S. RES. 400 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 186
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 12, 1976
• Content Type: OPEN

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Calendar No. 728
S. RES. 400
94TI-I CONGRESS
2D SESSION
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
MAY 12,1976
Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed
AMENDMENT
Intended to be -proposed by Mr. ROTH (for himself and Mr.
HUDDLESTON) to S. Res. 400, a resolution to establish a
Standing Committee on Intelligence Activities, and for other
purposes, viz : Strike section 8 (d) and insert in lieu thereof :
(d) The Select Committee on Standards and Conduct
2 shall have the duty to investigate alleged disclosures of intel-
3 ligence information by a Member, officer, or employee of
4 the Senate, in violation of subsection (c) . At the request of
5 five of the members of the Committee on Intelligence Activi-
6 ties or sixteen Members of the Senate, the Select Committee
7 on Standards and Conduct shall investigate any such alleged
S disclosure of intelligence information and report its findings
9 and recommendations to the Senate..
Arndt. No. 1642
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 AMENDMENT
Intended to be proposed by Mr. ROTH (for him-
self and Mr. HUDDLESTON) to S. Res. 400, a
resolution to establish a Standing Commit-
tee on Intelligence Activities, and for other
purposes.
MAY 12,1976
Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed
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94r11 CONGRESS
2D SESSION
Calendar No. 728
S. RESO 400
IN HIE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
? MAY 12,1976
Ordered to be printed
(IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE)
Proposed by Mr. CANNON (for himself, Mr. ROBERT C.
BYRD, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. HUGII SCOTT, Mr. P,RCY,
Mr. HATFIELD, Mr. R,IPICOFF, Mr. CIIURCII, Mr. MOND A.LE,
Mr. BAKER, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. PHILIP A. HART, Mr.
IIUDDLESTON, Mr. MORGAN, Mr. GARY HART', Mr.
MATIIIAS, Mr. SCHWEIKER, Mr. JAVITS, Mr. KENNEDY,
Mr. DURKIN, Mr. ROTH, Mr. STEVENSON, Mr. BROOKE,
Mr. BROCK, Mr. WEICKER, Mr. HUMPHRj, "Y, Mr. CLARK,
and Mr. PELL) to S. Res. 400, a resolution to establish a
Standing Committee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities,
and for other purposes, viz: in lieu of the language intended
to be substituted by the committee amendment insert the
following :
3 Committee on Intelligence, to oversee and make continuing
Arndt. No. 1643
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That it is the purpose of this resolution to establish a new
select committee of the Senate, to be known. as the Select
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1 studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the
2 United States Government, and to submit to the Senate
3 appropriate proposals for legislation and report to the Senate
4 concerning such intelligence activities and programs. In
5 carrying out this purpose, the Select Committee on Intelli-
6 gence shall make every effort to assure that the appro-
7 priate departments and agencies of the United States provide
8 informed and timely intelligence necessary for the execu-
9 tive and legislative branches to make sound decisions affect-
10 ing the security and vital interests of the Nation. It is further
11 the purpose of this resolution to provide vigilant legislative
12 oversight over the intelligence activities of the United States
13 to assure that such activities are in conformity with the
14 Constitution and laws of the United States.
15 SEC. 2. (a) (1) There is hereby established a select
16 committee to be known as the Select Committee on Intel-
17 ligence (hereinafter in this resolution referred to as the
18 "select committee") . The select committee shall be com-
19 posed of seventeen members appointed as follows :
20 (A) two members from the Committee on A.ppro-
21 priatons ;
22 (B) two members from the Committee on Armed
23 Services;
24 (C) two members from the Committee on Foreign
25 Relations;
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? 1 (D) two members from the Committee- on -tile
2 Judiciary ; and
3 (E) nine members from the Senate who are not
4 members of any :of the committees named in clauses
5 (A) through (D) .
6 (2) Members appointed from each committee named in
7 clauses (A) through (D) of paragraph (1) shall be evenly
8 divided between the two major political parties and shall
9 be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate
an -1 an ling minority member. J. ive of the members ap-
upon the recommendations of the majority and minority
leaders of the Senate after consultation with their chairman
d 1
pointed under clause (E) of. paragraph (1) shall be ap-
pointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon the-:
recommendation of the majority leader of the Senate and four
shall be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate
upon the recommendation of the minority leader of the,-
18 Senate.
(3) The majority leader of the Senate and the minority
leader of the Senate shall be ex officio members of the select,
committee but shall have no vote in the committee and
22 shall not be counted for purposes of determining a. quorum.
(b) No Senator may serve on the select committee for
24 more than nine years of continuous service, exclusive of.serv
25 ice by any Senator on such committee during the Ninety-
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1 fourth Congress. To the greatest extent practicable, one-third
2 of the Members of the Senate appointed to the select com-
3 mitte'e at the beginning of the Ninety-seventh Congress and
4 -eaeh Congress thereafter shall be Members o'f the Senate who
5 did not serve on such committee during the preceding
-,:Congress.
-7 . '(c) At the beginning of each Congress, the Members
8 of the Senate who are members of the majority party of
g the Senate shall elect a chairman for the select committee,
10 and the Members of the Senate who are from the minority
11 party of the Senate shall elect a vice chairman for such
12 committee. The vice chairman shall act in the place and
13 stead of the chairman in the absence of the chairman. Neither
14 the chairman nor the vice chairman of the select conunittee
15 shall at the same time serve as chairman or ranking minority
16 member of any other committee referred to in paragraph
17 6 (f) of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate.
18 (d) For the purposes of paragraph 6 (a) of rule XXV
19 of the Standing Rules of the Senate, service of a Senator as
20 a member of the select committee shall not be taken into
21 account.
22 SEC. 3. (a) There shall be referred to the select com-
23 mittee all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memo-
24 rials, and other matters relating to the following :
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1 (1) The Central Intelligence Agency and the Di-
2 rector of Central Intelligence.
3- (2) Intelligence activities of all other departments.
4 and agencies of the Government, including, but not lim-
5 ited to, the intelligence activities of the Defense Intelli-
6 gence Agency, the National Security Agency, and other
7 agencies of the Department of Defense; the Department
10
of State; the Department of Justice; ' and the Depart-
ment of the Treasury.
. ~ (3) The organization or reorganization of any de-
11 partment or agency, of the Government to the extent
12 that the organization or reorganization relates to a func-
13 tion or activity involving intelligence activities.
14 (4) Authorizations for appropriations, both direct
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and indirect, for the following :
(A) The Central Intelligence Agency and Di-
rector of Central Intelligence.
(B) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(C) The National Security Agency.
(D) The intelligence activities of other agen-
cies and subdivisions of the Department of Defense.
(E) The intelligence activities of the Depart-
ment of State.
(F) The intelligence activities of the Federal
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1 Bureau of Investigation, including all activities of
2 the Intelligence Division.
3 (G) Any department, agency, or subdivision
4 which is the successor to any agency named in
5 clause (A), (B), or (C) ; and the activities of any
department, agency, or subdivision which is the
7 successor to any department, agency, bureau, or
9
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subdivision named in clause (D) , (E), or (F) to
the extent that the activities of such successor depart-
ment, agency, or subdivision are activities described
11 in clause (D) , (E) , or (F) .
12 (b) Any proposed legislation reported by the select
13 committee, except any legislation involving matters specified
14 in clause (1) or (4) (A) of subsection (a), containing any
15 matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of any standing com-
16 rnittee shall, at the request of the chairman of such standing
17 committee, be referred to such standing committee for its
18 consideration of such matter and be reported to the Senate
19 by such standing committee within thirty days after the day
20 on which such proposed legislation is referred to such stand-
21 ing committee; and any proposed legislation reported by any
22 committee, other than the select committee, which contains
23 any matter within the jurisdiction of the select committee
24 shall, qt the request of the chairman of the select committee,
In ?'t~l't'ec to the select Poanlnitteo for its consideration of
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such matter and be reported to the Senate by the select com-
mittee within thirty days after the day on which such pro-
posed legislation is referred to such committee. In any case
in which committee fails to report any proposed legislation
referred to it within the time limit prescribed herein, such
committee shall be automatically discharged from further
consideration of such proposed legislation on the thirtieth
day following the day on which such proposed legislation is
referred to such committee unless the Senate provides other-
wise. In computing any thirty-day period under this para-
graph there shall be excluded from such computation any
days on which the Senate is not in session.
(c) Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as pro-
hibiting or otherwise restricting the authority of any other
committee to study and review any intelligence activity to the
extent that such activity directly affects a matter otherwise
within the jurisdiction of such committee.
18 (d) Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as
19 amending, limiting, or otherwise changing the authority of
20. any standing committee of the Senate to obtain full and
21 prompt access to the product of the intelligence activities of
any department or agency of the Government relevant to a
matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of such committee.
SEC. 4. (a) The select committee, for the purposes of
accountability to the Senate, shall make regular and periodic
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1 reports to the Senate on the nature and extent of the intelli-
2 gence activities of the various departments and agencies of the
3 'United States. Such committee shall promptly call to the
4 attention of the Senate or to any other appropriate commit-
5 tee or committees of the Senate any matters deemed by the
6 select committee to require the immediate attention of the
7 Senate or such other committee or committees. In making
8 such reports, the select committee shall proceed in a manner
9 consistent with section 8 (c) (2) to protect national security.
10 (b) The select committee shall obtain an annual report
11 from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the
12 Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Director
13 of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for public dissemi-
14 nation. Such reports shall review the intelligence activities
15 of the agency or department concerned and the intelligence
16 activities of foreign countries directed at the United States
17 or its interests. An unclassified version of each report shall
18 be made available to the public by the select committee.
19 Nothing herein- shall be construed as requiring the disclosure
20 in such reports of the names of individuals engaged in intelli-
21 gence activities for the United States or the sources of infor-
22 mation on which such reports are based.
23 (c) On or before March 15 of each year, the select com-
24 mittee shall submit to the Committee on the Budget of the
25 Senate the views and estimates described in section 301 (c)
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of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 regarding matters
within the jurisdiction of the select committee.
SEe. 5. (a) For the purposes of this resolution, the
select committee is authorized in its discretion (1) to make
5 investigations into any matter within its jurisdiction, (2) to
make ependitures ftom the contingent fund of the Senate,
(3) to employ personnel, (4) to hold hearings, ' ' (5) "to sit
and act at any time or place during the sessions, recesses,
and adjourned periods of the Senate, (6) to require, by
subpena or otherwise, the attendance of witnesses -and the
production of correspondence, hooks, papers, and documents,
(7) to take depositions and other testimony, (8) to procure
the service of individual consultants or oigariizations thereof,
in accordance with the provisions of section 202 (1) of the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, and (9) with the
prior consent of the Government department or agency con-
cerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to
use on a reimbursable basis the services of personnel of any
19 such department or agency.
20 (b) The chairman of the select committee or any mem=
21 her thereof may administer oaths to witnesses.
22 (c) Subpenas authorized by the select committee may
23 be issued over the signature of the chairman, the vice chair=
? 24 man, or any member of the select committee designated by
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1 the, chairman, and may be served by any person designated
2 by the chairman or any member signing the subpena-.
3 SEC. 6. No employee of the select committee or any
4 person engaged by contract or otherwise to perform services
5 . for or .at the request of such committee shall be given access
6 to any classified information by such committee unless such
.7 employee or person has .(1) agreed in writing and under
8 oath to be bound by the rules of the Senate (including the
9 jurisdiction of the Select Committee on Standards and Con-
10 duct) and of such committee as to the security of such in-
11 formation during and. after the period of his employment or
12 contractual agreement with. such committee; and (2) re-
13 ceived an appropriate security clearance as determined by
14 such committee in consultation with the Director of Central
15. Intelligence. The type of security clearance to be required in
16 the case of any. such employee or person shall, within the
17. determination of such committee in consultation with the
18.
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21
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Director of Central Intelligence, be commensurate with the
sensitivity of the classified information to which such em-
ployee or person will be given access by such committee.
SEC. 7. The select committee shall formulate and carry
out, such rules and procedures as it deems necessary to pre-
vent.the disclosure, without the consent of the person or per-
sons concerned, of information in the possession of such
committee which unduly infringes upon the privacy or which
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f violates the constitutional rights of such person or persons.
Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent such committee
from publicly disclosing any such information in any case in
which such committee determines the national interest in
the disclosure of such information clearly outweighs any
infringement on the privacy of any person or persons.
SEC. 8. (a) The select committee may, subject to
the provisions of this section, disclose publicly any informa-
tion in the possession of such committee after a determina-
10` tion by such committee that the public interest would be
11 served by such disclosure. Whenever committee action is
required to disclose any information under this section, the -
committee shall meet to vote on the matter within five days
after any member of the committee requests such a vote.
No member of the select committee shall disclose any infor-
mation, the disclosure of which requires a committee vote,
prior to a vote by the committee on the question of the _dis-
closure of such information or after such vote except. in
19 accordance with this section.
(b) (1) In any case in which the select committee votes
to disclose publicly any information which has been classi-
fied under established security procedures, which has been
submitted to it by the executive branch, and which the
executive branch requests be kept secret, such committee
25 shall notify the President of such vote.
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1 (2) The select committee may disclose publicly such
2 information after the expiration of a five-day period follow-
3, ing the day on which notice of such vote is transmitted to
4, the President, unless, prior to the expiration of such five-day
5 period, the President notifies the committee that he objects
6 to the disclosure of such information, provides his reasons
7 therefor, and certifies that the threat to the national interest
of the United States posed by such disclosure is vital and.
9 outweighs any public interest. in the disclosure.
10. (3) If the President notifies the select committee of his
11- objections to. the disclosure of such information as provided
12 . - -in - paragraph (2), such committee may; by majority vote,
13 refer the question of the disclosure of such information to. the
14 . Senate- for consideration. Such information shall not there-
15, after be publicly disclosed without leave of the Senate.
16. (.4) Whenever the select committee votes to refer the
17 question of-disclosure of any information to the Senate under
18 ? paragraph (3), the chairman shall, not later than the first
20
day on which the Senate is in session following the day _ on
which the vote occurs; report the matter to the Senate for its
21- consideration.
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(5) One hour after the Senate convenes on the fourth.
day -on which the Senate is in session following the day,
on which any such matter is reported to the Senate, or,
at such earlier time as the majority leader and the minority
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1 leader of the Senate jointly agree upon in accordance with
2 section 133 (f) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
3 1946, the Senate shall go into closed session and the matter
4 shall be the pending business. In considering the matter in
5 closed session the Senate may-
6 (A) approve the public disclosure of all or any
7 portion of the information in question, in which case
S the committee shall publicly disclose the information
9 ordered to be disclosed,
10 (B) disapprove the public disclosure of all or any .
11 portion of the information in question, in which case
12 the committee shall not publicly disclose the information
13 ordered not to be disclosed, or
14 (C) refer all or any portion of the matter back to
15 the committee, in which case -the committee shall make
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the final determination with respect to the public dis-
closure of the information in question.
Upon conclusion of the. consideration of such matter in close- d
session, which may not extend beyond the close of the ninth
day on which the Senate is in session following the day on
which such matter was reported to the Senate; or the,-close
of the fifth day following the day agreed upon jointly by the
majority and minority leaders in accordance with section
133 (f) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946
25 . - (whichever the case may be), the Senate shall immediately
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1 vote on the disposition of such matter in open session; with=
2 out debate, and without divulging the information with re-
3 spect to which the vote is being taken. The Senate shall.
4 vote to dispose of such matter by one or more of the means
5 specified in clauses (A) , (B) , and (C) -of the second sen-
6- tence of this paragraph. Any vote of the Senate to disclose
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any information pursuant to this paragraph shall be subject
to the right of a Member of the !Senate to move for recon-
sideration of the vote within the time and pursuant to the
procedures specified in rule XIII of the Standing Rules of
the' Senate,' and the disclosure of such information shall be
made consistent with that right.
(c) (1) No information in the possession of the select
committee relating to the lawful intelligence activities of any
department or agency of the United States which has been
classified under established security procedures and which
the select committee, pursuant' to subsection (a) or (b) of
this section, has determined should not be disclosed shall be
19 made available to any person by a Member, officer, or em-
20 ployee' of the Senate except in a closed session of the Senate
24
or as provided in paragraph (2)
(2) ' The select committee may, under such regulations
as the committee shall prescribe to protect the confidentiality
of such information, make any information described in para-
25 graph (1) available, to any other committee or any other
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Member of the Senate. Whenever the select committee makes
such information available, the committee shall keep a writ-
ten record showing, in the case of any particular informa-
tion, 'Which committee or which Members of the Senate
received such information. No Member of the Senate who,
and no committee which, receives any information- under this
subsection, shall disclose such information except in a closed
session of the Senate.
(d) It shall be the duty of the Select Committee on
Standards and Conduct to investigate any alleged disclosure
of intelligence information by a Member, officer, or employee,
of the Senate in violation of subsection (c) and to report
thereon to the Senate. - -
(e) Upon the request of any person- who is subject
to any such investigation, the Select Committee- on Stand-
ards and Conduct shall release to such individual at the
conclusion of its investigation a summary of its investigation
together with its findings. If, at the conclusion of its- investi-
gation, the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct
determines that there has been a significant breach of con-
fidentiality or unauthorized -disclosure by a Member, officer,
or employee of -the Senate, it shall report its findings to the
Senate - and- recommend appropriate action such as censure,
removal from committee membership; or expulsion from the
Senate, in the case of Member, or removal from office or
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employment or punishment for contempt, in the case of an
officer or employee.
SEC. 9. The select committee is authorized to permit
any personal representative of the President, designated by
the President to serve as a liaison to such committee, to
attend any closed meeting of such committee.
SEC. 10. Upon expiration of the Select Committee on
8 Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Ac-
9 tivities, established by Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth
10 Congress, all records, files, documents, and other materials
11 in the possession, custody, or control of such committee,
12 under appropriate conditions established by it, shall be trans-
13 ferred to the select committee.
14 SEC. 11. (a) It is the sense of the Senate that the head
15 of each department and agency of the United States should
16 keep the select committee fully and currently informed with
17 respect to intelligence activities, including any significant
18 anticipated activities, which are the responsibility of or
19 engaged in by such department or agency : Provided, That
20 this does not constitute a condition precedent to the imple-
21 menta.tion of any such anticipated intelligence activity.
22 (b) It is the sense of the Senate that the head of any
23 department or agency of the United States involved in any
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24 intelligence activities should furnish any information or docu-
25 ment in the possession, custody, or control of the depart-
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1 ment or agency, or person paid -by such department or
2 agency, whenever requested by the select committee with
3 respect to any matter within such committee's jurisdiction.
4 (c) It. is the sense of the Senate that each department
5 and agency of the United States should report immediately
6 upon discovery to the select committee any and all intelli-
7 gence -activities - which constitute violations of the consti-tu-
8 tional rights of any - person, - violations of -la`v, or violations
9 of Executive orders, Presidential directives, or departmental
10 or agency rules or`regulations; each department and agency
11 should further report to such committee what actions have
12 been taken or are expected to he -taken by the dep,rtments
13 or agencies- with respect to such violations.
SEC. 12. Subject to the Standing Rules of the Senate,
no funds shall be appropriated for any 'fise it year beginning
after September- 30, 1976, -with the exception of a con-
tinuing bill or resolution, -or- arnendrfient thereto, or con-
18 ference report thereon, to, or for - use of, : any department
19 or. aagency of the United- States to carry out any of the fol-
20 - lowing activities, unless such -funds shall have been pre-
21 viously authorized by a . bill or joint "resolution passed -by
22 - the Senate during' the same or preceding fiscal year to carry
23 out such activity for such fiscal year::,,
24 (1) The activities of the Central Intelligence Agency
25 and the Director of Central Intelligence..
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(2) The activities of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
(3) The activities of the National Security Agency.
(4) The intelligence activities of other agencies and
subdivisions of the Department of Defense.
(5) The intelligence activities of the Department of
State.
(6) The intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, including all activities of the Intelligence
Division.
SEC. 13. (a) The select committee shall make a study
with respect to the following matters, taking into consider-
ation with respect to each such matter, all relevant aspects
of the effectiveness of planning, gathering, use, security, and
dissemination of intelligence :
(1) the quality of the analytical capabilities of
United States foreign intelligence agencies and means
for integrating more closely analytical intelligence and
policy formulation;
(2) the extent and nature of the authority of the
departments and agencies of the executive branch to
engage in intelligence activities and the desirability of
developing charters for each intelligence agency or
department;
(3) the organization of intelligence activities in
the executive branch to maximize the effectiveness of
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1 the conduct, oversight, and accountability of intelligence
2 activities; to reduce duplication or overlap; and to im-
3 prove the morale of the personnel of the foreign intelli-
4 gence agencies;
5 (4) the conduct of covert and clandestine activities
6 and the procedures by which Congress is informed of
7 such activities;
8 (5) the desirability of changing any law, Senate
9 rule or procedure, or any Executive order, rule, or regu-
10 lation to improve the protection of intelligence secrets
11 and provide for disclosure of information for which there
12 is no compelling reason for secrecy;
13 (6) the desirability of establishing a standing com-
14 mittee of the Senate on intelligence activities;
15 (7) the desirability of establishing a joint com-
16 mittee of the Senate and the House of Representatives on
17 intelligence activities in lieu of having separate com-
18 mittees in each House of Congress, or of establishing
19 procedures under which separate committees on intelli-
20 gence activities of the two Houses of Congress would
21 receive joint briefings from the intelligence agencies and
22 coordinate their policies with respect to ' the safeguarding
23 of sensitive intelligence information;
24 (8) the authorization of funds for the intelligence
25 activitio of the Government and whether disclosure of
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1 any of the amounts of such funds is in the public interest;
.2 and
3 (9) the development of a uniform set of definitions
4 for terns to be used in policies or guidelines which may
5 be adopted by the executive or legislative branches to
6 govern, clarify, and strengthen the operation of intelli-
11.
12
13
14
gence activities.
(b) The select committee may, in its discretion, omit
from the special study required by this section any matter it
determines has been adequately studied by the Select Com-
mittee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities, established by Senate Resolution 21,
Ninety-fourth Congress.
(c) The select committee shall report the results of the
study provided for by this section to the Senate, together
with any recommendations for legislative or other actions
it deems appropriate, no later than July 1, 1977, and from
time to time thereafter as it deems appropriate.
SEC. 14. (a) As used in this resolution, the term "intel-
ligence activities" includes (1) the collection, analysis, pro-
duction, dissemination, or use of information which relates
to any foreign country, or any government, political group,
party, military force, movement, or other association in such
foreign country, and which relates to the defense, foreign
policy, national security, or related policies of the United
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1 States, and other activity which is in support of such activi-
2 ties; (2) activities taken to counter similar activities directed
3 against the United States; (3) covert or clandestine activities
4 affecting the relations of the United States with any foreign
5 government, political group, party, military force, movement
'6 or -other association; (4) the collection, analysis, production,
7 dissemination, or use of information about activities of per-
8 sons within the United States, its territories and possessions,
9 or nationals of the United States abroad whose political
10 and related activities pose, or may be considered' by any
11 department, agency, bureau, office, division, instrumentality,
. 12 or employee of the United States to pose, a threat to the
13 internal security -of 'the United States, and covert or clan-
14 'destine activities directed against such persons. Such term
15 does not include tactical foreign military intelligence serving
16 no national policymaking function.
17 (b) As used in this resolution, the term "department or
18 agency" includes any organization, committee, council, estab-
19 lishment, or office within the Federal Government.
20 (c) For purposes of this resolution, reference to any
21 department, agency, bureau, or subdivision shall include a
22 reference to any successor department, -agency, bureau, or
23 subdivision to the extent that such successor engages in intel-
24 ligence activities now conducted by the department, agency,
25 bureau, or subdivision referred to in this resolution.
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I SEC. 15. For the period from the date this resolution is
2 agreed to through February 28, 1977, the expenses of the
3 select committee under this resolution shall not exceed
4 $275,000, of which amount not to exceed $30,000 shall be
5 available for the procurement of the services of individual
6 consultants, or organizations thereof, as authorized by section
7 202 (i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.
8 Expenses of the select committee under this resolution shall
9 be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers
10 approved by the chairman of the select committee, except;
11 that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of_
12 salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.
13 SEC. 16. Nothing in this resolution shall be construed-
14 as constituting acquiescence by the Senate in any practice,
15 or in the conduct of any activity, not otherwise authorized
16 by law.
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Amdt. No. 1643 Calendar No. 728
94TH CONGRESS
~
2D SESSION S. RES.. 400
AMENDMENT
Proposed by Mr. CANNON (for himself, Mr.
ROBERT C. BYRD, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. HUGH
SCOTT, Mr. PERCY, Mr. HATFIELD, Mr. RIBI-
COFF, Mr. CHURCH, Mr. MONDALE, Mr.
BAKER, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. PHILIP A. HART,
Mr. HUDDLESTON, Mr. MORGAN, Mr. GARY
HART, Mr. MATHIAS, Mr. SCHWEIKER, Mr.
JAVITS, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. DURKIN, Mr.
ROTH, Mr. STEVENSON, Mr. BROOKE, Mr.
BROCK, Mr. WVEICKER, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr.
CLARK, and Mr. PELL) to S. Res. 400, a reso-
lution to establish a Standing Committee of
the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and
for other purposes.
