, as he pointed out, the only way
to deal with the men ha Kremlin is by
a policy of Armnesa.,and strength. In
this regard, I find Myself in complete
aecord_with, the yiews....eAPressed by the
Senata from ,AriZana. One does not
deal with tyrants gad dictators in the
same manner that iZe,,deals with normal
human beings. Tq 4e, successfully with
tyrants an,d diPtatqrs,, it is often neces-
sary that we deny to .tbern what they
' want and instead giVe them what they
do not. That is the only language they
understand.
President Eisenhower recognizes this
fact. I share the view expressed by the
Senator from Arizona that President
Eisenhower's successor, be he _Republi-
can or Me rat, must also recognize
,and I am quite certain that he
b ide us if he does not.
Certainly t &issue of who best can deal
with this problem and who best can deal
with the men in the Kremlin?Khru-
Ehchev or his successor?is bound to be
uppermost in the minds of the American
people as they approach the forthconAng
I ec tion.
The Senator from Arizona has rage a
great contribution to our thinking on this
subject by his address. He and ;
tales find ourselves in disagrAnne-
tins, that, or the other issue; b
et
flr
E's the distinguished Senator f
pona takes the position that our y n-
inent must continue its Policy, and mist,
17 anything, in the light of recent_evgnts,
otill firmer and still stronger M this
'respect, I fully share his views.
Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. Presidents-I
littened to the speech of the able Sena-
tor from New York yesterday on this
this fa
will
same subject. Whiie he and I are occa-
sionally?but only rarely, I might say--
in di.sagreement, there is no issue on
which we are more in agreement than
'the matter of the defense of the United
States.
My remarks today were addressed not
onlY t45 the neressity of American lead-
erg. 'reccegnizing this fact, which I be-
lieve they do?and I agree with the Sen-
ator from New York when he says that
regardless of who the next President may
be, he will lead from strength?I am
concerned in these remarks today about
the efforts being made by some people
In this country?not purposely?to mis-
lead the American people into thinking
that we can deal with these tyrants?
we would call them hoodlums in this
country?by being nice to them, in the
belief that they will treat us as they
would want us to treat them. At the
recent summit meeting?even though I
do not agree with the idea of summit
meetings?the heads of the American
Government and all the agencies con-
nected with that incident displayed ad-
mirable courage, and their performance
made me a little prouder of being an
American.
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fhe Tribune Lists CMnotogy ot Events in Uottapse at the Summitl
of Events in
Web
13 Y WAMR TROHAN
- Whims Maws Press Service]
ashington, May 28?With
Agressional investiga-
der way in the U-2
e inciderit and the
Gal the summit meet-
heads of State, THE
E presents a chrono-
logy of the tangled web of
vents.
Members of the House for-
eign. relations committee and
the Senate foreign affairs
committee are trying to un-
snarl the incredible array of
conflicting and contradictory
? statements.
The editor of Tu s TRIBUNE
asked for a detailed exam-
. ination of the facts, available
to date, without speculation
about whether or not -t h e
nnference would have been
scuttled by Russia regardless
of the spy plane incident- or
about the justification of the
spy policy.
Here Is the Record
The day by day record, as
far as it is known to date,
is as follows:
MAY 1 ?Pilot Francis G.
Powers took off from an un-
named field bound for an un-
revealed destination. T h e
flight was ordered because
clear weather was forecast,
good weather which might
not come again for several
weeks. President Eisenhow-
er has indicated there was an
immediate photographic mis-
sion in view?probably the
site of the 5 ton sputnik
launched on the eve of the
summit conference.
The same day there was a
second U-2 meteorological
flight from Turkey, gather-
ing weather data for the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space
administration. It has not
been made clear whether the
weather flights were made
to " cover " the spy flights.
Ike Approved Flight
Central intelligence agen-
cy officials say there was to
have been an end to U-2
flights before the summit i
conference. Just how soon be-
fore the summit the cut-off
was to come was not made
_ clear. President Eisenhower
said he fully approved the
Powers flight.
MAY 1-MAY 4
and the state de
knew Powers and his plane
were missing. powers carried
a poison needle and a pistol,
which is standard equipment
for all strategic air command
crews. It was said here that
the pilot was under no in-
' structions to use the needle
if captured, but he could
elect to use it, if he were
being tortured on capture.
? The pistol was said to be for
shooting small game if
brought down in wild areas.
Confusion on Planes
At first there was some
confusion as to whether the
weather plane or the Powers
plane was missing. This was
soon cleared up when the
weather plane was located.
There is no evidence that
the administration made any
plans on how to handle pos-
sible capture of the pilot. It
appeared that it was assumed
here the plane had crashed
and that no evidence of spy-
ing was left.
MAY 2?Russia asked for
'a 48 hour postponement of
the projected visit to the
United States of Russian Air
; Force Marshal K. A. Ver-
i shinin. This was not con-
nected to the missing plane.
, On May 4 the visit was for-
imally announced, but it was
Icanceled May 13 after the U-2
plane disclosure.
Tell Plane Missing
MAY 3?It was announced
from Istanbul, Turkey, that
' a single engine air force
; plane was missing near Lake
Van, not far from the Rus-
sian border. The report de-
scribed the plane as one of
two which had taken off
? from the United States base
at Incrilik, near Adana, Tur-
key, on a weathar reconnais-
sance mission. It was said the
second plane returned safely
but the pilot of the first
plane had reported his oxy-
gen mask was not function-
ing properly.
To date there is no evi-
dence that the U-2 was
downed near Sverdlovsk,
Russia, except Khrushchev's
word.
MAY 4?Khrushchev a n-
nounced to a cheering su-
preme soviet parliament that
an American plane had been
shot down over Russia. He
deliberately withheld the fact
that the pilot and spy films
had been captured.
President in Conference
President Eisenhower had
left for a national security
council meeting in a secret
hideout when news of
Khrushchev's speech reached
Washington. White House
Press Secretary James C.
Francis G. Powers
did not know about the
speech.
Secretary of State Chris-
tian A. Herter was in Athens
en route home from a NATO
foreign ministers conference
in Turkey. Under-Secretary
of State Douglas Dillon was
acting head of .the depart-
ment here. -
A state dephrtment spokes-
man, Lincoln White, who re-
ceived his instructions per-
sonally from Dillon; said that
"it may be" the plane
Khrushchev referred to Was
the missing NASA weather
plane. At this time it was
known that the missing plane
was not the weather plane.
NASA Press Chief Walter
T. Bonney said the plane was
on a wholly peaceful mission.
Whether or not Bonney knew
of the spy flights has not
been revealed.
Calls Story Nonsense
MAY 6?In Moscow it was
said the U-2 was shot down
by a single rocket on Khrush-
chev's personal orders, but
no further details were re-
vealed. Russian Foreign Min-
ister Andrei A. Gromyka
said the American explana-
tion was "nonsense."
The state department said
it was asking Moscow for
"the full facts." White said
"there was absolutely no?
N-0 ? deliberate attempt to
violate the soviet airspace."
He repeated the May 3 story
from Turkey that the pilot
was having difficulty with
his oxygen mask.
Ilei-ter returned home to
assume state department di-
rection of the incident. It
was evident that the affair
was left in state department
hands by the White House.
Tells of Capture
AY 7?Khrushchev, in a
econd speech, disclosed the
pilot had been captured and
had confessed. He displayed
spy photographs.
Washington officials went
into a series of huddles. The
chief participants in the hud-
dles were Herter, Dillon,
Hagerty, White and Charles
E. Bohlen, former ambassa-
dor to Russia and now top
adviser on Russian affairs. It
was decided to issue a state-
ment telling some, but not
all of the truth.
The state department said:
"As previously announced,
it was known that a U-2 plane
was missing. As a result of
the inquiry ordered by the
President, it has been estab-
lished that, insofar as the au-
thorities in Washington are
concerned, there was no au-
thorization for any such flight
as described by Mr. Khrush-
chev.
"Nevertheless it appears
that in endeavoring to obtain
information now concealed
behind the iron curtain a
flight over soviet territory
was probably undertaken by
an unarmed civilian U12 plane.
Forced by Secrecy
"Necessity for such activi-
ties as measures for legiti-
mate national defense is en-
hanced by the excessive sec-
recy practiced by the soviet
union in contrast to the free
world.
"It is in relation to the
danger of surprise attack that
planes of the type or unarm-
ed civilian U-2 aircraft have
made flights along the fron-
tiers of the free world for
the past four years . . .
Hagerty, when asked about
a report that President Eisen-
hower has ordered a halt t
all further spy flights o
Russia, said:
"I know of no such
_this is
aveler
uide
Herter, in another state-
Russia, said;
"In accordance with the
national security act of 1947,
the President has put into ef-
fect since the beginning of
his administration directives
to gather by every- possible
means the information requir-
ed to protect the -United
States and the free world
against surprise attack and
to enable them to make ef-
fective preparations for their
defense.
"Under these directives,
programs have been develop-
ed and put into operation
which have included exten-
sive aerial surveillance by un-
armed civilian aircraft, nor-
mally of a peripheral nature
but on occasion by penetra-
tion.
"Specific missions of these
MAY 8?President Eisen-
hower returned from Gettys-
burg to Washington and met
with Herter. The conference
reported was concerned
with removing the impres- The United States replied
sion the President did not to the Russian protest note,
know what was going on in saying:
spying. '? "In its note, the soviet
Khrushchev sent notes to government has stated that
Britain and France complain- the collection of intelligence
ing about the U-2 incident but
gave no indication of inten-
tion to wreck the summit con-
ference.
Going on 4 Years
MAY 9?In another state
department statement, Her-
ter said that "Penetration of
the Soviet Union had been
going on" by U-2s for four
years. He said that this had
been done on Presidential or-
ders to gather intelligence,
but added that specific mis-
sions had not been subject
to Presidential authorization.
White was asked whether
the Herter statement meant
that the flights were to be
continued. He said he would
leave that to the interpreta-
tion of newsmen.
MAY 10?The Russian press
described the Herter state-
ment as "a frank attempt to
legalize and justify violation
of state frontiers of other na-
tions for espionage." A Russ-
ian note to the United States
charged the flights were
being carried on with the
sanction of the United States
government but did not ;
blame President Eisenhower
Iflights would continue.
unarmed civilian aircraft have
not been subject to Presiden-
tial authorization."
Allen Dulles, as head of
CIA, made it clear that lie
was prepared to take full re-
sponsibility for the flight.
_
Nikita Khrushchev
hibition of U-2 wreckage and
im?ent KIaiushchev
pressed doubt of the earlier
conclusion that President
Eisenhower did not know of
the flights. He said the Presi-
dent would not be welcome
as a visitor in Russia in June.
MAY 12?In Washington,
President Eisenhower took
full responsibility for the
flights at a press conference.
He said nothing to counter
the implication that they
would continue.
about the Soviet Union by
American aircraft is a 'calcu-
lated policy' of the United
States.
"The United States gov-
ernment does not deny that
it has pursued such a policy
for purely defensive purpos-
es. What it emphatically does
deny-i,isi-that this policy has
any agbessive intent or that
Owl singoluildi. U-2 flight of
14051 vote ididertaken in an
efforkftwirejudioe the suc-
cess of the forthcoming meet-
ing of the head' ek,govern-
ment in Pari tv,:te return
the state af Anlerican-Soviet
Union relation to the worst
times of the cold war.
Puts Blame on Reds.,
"Indeed, it is the Soviet
government's treatment of
this case which, if anything,
may raise questions about
its intention in respect to
these matters . . ."
senflower or-
dered flights over Russia
stopped. This was not an-
nounced at the time but dis-
closed May 16.
MAY 13?Herter arrived ;]]]
in Paris. He denied that he
warning against further use
of their territory for spy
flights. The Russians said the
Powers flight originated in
Pakistan and was to have end-
ed in Norway. This has not
been confirmed in Washing-
ton.
MAY 14?Khrushchev ar-
rived in Paris.
MAY 15?President Eisen-
hower arrived in Paris.
Khrushchev called on
French President de Gaulle
and British Prime Minister
Macmillan, signaling his in-
tention to torpedo the con-
ference. He refused to join
in a meeting with President
Eisenhower, as suggested by
de Gaulle and Macmillan, at
which the U-2 situation could
be explored. Khrushchev was
also uninterested in sugges-
tions he be satisfied with a
promise that no more spy
flights would be made.
In Washington, George V.
Allen, director of the United
States information agency,
tried to clear up some of the
misunderstandings on the
flights. He told a television
quiz show:
"I will say that I know
that the spokesman of the
state department who gave
out the information was act-
ing in entirely good faith
when he said it was a weather
plane. . .
"There has been a great
misunderstanding that I
would like to correct today.
Mr. Herter, the secretary of
state, has not said that we
are going to continue to fly.
He said that there is an ob-
ligation and a responsibility
on the part of the govern-
ment of the United States
and of the free world to try
to obtain information to
guard against surprise attack,
but he has not said that we
are going to continue to fly.
He hasn't said one way or an-
other . . ."
Nixon Traces Blame
The same day Vice Presi-
dent Nixon, on another tele-
vision question and answer
program, traced some of the
blame for the erroneous
statements to persistent de-
mands of newspaper men for
fads.
He said the state depart-
ment leaders were confronted
with a situation in which
they did not know wh t the
Russians knew. He said It
was decided to engage in
evasive actions when news-
paper men descended on the
department, in order to pro-
tect the pilot and not to in-
form Russia about the nature
of the flight, if that nature
was unknown to Russia.
Nixon said officials here
had to "make a snap deci-
sion at the moment and it
proved that?it turned out
that the decision was wrong."
Nixon added:
"There is never a right
time to make one of these
flights if you're going to
get caught.
"The plus is this. You
realize that his flight clearly
demonstrates the feasibility
of the 'open skies' proposal
of the President.
Worz't Cause Harm
"This flight demonstrates
that unarmed planes can take
photographs without causing
any damage, any harm at all
to commercial aviation or the
national security of the coun-
try over which the flights are
made. . ."
MAY 16. ? At the only
meeting of the big four in
Paris Khrushchev charged
that the United States had
torpedoed the conference. He
demanded an abject apology
for the flights, punishment
of those responsible and an
end to the flights.
President Eisenhower r e-
sponded by branding Khrush-
chev's demands as an ultima-
tum which could not be ac-
cepted.
Only for Protection
He continued:
"We pointed out that these
activities [plane flights] had
no aggressive intent but rath-
er were to assure the safety
of the United States and the
free world against surprise
attack by a power which
boasts of its ability to deva-
state the United States and
other countries by missiles
armed with atomic warheads.
"There is in the soviet
statement an evident misap-
prehension on one key point.
It alleges that the United
States has, thru official state-
ments, threatened continued
overflights. - . .In point of
fact, these flight were sus-
pended after the recent inci-
dent and are not to be re-
sumed. .
personally. "
had given any intimation the
Rejects Ike Visit
Russia sent protest notes to
MAY 11?At a Moscow ex- Norway, Pakistan and Turkey
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Senators Query Herter Sharply on Conflicting
Statements
on Downing of U-2
Continued from Preceding Page
ourselves in deeper and deeper
In a denial of something which
was perfectly self-evident. That
was the choice that we were
faced with.
SENATOR LONG ? Well,
denial of espionage, but you
also have considerable indica-
tion that they would be denying
espionage that you are in posi-
tion to fairly well prove, could
you not? Could you not try
your espionage cases before the
United Nations as well as they
could?
SECRETARY HERTER?We
can. But espionage cases we
try before our own courts.
SENATOR LONG?Yes, but
If they want to try a case be-
fore the United Nations, couldn't
you just as well have insisted
on trying the espionage cases
with them in the United Nations
simultaneously?
SECRETARY HERTER?Yes,
we could, but in that particular
case the issue was a rather
different one.
SENATOR LONG?Here is
the thought that occurs to me.
Under the Russian system if he
admits he made a mistake he
has to resign more or less as
Malenkov [Georgi M. Malen-
kov, former Soviet Premier]
did or more or less throw him-
self on the mercy of the party.
But when we plead guilty to
espionage in this case, how can
we plead guilty on the one hand
and contend that there is no
punishment in order when we
plead guilty to violating inter-
national law? * * *
Distinguishes Cases
SECRETARY HERTER?Sen-
ator, the cases to which you are
referring, of which there have
been quite a numbber, have all
ben border cases where there
was no espionage involved,
where it was a question of a
border patrol or weather patrol
or something of that kind where
the issue was as to whether or
not there was an international
overflight or not which is en-
tirely different from this par-
ticcular case.
SENATOR LONG?Yes, but
the thought that occurs to me is
we didn't have to plead guilty
to anything, and I know lawyers
weresent guilty clients. Now,
lawyer, when you plead
"panty, aren't you more or less
btposition that you do have to
either apologize or take correc-
tive action, or even under our
system of law more or less offer
to take your punishment if you
are going to plead guilty?
SECRETARY HERTER?As
you may recall, the President
had stated that he had taken
corrective action. He has
characterized this as a re-
grettable incident. When t de-
mand was made on him, these
0' her demands on him, I don't
- think you, sir, or anyone else
could have accepted those de-
mands.
SENATOR LONG?I don't re-
quire my part of your examina-
tion be made a part of the pub-
lic record, Mr. Secretary. I don't
insist on it at all, but I don't
very well see how we can take
the atitude we are going to
,plead guilty in the matter and
then take the attiude that no
4 apology is forthcoming * * *
SENATOR CARLSON, Re-
publican of Kansas?Mr. Secre-
. tary, I want to ask questions
, on two items that I have select-
ed from the mail I have received
on the summit conference.
The first is that people that
write me are concerned because
of the fact that Mr. Khrushchev
? hurled such epithets at us, our
ur President and the nation as they
have?a coward?a bandit and
'aggressor. Will that influence
our course of action in getting
information that is necessary
for our security.
Will Protect Security
SECRETARY HERTER ?I
think we will do whatever we
feel is essential for our secu-
rity. I am not saying in that
respect that we are going to
deliberately utilize the U-2 again.
I have never said that.
SENATOR CARLSON?Can
we assure the American people
that despite all this tirade, there
will be no slackening in our
efforts to secure, by any meas-
ures or means, the information
; that is necessary for the secu-
rity of this nation? ?
SECRETARY HERTER ? I
think both the President ? I
think the President in particu-
lar, has made that very clear.***
Cooperation of the Allies
SENATOR CARLSON?Can
J the American people be assured
that the United States has the
full cooperation of our allies in
maintaining our position on the
Berlin status?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
Senator, one of the most im-
pressive things that I have ever
seen was the meeting of NATO
that took place after the
aborted, so-called summit con-
ference. I have never seen such
unanimity, such firmness, such
determination as exhibited at
that meeting.
SENATOR CARLSON?Mr.
Secretary, do you feel that we
are making any progress on
these nuclear test suspensions
at the Geneva conference and
? other places?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
During the last few weeks,
realy the last few days, they
have been meeting in Geneva
examining a coordinated pro-
'gram of research for improving
instrumentation so that small
shots can be detected under-
ground.
Those conferences have
!moved, I think, pretty satisfac-
torily. They are halted at this
moment, awaiting some instruc-
tions from Moscow.
In the next few days we
should know better whether or
- not there has been any radical
change of position on the part
of the Russians or not. There is
some chance of reaching agree-
ment. It will be a limited
agreement at best, but that
again depends on full agreement
with regard to the control
mechanisms.
As you know, those talks
hopeless, I think we will con-
tinue with them.
The First Information
SENATOR GORE, Democrat
of Tennessee?When did the
department first receive in-
formation that the U-2 flight
was down in Russia?
MR. DILLON?That informa-
tion was received in the depart-
ment during the day, on Sun-
day, the 1st of May, at about
the middle of the day, our time.
SENATOR GORE?What
was the nature of that informa-
tion?
MR. DILLON?The nature of
the information as conveyed to
me, which had been received in
the department through the
Central Intelligence ..ageney,
was that this p1ant-3E9101*er-
due at its destine/AOC ?itildAhat
the time beyond wilarMitirifuet
supply would carr- it had run
out and so therefore, it was
presumed down somewhere.
SENATOR GORE?The ques-
tion I ask is when did you first
have some notice, some in-
formation, some hint that the
plane was actually down in
Russian territory? I was not
referring to your presumption
that because of its flight pat-
tern and the amount of fuel
that it must be down.
When did you actually receive
some intelligence , some hint
that the Soviet had the plane?
MR. DILLON?That the So-
viets had the plane, I think the
first information tve received
on that was at the time Mr.
Khrushchev made his statement
on Thursday morning before
th
e, I
think it was the Supreme
Soviet, on the 5th day of May.
SENATOR GORE?Are you
sure you received no hint, no
information, no report from
either your embassy in Russia
or the intelligence agency that
the plane might actually be
down in Russia?
Mr. Dillon?It was our as-
sumption, since most of the
flight pattern of the plane, its
mission was to spend most of
its time over the Soviet Union,
it was our assumption that that
was most likely right from the
first, from when the plane did
not return. But we did rot re-
ceive any specific information
that it was down over the
Soviet Union, in the Soviet
Union, the Russians had either
the plane, the pliot or any parts
of it, until Mr. Khrushchev
made the statement on Thurs-
day morning.
SENATOR GORE?When did
you first receive some hint,
some information, some indica-
tion that the Soviets might have
the pilot alive?
MR. DILLON?The first in-
formation we received on that
was received in the department
in the afternoon of the 5th day
of May, after we had put out
our first statements.
Got Report From Embassy
This was in the form of a re-
port from our embassy in Mos-
cow saying that various other
foreign diplomats had heard at
cocktail parties or receptions
from various Soviet officials
that this plane was down and
at one time, to one of these for-
eign diplomats, a Soviet official
said that they had the pilot and
that report reached us.
We didn't know whether it
was accurate or not, but it gave
us pause. That reached us the
ofternoon of Thursday, and I
think it was on Friday that we
identified the fact that a photo-
graph of the wreckage as put
out by the Soviets was a fraud
and so then at that time we as-
sumed, we acted on the assump-
tion from then on, that they
probably had the pilot and that
they possibly had a good deal
of the plane.
SENATOR GORE.?A mem-
ber of your department informed
me in the offices of the cOmmit-
te on Friday morning of the
6th that the department did, in
fact, have information indicat-
ing that the Soviets may have
this pilot alive.
MR. DILLON.?That was
probably reporting the informa-
tion which I said was received
the afternoon of the 5th regard-
ing that.
SENATOR GORE.?Yes. Now
you say that you knew of the
flight, you knew of the flight
pattern; and you assumed that
the plane was down in Russia.
You say now that on the 5th
you received this information
that the pilot was probably
alive and yet, on the afternoon
of the 6th, this Mr. Lincoln
White, official spokesman for
the department, said this:
"There was absolutely no
deliberate attempt to violate the
Soviet air space and there has
never been."
Did you authorize that state-
ment?
MR. DILLON?No, not spe-
cifically. Mr. White was not one
of those in the Department of
State that had any knowledge
of these operations.
Conclusion Was Drawn
The statement which we au-
thorized the day before, which
Is in the record, was not that
categoric. But I don't think
that Mr. White, that there was
any reason why he shouldn't
have made such a statement.
He drew that conclusion from
the N. A. S. A. statement of
the day before and when he was
asked questions?he didn't vol-
unteer this statement. He was
being questioned apparently in
a press conference and he made
that statement, * * *
SENATOR GORE?Is Mr.
White authorized to speak to
the United States press on be-
half of the Department of
State?
MR. DILLON?Yes, he is.
SENATOR GORE?Are you
saying that he was making
statements about this, but that
he was not informed on the
subject?
MR. DILLON?I am stating
that he was not informed as to
the facts of this intelligence
operation any more than the
people who made the press
statements for N. A. S. A. were
informed of the facts of it.
SENATOR GORE?Do you
call that responsible and coordi-
nated performance?
MR. DILLON?We are get-
United Press International Telephoto
CENSOR HERTER TESTIMONY: Charles E. Bohlen, left, State Department adviser
on the Soviet Union, and Richard Helms of the Central Intelligence Agency go over the
testimony of the Secretary of State on the U-2 plane case, before making it public.
tion of intelligence. When you
have something as important
and secret as this, it is impor-
tant to limit the knowledge to
the minimum number of people
and this was strictly limited
throughout the Government and
we did limit it in the State
Department.
We dicl-not t hink it was
proper ba-vtiform our press peo-
ple. There' was a special pro-
cedure for people who were in-
formed of this, and the press
people were not so informed.
SENATOR GORE?Mr. Sec-
retary, lain questioning you
about the initial cover state-
ment issue you had in Turkey.
I am asking you about an offi-
cial falsehood on May 6, after
you say the Department knew
of the flight pattern, assumed
the plane was down, a whole
day after you received informa-
tion that the pilot was prob-
ably alive and in the afternoon
of the day after even I had been
Informed, I ask you again if
you think this is an example of
the coordination whicii, you earl-
Her told us the Department had.
MR. DILLON---BeniterviF
answer that. I think it took a
major decision to reach a deci-
sion which was reached the fol-
lowing day; that we were going
to abandon our cover story and
tell the truth. That decision
could not be reached rapidly
and quickly. It was reached aft-
er long sessions with the Secre-
tary on Saturday and until that
was reached, we saw no reason
to inform our press officer of
anything but the cover story,
which is what we were standing
by up until that time.
White's Statement Explained
THE CHAIRMAN?Senator,
may I interrupt? I didn't
understand why Mr. White
wasn't required to clear his
statement at this time with you.
MR. DILLON?I am glad to
answer tkit. Mr. White sees
the press every day, and he does
not know in advance necessarily
the detailed questions that he
may be asked. If a question
comes that he thinks he does
not know the answer to, he does
clear it with us. Now, the day
before, when he put out our
statement, it was given to him
and he followed exactly what
he had been told. He did not
make any statement that was
quite as categoric as this state-
ment he made the following day.
THE CHAIRMAN ? Why
didn't he stand on the one that
had been cleared?
MR. DILLON?This was just
an answer to a question. Why
he did it, he thought he was
telling the truth. I think he
acted perfectly all right. He
did not think that this was a
new question. He thought he
was following the cover story,
whihc he was. So he made this
statement. It wasn't a state-
ment; it was in answer to a
question. I want to emphasize
that.
THE CHAIRMAN?It was a
very categorical statement that
went far beyond the other state-
ment. That is what begins
to complicate your ssituation,
doesn't it?
MR. DILLON?Possibly to
some extent, yes.
THE CHAIRMAN?Mr. Sec-
retary, there are one or two
statements in your own state-
ment I would like to have de-
veloped a bit, for clarification
* * * on Page 5, point 2: "The
decision not to suspend this
program of flights, as the sum-
mit meeting approached, was a
sound decision." * * *
I understood from your pre-
vious statement and others that
the program was agreed upon,
and it was running along with-
out being suspended. But this
statement seems to leave the
implication that a specific de-
cision was taken not to suspend
them in view of the conference
approaching.
Was such a decision taken?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
That I can't tell you. I was not
a party to that.
THE CHAIRMAN ? Well,
this says "the decision not to
suspend this program of flights,
as the summit meeting ap-
proached was a sound decision."
Was there any decision taken
not to suspend it?
SECRETARY HERTER ?I
know that when the matter
came before me, which was
some time previous from the
point of view of the continua-
tion of the program, when con-
ditions were appropriate, I did
not interpose any objection to
it because of any diplomatic
event that was coming up.
Decision on Suspension
THE CHAIRMAN?Is it fair
to say then no specific deci-
have been going for along time. ting at this stage, Senator, into sien not to simnel-id them was
Pilot of U-2 Spy Plane
Termed in Good Health
WASHINGTON, May 27
(AP) ? Secretary of State
Christian A. Herter said to-
day that "we have been as-
sured" Francis G. Powers, the
American spy pilot now being
held in the Soviet Union, is in
good health.
Mr. Herter made the report
to the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee when asked
about the flier whose U-2
plane went down inside the
Soviet Union on May 1. The
United States Embassy in
Moscow has asked to see Mr.
Powers, but Mr. Herter said
it had not yet obtained per-
mission from the Soviet Gov-
ernment.
"We have been assured that
he is in good health and be-
yond that I can't tell you
whether we know where he is
being held or not," Mr. Herter
said. "Perhaps one of my col-
lea knows that. I don't
any informa-
elfore trat.
along without any decision
being taken to suspend them?
SECRETARY HERTER ? I
think that is correct.
THE CHAIRMAN ? There-
fore, the other way around is
that no positive decision was
taken not to suspend them, is
that correct?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
That is right.
THE CHAIRMAN ? That
statement, I think, needs clari-
fication. I think to me, it means
that at some point prior to
May 1, a specific decision was
taken not to suspend them in
view of the summit. Isn't that
a legitimate interpretation of
that sentence?
SECRETARY HERTER ? I
think that is correct. May I
read what the President said
on that subject: He said, "As
to the timing, the question was
really whether to halt the pro-
gram and thus forego the
gathering of important infor-
mation that was essential and
that was likely to be unavail-
able at a later date. The pro-
gram went forward."
*5*
THE CHAIRMAN ? Then
that decision was made by the
President?
SECRETARY HERTER?Oh,
he was certainly consulted with
regard to the continuation of
the program.
THE CHAIRMAN?Do you
known when that was made?
SECRETARY HERTER?No.
THE CHAIRMAN?Was it
prior to May 1?
SECRETARY HERTER ?I
couldn't tell you.
THE CHAIRMAN?Mr. Sec-
retary, do you know whether
there was a rnoritorium on
these flights during the meeting
at Camp David?
SECRETARY HERTER?No.
As- far as I know, that. question
never arose.
THE CHAIRMAN?So that
there was not, as far as you
know?
SECRETARY HERTER?As
far as I know, there was
not. * * *
The 'Plight' Statement
THE CHAIRMAN?Mr. Sec-
retary, what were the consider-
ations which led to the decision,
not only to assume responsibil-
ity for the flight, but to imply
that the flights would continue
in the future?
SECRETARY HERTER ?I
have to take responsibility for
the statement that was inter-
preted and, if I may, I would
Like to read you exactly what
was said on that score.
This is a statement that was
interpreted that we were going
to continue the flights:
"The Government of the Unit-
ed States would be derelict to
its responsibilities, not only to
the American people, but to
free people everywhere, if it
did not, in the absence of Soviet
cooperation, take such measures
as are possible unilaterally to
lessen and to overcome this
danger of surprise attack.
"In fact, the United States
has not and does not shirk this
responsibility."
That is the statement that
was interpreted that we were
going to continue the flights,
and it seems to me it was a
pretty far-fetched interpreta-
tion.
THE CHAIRMAN?Then, do
you mean that that statement,
that you did not intend to con-
vey the view or the possibility
that the flights would be con-
tinued, is that correct?
SECRETARY HERTER?No,
what I. was, savine there wee
today; that from the point of
view of our own interests and
that of the whole free world, it
is essential for us to do what-
ever we properly can in order
to acquire information to avoid
surprise attack or to be pre-
pared for it.
Statement Acceptable
THE CHAIRMAN?But in
view of that statement, do you
think that Mr. Khrushchev
could accept it and continue the
conference?
SECRETARY HERTER?Yes,
I certainly do, if he had wanted
to.
THE CHAIRMAN ? Do you
think our President would ac-
cept such a statement from any
other power?
SECRETARY HERTER ? If
he wanted to go to a confer-
ence? Certainly.
SENATOR MANSFIELD ?
Were there any indications that
Khrushchev plattned to scuttle
the conference before the U-2
plane was shot down on May 1?
SECREARTY HERTER?No.
SENATOR MANSFIELD ?
Did Khrushchev's Baku speech
precede or follow Mr. Dillon's
speech to the A. F. L.-C. I. 0.
convention?
SECRETARY HERTER ? It
followed it.
SENATOR MANSFIELD ?
Would you classify Mr. Dillon's
speech as very much in the
spirit of Camp David, the kind
of speech which any official of
the State Department might
have made before that historic
meeting?
SECRETARY HERTER?I
would say this, that Mr. Dillon's
speech was almost a require-
ment as an answer to the alle-
gations that had been made by
Mr. Khrushchev against Ade-
nauer and the Germans and his
continued repetition, which I
have given the chronology of,
ofthe fact that they were going
to take this unilateral position
sooner or later without its
being an absolute ultimatum on
the subject of Berlin, Germany.
SENATOR MANSFIELD?In
other words, Mr. Secretary,
speeches which you and Mr.
Dillon made were a counter-
action to the gradual hardening
of Mr. Khrushchev's speeches
in the period preceding that?
SECRETARY HERTER?En-
tirely.
Knew of 11-2 Program
SENATOR MANSFIELD ?
Did Secretary Dillon propose
that a U-2 flight be undertaken
prior to the summit conference?
MR. DILLON?No.
SENATOR MANSFIELD ?
Mr. Dillon, as acting Under-
Secretary, were you aware be-
forehand of the scheduling of
the U-2 flight over the Soviet
Unoin on May 1?
MR. DILLON?No, I was not
aware of it. [Deletion] I was
aware that there was a pro-
gram of flights that might take
place at some time when the
weather was right, but I think
-I was informed of- that maybe
a month or two before this
actual time, and I had nothing
to do with it afterwards be-
cause I didn't in the ordinary
course of my duties.
SENATOR MANSFIELD?
Your knowledge was, in effect,
general knowledge?
MR. DILLON?Yes,
SENATOR MANSFIELD?
Mr. Herter, happening to be
out of the country at the time,
was, I assume, unaware of any
specific flight but perhaps had
general knowledge that these
flights were being undertaken
and had been over a period of
years.
SECRETARY HERTER?
The first knowledge I received
was when I was in Ankara. I
didn't know there was a flight
under way. AU I heard was
this same report that a plane
was down.
SENATOR MANSFIELD--
Now, both of you have had gen-
eral knowledge of this: Would
it be a fair assumption a say,
despite the fact that the Presi-
dent undertook, in a certain
sense, personal responsibility
for this particular flight, that
he, too, likewise, had only gen-
eral knowledge but that because
of his position as the Chief of
State, he would be held repson-
sible under any circumstances
because of his position of re-
sponsibility?
SECRETARY HERTER?
That is correct.
Enters Qualification
Might I just qualify one
thing? When you say he was
familiar with this particular
flight and his timing, so far
as I know all of us were fa-
miliar with alternate possibil-
ities of flights but not this
mart iei leer fjjoilt
That would apply to the De-
partment of State and the
president.
SECRETARY HERTER ?
That is correct.
SENATOR HUMPHREY ?
Did anyone ask as to whether
or not you had any personal
knowledge of the U-2 flight?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
It was included, I said it was
included?I am sure it was in-
cluded in a group of flights that
I had been asked whether I
had any objections to them.
SENATOR HUMPHREY ?
If you wanted to, could you
have effectively vetoed such a
policy?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
No, I could only have given
my advice to the President.
SENATOR HUMPHREY ?
Would the Vice President be
aware of these decisions?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
I think that in the matter of
the National Security Council,
he was aware of the program
in the larger sense. I doubt
if he was familiar with any of
the individual flights as such,
but he may have been.
SENATOR HUMPHREY ?
The reason I asked that ques-
tion was that the Vice Presi-
dent intimated on a television
program, I believe the day be-
fore the President announced
in Paris, that the flights should
continue, and the next day the
President announced that he
had already canceled them.
The Vice President said they
would continue, and the next
day the President announced
that they had been suspended.
What I am asking is, would
the Vice President, as a mem-
ber of the Security Council,
have any opportunity of know-
ing the decision that had been
made by the President?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
There, the days followed so
quickly one on another that I
just couldn't answer that,
whether that opportunity had
been offered or not.
SENATOR HUMPHREY ?
The program of the flights, the
reconnaissance flights, was an
established program, apparent-
ly was agreed upon by the Se-
curity Council, is that correct?
SECRETARY HERTER?The
Security Council was aware of
it, yes.
SENATOR HUMPHREY ?
The Vice President is a mem-
ber of the Security Council?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
Yes.
SENATOR HUMPHREY?If
the Vice President states on a
television program that he un-
derstood that the flights would
continue, yet the President an-
nounced the next day in Paris,
that as of the previous Thurs-
day they had already been sus-
pended, do you think there was
any lack of communication be-
tween the responsible officials
of this Government?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
There, sir, I am trying to think
of the dates.
The Thursday on which the
President gave that order was
the day that I went to Paris. I
went to Paris that night.
The President followed two
nights later and whether or not
in that two-day interval any-
thing had been distributed with
regard to that order, I just don't
know.
SENATOR HUMPHREY?Do
you have any changed views,
Mr. Secretary, as to the value of
the so-called summitry diplo-
macy as a result of this recent
meeting?
SECRETARY HERTER ?I
think as a method of carrying
out negotiations it has taken a
hard knock.
Functions of NASA Cited
SENATOR MORSE?Mr. Sec-
retary, I think it would be help-
ful for this record if you made
a statement in regard to the
functions of NASA [National
Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration] and the part that
NASA played in connection
with the U-2 flight * * *. I raise
the question because I want to
do what I could in order to
clarify the record in regard to
the allegation made that there
is not the best of coordination
between the State Department,
C. I. A., Pentagon building and
now NASA, and that there may
be a need for a centralization in
the State Department of the
authority to authorize any
statement by any of these agen-
cies in regard to a situation
such as this, because of some
possible reason to believe that
if this had been centralized
more we would not have been
having different statements
coming from different agencies.
MR. DILLON?We were not
aware of the fact that N. A. S. A.
was going to make such a for-
mal statement as this, and I am
not sure that the Central Intel-
ligence Agency was either.
All the relationships?as I
said in my original statement?
there was coordination, there
was a decision that the state-
ments were going to be made
by the State Department.
That decision was taken and
made known to the other agen-
cies concerned, which were the
Department of Defense and the
Central Intelligence Agency,
then on the morning of May 5.
The Central Intelligence
Agency had the relationships
with N. A. S. A. and undertook
to pass that on, since we had no
relationships so far as N. A. S. A.
was concerned. They didn't
know we were in this thing, and
somehow this statement was
put out by N. A. S. A. some-
what more complete than we
expected, but it was along the
lines of the material that they
had been furnished.
The President Is Qroted
SENATOR GORE?The Pres-
ident, in his statement to the
American people, the other
night, said this:
"As to the timing, the ques-
tion was really whether to halt
the program and thus forgo the
gathering of important informa-
tion that was essential, and
that was likely to be unavail-
able at a later date. The deci-
sion was that the program
should not be halted."
Now, as I understood your
reply to the chairman of the
committee, you did not partic-
ipate in the making of a deci-
sion to halt or not to halt this
particular flight.
SECRETARY HERTER ? I
had approved of it.
SENATOR GORE ? On this
particular program.
SECRETARY HERTER ?
And approved of it as a part of
the program. The question of
the halting of it was not in
issue at that time although I
Herter Hints the Loss
Of U-2's Elsewhere
WASHINGTON, May 27
(UPI) ? Secretary of State
Christian A. Heter said today
that the United States RV
plane downed in the Soviet
Union May I was the first
lost in Soviet territory, but he
hinted that others had been
lost elsewhere.
Mr. Herter's hint of other
missing U-2 aircraft was
given in the first censored
section of his close-door testi-
mony before the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee.
Chairman J. W. Fulbright,
Democrat qf Arkansas, asked
him:
"Were any other planes lost
on these same ventures prior
to May the 1st?"
Mr. Herter replied: "* ? *
[deleted matter] not over So-
viet territory."
"None had been shot down
or lost over Soviet territory?"
Senator Fulbright asked.
"No," Secretary Herter an-
swered.
There have been published
reports in the past that a U-2
exploded over southern Ger-
many several years ago. There
also have been reports that
one crashed in the western
United States.
know that the summit con-
ference was coming.
SENATOR GORE?Well, my
specific question is this: did
you participate in a conference
or were you aware of a de-
cision, did you make a decision?
What is the full extent of your
knowledge of a decision that-
the flight would not be dis?
continued.
SECRETARY HERTER ? I
know of no conference at which
that matter was discussed. * * *
SENATOR GORE?How long
ago did you approve the pro-
gram?
SECRETARY HERTER -- I
can't tell you exactly but it was
some time prior to the time I
went abroad.
SENATOR GORE?Is it a
matter of weeks?
SECRETARY HERTER ? A
matter of weeks. * "
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Competitions in which per-
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Herter aild Dillon Are Questioned by Members of the Foreign Relations Committee
Continued from Preceding Page
happened, what was the lack of
organization or otherwise that
was responsible. If you can ex-
plain it I would be glad to have
you.
MR. DILLON?If it would be
helpful, I will be glad to explain
briefly the course of events in
the few days after the plane
was missing.
We first received news that
this plane was missing, was
overdue, at its home base on
Sunday, which was the day that
the Soviet Union later said the
plane was shot down.
At that time, it was deter-
mined that a cover story would
. be used as was stated by the
President the other night, which
had been previously prepared
for such instance.
There was full coordination
in this. I knew that the cover
story was to be issued and it
was discussed that it would be
issued as usual when a plane
Was lost at the base from which
the plane was lost. There would
be no statement from Wash-
ington, and this statement, this
information was given to the
people who would be in charge
of the flight at the base where
si it flew from in Turkey. * * *
In due course, the statement
was put out there that a plane
was missing. * "
Circumstances Unknown
After that statement was
made no further action was
taken here because we did not
know the circumstances of how
the plane had been lost, where
it had been lost, whether it had
been actually lost over Soviet
territory or not, although the
presumption was that it had
been lost over Soviet territory,
because that was apparently
where it was going to be the
greater part of the time in the
flight.
The next incident occurred on
the morning of Thursday, May
5, when we heard of the first
speech by Mr. Khrushchev in
which it was stated that they
had shot down a plane. They
didn't say wher the plane had
been shot down, but they said
that an American plane was
shot down.
This required action and
statements on our part. The
news of that was received by
me at last, during the course
of a meeting, a regular meeting
of the Security Council, Na-
tional Security Council, which
was being held that day as you
will remember, somewhere out
of Washington, as 'a part of a
civil defense exercise.
When we heard that news, it
Wirs lialtdosL that-the State De-
partment would handle all ques-
tions regarding it and taking
part in the discussion at that
time, present at that time were
myself, Secretary Gates [Secre-
tary of Defense Thomas S.
ig Gates Jr.] and Mr. Allen Dulles.
"So we were all three aware of
this decision.
Meanwhile, back in Washing-
ton, members of the State De-
partment were meeting with
members of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency to try and work
out a proper statement.
? When we returned to Wash-
ington, as soon as we returned
to Washington, that statement
was finalized in agreement with
the Central Intelligence Agency
and the White House was ob-
viously kept informed of the
contents of the statement, and
the statement was then put out
at 12:45 in the State Depart-
ment. * *
Questions on N. A. S. A. Data
, Meanwhile, prior to that, in
the days immediately before
. that, there had been also con-
versations between the State
Department and the Central
Intelligence Agency regarding
information that might be given
to N. A. S. A. [National Aero-
nautics and Space Administra-
tion] in case there were further
questions of them in Washing-
ton, for confirmation of state-
ments regarding where the
plane was down, something of
that nature
General guidelines on this
were prepared. This was prior
to the 5th, in the period of the
2d and 4th, and these, I under-
stand, were transmitted to
N. A. S. A. by the Central In-
telligence Agency.
The State Department at no
time worked directly with
N. A. S. A. on any of this
publicity or anything regarding
these flights.
SENATOR GORE, Democrat
of Tennessee?Did you say did,
or did not?
MR. DILLON?Did not. This
is part of the cover operation.
* * *
So then the next item on this
was that shortly after this
statement, N. A. S. A. was
asked a lot of questions about
the plane and they, following
the cover story that had been
prepared earlier, put out the
statement whic happeared in
the press that same day. I think
that came out about three
quarters of an hour after our
statement. They apparently
utilized the general guidelines
which they had been given, to
answer questions and put them
together into a statement which
was then put out.
SENATOR HUMPHREY,
Demcrat of Minnesota?What
was the date of that?
MR. DILLON?This was done
on May 5. This was right after
Mr. Khrushchev's first speech
in which he said a plane was
down somewhere and this was?
you will recall also at that time
the Soviets printed a photo-
graph of a plane that was
supposedly a wreck and we very
rapidly learned, I would say
within twenty-four hours, that
this photograph was a fraudu-
lent photograph and was not a
photograph of the U-2 wreckage,
I but was a photograph of some
Soviet-type plane.
Aware of Fraudulence
Almost immediately, I would
say on Friday the 6th, we were
aware that this was a fraudu-
lent picture, and so that gave
us some concern that the So-
viets might have a greater
knowledge regarding the air-
craft than we had previously
suspected, and that maybe they
the aircraft and possibly had
the pilot in their possession.
So this was then followed on
Saturday morning, the 7th, by
Khrushchev's speech in which
he stated that they did have the
pilot, and gave for the first
time actual information as to
where it was shot down and so
forth.
The Secretary returned to
Washington on Friday, May 6,
from Istanbul and Greece, and
I reported to him on the situa-
tion as of that time, and at
that time he naturally took
over.
Therefore, on Saturday morn-
ing, we met with him to deter-
mine what to do next, and at
that moment as we met, we
were faced with this new Soviet
statement saying that they had
the pilot, and a new situation
had arisen, and his action at
that time the Secretary will
answer for. But that was when
the decision was made to tell,
to reveal the fact that this was
an American plane. " *
SENATOR WILEY, Republi-
can of Wisconsin?In your opin-
ion, is the matter of using what
we have used in the past, the
U-2's for a mere period of
years, all in the interest of pre-
serving the integrity of the
United States and the integrity
of the West?
SECRETARY HERTER?I do
indeed.
SENATOR WILEY?And, in
your opinion, if the U-2 incident
hadn't happened?this is sort of
a duplication of the question
but I want to get to the main
question ? would Krushchev
have had an adequate excuse or
would we have drummed up
one? a
SECRETARY HERTER?
That can only be a matter of
speculation. I think that Mr.
Khrushchev has indicated by his
Baku speech, felt that from his
point of view the summit would
not turn out satisfactorily, and
that the U-2 incident was a
convenient handle for him to
use to torpedo the conference.
SENATOR WILEY?Isn't it
a fact that from his remarks
that he made in his talk in Ber-
lin that he knew that we were
using what has been called spy
planes, had been using the same
for some time?
SECRETARY HERTER ?It
certainly does, and that was re-
peated yesterday by Mr. [An-
drei A.] Gromyko [Soviet For-
eign Minister] in the statement
that he made at the United Na-
tions in which he said they had
known of this for some time,
that they had known of it at
the time that Mr. Khrushchev
was at Camp David [Md]. * * *
Both Called Adamant
SENATOR WILEY ? Then
because of previous conferences,
as you have outlined in your
remarks, it is very clear that
there was no real reason to
think that a conference could
have accomplished anything, be-
cause isn't it a fact that both
parties were adamant?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
That is true, sir, insofar as
Berlin and the German situation
was concerned.
SENATOR HUMPHREY?Mr.
Secretary, what agency or who
is the person in, the official in
this Government, who is in
charge of these flights, such as
the U-2 flights.
SECRETARY HERTER?The
Central Intelligence Agency.
SENATOR HUMPHREY?Do
you have constant information,
do you have continuing infor-
mation as to the number of
these flights, the course of these
flights, the purpose of these
flights in the State Department?
SECRETARY HERTER?The
general programs had been gone
over with the department. Ob-
viously it is impossible to tell
when these flights are going to
take place because they are so
dependent on the season of the
year and on weather conditions.
The agency has to plan num-
bers of alternatives so we never
know at any particular time or
any particular flight. But the
general approval of the program
had been received from the
State Department, of course, as
one of the advisers to the Pres-
ident in this matter.
SENATOR HUMPHREY ?
Did you know of this specific
flight ahead of time?
SECRETARY HERTER ? I
did not, no, I didn't know it was
in the air even when I was over-
seas nor do I think any of us
did until it came down.
SENATOR HUMPHREY?Is
Associated Press Wirephoto
A BRIEFING FOR REPORTERS: Senator J. W. Fulbrightleft, Arkansas Democrat who heads Foreign Relations
Committee, tells newsmen about developments at the clout hearing on the 11-2 plane and other recent matters.
Herter Denies Pre-Summi Review of U-2 Flights
tha your understanding, Mr. think we would do everything slim this, but in light of the
Dillon?
MR. DILLON?I was not away.
we could do to identify it right cnger of surprise attack this
i what I am getting at. This is
aware that it was in the air SENATOR HUMPHREY?tlittle different, may I say, of
until I was informed that itJust identify it.
was?it was overdue, as I vpy working the railroad yard
stated previously, where isubmarine off our coast, even
SECRETARY HERTER?Yes, (taking photographs or even
identify it. We have the
SENATOR HUMPHREY?withal, I think, to do that, .
tough this gets to be a little
When something goes wrong on SENATOR HTJMPHREY?In aious, too. But in the light of
one of these flights who is re-other words we, would we dis- anger of surprise attack by air
sponsible to give the cover patch interceptors? ower, there is some difference,
speak? think so. i
story, the cover-up story, so to SECRETARY HERTER?I there not?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
MR. DILLON?Central Intel- SENATOR HUMPHREY? here is some difference. On
ligence Agency, but we are also
What would be our view of such he other hand I think we could
responsible for agreeing with
a flight? ientify it very quickly. This is
story, and it is proper in the. SECRETARY HERTER-- he type of plane that no one
them that this is a reasonable
(deletion) * * * Certainly there ould possibly mistake for a
circumstances, but they have is very little that such a flight omber when you get close
the responsibility for executing
could ascertain that would nough to look at it. This is
it. (Censorship deletion.) worry us much. Every bit of ntirely an unarmed glider type
SENATOR HUMPHREY information that we have got f plane * "
in this country sems to be avail- SENATOR HICKENLOOPER,
Mr. Secretary, what do you
think would happen in the Unit-able through public means to tepublican of Iowa?Mr. Secre-
ed States if on our radar screen ? ? h t collect .ary, we hear a great many
we should discover a i 41 documents. In fact, in the whole tements about this plane
plane --Y-Itusian espionage system they eriig shot down. What is the
ing at high altitude in thisage
have colected maps, documents, est evidence on that? Was it
oeear of surprise attack, and
photographs of every part Shot down from its maximum
- --.-,---esi-aase-liesesesb-ileseteer--------ebeight- or did they consider that
SECRETARY HERTER? I SENATOR HUMPHREY? Iit had a flame-out at that
height and then came down to
t lower altitude or what?
SECRETARY HERTER?Sen-
or, there has been a good deal
01 speculation on that point. I
thnic that we are very skeptical
as sa whether it was shot down
from a very high altitude (dele-
tion),
SENATOR HICKENLOOPER
?Well, I think there is consid-
erable difference in a situation
where this plane might have
been shot down at 60- or 70,000
feet, or whether it was shot
down or shot at 5- or 7,000 feet.
SECRETARY HERTER?We
are very skeptical and there are
certain evidences that it was
?
tion to the world that they
knew about these flights and
that they could not stop them
from going over the Russian
territory with any consistency?
SECRETARY HERTER -- I
think that undoubtedly that
played a considerable part in
his own state of mind with re-
gard to the whole incident, the
feeling of frustration that they
had not been able to stop these
during a period of four years.
SENATOR HICKENLOOP-
ER?And that exposure to the
Russian people and to many
other nations of the world that
had been propagandized per-
haps into thinking that the
Russians were invulnerable
may very well have had some
effect on the attitudes within
the Kremlin?
SECRETARY HERTER ? It
may well have had very real
effects.
SENATOR MORSE, Demo-
crat of Oregon?What evidence
do we have, Mr. Secretary, that
Russia knew of previous Amer-
ican spy plane flights over
Russian territory?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
Only the statements of Mr.
Khrushchev and Mr. Gromyko.
SENATOR MORSE?When?
SECRETARY HERTER?Mr.
Khrushchev made it a number
of times. He did so in his state-
ments in Paris. He did so, I
think, in his statements that he
made to the Central Committee
of the Presidium in Moscow
before he left. Mr. Gromyko
made that statement again yes-
terday . . .
SENATOR MORSE?To what
extent, if any, do you think
Red China has put pressure on
. the Russian leaders to follow
not shot down from that alti-Ithis adamant course of action?
tude (Deletion).
I SECRETARY HERTER ?
That again, sir, is a matter of
speculation.
SENATOR MORSE ? You
have no evidence?
SECRETARY HERTER?But
the articles which have appeared
in the Red Star magazine, which
is their official publication,
have been of such a highly
critical natur,e of the whole pol-
iey of so called peaceful coex-
istence, the whole d?nte policy
that Mr. Khrushchev seemed to
have been following, that they
may well have a considerable
influence.
Asian Situation Discussed
SENATOR MORSE?Do you
SENATOR HICKENLOOPER
?Now, the Russians, I think it
has been quite well-established
from Mr. Khrushchev's state-
ments, that the Russians were
aware for same time in the past
that flight of this kind had gone
over their territory.
I say I think it is quite evi-
dent that Mr. Khrushchev was
aware or the Russians were
aware that flights of this kind
had gone on over their terri-
tory. At least they claim they
were. Did they ever file a pro-
test with the United States
Government?
SECRETARY HERTER?Not
with respect to this type of
flight * * * have any reason to believe that
SENATOR HICKENLOOP- we may be confronted with a
ER?Mr. Secretary, have you diversionary movement now Asia
by Red China stepping up mili-
had any opportunity to get a
reliable cross-section reading on
what other nations of the world
think deaut the vulnerability of
tary activities i n Asia seeking
to embarrass us?