MAY 12,1976
Ordered to be printed
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Calendar No. 728
94TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION So RESe 400
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
MAY 13) 1976
Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed
AMENDMENT
.Intended to be proposed by Mr. TAFT to amendment numbered
4643 to S. Res. 400, a resolution to establish a Standing
:Committee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for
.other purposes, viz:
1 On page 4, line 20, delete the word "not".
Amdt. No. 1645
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94TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION
Calendar No. 728
So RES9400
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
MAY 13,1976
Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed
AMENDMENT
Intended to be proposed by Mr. TAFT to amendment numbered
1643 to S. Res. 400, a resolution to establish a Standing
Committee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for
other purposes, viz : On page 6, line 12, delete paragraph
(b) and substitute the following provision :
1 . (b) Any proposed legislation or other intelligence matter
2 considered by the select committee, except any legislation
3 involving matters specified in clause (1) or (4) (A) of
4 subsection (a) , containing any matter otherwise within the
5 jurisdiction of any standing committee shall be communi-
6 cated to the chairman and ranking member, respectively,
7 of such standing committee, and at the request of the chair-
8 man of such standing committee any proposed legislation
9 shall be referred to such standing committee for its con-
Amdt. No. 1646
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2
1 such date was a. member of more than one committee of the
2 classes described in the second sentence of paragraph 6 (a)
3 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate may serve
4 on a number of committees within those classes equal to the
number of committees of those classes on which he was
6 serving on such day. No Senator who is a member of more
7 than two standing committees named in paragraph 2 of rule
8 XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate may serve on the
9 Select Committee on Intelligence Activities.
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Calendar No. 728
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
MAY 13, 1976
Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed
94Th CONGRESS
2D SESSION S? RES. 400
AMENDMENTS
Intended to be proposed by-_- Mr. Ir. TAFT to amendment num-
bered 1643 ,to S. Iles. 400, a resolution to establish a Stand-
ing Oomnli-ttee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and
for other purposes, viz :
On page 8, -lines 13 mid 14, delete the term "for public
dissemination".
On page 8, line 17, delete all after the period and delete
all of line 18.
Amdt. No. 1647
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94TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION
Calendar No. 728
S. RES. 400
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
MAY 13,1976
Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed
AMENDMENT
Intended to be proposed by Mr. NELSON to the amendment (in
the nature of a substitute) numbered 1643 submitted by
Mr. CANNON (for himself and others) to S. Res. 400, a res-
olution to establish a Standing Committee of the Senate on
Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes, viz : Strike
out subsection (d) of section 2 and insert in lieu thereof the
following :
1 (d) For the purposes of the second sentence of para-
2 graph 6 (a) of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the
3 Senate, membership on the Select Committee. on Intelligence
4 Activities shall not be taken into account until that date oc-
5 curring during the first session of the Ninety-sixth Congress,
6 upon which the appointment of the majority and minority
7 party members of the standing committees of the Senate is
8 initially completed. Each Senator who on the day preceding
Amdt. No. 1648
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such date was a member of more than one committee of the
2 classes described in the second sentence of paragraph 6 (a)
3 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate may serve
4 on a number of committees within those classes equal to the
number of committees of those classes on which he was
6 serving, on such day. No Senator who is a member of more
7 than two standing committees named in paragraph 2 of rule
XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate may serve on the
9 Select Committee on Iatt li.igezice Activities..
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94TII CONGRESS
2D SESSION
Calendar No. 728
S. RES. 400.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
MAY 13,1976
Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed
AMENDMENTS
Intended to be proposed by Mr. TowER (for himself, Mr. STEN-
NIS, Mr. - GOLDWATER, and Mr. TIIURMOND) to the 'amend-
ment (in the nature of a substitute) numbered 1643 sub-
mitted by Mr. CANNON (for himself and others) to S. Res.
400, a resolution to establish a Standing Committee of the
Senate oh Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes, viz :
1 On page 5 strike out paragraphs (2) and (3) of section
2 3 (a) of the amendment and insert in lieu 'thereof the
3 following:
4 " (2) Intelligence activities of all other departments and
5 agencies of the Government except the Defense Intelligence
6 Agency, the National Security Agency, and other agencies
7 and subdivisions of the Department of Defense.
8 " (3) The organization or reorganization of any depart-
9 ment or agency of the Government, other than the Depart-
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2
1 ment of Defense, to the extent that the organization or reor-
2 ganization relates to a function or activity involving
3 intelligence activities.
4 Strike out clauses (B), (C), and (D) of paragraph
5 (4) of section 3 (a) of the amendment and redesignate
6 clauses (E) and (F) as clauses (B) and (C), respectively.
7 Strike out clause (G) of paragraph (4) of section 3 (a)
8 of the amendment and insert in lieu thereof the following :
9 " (D) Any department, agency, or subdivision
10 which is the successor to the agency named in clause
11 (A) ; and the activities of any department, agency, or
12 - , subdivision which is the successor to any department or
13 bureau named in clause (B) or (C), to the extent the
14 activities of such successor department, agency, or sub-
15 division are described in clause (B) or (C ), .".
16 Strike. out the period in section 4 (c) and insert in lieu
17 thereof ''as specified in section 3 (a,.) .'.'.
18
19
20
Strike out clauses (2), (3), and (4) of section 12 and.
redesignate clauses (5) and (6) as clauses (2) and (3)
respectively.
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INDEX OF DEBATE
(Pages and Dates of the Congressional Record)
S 7082 - 5/12 - Text of Cannon Amendment.
2 7085 - 5/12 - Ribicoff introduction - principles.
S 7087 - 5/12 .- Explanation Section by Section of
Compromise S Res 400.
S 7090 - 5/12 Summary of S Res 400 as reported out by
Government Operations Committee.
S 7092 - 5/12 - Summary of S Res 400 substitute.
S 7096 - 5/12 Pell-Ribicoff Colloquy on Concurrent
Jurisdiction.
S 7256 - 5/13 Text of Cederberg H Res. for a Joint
Committee.
S 7261 - 5/13 - Baker on "prior approval".
S 7262 5/13 - Church on the Resolution.
S 7270 - 5/13 - Hart on Notification of Covert Actions.
S 7340 - 5/17 - Percy on Concentrated Oversight.
S 7344 - 5/17 - Inclusion, of David .Kahn article on
USA in NYT Mag. 5/16/76 - "Big Ear on Big
Brother" inserted by Mondale.
S 7353 - 5/17. - Thurmond on Security and Jurisdiction.
S 7354 - 5/17 - Thurmond Insertion of testimony on S Res
400 before Armed Services 'Committee -
Ellsworth et. al.
S 7361 - 5/17 - Taft on standing committees vs select
committee - Colloquy with Ribicoff on
ability of standing committee member of
Select Committee to inform his parent
committee.
STATINTL
S 7409 - 5/18 -. Ribicoff on term of serving on Select Committee.
S 7535 - 5/19 - Stennis-Tower effort to-exclude DOD intelli-
gence activities from oversight by new committee.
S 7438 - 5/19 - Nunn-Ribicoff colloquy - on authorization
authority and disclosure and intelligence manpower.
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S 7540 - 5/19 - The American Legion on S Res 400 - inserted
by Cannon.
S 7547 - 5/19 - Cranston on Disclosure - Ribicoff on
Presidential restraint on using "National
Security" 4
S 7553 - 5/19 - Stennis in defense of the existing system
Vote on Stennis-Tower Amendment -.(#1649)
S-7555.63-31.
S 7559 - 5/19 - Vote on Cannon Amendment (no. 1643) 87-7.
S 7559 - 5/19 - Hollings on a Commission rather than a
committee.
S 7563 - 5/19 - Text of S Res 400 - Final Version - and the
vote - 72-22 with 6 not voting.
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DIGEST OF THE SENATE DEBATE ON SENATE RESOLUTION 400
12-19 MAY 1976
Because of the numerous amendments proposed to Resolution
400 in the debate before.the Senate Rules Committee after its
being reported out by the Government Operations Committee, and
because the final version of S Res 400 was arrived at by a
compromise among Senate leaders in camera, there is no record
of hearings on the final version nor a committee report to
interpret the provisions of the bill. The legislative history
of the resolution thus lies in the debate that followed the
compromise version - with the result that many, points of
procedure remain obscured and are possibly subject to
differences among members of the new Select Committee on
Intelligence as the Committee begins its operations.
There follows an effort to identify key interpretations
of the provisions of S. Res 400 as they emerged in the process
of debate. (Numbers and dates refer to pages in the
Congressional Record covering. the debate 12-19 May 1976):
JURISDICTION
Hruska: Argues strongly against inclusion of FBI in the
scope of the oversight committee. This divides jurisdiction
with the Judiciary Committee. The FBI should be viewed as
integral part of the Justice Department under the Attorney
General (S-7094-5/12).
Pell-Ribicoff Colloquy on Concurrent Jurisdiction: Pell
fears the Hughes-Ryan Amendment will be superseded by the new
Committee, restricting the Foreign Relations Committee's
access to Presidential reports on covert action - seeks
clarification. Ribicoff assures that S?Res 400 does not
repeal the Hughes-Ryan Amendment - "as a resolution it could
not do so". The jurisdiction of the: Foreign Relations
Committee is not changed by S Res 400. Legislation. bearing
primarily on foreign policy,. rather than intelligence, would
go to the Foreign Relations Committee, with the new committee
having the .right to request sequential referral - and vice
versa if intelligence were primary in proposed legislation.
Creation of the new committee should not be used by the
intelligence community to deny a standing. committee any
information on any matter with which the committee is concerned"
(S-7096-7-.5/12).
Mondale: We should have a single committee with primary
legislative jurisdiction and for annual authorization of budgets
with concurrent jurisdiction with Judiciary, Armed Services.and
Foreign Relations. Annual budget authorization is essential to
oversight. Only if Congress can cross agency lines can it
establish interactions among agencies, obtain necessary
information without resorting to subpoenas, and take action
where secrecy is necessary (S-7259-5/13).
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Church: Necessary that the oversight committee have
annual authorization authority over CIA and all intelligence
elements of other departments and agencies. "The power of
the purse is the most effective means that the legislature
can have to assure that the will of Congress is observed."
The new committee for the first time, can consider all budgetary
requests of the national intelligence community on an annual
basis. (S-7263-5/13)
Eastland: Argues against inclusion of the FBI in the
jurisdiction of the new oversight committee on grounds of..
the differences between domestic and foreign intelligence and
the fractionating of consideration of the Justice Department
(S-7265-5/13). Argues against the whole of S Res 400 as too
insecure to protect intelligence operations.
Cranston: The Committee will have jurisdiction throughout
the national intelligence community - especially in annual
authorization of funds which should help in fiscal and
organizational planning. in the Executive Branch. Stresses.
sequential referral to stimulate other committees to examine
intelligence activities. But there is a major exception:
the exclusive jurisdiction of the new Committee over CIA, a
good measure to end the Armed Services control of a civilian
agency. (S-7267-5/13)
Weicker: Objects.to the procedures for appointing members
from the standing: committees - a continuation of previous
failures to carry out oversight (S-7276-5/13). Cannon's
amendment to. force consultation with the chairmen of the
standing committees as to their members to be appointed to.the
oversight . committee. passed 75-17 + 8 not voting.
Symington: Hopes for Foreign Relations and Armed Services
to jointly review national intelligence in all its ramifications
since 95% of all our intelligence in peacetime has,to do with
foreign relations as against military operations (S-7281-5/13).
Percy: Argues for inclusion of Defense intelligence
activities in the jurisdiction of the new committee on grounds
that Defense accounts for nearly 90% of US'spending on intelli-
gence. It would defeat the essence of the compromise on
concurrent jurisdiction and return oversight to the standing
committees. Believes that any Senator, whether or not he
sits on the oversight committee, can get the information he
needs from intelligence, and that, even though NSA and DIA
Activities are sensitive, the Committee must go into them for
management efficiency, duplication and the value of the end
product. Argues against fractionalized responsibility for
oversight on the basis of past.oversight performance. Argues
for.stric.t legislative charters for such as NSA and Army
intelligence to prevent wrongdoing. (S-7340-5/17)
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Mondale: Argues against Stennis-Tower amendment which
would remove all DOD intelligence activities from the over-
sight of the new Committee. DIA was involved in covert action
(Track 2 in Chile); NSA was involved in domestic surveillance
[NYT Magazine 5/16/76 - Kahn-Big Ear on Big Brother]; Army
was involved in spying on innocent Americans and para-
military operations. We must have defense within the law.
(S-7343-5/17)
Taft: Questions how a chairman of a standing committee
can know what is before the Select Committee so to ask for
referral - cites the Armed Services Committee testimony.
Hart reminds Taft that Sec 4(a) calls for the Select Committee
to call to the attention of the Senate or an appropriate
committee any matter requiring attention. Taft still is
concerned that informing the standing committees is up to a
judgment of the select committee. Ribicoff effort to reassure
Taft. Sec 4(a) already requires prompt communication by the
select committee to the appropriate standing committee, but is
concerned that "any matter" could be burdensome to the new
committee, so prefers existing language in 4(a) as it stands -
and 3(d) calls for "nothing in this resolution shall be
construed as....changing the authority of any. standing
committee... to obtain full and prompt access to the product
of the intelligence activities... relevant to a matter of
otherwise in the jurisdiction of such a committee". Ribicoff
stresses sequential referral and the need for comity among the
Select Committee and the standing committees and the Executive
Branch. Taft is still concerned whether the members of the
Armed Services Committee on the Select Committee can communicate
information they obtain on the Select Committee to the Armed
Services Committee Chairman and Ranking Minority Member.
Ribicoff feels the members from the standing committees will
determine. proper rules. for such informing,. Percy agrees and
feels that procedures are adequate for making certain that
information will be transmitted to the appropriate committees,,,
but sees the Taft Amendment (S Amend. 1646) would require -
in the stipulation "any matter" - too much reporting. by the
Select Committee of matters not requiring concurrent legislative
jurisdiction and which are sensitive and would reduce the
independence of the Select Committee. Taft.continues concerned
that a member of the Select Committee from a standing committee
would be in a conflict of interest position in informing the
chairman or other members of his parent committee - sees his
amendment as correcting that conflict of interest. Ribicoff
insists that when a matter.of substance comes to the Select
Committee it then will go over to the appropriate standing
committee and amends the resolution to.make that sure, with
Tafts and Percy's agreement. (S-7361-5/17)
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Taft: Concerned that the Select Committee is a "B"
committee - one involved with secondary matters. is intelli-
gence not a critical matter for the Congress? Members will
avoid serving on an add-on committee which will prevent
the best minds being available for judgments on intelligence.
Fears the Staff will become the real experts on intelligence
and thus become the real Select Committee and the dominant,
un-overseen, force in the intelligence activities of the
US. (S-7408-5/18)
Tower and Stennis: Effort to amend to exclude DOD
agencies from the jurisdiction of the new Select Committee
on the grounds it is impossible to separate the Defense
intelligence budget from other Defense appropriations.
Young opposes S Res 400 as creating a committee of excessive
membership and staff - a.major security hazard. (S-7534-5/19)
Ribicoff strongly opposes (S-7537-5/19) - the new committee
must have concurrent jurisdiction over DOD activities because
Defense is the primary collector of national intelligence
with 80-90% of the intelligence expenditures; it is impossible
to separate civilian and military intelligence agencies in
legislative and fiscal considerations; and the interests of the
Armed Services Committee are adequately protected by clauses in
? Sec 3(b), 3(c), 3(d) and 4(a) as to notification, informing
and investigation of DOD intelligence activities. Tactical
intelligence remains solely within the jurisdiction of the
Armed Services Committee; the new committee will have
jurisdiction only over that part of DOD intelligence activities
that provide national intelligence information. The distinction
between tactical and national intelligence is already well
established by EO 11905 and its charter for the CFI and by
the Church Committee Report. Yet, as Ellsworth noted, there
are grey areas between the two. Definition-of what is spent
on tactical and national intelligence intelligence is one of
the first tasks of the new committee. Tower is only concerned
about legislative authority, not oversight. Ribicoff reminds
that there is shared legislative functions and that the standing
committees are represented.
Nunn-Ribicoff'Colloquy: [See Security and. Disclosure] -
On intelligence manpower'- who would authorize. Ribicoff sees
Armed Services as first reference, with the new committee in
sequential referral, depending on the view of the Parliamentarian.
Admits grey areas in the legislation requiring a working out
between the new committee and the standing committees. (S-7438-5/19)
Thurmond: Continues to argue separation of Armed Services
from consideration by the Select Committee (S-7545-5/19) - with
. illustrations of responsibility to SecDef and the services of
DIA, NSA, the Service Intelligence Agencies and overlap with
service budgets - how to charge costs attributable to intelli-
gence in military operations? Again raises risks of expanded
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disclosure and urges avoidance of new layers-of supervision.
Notes the problem of coordination with the House on
appropriations. (5-7545-5/19)
Huddleston: Opposes the Stennis-Tower amendment removing
DOD intelligence activities from the jurisdiction of the new
Committee. "Oversight without legislative participation is
toothless oversight". Defense constitutes 80-90% of intelli-
gence expenditures and must remain in the oversight of the
new Committee. (S-7549-5/19)
Goldwater: Supports Stennis-Tower amendment to give
Armed Services sole jurisdiction to prevent leaks and to
afford concentration on military intelligence. "Create a
committee to take care of abuses of the American people, but
allow military intelligence to go on as it has in the past".
A 15-man committee will not conceal covert action so useful
because it avoids wars. (S-7550-5/19)
Morgan: Disagrees with Stennis-Tower amendment. Believes
it possible to separate DOD intelligence activities contributing
to national intelligence from tactical intelligence. DOD already
makes this distinction in programs submitted to Congress for
? budget authorization. The new committee would have concurrent
jurisdiction over all DOD agencies and programs created for
national intelligence functions, and the Armed Services
would retain sole jurisdiction over those intelligence activities
that serve military commanders. It would be impossible for
the new committee to exercise effective oversight if it cannot
oversee DOD activities. Fears that if the Armed Services
Committee proves more favorable to intelligence activities,
the tendency will be to let the military handle more and more
intelligence operations.
Stennis: Fears for military intelligence appropriations
since there is no parallel committee on intelligence in the
House. (S-7551-5/19)
Symington: Disagrees with the Stennis-Tower amendment -
it would drown CIA which is the only brake on DOD having an
exclusive right to define threats to national security. It
would end civilian supervision of intelligence, 90% of which
is a matter for the Foreign Relations Committee. (S-7551-5/19)
Church: Insists the new committee have concurrent jurisdiction
over DOD intelligence. Repeats previous anti-Stennis amendment
arguments. The new committee will have jurisdiction only over
national intelligence. We need a Committee that can embrace all
intelligence to cure the piecemeal oversight of the past.
(S-7552-5/19)
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Tower: Fears the new committee will create more problems
than it solves, particularly regarding clandestine operations.
Foreign confidence in our intelligence services is already
damaged and foreign services are.less disposed to cooperate
with us. Fears the new committee means proliferation in the
disclosure of sensitive information. The people fear we
have disclosed too much already, with adverse impact on
national security. (S-7552-5/19)
Stennis: Supports the Stennis-Tower amendment - objects
to breaking Defense intelligence out of the Defense budget,
sees proliferation of involvement in sensitive activities,
desires strengthening of military intelligence, asserts the
amendment will not reduce the power of the new committee but
will preserve regular Defense authorization procedures, claims
that abuses are few in the military intelligence activities,
fears additional disclosures of sensitive information in
separate authorizations. Argues that the new committee is
unfitted to handle Defense intelligence matters. (S-7553-5/19)
Stennis-Tower Amendment (no. 1649) defeated 63-31 with
6 not voting.
Byrd: Supports the Cannon compromise - urges study by
? the Senate Select Study Committee -.sees proliferation of
involvement and risks of disclosure - urgesa joint committee
with the House to handle as broad a matter as intelligence -
cites the Cederberg resolution and suggests the creation of a
Senate committee would foreclose a joint committee. (S-7556-5/19)
Kennedy: Supports the Cannon compromise. Cites vast
abuses.of power by intelligence in the past - calls for
Congressional charters for the agencies and guidelines for
their activities, particularly. in the area of electronic.
surveillance. S Res 400 provides the means to fulfill the
Senate's obligations to provide control and guidance over the
Executive Branch's intelligence activities.. Believes the new
committee must have jurisdiction over the FBI to check its
documented abuses, and the DOD activities as well, since it
is also involved in domestic intelligence activities.
(S-7557-5/19)
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SECURITY AND DISCLOSURE
Huddleston: Security restrictions on members and
staff will go far to prevent security considerations from
impeding the intelligence community dealing frankly with
Congress. .(S-7094-5/12)
Baker: Objects to the 9-day limit (Sec 8c) on debate
on disclosure. Believes that a serious matter of releasing
classified information over the objection of the President
should have full and complete debate, but welcomes the
/requirement for a vote of the full Senate on disclosure.
(S-7261-5/13)
Church: The proper role of secrecy in a democracy must
be carefully addressed. Those who argue to keep a matter
secret should have the burden of proof to show why a secret
should be withheld from public scrutiny. Such questions
should be debated by the full Senate. Votes that there is no
agreement as to what a valid national secret is and that the
Senate has no procedure to decide on. matters classified secret
by the Executive Branch. Argues that the Senate should address
violation of disclosure rules and that the Senate, once it sets
rules, should impose them on improper disclosure and assure
is violations are properly dealt with. (S-7263-5/13)
Cannon: "We do have a responsibility among ourselves to
be sure that information that should be kept classified is
kept classified". We have the procedure to declassify what
the Senate feels should be declassified but we must.look after
the security of the country. (S-7265-5/13)
Cranston: Objects to provision for Presidential objection
to disclosure as an injection of the Executive Branch into the
activities of the Legislative. Also objects to a Presidential
representative attending closed committee sessions as a bad
precedent.. Congress is not invited to sit in on NSC or USIB
meetings. Hopes for public. disclosure of the.lump sum of the
intelligence budget, referring to Article I, Sec 9, clause 7
of the Constitution. (S-7261-5/13).
Roth: The only way the oversight committee is going to
get the information it needs is to make certain the Executive
Branch believes Congress can exert the self-discipline necessary
to protect sensitive information. Supports the Huddleston
Amendment (S-7273-5/13) providing for investigation by the
ethics committee of any allegations of unauthorized disclosure.
Is supported by Percy. (S-7273-5/13). Huddleston fears
harassment by the Executive in this and calls for responsible
investigation of charges of violation. by the ethics committee.
(S-7273-5/13)
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Abourezk: Re Sec 8 of S Res 400: - re committee action
by majority vote on Presidential objection to disclosure.
Stresses fear that disclosure is up to the full Senate,
setting dangerous precedents: the Executive classification
system will be applied to Congress, surrendering Congress'
independent power to classify or not, and affect every
committee in Congress; the Executive can. control Legislative
decision on declassification, robbing the Senate of its
power to operate - a dangerous usurpation of power. Calls
for cooperative negotiation on matters of this kind.
Presidential certification (that the threat to national
security outweighs the public interest) promotes Executive
refusal to negotiate with the committee, moving the matter to
the full Senate - while the President is free to declassify
as he sees fit politically. The administration has set up a
public relations campaign to demonstrate that the Executive can
protect secrets but the Congress cannot. The restrictions of
Sec 8(c)(2) impose a bar to communication between members of
the Committee and other Members of the Senate and inhibits
"full and robust discussion" of important issues. (S-7277-5/13)
Ribicoff: Any Senator can use Rule XXXV(35) of the Senate
Rules to bring to a closed session of the Senate a difference
with the President over the disclosure of information, and the
Senate can then make its will known. (S-7278-5/13)
Abourezk: Cites Pike Report as an example of how the.
Executive can suppress the release of a Congressional.report
to the public by parliamentary maneuvers. Abourezk Amendment
(relating to majority vote of the Committee-on disclosure and
referral to the Senate) was moved to be tabled - this was
passed 77-13 with 10 not voting - so it was tabled. (S-7280-5/13)
Taft: Concerned about security. More people have to be
privy to sensitive information than in the. past. Presses an
amendment to Sec 4(b).on annual reports and their unclassified
versions to be made public by the Committee. Cites Ellsworth
in opposition before Stennis and Thurmond. Urges that such
reports not be made public - including funds appropriated.
Percy agrees. Ribicoff notes that Senate Rule XXXV permits
any two Senators to raise the amount of funds appropriated, and
the Senate could vote to disclose the amount appropriated.
Taft notes that the language of the resolution does not require
disclosure, but that disclosure of funds appropriated would be
up to the committee and then the Senate, but urges the Senate
to be aware of the dangers involved in giving aid to adversary
intelligence services. Is supported by Allen. (S-7349-5/17)
Urges, after colloquy with Brock, that public dissemination be
left to the Senate or the committee. Ribicoff agrees, so does
Percy.
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Thurmond: Concerned about security with a large
committee and with concurrent jurisdiction with four other
committees - 50 or 60 staff people will be involved and a "vast
proliferation of sensitive data" threatening our intelligence
effectiveness. Concerned over prior notification, authorization
fo funds by such a large committee which is sure to leak the
members and the possibility that the full Senate could make
public the most sensitive information - making the CIA an
arm of Congress, rather than the President. Also fears
release of information to other committees as the Select
Committee may consider necessary. Argues for retention of
oversight in the standing committees with qualified staffs.
(S-7353-5/17) Inserts lengthy record of hearings on S Res 400
before the Armed Services Committee (S-7354-5/17). Ellsworth,
primarily. Thurmond fears new committee will lead to much
proliferation of disclosure.
Cranston: Proposes that the President be required to
certify personally. and in writing that the threat of disclosure
poses a threat to national security interest such as to out-
weigh. public interest in disclosure. (5-7413-5/18)
Weicker and Stennis and Huddleston: Re Welch and security
problems to protect people in intelligence. (S-7534-5/19)
Nunn-Ribicoff Colloquy on Authorization and Disclosure:
Nunn - is there any requirement for disclosure of the amount
spent on intelligence? Ribicoff - no - S Res 400 does not
define this matter. It is up to the new committee. (See
Sec 12) - goes on to describe how the full Senate could
continue to conceal expenditures for intelligence and, under
Rule XXXV, go into closed session and debate the authorization.
Assumes the Intelligence Committee would in comity allow standing
committees full time to consider authorizations that affect
them. (S-7538-5/19)
Weicker: Denounces Stennis-Tower Amendment.as un-
constitutional in violating Act I Sec 9 and as continuing the
old concealment system. Tower replies that not every expenditure
is involved and that intelligence costs must be kept secret.
Despite Nunn, presses for public disclosure of a total figure
for intelligence expenditures. Percy feels it possible to
authorize funds for intelligence without public disclosure,
with the debate in closed Senate proceedings. (S-7542-5/19)
Cranston: Colloquy on Disclosure - Ribicoff: The President
would invoke grounds of national security only in the gravest
cases - "a matter of gravity". Imagines a President would use
such certification sparingly so as not to wear out his
credibility with the Senate. Cranston: sees it up to Senate
to determine whether the gravity of the matter (of disclosure)
.is sufficient to prevent disclosure. Ribicoff: Release would
be.permissable, without reference to the full Senate, only if
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the material does not conform to the operational procedure
of Presidential certification under Sec 8(b)(1) of S Res 400.
(S-7547-5/19)
Stennis: Expresses fears of disclosure of sensitive
collection capabilities and R&D and argues for the separation
of DOD activities from oversight by the new committee. Opposes
disclosure of budget figures - which the Senate has kept secret
for years - and for good cause. (S-7548-5/19)
Nunn: Concerned over the possibility that the language of
Sec 8 b 3 could permit the Committee to disclose information
over the President's objection if it did not, by majority vote,
submit the matter to the full Senate. Submits an amendment
"The committee shall not publicly disclose such information
without leave of.the Senate". Ribicoff accepts. (S-7549-5/19)
Hollings: Sees danger in the new committee as involving
40 Senators and, if the House establishes a similar committee,
some 200 members of the House being involved in sensitive
activities. Urges a small bi-partisan commission of members
of both Houses of Congress and 5 prominent non-government
people to make periodic surveys of intelligence activities,
with fundings to go to the Congress and the President.
Beall: Stresses importance of confidentiality in Select
Committee activities, particularly with respect to intelligence
personnel - his S-3242 providing for fines and imprisonment
for identifying people in intelligence operations - currently
pending before the Judiciary Committee. (S-7559-5/19)
Huddleston: There has been too much secrecy in the past,
but this must not be used to abolish all secrecy or controls.
Covert action is only.a.small part of intelligence, and its
errors obscure the achievements of other parts of intelligence.
Defends the Roth-Huddleston amendment for sanctions on un-
authorized disclosures - to be investigated by the ethics
committee and sanctions approved by the full Senate. Congress
must discipline its own. (S-7560-5/19)
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PRIOR APPROVAL AND COVERT ACTION
Perc : The Oversight Committee should not be in the
position where it is asked for prior approval which would
put the Members in a position of having been part and parcel
of the original decision and thus unable to exercise proper
oversight. (S-7091-5/12)
Goldwater: The President must have the ability to carry
out covert actions - which offers a range of options between
diplomatic notes and economic sanctions and outright war. But
the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, requiring six Committees and over 50
Senators and 120 Congressmen and their staffs to receive
notification of covert action, has about destroyed this
capability. Argues for a single joint committee on the model
of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. Cites Cederberg Res in
the House. (S-7256-5/13.)
Baker: Did not intend, in inserting language that prior
notification would not constitute a condition precedent to
implementation of action, (Sec 11) that this requires prior
approval, only prior consultation. (5-7261-5/13)
Church: Cites for "fully and currently informed" the
Atomic Energy Act, Sec 202(d) as requiring prior legislative
authorization of intelligence activities - which is essential
for vigilant oversight and a means of providing the advice of
Congress. (S-7263-5/13)
Cranston: See "Fully and Currently Informed". (S-7268-5/13)
Notes that Sec 16 re acquiescence of the Senate in unlawful
activity is to prevent CIA or any other. intelligence agency
as citing S Res 400 as authority to conduct covert operations.
Schweiker: Re "anticipated significant activities"
"while the Committee's consent would not be required before
covert actions could be implemented, it is.clear that the
Committee must be provided advance notice about significant
activities". And, as the Government Operations Committee
/noted, "it would be in the interest of sound national policy
for the President to be apprised in advance if the committee
is strongly opposed to any particular proposed activity".
(S-7269-5/13)
Gary Hart: Re Sec 11(a) - considers Baker's language re
"condition precedent to implementation" to be ambiguous. Traces
legislative history of prior notification: Church - S-2893-13(c)
1/29/76 - called for the Executive to notify the committee prior
to implementation of covert actions. Asks inclusion of S-2893
in the Record. S-2983 did not call for prior approval, only
prior notice, and did not require notification of all covert
actions, only "significant ones". The intent of 13(c) was to
permit Congress to advise the President before significant CIA
covert operations were begun. Activities heretofore submitted
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to the 40 Committee are "significant" and would require
prior notice to the committee. The Government Operations
Committee defined as "significant" those activities. which
are "particularly costly" or which affect diplomatic,
political or military relations with other nations. The
Government Operations Committee did not envision a veto on
any activity the new committee knew of in advance, but
recognized that the President should know of the views of the
committee on the action proposed. The President is not
legally bound to notify the oversight committee since this
action is a resolution, not a statute. It expresses the
"sense of the Senate". The only statute going to notification
is the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance
Act. The Senate must have prior notification of significant
CIA covert operations so that it may advise the President;
covert action is "too dangerous a tool to be used by the
.President without congressional consultation". Covert action
cannot be used to circumvent debate and public accountability
or as a Presidential "convenience". Cites Clifford as for
joint Congressional and Executive decision making on covert
action. Likewise Cy Vance - who rejected a Congressional veto,
and Helms - who ifet Congressional approval was necessary to
avoid subsequent repudiation by Congress. "It is the clear
intent of the Senate that it be given advance notice of approved
CIA covert operations before they are implemented". (S-7270-5/13)
Clark: Can we allow a policy of covert action to continue
to interfere and violate laws of other nations wherever we think
it. useful? The resolution fails to cure this policy.
(S-7276-5/13)
Thurmond: Testimony before the Armed Services Committee by
Ellsworth - re no problem that the military will swallow CIA in
the resource allocation process under the CFI. Fears that
prior notification and the capacity of the Senate to leak will
endanger the lives of those engaged in covert operations. "The
President has to have some flexibility on when to move".
(S-7355-5/17)
Pastore: Rejects CIA having to have approval from the
Senate for actions it takes, but insists the Senate be
informed - as per Sec 211 of the Atomic Energy Act (Sec 11
of S Res 400). Percy: The Senate must avoid taking over
Executive responsibilities, but the President has agreed that
the options and problems would be committed to. writing and
signed by a "top officer", himself, in extraordinary cases..
(S-7545-5/19)
Goldwater: Fears a 15-man committee cannot conceal covert
action - thus reviving a useful means of avoiding wars.
(S-7550-5/19)
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"FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED"
Baker: Re Sec 11: wanted the "fully and currently
informed" language to conform with the practice of the
Joint Atomic Intelligence Committee precedent. Adds that
he recommended the language "Provided that this does not
constitute-a condition precedent to the implementation of
any anticipated intelligence activity". This was not
intended to require prior approval before Executive Branch
implementation, only prior consultation. (S-7261 - 5/13)
Church: The oversight committee must have the right to
acquire necessary information - that it be "fully and
completely informed". "The Executive Branch should be
obligated to answer any requests made by the Committee for
information within its jurisdiction". Cites the Atomic
Energy Act Sec 202(d). (S-7263-5/13)
Cranston: Cites.the importance of the proviso for
keeping the Committee"fully and currently informed". "The
new committee is to have access to any information within
the possession of the agencies relating to any matter within
the committee's jurisdiction". In combination with the
Hughes-Ryan Amendment, this should provide a meaningful
check on clandestine operations. This will make it possible
to bar funds for operations such as Angola - Tunney
Amendment 12/75. (S-7267-5/13)
Pastore.: Cites the precedent of the Atomic Bomb and
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for "fully and currently
informed no leaks from the Committee - but rejects CIA
having to come to the Senate for approval. (S-7545-5/19)
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 Approved For Release 20i/1.CIA-&9730200180001-5
May 12, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
beef producers and consumers will be'
fostered by this legislation. I noted this
morning at hearings before the Commit-'
teQ Agriculture and Forestry that rep-
organizations, were present to testify in
support of the Farmers Market Act and
similar legislation which was introduced
last year by Senator HUMPHREY and my-
self. At the hearings, Senator HUDDLE-
STON commented to the young lady from
the Consumer Federation that he felt a
growing awareness among consumer ad-
vocates of the difficulties faced by those
who provide food and fiber for the
United States. I think this is laudable,
and absolutely necessary. We owe it not
only to those in agriculture, but also
those who are served by agriculture, to
find ways in which cooperation and un-
derstanding can be developed.
Mr. President, this bill does just that,
and I believe if for no other reason, it
merits enactment. I would urge my col-
leagues to support the bill with me, for
the 'benefit of American ranchers and
consumers.
Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, I am
ready to yield back the remainder of my
time.
Mr. ALLEN. I yield back the remainder
of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
STAFFORD). All time is yielded back. The
question is on agreeing to the conference
report on the Beef Research and Infor-
mation Act. The yeas and nays have been
ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce
the Senator from Idaho (Mr.
CHURCH), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr.
INOUYE), the Senator from Wyoming
(Mr. McGEE), the Senator from Califor-
nia (Mr. TUNNEY) and the Senator from
New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA) are neces-
sarily absent.
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. I announce that
the Senator from Tennessee (Mr.
BAKER), the Senator from Massachusetts
(Mr. BROOKE) and the Senator from
Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN) are necessarily
absent.
The result was announced-yeas 65,
nays 27, as follows:
fRollcall Vote No. 375 Leg.]
Allen
Bartlett
Buckley
Burdick
YEAS-65
Goldwater Mondale
Gravel Moss
Hansen Nunn
Hart, Gary Packwood
Hartke Pearson
Haskell Percy
Hatfield Randolph
Helms Roth
Hollings Scott,
Hruska William L.
n'u,11 Byrd, Robert C. Eagleton
Biden Case Glenn
Hart, Philip A.
Morgan
Ribicof
Hathaway
Muskie
Schweiker
Javits
Nelson
Scott, Hugh
Kennedy
Pastore
Stevenson
Mathias
Pell
Weicker
McIntyre
Proxmire
Williams
NOT VOTING-8
Baker
Griffin
Montoya
Brooke
Inouye
Tunney
Church
McGee
So the conference report was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Nevada is recognized.
ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SEN-
ATOR RIBICOFF
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that after the Sen-
ator from Nevada has completed his re-
marks the distinguished Senator from
Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF) then be
recognized.
S7081
The select committee would have sub-
Pena power, a staff, and funds to keep-
itself informed so as to equip itself to
provide effective oversight of the intelli-
gence community.
Before the committee voted to report
the substitute amendment it had adopted
numerous perfecting amendments to the
resolution as opposed to the form in
which it was referred to the Committee
on Rules and Administration.
Some of those perfecting amendments
were unanimously approved while others
were agreed to by a bare majority vote.
The amendments changed various parts
of the resolution while leaving some por-
tions thereof unamended although many
of them were not favored by various
members of the committee. Hence, when
there were no further perfecting amend-
ments to be offered to the resolution, the
question was put on agreeing to a com-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without - plete substitute amendment for the reso-
objection, it is so ordered. lution, which was agreed to by a vote of
PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, the Senate will now
resume consideration of the unfinished
business, Senate Resolution 400, which
the clerk will state.
The second assistant legislative clerk
read as follows:
A resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish a
Standing Committee of the Senate on In-
telligence Activities, and for other purposes.
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the resolution.
- Mr. CANNON Mr. President, before I
get to discuss the history and action by
the Committee on Rules and Administxa-'
tion on Senate Resolution 400, I state
that several Senators, including myself,
representing groups of Senators holding
various points of view have been meet-
ing and discussing the possibility of
working out a compromise version. While
our resolve might not be completely
satisfactory to all parties, it is the best
possible compromise we could reach.
Later on I propose to offer this substitute
as a proposed amendment in the nature
of a substitute for the committee sub-
stitute as reported.
Mr. President, the Committee on Rules
and Administration on April 29, 1976,
reported Senate Resolution 400, to estab-
lish a Standing Committee of the Senate
on Intelligence Activities, and for other
purposes, with an amendment in the
nature of a substitute for the resolution
as referred to the committee, and an
amendment to the title of the resolution.
The title amendment reads "A resolution
establishing a Select Committee on In-
telligence."
The committee substitute would estab-
lish a permanent select, not a standing
committee, on intelligence with oversight
jurisdiction over the intelligence com-
munity but without legislative jurisdic-
tion; it proposes to leave within the
standing committees on Armed Services,
Foreign Relations, the Judiciary, or any
other committee their existing legislative
jurisdiction with respect to intelligence
activities.
5 to 4.
The ? committee, both in the case of
perfecting amendments to the resolution
and the substitute therefor, proposed
that the intelligence committee not be
made a standing committee, but instead
a select committee. The perfecting
amendments approved by the committee
before agreeing to the substitute pro-
posed to give the select committee se-
quential, concurrent jurisdiction over the
Central Intelligence Agency, the intelli-
gence activities of all other departments
and agencies of the Government, the
organization and reorganization plans
affecting intelligence activities within
Government agencies, as well as author-
ization for appropriations for practically
all such agencies.
The substitute' for the resolution re-,
ported by the committee would not ex-
tend any legislative jurisdiction to the
select committee. The composition of the
select committee as approved by the
Committee on Rules and Administration
was virtually the same in both the
amended version and the substitute
therefor.
In my opinion, in observing the action
taken by the Committee on Rules and
Administration, the committee was very
much concerned with, and emphasized
Congressional oversight of the intel-
ligence activities of the Administration
but at the same time it was particularly
concerned that national security secrets
were not to be leaked or divulged to Our
enemies abroad. The Rules Committee
wanted to establish a committee fortified
with the powers to do a good job without
doing harm to the operations of the in-
telligence agencies of the Government in
carrying out their functions and duties
for which they were created. The com-
mittee was particularly concerned to
tighten up the provisions of the resolu-
tion for preventing the leakage of in-
formation as well as the provision au-
thorizing the committee to make public
classified information; it was the feel-
ing of a majority of the committee that
confidential and secret information
should not be released by the committee
but that the committee when requested
by the administration or agencies there-
of to keep certain information confiden-
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 S 7082
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May-12, 1976
tial should vote to report that informa-
tion to the Senate in closed session, and
then let the Senate work its will as to
whether such information should be re-
leased to the public. The committee was
concerned that the select committee
should have a competent staff and there-
fore voted to eliminate the provision
which would restrict the tenure of serv-
ice of its employees.
Personally, I am opposed to the provi-
sions of the resolution as approved which
restrict the service of a Senator on the
select committee to a 6-year term. I am
also opposed to the provision which would
authorize the select committee to obtain
annual reports -from the intelligence
agencies on their intelligence - activities
and the intelligence activities of foreign
countries directed at the United States
or its interests and to direct the select
committee to unclassify these reports in-
eluding individuals engaged in intel-
ligence activities for the United States
or the sources of information on which
such reports are based.
After the committee voted to report the
committee substitute for the resolution, I
have engaged in conversations with Sen-
ators representing different points of view
on the resolution and because of the sen-
timents expressed; I proceeded -to discuss
the possibility with other senators. of
working out some kind. of a compromise-
version which would be acceptable to the
Senate. This ,substitute I propose to In-
troduce is flow cosponsored- by a great
number of other Senators. - -
In submitting this amendment; the
Senate -will be given an opportunity -to
vote on a compromise version between
tha,t reported by the Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations and the substitute
amendments acted on by the Committee
on Rules and Administration.
The compromise would establish a new
select committee to be known as the Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence. it would
be composed of 17 Senators-as now
drafted, however, there is some contro-
versy as to the size of the committee,
which undoubtedly will be considered on
the floor-two.each from the Committee
on Appropriations, the Committee on
Armed Services, the-Committee on For-
eign: Relations, and the_ Committee on
the Judiciary, and- 9 members from- the
Senate who are not .members of these
committees. No Senator would be Per-
mitted to serve more. than 10 years, to
be appointed so as to give them a rotat-
ing membership with one-third of the
members to the greatest extent possible
being appointed at the beginning of each
Congress. All of the members are to be
appointed by the President pro tempore
on the recommendations of the major-
ity and minority leaders, after consulta-
tion with the respective committee chair-
men. The majority and minority leaders
will be ex officio members but without a
vote.
The chairman and vice chairman are
to be elected at the beginning of each
Congress by the members of their respec-
tive political parties. Senators appointed
to this committee will be exempt from
the limitations placed on the number of
committee assignments to which a Sena-
for Is entitled.
The committee is given Investigatory
and oversight authority which would a1-
low it to study all Intelligence activities
and programs by the Government; It
would also have legislative jurisdiction
over matters enumerated in section 3, in-
cluding authorizations therefor. This
jurisdiction would be shared with the
standing committees which already have
jurisdiction over such subject matter ex-
cept in the case of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency ,and the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, which would fall solely
within the jurisdiction of the select com-
mittee-that is, except for the Central
Intelligence - Agency and the Director
thereof, certain .committees would be
given sequential, concurrent jurisdiction
over the intelligence community.
The existing committees of the Senate
would in no way be restricted in making
studies and reviews of matters which fall
within their jurisdiction, respectively.
Regular and periodic reports to the
Senate on the nature and extent c the
intelligence activities 'of the various de-
partments and agencies . would be re-.
quired. The committee would be directed
to obtain annual reports from agencies
participating in intelligence activities
and make public such unclassified in-
formation-I repeat, unclassified infor-
mation.
The committee would also be required
to report on or before March 15 of each
year to the Committee on the Budget of
the Senate the views and estimates "de-
sbribed in section 301(c) of the Congres-
sional Budget Act regarding matters
within its jurisdiction."
The committee -would be authorized to
make investigations, armed with subpena
power. It would be authorized a staff and
funds to keep itself informed on the in-
telligence activities within its jurisdic-
tion to insure effective oversight of the
intelligence community.
. Effort was made to assure security
against divulging unlawful Intelligence
activities and to protect our national
security. Reports on lawful, classified in-
formation by this group will be made to
the Senate in closed session to determine
if such information should be released.
The - formula for this protection is set
forth in sections '6 through 8.
All of the records, files, documents,
and other materials held by- the Select
Committee on Government Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities
will be transferred to this committee.
Section 11 expresses the sense of the
Senate as to the responsibility of the
departments and agencies of the Govern-
ment to keep the select committee in-
formed of all developments in intelli-
gence activities by the respective depart-
ments and agencies.
Subjects to be studied by the select
committee and on which the committee
is directed to file a report not later than.
July 1, 1977, are set forth in section 13.
These matters include, among other
things, the question of whether a stand-
ing committee should be formed and the
question of whether a joint committee
should be formed, such as the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy. A proposal
already has been made In the House to
create a joint committee, between the
House and the Senate, on intelligence
activities. Funds are authorized in the
amount not to exceed $275,000 through
February 28, 1977, paid out of thWe
tingent fund of the Senate. I submit this compromise to the
for its decision and judgment. There is
no question in my mind but that all Sen-
ators share with me the desire to
strengthen and to improve the Govern-
ment's role in the intelligence field. In
that spirit, I submit the compromise for
the approval of the Senate. I send to the
desk an amendment in the nature of a
substitute, to be considered as a substi-
tute for the committee amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, there is
one slight modification that has been
agreed upon, and I. ask unanimous con-
sent to submit it at a later time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The legislative clerk read as follows;
AMENDMENT No. 1643
The Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON)
(for himself, Mr. ROBERT G. BYRD, Mr.
MANSFIELD, Mr. HUGH SCOTT, Mr. PERCY, MT.
HATFIELD, Mr. RmicoFF, Mr. CHuacH, Mr. -
MONDALE, Mr. BAKER, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr.
PH=n' A. HART, Mr. HUDDLESTON, Mr. MORGAN,
Mr. GARY HART, Mr. MATHIAS, Mr. SCHWEIKTR,
Mr. JAvrrs, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. Dunxav, Mr.
ROTH, Mr. STEVENSON, Mr. BRooxE, Mr.
Baocx, Mr. WEICKER, Mr. HuMP.HREY, Mr.
CLARx, and Mr. PELL) proposes an amend-
meat In the nature of a substitute: in lieu of
the language intended to be substituted by
the committee amendment insert the fol-
lowing:
That it is the purpose of this resolutiogiAQ
establish a new select- committee of
Senate, to be known as the Select Co on Intelligence to oversee and make con-
tinuing studies of the intelligence activities
and programs of the United States Govern-
ment, and to submit to the Senate appro-
priate proposals for legislation and report
to the Senate concerning such intelligence
activities and programs. In carrying out this
purpose, the Select Committee on Intelli-
gence shall make every effort to assure that
the appropriate departments and agencies
of the United States provide informed and
timely intelligence necessary for the execu-
tive and legislative branches to make sound
decisions affecting the security and vital
interests of the Nation. It is further the pur-
pose of this resolution to provide vigilant
legislative oversight over the intelligence
activities of the United States to assure that
such activities are in conformity with the
Constitution and laws of the United States.
SEc. 2. (a) (1) There is hereby established
a select committee to be known as the Select
Committee on Intelligence (hereinafter in
this resolution referred to as the. "select
committee"). The select committee shall be
composed of seventeen members appointed
as follows:
(A) two members from the Committee, on
Appropriations;
(B) two members from the Committee on
Armed Services;
(C) two members from the Committee on
(D) two members from the Committee on
the Judiciary; and
(E) nine members from the Senate who
are not members of any of the committees
named in clauses (A) through (D).
(2) Members appointed from each, Co mittee named in clauses (A) through (D
paragraph (1) shall be evenly divided
tween the two major political parties an
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shall be appointed by the President pro tern-
pore of the Senate upon the recommenda-
tions of the majority and minority leaders
-of the Senate after consultation with their
cnan and ranking minority member.
oW (E) of paragraph (1) shall be ap-
pointed by the President pro tempore of the
Senate upon the recommendation of the ma-
jority leader of the Senate and four shall be
appointed by the President pro tempore of
the Senate upon the recommendation of the
minority leader of the Senate.
(3) The majority leader of the Senate and
the minority leader of the Senate shall be
ex officio members of the select committee,
but shall have no vote in the committee and
shall not be ounted for purposes of deter=
miffing a quoium.
(b) No Senator may serve on the select
committee for more than nine years of con-
tinuous service, exclusive of service by any
Senator on such committee during the
ninety-fourth Congress. To the greatest ex-
tent practicable, one-third of the Members
of the Senate appointed to the select com-
mitteo at the beginning of the ninety-seventh
Congress and each Congress thereafter shall
be Members of the Senate who did not serve
on such committee during the preceding
Congress.
(c) At the beginning of each Congress, the
Members of the Senate who are members of
the majority party of the Senate shall elect
a chairman for the select committee, and
the Members of the Senate who are from the
minority party of the Senate shall elect a
vice chairman for such committee. The vice
chairman shall act in the place and stead of
the chairman in the absence of the chair-
man. Neither the chairman nor the vice
chairman - of the select committee shall at
the same time serve as chairman or ranking
minority member of any other committee
referred to in paragraph 6(f) of rule XXV
of the Standing Rules of the Senate.
For the purposes of paragraph 6(a)
e XXV of the Standing Rules of the
the select committee shall not be taken into
account. -
SEC. 3. (a) There shall be referred to the
select committee all proposed legislation,
messages, petitions, memorials, and other
matters relating to the following:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency and
the Director of Central Intelligence.
(2) Intelligence activities of all other de-
partments and agencies of the Government,
including, but not limited to, the intelligence
activities of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Agency, and other
agencies of the Department of Defense; the
Department of State; the Department of Jus-
tice; and the Department of the Treasury.
(3) The organization or reorganization of
any department or agency of the Government
to the extent that the organization or reor-
ganization relates to a function or activity
involving intelligence activities.
(4) Authorizations for appropriations, both
direct and indirect, for the following:
(A) The Central Intelligence Agency and
Director of Central Intelligence.
(B) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(C) The National Security Agency.
(D) The intelligence activities of other
agencies and subdivisions of the Department
of Defense.
(E) The intelligence activities of the De-
partment of State.
(F) The intelligence activities of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, including all
activities of the Intelligence Division.
(G) Any department, agency, or subdivi-
sion which is the successor to any agency
named in clause (A), (B), or (C); and the
the activities of such successor department,
agency, or subdivision are activities described
in: clause (D); (E), or (F).
(b) Any proposed legislation reported by
the select committee, except any legislation
involving-matters specified in clause (1) or
(4) (A) of subsection (a),. containing any
matter otherwise within the. jurisdiction of
any standing committee shall, at the request
of the chairman of such standing committee,
be referred to such standing committee for
its consideration of such matter and be re-
ported to the Senate by such standing com-
mittee within 30 days after the day on which
such proposed legislation is referred to such
standing committee; and any proposed leg-
islation reported by any committee, other
than the select committee, which contains
any matter within the jurisdiction of the
select committee shall, at the request of the
chairman of the select committee, be referred
to the select committee for its consideration
of, such matter and be reported to the Sen-
ate by the select committee within 30 days
after the day on which such proposed leg-
islation is referred to such committee. In any
ease in which a committee fails to report any
proposed legislation referred to it within the
time limit prescribed herein, such commit-
tee shall be automatically discharged from
further consideration of such proposed legis-
lation on the thirtieth day following the day
on which such proposed legislation is re-
ferred to such committee unless the Senate
provides otherwise. In computing any thirty-
day period under this paragraph there shall
be excluded from such computation any days
on which the Senate is not in session.
. (c) , Nothing in this resolution shall be
construed as prohibiting or otherwise re-
stricting the authority of any other com-
mittee to study and review any, intelligence
activity to the extent that such activity
directly affects a matter otherwise within
the jurisdiction of such committee.
(d) Nothing in this resolution shall be
construed as amending, limiting, or other-
wise changing the authority of any standing
committee of the Senate to obtain full and
prompt access to the product of the intel-
ligence activities of any department or agency
of the Government relevant to a matter
otherwise within the jurisdiction of such
committee.
SEC. 4. (a) The select committee, for the
purposes of accountability t6 the Senate,
shall make regular and periodic reports to
the Senate on the nature and extent of the
intelligence activities of the various depart-
ments and agencies of the United States.
Such committee shall promptly call to the
attention of the Senate or to any other'
appropriate committee or committees of the
Senate any matters deemed by the select
committee to require the immediate atten-
tion of the Senate or such other.committee
or committees. In making such reports, the
select committee shall proceed in a manner
consistent with section 8(c) (2) to protect
national security. -
(b) The select committee shall obtain an
annual report from the Director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of State, and the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion for public dissemination. Such reports
shall review the intelligence activities of the
agency or department concerned and the
intelligence activities of foreign countries
directed at the United States or its interests.