SECRETARY HERTER ? I
Russian defenses? In other think we should be very alert
words, on the 'theory that per- to that.
Associated Press Wirephoto
haps a part of Mr. Knliushchey's SENATOR MORSE?Do we
DIPLOMATS C()NFER f H t
1,44_ ,k2.2A .;1,a4=1,- atZ:( Ifyiderffirer
*ng in the development of nu
lear weapons, either on thei
avn or assisted by Russia?
SECRETARY HERTER?No
le do not.
SENATOR AIKEN, Republi
'an of Vermont?Mr. Secretary
me of the missing links in that
hain of information seems to
3e the circumstances surround-
ng the capture of the U-2 or
parts of it and the pilot. Has
every effort been made on our
part to see the pilot of the U-2
to interview him?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
Yes. * * *
SENATOR AIKEN?Isnt' it
a fact that the Russians had
previously undertaken to secure
a U-2, both by.interceptors and
rockets?
SECRETARY HERTER ? I
can't tell you about that.
SENATOR AIKEN ? Don't
you know anything about that,
or don't you want to talk?
SECRETARY HERTER ? I
can't tell you about rockets. I
think there probably have been
occasions when they might have
tried by interceptor planes, but
they couldn't reach that alti-
tude.
SENATOR AIKEN ? Then
you have no comment to say
about that undertaking to get
one by rockets?
SECRETARY HERTER?No,
I think I can point out one bit
of evidence that perhaps will be
supplemented when Mr. Dulles
testifies here, and that is that
the picture of what seemed to
be the genuine U-2 plane had
bullet holes in the wings and
they are not likely to have bul-
let holes from any rocket.
SENATOR AIKEN?No. Does
seem unlikely to you that the
-2 was brought down with a
one-shot rocket?
SECRETARY HERTER ?It
seems to us very unlikely.
SENATOR AIKEN?Leaving
the pilot and much of the
equipment intact, as has been
claimed?
SECRETARY HERTER ?It
seems to us very unlikely.
SENATOR AIKEN ? Wasn't
the list of equipment which was
given out by Mr. Khrushchev
such equipment as would have
been naturally carried on any
plane that was undertaking to
secure information of this type?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
That i'-right.
SENATOR AIKEN? Of any
country?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
That is correct.
Arrangements if Plane Fell
SENATOR LONG, Democrat
of Louisiana?Mr. Secretary, I
believe that U-2 flights should
have bee nmade. I
that publicly,.
by that statement. I wondered
if the department and those re-
sponsible had not planned well
in advance just what we were
going to do when the Soviets
ultimately got one of these
U-2's. Had there been such plans
made?
SECRETARY HERTER ? I
believe they had. * * *
SENATOR LONG?Yes. But
that also involves your respon-
sibility because you would be
the on ewho would give the ex-
planation.
SECRETARY HERTER ?
That is correct.
SENATOR LONG?While I
don't see how the great powers
can avoid conducting espionage
and military intelligence, as a
practical matter as long as it is
conducted on the other person's
soil, isn't that a violation of
international law?
SECRETARY HERTER?All
espionage is a violation of sov-
ereignty, all forms of espion-
age. * * *
SENATOR LONG ? The
thought that occurs to me is,
did we not ? would it not be
the original plan that this na-
tion would not under any cir-
cumstances admit that it was
sending those planes behind the
Iron Curtain in the event that
one of those planes was cap-
tured?
SECRETARY HERTER ? I
think that, as Mr. Dillon has
explained, a cover story was
prepared for that contingency.
I think the actual circumstances
turned out to be rather different
from anything that had been
anticipated in the preparatory
work that had been done.
SENATOR LONG?Well, the
previous planning had been that
we would not admit it, is that
correct?
SECRETARY HERTER?Yes
SENATOR LONG?Now, of
course, the Russians are in no
position to put us on trial. They
won't go before the World Court
en anything with us, will they?
? SECRETARY' HERTER ?
They have not.
SENATOR LONG ? As a
matter of fact, have we not
previously tried to get them
before the World Court on the
shooting down of our planes?
SECRETARY HERTER?We
have tried to get Bulgaria be-
fore the World Court and have
offered to take one of the cases,
the border cases, to court, and
they have refused.
SENATOR LONG?And they
have declined?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
They have declined.
SENATOR LONG ? In the
absence of any admission On
the part of this Government,
how could they have possibly
placed us in position to force
us to admit that that plane was
deliberately sent there? 5
SECRETARY HERTER?
Well, the other cases were all
borderline cases of incursions
over the edge of the border. This
particular case the plane was
shot down in the very center of
Russia, some 2,000 kilometers
inside of Russia.
Questions Admission
SENATOR LONG?But the
point I have in mind, Mr. Secre-
tary, is I don't see how they
can force you to take the
Fifth Amendment because they
wouldn't get you before a tri-
bunal to do it because they
wouldn't do it themselves, and I
don't see how they could have
forced you to concede that that
was an authorized mission un-
less somebody, the President or
you, elected to make that ad-
mission.
But do you see any way Mat
they could have compelled you
to admit that that espionage
mission was a calculated plan
and deliberately undertaken
SECRETARY HERTER--No;
Sir, the alternative for us was
to continue denying any respon-
sibility whatsoever for it. They
would undoubted!. yas they saidt
they would do, take it before
the United Nations, submit id1(
the evidence to the United
Nations, and we would have dug
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.1 4
Excerpts From Censored Transcript of Senate Panel's Hearing on U-2 and Summit
Sheeiel to The New York Tire,. ,
WASHINGTON, May
27'?
Following are excerpts from th
'censored transcript of today'
hearings of the Senate Foreign
Relations, Committee on the U-
' incident and the failure of th
sUmmit conference. Senator
resent inc14141( J. W. Fut
lir Man4field
-bright, Deraiwrirof .4rkinsas
chairman;
Democrat of Montana; Alber
Gore, Democrat of Tennessee
Frank J. Lausiche Democrat
Ohio; AleadnalirkWiley, Repitb
lican of W4consin; Bourke
.Hickenlooper, Republican o
Iowa; George D. Aiken, Repub
:lican of Vermont, and Frank
Carlson, Republican of Kansas.
The primary witness was Secre-
tary of State Christian A. Her-
-ter. Also present were Under
..,Secretary of State Douglas Dil-
lon, Charles R. Bohlen, special
adviser to the Secretary of
State, and others.
The committee met at 10:07
,.A.. M., pursuant to notice, Sen-
ator J. W. Fulbright (chair-
man of the full committee) pre-
siding.
final analysis understand our
policiea if they are to be sup-
e pcirttel by the people, we have
a arranged for a high-ranking
official st-thiskasecutive Branch
2 to deletirilleenV- the executive
e transcript illirWiatements or in-
s formation which might in any
_ way jeopardize tBn*ttonal se-
curity; Should any question aris
as to whether such deletions go
t beyond those necessary to pro-
tect the national security, I will
appoint a bipartisan subcoirmit-
? tee to coruuder Such sues-
. tions * * *
r
e
e,
Mr. Fulbright
Mr. Secretary, we apprecisfo
your willingness to come herft
today to discuss with the com-
mittee the events of recent
days and weeks which are re-
lated to the collapse of the
long-planned summit confer-
ence.
? ,Chairman Khrushchev,
pr
for months has pronnitilitr a
summit conference and invited
-people throughout the world to
believe' that an easing of ten-
sions between the free world
and the Communist world might
be possible, has now dashed
,those hopes_ In a few Short
hours he destroyed the atmo-
sphere of negotiation which
had been built up over long
months.
Mr. Secretary, you and the
President have been frequent
in your warnings in the past
thta our hopes must not VIse
too high lest they be da
to pieces, as they have beer!,
by a swing of the Soviet pen-
dulum.
Despite the fact that there
are few in the free world who
doubt that the principal onus
SO the destruction of summit
hopes must be borne by Chair-
man Khruchchev, there are
many who believe that our con-
duct has not been without fault.
They believe there are things
we might have done, which
were not done. They believe
there were things which we did,
which might better have been
left undone?or delayed.
I have long believed that one
of the basic strengths of our
democracy is found in our ca-
pacity of self-appraisal ? our
ability to be critical, without
destroying our unity.
Task Confronts Committee
At this particular juncture of
history, this committee is con-
fronted with a most difficult
task. Without furthering the
objectives of the Soviet Union,
we must subject our own ac-
tivities to careful scrutiny to
ascertain whether we have con-
ducted ourselves in a way best
calculated ot promote the inter-
ests of this nation and to pre-
serve the peace of the world.
I am sure there are some who
will feel that any such scrutiny
of our own activities can serve
no good purpose. As for my-
self, however, I believe that fail-
ure now to review and assess
our conduct would be to neglect
our responsibility and to lose an
.opportunity to imprve the pro-
cedures and the execution of
our foreign policy.
I take this occasion, Mr. Sec-
retary, to assure you once again
that I am certain there is no
Intention on the part of any
member of this committee to
deal with this subject on a
partisan basis. We are meet-
ing here not as Republicans or
Democrats, but as members of
the Senate, who, in taking their
oaths of office, swore, as did
you, to uphold the same Consti-
tution.
We are concerned, as you are,
that nothing that takes place
here in any way damage the
conduct of our foreign policy.
Above all, we should strive to
aVoid bitter partisan debate
which might _prejudice the rea-
sonable and effective conduct
of our foreign policy in the
future. The motives of par-
ticipants in events of recent
weeks are not at issue. At the
same time we seek, as lam sure
you do, to conduct this review
in such a way that we may
learn from the events of the
past weeks what we can do to
improve our foreign policies and
our governmental procedures
for their formulation and execu-
tion.
Sensitive Subjects
I know that the subjects
which we will be discussing are
most sensitive and delicate. In-
deed, we should acknowledge
that there is one vast area of
Executive Branch activity which
is not subject to the usual type
of Congressional control, or to
the check of public opinion?
that is, the operations of the
Central Intelligence Agency. Its
operations, as similar activities
of all great nations, are divorced
and separate from the normal
standards and the usual re-
straints that are characteristic
of other Governmental opera-
tions.
*4*
There is no point in our pre-
tending that the black arts of
Intelligence operations no not
now, and have not throughout
recorded history, involved viola-
tions of every commandment.
They do. Lying, cheating, mur-
der, stealing, seduction and sw-
ede are part of the unpleasant
business in which all great na-
tions partieiptae?not because
they want to, not because they
- believe these acts are moral, but
because they believe such activi-
ties are essential to their own
self-preservation. This is one of
the ugly facts of life in this
, As you know, the committee
' has agreed that these sessions
are to be executive. However,
in- order to make the maximum
amount of information available
to the public, which must in the
-
Mr. Herter
* * * On May 1 oceured th
unfortunate failure oflat-Intel
ligence mission. Tl* U;
at once seized on it to compli-
cate the approach to the sum-
mit. With regard to the role of
the U. S. Government in this
matter, I cannot hope to im-
press on the lucid and straight-
fgregard account which the
President gave to the natio
Wednesetay night. . . .
Ifere--I would only like t
re-enphasize four central point
which stood out in the Presi
dent's accolint:
1. The U-2 program was a
Important and efficient intern
ence effort. We knew tha
failure of any mission unde
this _program would have serious
coneequenceS but we considere
that the great benefit derived
justified the risks involved.
2. The decision not to suspen
this program of flights, as th
summit meeting approached
was a sound decision. Condition
at a later season would have
prevented obtaining very im
portant information. There is
never a "good time" for a fail-
ure of an intelligence inission.
We believe it unwise to lower
our vigilance because of theta
political negotiations.
1. Initial statements by 01
- S. Government properly
sought first of all to protec
the pilot, his intelligence mis
sion and everything connected
with it that might still be kep
secret But when it became
clear that plane and pilot were
in Soviet hands we believed the
Congress and the American
people should be given the facts
Thus up to May 7, U. S. states
ments followed the general line
of the cover story, and there-
ter .weri idjuated to thiAitu-
on ss it developed. _
4 Since the U-2 system had
been compromised, it was diss
continued as any other intei
genee mission- would be in suc
a case. Announcement of its
discontinuance was withheld
until the President could convey
the fact personally in Paris.
Course Called Sound
Based on these four points, I
believe most Americans will
agree that the main course of
our actions, given what we
knew at any particular time,
was sound. In particular, I
have doubts that any alteration
in the language of United States
statements would have made
any difference in the arbitrary
Soviet demands which fol-
lowed. * * *
On my arrival in Paris on
Friday, May 13, there was al-
ready considerable speculation
at the news that Mr. Khru-
shchev was arriving in Paris on
Saturday, rather than on Sun-
day, the day on which the
President and Mr. Macmillan
were due to arrive. * * *
On Sunday at 11 A. M., at
his request, Mr. Khrushchev,
accompanied by Foreign Minis-
ter [Anrei I.] Gromyko and
Marshal Malinovsky [Marshal
Rodion Y. Malinovsky, Soviet
Minister of Defensej?which is
in itself an unusual procedure
which I shall revert to later?
called on President de Gaulle at
the Elysee Palace.
During this meeting he left
with President de Gaulle a
memorandum setting forth the
conditions which would have to
be met by the United States
before Khrushchev would be
prepared to attend a summit
conference. The French dele-
gation provided a copy of this
memorandum to the American
delegation early that after-
noon. * * *
It was our general conclu-
sion, subsequently borne out
by the facts, that the position
and totally unacceptable de-
mands set forth in this docu-
ment had been drawn up in
Moscow prior to Mr. Khru-
shchev's departure. In this sense
it represented a fixed Soviet
Governmental position from
Which even Mr. Khrushchev-
would not have the authority
to depart while in Paris.
Soviet Delegate Bound
I might digress here to ob-
serve that it had been our ex-
perience at previous conferences
with the Soviets, at least since
the death of Stalin, that the
Soviet representative, no matter
how highly placed he might be,
was bound by the collective de-
cisions on basic policy matters
made prior to his departure
from Moscow. Any substantive
changes in these positions ap-
parently required reference back
to Moscow before they could
be undertaken.
I should like to emphasize
the opinion which was thus
unanimously arrived at in the
American delegation, since it
bore directly upon the position
which the President took at the
meeting on Monday morning.
It was out of the question, of
course. that there should be
any acceptance by the Presi-
dent of the humiliating and ar-
rogant conditions of Mr. Khru-
shchev. We had very much in
mind, however, the importance
of showing the world that it
was Mr. Khrushchev, and no
one else, who was placing this
summit conference in peril.
President Made Decision
The President, therefore, de-
cided before the Monday meet-
ing that the proper course of
action, consonant with the great
responsibility which he bore and
the seriousness of the issues,
was not to engage in vitupera-
tion with Mr. Khrushchev, but
to demonstrate the restraint and
dignity which was incumbent
upon the office he holds and
which befitted the leader of a
great country.
In connection with this elect-
United Pre.s International Telephoto
BEFORE CLOSED HEARnisO: Senator J. W. Fulbright, standing, Arkansas Democrat,
talks with Secretary of Statillterter. Mr. Fulbright heads Foreign Relations Committee.
-
sion, the President resolved to
announce to the conference- his
previously taken decision. to
suspend further flights of 15-2
aircraft over -the Soviet Union.
4thOugh ting original inten-
trim bad' been to rtRtfict the
first meeting of confippinee
t Abe e I 0
Stittellufdlitentli=of et#
and to their interpreters, th
President, on learning Gromyli
and Marshal Malinovsky wouM
attend, asked Secretary Gate
and Mysfitlf to accomppny him
to thfli meeting ? * ?
This meeting completely con
firmed our conclusion of th
night before that Mr. Khru
shchev was operating within
the fixed limits of a policy se
before his departure from Mos
cow. It is significant in this
connection that the statement
he issued later that day, Mon-
day, May 16, which was identi-
cal with the one he had made
at the conference, took no cog-
nizance whatsoever of the dis-
cussion at the conference, and
in particular of the President's
statement concerning the sus-
pension of U-2 overflights * * *
Thus the summit conference
was ended by Soviet intransi-
gence before it began, without
addressing the great interna-
tional issues with which it was
supposed to deal.
We have naturally given a
great deal of thought to the
reasons for this extraordinary
action by the Soviets in coming
all the way from Moscow to
Paris for the sole purpose of
sabotaging the conference.
I should like to say right off
that there are many obscure
aspects of this Soviet behavior
and that we do not know all
considerations and factors which
went into its determination. We
probably never shall. I hardly
need to emphasize here to the
members of this committee the
complete secrecy in which deci-
sions are arrived at in the So-
viet Government and in the
hierarchy of the Communist
party, which is the effective
ruler of that country. It is only
possible to try to deduce from
Soviet actions, after they are
taken, the considerations which
brought them about. What I
give you now, therefore, is at
best a tentative estimate of
why the Soviet Union behaved
as it did, an estimate which may
have to be revised in the light
of further information and fu-
ture events.
brutal and threatening attitude
he adopted at Paris it was con-
sidered desirable to have some
tangible evidence of Soviet
armed strength in the person
of Marshal Malinovsky. Sec-
Gromyko and Malinovsky
uld.,b able to testify upon
ft Moscow that he had
ASA "Vfictly to the agreed
sitioiCA, ?
?
Ito-kens certain that the
6 cbien to cancel the invitation
to thefresident was made be-
fore ?nnishchey left Moscow.
As to what led the Soviets to
- this extreme position, in regard
e to the summit meeting which
- had, previously appeared so
much desired by Mr. Khruschev,
t we enter into the realm of pure
speculation, as I indicated ear-
Her. The most we can hope to
do in the absence of reliable in-
formation is to evaluate the ele-
ments and factors which appear
to have entered into this de
cision. shall try to list them
briefly.
1. There was considerable in-
dication, particularly during
April, that Mr. Khrushchev had
concluded that there was like-
lihood of his having his way,
particularly in regard to Berlin,
at the summit. Evidence of
Western determination and unity
on this point in speeches and
statements by Western leaders
appears to have brought him to
this conclusion. Thus, in his
Baku speech on April 25, he
not only reiterated with the ut-
most finality his position on
Berlin, including his intention
to conclude a separate peace
treaty with the East German
Regime, but he also began for
the first time seriously to cast
doubts upon the success of the
summit. By this, of course, he
meant success on Soviet terms.
2. Although the evidence is
highly inconclusive, there are a
number of indications that Mr.
Khrushchev's conduct of So-
viet foreign policy, particularly
his over-personalization and?in
Communist eyes?over-commit-
ment through personal visits to
the United States and France,
was arousing at least serious
questioning, if not opposition,
to the Soviet hierarchy. It
would seem a logical deduction
that some of the opposition to
his conduct of foreign relations
which was openly voiced by the
Chinese Communists found a
sympathetic response-
some of his associates, and very
probably among the Soviet
military.
3. It was against this back-
ground that the 15-2 incident
occurred. A combination of
these three factors in our judg-
ment is what resulted in the
definite and brutal decision to
disrupt the Paris conference.
Tto determine how each of thesei
factors should be weighed is.1
for the moment, beyond our I
reach.
One Thing Is Certain
There is one thing, however,
that can be regarded as certain:
This is the decision to wreck
the conference was made prior
to Khrushchev's departure from
Moscow. At no point during his
stay in Paris ? neither when
he disclosed his true intentions
to General de Gaulle at 11 A. M.
on Sunday the 15th nor subse-
quently ? did Khrushchev devi-
ate one inch from his demands
that the United States (1) de-
nounce the overflights, (2)
apologize to the Soviet Union,
(3) punish those responsible for
these flights. Neither the state-
ment made by the President at
the one meeting held on Mon-
day nor the serious and respon-
sible efforts of General de Gaulle
and Mr. Macmillan in bilateral
talks with Mr. Khrushiliev be-
fore and after the President's
announcement of suspension of
flights could persuade him to
withdraw these unacceptable
demands. Indeed, it is a logical
deduction from his behavior in
Paris that he had no authority
to modify his position to any
significant degree.
The fact that he was ac-
companied everywhere, and lit-
erally everywhere, by Foreign
Minister Gromyko and Marshal
Malinovsky is an interesting
sidelight on this point. There is
much speculation as to this
change from his previous atti-
tude during his visits both to
the United States and France,
when he insisted upon having
meetings alone with the Presi-
dent and with President de
Gaulle, with only interpreters
present. The best guess as to
the significance of this new fac-
toe i,r that (1) in -,,,i O5 of th
Incident Seized Upon
The U-2 incident was most
certainly seized upon and mag-
nified beyond its true propor-
tions as a justification for this
decision. It is debatable whether
it would have been possible for
Mr. Khrushchev to devise an-
other pretext for so radical and
violent a position.
It might well be that a lack
of success at the summit would
have confronted Khrushchev
with a much more difficult
choice, for his point of view,
than no conference at all. He
and his associates may have
therefore much preferred to
avoid facing the consequences
of failure of negotiation by the
simple expedient of torpedoing '
the conference.
It may seem incredible to you
that responsible leaders of a
great power should have come
all the way to Paris merely for
the purpose of wrecking the
conference, thereby incurring
world-wide condemnation of the
Soviet Union and enhancing thel
sense of unity and purpose
among not only the Western
powers represented there but
also the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and free nations
everywhere.
I believe the answer Iles in a I
Khrushchev's and the Soviet's
thinking.
Mr. Khrushchev undoubtedly
hoped ? and this explains his
early arrival in Paris?to divide
the Allies and isolate the United
States. He anticipated that the
United States would refuse the
demands he had set forth and
that the conference would then
collapse, with the United States
bearing the responsibility for
the rupture before world
opinion.
Flans Miscarried
His plans miscarried because
our two Allies stood solidly and
loyally with the United States
and refused to be parties to Mr.
Khrushchev's scheme. The re-
sult, as the whole world knows,
was that the position which Mr.
Khrushchev brought to Paris
resulted in the complete isola-
tion of the Soviet Union rather
than the United States and in
placing the responsibility for
the disruption of the conference
squarely where it belongs?on
his own shoulders.
This estimate of the reasons
for Mr. Khrushchev's behavior
is strongly supported by the at-
tack which he made at his press
conference on General de Gaulle
and Prime Minister Macmillan
for what he termed their lack
of objectivity, lack of will and
subservience to the Allied re-
lationships?in other words, in
plain English, for their solidari-
ty with the United States, their
loyalty to our common purpose,
and their refusal to play the
Soviet game,
I believe the signs are that
there has been as yet no radical
alteration in Soviet policy,
though we can expect the con-
tinuance of a propaganda ef-
fort designed to split off the
United States from its Allies.
This conclusion is supported by
Mr. Khrushchev's Paris state-
ments, including those at his
press conference. It is support-
ed, somewhat more specifically
and definitely, by the state-
ments which he made in Berlin
on his way home.
Soviet Secrecy Stressed
We must remember, however,
that, given the nature of the
Soviet state, the men who run
it can meet in secret at any
time and change existing policy
without public debate or even
foreshadowing any such change.
It is for this reason that any
statement about a phase of
Soviet policy must be regarded
as qualified, with no certainty
that it will remain valid in the
future.
Thus, though the world's
hopes have been keenly disap-
pointed by the fact that the
summit conference was not held
as planned, the signs so far are
that the basic realities of the
world situation have not been
greatly changed. Whether this
continues to be so depens, as I
have indicated, on actions of the
leading Communist countries.
Provisionally, however, I con-
clude that the implication for
United States policy is that the
main lines of our policy remain
sound and should be continued.
The lesson of Paris is that we
should prosecute those lines
with renewed effort. Proponents
within the Communist bloc of
an aggressive course must not
be encouraged by signs of weak-
ness on our part. Proponents of
a peaceful course should be
encouraged by our readiness to
get on with outstanding interna-
tional business in a sober and
rational manner.
.We must remain prepared to
withstand aggressive pressures,
not only in Berlin but also else-
where. I trust that our evident
readiness will deter such pres-
sures.
Among the lessons of Paris,
the most important for the free
world, including ourselves, it
seems to me is fresh realiza-
tion of the dangers we face and
consequent need for closing of
ranks and moving ahead with
our own and our allies' programs
for strengthening the free
world. We came back from Paris
with a keener sense of what
it means to have allies, and I
lo oyo 1-3?_ ooy- ryllizyro,o, 3,1.11
take new life from this experi-
ence.
At the same time I would
stress equally the need to ex-
pand imaginatively and gener-
ously our collaboration with the
newly developing countries.
On both accounts, I hope the
Congress will give wholehearted
support to our Mutual Security
Programs as authorized by this
cominittee, which are now more
important than ever.
We must continue, as the
President has said; to seek in a
business-like way to make prog-
ress on outstanding problems
with the Soviet Union. We in-
tend to go ahead with existing
negotiations, to stand by our
commitments, and to foster
open communications and peace-
ful exchanges. Above all, we
shall not cease from the most
determined, patient, resourceful
endeavor to find ways to bring
the arms race under control
and thus to meet the nuclear
menace that hangs over man-
kind.
Asks Calm Outlook
I believe in this period it is
incumbent upon us, all of us,
to keep a calm and steady gaze
on the world scene and to avoid
actions, sttements and attitudes
which might tend unnecessarily
to increase international ten-
sion. If such an increase is to
occur, it should be clearly the
fault of the Soviets and we
should not do them the favor
of providing pretext for action
by them which would have this
effect.
We should not define as
"hard" or "soft" our attitude
or policy toward the Soviet
Union. To do so is not only to
deflect our gaze from the grim
reality that confronts us, but
even more to plunge us inevi-
tably into fruitless and damag-
ing domestic recriminations.
We must now, as in the
future, maintain a vigilant,
calm and resolute posture and,
insofar as it lies in our power
to do so, be accurate in our
estimates and effective in our
actions.
I would close in expressing
the hope that we will not be-
come so fixed in preoccupation
with the Soviet challenge as to
lost sight of our own construc-
tive purposes?which are larger
and more important than mere-
ly resisting or reacting to ex-
ternal threats.
We have our own vision of the
future toward which we want to
see the world evolve. We have
our own programs for helping
to bring that future about?for
holding high the light of free-
dom, for sharing its message
and rewards with emering na-
tions, for trying to creat an in-
ternational community in which
the rule of law will replace the
rule of force. It is to these pro-
grams that our talents and en-
eries should be rededicated in
the uncertain times that lie
ahead.
Suspension of U-2 Flights
THE CHAIRMAN?Proceed-
ing, Mr. Secretary, under our
agreed regulations, can you tell
the committee when the deci-
sion to suspend any further
flights over Russian territory
was taken?
SECRETARY HERTER?My
impression is that it was taken
on the Thursday before the
President went to Paris * * *
THE CHAIRMAN?What
were the considerations which
led to the decision taken on
the 12th, I believe, This/v*9.y
the 12th of May, that there
should be no further flights over
the?
SECRETARY HERTER?Mr.
Chairman, I think I answered
that in my own statement, in
which I said that since the IT-2
system had been compromised,
It was discontinued as any
other intelligence mission would
be insuch a case.
THE CHAIRMAN?It had
been compromised sometime be-
fore the 12th, wasn't it?
SECRETARY HERTER?No,
sir.
THE CHAIRMAN ? Was a
moratorium on flights agreed
upon prior to May 1 to be
effective at any time after
May 1?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
Not that I know of.
THE CHAIRMAN?Was any
moratorium on the flights
agreed upon prior to May 1,
o be effective at any time after
May 1.
SECRETARY HERTER ? I
have heard reports to that ef-
fect, but of my own knowledge
I do not know.
THE CHAIRMAN?Was such
a moratorium ever discussed or
considered by anyone in the
State Department?
SECRETARY HERTER?Not
by Mr. Dillon nor myself.
[Douglas Dillon is Under Sec-
retary of State.]
THE CHAIRMAN?Or any-
one?
SECRETARY HERTER. I
don't know of anyone.
THE CHAIRMAN?Do you
know whether the C. I. A. con-
sidered such a moratorium?
SECRETARY HERTER ? I
do not, sir.
Dulles Will Testify
THE CHAIRMAN?Did Mr.
Dulles [Allen W. Dulles, direc-
tor of the Central Intelligence
Agency] or anyone else order
a suspension of flights after the
loss of the plane on May 1?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
That Sir, he will be able to
testify to. I can't tell you as of
what date he did that.
THE CHAIRMAN ? Were
any other planes lost on these
same ventures prior to May 1?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
Not other Soviet territory.
THE CHAIRMAN ? None
had been shot down or lost over
Soviet territory?
SECRETARY HERTER?No.
THE CHAIRMAN ? The
flight referred to, that Chair-
man Khrushchev referred to on
April 9, you were aware of
that, were you?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN?It was a
successful flight over?
SECRETARY HERTER?It
was.
THE CHAIRMAN?If the
president decided to suspend the
ilaglyto May 16.
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100060001-7
Senators Handicapped
By Silent Microphones
WASHINGTON, May 27
(UPI)?The $27,000,000 new
Senate office building has an
elaborate system of micro-
phones for members and wit-
nesses in each committee
room.
But members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee
and Secretary of State Chris-
tian A. Herter had trouble
hearing and understanding
each other throughout a long
morning session on the ill-
fated summit conference.
Only when he moved down
to the witness table for a
news conference afterward
did Chairman J. W. Ful-
bright, Democrat of Arkan-
sas, find out why. The micro-
phones weren't turned on.
which you stated he did on the
12th, why was this announce-
ment delayed-until the meeting
with Chairman Khrushchev on
the 16th?
SECRETARY HERTER?Be-
cause the President reserved
that decision to make the an-
nouncement in Paris.
THE CHAIRMAN?What was
reasoning for doing that?
SECRETARY HERTER ? I
cannot give you the answer, sir.
THE CHAIRMAN?I believe
you stated very convincingly
that Chairman Khrushchev
came to the conference deter-
mined to wreck it. Do you be-
lieve that the U-2 incident con-
tributed to this determination
on the part of Chairman Khru-
shchev?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
Yes, I believe it did. It was one
of the factors as I tried to ex-
plain in my statement.
THE CHAIRMAN?Why do
you think?
SECRETARY HERTER?Mr.
Chairman, might I for a mo-
ment go back to the previous
question you had asked as to
the President's delay in an-
nouncing the suspension of the
flights?
You may recall that he, at
the summit or at the so-called
meeting in Paris, coupled that
with the offer of bringing into
the United Nations a proposal
for a general overlight program
superintended by the United
Nations, and wanted to couple
those two things together.
THE CHAIRMAN?Mr. Sec-
retary, why do you think Chair-
man Khrushchev left a way out
for the President by suggesting
in one of his earlier statements
that he believed the President
did not know about these
flights?
SECRETARY HERTER?I
can there, of course, only spec-
ulate that he had himself com-
mitted himself very strongly in
Russia with regard to his friend-
ship for the President, and
wished to in that way continue
the possibility of the President's
disclaiming any responsibility
for the flight.
THE CHAIRMAN ? What
was the reason for not accept-
ing this way out on our part?
Why didn't we accept that sug-
gestion?
SECRETARY HERTER?It
was a question of judgment as
to when the essential facts had
been revealed by the capture of
the pilot and the plane with all
its instrumentation intact, the
United States Government
should admit the fact that this
overflight had taken place, that
it was an intelligence overflight,
and that decision was made, of
course, by the President him-
self.
The General Practice
THE CHAIRMAN?Mr. Sec-
retary, you are a long-time de-
votee of international relations
and thoroughly familiar with
precedents in this field. Is the
public assumption and respon-
sibility for espionage by the
head of a state the usual and
customary practice among na-
tions?
SECRETARY HERTER?No,
the general practice has been, I
think, for a long period of time
to deny any responsibility what-
ever.
THE CHAIRMAN?Do you
know of any precedent in our
history or in the history of any
great nation in which the head
of state has assumed personal
responsibility for espionage ac-
tivities?
SECRETARY HERTER?No,
I do not know of any first hand.
It may be that there have been
some. On the other hand, I
would point out, Mr. Chairman,
that this particular incident was
of a very unusual nature.
THE CHAIRMAN?As a gen-
eral policy, do you believe it is
wise for the head of state to
assume responsibility for espion-
age activities?
SECRETARY HERTER?
Well, very frankly, I don't think
it makes a great deal of differ
ence from the point of view of
what the public believes.
On the other hand, I believe
in a case of this kind the telling
of the truth was the better
course than getting deeper into
fabricating excuses or disavow-
ing responsibility.
Unusual Circumstances
THE CHAIRMAN ? What
precisely were the reasons that
persuaded you to depart from
precedent in this case? What
were the unusual circumstances
you referred to?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
The unusual circumstances
were the facts that the materiel
and the statement of the pilot,
not every bit of which was ac-
curate, but a great part of
which was accurate, had been
revealed, and were being pres-
ented to impartial tribunals for
examination.
Under those circumstances,
which was very different from
the ordinary espionage case, I
think it would have become'
extremely evident and was ex-
tremely evident that this inci-
dent had taken place.
THE CHAIRMAN?Well, in
our spy cases, isn't it a fact
that the evidence of the par-
ticular person being a spy, of
some of those we had, was not
in question? The difference is
in whether or not the head of
state takes responsibility for it,
not that it was convincingly
shown he was a spy. Isn't that
the difference?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
That is a difference.
THE CHAIRMAN?We often
catch a spy. We have ourselves,
it has been related, and there is
no doubt he is a spy with all the
paraphernalia which usually ac-
companies a spy, but the point
I thought that would be very
interesting to the committee to
know is why in this particular
case, in spite of the convincing
nature of the evidence that he
was a spy, that the President
and the head of state should
assume responsibility for it.
SECRETARY HERTER ?
The first was that it was obvi-
ous from the facts as to what
had occurred. Second was that
the situation which had led to
this entire activity was the one
which is probably disturbing the
peace of the world the most and
leads to the greatest tensions in
the world, namely, the danger
of surprise attack, and the
secrecy behind the Soviet Union.
When Parley Was Wrecked
THE CHAIRMAN ? Was it
not after the President said that
he did know and took full re-
sponsibility for these flights
that Chairman Khrushchev be-
came completely intransigeant
and wrecked the conference?
SECRETARY HERTER ?
That is very difficult to deter-
mine. If I may, I would like to
cite at this point just one piece
of evidence that I mentioned
yesterday before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee.
On May 6 the Soviet Embassy
in Washington, before any state-
ment had been made accepting
any degree of responsibility, be-
fore the President had made
any statement, this was on May
6, cancelled from the magazine
which is published in the United
States similar to the magazine
which is published by the United
States in Russia, called the
U. S. S. R., stopped a press run
of- that anagashie-snd.took,
of it all references to the com-
ing visit of the President to So-
viet Russia. The magazine had
in it a welcome to the President
in his visit to Russia, pictures
of the places that he was going
to, and a good many photo-
graphs indicating what a great
success his visit was going to
be. That was cancelled and
taken out of the magazine en-
tirely. * "
SENATOR GREEN, Demo-
crat of Rhode Island?May I
ask a few more questions about
the same matter, because I do
not understand and perhaps it
is my fault, how far did the
President act alone and how far
the State Department acted
alone before they came together
and agreed on the situation?
Calls Consultation Steady
SECRETARY HERTER?I
would say there was consulta-
tion right through in this peri-
od, May I make this observa-
tion, Mr. Chairman, from the
point of view of first-hand
knowledge on these matters, I
asked Mr. Dillon to come up
with me because for the?until
May 6, 1 was out of the United
States, he was acting Secretary
of State and some of the ques-
tions that may be directed to
that period when I was out of
the country he can answer
from first-hand information,
whereas I would have to do it
only from second-hand informa-
tion.
THE CHAIRMAN?We would
be very glad to have Mr. Dillon
supplement the statement when-
ever you would like.
SENATOR GREEN?Mr. Dil-
lon, then will you take up the
answer to my question?
MR. DILLON?All I can say
is that in the period that I had
responsibility we were in con-
tact regularly with the Presi-
dent with full coordination.
SENATOR GREEN ? Well,
the division of authority seems
to have resulted in a great
many understandings which
have well been spread in the
press, and the people are anx-
ious to be informed on how it
Continued on Next Page
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IT'S A DATE!
this Sunday let's have
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Approved For Release 2004/05/fiy Elit-NE9OT00782R000100060001-7
.1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?APPENDIX
do? When a country declares war on you
agai and again for over 40 years and the
philo . y has done the same for nearly a
hundre ? rs do you love them and forget
their nam Judas?
Communi ust be defeated to have civ-
ilization, relig and mankind for none of
them exist in a ue and honorable form
under communism. ere is an old saying
fight Are with fire a ? how can we serve
liberty by placing it u.. the chopping block
and giving the enemy a s ax?
Patrick Henry once sal "Peace, peace
when there is no peace," also, "Give
me liberty or give me death."
I am a conscientious objecto every-
thing that sells our free Republic ort.
Very truly yours,
et"
WILLIAM BERNARD.
The Summit Meeting
Exivt.NSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ALEXANDER WILEY
OF WISCONSIN
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Friday, May 27, 1960
Mr. 'WILEY. Mr. President, this
morning, the Secretary of State, the
Honorablerata, appeared
before the Foreign Relations Committee
and gave a very illuminating statement.
I understand the statement was first re-
leased to the press.
I believe this statement by the Secre-
tary of State and the President's remarks
of the other evening, over the radio and
television, give the complete story. From
these two statements, the people of
America can obtain all the facts neces-
sary to be had in connection with the so-
called fiasco at the summit which was
caused by Khrushchev.
I ask unanimous consent that the
Watment by the Secreta iy of State be
prin ? ppei?A?=TM-c o
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTIAN A.
HERTER, SECRETARY OF STATE, BEFORE THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE,
FRIDAY, May 27, 1980
I. THrtriirsirV THE SUMMIT
A. The threat to Frertire"a4*-"
In order to understand what happened in
Paris we need to look back over the preced-
ing 18 months.
In November 1958, the U.S.S.R. began a
new strategy directed toward altering the
situation in Berlin and East Germany in its
favor. If the Western Powers refused to give
up their present position in Berlin and make
West Berlin a so-called free city, the Soviet
Union stated its intention to proceed uni-
laterally at the end of 6 months, turning
over full sovereignty to the so-called G.D.R.
and thereby confronting the Allies with the
alternative of capitulation or resort to force
which would be met by Communist force.
Though the strategy as it unfolded proved
to be more flexible than its original state-
ment, it is still the official policy of the
U.S.S.R. Its force lies in the Soviet ability
to threaten Berlin, where we are morally
committed but physically exposed.
The Western Powers, of course, promptly
rejected the Soviet proposal and reaffirmed
their determination to stand by Berlin.
In the months that followed, while the
U.S.S.R. elaborated and pressed its strategy,
the Western Powers concerted their plans to
meet it. They sought to engage the U.S.S.R
in negotiation, thereby clarifying its inten-
tions and, either attaining solutions accept-
able to the West or, as a Minimum, convinc-
ing it that unilateral action against Berlin
would not be sound.
B. Engaging the U.S.S.R. negotiation
It was by no means a foregone conclusion
that the U.S.S.R. would negotiate on an ac-
ceptable basis. In January 1959 the U.S.S.R.
proposed a conference to adopt a peace treaty
with the two parts of an indefinitely divided
Germany. The Western Powers continued to
maintain that a peace treaty could be nego-
tiated and signed only with a unified Ger-
many, hence that the reunification of Ger-
many must be settled first. They also
maintained that the only proper solution for
Berlin lay in its becoming the capital of a
unified Germany, and therefore they were
unwilling to discuss Berlin as an isolated
issue. But the U.S.S.R. had held for some
time that reunification was solely the busi-
ness of the Germans and therefore refused
to discuss it.
The West persisted. during February and
March iii its efforts to get the Russians
talking somehow. It proposed a meeting of
Foreign Ministers, with the prospect of a
possible summit meeting when due prepara-
tions had been made. The U.S.S.R. had re-
peatedly indicated a desire for one since 1956.
Finally a compromise agenda, which did not
prejudice the substantive views of either
side, was adopted for a foreign ministers'
meeting and a date was set in May, shortly
before the expiration of the original Soviet
deadline for meeting their arbitrary demands
on Berlin.
C. Foreign ministers' deadlock
During the intensive preparations for the
meeting the Western Powers developed a new
version of their basic position regarding
Germany,, which was submitted at Geneva
as the Western peace plan. It consisted in
approaching the unification of Germany
through a series of stages, thereby offering
the U.S.S.R. a chance to adjust its position
gradually to the eventual loss of its hold on
East Germany which free elections would
presumably bring. The plan showed flexibil-
ity and imagination; it appealed to world
opinion, but its rejection by the U.S.S.R.
was nonetheless flat. The U.S.S.R. stuck
adamantly to its previously announced pro-
posals for a peace treaty with a divided Ger-
many. Thus the basic positions remained
totally unreconciled.
Finding no progress possible on Germany,
the Western Powers and the U.S.S.R. ex-
plored the possibility of an interim agree-
ment on Berlin which, without contemplat-
ing a basic solution of Berlin as a separate
issue, would do something to mitigate diffi-
culties which the U.S.S.R. professed to find
there. Though some progress was made in
this direction, the U.S.S.R. insisted on lan-
guage which would have implied the eventual
erosion of the Western position in Berlin.
Accordingly, despite the labor of 3 months
with only one short adjournment, the
Foreign Ministers' meeting ended in dead-
lock.
D. High-level trips
The failure of the Foreign Ministers' meet-
ing did not result in a War crisis, however,
because a parallel train of events had mean-
while brought hope in a different direction.
We took the opportunity of Mikoyan's visit
to the Soviet Embassy here in January to
arrange informal exchanges of views between
the Soviet leader and top U.S. officials. This
was followed in June and July by further
visits and exchanges of Koz.lov to this coun-
try and the Vice President to the 'U.S.S.R.
A4553
The fact that these visits took place without
public incident and made possible somewhat
more realistic communication than usual
with the Soviet leadership seemed to offer a
possibility?only a possibility, of course?
that means of avoiding war and eventually
getting Soviet-Western relations into some-
what less dangerous shape might be found
by developing these informal contacts.
Accordingly, the President decided to go
ahead with a move which he and his advisers
had long had in mind when the time seemed
right. He invited Chairman Khrushchev to
visit this country, and the visit was an-
nounced before the Foreign Ministers ended
their Geneva meeting.
During that visit no progress was made,
or indeed expected, on resolving outstanding
problems, but a somewhat greater degree of
mutual understanding was seemingly at-
tained, particularly on the need to settle
international questions by peaceful means
rather than by force. There was also a sus-
pension, later publicly acknowledged, of
Whatever was left of the Soviet ultimatum
on Berlin.
E. Preparation for the summit
After the Khrushchev visit it was judged
feasible and desirable by the Western Pow-
ers to move toward renewed discussion, this
time at the summit. Some flicker of hope
for progress on Berlin had appeared at Camp
David, whereas Geneva had ended in dead-
lock. During his American visit Khrushchev
had also evinced an interest in the equally
vital field of disarmament, and even though
disarmament talks were to start in the Com-
mittee of Ten at Geneva it was felt that
Khrushchev might reserve his constructive
moves, if any, for the summit.
Accordingly, after due consultations
among the Western heads of government an
invitation to a summit was sent to Khru-
shchev and accepted by him, and after some
difficulty over earlier dates the time was
finally set for May 16. This move found
broad support in Western public opinion.
There ensued an intensive and protracted
series of preparations on the Western side,
involving repeated meetings not only of the
Foreign Ministers and of NATO but even of
the heads of government. Within our own
Government we also studied most carefully
the possibilities of making progress not only
on Berlin and Germany but most particu-
larly in disarmament, as well as other aspects
of general Soviet-Western relations.
At the December meeting of Western heads
of Government a consensus emerged that
the May summit might be only one of a
series of such meetings, and that it would
be largely exploratory. Some modest prog-
ress was hoped for, but no major solutions
on any front. But if a beginning could be
made, the series of talks, possibly in a grad-
ually improving atmosphere over the years,
might do substantially more.
F. Summit prospects dimmed
In the first weeks after the Khrushchev
American visit there was a general improve-
ment of atmosphere and people began talk-
ing, partly in hope, partly in some confusion,
about "detente." There were comparatively
conciliatory speeches on each side; there
was progress in the test-ban talks at Geneva;
a new Soviet-United States cultural agree-
ment was signed November 21, and on De-
cember 1 the United States, the U.S.S.R.,
and other powers signed the Antarctic
Treaty.
But clouds began to gather even then.
One of the earliest signs was the strong
Soviet protest on November 11 against West
German plans to build a broadcasting sta-
tion in West Berlin. Another was the
Khrushchev speech on November 14 which
was harder in tone, boasted again of Soviet
missile prowess, and began a concentrated
attack on Adenauer and the German Federal
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i/A4554 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- APPENDIX
Republic which later increased and seemed
to be a central feature of Soviet presuramit
tactics. The reason for this attack is still "
a matter for speculation. Perhaps they
thought it would undermine the Western
position on Berlin by helping to divide the
Western Allies. It had no such effect of i
course, but naturally rallied us to speak :
out in defense of our German ally.
Khrushchev as early as December 1 also I
began repeating his threats to sign a separate
peace treaty with East Germany. He re-
peated these threats in his speech to the I
Supreme Soviet on January 14 and in his
remarks during his visit to Indonesia and .
other countries in January. On February
4, the Warsaw Pact powers issued the first
formal blocwide commitment to sign a sepa-
rate GDR peace treaty. Thus Khrushchev'
threatening Baku speech of April 25, thong
it was the most sweeping since Feb
1959, was only a harsher version of what h
had been saying for months before. I sha
make full documentation on his speeche
available to the committee.
Not until April did we reply, at length
to this mounting crescendo of Soviet state-
ments. We did so in order to keep the rec-
ord straight?notably in the speeches of
April 4 and 20, which Khrushchev attacked
for starting arguments that he in fact had
begun.
The unity of the four Western Powers on
Berlin meanwhile presumably signaled to the
U.S.S.R. that prospects for eroding the West-
ern position or obtaining Soviet terms on
Berlin remained slight. President de Gaulle
and other leaders were quite firm in dis-
couraging expectations on this front. The
NATO Council in Istanbul May 2-4 also
reaffirmed the Western position on German
reunification and regretted Soviet refusal to
discuss specific practical measures of dis-
armament. Thus as the summit drew near
the prospects for important agreement
seemed slender, so long as the U.S.S.R. re-
mained committed to driving the Western
Powers out of Berlin and to discussing dis-
armament in terms of general principles
rather than concrete steps.
The Western outlook consistently re-
mained, however, that the summit would be
worthwhile. It would afford an opportunity
for an exchange of views which would clarify
each side's position; it might contribute to
some reduction of tensions over Berlin and
narrow some of our differences on disarma-
ment. It could be at least a, small first step
in a long process of improving Soviet-
Western relations.
rirerignict4iimmagrigru
On May e unfortunate failure
of an intelligence mission. The U.S.S.R. at
once seized on it to complicate the approach
to the summit. With regard to the role of
the U.S. Government in this matter, I cannot
hope to improve on the lucid and straight-
forward account which the President gave
to the Nation Wednesday night. I will,
therefore, not attempt to go into detail,
although I am of course ready to answer
questions concerning my responsibilities.
Here I would only like to reemPhasize
four central points which stood out in the
President's account:
1. The U-2 program was an important and
eiXtertrant-#41114ering4r. We knew that
nder this program
would have serious consequences but we
considered that the great benefit derived
justified the risks involved.
2. The decision not to suspend this pro-
gram of flights, as the summit meeting ap-
proached, was a sound decision. Conditions
at a later season would have prevented ob-
taining very important information. There
is never a "good time" for a failure of an
intelligence mission. We believe it unwise
to lower our vigilance because of these po-
litical negotiations.
8- ;RIVAL Itatamenta by the U.S. Govern-
ment properly sought first of all to protect
the pilotak ini.Wence mission, and every-
thing conteetU" with it that might still be
kept secret. But when it became clear that
plane and pilot were in Soviet hands we
believed the Congress and the American peo-
ple should be given the facts. Thus up to
May 7 'U.S. statements followed the general
line of the cover story, and thereafter were
adjusted to the situation as it developed.
4. Since the U-2 system had been com-
promised, it was discontinued as any other
intelligence mission would be in such a case.
Announcement of its discontinuance was
Withheld until the President could convey
the fact personally in Paris.-
Based on these four points, I believe most
Americans will agree that the main course of
our actions, given what we knew at any par-
ticular time, was sound. In particular, I
have doubts that any alteration in the
language of U.S. statements would have
made any difference in the arbitrary Soviet
demands which followed.
NI. THE EVENTS IN PARIS
A. Narrative
/ should like to give you an account of
the major developments at Paris. I shall be
as brief as possible, since the details have
been widely publicized, But I would like to
tell you of those events which in my opinion
had a detriment effect there, and particu-
larly those which influenced the decisions of
the President.
On my arrival in Paris on Friday, May 13,
there was already considerable speculation
at the news that Mr. Khrushchev was arriv-
ing in Paris on Saturday rather than on
Sunday, the day on which the President and
Mr. Macmillan were due to arrive.
Mr. Khrushchev's statement on arrival at
Orly Airport gave no indication of his subse-
quent position. It was mild in character
and conveyed the distinct impression that
he would proceed with the summit confer-
ence despite the 11-2 incident. Subsequent
events showed that this was deliberately de-
signed to conceal his real purpose.
On Sunday at 11 a.m., at his request, Mr.
Khrushchev, accompanied by Foreign Min-
ister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky?
which is in itsself an unusual procedure
which I shall revert to later?called on
President de Gaulle at the Elyste Palace.
During this meeting he left with President
de Gaulle a memorandum setting forth the
conditions which would have to be met by
the United States before Khrushchev would
be prepared to attend a summit conference.
The French delegation provided a copy of
this memorandum to the American delega-
tion early that afternoon. The memoran-
dum was subsequently presented by Mr.
Khrushchev, without change, as the open-
ing part of his statement to the four-power
meeting on Monday morning, May 16.
After visiting President de Gaulle Sun-
day morning, Khrushchev called on Prime
Minister Macmillan at 4:30 p.m. on the same
day and read the same statement of posi-
tion to him.
The copy of the statement received from
the French delegation was, of course, the
subject of immediate consultation with the
President and with members of the Ameri-
can delegation as to its significance and
meaning.
It was our general conclusion, subse-
quently borne out by the facts, that the posi-
tion and totally unacceptable demands set
forth in this document had been drawn up in
Moscow prior to Mr. Khrushchev's departure.
In this sense it represented a fixed Soviet
governmental position from which even Mr.
Khrushchev would not have the authority to
depart while In Paris.
I might digress here to observe that it had
been our experience at previous conferences
with the Soviets, at least since the death of
May 27\
Stalin, that the Soviet representative, no
matter how highly placed he might be, was
bound by the collective decisions on basic
policy matters made prior to his departure
from Moscow. Any substantive changes in
these positions apparently required reference
back to Moscow before they could be under-
taken.
I should like to emphasize the opinion
which was thus unanimously arrived at in
the American delegation, since it bore di-
rectly upon the position which the President
took at the meeting on Monday morning.
It was out of the question, of course, that
there should be any acceptance by the Presi-
dent of the humiliating and arrogant condi-
tions of Mr. Khrushchev. We had very much
In mind, however, the importance of showing
the world that it was Mr. Khrushchev, and
no one else. Who was_placing this summit
conference in peril.
The President, therefore, decided before
the Monday meeting that the proper course
of action, consonant with the great respon-
sibility which he bore and the seriousness of
the issues which were to have been discussed
at the conference, was for him not to engage
in vituperation with Mr. Khrushchev but to
demonstrate the restraint and dignity which
was incumbent upon the office he holds and
which befitted the leader of a great country.
In connection with this decision, the Pres-
ident resolved to announce to the conference
his previously taken decision to suspend fur-
ther flights of U-2 aircraft over the Soviet
Union.
Although the original intention had been
to restrict the first meeting of the conference
at the summit to the chiefs of state and
heads of government and their interpreters,
the President, on learning that Mr. Khrush-
chev wished to bring Foreign Minister
Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky, asked
Secretary Gates and me to accompany him to
this meeting.
I do not need to describe this meeting in
detail beyond saying that Mr. Khrushchev
read a statement which, with interpretation,
took fully an hour. He read this entire
statement from a prepared text before him.
The first part of this statement was the
memorandum which he had left with Presi-
dent de Gaulle, plus certain additions which
were in the same vein as regards the United
States and which referred to Soviet willing-
ness to hold a summit conference within 6 to
8 months. The major addition was the can-
cellation of the invitation to the President
to visit the Soviet Union.
Apart from his statement, which was made
public, the President only once joined in the
ensuing discussion?in order to make clear
to Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues that
the suspension of the U-2 flights was not
merely for the duration of the conference
but for as long as he was in office.
The balance of the discussion at this meet-
ing, which I should point out was the only
one during the entire period in Paris at
which the Soviets were present, was largely
devoted to attempts by President de Gaulle
and Prime Minister Macmillan to dissuade
Mr. Khrushchev from the irrevocable step of
publishing his abusive statement, whose un-
acceptable conditions would render impos-
sible any conference at the summit, and to
Khrushchev's adamant insistence that he
would publish this statement and do so at a
time of his own choosing. The meeting
broke up on the basis of a suggestion by
President de Gaulle that the conferees should
reflect on this matter for 24 hours and then
examine the situation.