An unclassified version of each report shall be
made available to the public by the select
committee. Nothing herein shall be construed
as requiring the disclosure in such reports
of the names of individuals engaged in Intel-
ligence activities for the United States or the
sources of information on which such re-
ports are based. .
(c) On or before March 15 of each year,
the select committee shall submit to the
Committee on the Budget of the Senate the
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views and estimates described in section
301(c) of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974. regarding matters within the jurisdic-
tion of the select'committee.
SEC. 5. (a) For the purposes of-this resolu-
tion, the select committee is authorized in
its discretion (1) to make investigations into
any matter within its jurisdiction, (2) to
make expenditures from the contingent fund
of the Senate, (3) to employ personnel, (4)
to hold hearings, (5) to sit and act at any
time or place during the sessions, recesses,
and adjourned periods of the Senate, (6) to
require, by subpena or otherwise, the attend-
ance of witnesses and the production of
correspondence, books, papers, and docu-
ments, (7) to take depositions and other tes-
tirimony, (8) to procure the service of individ-
ual consultants or organizations thereof, in
accordance with the provisions of section
202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1946, and (9) with the prior consent of the
Government department or agency concerned
and the Committee on Rules and Adminis-'
tration, to use on a reimbursable basis the
services of personnel of any such department
or agency.
(b) The chairman of the select committee
or any member thereof may administer oaths
to witnesses.
(c) Subpenas authorized by the select
committee may be issued over the signature
of the chairman, the vice chairman, or any
member of the select committee designated
by the chairman, and may be served by any
person designated by the chairman or any
member signing the subpena.
SEC. 6. No employee of the select committee
or any person engaged by contract or other-
wise to perform services for or at the request
of such committee shall be given access to
any classified information by such committee
unless such employee or person has (1)
agreed in writing and under oath to. be bour}d
by.the rules of the Senate (including the
jurisdiction of the Select Committee on
Standards and Conduct) and of such com-
mittee as to the security of such information
during and after the period 'of his employ-
ment or contractual agreement with such
committee; and (2) received an appropriate
security. clearance as determined by such
committee in consultation with the Director
of Central Intelligence. The type of security
clearance to be required in the case of any
such employee or person shall, within the
determination of such committee in con-
sultation with the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, be commensurate with the sensitivity
of the classified information to which such
employee or person will be given access by
such committee.
SEC. It. The select committee shall formu-
late and carry out such rules and procedures
as it deems necessary to prevent the dis-
closure, without the consent of the person
or persons concerned, of information in the
possession of such committee which- unduly
'Infringes upon the privacy or which violates
the constitutional rights of. such person or
persons. Nothing herein shall be construed
to prevent such committee from publicly dis-
closing any such information in any case in
which such committee determines the na-
tional interest in the disclosure of such in-
formation clearly outweighs any infringe-
ment on the privacy of any person or persons.
SEC. 8. (a) The select committee may, sub-
ject to the provisions of this section, disclose
publicly any information in the possession
of such committee after a determination by
such committee that the public interest
would be served by such disclosure. When-
ever committee action is required to disclose
any information under this section, the com-
mittee shall meet to vote on the matter
within five days after any member of, the
committee requests such a vote. No member
of the select committee shall disclose any
information, the disclosure of which requires
a committee vote, prior to a vote by the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE May 12, 1976
committee on the question of the disclosure
of such information, or after such vote except
in accordance with tbba, Section
(b) (1) In any case In which.. the select
committee votes to disclose publicly any in-
formation which has been classified under
established security procedures, which has
been submitted to it by the executive branch,
and which the executive branch requests be
kept secret, such committee shall notify the
President of such vote. I .
(2) The select committee may disclose
publicly such information after the expira-
tion of a five-day period following-the day
on which noticerof such vote Is transmitted
to the President, unless, prior to the expira-
tion of such five-day period, the President
notifies the committee that he objects to the
disclosure of such information, provides his
reasons therefor, and certifies that the threat
to the national interest of the United
States posed by such disclosure fs vital and
outweighs any public interest in the dis-
closure.
(3) If the President notifies the select
committee of his objections to the disclosure
of such information as provided- in para-
graph (2), such committee may, by major-
ity vote, refer the question of the disclosure
of such Information to the Senate for con-
sideration. Such information shall not
thereafter' be* publicly disclosed without
leave of the Senate.
(4)' Whenever the select committee votes
to refer the question of disclosure of any
information to the Senate under paragraph
(3), the chairman shall, not later than the
first day on which the Senate is in session
following the day on which the vote occurs,
report the matter to the Senate for its con-
sideration:
(5) One hour after the Senate convenes
on the fourth day on which the Senate Is In
session following the day on which any such
matter is reported to the Senate, or at such
earlier time as the majority leader and the
minority leader of the Senate jointly agree
upon in accordance with section 133(f) of
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,
the Senate shall go into closed session and
the matter shall be the pending business.
In considering the matter in closed' session
the Senate may-
(A) approve the public disclosure of all
or any portion of the informtion in ques-
tion, in which case the committee shall pub-
licly disclose the information ordered to be
discosed,
(B) disapprove the public disclosure of
all of any portion of the information in
question, in which case the committee shall
not publicly disclose the information ordered
not to be diclosed, or
(C) refer all or any portion of the matter
back to the committee, in which case the
committee shall make the final determi-
nation with respect to the public disclosure
of the information in question. a
Upon conclusion of the consideration of
such matter in closed session, which may not
extend beyond the close of the ninth day
on which the Senate is in session following
the day on which such matter-was reported
to the Senate, or the cose of the fifth day
following the day agreed upon jointly by the
majority and minority leaders in accordance
with section 133(f) of the Legislative Re-
organization Act of 1946 (whichever the
case may be), the Senate shall immediately
vote on the disposition of such matter in
open session, without debate, and without
divulging the information with respect to
which the vote is being taken. The Senate
shall vote to dispose of such matter by one
or more of the means specified in clauses
(A), (B), and (C) of the second sentence
of this paragraph. Any vote of the Senate
to disclose any information pursuant to this
paragraph shall be subject to the right of
aMember of the.Senate to move for recon-
sideration of the vote within the time and
pursuant to the procedures specified in rule
XIII of the Standing Rules of the Senate,
and the disclosure of such information shall
be made consistent with that right.
(c) (1) No information in the possession
of the select committee relating to the lawful
intelligence activities of any department or
agency of the United States which has been
classified under established security proce-
dures and which the select committee, pur-
suant to subsection (a) and (b) of this sec-
tion, has determined should not be disclosed
shall be made available to any person by a
Member, officer, or employee of the Senate
except in a closed session of the Senate or as
provided in paragraph (2).
(2) The select committee may, under such
regulations as the committee shall prescribe
to protect the confidentiality of such infor-
mation, make any information described in
paragraph. (1) available to any other. com-
mittee or any other Member of the Senate.
Whenever the select committee makes such
information available, the committee shall
keep a written record showing, in the case
of any particular information, which com-
mittee or which Members of the Senate re-
ceived such information. No Member of the
Senate who, and no committee which, re-
ceives any information under this subsection,
shall disclose such information except in a
closed session of the Senate.
(d) It shall be the duty of the Select Com-
mittee on Standards and Conduct to investi-
gate any alleged disclosure of intelligence
information by a member, officer, or em-
ployee of the Senate In violation of subsec-
tion (c) and to report thereon to the Senate.
(e) Upon the request of any person who Is
subject to any such investigation, the Select
Committee on Standards and Conduct shall
release to such individual at the conclusion
of its investigation a summary of its investi-
gation together with its findings. If, at the
conclusion of its investigation, the Select
Committee on Standards and Conduct deter-
mines that there has been a significant
breach of confidentiality' or unauthorized
disclosure by a Member, officer, or employee
of the Senate, it shall report its findings to
the Senate and recommend appropriate. ac-
tion such as censure, removal from commit-
tee membership, or expulsion from the Sen-
ate, in the case of Member,' or removal from
office or employment or punishment for con-
tempt, in the case of an officer or employee.
SEC. 9. The select committee is authorized
to permit any personal representative of the
President, designated by the President to
serve as a liaison to such committee, to at-
tend any closed meeting of such committee.
SEC. 10. Upon expiration of the Select Com-
mittee on Government Operations With Re-
spect to Intelligence Activities, established
by Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth Con-
gress, all records, files, documents, and other
materials in the possession, custody, or con-
trol of such committee, under appropriate
conditions established by it, shall be trans-
ferred to the select committee.
. SEC. 11. (a) It is the sense of the Senate
that the head of each department and
agency of the United States should keep the
select committee fully and currently in-
formed with respect to intelligence activities,
including any significant anticipated activi-
ties, which are the responsibility of or en-
gaged in by such department or agency:
Provided, That this does not constitute a
condition precedent to the implementation
of any such anticipated intelligence activity.
(b) it Is the sense of the Senate that the
head of any department or, agency of the
United States involved in any 'intelligence
activities should furnish any information or
document in the possession, custody, or con-
trol of the department or agency, or!person
paid by such depatrment or. agency, when-
ever requested by the select committee with
respect to any matter within such commit-
tee's jurisdiction. -
(c) It is the sense of the Senate that each
department and agency of the United States
Bence activities which constitute 'vioIWs
of the constitutional rights of any person,
violations of law, or violations of Executive
orders, Presidential directives, or' depart-
mental or agency rules or regulations; each
department and agency should further re-
port to such committee what actions have
been taken or are expected to be taken by
the departments or agencies with respect to
such violations.
SEC. 12. Subject to the Standing Rules of
the Senate, no funds shall bei appropriated
for any fiscal year beginning ter Septem-
ber-30, 1976, with the exception of a con-
tinuing bill or resolution, or amendment
thereto, or conference report thereon, to, or
for use of, any department or agency of the
United States to carry out any of the follow-
ing activities, unless such funds shall have
been previously authorized by a bill or joint
resolution passed by the Senate during the
same or preceding fiscal year to carry out
such activity for such fiscal year-
(1) The activities of the Central Intelli-
gency Agency and the Director of Central
Intelligence.
(2) The activities of the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency.
(3) The activities of the National Security
Agency.
(4) The intelligence activities of other
agencies and subdivisions of the Departn;ent
of Defense.
(5) The intelligence activities of the De-
partment of State.
(6) The intelligence activities of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, Including all
activities of the Intelligence Division.
SEC. 13. (a) The select committee shall
make a study with respect to the following
of the effectiveness of planning, gatheiTllg,
use, security, and. dissemination of intelli-
gence-
(1) the quality of the analytical capabili-
ties _ of United States foreign intelligence
agencies and means for integrating' more
closely analytical intelligence and policy
formulation;
(2) the extent and nature of the authority
of the departments and agencies of the ex-
ecutive branch to engage in intelligence ac-
tivities and the desirability of developing
chatters for each intelligence agency or
department;
(3) the organization of intelligence activi-
ties in the executive branch to maximize the
effectiveness of the conduct, oversight, and
accountability of intelligence activities; to
reduce duplication or overlap; and to improve
the morale of the personnel of the foreign
intelligence agencies;
(4) the conduct of covert and clandestine
activities and the procedures by which Con-
gress is informed of such activities;
(5) the desirability of changing any law,
Senate rule or procedure, or any Executive
order, rule, or regulation to improve the pro-
tecation of intelligence secrets and provide for
disclosure of information for which there is
no compelling reason for secrecy;
(6) the desirability of establishing a stand-
ing committee of the Senate on Intelligence
activities;
(7) the desirability of establishing a joint
committee of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on intelligence activities in
lieu of having separate committees in each
House of Congress, or of establishing proce-
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May 12, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
policies with respect to the safeguarding of
sensitive intelligence information;
(8) the authorization of funds for the in-
a ence activities of the government and
vjWer disclosure of any of the amounts of
Wends is in the public interest; and
the development of a uniform set of
definitions for terms to be used in policies
or guidelines which may be adopted by the
executive or legislative branches to govern,
clarify, and strengthen the operation of intel-
ligence activities.
(b) The select committee may, in its dis-
cretion, omit from the special study required
by this section any matter it determines has
been adequately studied by the Select Com-
mittee to Study Governmental Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities, estab-
lished by Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth
Congress.
(c) The select committee shall report the
results of, the study provided for by this
section to the Senate, together. with any
recommendations for legislative or other ac-
tions it deems appropriate, no later than
July 1, 1977, and from time to time there-
after as it deems appropriate.
SEC. 14. (a) As used in this resolution, the
term "intelligence activities" includes (1)
the collection, analysis, production, dissemi-
nation or use of information which relates
to any foreign country, or any government,
political group, party, military force, move-
ment, or other association in such foreign
country, and which relates to the defense,
foreign policy, national security, or related
policies of the United States, and other ac-
tivity which is in support of such activities;
(2) activities taken to counter similar ac-
tivities directed against the United States;
(3) covert or clandestine activities affecting
the relations of the United States with any
foreign government, political group, party,
military force, movement or other associa-
tion; (4) the collection, analysis, production,
domination, or use of information about
tionals of the United States abroad whose
political and related activities pose, or may
be considered by any department, agency,
bureau, office, division, instrumentality, or
employee of the United States to pose, a
threat to the internal security of the United
States, and covert or clandestine activities
directed against such persons. Such term
does not include tactical foreign military in-
telligence serving no national policymaking
function.
(b) As used in this resolution, the term
"department or agency" includes any or-
ganization, committee, council, establish-
ment, or office within the Federal Govern-
ment.
(c) For purposes of this resolution, ref-
erence to any department, agency, bureau.
or subdivision shall include a reference to
any successor department, agency, bureau, or
subdivision to the extent that such succes-
sor engages in intelligence activities now
conducted by the department, agency,
bureau, or 'subdivision referred to in this
resolution.
SEC. 15. For the period from the date this
resolution is agreed to through February 28,
1977, the expenses of the select committee
under this resolution shall not exceed $275,-
000, of which amount not to exceed $30,000
shall be available for the procurement of
the services of individual consultants, or
organizations thereof, as authorized by sec-
tion 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946. Expenses of the select commit-
tee under this resolution shall be paid from
the contingent fund of the Senate upon
vouchers approved by the chairman of the
select committee, except that vouchers shall
n be required for the disbursement of.
by the Senate in any practice, or in the con-
duct of any activity, not otherwise author-
ized by law.
PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, before
Senator RIBICOFF speaks, I ask unani-
mous consent that Bill Cochran and Miss
McPherson, of the committee staff, have
the privilege of the floor during the con-
sideration of this matter.
The PRESIDING. OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr..RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the following
staff members have the privilege of the
floor during the debate and voting on
Senate Resolution 400: Richard Weg-
man, Paul Hoff, Paul Rosenthal, John
Childers, Andrew Loewi, Claudia Ingram,
James Davidson, Tom Dine, Brian Con-
boy Charles Morrison, William Jackson,
Carolyn Fuller, Britt Synder, and Walter
Riggs.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
,objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, before
making my statement, I take this op-
portunity to pay special tribute to Sen-
ator CANNON, Senator ROBERT C. BYRD,
Senator PERCY, and Senator CRANSTON-
and there are many others-who worked
hard to make.this legislation possible.
During the entire discussion before the
Committee on Government Operations
and before the Committee on Rules and
Administration, and thereafter, while
there were differences of opinion, I
found that Senator CANNON and Senator
ROBERT C. BYRD had open minds, on all
the problems and controversies that'
swirled around this measure.
Senator ROBERT C. BYRD was particu-
larly 'concerned that the Senate act on
this important subject. He was aware of
what had transpired and the need for a
strong intelligence oversight committee,
as well as the implications of trying to
work out a compromise that was worthy
of the Senate and would not lead to deep
divisions in the Senate and in the Na-
tion., I especially take this opportunity
to pay tribute to Senator ROBERT C. BYRD
and Senator CANNON.
I also want to pay tribute to the dis-
tinguished majority leader, Senator
MANSFIELD, and to Senators BAKER,
MONDALE, JAVITS, HATFIELD, CLARK,
CHURCH and WEICKER for their great help
in working to bring about this compro-
mise.
Today, the Senate begins considera-
tion of legislation to create a permanent
committee on intelligence activities.
I strongly support creation of a new
intelligence committee with full legisla-
tive and authorization authority.
At this time, I point out that the first
person who proposed a committee on
intelligence was our majority leader.
Senator Mansfield, who, more than 20
yars ago, suggested that it * was ab-
solutely essential for us to have a legis-
lative committee in the entire field of
intelligence. Since then, a number of
studies have recommended' taking this
step. In 1975 the Commission on CIA
Activities headed by Vice President
ROCKEFELLER recommended creation of
a new committee on intelligence follow-
ing their study of the activities of the,
S 7085
CIA in the United States. Most recently,
the select committee recommnded a
new committee after a 15-month study
of the intelligence community. Creation
of the committee can be postponed no
longer.
Mr. President, I believe creation of
a new committee with the necessary au-
thorities will be good for the country,
good for ' the intelligence community,
and good for the Senate.
A new committee will help protect the
constitutional rights of our citizens and
help restore the confidence of the Amer-
ican people in their intelligence agencies.
A recent public opinion poll found that
while 78 percent of the public believe it
is very important to have the best in-
telligence agency in the world, the public
also believes by a 66-percent to 18-per-
cent margin that both Congress and the
White House should monitor the CIA
more closely. Public confidence in the
intelligence community will remain un-
certain until the public knows that its
elected representatives are effectively
overseeing and working with the intelli-
gence agencies.
Creation of a permanent new com-
mittee with a clear authority to reorga-
nize the intelligence community can help
end the uncertainties and distractions
which now plague the intelligence agen-
cies, thereby making it difficult for the
agencies to concentrate on their proper
job of providing the intelligence this
country needs.
A new committee can help restore a
sense of comity between the executive
branch and the Senate and help reassert
the proper role of Congress in the con-
duct of foreign affairs. A full and frank
exchange of views between the Senate
and the President -will help avoid such
embarrassing situations as Angola and
promote a more unified foreign policy.
Witnesses who' testified before the
Government Operations Committee in
favor of a strong new committee in-
cluded: Senators MANSFIELD, CHURCH,
CRANSTON, HUDDLESTON, and BAKER;
Dean Rusk; Nicholas Katzenbach; Wil-
liam Colby; McGeorge Bundy; Clark
Clifford; Richard Helms; Morton Hal-
perin; John McCone; and Henry Kis-
singer. Dr. Kissinger testified that crea-
tion of such a new committee would be
in the interest of national security. Mr.
David Phillips, president of the Associa-
tion of Retired Intelligence Officers, said
that 98 percent of his membership re-
sponding to a poll favored creation of a
new intelligence committee.
On the basis of those hearings, the
committee came to the following con-
clusions which were in turn embodied
in Senate Resolution 400 as reported by
the committee:
First. There is a need for vigorous con-
gressional oversight of the intelligence
community. Congress cannot simply pro-
ceed in the future as if nothing has hap-
pened.
Second. To provide this effective over-
sight of the intelligence agencies, a per-
manent new Senate committee must be
established. The present committees have
too many other important responsibilities
to permit them to devote the time and re-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 12, 1976
sources necessary for really effective
oversight.
Third. Oversight and legislative au-
thority over the intelligence community
should be centered in this new Senate
committee. The vast majority of wit-
nesses who testified before the committee
stressed the need for centralizing the in-
telligence oversight function into as few
committees as possible. The present
proliferation of committees increases the
chances for unauthorized disclosures of
sensitive information and diffuses over-
sight responsibility.
Fourth. Because the Government's in-
telligence activities, both here and
abroad, are so interrelated, the new com-
mittee's jurisdiction must cover all agen-
des that engage in intelligence activities,
Including the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy and the Departments of State, De-
fense, and Justice, including the FBI.
Fifth. The new committee must have
the formal authority and the practical
means to obtain access to all the infor-
mation it needs.
The abuses of the intelligence commu-
nity that have been disclosed in the last
few years dramatically demonstrate the
need-for creating a new intelligence com-
mittee with the powers set out in the
Cannon proposal.
In considering the need for a strong
new -committee, we- cannot forget the
abuses described in the final report of
the select committee. These include:
The FBI counterintelligence programs
designed to disrupt political groups in
the United States. Under these programs,
the Bureau engaged in, hundreds of
burglaries of nonviolent domestic groups.
The wiretapping, bugging, and
harassing of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr. by the FBI. Indeed, on the eve of
Dr. King's receipt of the Nobel Prize, the
FBI sent him a note suggesting that he
commit suicide.
The CIA's Operation CHAOS, which, in
violation of the agency's chapter, com-
piled files on over 300,000 American
citizens and organizations. Under Oper-
ation CHAOS, . CIA agents infiltrated
antiwar and civil rights groups in an
attempt to disrupt them.
Drug testing on unsuspecting citizens.
The use of covert relationships with
newspaper reporters and the covert use
of American student, labor, and reli-
gious, groups. I
The National Security Agency's "Op-
eration Shamrock," which transmitted
international telegraph traffic to the
NSA from 1948 onward.,
"Operation Minaret," in which the Na-
tional Security Agency gathered infor-
mation on antiwar protestors.
The 100,000 files that Army intelli-
gence opened on civilians and groups
unaffiliated with the Armed Forces.
The IRS "special services staff" which
gathered information on 3,000 domestic
organizations and 8,000 individuals, and
the IRS audits on individuals and groups
because of their beliefs and political ac-
tivities.
. The thousands of foreign covert op-
erations, including assassination plots,
undertaken since 2961.
The Senate-cannot simply turn its back
on these revelations. Nor can It simply
create a new study committee to study
once more what the Select Committee
on Intelligence and other committees,
commissions, and others have already
studied. The excellent work of the se-
lect committee has now been done. It is
now time for the Senate to begin to act
on the over 170 recommendations made
by the select committee in its final re-
port, including 'many recommendations
for legislation. Legislation must be con-
sidered and procedures established that
will make it certain that the Govern-
ment's intelligence activities are subject,
like everything else the Government does,
to the rule of law and the will of the
people. Legislation must be considered
and procedures established to assure that
the intelligence community is organized
as efficiently as possible to provide ac-
curate and timely intelligence at a rea-
sonable cost and with a minimum of
duplication.
To do all this, a new committee with
broad legislative authority must be
created in this session of Congress. It is
not enough to say that the abuses will
not happen again, that the present com-
mittees will hire more staff, and that the
present system of oversightcan be made
to work.
Under the present system, at least
three committees, in addition to the
Committee on Appropriations, have over-
sight responsibilities, each for a limited
part of the , intelligence community.
Oversight of the Government's intelli-
gence activities, although a difficult and
time-consuming task in, itself, is in fact
only a small portion of the full respon-
sibilities of these committees. It is small
wonder that none of these committees is
able to exercise comprehensive over-
sight over the intelligence community.
In the domestic intelligence area, for
example, the. Church committee found
that Congress "has failed to define the
scope of domestic intelligence activities
or intelligence collection techniques, to
uncover excesses, or to propose legislative
solutions. Some Members have failed to
object to improper activities of which
they were aware and have prodded agen-
cies into questionable activities." Select
committee report, book II, page 277.
The most important means of over-
sight is the power of the purse. Yet Con-
gress, as a whole, has never known how
much the intelligence agencies are spend-
ing or how much is spent on intelligence
activities generally. Select committee
report, book I, page 469.
Nor will it do just to. Place on top of
the present inadequate system a new
committee without legislative and au-
thorization authority. It would be equally
unwise to create a committee which must
share all of its legislative or authoriza-
tion jurisdiction with-other committees.
Although a number of the Govern-
ment's intelligence agencies are part of
larger departments, the President has
recognized that the Government's intel-
ligence activities are an integral whole
that must be looked at as a single whole.
In February, he moved to centralize fur-
ther executive branch supervision of all
the Government's intelligence activities,
whether they are part of the Department
of Justice,. the Department of Defense,
the Department of State, or the like. The
Senate must do the same.
Only a single committee with full leg-
islative and. authorization: aathori4ftl
assure comprehensive and coati
oversight of the intelligence comm y
on a permanent basis. Only a single com-
mittee with the necessary authority can
consider comprehensive legislation to
rewrite the charters and structures of
the 11 or more intelligence agencies scat-
tered throughout the Government. Only
a single committee with the necessary
authority will have the time and ability
to review adequately the expenditures of
all the intelligence community and to
approve annual authorizations.
Mr. President, Senate Resolution 400,
as reported by the Government Opera-
tions Committee, will give us the means
for.exercising the necessary type of com-
prehensive oversight over the intelli-
gence community. If there are changes
that may be made to, perfect this resolu-
tion without changing its essential na=
ture, I hope they will, be proposed. But
the Senate cannot allow the jurisdic-
tional concerns of its own committees to
overshadow the national interest. In the
long run, it is not crucial that one com-
mittee or another loses or gains jurisdic-
tion. What is crucial in. the long run is to
establish a new committee to exert effec-
tive congressional control over the intel-
ligence community. I strongly urge the
Senate to promptly create such a com-
mittee.
Mr. President, the need for improved
oversight of the intelligence agencies is
apparent. I am pleased that in theg]W
few days my colleagues and I have
able to work out a compromise tha
provide that much-needed oversight. The
compromise substitute that will be pro-
posed will assure that the Senate will as-
sume its proper place in our constitu-
tional system.
The compromise substitute is the prod-
uct of much hard work and a commend-
able spirit of compromise and accom-
mqdation. It is a delicately balanced pro-
posal that addresses the concerns of the
intelligence community, the executive
branch, the Senate, and most important-
ly, the public.
It gives the new committee the essen-
tial elements and powers which any
committee must have to do an effective
job of oversight. The new committee will
pay a very important role In oversee-
ing and legislating for the intelligence
community. At the same time, the com-
promise protects the legitimate interests
and concerns of the standing commit-
tees. The key elements of the substitute
are as follows:
First, the new intelligence committee
would be a select committee with 17
members-9 majority members and 8 mi-
nority members-appointed by the lead-
ership on a 9-year rotating basis. Four
majority and' four minority seats are
reserved for members of Armed Services,
Foreign Relations, Judiciary, and Ap-
propriations.
Second, the new committee. would
legislative and authorization jurition over all U.S. Intelligence activities,
Including CIA, FBI, and DOD. The juris-
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diction is exclusive over the CIA and its
authorization.