This meeting completely confirmed our
conclusion of the night before that Mr.
Khrushchev was operating within the fixed
limits of a policy set before his departure
from Moscow. It is significant in this con-
nection that the statement he issued later
that day, Monday, May 16, which was iden-
tical with the one he had made at the CON-
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1960
ference, took no cognizance whatsoever of the
discussion at the conference, and in particu-
lar of the President's statement concerning
the suspension of U-2 overflights.
The rest of the proceedings in Paris were
anticlimactic. It was apparent to all the
Western representatives that there was no
possibility of a summit conference short of a
changed position on Mr. Khrushchev's part.
On Monday Mr. Macmillan visited Mr. Khru-
shchev in a fruitless effort to persuade him
to withdraw his impossible demands.
On that same day President de Gaulle de-
cided, with the agreement of the President
and Prime Minister Macmillan, to call a ses-
sion of the summit conference for 3 p.m. on
Tuesday, May 17, which was after the 24-
hour recess which he had proposed on Mon-
day. He sent invitations in writing to the
three other participants.
The President, in accepting, made clear his
view that acceptance by the Soviet repre-
sentative would mean that the Soviets had
abandoned the demands which the President
had previously found completely unaccept-
able.
Mr. Khrushchev did not show up at the
appointed time for the Tuesday meeting.
After a great deal of telephoning between the
Soviet Embassy and the French Foreign Office
it became clear that he was refusing to attend
a summit conference and would only join in
what he termed a preliminary meeting to
ascertain if conditions could be created for
a summit conference. By this reference to
"conditions" he obviously meant the accept-
ance by the United States Of all of the condi-
tions he had set forth previously, and indeed
he so stated in a written communication to
President de Gaulle later that same day.
In the light of Mr. Khrushchev's refusal
to attend the summit conference, except on
terms which all three Western representa-
tives deemed unacceptable, the three West-
ern heads of government met briefly at 9:30
p.m., on May 17 to approve the final tri-
partite communique, a copy of which I should
like to insert in the record.
Thus the summit conference was ended by
Soviet intransigence before it began, without
addressing the great international issues with
which it was supposed to deal.
The following day, Wednesday, May 18, was
marked by tripartite meetings of the Western
heads of government and their Foreign Min-
isters to consider the situation. In these
meetings we sought to analyze the reasons
for the Soviet attitude, prospects for the
future, and the measures that the three
Western Powers might adopt.
This day was also marked by Mr. Khru-
shchev's press conference, which was fully
reported by press, television, and radio. It
was apparently an unparalleled performance
of vituperation, abuse, and loss of temper.
It should be noted, however, that despite
the apparently uncontrolled nature of his
remarks and actions at this press conference,
Mr. Khrushchev was very careful not to com-
mit himself to any specific course of action
in the international field.
B. Analysts
We have naturally given a great deal Of
thought to the reasons for this extraordinary
action by the Soviets in coming all the way
from Moscow to Paris for the sole purpose
of sabotaging the conference.
I should like to say right off that there
are many obscure aspects of this Soviet
behavior and that we do not know all con-
siderations and factors which went into its
determination. We probably never shall. I
hardly need to emphasize here to the mem-
bers of this committee the complete secrecy
in which decisions are arrived at in the
Soviet Government and in the hierarchy of
the Communist Party, which is the effective
ruler of that country. It is only possible
to try to deduce from Soviet actions, after
they are taken, the considerations which
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?APPENDIX
brought them about. What / give you now,
therefore, is at best a tentative estimate of
why the Soviet Union behaved as it did, an
estimate which may have to be revised in
the light of further information and future
events.
There is one thing, however, that can be
regarded as certain: This is that the deci-
sion to wreck the conference was made prior
to Khrushchev's departure from Moscow.
At no point during his stay in Paris?nei-
ther when he disclosed his true intentions
to General de Gaulle at 11 a.m. on Sunday
the 15th nor subsequently?did Khrushchev
deviate 1 inch from his demands that the
United States (1) denounoe the overflights,
(2) apologize to the Soviet Union, (3) punish
those "directly responsible," and (4) prom-
ise not to repeat these flights. Neither the
statement made by the President at the one
meeting held on Monday nor the serious and
responsible efforts of General de Gaulle and
Mr. Macmillan in bilateral talks with Mr.
Khrushchev before and after the President's
announcement of suspension of flights could
persuade him to withdraw these unacceptable
demands. Indeed, it is a logical deduction
from his behavior in Paris that he had no
authority, to modify his position to any
significant degree.
The fact that he was accompanied every-
where, and literally everywhere, by Foreign
Minister Gromyko and Marshal Malinovsky
is an interesting sidelight on this point.
There is much speculation as to this change
from his previous attitude during his visits
both to the United States and France, when
he insisted upon having meetings alone with
the President and with President de Gaulle,
with only interpreters present. The best
guess as to the significance of this new fac-
tor is that (1) in view of the brutal and
threatening attitude he adopted at Paris it
was considered desirable to have some tangi-
ble evidence of Soviet armed strength in the
person of Marshal Malinovsky. Secondly,
Gromyko. and Malinovsky would be able to
testify upon return to Moscow that he had
stuck strictly to the agreed position.
It also seems certain that the decision to
cancel the invitation to the President was
made before Khrushchev left Moscow.
As to what led the Soviets to this extreme
position, in regard to the summit meeting
which had previously appeared so much de-
sired by Mr. Khrushchev. we enter into the
realm of pure speculation, as / indicated
earlier. The most we can hope to do in the
absence of reliable information is to evalu-
ate the elements and factors which appear
to have entered into this decision. I shall
try to list them briefly.
1. There was considerable indication, par-
ticularly during April, that Mr. Khrushchev
had concluded that there was little likeli-
hood of his having his way, particularly in
regard to Berlin, at the summit. Evidence of
Western determination and unity on this
point in speeches and statements by West-
ern leaders appears to have brought him to
this conclusion. Thus in his Baku speech
on Aprii 25, he not only reiterated with the
utmost finality his position on Berlin, in-
cluding his intention to conclude a sepa-
rate peace treaty with the East German
regime, :but he also began for the first time
seriously to cast doubts upon the success of
the summit. By this, of course, he meant
success on Soviet terms.
2. Although the evidence is highly incon-
clusive, there are a number of indications
that Mr. Khrushchev's conduct of Soviet
foreign policy, particularly his overperson-
alization and in Communist eyes overcom-
mitment through personal visits to the
United States and France, was arousing at
least serious questioning if not opposition
in the Soviet hierarchy. It would seem a
logical deduction that some of the opposi-
tion to. his conduct of foreign relations
which Was openly voiced by the Chinese
A4555
Communists found a sympathetic response
among some of his associates, and very prob-
ably among the Soviet military.
3. It was against this background that the
111-2 incident occurred.
A combination of these three factors in
our judgment is what resulted in the defi-
nite and brutal decision to disrupt the Paris
Conference. To determine how each of these
factors should be weighed is, for the moment,
beyond our reach.
The U-2 incident was most certainly seized
upon and magnified beyond its true propor-
tions as s. justification for this decision.
It is debatable whether it would have been
possible for Mr. Khrushchev to devise an-
other pretext for so radical and violent a
position.
It might well be that a lack of success
at the summit would have confronted Khru-
shchev with a much more difficult choice,
from his point of view, than no conference
at all. He and his associates may have
therefore much preferred to avoid facing the
consequences of failure of negotiation by
the simple expedient of torpedoing the
conference.
It may seem incredible to you that respon-
sible leaders of a great power should have
come all the way to Paris merely for the
purpose of wrecking the conference, thereby
incurring worldwide condemnation of the
Soviet Union and enhancing the sense of
unity and purpose among not only the
Western Powers represented there but also
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and
free nations everywhere.
I believe the answer lies in a basic miscal-
culation in Mr. Khrushchev's and the Sovi-
et's thinking.
Mr. Khrushchev undoubtedly hoped?and
this explains his early arrival in Paris?to
divide the allies and isolate the United
States. He anticipated that the United
States would refuse the demands he had set
forth and that the conference would then
collapse, with the United States bearing the
responsibility for the rupture before world
opinion.
His plans miscarried because our two allies
stood solidly and loyally with the United
States and refused to be parties to Mr. Khru-
shchev's scheme. The result, as the whole
world knows, was that the position which
Mr. Khrushchev brought to Paris resulted
in the complete isolation of the Soviet Union
rather than the United States and in placing
the responsibility for the disruption of the
conference squarely where it belongs?on his
own shoulders.
This estimate of the reasons for Mr. Khru-
shchev's behavior is strongly supported by
the attack which he made at his press con-
ference on General de Gaulle and Prime
Minister Macmillan for what he termed their
lack of objectivity, lack of will, and sub-
servience to the allied relationships?in other
words, in plain English, for their solidarity
with the United States, their loyalty to our
common purpose, and their refusal to play
the Soviet game.
IV. THE FUTURE
What conclusions should we draw for the
future?
I believe the signs are that there has been
as yet no radical alteration in Soviet policy,
though we can expect the continuance of
a propaganda effort designed to split off the
United States from its allies. This conclu-
sion is supported by Mr. Khrushchev's Paris
statements, including those at his press con-
ference. It is supported, somewhat more
specifically and definitely, by the statements
which he made in Berlin on his way home.
We must remember, however, that, given
the nature of the Soviet state, the men
who run it can meet in secret at any time
and change existing policy without public
debate or even foreshadowing any such
change. It is for this reason that any state..
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77A4556 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -,- APP IX
nsent about a phase of Soviet. policy must
be regarded as qualified, with no certainty
that it will remain valid in the future.
Thus, though the world's hopes have been
keenly disappointed by the tact that the
summit conference was not held as planned,
the signs so far are that the basic realities
of the world situation have not been greatly
changed. Whether this continues to be so
depends, as I have indicated, on actions of
the leading Communist countries.
Provisionally, however, I conclude that the
implication for U.S. policy is that the main
lines of our policy remain sound and should
be continued. The lesson of Paris is that
we should prosecute those lines with re-
newed effort. Proponents within the Com-
munist bloc of an aggressive, course must
not be encouraged by signs of weakness on
our part. Proponents of a peaceful course
should be encouraged by our readiness to
get on with outstanding international busi-
ness in a sober and rational manner.
We must remain prepared to withstand ag-
gressive pressures, not only in Berlin but
also elsewhere. I trust that our evident
readiness will deter such pressures.
Among the lessons of Paris, the most im-
portant for the free world including our-
selves, it seems to me, is fresh realization of
the dangers we face and consequent need
for closing of ranks and moving ahead with
our own and our allies' programs for strength-
ening the free world. We came back from
Paris with a keener sense of what it means
to have allies, and I am sure that our alli-
ances will take new life from this experience.
At the same time I would stress equally
the need to expand imaginatively and gener-
ously our collaboration with the newly devel-
oping countries.
On both accounts I hope the Congress will
give wholehearted support to our mutual se-
curity programs as authorized by this com-
mittee, which are now more important than
ever.
We must continue, as the President has
said, to seek in a businesslike way to make
progress on outstanding preblems with the
Soviet Union. We intend to go ahead with
existing negotiations, to stand by our com-
mitments, and to foster open communication
and peaceful exchanges. Above all, we shall
not cease from the most determined, pa-
tient, resourceful endeavor to find ways to
bring the arms race under control and thus
to meet the nuclear menace that hangs over
mankind.
I believe in this period it is incumbent
upon us, all of us, to keep a calm and steady
gaze on the world scene and to avoid actions,
statements, and attitudes which might tend
unnecessarily to increase international ten-
sion. If such an increase is to occur, it
should be clearly the fault of the Soviets
and we should not do them the favor of pro-
viding pretext for action by them which
would have this effect.
We should not define as hard or soft our
attitude or policy toward the Soviet Union.
To do so is not only to deflect our gaze from
the grim reality that confronts us, but even
more to plunge us inevitably into fruitless
and damaging domestic recrimination. We
must now, as in the future, maintain a vigi-
lant, calm, and resolute posture and, in-
sofar as it lies in our power to do so, be ac-
curate in our estimates and effective in our
actions.
I would close in expressing the hope that
we will not become so fixed in preoccupa-
tion with the Soviet challenge as to lose
sight of our own constructive purposes?
which are larger and more important than
merely resisting or reacting to external
threats. We have our own vision of the
future toward which we want to see the
world evolve. We have our own programs
for helping to bring that future about?for
holding high the light of freedom, for shar-
ing its message and rewards with emerging
nations, for trying to create an international
community in which the rule of law will re-
place the rule of force. It Is to these pro-
grams that our talents and energies should
be rededicated in the uncertain times that
lie ahead.
What Is Communism?
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OP
HON. JOEL T. BROYHILL
OF VIRGINIA
/N THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 4, 1960
Mr. BR()YHILL. Mr. Speaker, I
should like to call the attention of the
Members of this House to an editorial
that appeared in the Alexandria (Va.)
Gazette on May 23, 1960. It seems to me
that this editorial presents a particu-
larly well-reasoned statement of the
issues and problems involved in the im-
portant question of increasing the
knowledge of our citizens, and particu-
larly our children, of Communist propa-
ganda and policies. The editorial reads
as follows:
WISAT IS COMMUNISM?
At its meeting last week the Fairfax Coun-
ty School Board went on record to have in-
stituted in the county high schools, a course
of study that would instruct as to the mean-
ing of communism. Col. Waldron Leonard,
a member of the board, made the suggestion.
For some time he has been disturbed by the
effect that communistic propaganda has
been having upon the minds of some of the
youth of our land. He feels that in order to
combat the evil effects of the political, so-
cial, economic and nonspiritual aspects of
communism, it is most important that its
true meaning be taught and understood.
The admonition "to seek the truth and
the truth shall make you free" led to Colonel
Leonard's suggestion and the action of the
county school. board. So often are we mis-
led by labels that misrepresent products, ob-
jectives, ideas, and ideals.
We cannot ignore the great conflict in the
world today between a society that recognizes
the dignity of man and his relationship with
his God, and a godless, materialistic society
that makes of the individual a servant and
instrument of the state. To some, commu-
nism is made to appear as a perfect social
order. To others, it evidences a political
philosophy that is used by would be tyrants
to destroy the rights, responsibilities, hopes,
and aspirations of the individuals.
It must be recognized that some risk at-
taches to the teaching of the meaning of
communism in our public schools. The sub-
ject to be taught is one thing?the method
employed in the teaching of the subject is
something else. A responsibility will rest
upon the school board and the superintend-
ent of schools to make sure that well quali-
fied instructors are chosen for such classes.
As it is imperative that the real meaning of
communism be understood, the risk of hav-
ing the course slanted must be assumed and
guarded against. The personality, thinking
and the understanding of a teacher becomes,
in varying degree, a part of a course of in-
struction and give to it color as well as sub-
stance.
In our daily lives we are being continuously
confronted with the facts of life. Our prob-
lem is to discern the facts?distinguish them
from fiction?and to properly interpret them
In their relations, one to another. Every in-
dividual hopes that society will permit and
afford him a better way of life. This being
a common aspiration of man, some of those
May 27
who would give direction to the development
of a better social order will emphasize ob-
jectives and make reckless promises for their
realization. We note little disagreement be-
tween political leaders, whether on the local,
State, National or world levels, as to objec-
es. Who can publicly be opposed to the
deals of peace end prosperity?to freedom,
justice, and the opportunity for the individ-
ual to develop his or her full potential? It
is when we come to the means and methods
to be employed to attain these objectives that
wide differences of opinion appear and are
advanced.
A few years ago we heard much about the
Four Freedoms. Only the idealist and the
optimist can hope that these freedoms will
ever be realized. Their attainment presup-
poses a complete transformation of the na-
ture of man?the elimination of selfishness
and his ambition for power. Is there any
evidence today that a communistic social
order has or can cause to be made such a
miraculous change in man?
In recorded history, the nature of man
has not changed materially. What changes
that have taken place in different forms of
society, have been occasioned primarily by
self-interest. Wars, with their destruction
of life and property, show how easy it is
for us to revert to the laws of the jungle
if self-interest so dictates. Our search for a
utopian social order, whether called com-
munism or by some other name, should not
lead us to accept false promises?promises
of a way of life that will not and cannot be
realized.
There are more aspects to the Communist
philosophy of society than just the promise
of a better economic social order. Assum-
ing that a Communist society could provide
better for the economic wants of man, what
price does the individual pay In order to
accomplish such an end? What happens to
the dignity and meaning of the individual
in such a society? One who teaches the
meaning of communism in our public
schools must know the subject and be well
prepared to answer all of the questions of
an awakened and inquiring student mind.
Much good can come from such a course if
the teaching differentiates between what
communism promises in theory and what
it provides in performance. Those interested
in our schools and what is being taught,
should be concerned with how the new
course of study will be presented. ?
Neighborhood Center of Philadelphia
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. HERMAN TOLL
OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, May 26, 1960
Mr. TOLL. Mr. Speaker, on Monday,
May 23, I had the pleasure of attending
the dinner celebrating the 75th anni-
versary of the Neighborhood Center of
Philadelphia at the Sheraton Hotel.
The main speaker on this occasion was
Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was also
celebrating her 75th year.
The Neighborhood Center today gives
guidance to the young and old of all
races and creeds, and provides them with
the facilities which will contribute to
their enjoyment of wholesome leisure.
The aim of this great organization has
changed from the original concern with
the economically and socially under-
privileged to helping people of all ages
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/960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX
more information through reconnais-
sance.
To supplement these views, Mr. Speak-
er, I submit, herewith, imy.ajjA, jazatiala
of May 22, 1960, over s-tation WGAN of
POrtlaliertialne, through the courtesy
of the Gannett Publishing Co. and its
able and alert Washington correspond-
ent, May Craig:
BROADCAST OVER STATION WGAN RADIO, PORT-
LAND, MAINE, MAY 22, 1960, BY HON. JAMES
watiktalaemi-
C. OLivss.
"fa7lreS
and gentlemen, in the light of the
world-shaking events of the past week at
Paris, there can be only one subject to dis-
cuss with you today, my friends. That sub-
ject, of course, is the torpedoing by Khru-
shchev of the long-publicized and, in most
quarters, the desperately desired summit
conference of the Big Four.
I have used the words "in most quarters"
advisedly, because the people of the world
had been sold on the hope that this meet-
ing of the leaders of the four big powers
of the world could, and would, in some magi-
cal manner, pull a rabbit out of the hat and
irreconcilable, as it seems to me, issues
would be amicably settled. At the least, the
people of the world had been brainwashed
with the illusion that a summit meeting
could result in a relaxing of tensions be-
tween the free and the regimented worlds.
Inviting Khrushchev to visit America,
without first obtaining from him some prom-
ise, for what it may have been worth, was
the first mistake that our policymakers
made. Then, after his arrogant and con-
temptuous attitude had been completely
displayed, and we had been influenced to
overlook his boasting and his insulting con-
duct while he was a guest of the President,
the Madison Avenue soap-selling technique
came into fun tempo. Remember the hog-
wash which sounded the theme song of the
spirit of Camp David. The beautiful dove
of peace was flying at tile masthead of prac-
tically every newspaper in America. The
summit conference was to be the culmina-
tion of the dedicated efforts for settlement
of these issues which have continued to be-
devil the world in the form of the cold war.
The irreconcilable ideologies of the social-
istic-communistic and the capitalistic camps
were to be submerged in compromise. Ev-
erybody was to save face. Nobody would be
an appeaser. In short, the wonderful rabbit
was to jump out of the hat.
But the leopard never had changed his
spots. Khrushchev never did have any in-
tention of yielding by one inch. His inten-
tions, in my opinion, were as always to play
the Western World for suckers. He intended
and did use the sounding board of the still-
born summit conference for the purpose of
throwing his weight around. He merely re-
peated in a more vigorous and a more in-
sulting technique the same attitude which
he expressed while on his visit to America as
the guest of our President.
I took the position, then, that we were
making a mistake in our invitation to him
to visit this country. We now find our gul-
libility being paid off with insults such as
no head of a great power would ever have
thrown at another great power, unless he
was prepared for the showdown of war.
The Russia of today has not changed one
iota from the Russia of Stalin, so far as its
basic objectives are concerned. We never
learn a lesson from being kicked around.
When Stalin was as truculent, as demand-
ing, and as doublecrossing as Khrushchev is
today, we swallowed his insults in our ef-
forts to get along with him.
These butchers in the Kremlin remain
butchers and compromise is practiced by
them in only one way, and that is down a
one-way street in which they are determined
to control the right-of-way. Our yielding
and mild policy for the hope of cooperation
only results in continued yielding. Peace-
ful coexistence in the language of the Soviets
means only one thing, and that is on terms
to be established by the Soviets in their own
best interests.
We cannot placate an attitude of implaca-
bility except by yielding our own self-respect.
They are hard and we have been soft. They
know where they are going and use every
devious and calculating means to get there.
We indulge in wishful thinking and fail to
evaluate the hard, uncompromising deter-
mination of these ruthless despots. They are
surging ahead with everincreasing momen-
tum while we are beguiled along the prim-
rose path of complacency and ill-advised
optimism.
It is no surprise to those of us who evalu-
ate the Soviet leadership as unscrupulous,
cunning, crafty, and tough dedicated men
without any consciences whatseoever that
Khrushchev would act like a Hitler. Any
man, drunk with power, is certain to throw
his weight around when he believes that he
is serving his purpose ?in so doing. We
should blame ourselves for allowing our-
selves to be such dupes, as we have been.
Khrushchev is still feeling his first sput-
nik, which our present leaders did their
best to downgrade. The Soviet shot at the
moon; their photographing of the back side
of the moon; their latest space vehicle which
could mark another first in the very near
future; their progress in the sciences, includ-
ing oceanography with which I have some
familiarity, and their drive with purpose to
goals which we had estimated as unattain-
able for them for many years have combined
to develop the arrogance which Mr. K. threw
without restraint at our President and at us
at the Paris debacle.
Once again, let me refer to the kind of
peaceful coexistence which the Soviets en-
vision by citing these words of Lenin: "The
existence of the Soviet Republic side by side
with imperialistic states for a long time is
unthinkable. One or the other must tri-
umph in the end. And, before that end
supervenes, a series of frightful collisions
between the Soviet Republic and the bur-
geois states will be inevitable." Khrushchev
has openly stated that Soviet Russia will
never abandon its goal of world conquest.
It is true that he may not have used those
exact words; but, he did state at the Na-
tional Press Club, last September, while he
was the geust of the President that "the
foreign policy of the Soviet Union is founded
on the Leninist principle of peaceful co-
existence of states with different social sys-
tems." In the light of this stated philosophy
which dominates the Soviet consecration to
its goal and objective, is there any further
need to beat our braint out, trying to find
some other hidden or farfetched motivation
for Khrushchev's brutal and barbarous treat-
ment of the United States at the Paris fiasco?
- It satisfies rae to take him as he is and not
get all confused by trying to think of him
as something different. He represents an
economic and governmental system which is
directly and completely the antithesis of
America. As the leader and spokesman of
this system he has boasted that "we will
bury you." This is reason enough for me
to be convinced that we should not fool
ourselves any longer with wishful thinking
that we only need to close our eyes to the
realities of the world in which we now live
and the big bad wolf will go away.
We have been badly shaken by this epi-
sode; but, we asked for it. We probably
will be shaken again and again and again
during these next few days, weeks and
months. To me, this means that we must
be tough without being truculent. We must
be resolute without being rabid. We must be
persistent without being punitive. Khru-
shchev is rattling his rockets. To me, this
means that we must transform our com-
placency of dream world thinking into an
attitude of action. We are in a race for
survival whether we like it or not. The
44's.
A4581 1,
true face of the Kremlin was displayed at
Paris.
In short, the United States and our allies,
as well, must heed these storm warnings.
Mr. K. has been acting, under instructions
from the Kremlin, like a hurricane and if
we have the commonsense to meet this chal-
lenge, we must batten down the hatches.
It will be wise, in lieu of speculating why
"Khrush" blew his top to check ourselves,
for the purpose of urgent correction, and
examine: (1) the reasons why we have
slipped in prestige during the last 5 years
among them being psychological negativism,
loss of dynamism, the obvious subordination
of defense needs to the sacred cow of the
budget and refusal to acknowledge that we
are in a contest in space as well as in every
other phase of our national being.
Cr n national croc Is the
o mon, o y eps ru-
ev o a s cause celebre to a
manifest absurdity. One has only to know
that the Soviets are making regular recon-
naissance flights over England every day in
order to place this defense activity of ours
In its proper perspective. This is not the
most sordid crime of the century. If we
were not using every logical and possible
means of gaining information concerning the
activities of this avowed enemy of America,
we would, indeed, be derelict in our respon-
sibility even to the point of treason. Why
do we think that we should have a guilt
complex because of this effort to protect our
own country against a communistic dictator-
ship which has looted and murdered across
half of Europe? Have we forgotten Buda-
pest? Have we forgotten the murder of East
Berliners who were fighting for freedom?
Do we have to apologize to ourselves or to
the world which knows from firsthand ex-
perience in practically every corner of the
globe of the operation by the Soviets of the
most massive and, yes, the most malignant
espionage system ever known in the history
of the world? I think that we should not
be beating ourselves over the head for acting
in our own self-defense which is, by the same
token, the defense of the free world. These
cries of Khrushchev are just so much public
relations fakerism and we certainly are
ridiculous if we continue to upgrade them
to anything different by our own breast-
beating.
Khrushchev, in my opinion, never did
have any intention of making the summit
conference a success in causing interna-
tional tensions to relax, except upon his own
terms. If this could not be done, then, he
intended to do just what he did: Namely,
use it as a sounding board for world atten-
tion and propaganda by telling off the three
leaders of the Western World,
The U-2 episode only served to make his
objective, more attainable and in his view-
point, more justifiable.
The real issue is where do we go from
here? How do we pick up the pieces? Agree-
ment on the halting of nuclear and thermo-
nuclear testing, moves toward sincere mutual
disarmament, and relaxing of cold war ten-
sions are still on our agenda. But, I fear,
that Khrushchev and the Kremlin will, and
as a matter of fact, already have, planned
more moves of brinkmanship. The free
world must be prepared to withstand more
shocks of psychological warfare.
It could be that, within the next few days,
the Soviet space vehicle will reenter the
earth's atmosphere and make a landing with
the first spaceman of all time as we know it.
If this is accomplished, the impact on the
world and, upon us, will be catastrophic.
How will we protect and harden ourselves
against this further softening technique of
the Communists?
What happens when, as, and if these pos-
sible and even probable acts of brinkman-
ship develop, namely:
1. The signing of a separate peace treaty
with East Germany and the subsequent acts
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A4582
of harassing and closing off the Berlin high-
way and air corridor?
2. The march of North Koreans into South
Korea?
3. The military aggression against Quemoy
and the Matsu Islands?
4. Increased over acts by Castro?
5. Further agitation and overt acts in
Panama?
6. Stepping-Up tensions in Turkey and
in strategic areas of the Near East?
Are we prepared, psychologically and mili-
tarily to stand up resolutely against these
acts of aggression, directed toward softening
us up for the kill?
The communistic art of disarming an op-
ponent with smiles and tokens of good will
and then, at the proper psychological mo-
ment of withdrawing, scowling and threat-
ening have been well demonstrated by the
visit of Khrushchev to our land, followed by
the phony talk about disarmament and
world peace in the spirit of Camp David,
then, concluding in the fiasco of the Paris
summit conference.
This should be sufficient indoctrination
for us in communistic cunning to prepare
us when more of the same treatment tails
on our collective head.
The only answer for us is to get the big-
gest possible stick at the earliest possible
date, speak softly but resolutely, say what
we mean and mean what we say, fully re-
alizing that further appeasement can only
mean living on our knees for generations to
come.
The Soviets respect nothing except power
and strength, both mental and physical.
Our leaders must measure up to this yard-
stick or else.
This, my friends, is what the U-2 incident
and the collapse of the summit mean to me.
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CO
Sthool Construction Assistance Act of
1960
SPEECH
Os,
HON. HAROLD D. DONOHUE
OF MASSACIMSETTS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, May 26, 1960
The House in Committee of the Whole
House on the State of the Union had under
consideration the bill (H.R. 10128) to au-
thorize Federal financial assistance to the
States to be used for constructing school
facilities.
Mr. DONOHUE. Mr. Chairman, be-
cause of the overwhelming evidence on
record showing the urgent need of
proving school facilities throughout the
Nation, I rise in support of this bill grant-
ing reasonable Federal assistance to the
States for such purpose.
In the development of a legislative
proposal toward law enactment, it is our
democratic custom to afford opportuni-
ties for advocates and antagonists to
submit their evidence and views through
congressional committee hearings.
There is no need for me to recount the
convincing mass of statistical, and other
objective evidence, presented by the fore-
most educational authority in the coun-
try and contained in the record of com-
mittee hearings, over the past several
years. Their concrete facts and figures
leave no question about the great de-
ficiency of educational facilities around
the country.
RESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX
There is also no need for me to re-
iterate the testimony of the multitUdi-
nous officials of States and municipali-
ties demonstrating that their various
States are wholly unable to provide, from
their own drained resources, the urgently
required improvements in school facili-
ties.
The two basic factors involved are the
need for school improvements and the
Inability of the States to construct them.
Since these two factors have been proved
beyond question, it appears to me that
there should be no reasonable doubt that
this measure should be approved.
With full realization of the conse-
quences that may follow from the col-.
lapse of the Paris summit meeting, there
ought to be no uncertainty about the im-
perative necessity of accelerating our
preparations to meet the Russian Com-
munist on every front, including the edu-
cational front. Realistically admitting
our past mistakes and factually facing,
the import of a long, continuing cold
war atmosphere, let us wisely now take
the steps to guarantee that our youth will
be adequately trained to meet and beat
the Communist challenges in the future.
There can be no better or wiser eco-
nomic planning for the future security
of America than a reasonable investment
for the superior schooling of the coun-
try's children. Let us endorse and ap-
p ve that practical investment today.
If we can afford to generously grant,
Christian concern, many billions of
dollars for the advancement and train-
ing of people in undeveloped countries
throughout the world then surely we can
afford to provide reasonable assistance
for the training and development of the
children of the burdened American
taxpayers.
Today, the "Edmonds"?Tomorrow,
World Trade
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. AL ULLMAN
OF OREGON
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Friday, May 27, 1960
Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, last week
the destroyer U.S.S. Edmonds made its
way up the Columbia River to the inland
port city of The Dalles, Oreg. My col-
leagues will be interested in the follow-
ing editorial from the Dalles Optimist,
which points out that this historic visit
of an American fighting ship some 185
miles upstream from the mouth of the
Columbia marks the creation of a new
ocean waterway of great importance to
the future of the Northwest and the
Nation:
[From the Dalles (Oreg.) Optimist, May 19,
1960] ,
TODAY, TETE "EDMONDS"?TOMORROW, WORLD
TRADE
Arrival of the U.S.S. Edmonds, a destroyer
escort of the U.S. Navy, in The Dalles this
Friday for a 3-day stay, with open house
aboard the vessel on Saturday?Armed Forces
Day?marks a definite milestone in the long
and varied history of this century old city.
May 27, 1960
For one thing, it marks acceptance by the
Navy of the existence of a usable channel
from Vancouver upriver to The Dalles for
vessels of this size?in the case of the Ed-
monds, more than 300 feet in length with a
draft of 16 feet.
With completion of the deep-draft (27
feet) channel next month, port of The Dalles
will technically be in position to serve the
commerce of the inland empire region. Ac-
tually, this is not the case since it will first
be necessary to construct suitable facilities
before the potential commerce of the region
can be moved from The Dalles into world
markets.
However, potential commerce Is already
here since savings can be achieved by Harvey
Aluminum by the movement of alumina to
The Dalles by ship and shipment of other
cargoes to their plant in the Los Angeles
area.
Outbound cargoes of wheat for the Orient
also are potentially available for return cargo
on alumina ships since savings are possible.
In industry and commerce, that's reason
nough.
As the potential of these two basic cargoes
is realized, commerce will be expanded to a
wide range of export commodities produced ?
in the interior.
Thus, the arrival of a naval vessel here is
symbolic of future commercial use of this
new seaway which will be of vast importance
to the economy of the region, largely de-
pendent upon marketing of wheat.
Strangers to Portland, no doubt, are
always somewhat amazed to find ocean-
going vessels in the snug harbor provided by
the Willamette River, and during rose fes-
tival time, to note the presence of 'destroyers
and cruisers. But Portland is truly a mari-
time city, and the same some day can be said
of The Dalles, 86 miles farther up the Co-
lumbia?great river of the West.
Flags will be flying on the U.S.S. Edmonds
In The Dalles harbor as that vessel on Friday
afternoon becomes the symbol of a new age
of waterborne commerce for the city and
region. All of us should join in welcoming
the officers and crew of the Edmonds, and
we're sure the reception, both official and
public, will be a rousing one. This is an
auspicious occasion, not unlike the arrival
of the first trains a half century or more ago
over highways of iron.
In the wake of the Edmonds will move the
commerce of an empire over the waterway
afforded by Bonneville Pool.
This week bids were called by the Corps of
Engineers, U.S. Army, for modification of
the channel just below Bonneville Dam to
permit the easy passage of large vessels
through this area now made difficult of pas-
sage by strong crosscurrents.
This project of the engineers is solidly
based on the economics of the situation,
promising numerous benefits to those of us
who live and work in the area east of the
Cascade Mountains.
The Dalles for more than a century has
been a crossroads of commerce, first as the
point of contact between stagelines into the
interior and the river boats which first plied
the Columbia.
Now railroad and truck and buslines
serve the commercial and transportation
needs of the area on land, and barge fleets
handled by diesel-powered tugs, move water-
borne commerce up the river as far inland as
Pasco, and out of The Danes to all parts of
the west coast and even to Hawaii.
The potential for development of port of
The Dalles as a world port clearly is here.
How soon that time is coming will depend
upon the vision and energy of the port com-
missioners and their staff, and of the fore.
sight of the people of the port district.
Opportunity is knocking. The develop-
ment of suitable deep-draft facilities must
not be long postponed.
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MAY 3 I. iv
10638 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
bringing to the devastated areas of Chile
food, lothing, blankets, medicines?In
fact, eflre field hospitals and hundreds
of doe s, nurses, and technicians to
staff the
Many p vate American agencies are
carrying o nationwide fundraising
drives to al our southern neighbors.
They include e Red Cross, the Church
World Service, tholic Relief Services,
Lutheran World ervice, Seventh-day
Adventists, and th Church of the Lat-
ter-day Saints, to me just some of
them.
I urge every America to consider the
plight of his neighbors Chile and to
respond generously and tly to these
fund appeals.
The first needs, of course, e to take
care of the sick and injured, bind up
their wounds, to feed them, an house
them in some sort of temporary elters.
But after that, Chile will have to ? uild.
It is estimated that 2 million Ch ans
were made homeless as a result of ns
enormous catastrophe, and the South
Hemisphere's winter is just beginni
Property damage amounts to at least
billion dollars?maybe much more.
I feel confident that the U.S. Govern-
ment and its people will offer the brave
and resolute people of Chile generous
help in rebuilding their devastated com-
munities. We will help them to rebuild
their homes, churches, and shops, and to
restore their means of livelihood?in a
word, to make it possible for millions of
sufferers to resume a pattern of every-
day living once more. '
It may be that such help could not be
forthcoming from the United States
within the framework of our present aid
programs to Latin America. Special
consideration may have to be given to
the problem and a solution worked out.
That we should do.
I think that one thing could be learned
from America's response to the Chilean
disaster. Help from our Government
and people-to-people assistance have
poured forth abundantly to the disaster
victims of Chile?certainly not in the
hope that we would reap gratitude or
appreciation, but because it was the nat-
ural thing for one good neighbor to do
for another.
RELATIONS BETWEPN CUBA AND
THE UNITED STATES
Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, on
last Friday it was announced that the
President had ordered a halt to further
technical assistance from the United
St es to Cuba.
I sought that the President's action
was s ible and realistic. It has never
made s e to me to have our Govern
ment gi g aid and comfort to a g
ernment ich is openly vilifying us
our way of
Furthernio I am certain that the
President's sta s ent will clear the air
of the confusio which exists in this
hemisphere about position toward
antidemocratic gove eats. Everyone
in Latin America will know that the
United States is not soft communism
nor on dictatorships of th eft or right.
I believe the people of Western
Hemisphere and all of the"arid out-
side the Soviet orbit will hail and approve.,,
the President's action. It reaffirmg
America's role as the leader in the
many-faceted war against comnaunisi.
and all it stands for.
There is one more point. I hope that
those who have up to now sought a con-
tinuation of the very partial and prefer-
ential sugar legislation as it pertained
to Cuba will be willing to reevaluate
their position and permit the Congress
to revise the legislation in a realistic and
up-to-date manner.
The Washington Evening Star of yes-
terday published a significant editorial,
clearly setting forth our illogical posi-
tion in granting Cuba a favored-nation
status in our sugar purchasing. The
Star points out that our technical aid
to Cuba was halted because it was not
In our national interest to continue
such aid. Then it asks, Is it in our na-
tional interest to continue the heavy
subsidization of the Cuban sugar indus-
try?
I ask unanimous consent that this edi-
torial be inserted in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
follows:
cm the Washington Star, May 30, 1960]
CONTEMPTUOUS MR. CASTRO
Cu 's Prime Minister Castro has shrugged
off th Innounced ending of our technical
assistan to his country as "insignificant,"
and has ded some contemptuous remarks
about wha e may do with our aid money.
It is corre of course, that the two pro-
grams involv ?one in agriculture and the
other in civil viation?are not of major
importance to e Cuban economy. Their
annual cost is mated at about $200,000,
and less than a d n U.S. specialists are en-
gaged in their oper ion in Cuba. But while
emphasizing that mination of the pro-
grams within 180 da should not be inter-
preted RS retaliation r Mr. Castro's anti-
United States words an policies, administra-
tion spokesmen point explained that the
programs no longer are c sidercd In the na-
tional or hemispheric mt est of the United
States.
On this ground, it seems tting to ques-
tion whether continued hea subsidization
of the Cuban sugar industry ewise is in
our national interest. Under isting law,
expiring this year, Cuban sugar h a favored
position in the big U.S. markek both in
volume and in price. By far, suga Cuba's
most important cash crop and a gu anteed
market at a premium price is not insig ficant
to the Cuban economy.
The administration has recommended that
the new sugar act give discretionary author-
ity to the President of the United States
to revise quotas and prices on sugar imports.
We believe that the President should have
this ,thority, and that it should be exer-
ci national and hemispheric interests.
MUTUAL SECURITY: THE MEASURE
OF LEADERSHIP
A NEW STAGE IN EAST-WEST MATIONS
Mr. . Mr. President, we may
ermg?and I think it apparent
that vie are?a new stage in East-West
relations. Our determination and our
leadership of the free world will undergo
new tests. Our allies will be searching
our actions anxiously. Their resolution
to stand inflinching against communism
will depend in great part on the matu-
rity and wisdom of our actions.
May 31
The Communists are doing more than
hurling brutal and arrogant threats at
us. The Communists are hard at work
building military strength. They are
applying their scientific resources to new
weapons. They are looking for oppor-
tunities to penetrate the uncommitted
areas of the world with tantalizing and
spurious offers of economic and military
aid. They are hoping to bully and
bludgeon our friends, particularly the
smaller ones bordering on the Soviet
bloc, into abandoning their defensive
alliances and their friendly relations
with the United States and our allies.
The Soviet Union has long recognized
the importance of the underdeveloped
areas of the world in relation both to the
spread of Communist ideology and to the
augmentation of Soviet world power. As
early as 1920, Lenin changed the direc-
tion of Communist Party international
policy from direct attack on European
capitalism to an undermining of the eco-
nomic strength of Europe through activ-
ity in the colonial areas. Thus, the rev-
olutionary and nationalistic tendencies
In Asia were to receive the fullest pos-
sible support. With the subsequent
emergence and growth of nationalism
and the establishment of new States born
out of the colonial areas in the Middle
East and in Africa, this policy was ex-
panded into these areas. A Soviet pat-
tern of economic penetration for politi-
cal purposes began to emerge. Today the
U.S.S.R. offensive continues against the
uncommitted nations on the Asian, Mid-
dle Eastern, and African fronts, and in
this hemisphere as well.
In the years since Stalin's death,
Soviet policy has emphasized what it
terms, euphemistically or otherwise,
peaceful coexistence. Development of
trade and the export of technical assist-
ance, Russian style, have been fashioned
Into new policy tools. As a corollary, the
tactical objectives of communism have
emerged as exploitation of new nations'
laudable and logical desires to achieve
technological and social maturity. Rus-
sia undertakes the exploitation of neu-
tralist atmosphere to achieve a pro-
Soviet attitude. She seeks substitution
of Soviet for Western influences
throughout the underdeveloped areas.
By a combination of propaganda, tech-
nical, and economic aid, plus espionage
and subversion, the Soviets work almost
fanatically to establish and extend their
influence and power.
Soviet intelligence services and the In-
teffftriOnatcommu,nist movement play a
maTO1 role in their activities. The sen-
ior Soviet intelligence apparatus, com-
posed of the State Security Service, and
the military intelligence organization.
controls 6Agatijuterj?oettugoletwork of
foreign amtLAn.4 operations directed
arrft*enibn, terror, aktsstifitibii?, Enid
sabotage. In addition to attempted
penetration of all levels of official and
nonofficial groups in each country, where
they have been singularly successful, this
apparatus infiltrates agents whose iden-
tity papers, passports, and the like are
often stolen or falsified, in direct viola-
tion of the sovereignty of the host na-
tions. As a result of the secret support
and direction supplied by the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, the local
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1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
identified ambiguous events, a percentage
sufficiently high to discourage evasion. This
identification capability depends on only one
method of distinguishing the signals pro-
duced by earthquakes from those produced
by explosions. It is expected that other
methods of discrimination will be developed
to reduce the number of unidentified events
and thereby increase the percentage of sus-
picious events that may need to be inspected
on-site. For instance, the estimates of the
capability of the Geneva network have been
based on observations of the differing char-
acteristics of only the first part of the low
frequency signal emitted by an earthquake
and an explosion. Use of other parts of the
low frequency signal is expected to improve
the capability of the Geneva network as al-
ready agreed upon (testimony bi Dr. Oliver).
In addition, study of characteristic differ-
ences of high frequency signals produced by
earthquakes and explosions may prbvide ad-
ditional techniques of discrimination and
identification (testimony of Dr. Roberts).
TESTING IN SPACE
By monitoring blasts in space from the
earth's surface, it appears POSSIble that the
Geneva network may be able to detect ex-
plosions out to 300,000 to 500,000 miles. Be-
yond that distance monitoring by a system
of surveillance satellites may he possible. In
addition, test vehicles going into space may
be detected by other means at the time of
launching. Techniques of shielding blasts in
space to reduce the possibility of detection
have been suggested. No tests in space are
known to have occurred.
SUMMARY
The Geneva network as planned, with 21
well-equipped seismic stations in the U.S.S.R.
supplemented by 20 on-site inspections per
year, is capable of effectively monitoring
tests of 20 kilotons (Nevada conditions) and
above. A more favorable arrangement of the
21 stations would bring the limit down con-
siderably below that level. If secret prepa-
ration of an extremely big underground hole
were possible without risk of discovery by
other than seismic means, tests in such a
hole up to over 100 kilotons could be
sufficiently muffled to escape detection by
this system. Construction of big holes ap-
pears to be practicable only in salt forma-
tions, which occur in regions constituting
less than one percent of the U.S.S.R. and in
these regions earthquakes are very rare. It
is sufficient for control to be able to detect
and locate a blast in such a region, without
distinguishing it from an earthquake. The
Geneva network can do this for a 30-kiloton
blast partially muffled in a 200-foot-diameter
hole. Such holes exist, filled with brine
petroleum products. The Geneva netw
is thus capable of controlling tests .. .ve
20 kilotons without big holes or a e 30
kilotons with such existing holes if mped
out. It would also partially m or un-
muffled tests considerably below, kilotons.
Future improvements are finitely ex-
pected in detection techniq and may be
anticipated also in teehni es of evasion.
Among the several promis g improvements
expected in detection hniques is more
knowledge of the char teristic differences
between blasts and rthquakes, observed
through the same logic formations. If
necessary, a suspi us event can thus be
checked by deton ng a blast near it. This
method can also ? e used to locate the event
more accuratel and to reduce greatly the
area to be sea hed by an onsite inspection.
If such imp vements should fail to make
the Geneva etwork capable of distinguish-
ing sulfide ly very small blasts from earth-
quakes, g 1 atly increased capabilities may be
obtaine by adding more stations to the
system Even with present techniques, 30
well-e ? ipped stations instead of 21 in the
U.S.& . would take the limit down below
5 kilotons. The addition of a somewhat
greater number of very simple robot stations,
with future techniques, may take the limit
for dependable identification well below 1
kiloton. This would have the additional
advantage of reducing substantially the area
to be searched by onsite inspections.
In short, the Geneva Network has the
capability of adequately monitoring under-
ground tests of a power down to about the
size of the Hiroshima A-bomb; namely, one-
tenth of 1 percent of the power of a large
H-bomb; or two-tenths of 1 percent if a
program of evasion were undertaken with the
handicap of testing in big holes such as now
exist in the limited salt-dome regions of
Russia; or one-half of 1 percent if the con-
struction of much bigger holes were con-
templated. The capability of the monitoring
system may be expected to improve markedly
with future research and development.
Mr. PROX:M1RE. Mr. President, the
New York Times, on May 28, carried a
detailed summary of the reopening of the
Geneva talks which some of us may have
missed. I ask consent that it also be
printed in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ATOM TEST TALKS RESUME IN GENEVA?SOVIET
'ASKS ASSURANCE U.S. PLAN WILL NOT AID
ARMS?SILENT ON 13-2 CASE
GE/EVA, May 27.?The United States, Brit-
ain, and the Soviet Union resumed today the
negotiations for a ban on nuclear weapon,
testing.
No reference was made to the U.S., -2
reconnaissance plane shot down May 1ADver
the Soviet Union as the delegates )Fecon-
vened after a 2-week recess for th ummit
meeting in Parte,
However, Semychsi K. Tsarapki ? the Soviet
delegate, asked for guarante that under-
ground nuclear explosions nned by the
United States under its p ect Vela would
not serve in weapons opment in addi-
tion to helping to find ective controls for
a ban on tests.
The Soviet nego or pirk the request in
such a way, how r, that he seemed to be
asking for no infe than the nbrmai guaran-
tees that 130 sides would expect of each
other to as e that all undertakings were
observed.
As a r It, Sir Michael Wright, of .Britain,
the c erence's chairman for the day, was
abl o describe the 206th session oT the
1 onth-old negotiations as a business-
e meeting iln a noncontroversial atnios-
here."
James T. Wadsworth, the U.S. delegate,
confirmed the chairman's remarks. "There
was no recrimination?not even one echo
from Paris," he commented after the 80-
minute session.
"As usual," was the way Mr. Tsarapkin de-
scribed the atmosphere in the conference
room.
The Soviet delegate made a long statement
to the conference emphasizing that the So-
viet Union had no intention of holding nu-
clear explosions as part of the projected co-
ordinated program for developong controls
on underground tests.
Mr. Tsarapkin also emphasized that the
Soviet Union had agreed to the idea of the
research program only because the West
wanted it. The Soviet Union remains per-
fectly satisfied with the control system de-
vised by the East-West experts who met
here in the summer of 1958, he said.
It was to remove the "obstacle" raised by
the U.S. doubts over the effectiveness of the
1958 control system that the Soviet Union
accepted the research program now being
drafted here by the scientists of the three
countries, Mr. Tsarapkin added.
The Soviet Union will insist that any nu-
clear explosions held by the United States
under the research project be surrounded by
10637
"adequate safeguards." the Soviet delegate
said. Mr. Tsarapkin said that this meant
that the Soviet Union should be able to see
fel- itself that none of the U.S. nuclear tests
had military value.
President Eisenhower announced on May 7
the Vela project for a series of underground
nuclear explosions to develop controls for
hard-to-detect tests. He emphasized later
at a news conference that the blasts would
have nothing to do with weapons develop-
ment.
Mr. Tsarapkin said that assurances of this
kind were all very well but he ,thought that
the nuclear tests for reseirch purposes
should also have technicaloreguards. It is
up to the United States to lake proposals on
this, he added.
WE MUST GRA
IZENS FR
OUR SENIOR CIT-
M FROM FEAR
Mr. PROX E. Mr. President, is it
the will and tent of the Senate that
the vast ma' rity of our senior citizens
i
face retir ent with dread? I think
not; but ow else can history record
our atti de if we continue to allow our
elders o fear each passing day that
brin them closer to mounting medical
cos and little or no way to meet them?
letter from a Wisconsin constituent
describes the plight of a man approach-
Ing this grim trap, and with nowhere to
turn but to us. I ask unanimous con-
sent that it be printed in the RECORD at
this point.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
SENATOR PROXM/RE: I am writing to request
your wholehearted support of the Forand
bill. I am a victim of varicose veins, which,
as you probably know, can cause recurrent
trouble. I am nearly 64 years old and have
hospital insurance, which covers my present
expenses when hospitalized, and these cost
about $15 per day. On retirement I will no
longer be able to qualify for insurance. My-
self and other senior citizens are in need
of such a measure of medical and hospital
care as the Forand bill provides.
It is my hope that you will give this bill
your wholehearted support and help large
numbers of senior citizens who are gravely
concerned. Thank you in advance.
Yours truly,
THE DISASTER IN CHTTM
Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, an
unmerciful disaster has devastated a
httge area of Chile. Thousands of
Chileans have died in a series of violent
earthquakes, tidal waves, and* volcanic
explosions. More thousands are missing
or injured.
Whole yillages have been wiped out
and great sections of cities destroyed.
The scourgi of disaster has been felt
along a line'-,.of distress 2,600 miles in
length. Even-mow, the extent of suf-
fering and horr)Ekr is not yet fully known.
The United Stik tes, I am proud to say,
has acted as a go neighbor should act,
opening its heart tkthe people of Chile,
and offering its hanNto help them over-
come their suffering :land their wants.
The magnitude of this? calamity is ap-
paling, but our Government and our
people are responding with a great out-
pouring of help.
Sixty huge U.S. Air Force planes are
carrying out a wonderful mercy airlift,
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1960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
party, or one or more of its front organi-
zations, carries out all political action
within its means to promote Soviet ends.
dut
thinitts command posts for Soviet
espionage, subversion, propaganda, and
Communist Party efforts. Among the
personnel assigned to such installations
are i;n2aiv taft,tnembers of tDe jirtelli-
gence services sea' 6.1ddica- to operate
under the- gide of diplomats. The
groups of Soviets assigned to technical
aid missions, hospitals, and the like also
usually include a high percentage of in-
telligence personnel. The U.S.S.R. also
exploits the acceptance in these areas of
the official Soviet embassies and trade
delegations designed to achieve on-the-
spot manipulation of the newspapers and
other information- media of the host
countries.
THE OVERALL SOVIET PROGRAM FOR UNDERDEVEL-
OPED AREAS
The overall Red program for under-
developed areas has been focused around
three major campaigns:
First. Opposition to what is called
"economic neocolonialism," including
promotion of the nationalization of for-
eign-owned enterprises, combined action
to discourage Afro-Asian trade links
with the West, encouragement of oppo-
sition to the European Common Market
and the Eurafrica plan, and resistance to
new foreign capital investment in pri-
vate enterprise.
Second. Support for national libera-
tion of colonies and recovery of so-called
"alienated" territories.
Third. Encouragement of that version
of Afro-Asian unity in which Soviet bloc
countries of Asia would be accepted as
full and equal partners, entitled to pref-
erential political, cultural and economic
treatment.
In developing these campaigns the in-
ternational fronts have engaged in sev-
eral kinds of organized effort:
First. Expanding the international
role and activities of their Afro-Asian af-
Mates and leaders through organizing
special gatherings, assigning major or-
ganizational tasks to them, and holding
broad meetings in which maximum Afro-
Asian participation is invited and pub-
licized;
Second. Inspiring, supporting, and
participating as much as possible in joint
activities sponsored by unaffiliated Afro-
Asian bodies of a similar character; and
Third. Publicizing and supporting
Afro-Asian aims and aspirations in
Western areas and in such bodies as the
United Nations Specialized Agencies,
where such support is most likely to in-
fluence Afro-Asian peoples, and to suck
them into the Red orbit.
AFRICA: THE OVERALL RED PROGRAM IN ACTION
The enormous effort being expended
in Africa by the U.S.S.R. clearly illus-
trates the significance of the Soviets'
total worldwide program.
One of the most important centers for
Soviet espionage and subversion directed
against the entire African continent is
found in Cairo, Egypt. Activities ema-
nate from both the Soviet Embassy and
the Communist-dominated Afro-Asian
NO. 98-5
Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian
Solidarity Committee. The signing of
an agreement between the U.S.S.R. and
Tunisia this month established diplo-
matic relations; this action was accom-
panied by the U.S.S.R. usual offers of
aid and favorable trade agreements.
The Soviets established diplomatic rep-
resentations in both Morocco and Libya
shortly after these countries attained
their independence. In these countries,
Soviet diplomatic representatives have
been attempting to obtain strategic in-
telligence on U.S. Air Force bases there
and to acquire the information which
would allow the Soviets to formulate
plans for future sabotage or worse.