The intelligence committee will have
usive legislation and authorization
diction over the CIA and the Direc-
of Central Intelligence. But if the se-
lect committee reports legislation, in-
cluding authorization legislation, that
affects agencies other than the CIA or
the Director of Central Intelligence, the
legislation may be .sequentially referred
for up to 30 days to the appropriate
standing committee with general juris-
diction over that agency. Under similar
.procedures the Intelligence committee
chairman could ask for referral to his
committee of legislation affecting any
of the intelligence activities of the Gov-
ernment which has been reported by an-
other committee.
The original referral of any legislation
will be to the intelligence committee if
it predominately Involves the intelligence
activities of the Government.
Third, the compromise provides that
the intelligence community budget will
be annually authorized. Annual authori-
zation will constitute a very important
aspect of the committee's oversight of
the agencies. It should assure a regular
review of each agency's activities, Its ef-
ficiency, and its priorities. The annual
authorization procedure preserves the
Senate's ability to act via the continuing
resolution route In an emergency situ-
ation.
Fourth, committee has full subpena
and Investigative authorities. The in-
telligence community is expected to keep
the committee fully and currently in-
,ed about the intelligence activities
responsible for, or engages In, in-
c uding any significant anticipated ac-
tivities. Intelligence agencies must pro-
vide all necessary information and doc-
uments to the intelligence committee.
Fifth, the committee may disclose in-
formation where, disclosure is in the
Public interest. If the President objects
to committee disclosure of any classified
Information the full Senate must decide
the matter of disclosure. The resolution
In no way affects the right of two sen-
ators under rule 35 to ask for a closed
session of the Senate to discuss sensitive
matters, including the question of
whether the Senate should disclose
classified information.
disclosed clasified information.
Committee disclosure of classified in-
formation to other Senators is governed
by specific Provisions, including a re-
quirement that there be a written rec-
ord of such disclosure.
Mr. President, I want to commend my
colleagues on their hard work and great
concern for the national interest that
this substitute embodies. I urge my fel-
low Senators to adopt this substitute. By
doing so we may close the book on an
unpleasant past and begin to restore the
Nation's confidence in the intelligence
community, the Senate, and itself.
-Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have a section-by-section analy-
sis of the Cannon substitute printed in
the RECORD.
ere being no objection, the mate-
was ordered to be printed In the
RtEbORD, as follows:
S 7087
SENATE RESOLtOTION 400 COMPROMISE- the Department of Defense, Including the
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Na-
SECTION 1-STATEMENT OF PURPOSE tional Security Agency, and the intelligence
This section states that it Is the purpose of activities of the Departments of State, Jus-
the resolution to create a new select com- tice, and Treasury. The jurisdiction includes
mittee of the Senate with legislative juris- legislation reorganizing the intelligence com-
diction to oversee and make continuing stud- munity.
In-
lea of the intelligence activities and pro- Subsection 3(a) also specifies that the in-
grams of the U.S. Government. This section telligence committee will have jurisdiction
obliges the committee to make every effort over authorizations of budget authority for
to assure that the appropriate departments the chief intelligence agencies in the gov-
and agencies of the United States provide ernment: the Central Intelligence Agency;
informed and timely intelligence necessary the intelligence activities of the Department
for the executive and legislative branches of Defense (including the Defense Intelli-
to make sound decisions affecting the secu- gence Agency and the National Security
rity and vital interests of the nations. As,the
wording of the section suggests, one of the
goals of the new committee should be to as-
sure that other members and committees of
the Senate receive directly from the agencies
all the intelligence analysis they need to ful-
fill their responsibilities. It is further the
purpose of the new committee to provide
vigilant oversight of the intelligence activi-
ties of the United States. -
Agency); the intelligence activities of the
Department of State; and the intelligence
activities of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, specifically, all activities of the Bu-
reau's Intelligence Division. The committee
will continue to have jurisdiction over these
parts of the intelligence community even if
they are transferred to successor agencies.
Subsection (b) provides that the intelli-
gence committee will have exclusive legisla-
tion and authorization jurisdiction over the
SECTION -2-COMMITTEE STRUCTURE
Subsection (a) establishes the Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence Activities. It provides
that the committee will be composed of 9
majority and 8 minority members. Two mem-
bers will be drawn from each of the follow-
ing committees: Appropriations, Armed Serv-
ices, Foreign Relations, and Judiciary' Com-
mittees. The other 9 members of the new,
committee may not be members of the above-
named four committees.
Clause 2 of this subsection provides that
members appointed from each of those four
named committees will be evenly divided be-
tween the two major political parties and
appointed by the President pro tempore of
the Senate upon the recommendations of the
majority and minority leaders of the Senate,
respectively. Five of the remaining 9 at
large members will be appointed by the Pres-
ident pro tempore of the Senate upon the
recommendation of the majority leader and
four will be appointed by the President pro
tempore upon the recommendation of the
minority leader.
The majority leader and minority leader
of the Senate are to be ex officio members of
the Select Committee but will have no vote
on the committee.
Subsection (b) prohibits a Senator from
serving on the committee for more than 9
consecutive years. It is expected that in each
Congress approximately- one-third of the 17-
member committee will be new members.
This section also provides that, at the
beginning of each Congress, the members
of the full Senate who are members of the
majority party will select a chairman and
the minority members of the full Senate
will select a vice chairman. The resolution
expressly provides that neither the chair-
man nor the vice chairman may serve at
the same time as a chairman or ranking
minority member of any other permanent
committee. The vice chairman is to act in
the place of the chairman in the chairman's
absence. .
Subsection (d) provides that membership
on the new intelligence committee will not
be taken into account for purposes of deter-
mining the number of committees a Sena-
tor may serve on. A Senator need not give
up a seat on another committee in order to
serve on the new intelligence committee.
SECTION 3-JURISDICTION
This section defines the new committee's
jurisdiction. Subsection (a) gives the com-
mittee legislative jurisdiction over the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and the Director of
Central Intelligence, as well as over the in-
telligence activities of all other departments
and agencies of the Government. These other mittee. Any report the intelligence commit-
agencies and departments include, but are tee makes will be subject to the provision in
not limited to, the intelligence activities of section 8(c) (2) to protect national security.
CIA and the Director of Central Intelligence.
The subsection also provides, however, that
if the select committee reports legislation,
including authorization legislation, that af-
fects agencies other than the CIA or the
Director of Central Intelligence, the legisla-
tion may be sequentially referred for up to
30 days to the appropriate standing commit-
tee with general jurisdiction over that
agency. Under similar procedures the intelli-
gence committee chairman could ask for re-
ferral to his committee of legislation affect-
ing any of the intelligence activities of the
government which has been reported by
another committee.
The original referral of any legislation will
be to the intelligence committee if it pre-
dominately involves the intelligence activ-
ities of -the government. If the legislation
predominately involves non-intelligence mat-
ters and secondarily intelligence, the legis-
lation will be referred to a standing commit-
tee, and then sequentially refersed to the
intelligence committee.
Subsection (c) makes it clear that noth-
ing in the resolution prohibits or restricts
the authority of any other committee to
study and review any intelligence activity
to the extent that such activity directly af-
fects a matter otherwise within the jurisdic-
tion of the committee, Any committee may
conduct oversight hearings concerning an
agency's intelligence activities and the affect
of the intelligence activities on the ability
of the agency to perform its overall mission.
Subsection (d) provides that nothing in
the resolution limits or inhibits any other
Senate committee from continuing to obtain
full and direct access to the product of the
intelligence. agencies where that informa-
tion is relevant to a matter otherwise within
the jurisdiction of such committee. This
provision specifically assures the right of
any other committee, such as the Foreign
Relations Committee, to receive briefings on
the political situation in any part of the
world.
SECTION 4-COMMITTEE REPORTS
Subsection (a) requires the new commit-
tee to make regular and periodic. reports to
the Senate on the nature and extent of the
Government's intelligence activities. The
committee must can to the attention of the
Senate or any other appropriate committee
any matters which require the immediate
attention of the Senate or other committees.
If, for example, the intelligence committee
possesses information on intelligence activ-
ities that may have a significant affect on
foreign policy, the intelligence committee
should notify the Foreign Relations Com-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 12, 1976
Subsection ('b) requires the intelligence
committee to obtain a report each year from
the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Secretary of Defense, the Sec-
retary of State, and the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation for purposes
of public dissemination. Each report should
review the intelligence activities of the par-
ticular agency or department submitting the
report. Included in this report should be a
review of the intelligence activities directed
against the United States or its interests
by other countries. The reports by the four
intelligence agencies and departments are to
be made public in an unclassified form. ,
Subsectipn (c) makes it clear A hat the
new committee must comply, like any other
committee,. with the reporting requirements
of the Budget Act of 1974.
SECTION 5-INCIDENTAL POWERS
Subsection (a) gives the new committee
all the incidental powers it must have to
operate effectively as a'committee. The pow-
ers spelled out in this subsection include the
power to investigate, to issue subpoenas and
take depositions, and to exercise the normal
administrative and financial powers of a
committee. Subsection (b) authorizes the
chairman of the committee or any member
thereof to administer oaths. Subsection (c)
provides that the chairman, vice chairman,
or any other member designated by the
chairman may issue a subpoena and speci-
fies the procedure for serving the subpoena.
SECTION 6-COMMITTEE STAFF
This section spegifies the security provi-
sions applicable to committee staff. It re-
quires staff to pledge in writing, and under
oath, to observe the security rules of the
Senate and of the new committee both while
employed by the new committee and after-
wards. Staff must receive a security clearance
under a system directed by the new commit-
tee, but developed in consultation with the
Director of Central Intelligence.
SECTION 7-INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY
The sectipn requires the committee to for-
mulate and carry out rules and procedures
to prevent the disclosure of information
which unnecessarily infringes upon anyone's
privacy: The committee may disclose infor-
mation if it determines that the national
interest in the disclosure of the information
outweighs any privacy concerns.
SECTION 8-DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
Subsection, (a) establishes the basic rule
that the committee may disclose information
where disclosure is in the public interest. It
also establishes basic rules governing those
instances, which will certainly not occur in
every case; where the committee must vote
on whether to disclose particular information
such as classified information governed by
subsection (b). In those instances, the com-
mittee must vote on the matter within five
days if any member requests a meeting for,
such purpose. When such a meeting is nec-
essary, a committee member may not pub-
licly disclose the information until the com-
mittee votes to do so, and then only in
accordance with the procedures established
by the rest of this section, as well as any
other procedures established by the com-
mittee.
Subsection 7(b) governs the public dis-
closure of information which the executive
branch has classified under established se-
curity procedures. If the committee wishes
to disclose such classified information it
must inform the President and give him five
days to respond. If the President does not
object, the committee may disclose. If the
President does object, and certifies that dis-
closure would threaten vital national inter-
ests, the committee may determine that dis-
closure should occur despite the President's
objections. The committee may then .refer
the matter to the full Senate for its deter-
mination pursuant to the expedited proce-
dures spelled out in the remainder of the
subsection.
Under this expedited procedure the com-
mittee must refer the matter within a day to
the Senate. After the matter lays over a max-
imum of three days, it would then automat-
ically become the pending order of business
and the Senate would have up to 5 days to
discuss in closed session whether or not there
should be public disclosure. No later than
the close of the fifth day after the matter is
taken up the Senate must vote in open ses-
sion either to disclose, not to disclose, or to
refer the matter back to the committe for its
final determination.
Subsection 8(c) governs the disclosure by
the committee to other Senators of informa-
tion classified under established security
provisions relating to the lawful intelligence
activities of the government which the com-
mittee has determined should not be dis-
closed.
An$* such disclosure may only occur in a
closed session of the Senate, or pursuant to
the rules of the committees and the proce-
dures described in this subsection. Under
these procedures the committee must keep
a written record in each case, showing which
committee or member received the informa-
tion. The subsection contains a prohibition
against any Member of. the Senate, or any
committee, which receives the information
from the select committee disclosing the in-
formation to any other person. In addition
to these protections, disclosure of such sen-
sitive information will be subject to what-
ever additional rules the committee adopts
on its own to protect the confidentiality of
such information.
Subsection (d) requires the Select Com-
mittee on Standards and Conduct to in-
vestigate any alleged disclosure of classified
information in violation of the provisions of
this section. Subsection (e) states that if the
Select Committee on Standards and Conduct
decides at the conclusion of its investigations
that any Member, officer, or employee of the
Senate has committed a significant breach
of confidentiality it must report its findings
to the Senate and recommend appropriate
action. In the case of a Senator this may be
censure, removal from committee member-
ship, or expulsion. In the case of an officer
or employee, it may be removal from em-
ployment or punishment for contempt.
SECTION 9-PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVE AT
COMMITTEE MEETING
This section authorizes the committee to
permit, under rules established by the com-
mittee, a personal representative of the Presi-
dent to attend the closed meetings. The pro-
vision does not require the new committee
to invite a representative of the executive
branch to attend closed meetings, or estab-
lish a presumption that. the committee will
do so. It merely makes explicit the power that
any committee has to invite a Presidential
representative to attend committee delibera-
tions if the committee finds such representa-
tion helpful in conducting its duties. Be-
cause of the special nature of the new com-
mittee's work, however, it may find this pro-
cedure especially useful.
SECTION 10-DISPOSITION OF THE MATERIAL OF
THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
This section provides for the transfer of
documents, records, files and other materials
from the Select Committee on Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Acti-
vities to the new committee.
Since its inception, the Church Committee
has reached certain understandings with the
CIA and other intelligence agencies concern-
ing the ultimate disposition of written ma-
terial provided to the select committee.
Under these agreements, some material pro-
vided to the select committee was to be re-
turned to the appropriate agencies. Other
materials were not to have been re-
turned. This section respects those agree-
ments.
The new committee will obtain posses
should be returned to the executive branch.
SECTION 11-COMMITTEE ACCESS TO
INFORMATION
Subsection (a) governs the information
which the intelligence agencies must pro-
vide on their own initiative to the new com-
mittee. The subsection expresses the sense of
the Senate that the. 'intelligence agencies
should keep the committee fully and cur-
rently informed about its activities. This re-
quirement does not apply to the myriad de-
tails of day-to-day intelligence operations,
but only to information which the commit-
tee needs to make informed judgments on
policy questions. '
The requirement extends to briefing the
committee in advance of any significant
anticipated activities, such as covert opera-
tions. An anticipated activity may be sig-
nificant because it is financially costly, or
because it may affect this country's dip-
lomatic, political, or military relations with
-other countries or groups. The Proviso clause
makes it clear that while the agencies are
expected to brief the intelligence committee
in advance on proposed covert operations,
implementation of the covert action is not
dependent upon the committee in turn ap-
proving the proposed activity. Affirmative ac-
tion by the committee is not a condition
precedent to implementation of the activity.
Subsection (b) expresses the sense of the
Senate that the head of any department or
agency of the United States involved in any
intelligence activities should make available
to the committee any person paid by the
agency to provide any information the com-
mittee requests, and to furnish upon request
any document or information which the
partment or agency has in its possess
vision, the committee will, of course, have
the subpena power to enforce its requests for
information.
Subsection (c) expresses the sense of the
Senate that each department and agency re-
port any intelligence activity that may vio-
late the constitutional rights of any person,
or may violate any law, Executive order, Pres-
idential directive, or departmental or agency
rule or regulation.
Such reports should be made to the intel-
ligence committee immediately upon dis-
covery of the wrongdoing. Each department
or agency should further report to the com-
mittee what action is taken or expected to
be taken by the department or agency with
respect to such violations.
SECTION 12-ANNUAL AUTHORIZATIONS
This ?ection insures an annual or bian-
nual authorization of funds for the intelli-
gence agencies over which the new committee
had jurisdiction beginning September 30,
1976. In the past some of the intelligence
activities have been governed by openended
authorizations. The section places clearly
upon the record a decision by the Senate
that in the future this will no longer be the
case and that, instead, there will be annual
or biannual authorizations. The section rec-
ognizes, however, that as in the case of other
agencies, the intelligence agencies may have
to be funded in an emergency by continuing
resolutions pending adoption of the authori-
zation. It also recognizes that' the funding
of the intelligence agencies will be subject
to the standing rules of the Senate.
Periodic authorizations of the intelligence
agencies will constitute a very important
aspect of the committee's oversight over
agencies. It should assure a regular rev
of each agency's intelligence activities,
efficiency, and its priorities.
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SECTION 13-COMMITTEE STUDIES
This section sets forth important subject
matter areas which the new committee would
.Jae required to study and report on by July 1,
A7 and from time to time thereafter as
eems appropriate. Those study areas are
'W 'deems
(1) the quality of the analysis of foreign
intelligence information and the use of anal-
ysis in policymaking;
(2) the authority of each agency to engage
in intelligence activities and the desirability
of developing legislative .charters for the
agencies;
(3) the organization of the executive
branch to maximize oversight, efficiency and
morale;
(4) the conduct of covert and clandestine
activities and the process of Informing the
Congress of such activities;
(5) the desirability of changing laws and
rules to protect necessary secrets and to pub-
licly disclose information that should be
disclosed;
(6) the desirability of establishing a stand-
ing committee of the Senate on intelligence
activities;
(7) the desirability of establishing a joint
Senate-House committee on intelligence
activities;
(8) the procedures under which funds for
intelligence activities are authorized and
whether disclosure of the amounts of fund-
ing is in the public interest;
(9) the development of a common set of
terms to be used by the executive and legis-
lative branches in policy statements and
guidelines it issues in the intelligence area.
Subsection (b) specifically provides that
the new committee may omit from its study
any matter which the committee feels the
Church committee has already adequately
studied.
SECTION 14-DEFINITIONS
Subsection (a) defines four aspects of the
"intelligence activities." They are: na-
il or foreign intelligence, counterintelli-
gence, foreign covert or clandestine activi-
ties, and domestic intelligence.
National or foreign intelligence covers
intelligence which is relevant to the govern-
ment's national decision-making.
The definition of domestic intelligence
does not cover the normal investigatory
work that all enforcement agencies engage
in as a part of their normal responsibilities
to enforce the law. The only domestic intel-
ligence activities that are covered by the
term intelligence are those activities that
focus on the political and related activities
of Americans because of the threat those
activities pose, or are alleged to pose, to the
internal security (i.e., fundamental inter-
ests) of the United States.
The definition of intelligence activities
does not include tactical foreign military
intelligence serving no national policy-
making function.
SECTION 15-FUNDING FOR THE NEW
COMMITTEE
This section authorizes start up funds for
the select committee. It provides up to
$275,000 for the period between the time the
new committee is created and February 28,
1977.
SECTION 16-EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS
Section 16 states that nothing in the reso-
lution is intended to imply approval by the
Senate in any activity or practice not other-
wise authorized by law. The section is in-
tended to make it clear that by assigning the
new committee jurisdiction over a particular
activity, such as covert or clandestine activ-
ities, or the domestic intelligence activities
o the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
to does not thereby intend to express
view as to the legality of any such
ac ity.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I wish
to make just one inquiry of the distin-
guished Senator from Nevada. In setting
forth his understanding of the compro-
mise proposal, I do not know whether
it was just -a slip of the tongue, but he
mentioned the fact that there would be
a limit of 10 years on the terms that
Senators would serve. I have had the un-
derstanding that we had agreed on a 9-
year -term. -
Mr. CANNON. Yes, we agreed ill our
meeting on 9 years. In working with
the staff, the suggestion was made on the
part of some of the staff members, and
it was, I understand, cleared with staff
members all around, that it would be
better if it went either 8 or 10 so
that it coincided with the terms of a par-
ticular Congress and we would not have
a change in the middle of a Congress.
That was reported back to me as having
been cleared by staff members. I did say
10 deliberately and put that in the bill
as a result of that discussion. I have no
feeling for whether it is 8 or 10, but I
think it makes sense to have it one or the
other, rather than the 9-year term which
we had discussed.
Mr. RIBICOFF. I understand the posi-
tion of the Senator. The only thing is
that our staff was not informed and Sen-
ator PERCY and I heard it here for the
first time. I am sure that before the bill
is decided on, we shall have opportunity
to discuss this during the next day or so
and clarify it. I did want to call atten-
tion to the fact that the Senator's de-
scription of the bill is accurate, with that
minor discrepancy.
Mr. PERCY. Will the Senator yield to
me?
Mr. RIBICOFF. Yes.
Mr. PERCY. The Senator from Con-
necticut and I have confirmed with the
acting majority leader (Mr. ROBERT C.
BYRD) that 9 years was the agreement.
But the Senator from Illinois would like
Senator CANNON to know that if chang-
ing in the middle of a Congress does pre-
sent a problem, and it certainly is a fac-
tor that we had not considered, the Sen-
ator from Illinois will be very pleased to
change it to 8 years, but not 10. The Sen-
ator from Illinois preferred the 6-year
period but'V#ceded in order to reach the
compromise.
Mr. C ON. Nine years was the fig-
ure we a eed on. It was drafted that
way. But when the suggestions came
back to me from staff, from discussion,
after meetings by some staff with both
the majority and minority members, that
we ought to go to 10 or 8, I felt that
would pose no problem. I am perfectly
willing to go to 9. It does not pose any
problem as far I am concerned, but
it may be bett to go 8 or 10 rather
than because of the break-in Congress.
MI'AWBICOFF. I just waited to clar-
ify tl e record and some time tomorrow.
I am sure we can straighten out that dif-
ferenc
Mr. If the Senator will yield
further, cause the.y istinguished Sena-
tor put in a compromise cosponsored by
so many who attended that meeting, per-
haps it would be best to leave that figure
at nine, which did represent the agree-
ment at that time. Then obviously, we
S 7089
can change it to 8 or 10, as the Senate
desires.
Mr. CANNON. The Senator makes a
good point. I thought it had been cleared
with all people.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that where the figure 10 is inserted
for the figure 9, it-be changed to the fig-
ure 9. 1
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, before be-
ginning my comments, my first thoughts
turn again toward the remarkable work-
ings of the U.S. Senate. -
Despite the anti-Washington attitude
and the anticongressional feelings ex-
pressed by opinion polls, where we are
rated relatively low, the observation of
the Senator from Illinois has been that
when a critical issue is faced by the Sen-
ate, the Senate generally faces up to that
issue. Whereas we may have had an ex-
tended-and I do mean extended-de-
bate, and it appeared a few days ago as
though there would be great disharmony
on this matter, through the diligent ef-
fort of a number of my colleagues, we
have now reached a compromise that is
incorporated in the amendment- offered
by Senator CANNON on behalf of a great
many of us. I do wish to pay great tribute
not only to my own distinguished chair-
man (Mr. RIBICOFF) with whom I have
enjoyed working for so many years, but to
Senator CANNON, who has contributed so
much to this effort, and Senator ROBERT
C. BYRD of the Committee on Rules and
Administration.
Mr. President, I wish to express my
deep appreciation to Senator Sam Ervin,
who undertook the chairmanship of the
Select Committee on Watergate, and who
did an absolutely outstanding job. That
investigation, conducted with him. as
chairman, and my distinguished col-
league (Mr. BAKER) as his vice chairman,
provided a basis for many years in the
future, I believe, for the Senate inves-
tigating malfeasance in the executive
branch of Government. Certainly, I com-
mend Senator BAKER for his work and
help on Senate Resolution 400.
Compromise would have been impos-
sible without the work that has been
undertaken by every Senator who has
worked on this compromise resolution.
Also on the Government Operations
Committee are Senators MusKIE, JAVITS,
WEICKER? ROTH, and BROCK, who have
contributed greatly, as have other Sena-
tors such as Senators MONDALE, CRANS-
TON, SCHWEIKER, HATFIELD, CLARK and
HUDDLESTON.
I know we are going to benefit tremen-
dously by the continuing participation of
the distinguished Senator from Alabama
(Mr. ALLEN), who worked on this matter
diligently in the Rules Committee.
The Government Operations Commit-
tee staff-and the Senator from Illinois
is not qualified to speak of staff members
from other committees-but certainly
Dick Wegman, John Childers, Paul Hoff,
Claudia Ingram, Charles Morrison, Brian
Conboy, Ted van Gilder, and James
Davidson of the Government Operations
Committee staff performed a remarkable
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 12, 1976
service in bringing us to-this particular
point.
Mr. President, today we do face one
of the most vital issues before this body
in many years. It is a question that in-
volves the national security of this coun-
try. It is a question that involves the
personal rights and freedoms of all
American citizens. It is a question that
involves whether or not Congress is will-
ing to stand up to its constitutional re-
sponsibilities to adequately oversee the
operations of the executive branch.
it is a question of whether or not we
are a nation of laws and constitutional
procedures or whether we are going to
abdicate our oversight responsibilities
and, in effect, delegate important powers
of this country to a; select, nonelected
group in the executive branch, without
providing for adequate accountability.
This is not a new question before us,
Mr. President. Ten Congresses ago, in
4955, Senator MANSFIELD introduced a
resolution which would have established
a Joint Committee on Central Intelli-
gence. The new committee would have
had legislative authority over the agency,
and required that the CIA keep the new
committee "fully and currently informed
with respect to ,its current activities."
That resolution was defeated by the
full Senate.
There have been other attempts to
create such a committee in the interven-,
ing 20 years. All have failed, but now we
have the facts that demonstrate beyond
a doubt that such a new committee is
needed.
Investigations of the past year and a
half have shown that the intelligence
agencies of this Government have gone
beyond their charters and committed
illegal actions. The CIA, the FBI, and
NSA have all abused the right of Ameri-
can citizens, and committed illegal ac-
tions.
The need for better oversight by Con-
gress over the intelligence community is
clear. This is not just the feeling of cer-
tain Members of the Senate; it is also
the recommendation of the executive
branch. The Commission on the Orga-
nization of Government for the Conduct
of Foreign Policy, the so-called Murphy
Commission, recommended that Con-
gress create a new structure for oversee-
ing the intelligence community.
Last year, in June 1975, the President's
Commission on CIA Activities Within the
United States recommended that a new
intelligence committee be established in
order to improve the operations of the
intelligence agencies and to prevent
abuses in the future. This Commission
was headed by Vice President RocxE-
FELLER.
In addition to these executive branch
recommendatons, the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence has made a major
study of the intelligence community and
has come forward with recommendations.
Certainly in mentioning that committee,
a great many Members of the Senate
worked with'great diligence, but I should
like to particularly point out the work
of such distinguished Members as Sen-
ator CHURCH, Senator TOWER, Senator
BAKER, Senator MATHIAS, and others who
have contributed immensely to the work
of that select committee.