The Soviets have also been active
among the Communist parties of these
areas, especially in Libya, where they
have concentrated not only on Libyan
Communists but also on the local Italian
Communist group. Although the So-
viets have not yet recognized the Pro-
visional Algerian Government in exile,
the Chinse Communists have extended
official:recognition and offered arms and
monetary aid as well. Members of Al-
gerian nationalist groups have, however,
consulted with Soviet officials in other
countries, and it will probably not be
long before Soviet recognition becomes
official here as well.
Soviet permanent installations in
Ethiopia are the focal point for Soviet
activity for the entire horn of Africa.
There is a permanent cultural exhibition
in Addis Ababa which disseminates Com-
munist propaganda, offers courses in
Russian language, and generally at-
tempts to indoctrinate its visitors, mainly
young Ethiopians and students from East
Africa. A strong indication of the active
Soviet interest in Africa and the heavy
selling job the U.S.S.R.'s offers of aid
without strings?Russian style?has
done may be seen in the visit of Emperor
Haile Selassie to the U.S.S.R. last sum-
mer. An aid agreement of $100 million
was signed with the Soviets, and an oil
refinery and technical school staffed by
Soviet officials are planned. In June, a
Soviet industrial exhibition will be held
in Addis Ababa, and it is reported that
the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade will
travel there to officially open it.
are plan-
g to build a po y ec n cal institute at
Giii,which will accommodate from
UM-to 2,500 Guinean students. The in-
stitute will be staffed by Soviet person-
nel?the method consistently used by the
U.S.S.R. to infiltrate their officials into
positions of influencing long-range eco-
nomic development and planning.
These a _eernenWatre-
.114. ,i,6611-ee Qffi,Semip strategic Conn-
triei in =dem:ley-eloped areas, in techni-
cal projects, hospitals, and similar re-
cipients of Red aid programs. It is char-
acteristic that such projects are estab-
lished only on agreement -that the entire
staffs are supplied by the Soviets.
A significant aspect of Soviet assist-
ance in this field may be seen in the
willingness of the Soviet Government to
sponsor and subsidize the study of the
Russian language, Under a teacher ex-
change agreement, Russian language
Instruction at the university level is al-
10639
ready underway in such countries as
Egypt, Syria, Afghanistan, India, and
Indonesia. In the newly independent
state of Guinea, Russian has been
selected as the second language of the
country?French being the first?and 40
secondary schoolteachers will arrive
from the Soviet Union in the fall to
initiate this instruction. English had
originally been selected as the country's
second language, but this plan was aban-
doned when the U.S. Government was
able to offer only one teacher.
TWO CASE HISTORIES: PANYITSHEIN AND
OGANESYAN
A meshing of the activities of various
Soviet Commiplist Party, espionage, and
governmental, organs, in these areas is
illustrated by such interesting items as
the presence of Aleksander Semenovich
Panyushkin in the CPSU?that is the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union?
delegation to the conference last Sep-
tember of the Democratic Party of
Guinea. In November 1959, Panyu-
shkin was described in Pravda as a
"member of the Council of the Union of
Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cul-
tural Relations with Foreign Countries."
He will be best remembered in the United
States as Soviet Ambassador from 1947
to 1952, and sometime member of the
Soviet delegation to the United Nations
during that time. This same Panzu-
shkin was identifieds f6Tf-very
kliMledgeable defectors from the Soviet
intelligence services as a longtime career
officer of the Soviet intelligence organ-
izations, airriErt'firer61 'Soviet Intel-
lire-rice activities in the United States
during his official tour here. In the
summer of 1953 he was chief of all the
foreign intelligence activities of the
Soviet state security service throughout
the world. The presence of such a man
as a friendly party representative in
Guinea clearly indicates, I think, the im-
portance of these areas to the Soviet
intelligence services and to the Soviet
Government as a whole.
Soviet "friendship" to these areas of
the world is also revealed in a more
accurate light by the policy of sending
as diplomats to these countries highly
experienced intelligence officers whose
real aim is to promote the supremacy of
the Soviet Union and the theory of In-
ternational communism by any means.
The recent assignment to Iran of
ehiJ Gevorlovich- Ogav.e.Wan as rst
Secretary of the Foreign -Ministry of the
U.S.S.R. is a glaring example. The na-
ture of Oganesyan's true assignment in
Iran can safely be predicted on the basis
of his past career: From 1946 to 1950, he
was the chief intelligence resident in
Iran, ostensibly assigned as second secre-
tary of the Soviet Embassy; from 1949 or
1950 to May of 1953, he was chief of the
section for deep-cover agents of the state
security service in Vienna, Austria, dur-
ing which time he maintained contracts
with Boris Morros, of note as a cocon-
spirator with the Sobells in spying in the
United States.
This is a part of the Soviet record.
vf,391kIEW MILITARY FORCES
The Soviet Union is prepared to fight
wars ranging in scope from small brush-
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fire conflicts, including limited nuclear
encounters, to all-out nuclear war, in the
words of their leaders.
The Soviet Union's ground, force, with
abd'arTftreriVitThiii-, is continuously en-
gaged in a comprehensive training pro-
gram designed to maintain peak combat
efficiency. Soviet units in East Germany,
which are considered to be the elite force
of the Soviet Army, are known to be
training in tactics reflecting new con-
cepts of the nuclear age, and it is believed
that such training is being conducted
throughout the Red army. Equipment
designed to increased mobility and fire-
power is being introduced regularly. In
fact, practically all Soviet units have
been reequipped with military materiel
of postwar design and manufacture.
The Soviet Navy is rated as second
onirtrtlie 1J.S. Navy in offensive and
defensive power. Although the U.S.S.R.
has no aircraft carriers, it has the larg-
est submarine force in all the world.
This force consists of over 400 units,
nearly '75 percent of which are of the long
range, ocean patrol type. There is some
evidence that a few of these submarines
have also been converted so as to be able
to fire ballistic missiles. Submarines
based along the Murmansk coast and in
the Soviet Far East have continuous ac-
cess to the open seas, and in recent years
Soviet submarine activity in the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans has increased, occa-
sionally extending as far as the U.S.
coasts.
VIP,11.49.S-R. continues to build new
submarines. It is quite probable that
Some of the units under construction are
nuclear powered. The Soviet Navy also
has strong surface forces consisting of
cruisers, destroyers, 'mine vessels and
numerous patrol craft.
I observed just a few days ago that a
Communist nuclear-powered icebreaker
is now in commission.
For the past several years, the overall
strength of Soviel,..aixj.or,,acs has re-
mained at somewhat less than 20,000
aircraft, supported by a complex of mod-
ern air facilities and a realistic training
program. Khrushchey's statements re-
garding the obsolescence of manned air-
craft appear to be supported by cutbacks
in their production. Some high per-
formance aircraft are being produced,
however, and research and development
continues in the air weapons field.
At the present time, the major Soviet
strategic delivery force is still long range
aviation, which is composed of more
than 1,000 medium and heavy bombers.
But it is clear from Soviet statements
and programs that the U.S.S.R.'s current
emphasis is in the field of missiles and
rocketry.
Sovi - el 1! in
nuSgffes began immedia e y a er orld
War II. For nearly 15 years the U.S.S.R.
has conducted a thorough and well-
planned effort. The Soviets now have
operational missiles bath for defense
against aircraft, and for offensive use,
including types which can be launched
from ground-based units, aircraft, and
naval vessels. Their major ground-
launched delivery systems include mobile
missiles with ranges measured in hun-
dreds of miles, capable of reaching most
significant Western targets in Europe
and Asia. Soviet space launchings and
firings into the Pacific Ocean show that
the U.S.S.R. has some capability to di-
rect ICBM's at targets as distant as the
United States. The importance of bal-
listic missiles in Soviet planning is amply
illustrated by the U.S.S.R.'s recent an-
nouncement of the creation of a special
rocket force.
In the light of these sobering facts,
our future course of action with our
friends and allies throughout the world
must and will be made clear for all to
understand:
We shall continue to search for means
of advancing an honorable peace, by pa-
tient urging of genuine negotiation for
sound first-step progress.
We shall maintain and make more ef-
fective our own defenses?our nuclear
arsenal, our missile development, and
our limited war capability, all designed
to deter aggression or, if necessary, to
combat it.
We shall reinvigorate our collective
security alliances by demonstrating a
willingness to contribute our full and fair
share in manpower and modern arms to
the defensive strength of the free na-
tions of the globe.
We do not intend, by neglect or dis-
interest, to allow the Soviet bloc suc-
cessfully to infiltrate the emerging na-
tions of Asia and Africa. We shall
continue the world's confidence in Amer-
ica's moral leadership by extending an
honest hand of friendship and of as-
sistance to the underdeveloped nations
in their fight for progress and freedom.
rim COMING TEST
We are all painfully aware of what
happened in Paris. We have seen and
been shocked by the arrogance of the
Soviet Prime Minister, by his unre-
strained vituperation, and by his callous
destruction of the summit conference.
These events have jolted every one of us
into a fuller realization of what survival
costs. The free world is once again
faced with the naked threat of Commu-
nist power, and with the more transpar-
ent efforts to frighten our allies and
friends and to split the free world apart.
In the coming months our courage,
strength, and resolution will be sorely
tried. The crisis over Berlin could come
to a head. Communist violence in other
parts of the world may erupt again:
bellicosity in the Formosa Straits, ter-
rorism in Laos and Cambodia, pressure
on Afghanistan or India or elsewhere, in-
citement in South America and greater
penetration in Africa.
But we are not alone in the struggle to
preserve freedom. Through the mutual
security programs of economic and mili-
tary assistance abroad, we are able to
strengthen ourselves and the free world
in deterring Communist aggression
whether Soviet or Red Chinese.
MSP-ITS HISTORIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Let us look backward for a moment to
see how the mutual security program
came into being and what it has accom-
plished.
It is no exaggeration to say that this
great program, initiated by a Democratic
President and a Republican Congress and
continued by a Republican President and
Democratic Congresses, has been one of
May j1N,
the tremendous successes of our national
history. In its very first years, it saved
two highly strategic and important na-
tions, Greece and Turkey, from Commu-
nist domination. It made possible the
recovery of war-town Western Europe
with its civilization, love of freedom, its
culture, its splendid people, and its great
resources. Without doubt, it saved at
least three nations?probably more?
from Communist takeover at the polls.
It preserved Iran on the edge of Soviet
power. It helped to save southeast Asia
from total Communist domination. It
has preserved and reinvigorated all that
remains of free China. It made possible
the creation of our great NATO alliance
and gave it its initial strength.
It is the program which makes pos-
sible the availability of 250 forward bases
essential to the full meaning and effec-
tiveness of our military strategy of deter-
rence.
It is this program which contributes to
the strength among our allies abroad,
so essential to the success of any neces-
sary effort to wage a limited or other
kind of war against aggression.
It is this program which holds out to
the people of the less developed nations
of the world the friendly assistance they
need in their tremendous effort to fight
their way up from age-old poverty, ig-
norance, and disease.
It is this program, joined in by other
free nations, which provides the free
world's answer to the Communist bloc's
attempt to woo and win the newly emerg-
ing nations of Asia and Africa with
lavishly proffered military and economic
aid.
It is this program which, in a most
significant degree, is the symbol of
American leadership in world affairs. In
short, this program is the strongest, most
flexible instrument available to our Na-
tion and our Government in the conduct
of our foreign relations in this most
critical period in our history.
If this program did not exist, we would
have to invent it. ?
What would have happened if we had
not had this program? What would hap-
pen if we did not have it now? Our
whole forward strategy of defense would
be weakened to the point of collapse.
The sources of raw materials essential to
our defense and our prosperity would
be threatened. Our allies and other free
countries would be left at the mercy of
Communist threats and subversion; their
confidence in and hope for a free world
would be shattered.
We would find ourselves more and
more isolated in a narrowing world
swamped by the widening and engulfing
Red tide.
We would be confined to a policy of
fortress America?a policy we long ago
examined and long ago realistically re-
jected in this era of nuclear power in
which we are now well entered.
Under this strategy, we recognize that
the maximum potential military theater
of operations today is the entire globe.
That underscores the importance of the
250 bases we now maintain abroad.
An important segment of our defensive
arrangements is dependent on the contri-
bution by our allies in military forces,
in land for missile and naval bases, in
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
military facilities of all kinds, in eco-
nomic sacrifices by diversion of resources
from consumption to military purposes.
The constancy of our allies in making
their contributions and in refusing to
knuckle under to a Communist neighbor
Is directly proportional to our own un-
yielding purpose and to our contribution
to the joint free-world defense.
The day is near when we will be called
upon to vote funds for the mutual secur-
ity program. By approving the Presi-
dent's program, both the Communist and
the free world will clearly see our iron
purpose in meeting full-on the Soviet
threat.
THE MSP FOR FISCAL YEAR 1981
I turn now to the program the Presi-
dent has proposed for fiscal year 1961. It
includes three major elements: the eco-
nomic programs which we authorized re-
cently; the Development Loan Fund for
which the Congress authorized appropri-
ations last year; and the military assist-
ance program for which we haye pro-
vided an open-ended authorization of
funds for 2 years.
Military assistance: Under this mili-
tary assistance authorization, the Presi-
dent has asked for $2 billion for fiscal
year 1961.
This is the sum recommended by
a committee of distinguished experts
headed by William H. Draper and desig-
nated by the President to make the most
searching study of the needs of our mili-
tary assistance program in the context
of our overall military security program.
This is the sum recommended by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Who have said in
the most categorical terms that this rep-
resents the most economical and effi-
cient use of funds to bolster America's
security, and that they would not want
one dollar transferred from this use to
our regular Defense Department budget.
What is this $2 billion needed for?
About $1.2 billion is simply to main-
tain the present strength of forces on
the Communist frontiers in Korea, the
Republic of China, Vietnam, Pakistan,
Iran, Turkey, Greece, and others of our
NATO allies. But an essential part of
this program is for the modernization
and strengthening of the weapons avail-
able to our allied forces; and the tragedy
of any cut would be that it would neces-
sarily cut into?indeed, could prevent?
this very strengthening and modern-
ization.
I have heard it said as to our European
allies that with their improved econo-
mies they should carry a greater part of
the load; that we should be able to re-
duce our aid. I agree; and this is, in
fact, being done. The percentage of
U.S. contribution to NATO defense has
declined from 20 percent to 4 percent
since 1952. Last year alone the Euro-
pean NATO countries increased defense
spending by 11 percent.
This is the first solid accomplishment
I want to point to?a greatly improved
NATO defense without increase in cost
to the American taxpayer. In specific
terms, this means:
Thirty missile battalions under Gen-
eral Norstad's command in Europe;
The Thor missile with nuclear capa-
bility deployed in the United Kingdom;
Jupiter missiles being installed in Tur-
key and Italy;
Joint production of Sidewinder and
Hawk missiles by European countries;
Modern anti-submarine-warfare capa-
bility covering the limited sea outlets of
the Russian submarine fleet; and
Greatly increased firepower of inte-
grated NATO land forces which face the
40 Russian divisions in East Germany
and Poland.
About one-third of our military assist-
ance money goes to the Far East. The
forces we are helping in this theater are
nearly all directly confronting superior
Communist manpower. In some areas,
our weapons and ammunition are used
by allied forces in sporadic outbursts of
fighting. Taiwan and the offshore is-
lands of Quemoy and Matsu have been
reinforced with strong retaliatory fire-
power. In Vietnam and Laos, we have
provided equipment and training against
guerrilla warfare which now, thanks to
our joint efforts, has been greatly di-
minished and which presents no imme-
diate threat.
Eighteen Korean divisions defend
South Korea against a new invasion from
the North, allowing U.S. troops to be re-
duced to two divisions. These vital land
forces are reinforced by a modern
Korean air force, naval units, and mis-
sile battalions supplied by the United
States.
There are a few examples of what mili-
tary assistance, under Mutual Security,
has accomplished. Without it, our col-
lective security agreements would be little
more than contracts of good intentions.
Without the forces which we help to arm,
either the security of the United States
would today be in grave danger, or we
would have a defense budget increased
many times over the $2 billion we are
asked to provide for military assistance.
ECONOMIC AID FOR MILITARY STRENGTH
It would be worse than useless to pro-
vide an ally with equipment for military
forces if its economy broke under the
burdens of supporting such forces. To
prevent this, we help 12 of our allies with
economic aid in the form of defense sup-
port.
The need for such defense support as a
supplement to military assistance is self-
evident. A war-ruined and underde-
veloped country like Korea cannot alone
maintain an army of well over half a
million men in the free world interest.
Small countries like Greece and Turkey
cannot bear the whole economic burden
of large armies for land defense on the
flank of NATO and on the frontiers of the
Communist bloc. It would mean eco-
nomic chaos for these countries to try to
meet the whole cost of troop pay and
other expenses of outside military forces.
We fill the gap through our defense sup-
port program. It has a twofold effect.
On the one hand, our dollar aid is used
to import commodities and capital goods
which, wherever possible, contribute di-
rectly to economic development. On the
?other hand, these goods are sold on local
markets and the proceeds are used by the
local government to meet a part of the
costs of their own military establish-
ment.
1064.
In countries like Pakistan, Korea, and
Cambodia, defense support may be the
margin between extinction and progress.
In Turkey, largely due to defense sup-
port, the gross national product has
nearly doubled since 1948. Spain, where
vital strategic air bases are now located,
with defense support, has shown great
economic gains in the past few years.
Mr. President, at a luncheon in the
White House today, I had the honor to
sit in the presence of representatives of
the SEATO countries. I met a, number
of them. Many of them?perhaps most
of them?have skin whose color is dif-
ferent from yours and mine. They
represent diverse religions, cultures, and
economies. But they are all united in
their fierce desires to advance the cause
of freedom for themselves and for their
people. They stand shoulder to shoul-
der by the Government and the people
of the United States in an effort to deter
aggression?and I mean, essentially,
potential Communist aggression against
the free way of life. They, like Ameri-
cans, decline to accept the complete
regimentation of international commu-
nism.
I considered it a great honor to be
present. It will be one of my moving
recollections of my years in the Senate
that I met gallant and proud and able
representatives of countries which are
members of the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization, all meeting together in
this free Capital of ours, to determine
the best means by which the security
of Southeast Asia may be preserved?in-
deed, may be strengthened.
MUTUAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS
I think that we are all keenly aware
that the strength of the free world rests
not alone on military power but on the
economic progress of its peoples. This is
particularly true in the less developed
and the newly independent nations
where there is a surging demand for a
better way of life.
The United States has been responsive
to the aspirations of these peoples. We
are providing assistance to them through
our mutual security program.
Our chief means for moving skills and
investment capital to the underdeveloped
countries are the mutual security pro-
grams of technical assistance and the
Development Loan Fund. The President
has asked appropriations of $181 million
for technical cooperation, together with
$34.5 million for international technical
cooperation programs. He has asked
$700 million for the development Loan
Fund. These programs are our response
to the people of the world struggling for
a better life. They make up our front-
line defense against Soviet economic
warfare. Through them, we heed the
urgent pleas of the new nations of Asia,
the Middle East, and Africa for help in
meeting the enormous problems of their
first months and years of existence. Six
more countries will become independent
in the coming months alone. They need
encouragement in their efforts to move
forward in freedom.
TECHNICAL COOPERATION-WORKING WTTH
PEOPLE
Our technical cooperation program--
point 4, we call it?is undoubtedly the
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10642 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
best known of all our efforts. I shall not
dwell on it. Let me assert, however, that
the need to build skills, to educate, to
train is still fundamental to everything
else. In the new countries of Africa, for
example, the shortage of trained people
is very great. In the Belgian Congo,
there are said to be eight college gradu-
ates who are not Europeans?and many
of the Europeans are leaving as the Con-
go becomes independent.
Yet we have many solid accomplish-
ments to point to, and together with the
United Nations technical assistance pro-
grams and efforts of other countries, we
are beginning to fill the vacuum in skills,
training, and literacy. For example,
when the U.S.-financed Agricultural
Technical School in Ethiopia opened, 690
applications were received for 68 open-
ings. Each year, 120,000 Turkish Army
recruits are learning to read and write
under programs developed by American
language experts.
THE DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUND
This recently created Fund is the ulti-
mate source of capital for the underde-
veloped nations to turn to. In a little
over 2 years of operation, the Loan Fund
has financed large-scale projects in the
basic development fields of transport and
communications, power, large industry,
and mining. Of special importance, I
think, is its success in lending to local de-
velopment banks in other countries
which in turn lend sums of less than
$10,000 to small investors. These small
loans stimulate private enterprise, create
jobs, and help meet the demand for con-
sumption goods in underdeveloped coun-
tries. I emphasize that this is a loan pro-
gram, not a grant program. For ex-
ample, a single one of these loans, to
assist rubber growing in Guatemala, will
help employ 17,000 workers, supply rub-
ber for a new tire factory, produce $30
million worth of exports a year, and
open to the United States a nearby sup-
ply of strategic natural rubber.
The President has asked $700 million
for the Development Loan Fund for next
year. This is far less than the $1,100
million the Congress has authorized. It
is, I think, a logical and laudable re-
quest for funds that are desperately
needed for the development of nations
whose future is important to us. Cer-
tainly it should be provided in full.
SPECIAL ASSISTANCE
There are several nations with which
we do not have military assistance ar-
rangements, but in whose stability and
progress we have the greatest interest.
Several of these nations, such as Libya
and Morocco, provide us with base rights
of the greatest importance. The democ-
racy of Israel receives added strength
from this program. Others, such as Jor-
dan, could collapse, leaving the gravest
danger of chaos or worse, were it not for
our help which we provide through spe-
cial assistance.
I might mention Tunisia as an exam-
ple of one country where our special
assistance has borne fruit. Three years
ago, this small Arab country cut its ties
with France, and embarked on an at-
tempt to steer a democratic course
against the tides of Arab nationalism
and the subverting currents of commu-
nism. With the help of special assist-
ance from the United States, Tunisia has
recovered from the economic shock that
accompanied independence, and has
established itself as a dynamic and pro-
gressive force in the Arab world. Tuni-
sia's success in reaching its goals through
cooperation with the West is carefully
watched by the emerging African and
neighboring Arab States.
CONTINGENCY FUND
Past experience has taught us that
each year there will arise emergencies
and contingencies we cannot foresee.
Under these circumstances it is wise to
have available to the President a contin-
gency fund. The President requested
for that fund for next year $175 million,
and the Foreign Relations Committee
recommended the authorization of that
amount. I deeply regret that this fund
was cut to $155 million on the Senate
floor. The final conference action was
$150 million. To my mind, it is only too
obvious, under present circumstances,
that at least this full sum should be pro-
vided for the coming difficult year.
Who knows what the coming year
may bring? Why should the hand of any
President of our country be shackled in
such a way that he cannot have the
means by which to meet unforeseen con-
tingencies which might endanger the
security of the people of the United
States?
ERRORS IN MUTUAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
We have heard much this year, as in
the past, of individual mistakes in the
conduct of the mutual security program.
There will probably be mistakes in the
future. This is bound to occur when we
build complex projects in backward
areas and within primitive economic sys-
tems. In my comments, I have delib-
erately stressed individual instances
where we have succeeded. Almost none
of these success stories have received at-
tention in Congress or in the American
press. For every publicized mistake in
this program, for every disappointing
project, there are thousands of cases
where, because of our efforts, people are
eating better, have jobs, are free of dis-
ease, are protected against Communist
guerrilla tactics or worse, have new land
to till, can read and write, have new hope
for their children, and have hopes for
freedom for themselves, for their fami-
lies, and for their countries. In the per-
spective of history, this may become the
most important thing the people of
America do today as a nation.
CONCLUSION
I do not believe that anyone can hon-
estly doubt the urgency of our need to
bind together the nations of the world,
still able to make a choice between
tyranny and freedom. United in our
common purpose, if we act with resolu-
tion and determination, in responding
to the needs of our free world friends and
allies, we will prevent the aggressive
plans of the Communist bloc from reach-
ing fruition. If history teaches us any-
thing, it is the tragedy of failing to stand
together in times of crisis. In one of his
most memorable speeches to the House
of Commons, which occurred after the
May 31
fall of France, Britain's great leader,
Winston Churchill, said:
If we can stand up to him (Hitler), all
Europe may be free and the life of the world
may move forward into broad, sunlit up-
lands. But if we fail, then the whole world,
including the United States, including all
that we have known and cared for, will sink
into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more
sinister, and perhaps more protracted by the
lights of perverted science.
While the 1960's are not identical with
the years of World War II, we may be
sure that if we fail to stand up to inter-
national communism, if we fail to make
the exertions which providence requires
of us, our failure will draw us closer to
the abyss of which Churchill spoke.
But we need not fail. We are on the
eve of achieving complete mastery over
the fallen forces of nature, on the seas,
on the land, and in the air, reaching out
toward the stars. It is within our power,
as the leader of the free world, to bring
a new birth of freedom to men every-
where.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence
of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
WIL-
LLAMs of New Jersey in the chair) . The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
OVERALL LIMITATION OF FOREIGN
TAX CREDIT
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (H.R. 10087) to amend the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to per-
mit taxpayers to elect an overall limita-
tion on the foreign tax credit.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, the bill
now before the Senate, H.R. 10087,
should not be considered in isolation, nor
can it be taken at face value. This bill
would provide a privileged minority of
American talEpayers with tax concessions
not availabl to very many. The prob-
lem here inv ved is part and parcel of
the larger pr s lem of the proper method
of taxing the come earned abroad by
U.S. corporatio . At the present time,
certain foreign taxes are allowed as
credits against t U.S. income tax; and,
furthermore, the cidence of the U.S.
tax varies, both as ? rate and as to time
levied, with the or ization of the for-
eign operating arm i the U.S. corpora-
tion.
Specifically, the bill uld allow a U.S.
corporation, in taking edit for foreign
Income, war profits, a excess profit
taxes against U.S. incom axes, to apply
either the per-country itation, now
in effect, or the overall lim ation, at the
option of the corporation. his bill was
originally section 5 of Hou bill 5, the
so-called Boggs bill. For s e reason,
this part of H.R. 5 was sing d out for
special treatment. The Tre ury op-
posed the provisions of this ll when
such provisions were embodie , in sec-
tion 5 of the Boggs bill, in heafing be-
fore the Ways and Means Committee.
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11-2 and Khrushchev Nonsense
EXTENSION OF REMARKS .
? op;
HON. WINT SMITH
- OF KANSAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, May 31, 1960
Mr. SMITH of Kansas. Mr. Speaker,
much comment has been heard and a
great deal written about the recent MCI-
dent in Paris?most generally labeled
"The Summit Conference That Failed."