The resolution before the Senate to-
day, Senate Resolution 400, is the prod-
uct of all these investigations and rec-
ommendations. It contains the recom
mendations of all these investigatory
bodies. Senate Resolution 400 is an at-
tempt to respond to the need for more
effective oversight of the intelligence
community. Not only would it prevent
abuse in the future, but I feel it would
begin to restore the trust and confidence
in the intelligence community that we
all desperately need.
In the hearings the Government Oper-
ations Committee held, the call for a new
committee to oversee the activities of the
intelligence community was made clear.
Secretary of State Kissinger supported
the creation of a new committee; former
Director of CIA Colby supported a new
committee; -two other former Directors
of the CIA, John McCone and Richard
Helms, supported the creation of a new
committee; Clark Clifford, former Secre-
tary of Defense, supported a new com-
mittee; Mr. McGeorge Bundy, former
National Security Adviser to *the Presi-
dent, supported such a new committee;
Mr. David Phillips, president of the As-
sociation of Retired Intelligence Officers,
supported a new committee, and said that
98 percent of the members of his associa-
tion, who were retired intelligence offi-
cers, favored the creation of a new over-
sight committee.
The need for such a new committee
seems clear to me and I believe it was
made very clear by the testimony and
the inferences in the testimony of Secre-
tary Dean Rusk, former Secretary of
State. He made the astounding comment
that he thought as Secretary of State
he knew all the major activities being
carried on by the Central Intelligence
Agency overseas that affected foreign
policy for which he had direct respon-
sibility to the President of the United
States.
He only learned subsequently, by read-
ing the newspapers and reports that
came out of Senate committees and other
committees established for that purpose,
that he did not know all that he was
supposed to know and that he thought
he knew, and I rather imagine. he was
shocked to find that.
What we want to prevent is any future
Secretary of State, responsible for carry-
ing out foreign policy of this Govern-
ment, not even knowing some of the
activities carried on by the Government
that affect foreign policy. Nor should we
be surprised as a Congress to find that
-activities have been carried out over
which we have really nl't had adequate
access to the,, information in some form
or other. The question is, wh4010 rm
should oversight take now?
i would not question at all the inten-
tions and desires of the Member . -of the
Senate in the past who ha over-
sight responsibility. But th ponsi-
bility has been franented. M y times
committees have, simply not been told.
If they did not ask the right question,
the information was not volunteered to
them. There was not an open basis and
there was not a clear overall responsibil-
ity in one single central committee for
the operation of the CIA.
So there is no use looking to the past.
What we need to do is work together
find a basis in the future for overco
ing the deficiencies of the past.
With what has been said, though, wha
kind of a committee should we have?
Based on recommendations of the Sen-
ate Select Committee on Intelligence,
the Government Operations Committee
unanimously reported Senate Resolution
400. Senate Resolution 400, as original-
ly reported, would have created a strong
oversight committee with legislative au-
thority and authorization authority.
As reported by the Senate Government
Operations Committee, Senate Resolu-
tion 400 would have created a new stand-
ing committee of the Senate with legis-
lation and authorization authority over
the intelligence community. It would
have required the intelligence commun-
ity to keep the new committee fully and
currently informed, and would have pro-
vided oversight over the intelligence ac-
tivities of the United States to assure
that actions taken by the intelligence
agencies were legal.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed at this point in the
RECORD a summary of the provisions of
Senate Resolution 400 as originally in-
troduced.
There being no objection, the sum-
mary was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
,SUMMARY
Specifically, S. Res. 400 provided that:
1) The committee would have been com-
posed of 11 members of the Senate, six
lected from the majority party of the Sen
and five members from the minority party
the Senate. Members of the new committee
would be selected by their respective cau-
cuses.
2) The resolution provided for rotating
membership by members of the committee,
as well as rotating staff.
3) The new committee would have pro-
vided exclusive legislative jurisdiction over
the intelligence agencies of the United States
government to ensure consolidated legislative
authority over the intelligence community.
4) Disclosure provisions were written into
the bill so that if the President objected to
the release of any information provided to
the new committee, the new committee could
not release such information if three mem-
bers of the committee objected. In such case,
the question of whether or not to disclose
would have to be referred to the full Sen-
ate for disposition. Procedures were also writ-
ten into the resolution to establish a record
of to whom information was provided by the
intelligence committee. Further, sanctions
were written into the bill mandating the
Select Committee on Standards and Con-
duct to investigate any alleged disclosure of
intelligence information in violation of the
resolution.
5) S. Res. 400 as originally reported re-
quired the committee to be kept fully and
currently informed with respect to intel-
ligence activities by executive branch agen-
cies, including any significant anticipated
activities. This did not require and was
never intended to require prior approval by
the committee of intelligence activities, but
did mandate that the new committee be kept
fully and currently informed of the activities
of the agencies.
6) The new committee was to be provi
exclusive authorization authority over
budgets of the intelligence agencies. This
was considered to be a most vital factor for
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
S 7091
the new committee to be. able to operate be in a position where it is going to take reorganization effort to bring these ac-
properly and with atuhority. For the first for granted that the executive branch tivities together and have someone who
time, this would have provided consolidated-
control over the of government alone will carry out this could be held responsible for the overall
intelligence community
Zgets. operation. They do not want to have the activity. I think we knew that when we
feeling that the material, the function, confirmed Mr. George Bush to that po-
r.'PERCY. The basic reason for the and the purpose of such an organization, sition. He has been given that responsi-
tion of a new committee is to pro- the intelligence community, has to be so bility.
vide a single focal point in the Senate to secretive that Members of Congress who The Congress has made it very clear,
oversee the intelligence community. At have a responsibility and who are cleared indeed, that it expects all activities in
the present time, executive branch re- for top secret cannot be taken into the the intelligence community to cooperate
sponsibility for intelligence is spread confidence. with that Presidential direction and re-
among a number of organizations, some But I have resisted mightily every ef- organization in structure and that we
civilian and some military. No one fort to have oversight by the Congress will, in our oversight responsibilities, do
agency or department is solely respon- in such a way that Congress would be everything we can to determine that
sible for our intelligence program, part and parcel of the decisionmaking structure and organization is being car-
Jurisdiction in the Senate over intel- process. ried out as originally conceived.
ligence matters and oversight of the in- How can we exercise oversight ac- In no way is Senate Resolution 400 de-
telligence community Is also widespread, tivity, as a we should, and be in on the signed to mean that Congress actually
and a number of committees have a piece day-by-day decisions for, say, covert op- runs the intelligence agencies. Direction
of the action. There is no single commit- erations? and implementation of policy must come
tee at the moment that has overall over- Those operations belong in the juris- from the executive branch. However,
sight of legislative functions for the in- diction of the executive branch of Gov- Congress must exercise consolidated
telligence community. Responsibility in ernment, so long as they are committed oversight over the intelligence commu-
the Seante at the present time is spread .to writing, so long as there is a top of nity. If we expect, as we did, the exec-
among the Armed Services Committee, ficial responsible, and for a major ac- utive branch to reorganize that activity
the Foreign Relations Committee, the tivity the President of the United States so it could bring its own organization to-
Judiciary Committee, and the Appro- must be responsible. President Ford has gether, we have to, ourselves, then bring
priations Committee. The responsibility said to me, the Senator from Illinois, ourselves together in such a way that we
for oversight for the intelligence com- that he would personally sign in writ- can operate without duplication, over-
munity is the prime focus of no single ing the options placed before him, the lapping inefficiencies, and, we might say,
committee in the Senate. In some in- problem being faced up to, and the de- overlooking, because our oversight activ-
stances now there Is not even oversight cision made. ity is not properly structured and proper-
staff or there is at best a limited staff to The congressional oversight can be ly organized.
oversee the intelligence community. fully informed, can be kept up to date, We have to do so in such a way that
Intelligence is so vital and so impor- but should not be in the position where we do not authorize and appropriate
tant to the security of this country that it is being asked for prior approval which money for organizations and then im-
any effective congressional oversight re- might jeopardize the intelligence activ- pose upon them such a burden so that
quires that any oversight committee ity and :which might then put the Con- they literally are incapable of carrying
make the intelligence community its gress in a position where it truly could out their responsibilities.
prime focus. not perform an oversight function be- The Senator from Illinois was, very
I would like to digress, Mr. President, cause Members of Congress have been disturbed and literally shocked when Mr.
just a moment on that particular part and parcel of the original decision- Colby testified, in response to a question
t. I have talked to a great many making process. from the Senator from Illinois, as to
americans in many States, but particu- The Senator from Illinois has been what proportion of his time as Director
larly in the State of Illinois, during the extraordinarily concerned that the Con- of the CIA he spent preparing for testi-
process of the investigation of our Intel- gress, in a reaction to Watergate, to mony before congressional committees,
ligence activities. Lockheed, to the CIA, FBI, and Internal appearing before Congressional commit-
(At this point, Mr. CULVER assumed the Revenue revelations, is going to overre- tees of the House and Senate, and then
chair as Presiding Officer.) act and, really, in a sense, assume unto responding to the work given to him by
Mr. PERCY. At no time have I ever itself executive branch responsibility. the committees before whom he had
found any reasonable or rational per- Clearly, we must exercise oversight. appeared.
son who in any way questioned for one But clearly, we cannot run the Govern- Mr. Colby thought about it, put a few
moment the need for a strong, powerful ment-by a committee of 535 people. That figures on a piece of paper, and has not
nation that is the leader of the free is why the executive branch of Govern- since corrected the figure he gave the
world and that has a tremendous bur- ment was conceived, to have a chief ex- Senator from Illinois.
den of responsibility on its shoulders to ecutive officer who could react -to all of Sixty percent of his time in 3 years as
have an effective, efficient intelligence the arguments and had the authority to Director of the CIA was spent before
community. say that this is what we are going to do Congress. I asked him what he thought
That is not subject to question. I think or not to do, subject always to our ap- should be the proportionate amount of
anyone who would demagogue this issue propriation process, subject always to time. He thought 10 percent-90 percent
and point to the abuses that have been our oversight responsibilities. to direct the activities and do the work
carried out as a means of trying to de- I think we have presented to the Con- and 10 percent to be accountable to Con-
stroy the intelligence community would gress, to the Senate for its consideration, gross would be a fair proportionate share
in so doing, destroy the ability of the the creation of a new committee that of his time.
United States to protect its vital inter- can be a single focal point in the Sen- I think that possibly might apply to
ests and the vital interests of the free ate to oversee the intelligence commu- virtually every member of the executive
world. nity, and yet an oversight committee or- branch of Government unless an agency
I do not think that is really an issue. ganized in such a way that it is clearly is in deep trouble. Obviously intelligence
The people of this country expect us to determined that it is not going to be a has been in some deep trouble for a few
have a thorough,, ongoing intelligence part of the decisionmaking process and years now.
facility and capability. I think they ex- that is not going to usurp the responsi- But I think our aim ought to be to
pect us to have the finest in the world. bilities of the intelligence community organize in such a way that the Director
What they do not want is abuse in the itself. can devote a reasonable proportion of
name of law enforcement. They do not Intelligence activities are spread his time to Congress, but not be on the
want such an agency breaking the law. among a large number of executive Hill so much that, literally, the Agency's
They do not want people in that agency branch organizations today-some civil- direction is being left to subordinates
to feel that they somehow have a mission ian and some military. No one agency or who are not. personally directly account-
in life so important that they are above department is solely responsible for our able to the Congress.
law. They do not want complicity intelligence program. We know that inefficiencies in the per-
,hat. They do not want Congress to It was the purpose of'the Presidential formance of. the intelligence community
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S 7092 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 12, 1976
can really cost billions of dollars. We
know that. based on studies to date,
there are inefficiencies and duplications
in the inteftggence agencies. But there is
no single co mittee to Pull all this in-
formation together in the Senate at the
moment.
Therefore, I strongly support consoli-
dated oversight over the intelligence
community. It is time for the Senate to
take such action.
Throughout the debate on this Issue,
my primary goal will be to assure that
we have strong, effective oversight over
the intelligence community.
Certainly, the Senator from Illinois,
and every other Senator, I trust, will be
willing to be flexible. Already, the-dis-
tinguished Senator from Nevada (Mr.
CANNON) has indicated there has come
an issue on the tenure of the Senators
serving on the committee that should
be subject to floor discussion. He has
indicated a willingness to be flexible.
Certainly, the Senator from Illinois will
be flexible on that issue, as I am sure
my distinguished colleague from Con-
necticut will be.
We are not .saying this compromise is
final. It is subject to amendment. It is
subject to discussion. But it does repre-
sent a remarkable effort by a group of
Senators determined to try to resolve
some of the major points of controversy
prior to placing the substitute on the
floor.
Senate Resolution 400, as reported by
Government Operations, is certainly sub-
ject to amendment in itself, and has been
these divergent opinions and to reach a by the new intelligence Committee. I~ the
general consensus that is in the realm of case of the CIA, exclusively; in the case of
the possible and at the same time is other agencies, on the concurrent basis. How-
_ ever, language will be written into the reso-
Today we have before us a proposed should an authorization not be appro
substitute for Senate Resolution 400 that prior to the appropriations process.
I cosponsored which can hopefully re- 5) On disclosure, if the new committee
ceive maximum support. It is a product been classified as release any submmtte ion it which has
of days of discussion and intense con- executive branch, the committee shall notify
sideration of vitally important issues in the President of such vote. The Select Com-
an attempt to reconcile divergent views. mittee may then publicly release such infor-
We hope that the proposed substitute, mation after 5 days unless during that inter-
which blends widely differing points of vening period of time the President notifies
view, will accomplish what most of us the Committee that he objects to the dis-
seek to accomplish. closure of such information. After review of
I am able to offer my wholehearted the President's objections, if the Committee
suppord to the compromise proposal, and still wishes to release the information it may
I ask -unanimous consent that the sum- refer the question of disclosure to the full
mary, as I understand the: substitute, be Senate for consideration. The Senate will
then make the final decision in closed ses-
printed in the RECORD at this point sion, and may take any one of the following
There being no objection, the summary three courses of action: (1) approve the pub-
Was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, lic disclosure of any or all of the Informa-
as follows: tion in question; or (2) disapprove the pub-
SUMMARY lic disclosure of amy or all of the informa-
Following are the major points of the sub- tion in question; or (3) refer any or all of the
stitute: information in question back to the Com-
1) There is established a Select Committee mittee, in which case the Committee shall
to be known as the Select Committee on make the final determination with respect
Intelligence Activities. The Select Commit- to the public disclosure of'the information
tee shall be composed of 17 members-nine in question.
members selected at large, 2 members from There is a provision in the resolution which
the Appropriations Committee, 2 members requires that the final vote on the question
from the Armed Services Committee, 2 mem- of whether or not to release shall not occur
bers from the Foreign Relations Committee later than the close of the ninth day on
and 2 members from the Judiciary Commit- which the Senate is in session following the
tee. day on which such question was reported
The Majority Leader of the Senate and the to the Senate.
Minority Leader shall be. ex officio members 6) No information in the possession of
of the Committee and shall have no `vote.' . 'the Select Committee which the Committee
The members of the Committee shall be has determined should not be disclosed shall
be made available to any person except in
appointed by the Majority and Minority a closed Cessio of the Senate nr_ information
confirmed by the respective caucuses.
agree, during the course of debate this mittee to another committee or ono
week, to amendments that would emas- The Committee will be a bipartisan com- member of the Senate according to rules thW
culate the proposed new committee; that mittee with nine members from the majority Select Committee lays down. No member of
would make it weak; that would make it and eight members from the minority. The the Senate receiving such information can
a toothless watchdog; that Would pro- majority members of the Senate shall select disclose such information to any other parties
the chairman for the Select Committee and except in a closed session of the Senate or
vide no real, effective oversight. That I the minority members of the senate shall with the permission of the Select Committee.
cannot agree to. Nor do I feel my col- select the vice chairman for the committee. 7) The Select Committee on Standards and
leagues on the Government Operations Service in the -Select Committee shall not Conduct shall investigate any alleged -disclo-
Committee and the Select Committee on count against a member's service on any sure of intelligence information in violation
Intelligence or the committee on Rules, other committee. In other words, this is an of these rules. The Select Committee on
which has heard for so many days hear- add-on committee. Standards and Conduct shall investigate any
ings on this matter, could agree to that. 2) The members of the Select Committee alleged violation and report Its findings and
Certainly, after weeks of hearings, in shall rotate with the maximum term being 9 recommendations to the Senate.
years of membership on the committee; 1/3 of 8) The head of any department or agency
good conscience none of us could agree the committee will rotate each 3 years. The of the United States engaged in intelligence
to emaseculating amendments that staff shall be permanent with no rotation. - activities shall keep the Select Committee
would betray the trust placed in us by 3) The new committee shall. have legisla- fully and currently informed, including any
the American public, and I think in this tive and authorization authority. In the case significant anticipated activities which are
respect by the executive branch of Gov- of the CIA, such legislative and authoriza- the responsibility. of such department or
ernment. Time after time they have said tion authority shall be exclusive. In the case agency. It is the mandate of the agency or
they wanted effective oversight. They are of other covered intelligence agencies in this department to keep the committee informed.
legislation, the authority shall be shared with In no way is this requiring committee ap-
ing tee it; they are looking for it. But the standing committee with over- proval before engaging in such activities. In
they y want it organized in such a a way present other words, there is a mandate to keep the
that it is not disruptive to their own sight responsibility. There shall be a process committee fully and currently informed but
of concurrent sequential referral of legisla- the committee does not have a veto power
operations. tton and authorizations. In other words, in over activities of such agency or department.
Mr. President, it comes as no surprise the case of an agency such as the NSA, both
to Members of this body that the precise the intelligence Committee and the current Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the dis--
form that oversight should take has been standing committee would share jurisdiction. closures of the last few days have made
extremely controversial. Some have ad- In any case where either the Intelligence the need for oversight in the Intelli-
vocated maintaining the status quo, some Committee or the standing committee re- gence community painfully evident. I
ported out legislation or an authorization, it
have preferred a new study, while others would then be referred to the other com- venture to say there are few Members of
have spoken in favor of a strong new mittee for a period not to exceed 30 days. If this body who would wish to see repeated
committee with concentrated authority. the second committee did not take action the violations of our civil liberties which
This diversity of view, Mr. President, is within 30 days, the second committee would have occurred. I believe that the pro-
what makes this institution so great and be automatically discharged from responsi- posed new committee represents the most
so representative of the American peo- bility for the legislation and it would go to effective possible check against repeated
the Senate floor. A major addition to the activities s which are a threat to the very
pie. it is a source of strength rather than substitute was the re-inclusion of the FBI foundation our democracy.
of weakness. Our strength is in our in the jurisdiction of the Intelligence Com- -
diversity. mittee. - Mr. President, over 200 years of o
Another source of strength, Mr. Presi- 4) The budgets for the covered intelli- Nation's history have shown we must
dent, is this body's ability to reconcile gence agencies shall be annually authorized ever alert to the dangers posed by those
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S 7093
who_wlsh us no well. The American peo- agencies and evaluating their perform- provide us, often under the most .trying
pie need a strong intelligence commu- ance. Our findings, reported in more and dangerous circumstances. Without
nity. than 600 pages of text on April 26, re- their work, we could not feel militarily
undreds of editorials and hundreds of is required.
tegod'abuses point out a need for better That report, together with others
Sersight of the intelligence agencies. which have, been made public, demon-
The American people need to be assured strates with clarity that the intelligence
that these necessarily,secret agencies op- agencies of our Government have at
erate within the law. The American peo- times operated outside both the law and
ple and the Senate need strong oversight their charters and outside the bounds of
of the intelligence community. The pro- wisdom. The information which has
posed new Committee on Intelligence Ac- been released over the last few months
tivities will do the job and do it well. I regarding drug testing on unwitting
urge my colleageus to offer their support. Americans, assassination plots and the
Finally, I ask unanimous consent that interception of millions of messages sent
Elliot Maxwell, Mike Madigan, and Bob by private citizens reflect activities
Kelly, of the Select Committee on Intelli- which have simply gotten out of hand
gence, be granted access to the floor, in- and indicate a pressing need for our
cluding votes, during the consideration intelligence agencies. to return to ac-
of Senate Resolution 400, and that the cepted practices.
same privilege be granted to Mr. John These reports also indicate that the
Childers, minority counsel for the Gov- United States is involved in a multitude
ernment Operations Committee. of so-called covert activities abroad-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without activities which by their nature cannot
objection, it is so ordered. be subjected to public scrutiny and de-
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President, I, bate as can, for example, the activities
too, commend the distinguished chair- of the Department of Agriculture, or the
man of the Government Operations Department of Commerce or most of the
Committee, the chairman of the Rules other activities of our Government.
Committee, and the others who have Our Government has been involved in
participated in developing this substi- some 900 such major or sensitive projects
tute amendment which has been intro-. since 1961 and several thousand minor
duced this afternoon. ones, many of which, especially in the
It was just a week ago that the press earlier years were undertaken without
reports indicated that the prospects for the approval or review of a high level
developing a strong oversight Commit- body outside the Central Intelligence
tee on Intelligence in the U.S. Senate Agency. I, and the committee in general,
were rather bleak. I would say that those concluded that we must maintain a ca-
reports were somewhat premature, even pability for such actions and that our
though perhaps it is a little early now Nation will be forced in a number of in-
il predict that this body will accept the stances to continue to utilize covert ac-
islation which is now before it, or tivities. But; at the least, additional
l l accept it without substantial oversight and accountability must be ap-
change. But I think certainly we can say plied to this area which has to operate
that the prospects are greatly improved. under a certain veil of secrecy.
In my own judgment we will have a Finally, our report indicates that de-
good oversight committee established to spite the fact that our intelligence agen-
look after the intelligence operations of cies have served well in many areas, there
this Nation. , are aspects of their operations which
Mr. President, in the days ahead we could be improved. For example, more
will be discussing what I view as one of attention should be given to producing
the most important pieces of legislation the so-called finished product of Intelli-
which will come before this Congress. gence information; more coordination
During those days of debate, we will and less waste and inefficiency might re-
touch upon many issues-issues regard- suit from strengthening the Director of
ing Senate rules, the role of a new com- the Central Intelligence-DCI. With the
mittee, the authorities for that commit- large increase in the number of Soviets
tee, the manner of selecting members.
There are many differences of opinion
with regard to these issues-differences
which will have to be worked out in our
deliberations and perhaps in Senate
rollcall votes. Each of these matters is
of importance, and I do not believe that
any should be slighted in considerate
But, in addressing the various s
sidiary issues, I hope that we will not
lose sight of what I consider to be the our intelligence community-argue or to propose legislative solutions. Some of
foremost one-the need for a strong strongly for increased oversight, central- its members have failed to object to im-
committee for the intelligence com- ized in a committee whose principal con- proper activities of which they were aware
munity with legislative and authorizing cern shgll be intelligence. and have prodded agencies into questionable
authority. If there is one thing that my service activities.
As chairman of the Foreign and Mili- on the Intelligence Investigating Com- Then the report concludes:
tary Intelligence Subcommittee of the mittee has done, it is to reinforce my be- If Congress had addressed the issues of
Select Committee to Study Governmen- lief in, and commitment to a strong and domestic intelligence and passed regulatory
tal Operations with Respect to Intel- effective intelligence system. In the legislation, and if it had probed into the
ligence Activities, I have spent many world in which we live, we could not activities of intelligence agencies and re-quired s during the past 15 months review- survive without the information which of the excesses account
thet for their deeds, many
the activities of our intelligence thousands of dedicated men and women occurred. Past) might not have
secure. We could not conduct foreign re-
lations with assurance. We could not en-
-ter treaties with confidence. Quite sim-
ply, we could not adequately protect our-
selves.
Yet, perhaps the most insidous danger
is intelligence agencies which operate
under a cloud of suspicion and doubt.
But, that is what the situation has been.
That is what effective oversight can help
prevent.
So, as consideration of this measure
continues, I hope that we will all remem-
ber that the heart of the matter is over-
sight and accountability. Past wrongs
argue to be righted as best they can;
future effectiveness and legality de-
mands to be secured. The most import-
ant single move we could make toward
accomplishing that is to create a strong,
responsible oversight committee which
can exercise that eternal vigilance which
Thomas Jefferson warned us its the. price
of liberty.
I thank the Chair.
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. President, the
matter before the Senate today and that
will be before the Senate for the next
few days comes down to one very simple
question: Will we ignore the past, or
will we learn from it?
We now have the reports of the Select
Committee on Intelligence which care-
fully document over 40 years of abuse by,
and misuse of, the intelligence agencies
of the Federal Government.
For nearly 15 months, Mr. President, I
sat as a member of that committee and
listened to the testimony concerning the
abuses and misuses of the Agency.
In the course of those 40 years, we
have had the rights and the privacy of
Americans violated in countless episodes.
Furthermore, we have seen that many
of these episodes were not the isolated
aberrations'of agents out in the field, but
rather were part of concerted programs
ap oved at the highest levels of these
agcies. I remind my colleagues of the
FBI's program called COINTELPRO and
the CIA's program called CHAOS.
Despite the fact that these programs
did have high-level approval and resulted
in widespread and systematic violations
of the rights of law-abidin
citizens
g
,
and other"nationals whose interests may Congress, until recently, had never
be contrary to ours, in our country, addi- sought to learn about them or control
tional counterespionage efforts may need them. Indeed, on some occasions, I am
to be made. afraid our actions in Congress actually
These three situtaions-the unfortu- encouraged them.
nate episodes which have occurred in the As the select committee 'put it in its
past, the necess*r of maintaining our final report:
ability to conduct 'covert actions and the Congress has failed to define the scope of
need for improvement in th? effective- domestic intelligence activities or intelligence
neon
d effi
i .
f
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t- ` - - - - - -
an
c
ncy o
aspec
vario
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE May 12, 1976
We have the opportunity to remedy
this situation by creating a committee
with the authority to propose legislative
solutions, and the power to make these
agencies accountable for their activities._
Mr. President, as I mentioned, I served
on the Church committee, and while I
initially approached that assignment
with considerable skepticism, I came to
realize that the abuses of the intelligence
agencies were real, and that people who
had done nothing wrong in the eyes of
the law, had nonetheless suffered at the
hands of the Government for the simple
reason that they had dared to be differ-
ent.