It is well known that the men supposed
to ascend to the summit never got off
the banks of the lazy flowing Seine
through the city of Paris. Recently I
received a letter from an attorney,
Charles A. Walsh of, Conan/tit,
MY. Walsh has set forth some ,very perti-
nent ideas in regard to this Faris con_-
ference. In the 'letter accoMpanaring
this article he says this:.
The wild reactions now visible indicate
very clearly that Elrusheiev's direction to
his helpers in this country have already had
effect. "Dump NnioN" is again a part of the
plan now in operation. Of course, every ef-
fort will be made to forestall his nomination,
and to get internationalist, Rockefeller, to
head the Republican ticket. GoLnwe'rza is
even less acceptable to the appeasers than
NIXON; Already the propaganda hounds of
the press and radio are baying for Nrxow's
hide.
It is apparent to me that the political
propaganda of the Communist Party la al-
ready active in an endeavor to infineece
both political conventions. Those who are
grown up politically, know that the Cortimn-
fist Party works very effectively inside of
the Democratic and Republican Parties, It
occurred to me in the course of the prepara-
tion of the material I am sending, that the
leftist elements of the Republicans would try
to make another "dump ITialciN," attempt.
The first intimation to t4at e,frort came
yesterday when Rockefeller mmounced that
he would accept a draft by the Republican
National Convention, Although News seems
to have more than enough votes to secure
the nomination on the first ballot, we can
,,,be sure that powerful influences are now at
work to undermine and destroy him. The
internationalists and the Red appeasers can-
not forget that he is the man who, more than
anyone else, 'was responsible for the exposure
Of Alger Hiss, Accordingly, we can expect to
see a fight made on Maori by the Caine old
NIXON allYlptIlg ? drowd.
Already Achill Stevenson, Paul Butler, Sen-
ator KennedY, Chester Bowleg, and Senator
Fulbright, all of whom are able to qualify
as internatiOnalists, extraordinary, and ap-
peasers plenipotentiary are busy making
trouble and intheiatipg phetthey can qualify
in the Roosevelt twaVion of Communist ap-
peasement: This fie no pretty picture, but
it is the tigft-i4pe Of things as they exist.
Here are Mr. Viralsh's obAervations. I
commend them most highly because it
proves that: citizens of the high plains
of mid-America can see the international
pitfalls even clearer than international
-eiipe? Who are inclined to look too often
thrtittilf the rose tinted glasses on the
one-Whrldraspeot : ?
U-2 AND KIIRIISNONAV,PONSWi
It now seems clear that the U-1 incident
which was seized upon by Khrushchev as a
cause celebra was in fact only a trifling in-
cident lathe world atruggIFITOW iteprogress.
-7,:te411Yelitent was delibeTately bloyn Vie by
Soviet propaganda Mere:Bit Menai-tin of
evil and wroes. on the, part of the United
States. It Wee deed as a handy instrument to
insult the President, humiliate the American
,c..
ptopie. and ticit ?,,,ple the keg of moonshine
diplomaty, cifile the Summit Conference.
The whole zoos hev tantrum at the sum-
mit reminds exiet,citthe town bully publicly
insulting the maypr? setting WA(' dogs bark-
ing, and breaking up the town picnic be-
cause the Mayo; ?Would not apologize for
stepping on. Vie eet's IV;
The trifling. chkracter of the I.7-2 incident
has been publicly disclosed by Khrushchev
himself. Khiinsteliey knew of the photo-
g.lic,nottgrani OljkLiv A trAgg..9 over Soviet
teriltory 'fa'i a long period Of time. When
he visited the Presidetn at Camp David last ,
fall, he was tempted to speak to Eisenhower
abeut the matter. He disclosed this at his
news conference in, Paris. He said that he
finally decided after considering it, not to
bring the matter up. He said that he and
the President were on friendly terms, so he
decided that the matter could wait. He was
-then busy practieing the Camp David spirit.
He said that the ates at was addressing
,Ialra.as friend in tha:R language, and
.u t
that he was rettunlhe , Aliatation in Eng-
as
lish. Only one cciencllsibb: can be drawn
from this remarkable acknowledgment, and
that is that while Khrushatiev was Irked and
annoyed because our photographic ' planes
were flying over Russian territory almost at
will; and he was also further annoyed, be-
cause Russian defenses were not equal to
the task of bringing them down. However,
he then needed to promote a friendly under-
standing. While Khrushchev was visiting at
Camp David, he did not need a peg upon
which to hang a series of insults. He had no
Occasion then to smash the dishes, break the
furniture, or blow the house off of the
foundation. Instead, he was anxiously en-
deavoring to bring about a summit confer-
ence. He was purring like a Communist kit-
ten in capitalistic sunshine, and hoping that
the President could be coaxed into another
diplomatic corner.
We must bear in mind that Khrushchev
and the First Minister of Britain were, during
those months, Crusting at the seems, so to
speak, organizing another high-hat go, at
personal diplomacy, with our President and
the President of France. In view of all these
circumstances and the pattern of other
events, something more than the flight of an
Air Force photographic plane over Russian
territory Is needed to make a sensible ap-
praisal of the Khrushchev reasons for wreck-
ing the conference.
"The spirit of Camp David" was touted
throughout the world as a new era in the
cold war; but the "spirit" lost a great deal
of its appeal long before the scheduled meet-
ing at Paris. For some weeks before May 16
there were a great number of symptoms evi-
dencing Soviet displeasure with the prcs-
peas of the projected summit meeting.
While it is true that the British 'Prime Min-
ister continued until the last tEl 'Ooze ap-
peasement from all his diplometic pores;
but the German Chancellor, President de
Gaulle, and to a lesser extent, our President
gave every appearance of standing firm arid
standing for no further Communist appease-
ment. Khrushchev and his advisers cer-
tainly did not like the looks of the situation.
They reacted in typical Communist fashion.
They incited their stooges and dupes into a
general , pattern of rioting. The fomented
riots in South Africa, Korea, Turkey, and San
Francisco. Everywhere the pattern was the
sarrie. Students were incited and inflamed
against wrongs or supposed wrongs of con-
stituted authority. Khrushchev was show-
ing Communist teeth everywhere. Those
events were staged for the purpose of letting
the people of the world know the capacity
of the Kremlin for malting trouble.
Then the U-a intident *came upon the
, scene. -.The-plane Xenle, depaiaatare Russian
territory onlIttaelahowelien it -waa substan-
tially a week before .thei:incident jaegan ta
take shape as an impertant sees& It was
about 5 ,.days later before itheufilachev even
mentioned the incident. Itawaie then seized
upon by the Red rulers as A suitable means
with which to damn Amer. and, the Presi-
dent of the United Stateei ?
's - ? king up
There are all sorts of lip*, ations concern-
ing Khrushchevthia=eillpee,` ruabaletaaninlaelf worked
assiduously for months itedaring,..about the
meeting which he hireself ,eleseiroyed. Why
was this done? It will/AMP:24 heCaUse at one
time it suited the Kremilsaipurpose to hold!
the 'conference and at the thitte appointed for
the meeting, it no longer stilted the plans of
the Kremlin. Since Khrushchev knew about
our photographic planes flying over Russia
for ilioinaiflyears, the flight Of the U-2 over
Russia...Qat liday 1 was only a pretext .for the
per-farina/Ice of Khrushchev at Paris in May.
Ejalaalialase. is certainly not the person to be
howling about spying since, tens of thousand
Q4,jl . illMjects air pinitiiink that as yoca-
tion. He might be likened to the man who
nifirdered his parents and then asked for
sympathy because he was an orphan.
In view of these considerations' the U-
incident at most is a trifling matter; and lo
consider it of special importance, is to titia;
Rusian propaganda at face value. No adult
should be fooled by this thing. And no one
should be fooled by .rxastbeatiaga-e4
Adlai Stevenson and Welter Lipprnarm. They
easily" iquadify as Internationalists and ap-
peasers in the first magnitude.
It is sufficient explanation for Khru-
shchev's conduct to remember that he
needed some sort of an ass to beat, someone
to insult, and some pretended outrage to up-
set the conference. In this connection, the
11-2 incident was a convenient diplomatic
windfall which served his purpose.
The rulers of the Kremlin knew that they
had nothing to gain by the Paris Conference.
A delay was needed and a hope was enter-
tained that the next tenant of the White
House will have more inclination to appease-
ment than its present inhabitant. Khru-
alichev, in fact, said this at his "press con-
ference." He not only blamed the President,
he insulted and abused him in the worst
fashion imaginable. Never in the history
of the country has our Chief Executive been
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objected to insults such as were heaped to Khrushchev, and which or the nominees
upon him by the Kremlin boss. Khrushchev can be sure of an invitation to Moscow, and.
a1s0 made it clear that he despises the Vicz accepted as a participant at another summit"
President. A week or 10 days before the eonference.
0
Paris Conference, the President mentioned
that Vice President NixoN might be asked
to sit in at the Conference in case the Presi-
dent was called away. Khrushchev took
note of this, and stated that to allow the Vice
President to participate in the Conference
would be like "sending a goat to take care
of the cabbage."
Whatever .Khrushchev's attitude toward
Eisenhoarer may have been in Camp David,
he decided to throw him out of his diplo-
matic baggage like he might dispose of a
ragged shirt. He made it very clear that he
hopes for a later summit meeting, and that
the presidential election is a matter of vital
concern to him and to the Communist Party.
Among the major purposes Khrushchev
achieved in Paris last week was to notify
the world and the Communist Party of the
United States, in particular, that the new
littler in Communist demonology is Presi-
dent Eisenhower and the new Himmler is
Vice President Nixox. Thus, Khrushchev
added two names to the Commun.* litany
of demons. This was his way of taking
part in American politics. It was his way pi
telling the Communist world and the Com-
munist Party of the United States, its fellow
travelers, dupes, and. fringe adherents, that
they are to effeet a change in the political
climate of the United. States. It was his Way
of telling thenI,Aat the President is a dis-
card and the Vice President unacceptable.
Likewise, It Was his way of saying that politi-
cal talks and summit meetings, must be held
on the terms of the Kremlin. It ought to be
clear by tJaie time that diplomatic inter-
course With political crocodiles like the
Communists, is nonsense. Those who remain
addicted tOtlie belief that headhunters and
cannibals will give up their first principles if
you talk to them in a friendly fashion, are
still convinced by their own propaganda.
Khrushchev did a masterful job of telling
all and sundry that talks at the summit
cannot be resumed until there is a change
of political climate in the United States. In
effect, he told his stooges here to go to work
and elect a respectable Preeident of the
United States, who can be invited to confer
with Communists. Re made it clear that
Franklin Roosevelt was acceptable as a
U.S. President. By inplication, it was clear
to his adherents in the United States, that
they must work for the election of a Presi-
dent who follows the Roosevelt tradition.
It is abundantly clear that Khrushchev's
hand is in our political pottage; and it will
be well for us to keep that in mind. It
would also be well, to watch the propaganda
and comments of the leftist section of the
press. You may rest assured that the Krem-
lin will make no further public statements
about the presidential election in the United
States. In fact, the Kremlin will deny that
It is even interested. That is surely a part
of the plan. That will be the best way of
furthering the fortunes of Moscow's candi-
date. Certainly no further public directions
to Communist adherents in the United States
are necessary. They know what they are ex-
pected to do. If future orders from the
Kremlin are necessary, they will not be made
public.
In connection with this, it will be inter-
esting to see how the Kremlin Joh is done.
This year in America, Walter IAN:en:anti can
be counted on to set the pattern. Joseph
Alsop, Drew pearson, and Doris Fleeson may
be relied upon to carry the political torch for
candidates drIth liberal leftist orientation.
Those who have been the publie apologists
and supporters of Alger Hiss, William Rem-
ington, Owen. ?Lattamore, and Dr. Oppen-
heimer can be counted upon to make clear by
their writings which of the candidates for
the presidential nomination are acceptable
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
he Chicago Tribune has been writ-
ng a series of stories during the debate
in the United Nations, pointing out the
type of espionage carried on by the
Soviet agents right here in our own
country. This is an excellent series be-
cause it demonstrates the hypocrisy of
Khrushchev's anguished outcries against
our planes flying over the Soviet Union.
I am also glad to see our own Govern-
tent start releasing hitherto secret in-
ormation about the extent of Commu-
*st espionage in our own country. I
ope the PIA will make more of this in-
formation available to the American
people so they can see how tirelessly the
Communists are working to destroy us.
I hope in bringing forth the information,
the CIA will surface Col. Jan Monat, the
formerifeffertinfittlittlieeTor VieCom-
munist regime in Poland, who deflected
to our side last year. I am sure Colonel
Monat can give us much details about
the Communist conspiracy.
The gentleman from Washington, just
a few minutes earlier today, related how
a microphone had been planted in the
American Embassy in Moscow.
Certainly, as I said at the outset of
my remarks, while the present investi-
gation being conducted by the other body
is laudable indeed, I do hope and feel
that some investigation should be made
as to why at this particular time, at this
crucial moment, when the summit con-
ference was being arranged, this par-
ticular U-2 plane should have fallen
Into Soviet hands, thus giving Mr. Khru-
shchev this wonderful plum that he
needed to break up; to torpedo, the sum-
mit conference.
I feel that these things do not just
conveniently happen; and while I am
not prepared to make any accusations, I
think that the American people would
be a great deal more comfortable?I
know I, myself, would be more comfort-
able?if I knew that an investigation had
been made, a thorough top-to-bottom in-
vestigation, of all the incidents preced-
ing this plane flight to ascertain whether
in fact this was just an unfortunate coin-
cidence. It may be reasonable to be-
lieve that it might have been just a coin-
cidence that the 17-2 plane went down
at this particular time. We had been
rrigijang tlyse flights forarS and the
Soviet 1'7-Mon had not beeMmable to knock
ii down any of these airplanes. It is quite
possible the law of averages finally
caught up with us. But I have been
asked by many of my constituents
whether or not anything is being done to
I'\
find out whether possibly there had been
Some collusion somewhere ,alopg, the line
fl.iffier to give Mr.' lehrushcheir-this
tilrifirglittrab not believe we should corn-
pletely ignore this possibility in view of
the Soviet's long and despicable history
of espionage in our country.
Since there is a tremendous overlap-
ping of jurisdictions in any investigation
of this type, with various committees of
Congress having jurisdiction over cer-
tain segments of this investigation, if it
would be in order. I would suggest that
perhaps the chairmen and the ranking
minority members of the standing com-
mittees which have jurisdiction over
Some phases of all this activity conduct
a joint investigation. I believe this joint
committee should include the chairman
of the House Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs, the chairman of the Committee on
Armed Services, the chairman of the
Committee on Science and Astronautics,
the chairman of the Committee on Ap-
propriations, the chairman of the Leg-
islative Oversight Committee, the chair-
man of the Committee on Government
Operations and finally the chairman of
the Committee on the Judiciary, and of
course, the ranking minority member
of each. I am wondering if, perhaps,
they could not get together and lay out
some course of action, some plan of in-
vestigation to get all the facts of this
ill-fated but historic flight.
I believe that since the Camp David
meeting, since we made the tragic mis-
take of inviting Khrushchev to this
country?and I said on the floor of this
House at that time that it was a mis-
take to dignify Mr. Mikoyan, Mr. Khru-
shchev, Mr. Kozlov, and all these other
Soviet leaders who were brought to this
country and welcomed in this country
and shown the traditional American
hospitality; I said then that it was a
mistake to invite these men?I believe
that since the Camp David meeting,
there appears to have been a sort of
lessening of the realization of the fact
that if ever we needed security mind-
fulness in this country, we need it now.
I would like to have the chairmen of
these committees get together and see
if among themselves they could lay out
a course of action to have an investi-
gation of our entire internal security
structure in a manner that would not
in any way jeopardize our national se-
curity.
I am thinking of the many Americans
who have been asking the question: Has
this airplane really fallen into Soviet
hands at this very critical time by pure
accident or were there other factors
that contrilbuted to it? These people
are entitled to an answer.
I am perplexed by one thing in this
entire 17-2 spy plane affair. The Presi-
dentmtirlfirTtlirthe other day
said?and I think the President is to be
congratulated for his firmness at the
summit, for not yielding to Khru-
shchev's scandalous demands of an apol-
ogy; I am in complete agreement with
the President on this?but I am a little
perplexed in hearing the President say
that the initial American reports re-
garding this U-2 incident were designed
as a "covers," and were purposely
distor= -?prige-er the 17-2 pilot. The
thing' that confuses me IS 't-l-iat'*hile the
President now explains the original mix-
? up in handling the affair was the result
of efforts to protect the pilot, t ? I ?ad
CIA Ua4 earlierpold a CM
o pAgress that the ,p0t or this air-
Mae-had been instructed, if he should
fall into enemy hands, to make,a_clean,
confession of his activitlek
wi1ttdfl who' gave srich instructions
to this American pilot a spy mission?
Certainly such complete disclosure
would jeopardize our entire intelligence
structure.
This is one of the aspects into which
I would like to have this joint commit-
tee go more deeply. Why was Pilot
Powers told that if he were caught, he
should make a full, clean sweep of
things? I know that during the war,
when our own American soldiers were
captured by the enemy?of course, Mr.
Powers was not a member of the mili-
tary, he was a civilian?but during the
war, when our American soldiers fell in-
to enemy hands, we had been instructed
to give only our name, rank, and serial
number, and that is all.
I am perplexed and disturbed as to
why these instructions, if they were in
fact given to Powers, were given, and who
was responsible for these instructions for
Mr. Powers to go out, when he is caught,
and tell his captors just exactly what he
is doing; why he is doing it; how long he
has been doing it, and everything else.
This type of instruction, I believe, could
jeopardize our American security sys-
tem as much as anything else. There
are many other aspects of this disastrous
flight, which could effect the future of
the world, that need to be studied by
competent authority.
So, while I am in full agreement that
our American Government that it should
have continued these flights over the
Soviet Union?and I do not share the
criticism of those who say that these
flights should have been stopped?while
I am in full agreement with the position
that the President has taken, one of
firmness at the summit, one of not yield-
ing an inch to Khrushchev, I am dis-
turbed that now when the smoke is be-
ginning to clear apparently no investi-
gation is going to be made as to the inci-
dents precedent to the capture of this
aircraft.
I renew my request that, if it is in
order, the chairmen of the standing
committees of the House get together and
sit either as a joint committee or work
out some sort of a formula so that in-
vestigation of our entire security pro-
gram in America could be made.
I emphasize again that we would make
a tragic mistake if we as Americans
did not go beyond the scope of normal
assumption. The normal assumption
quite properly is that there was nothing
wrong, that this was an unfortunate in-
cident where the airplane flamed out and
came down to an altitude at which the
Soviet Union could then force it down to
the ground. That would be the normal
assumption, and perhaps that normal
assumption is completely justified. But
today, when we are dealing with an
enemy that is more brutal than the world
has ever seen before; an enemy that will
resort to any methods of sabotage or
espionage; any tactics--and we know
this from 15 years of experience in deal-
ing with the Communists and we have
ample evidence that they will stop at
nothing to destroy us?it then behooves
us as Americans to go beyond the normal
scope of assumption and find out why
these things happened at this particu-
larly convenient time for Mr. Khru-
shchev to torpedo the summit conference.
Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gen-
tleman from Iowa.
vilisillebeifial. It is my understanding
that there are two committees in the sen-
ate, one under the leadership of the dis-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
tinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr.
FULBRIGHT] and the other under the
chairmanship of the distinguished Sen-
ator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON]
that are going to conduct full hearings
on all matters relating to the failure of
the summit conference.
It is my understanding that this in-
vestigation will cover all angles, both
prior and subsequent to the landing of
the U-2 plane, that these investigations
will be held at a very high level on a
nonpartisan basis, and with the concur-
rence of the White House, so that the
facts may be fully developed.
As to the gentleman's suggestion that
the chairmen of several committees of
the House conduct an investigation, let
me say lam sorry the gentleman has not
had the benefit of some of the discus-
sions I have had with relation to that
very matter. In the meeting which I
attended it seemed to be the general con-
sensus that it would be a mistake to have
the committees of Congress go into mat-
ters which involve such a delicate- sit-
uation as ptefieerl"ffilffirtve
x ge the inf wernt the public
should have from these committees that
are already functioning in .the Senate,
and that 1 - - t
tbg pmiagms u e merman
MAW-
-Valasigi- If the gentleman will
perMit me, it rather intrigues me why
so many of the people who are in charge
of our intelligence setup in this country
take upon themselves the attitude that
they are beyond the scope of Congress.
I know from experience?I, myself, in
1952 was an investigator for a congres-
sional committee which investigated a
very serious crime committed by the
Communists against some 15,000 allied
army officers?I must say I was complete-
ly unsatisfied, as I delved into these vari-
ous aspects of American intelligence, with
? t.L.1.'f.11i-
s. ?o"ifOrSg
, a do not see anything incon-
sistent with a suggestion that responsi-
ble chairmen of standing committees in
Congress conduct such an inquiry. I
have complete confidence in these men.
We stood here on the floor of the House
of Representatives recently and ap-
plauded the speech delivered on the floor
of this House by the chairman of the
Committee on Appropriations [Mr. CAN-
NON] when he told us he had known of
these flights for 4 years. I was very
happy to hear that the chairman of this
committee had been taken into the con-
fidence of the military. The fact re-
mains that our intelligence people can
take into their confidence the chairmen
of these standing committees who set up
the appropriations and who set up the
policies and the various other aspects of
our national security. I am not, as a
Member of the Congress, ready to sur-
render those rights to the bureaucracy of
any agency.
Mr. HOEVEN. I can understand the
gentleman's concern about having the in-
formation which he desires.
Mr. PUCINSKI. If the gentleman will
permit me, I do not necessarily desire it
for myself, but certainly I do want an ap-
propriate committee of Congress to have
It so that we can be certain that there
was no collusion or just plain careless-
ness in giving Khrushchev the tools with
which to wreck the summit conference.
The gentleman will agree that plain
carelessness, when you are dealing in this
complicated field of espionage, is just as
disastrous to our Nation as outright trea-
son. I think many of our agencies have
been just plain careless in dealing with
the Soviets and the investigation I am
proposing might help improve this sit-
uation. It is entirely possible that the
U-2 failure ultimately, will be traced to
sloppy operations. But when we are
fighting for our very survival we can no
more tolerate carelessness than we can
tolerate espionage.
Mr. HOEVEN. I understood you
wanted the information as a Member of
Congress. Again I say we are dealing
with a very delicate subject, to wit, the in-
telligence and national defense of this
country. Would the gentleman want
confidential information given to the
public which might jeopardize our na-
tional defense structure?
Mr. PUCINSKI. No; I do not want to
disclose anything which would jeopar-
dize our national defense. I have said
many, many times, where matters of
national security are at stake, certainly,
these things and the secrecy of these
proceedings should be respected. I agree
with the gentleman. I am not suggest-
ing that. But I would like to say this.
Too often I have found that inefficiency
and mistakes are covered up by the label
"top secret," and I would be glad to get
another special order to go into greater
detail on that. Too often we have per-
mitted agencies in our Government to
mark a situation "top secret" because
they could not stand the scrutiny of a
congressional committee to decide
whether they were conducting them-
selves properly.
I, for one, feel it is the duty of Con-
gress to see that the conduct of our
Federal agencies is such a not to im-
pair the safety of our Nation. I am not
satisfied with self-serving statements of
department heads who deal in broad
generalities. I do not want this Nation
to wake up some morning and find that
we had failed to properly oversee the
activities of essential agencies. In our
dealings with the Soviet Union, we can
leave nothing to chance and that is why
I am suggesting this full-scale investi-
gation. Not just a superficial inquiry,
but a full investigation which would
minutely check out every conceivable
phase of this disastrous U-2 flight. A
full-scale investigation conducted by
responsible Members of Congress in a
nonpartisan manner and in a way that
would preserve the rights of indi-
viduals.
Mr. Speaker, I should like to in-
clude with my remarka a column which
appeared today in the Washington Daily
News and which was written by one of
its top columnists, Mr. Ed Koterba. I
believe it demonstrates so well one of
the points I have been discussing here
today.
May 2
Mr. Koterba's column follows:
THERE'S LOTS TO BE SAID ON SECRET
EAGLE ,
(By Ed Koterba)
The press relations man at the Pentagon
said, "I'm sorry, but that information is a
military secret. It's classified."
The reporter said: "But I have the infor-
mation before me at this moment. And he
reeled it off. It gave all the detailed facts
on the air-to-air missile, the Eagle.
On the Pentagon end of the phone there
was shocked silence?followed by a dozen
queries and, later, by a congressional re-
quest for a full-scale investigation.
This was one of several instances of ap-
parent blundering by our side on military
secrecy. Ironically enough, this case of open-
ing up supposed secrets by the Pentagon
came at a time when Russia was charging
us before the world with obtaining military
information from the Soviets.
TEXAS NEWSMAN
The reporter in this story is John Harris,
Washington correspondent for a Houston,
Tex., newspaper.
His information came from the "1960 Mis-
sile Handbook," which was distributed just
down the hall in the National Press Building.
A few days after his story was printed, a
bigshot Communist, Valdimir D. Pavlov,
third secretary of the Soviet Embassy,
showed up and procured a copy of the book,
paying the asking price of $2.
Oddly enough, Mr. Harris' story did not
identify by name nor location his source of
information.
Publisher of the missile handbook is Ken-
dall K. Hoyt, director of the Association of
Missile and Rocket Industries.
When I confronted Mr. Hoyt, he said: "We
have information on 300 UB. missiles." He
showed me his bulging files.
DATA
Data on the secret Eagle showed that it
was 15 to 20 feet tall, weighed a half-ton,
had a range of 100 miles and flies up to
100,000 feet. All this information was
marked classified at the Pentagon.
"For heaven's sakes," I said to Mr. Hoyt,
"-where did you get all this information?"
Calmly, he said he got it from the Aircraft
& Missiles magazine, which is distributed to
9,000 firms. Originally, he said, it came
from?of all things?Pentagon handouts.
But, to be on the safe side, he said, he
checked with the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation when the Communist?who openly
identified himself as a Soviet technician?
showed up in his office. The FBI, Mr. Hoyt
said, cleared the sale.
And what is the Red official going to do
with all that compiled information?
Over the phone he said, candidly: "Some
of our Soviet scientists may be interested."
LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM
Mr. ? OEVEN. Mr. Speaker,
unanim consent to proceed for 1, in-
ute in or to inquire of the majority
leader as . 'ny changes in the program
for next wee
The SPEA pro tempore. With-
out objection, F so ordered.
There was no ection.
Mr. MeCORM . Mr. Speaker, I
am glad my frien kes that inquiry
because I do want vise the House
that since announcing program, and
you will remember I ref d to the bill,
S. 1892, having to do with project in
Oklahoma, I have had the portunity
since announcing the progr to talk
with the chairman of the Co ttee On
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