Most importantly, the Church commit-
tee's work demonstrated to me that there
is no activity undertaken by the Federal
Government which so jeopardizes the
rights guaranteed to us by the Constitu-_
tion. Intelligence activity, almost by def-
inition, is directed at persons and orga-
nizations who have committed no crime
but whose activities are thought to pose
a danger to our internal security or of
fect our foreign relations. By`its very
nature, therefore, intelligence activity
tends to skirt the traditional notion that
governmental surveillance will be em-
ployed only after a warrant has been
issued on the grounds that there is prob-
able cause that a crime has been, or is
about to be, committed.
Again, I remind my colleagues that
the record of the select committee shows
us that intelligence activities of the past
have resulted in the Government's open-
ing mail and reading telegrams, in its
tapping telephones, and its breaking into
homes-all without benefit of a search
warrant or indication that a crime was
being committed.
In short, there is no activity carried
out by the Federal Government which
can have so' devastating an impact on the
Bill of Rights. While intelligence activ-
ities cost us relatively little in terms of
money, they can cost us very dearly, in
terms of our principles.
It is for this reason, then-the particu-
lar sensitivity of intelligence activities
with respect :to the impact on the rights
of indivduals-that convinces me that we
need a strong oversight committee to
deal exclusively with this area.
I realize that adoption of the approach
suggested here will result in-the juris-
diction of existing committees being
diminished insofar as their oversight of
intelligence activity is concerned. But by
concentrating oversight in a new com-
mittee with jurisdiction to treat intelli-
gence activity exclusively, we should not
only get better oversight of intelligence,
but existing committees should them-
selves be able to devote greater time to
non-intelligence operations of the agen-
cies they oversee.
One of the problems of the past has
been that questionable intelligence activ-
ities have not been brought to the atten-
tion of existing oversight committees be-
cause they have constituted a relatively
small part of an agency's operations, and
have involved relatively small sums of
money. The possibility that certain pro-
grams might intrude on the rights of in-
dividuals has seldom motivated any in-
telligence agency to seek approval from
Congress.
I foresee this new committee, however,
as being informed, in advance, of any
intelligence activity which could affect
the rights of Americans. I furthermore
foresee such a committee investigating
allegations that intelligence activities
have violated constitutional guarantees.
Finally, I foresee this new committee de-
veloping-for the first time-the exper-
tise necessary for Congress to formulate
and enact legislative standards to govern
intelligence activity.
I might also add that I think a strong
oversight committee will result in more
cooperation and better coordination be-
tween Congress and the intelligence com-
munity than 'heretofore. The Church
committee found, on the one hand, that
in the past there had been an attitude
on the part of intelligence agencies that
Congress could not be trusted to keep its
secrets, and an attitude, on the other
hand, that Congress really could not
understand all of the ramifications
which the agency considered in decid-
ing to undertake this or that action.
So Congress was not informed, unless,
on occasion, the plans of the agency
went awry, in. which case Congress was
presented with a fait accompli.
I see a centralized oversight committee
as changing all this. First, I think the
concept of a single committee with in-
telligence responsibility is appealing from
a security point of view, the intelligence
community would not be forced to spread
classified information over a multitude
of congressional committees. Moreover,
the committee itself would be in a better
position than committees with other-
than-intelligence jurisdiction to adopt
stringent security procedures. I note in
the resolution currently pending that
certain security restrictions are placed
on both members and staff, and that
there is a formal procedure to be fol-
lowed prior to the public disclosure of
any classified information. Such meas-
ures would go far, to insure that security
considerations do not, in the future, pre-
vent the intelligence -community from
dealing frankly with the Congress.
Second, I think that Congress would
be in a position for the first time, to exer-
cise its own independent judgment with
respect to intelligence operations. With
a membership and a staff devoted solely
to intelligence needs and problems, the
ernment off the backs of people. One
way to insure that this is done, is for
Congress to "get on the backs" of those
agencies whose activities threaten our
exert a gentle, but unrelenting, pressure,
which lets them know that we are there
and cannot be taken for granted.
And so, Mr. President, I urge my col-
leagues to support the substitution
offered by Senator CANNON. In my opin-
ion, this measure would create the strong
oversight committee which I think the
experience of the past 40 years cries out
for.
To do any less would be worse than
doing nothing. Effective oversight over
any governmental activity is dependent
upon the ease of access which a com-
mittee has to records and personnel in-
volved in that activity. It has been my
experience that unless a congressional
committee has legislative or monetary
clout, its inquiries are largely ignored. It
is politely strung along, but it is not
effective.
It - is for this reason that I think it
essential that any committee we create
have the authority to report legislation
and the authority to authorize appro-
priations. To establish an oversight com-
mittee without the power needed to ob-
tain access and cooperation from the
intelligence community would be worse
than doing nothing at all-it.would only
camouflage the reality of the situation.
Mr. President, if we pass up this op-
portunity to create such a committee, it
very well may be another 50 years before
the abuses of such agencies again will
be disclosed to the public and the suppor0
found that is necessary to enact suck
legislation.
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, the dis-
cussion before us sharply raises the ques-
tion of how the Senate should best exer-
cise its oversight authority over govern-
mental intelligence programs.
I have long been concerned with such
intelligence activities having been deeply
involved in this area by virtue of my
membership on the Appropriations and
Judiciary Committees.
Today I wish to address my remarks
chiefly to that aspect of congressional
oversight pertaining to the Department
of Justice.
In March, the Judiciary Committee
was referred Senate Resolution 400
committee would be in a position to which sought to create a new permanent
understand and evaluate the decisions- committee with exclusive jurisdiction
made by the intelligence community as
no congressional committee has ever
done before. My conversations with peo-
ple in the intelligence community lead
me to believe that this change would be
welcomed by the intelligence community.
They want to have the approval of the
Congress, and they would 'like it to
shoulder some of the responsibility for
the tough decisions which must be made.
And well it should. Too long have we
abdicated our role in these matters, and
too often has our neglect resulted in
erosions of individual rights going un-
checked and unrepaired.
Justice Douglas once wrote that the
Bill of Rights was written to keep gov-
over all aspects of the intelligence func-
tion of the executive branch. Following
he$ings and much deliberation amongst
can rnittee members, the Judiciary Com-
tion the grant of jurisdiction to the pro-
posed Committee on Intelligence Ac-
tivities over the intelligence activities of
the Department of Justice, including the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The amendments would retain in the
Judiciary Committee its historic juris-
diction over the Department of Justice
and the FBI. The present exercise of
jurisdiction over these activities is in
accord with the purpose and spirit of thqft
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946
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Senate Report No. 1400, 79th Congress, Mr. President, we have heard much In Mr. President, for these reasons I am
2d session, Legislative Reorganization recent years that the FBI should be more opposed to the creation of a permanent
Act of 1946-May 31, 1946-set forth accountable to the Department of Justice 'Senate Intelligence Committee with
-*ae Wstandards controlling committee and the Attorney General. It should be jurisdiction, whether exclusive or con-
sdiction, page 2: viewed as an integral part of the Depart- current, over the intelligence aspects of
he bill) would replace our jerry-built ment of Justice-not as a separate law the Department of Justice.
committee structure with a simplified system enforcement or intelligence agency. The It is my understanding that some
of standing committees corresponding with effect of splitting of the intelligence over- Members may attempt to revive such a
the major areas of public policy and admin- sight of the Bureau -and vesting it with a version of. Senate Resolution 400 as was
istration . . . and the coordination of the separate committee would tend to create reported committee system with the ported by the Government Operations
pattern of the administrative branch of the the impression that it is somehow di- Committee. While I do oppose such an
National Government would improve the vorced from the rest of the law enforce- approach, I am not wedded in opposition
performance by Congress of its legislative ment branch of the Federal Government. to the version of Senate Resolution 400
and supervisory functions. We should remember, Mr. President, as it was reported by Chairman CANNON
Following this continuing guideline, that the Bureau is under the supervision from the Rules Committee.
the Judiciary'Committee possesses over- bf the Attorney General, the principal The Rules Committee version of Sen-
sight jurisdiction over the Department law enforcement office in the Federal ate Resolution 400 would in effect con-
of Justice and its bureaus including the Government, a subject over which the tinue the work of the present Select
Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Judiciary Committee has long exercised Committee. The temporary committee
full committee and at least three sub- jurisdiction. which is proposed would be granted gen-
committees exercise jurisdiction over the As stated by Director Kelley:, eral oversight of all intelligence activity
Bureau and its functions, the Subcom- While the FBI has many duties concerning rather than exclusive jurisdiction, leg-
mittee on Administrative Practice and the internal security of our country, it is islative or authorization wise, which some
Procedure, the Subcommittee on Con- not alone in this responsibility. The entire are promoting. It would have an oppor-
criminal justice system is involved. Obser- tunity -to review this subject area with
stitutional Rights and the Subcommittee vance of the law and the preservation of
on Criminal Laws. public order are the foundations for this some objectivity now that the emotion
The difficulty with Senate Resolution country's domestic security. Without ade- charged revelations of the past year have
400, prior to its being amended, is that quate and equitable enforcement of the become public.
it proposed to split, the oversight juris- law, whatever the source or circumstance of In summary, Mr. President, it is my
diction of the FBI between the Judiciary its violation, a democratic society cannot firmest belief that the granting of legis-
Committee and the proposed new Intelli- enjoy the stability it requires. lative oversight of FBI intelligence to a
gence Committee, with the new commit- Stripping the Judiciary Committee of new committee will cause not only con-
tee to have jurisdiction over intelligence jurisdiction over law enforcement in the fusion as to congressional direction to
activities of the Bureau and the Judi- area of internal security while leaving the Department of Justice in its law
ciary Committee to retain jurisdiction it with general jurisdiction over the re- enforcement investigatory function but
over nonintelligence aspects of this mainder would be to create a hybrid will also create much costly duplication
agency. wherein necessary general oversight in request for materials and information
Those who have studied the FBI's or- over law enforcement would be annulled being sought by the various Senate com-
ganization and mode of operation are and essential-perspective destroyed. es so authorized to oversee this
ell aware that its intelligence activities The Judiciary Committee is at this Department.
intertwined with its law enforcement moment considering the revision of title The most important reason against
ction. For the most part its intelli- 18 of the United States Code, the crimi- splitting jurisdiction, however, Mr. Pres-
gence activities are an investigatory tool nal laws including the provisions on ident is that mentioned by Attorney Gen-
used in detecting crime. espionage. Should.it report a bill with eral Levi in testimony before both the
There is a real potential that a split- amended espionage provisions subject to Judiciary and Government Operations
ting of the oversight jurisdiction of in- future amendment by the Intelligence Committees.
telligence and nonintelligence aspects of . Committee? Should it report.a bill with Mr. Levi strongly stressed the necessity
the FBI may create much confusion and no change in the existing provisions on of continuing and strengthening the con-
result in conflicting congressional guid- espionage with the expectation that the cept that the intelligence activity of the
ance to that agency. It should be noted bill will be rereferred to the Intelligence FBI is part and parcel of the law en-
that the FBI, unlike other intelligence committee? Should the lengthy study forcement mission of the Department of
collecting agencies affected by Senate that has gone into the espionage provi- Justice. I do not wish to aid those who
Resolution 400, is a law enforcement sions be put aside? would, however inadvertently, separate
agency. The intelligence activity of the A further consideration which I be- these two functions.
FBI is simply a means by which it detects lieve should be borne in mind is that a I wish to state again, Mr. President,
and investigates violations of Federal separation of intelligence oversight from that I fully oppose the creation of a per-
criminal laws. Because this activity is so the traditional law enforcement aspect manent Senate Intelligence Committee
integrally related to the criminal inves- of the Deparmtent and the Bureau with jurisdiction, concurrent or exclu-
tigatory function of the FBI and the De- would very likely result that no one sive, over the intelligence activities of
partment of Justice, it is our belief that Senate committee would have a general the FBI both in an oversight and legis-
oversight of the FBI should be continued overview and knowledge of all the activi- lative nature.
to be dealt with as a unit. ties of the Department of Justice. This As I have. indicated, such a move would
Mr. President, during the hearings be- could result in some information as to give strength to the concept that the
fore the Judiciary Committee on Senate its operations to "fall between the intelligence activity of the FBI was sep-
Resolution .400, both Attorney General cracks" and become known to no com- arate from the law enforcement function
Levi and FBI Director Kelley testified. mittee. of the -Department of Justice where it
Both stated that vigorous oversight of The Senate Rules Committee, to necessarily and properly rests. Such a
the Department of Justice and the FBI which Senate Resolution 400 was subse- move, further could easily result in long
was healthy and productive In the better- quently referred, concurred with the range confusion and conflict of congres-
ment of the system. Both urged that this Judiciary Committee position on this sional directives to the FBI not to men-
function could be best served by retain- subject, noting in part in its report tion the costly and duplicative requests
ing oversight in a single committee. that-
Mr. Levi well for material and information being
pointed out- The intelligence activity of the FBI is a sought by the various committees in-
That intelligence activities of . the FBI means by which it detects and investigates volved.
should be closely tied to the criminal law. violaions of federal criminal laws. Because I believe also, that I would be remiss
And that- this activity is so integrally related to the in not adding that a sharing of access
criminal investigatory function of the FBI
ngr
spessional oversight arrangements that and the Department of Justice, it is the be- to intelligence material provides a
d
lit off the Intelligence functions from lief of the Committee that all legislative au- greater possibility of unauthorized dis-
ore ordinary law enforcement functions thority should be continued to. be dealt with closure of matter which the Department
of the Bureau would tend
force of this to diminish the as a unit within the jurisdiction of the Com- of Justice understandably needs to safe-
perception. mittee on the Judiciary. guard in order to protect its sources and
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 12, 1976
techniques of investigating criminal vio-
lations.
For these reasons, Mr. President, I
urge my colleagues to reject any meas-
ures which grant any proposed standing
committee the jurisdiction over the in-
telligence activities of the Department of
Justice.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, The
U.S. Senate could play a major role in
improving the image and the creditabil-
ity of the American intelligence com-
munity if it adopts the proposed substi-
tute to Senate Resoluton 400 to be offered
by Senators MANSFIELD, CANNON, RIBI-
coFF, and others. I am pleased to join my
colleagues in cosponsoring this measure.
As the Members of the Senate know,
this substitute would establish a Select
Committee on -Intelligence Activities
with both legislative and budgetary au-
thority over the CIA and other intelli-
gence agencies. If adopted, this measure
would centralize, for the first time, the
Senate's oversight of the American in-
telligence community. At the same time,
it would permit other committees of the
Senate the continued opportunity to re-
view and oversee the work of the DIA,
FBI, and the National Security Agency.
For over 15 months, the Church com-
mittee has conducted a thorough and an
exhaustive study and investigation of
the practices and policies of the CIA,
FBI, NSA, and the D4A. While none of
us are proud of the past abuses of power
which have taken place in these agencies,
we all know of the important role these
organizations play in the overall security
of our country.
Mr. President, many of us believe and
feel that the responsibility for these
abuses, as reported by the Church com-
mittee, must not only be placed upon
the executive branch, but the legislative
branch as well. Had the Congress exer-
cised the proper oversight of these agen-
cies for the past 25 years, quite possibly
many of the abuses would never have
occurred.
It is true that the political climate of
the times did not require nor did it ex-
pect the Congress to play an active over-
sight role. But, the present times are such
that the American people are demanding
that we, in the Congress, assume our re-
sponsibility, and begin to exercise an
active interest in the affairs of the Amer-
ican intelligence community. -
The*adoption of this measure will be
a signal to the American people that
the Congress is not only intent upon
disclosing illegal practices, but is intent'
upon preventing similar practices from
taking place in the future.
Mr. President, I urge the early, adop-
tion of this substitute. To do otherwise
will be a message to the American people
that their elected representatives are
not interested in seeing to it that all
aspects of intelligence work are done in
accordance with the Constitution and
the laws of this Nation.
WATERGATE REORGANIZATION
AND REFORM ACT OF 1976
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Watergate
Reorganization and Reform Act of 1976,
S. 495, as amended, which I reported to-
day, be referred, at the request of the
Committee on the Judiciary, to the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, with instructions
to report not later than June 11, 1976. -
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I have
a parliamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator will state it.
Mr. RIBICOFF. My understanding is
that we have satisfied section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 by, re-
porting S. 495 from the Committee on
Government Operations by May 15, even
though the bill, at the request of the
Committee on the Judiciary, will be re-
ferred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
If one committee reports a bill by May 15
and after the bill is reported, another
committee requests the bill to be referred
to it for a limited period of time, which
will. result in that second committee
completing work on the bill after May 15,
have the requirements of section 402 of
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974
been met? -
The PRESIDING OFFICER. They
have been net.
PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400)
to establish a Standing Committee of the
Senate on Intelligence Activities, and
for other purposes.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
EXECUTIVE SESSION
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD,. Mr. President,
I understand that there are two nomina-
tions at the desk which were reported
earlier today by the Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare. I ask unanimous
consent that the Senate go into execu-'
tive session to consider those nomina-
tions.
There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to the consideration of execu-
tive business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The nom-
inations will be stated.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
The assistant legislative clerk read
the nomination of Michael H. Moskow,
of New Jersey, to be Under Secretary of
Labor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the nomination is considered
and confirmed.
The assistant legislative clerk read the
nomination of John Conyers Read, of
Virginia, to be an Assistant Secretary
of Labor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the nomination is considered
and confirmed. _
LEGISLATIVE SESSION
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the Sen-
ate resume the consideration of legis
tive business.
There being no objection, the Sena
resumed the consideration of legislative
business.
ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SEN-
ATOR PROXMIRE ON MONDAY
NEXT
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that on Mon-
day next, after the two leaders or their
designees have been recognized under
the standing order, Mr. PROXMIRE be rec-
ognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER.,Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ORDERS FOR RECOGNITION OF MR.
MONDALE AND FOR ROUTINE
MORNING BUSINESS ON TOMOR-
ROW; ORDER FOR CONSIDERA-
TION OF UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that after Mr.
PROXMIRE and Mr. GOLDWATER have been
recognized on tomorrow, under the order
previously entered, Mr. MONDALE be re-
cognized for not to exceed 15 minutes,
after which there be a period for the
transaction of routine morning business,
with statements therein limited to 5 min-
utes each, such period not to extend
beyond 1 p.m.; that at 1 p.m., the Senate
resume consideration of the unfinish
business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With
objection, it is so ordered.
PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400)
to establish a Standing Committee of the
Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for
other purposes.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I suggest the absence of a quroum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll. -
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I was very
struck with Senator MORGAN'$ statement
when he said that 50 years ago, we had
a previous scandal that needed cleaning
up and rectification. It seems odd that
in our country's history, every 50 years
something of this sort arises. We had the
grant scandals of the 1870's, the Teapot
Dome scandal of the 1920's, then we had
the Watergate and,CIA problems in the
1970's. Let us hope that in the 2020's we
do not go through the same cycle again.
Mr. President, I commend the Mem-
bers of this body who have cooperat
so effectively and wisely in aevelopi
the compromise amendment on intel
gence oversight which has been proposed
by the distinguished Senator from
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S 7097
Nevada. A strong intelligence oversight implications, rather than intelligence Mr. PELL. I thank my colleague very
committee will be established if this implications, would continue to go to the much for these answers, which will be an
amendment to Senate Resolution 400 is Foreign Relations Committee, with the important part of the recommended ac-
opted? right of the new committee to ask for a tion on this amendment. I look forward
strong and effective Senate Over- sequential referral, to supporting the Senator.
ht Committee with legislative author- Mr. PELL. I thank my colleague. In Mr. `RIBICOFF. I thank the Senator
ity is required in order to insure that the. section 3, paragraph (b) of the amend- very much.
intelligence activities of the United ment it is stated that "any legislation Mr. President, I suggest the absence of
States directly support American secu- reported by the select committee, except a quorum.
rity interests, are conducted under clear any legislation involving matters spe- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
legal authority, and do not violate the cified in clause (1) "-that is, the CIA-or will call the roll.
civil rights of American citizens. The (4) (A) -CIA budget-"of subsection (a), The assistant legislative clerk pro-
S.,lect Committee headed by the distin- containing any matter otherwise within ceeded to call the roll.
guished Senator from Idaho has done an the jurisdiction of any standing ;com- Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I ask
excellent job in studying all facets of the mittee shall, at the request of the chair- unanimous consent that the order for
activities of the intelligence community man of such standing committe, be re- the quorum call be rescinded.
and in making recommendations for leg- ferred to such standing committee -for The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
islative action. But it is now essential its consideration." objection, it is so ordered.
that legislation be developed and acted Does that mean that any legislation Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, first, I
upon. That is why I support the creation developed by the proposed intelligence congratulate the distinguished Senator
of the kind of intelligence committee committee relating to. CIA activities from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF) and
proposed in the amendment before us. having foreign policy implications would the distinguished Senator- from Illinois
Although I support this amendment, be referred upon request to the Foreign (Mr. PERCY) on the remarkable job
I do have some questions relating to the Relations Committee? they have done in taking ideas contrib-
effect of the amendment on the jurisdic- Mr. RIBICOFF. If the legislation re- uted by many Members of .the Senate,
tion and activities of other interested ported by the Select Committee has Sig- melding them with their own very im-
committees, particularly the Foreign Re- nificant foreign policy implications, the portant views, and then bringing them
lations Committee, of which I am a mem- Committee on Foreign Relations would here in the form of a legislative proposal
ber. I would therefore appreciate it if the be able to ask for a sequential referral that I think is going to pass. I believe it
distinguished Senator from Connecticut of the legislation. should pass. I take this time simply to
who has done such a fine 'job in develop- Mr. PELL. I thank the Senator. Later express my views and my appreciation
ing this compromise as the floor manager on in that same paragraph, it is stated to them.
of Senate Resolution 400, would be so that- Mr. President, we are finally approach-
kind as to respond to the following Any proposed legislation reported by any ing the climax of a year and a half of an
questions: committee, other than the select committee, unprecedented investigation into the
The Committee on Rules, in its report, which contains any matter within the juris-
raised the possibility that the Hughes- diction of the select committee shall, at the world of intelligence. When the major-
Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assist- request of the chairman of the select com- ity leader and I introduced the resolution
Act, which provides for Presidential mittee, be referred to the select committee in October 1974 that led to the creation
ante reports to four monde s cnmmiiden of for its consideration: of the Select Committee on Intelligence,
ma
"--
charges of domestic spying by the intei-
ersede-d if an intelligence committee Foreign Relations could initiate legisla-
foreign policy implications as long as
such legislation is referred subsequently
to the Proposed Intelligence Committee?
. Mr. RIBICOFF. That is correct
As I
said in response to your second question
,
.
feet the Hughes-Ryan amendment, but i such legislation would be sequentially re-
do believe that it would be useful to f d to the Intelligence committee.
clarify the matter in light of what has Mr. PELL. Finally, section 3, Para
been said by the Rules Committee. Jgraphs (c) and (d), state that other
Mr. RIBICOFF. May I ' respond this committees may "study and review any
way to the Senator from Rhode Island, intelligence activity to the extent that
who was deeply involved in the Commit- such activity directly affects a matter
tee on Rules hearings on these proposals: otherwise within the jurisdiction of such
Senate Resolution 400 does not repeal committee" and that such committees
the Hughes-Ryan Act. As a resolution, would "obtain full and prompt access to
it could not do so. Accordingly, crea- the product of the intelligence activities
tion of a new committee will not repeal of any department or agency of the gov-
the requirement of the CIA to brief the ernment relevant to a matter otherwise
Committee on Foreign Relations. within the jurisdiction of such commit-
Mr. PELL. I thank the Senator. tee." Do these provisions mean that the
administration the granting of exclusive juris- vide all of lthe would
information, which cohich the
the
diction to the
proposed intelligence Committee on Foreign Relations re-
committee over the CIA mean that quires, except of course raw data? I re-
paragraph 1(i) (1) of Senate rule XXV, call in this regard that, when I was con-
which states that the Committee on ducting hearings several years ago on
Foreign Relations hasp jurisdiction over weather modification activities in South-
"relations of the United States with for- east Asia, I was denied information on
eign nations generally," should be taken the grounds that the "appropriate" com-
to exclude jurisdiction over CIA activi- mittee-in this case, Armed Services-
ties which have foreign relations impli- had been notified.
cations? Mr. RIBICOFF. That is correct. Crea-
Mr. RIBICOFF. The jurisdiction of tion of the new committee should not be
the Committee on Foreign Relations used by the intelligence agencies to deny
ift legislation affecting the CIA is not the standing committee any information
ged b
S
t
y
ena
e Resolution 400. Leg-1 on any matter with which the committee
uommittee on Foreign Relations be-
cause of its predominant foreign policy
is concerned, such as an investigation
described by section 3(c) of the proposed
substitute to Senate Resolution 400.
The investigations and exposures of
the past year have revealed another type
of intelligence failure-this time not a
failure of military preparedness but of
adherence to the Constitution and the
law. The resolution before us today-a
product of a bipartisan effort to achieve
agreement on essentials-is a significant
breakthrough in the effort to remedy
the intelligence failure we have recently
experienced. The resolution deserves our
maximum support.
Today we see presidential hopefuls re-
ceiving standing ovations for telling
audiences "I promise I will never lie to
you." In a democratic society, when a
line like that brings people to their feet
applauding, you have really hit bottom.
.Government rests on the confidence of
the people. This resolution is designed to
restore the confidence of the people in
the intelligence agencies. The way to
bring the intelligence community out of
its present disarray and the drumfire of
criticism is,-to assure the American
people that Congress is meeting its con-
stitutional responsibilities to oversee in-
telligence operations. - Only then will
the clamor of attack and attention re-
cede. _
In this, our Bicentennial Year, the
enate has a special opportunity to re-
ew the values of those who founded this
country. Seventeen months ago, on Jan-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 12, 1976
nary 21, 1975, the Senate established the
select committee to examine the opera-
tions of the Government's intelligence
agencies. The results of that examina-
tion are now before the Senate and the
American people. They are profoundly
disturbing to the cause of democratic
government. For they detail in unmis-
takable terms the consequences of de-
parting from the constitutional plan
drawn by the Founders.
Those who won our independence 200
years ago recognized the necessity to
place governmental power under the rule
of law. They understood that power
carried with it the seed of abuse, and
that the exercise of unchecked power is
the path to tyranny. That is why we
have a government of checks and bal-
ances and a written Bill of Rights.
As set out in over 1,000 pages of
the select committee's final report, the
intelligence operations of the Govern-
ment have been the exclusive prerogative
of the executive branch. For nearly 40
years, Congress has abdicated its consti-
tutional responsibilities to oversee and
check the conduct of intelligence
operations by the executive. In the re-
sulting vacuum, great damage has been
done to our system of government and
to the rights of the American people.
to a state of war, the Executive has used
the intelligence agencies to launch major
military actions, such as the abortive in-
vasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, with-
out so much as informing Congress.
In requiring that . the new committee
must be informed about "any signifi-
cant anticipated activities," the resolu-
tion makes clear that the committee
must be provided advance notice about
significant intelligence activities. This
will avoid such incidents as occurred in
April 1961 when the Congress-possessed
of the exclusive constitutional power to
decide if the Nation shall go to war-had
no advance knowledge that a military in-
vasion of Cuba was to be carried out by
the executive branch as an "intelligence
covert action."
These are merely the surface points of
the intelligence iceberg that has been
cutting under and around the Constitu-
tion over the past generation. Today we
begin the historic task of restoring the
Framers' plan for a system of effective
checks on governmental power. The
American people expect the Congress-to
discharge its constitutional responsibili-
ties. The time is over when Congress can
creak along, looking the other way while
intelligence operations go unexamined
and unchallenged.
The Senate can truly celebrate the
Bicentennial by renewing the values of
our forebears. The creation of a ' new
intelligence oversight structure will re-
affirm the principles that are at the cen-
ter of our democracy. '
The work of the select committee over
the past year and a half has opened the
way. We need only have the courage to
keep to the course. By bringing the in-
telligence arm of the Government within
our constitutional system, we will enable
the proper range of intelligence activity
to go forward under law in the service
of the country.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I wish
to respond to the distinguished Senator
from Maryland for his gracious com-
ments about my colleague, Senator
PERCY, and myself.
It should be pointed out that through-
out this matter, Senator MATIIIAS made
At 1 o'clock p.m., the Senate will re-
sume consideration of the unfinished
business, Senate Resolution 400. The
pending question at that time will be o
the adoption of the Cannon substitute
the committee substitute to Senate Re
olution 400. Rollcall votes may occur to-
morrow on amendments or motions in
relation to any of the foregoing. Other
matters may come before the Senate.
Conference reports may be called up.
Rollcall votes may occur thereon.
ADJOURNMENT
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I move
that the Senate stand in adjournment
until 12 noon tomorrow.
The motion was agreed to; and at 5:54
p.m. the Senate adjourned until Thurs-
day, May 13, 1976, at 12 noon.
NOMINATIONS
Executive nominations received by the
Senate May 12, 1976:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Philip C. Habib, of California, a Foreign
Service officer of the class of career minister,
to be Under Secretary of Slate for Political
Affairs.
William D. Rogers, of Virginia, to be Un-
der Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., of Maryland, a
Foreign Service officer of the class of career
minister, to be an Assistant Secretary of
State.
Harry W. Shlaudeman, of California, a For-
eign Service officer of class 1, to be an As-
sistant Secretary of State.
Phillip V. Sanchez, of California, to be
bassador Extraordinary and Plenipotenti
of the United States of America to Colomb
Virron P. Vaky, of Texas, a Foreign Service
officer of the class of career minister, to be
'Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipoten-
tiary of. the United States of America to
Venezuela.
Robert V. Keeley, of Florida, a - Foreign
Service officer of class 1, to be Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the
United States of America to Mauritius.
IN THE NAVY
Rear Adm. William 0. Miller, Judge Ad-
vocate General's Corps, U.S. Navy, to be
Judge Advocate General of the Navy with
the rank of rear admiral, for a term of 4
years.
The record before us is clear, and it.
cannot now be ignored or covered up.
If we are to profit from history and ex-
perience, we must do more than avert
our eyes and return to business as usual.
In the face of the following facts, sure-
ly it is time to reorder our procedures
for meeting our constitutional responsi-
bilities:
First. Presidents and other high offi-
cials in every administration from
Franklin Roosevelt to Richard Nixon
have used the intelligence agencies to
serve their political and personal objec-
tives. The Huston plan-a noxious laun-
dry list of official criminality-was the
ultimate fruit of unchecked bureaucratic
and Presidential power.
Second. In the pursuit of "domestic in-
telligence," large numbers of law-abid-
groups ranging across the political spec- great contributions, and all of us who
trum from conservative to liberal . have worked on this legislation could not have
been subjected to extensive investigation achieved the results without his magna-
- and surveillance. Vicious tactics-violat- ficent contributions.
tog due process of law and fundamental Mr. MATHIAS. I thank the Senator.
human decency-have been used to de-
grade and discredit those marked out as
targets for domestic intelligence investi-
gation.
Third. The law has been systematically
ignored in the conduct of intelligence op-
erations. In but one example of many
uncovered by the select committee, more
than a quarter of a million first-class
letters were opened and photographed in
the United States by the CIA and FBI
between 1940 and 1973-in direct viola-
tion of the fourth amendment, Supreme
Court decisions, and statutory law.
Fourth. In foreign affairs, where the
Constitution gives the Congress the ex-
clusive power to determine whether the
Nation shall move from a state of peace
CONFIRMATIONS
Executive nominations confirmed by
the Senate May 12, 1976: .
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Bruce R. Montgomery, of Tennessee, to be
U.S. marshal for the eastern district of Ten-
nessee for the term of 4 years.
James R. Cooper, of Georgia, to be a mem-
ber of the Board of Parole for the remainder
of the term expiring September 30, 1978.
PROGRAM
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
the Senate will convene at 12 noon to-
morrow. After the two leaders or their
designees have been recognized under
the standing order, Mr. PROXMIRE will
be recognized for not to exceed 15 min-
utes, Mr. GOLDWATER will be recognized
for not to exceed 15 minutes, and Mr.
MONDALE will be recognized for not to
exceed 15 minutes. There will then be a
period for the transaction of routine
morning business not to extend beyond
the hour of 1 o'clock p.m., with Senators
permitted to speak not in excess of 5
minutes each.
Michael H. Moskow, of New Jersey, to be
Under secretary of labor.
John Conyers Read, of Virginia, to be an
Assistant Secretary of Labor.
The above nominations were approved
subject to the nominees' commitment to
respond to requests to appear and testify
before any duly- constituted committee of
the Senate.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 13, 1976
Congress to take its procurement decision
before those tests are complete is to violate
the separation between R & D and purchase
on which recent Secretaries of Defense have
rightly insisted.
The central difficulty with the B-i is its
traordinarily high cost. The performance
andards originally set for it have proved
unattainable, and its history, in conse-
quence, has been a familiar one: con-
sistently reduced performance specifications
and constantly growing real cost. The 244
bombers the Air Force wants will now cost
$20 to $25 billion, at best, and the pro-
curement and operation of the full system
will cost many tens of billions more. Yet it
remains undemonstrated, after a decade of
debate, that there is any long-term strategic
value In what may be the most costly single
element in the B-1 system-its supersonic
capability.
We sometimes hear that the B-i has been
studied enough. A recent statement by an
officer of Rockwell International refers In
this vein to scrutiny by "seven Secretaries
of Defense." But the truth is that the six
Secretaries we have had in the last 15 years
appear to be divided in their views of the
B-i. Robert McNamara is necessarily silent
on the matter, but there is little reason
to suppose that his views of high-cost pene-
tration bombers have changed in the 14
years since he successfully opposed the un-
lamented B-70. Clark Clifford strongly op-
poses the B-1. Melvin Laird and Elliot Rich-
ardson favored development but faced no
decision on procurement. James Schlesinger,
while he believes in the long-run need for a
new bomber of some sort, did not press for
the B-1 while in office, placing his main
budgetary emphasis on conventional needs.
He has said that a final decision on this
system should await the completion of its
technical tests and a demonstration that its
costs are under clear control; it seems rea-
sonable that the Senate should adopt at
least as strong a standard for Itself. It is
true that Donald Rumsfeld appears to be
n enthusiast, but his experience with pro-
curement pressures Is not long.
Far from proving that the matter has
been settled by earlier studies, the varied
judgments of the Secretaries of Defense of
the last 15 years constitute a powerful argu-
ment for the Senate to require a hard new
look before it acts on procurement. My own
strong impression is that among disinter-
ested military and civilian experts no major
new weapons system has ever had such
feeble support.
An additional and powerful argument for
delay is the emergence of at least one inter-
esting alternative to the B-1. The manned
bomber, once the dominant element of our
strategic deterrent, now necessarily has a
very different role. Today it is a supplemen-
tary guarantee against the madness of an
attempted surprise attack, a diversifier that
helps frustrate any Strangelove among
Soviet planners. It is far from clear that the
current design of the B-1, which would be
the most expensive single weapons system
ever deployed, properly reflects this more
limited role. There is impressive testimony.
that stand-off bombers with cruise missiles
may be cheaper, more stabilizing and easier
to protect. Without a fresh, thorough, and
comparative review, in which Air Force and
industrial pressures are firmly subordinated
to the national interest, it will be impos-
sible for the Congress and the public to
have confidence that this high-cost trip Is
necessary.
It is natural, in a time when there is legi-
timate concern about the military balance
between ourselves and the Soviet Union,
that a new and undeniably astonishing
weapons system should seem attractive to
many. But where is the evidence that throw-
ing this enormous amount of money at this
one relatively narrow problem will be good
for our side of the balance? The likeliest
danger of the next five years Is weakness in
our conventional capabilities, especially in
relation to Europe, the Middle East. and
the oceans. The B-1 is not going to help us
in these areas or in this time-span. The bil_
lions we might save by a less expensive
choice could help us very much indeed.
It seems especially unwise to make a pro-
curement decision of this kind, with tests
incomplete and costs not clear, in the heat
of an election campaign. History suggests
that our judgment on these complex choices
has not been at its best in election years.
There was no great hurry about H-bomb
tests in 1952, and no )nissile gap in 1960.
There is no bomber gap today.
Obviously the administration is preoccu-
pied with politics and worried about its
right-wing critics. But is it not the consti-
tutional role of the Senate, at such a mo-
ment, to assert the claims of the long-run.
national interest, and to insist on its right
and duty to get all the evidence before it
acts?
CONCLUSION OF MORNING
BUSINESS
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. is there further morning business?
If not, morning business is closed.
ROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Under the previous order, the hour
of 1 p.m. having arrived, the Senate will
now resume consideration of the unfin-
ished, business, Senate Resolution 400,
The report of the Church committee
has since documented abuses and viola-
tions of law and the constitutional rights
of.citizens committed by virtually every
agency in our intelligence community.
Together, the reports of these two select
committees, and the report of the House
Intelligence. Committee, contain a com-
posite history of national shame.
Over and over again, the record has
established with facts governmental
abuse of our laws, systems, and ideals.
Three years of fact upon fact upon
fact-the Watergate Committee, Church
committee, House Judiciary Committee,
Special Prosecutors, House Intelligence
Committee, grand juries, trials, press in-
vestigations, revelations, the Rockefeller
Commission, Schlesinger report, and
so on.
What did we learn from all of this?
How did it happen?
cause among other things nobody was
looking,
When I'say nobody, I mean particu-
larly those of us in this Chamber and
our compatriots across the way. Nobody
in the Congress was looking.
Finger-pointing time is over insofar as
it concerns people standing on this floor,
looking down at Pennsylvania Avenue or
at the agencies are concerned. The time
has come to look at ourselves.
There were plots to assassinate foreign
leaders
attempts to bu
what
,
y
were sup-
which the clerk will report. posed to be democratic elections in Italy,
The assistant legislative clerk read ass--weapons provided to 'aid the Kurdish
follows:. ti..i.+ f,.
Calendar No. 728, a resolution (S. .Res.
400) to establish a Standing Committee of
the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and
for other purposes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. 'President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem.-
pore. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR
Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that Barbara Clarke
be granted privilege of the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, as we
proceed with consideration of Senate
Resolution 400, let us not lose sight of
why it is that we have again come so far,
what it is we seek to accomplish by our
actions; and what it is we will lose should
we fail to act responsibly.
Neither "Watergate" nor the subse-
quent investigation of our intelligence
community was an aberration. In my
.own individual views in the Senate Wa-
tergate report. I explained that Water-
gate was a "documented, proven attack
on laws, institutions, and principles." The
report enumerated 189 separate viola-
tions of the Constitution. Every major
substantive part of the Constitution was
violated, abused, and undermined dur-
ing the Watergate period, and, indeed,
subsequent to it.
paigns launched to threaten, discredit,
and harass Dr. Martin Luther King and
other American citizens, et cetera, et
cetera, et cetera.
The CIA alone was not at fault. The
FBI and IRS, a tax collection agency,
joined in the act.
One fact emerges clearly from this
record. Call it'what you will, we do not
have oversight. We have had weak sight,
we have had blind sight, we have had
hindsight, we have had shortsight, but
we have not had oversight.
I think it is time to draw the line.
Three years of factflnding have given
us all the investigations, revelations, and
studies necessary to act on the creation
of real oversight in the Senate and move
on to legislative reform.
Meaningful oversight has constancy,
power, and legislative purpose. Intelli-
gence is too important to our national
interests and has been proven too dan-
gerous to our individual freedoms to be
relegated to an impotent, investigatory
committee. Even greater is the potential
for abuse when a committee investigates
without legislative purpose.
Currently, oversight over the intelli-
gence community is concentrated in no
less than four standing committees. At
'best intelligence oversight is a collateral
function, a secondary function, of these
committees. At worst, it is an ignored
responsibility. None is authorized to
legislate for the intelligence community
as the consolidated package we know it
has become.
Yet, if we leave their jurisdictions in-
tact, we would continue to receive a frag-
mented picture of intelligence opera-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
organized and get down to Washington
to present Us special problems to the
Congress.
What are
lems?
sae of, these special prob-
A forms which
out these days
tainly highest for small busi
often these forms, and the
right out of business. If the Selec
mittee on Small Business, the
Business Administration, and the
gional small business organizations
band together to accomplish just o
thing-the education of the Congress
to the differences between small business
and big business-they will surely have
justified the time and effort that has
gone into their creation.
Another problem facing small business
is access to credit. By publicizing the
horrible. impact on small business. of the
effects of a credit crunch, brought on
by either excessive inflation or Govern-
ment attempts to borrow far more than
it. should ever reasonably have to do,
these organizations can perform a great
service by helping to .persuade the Gov-
ernment to conduct its fiscal and mone-
tary affairs in a responsible fashion.
I should like again to congratulate Mr.
Alexander and to express my hope that
this awards program, and the activities
of State and regional small business or-
ganizations throughout the country, will
encourage widespread interest in the
success and encouragement of small busi-
As part of its observance of Small Busi-
ness Week, the Small Business Adminis-
tration has selected a small business
person of the year from each of the 50
States.
In Rhode Island, the person selected
for this honor is Mr. Dwight W. Harry,
president of the Life Cap Tire Service,
Inc., of, Providence. Mr. Harry, after
20 years as an employee and man-
ager of Life Cap Tire Service, 6 years
ago became the owner and president.
In his initiative, self-reliance and
spirit of independence, Mr. Harry is rep-
resentative of thousands of other small
business proprietors in Rhode Island who
are the very foundation of the economy
of our State. I congratulate Mr. Harry on
his well-deserved honor and extend to
him my best wishes for continued success
in the future.
Small Business Week is a time not only
to recognize the achievements and con-
le that confront the small business
co unity.
I s pleased this week to attend a
prese tion by the Small Business As-
sociati of New England and three
other r 'onal small business associa-
tions of eir legislative proposals de-
S 7253
per year to its current level-of more than
$2 million annually. Wulfsberg maxkets
.
their products worldwide through more
than 150 distributors and was recently
selected as the Aircraft Electronics Assoc
ciation manufacturer of the Year.
At the ninth annual Small Busine.
Subcontractor Conference and awards
banquet held yesterday, Blanchat Ma-
chine Co., of Wichita, Kans., was selected
as the SBA region VII winner. Blanchat
Machine Co. was nominated by the'
Wichita division of the Boeing Co. for its
outstanding subcontract work. Mr. and
Mrs. Calvin Ross and Mr. and Mrs.
Wayne, both of Wichita, accepted the
award for the Blanchat Machine Co. and
its president, Dudley Bramblett.
It is an honor for these businesses to
have been selected from the more than
133,000 smal: businesses in Kansas. My
congratulations go out to them and to
the award winners from the other 49
States, and I join with my colleagues in
recognizing their accomplishments and
outstanding contributions of small busi-
nesses nationwide.
THE B-1: A LONG LOOK BEFORE
Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, Mc-
George Bundy, whose service as Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs
under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson
has made him intimately familiar with
defense issues, has urged deferral of the
decision to procure the B-1 bomber. Writ-
ing in today's Washington Post, Mr.
Bundy calls the billion-dollar request for
procurement authorization "prematur
and unnecessary," and one which eou>~
be delayed with "no danger."
Rather than acting in the heat of an
election campaign, Mr. Bundy urges the
Senate to assert the claims of the long-
run national interest, and to insist on its
right and duty to get all the evidence
before it acts.
signed to small businesses a fair and
equitable c ce to grow and to prosper.
I believe of the proposals offered
by the small ess associations to re-
lieve small b esses of unnecessary
federal governni paperwork,. to pro-
vide more equita tax treatment, and
eliminate unfair petitive practices,
are sound and wel ' nceived. I hope
very much that pro confronting
small businesses will given the at-
tention they deserve d the coming
- The small businesses of .erica are
far too important to the Homy of
nesses everywhere. This is the sector of
our economy which is the key to upward
mobility for our population, and to the
competition which is so badly needed to
keep our economy running efficiently and
In the best Interests of the American
consumer. It deserves all of the support
and attention that we can muster.
our Nation to be neglected.
CELEBRATING SMALL BUS Mr. President, I consider Mr. Bundy's
WEEK article a most valuable contribution to
our consideration of the B-i program,
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, In hon f and I ask unanimous consent that it be
National Small Business Week, the S printed in the RECORD.
Business Administration hosted a serf There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
SMALL BUSINESS WEEK of events in Washington to honor out
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, by Procla-, standing members of the small business follows:
mation of the President of the United community from across the country. THE B-1: A LONG Loom BEFORE BIIYiNG
States, this week is Small Business Week. From the more than 13 million small (By McGeorge Bundy)
It is a time when we give recognition to business operations across the country. etime this month the senate will de-
the immense contributions made to the State, and Nation, small business award ba defense bill that contains a billion-
doll life of our Nation by millions winners were selected and invited to dolls uthorization for the actual procure-
of small businesses and businessmen. Washington to events which focus atten- _ ment the B-1 bomber. This premature and
I am delighted to join this tribute. All tion on the importance of small business unnec ry propcsal, heavily pressed by the
too often tend to view ourselves as ecthe my. Small business award winners should deferred Runt We ~therecant be as
a nation of f giant corporations and big outs cre-
business, perhaps because e it is the names were nominated by SBA district offices athorou ted by an , i cti n year. There issno danger
of those giant corporations that become across the country on the nbrnd of time. in such a y, and there could be great
familiar to us tnrougu uuaomv ?~=~~,a-~?' its impact on the job market, continued
advertising. There is no ger in delay because there
But the average American's daily con- growth, and improved financial position, is clear agreem that the B-&2 strategic
tacts with business.are not with giant its response to adverse conditions, and system can be re on.with confidence for
corporations, but with the small busi- personal characteristics of the nominees at least a decade, come.. The B-52 has
nesses that provide jobs, manufacture such as entrepreneurial ability and com- proved to be one ur most durable and
goods and provide services in his neigh- munity service efforts. improvable- aircraft. Ls not any present
need but an intense d' e to get the matter
boyhood and community. The Kansas small business award settled their way that oving the military
Indeed, small business establishments winner is Mr. Paul G. Wulfsberg, presi and industrial advocates.4X the. B1.
provide 58 percent of business employ- dent of Wulfsberg Electronics, Inc., in But precisely when .theta- is that sort o
ment in the United States. We are in- Overland Park, Kans. Wulfsberg Elec- pressure for a decision not yet needed, th
deed a nation of small independent busi- tronics was formed in 1970 and increased senate should be wary. The B-1 bas not
messes. its business by an unbelievable 40 percent completed its technical tests, and to ask
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May 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE
tions and would be handicapped in de-
veloping legitimate legislative remedies.
For all too long this vital sector of our
Government has gone unchecked and un-
one congressional committee had ex-
amined either the propriety or effects of
this departure from the norm.
I think the time has come to, say it
again and again, Mr. President: We are
a Government of laws. It is not enough
to say we remember these things and so
they will not happen again. We are not a
Government of memories, we are a Gov-
ernment of laws.
It is not enough to get up after the
abuses have taken place and say, "I
apologize". We are a Government of
laws, not a Government of apologies..
It is not enough to go a-head and issue
an executive order. Here today, gone to-
morrow. We are a Government of laws,
not a Government of executive orders.
The examination of agency charters,
the establishment of a statutory founda-
tion for agencies like the National Se-
curity Agency, the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the legislative recommenda-
tions of the Church committee- are func-
tions which must be assumed by a new,
permanent intelligence committee.
The proposal for strengthened intelli-
gence oversight Is neither new nor
unique. More than 20 years ago the dis-
tinguished majority leader introduced
similar legislation. Since 1948 nearly 200
bills have been introduced in both houses.
Three commissions-beginning with the
er Commission in 1955-endorsed
sals calling for more effective
oversight.
I would like to use this particular mo-
ment in my speech, Mr. President, to
pay particular compliments to the ma-
jority leader (Mr. MANSFIELD) and to the
chairman of the Senate Committee on
Government Operations (Mr. RrBicoFF).
Were it not for these two men, I have no
doubt that Senate Resolution 400 would,
not be on the floor today.
The Senate majority leader, who is not
a Johnny-come-lately, is not riding a
bandwagon, but, rather, foresaw the dan-
followed, there would have been no ne-
cessity for the rather sensationalavela-
tions of the past few years.
As he retires from a fruitful and a very
positive career in public service, I want
to pay the credit that is due. Should this
pass and this idea become law, then, in-
deed, it should be dedicated to this- man,
because nobody has been further out
front on the issue than. MixE 'MANSFIELD
and my colleague from the State of
Connecticut.
This particular idea was one of several
right after the Watergate. Over the
course of 3 years I have seen those ideas
of Watergate reform, tax privacy, intel-
ligence oversight, nibbled to death by the
power structure, either in the Congress
or the executive or the bureaucracy.
The nibbling finally came to an end
two of these important measures.
e Into the hands of the senior Sena-
to . from Connecticut (Mr. RrsicoFF).
S 7255
He used that knowledge gained over. people, if the President has a job to con-
many years of public service, and that form the agencies to the Constitution,
ability which he has demonstrated over then the people of this country have a
the years, to insist that these measures job, and it is specifically to get,the best
no longer be nibbled to death or fade men and women to serve.
away into the mist, but, rather, become There will be no greater ethics or ex-
the law of the land. Were it not for the cellence on the floor of the Senate or in
hard-nosed position which he has taken the White House, or anywhere in our
over the past several months, I know Government, than in the voting booths of
that these measures would not be before this country. So the finger-pointing
us for consideration by the Senate. cannot only stop from us on the Hill, but
Mr. RIBICOFF. Will my distinguished - it can. also stop from the American peo-
colleague yield? pie until they themselves become active
Mr. WEICKER. I yield. participants in this constitutional
Mr. RIBICOFF. I appreciate the democracy.
gracious comments of my colleague from Today we are here to regain that au-
Connecticut, but I believe the record thority and start exercising it. When we
should be clear that no other Member vote in a few days, we will see whether a
of this body in many, many years has majority of Members of this body are
shown such a continued dedication to the willing to assume the responsibilities be-
preservation of. individual rights and stowed upon them by their constituents.
liberties. It has been the consistent policy The Senate must decide if the preserva-
and philosophy of my junior colleague tion of the status quo is more important
from the State of Connecticut. When the than the resurrection of constitutional
history of this era is written, there will accountability.
be a special place accorded to the junior Let me state clearly, there is no reason
Senator from Connecticut for his con- for anybody in. this country to have to
tinued advocacy and fight in this cause. choose between effective law enforce-
Mr. WEICKER. I thank my friend and ment and effective intelligence and con-
colleague from the bottom of my heart. stitutionality. One can go along with the
The crux of this issue is accountability other. I am particularly appalled by
of Government to the people-constitu- those who would make the American
tional accountability. In the past, Mem- people choose, and say, "You have to
bers of this body have chosen not to choose one or the other." No, you can
know because -there were things which have both.
gentlemen ought not to know. Well, it is There is not one man on the Govern-
our responsibility to assure that those ment Operations Committee or in any
things which gentlemen ought not to other committee 'which discussed this
know, never reoccur. matter on which I have been privileged to
We can no longer pass off illegal activi- sit who does not believe in having an ef-
ties as the work of the White House, fective CIA and an effective FBI. They
because we have learned the hard way are clearly necessary to the security of
that even the White House must be con- the Nation. But there is no reason why,
trolled. That was precisely what was in the achieving of that effectiveness, the
intended by our forefathers when 200 Constitution has to be left in'the dust.
years ago when they established a sys- No way. I
tem of checks and balances to govern Sure, it is going to have to change
this Nation. . from the old system, from the old prac-
It is not a system of checks and bal- tices. Democracy, which we say is exer-
ances which excluded the CIA, the FBI, .cased by 100 Senators, is going to have to
the IRS, and the various intelligence- be exercised by 10 Senators, not 2, 3,
law enforcement agencies, but a system or 4.
of accountability for-all the Government, Democracy and the Constitution.
for all the people. It Is not a system which which we talk about as belonging to all
was intended to have Senators, Presi- Americans, are going to have to belong
dents, or corporate executives at one to all Americans, not just a.few. Con-
for all the people.
Through the past failure of Congress
to demand to know about the activities
of intelligence agencies-the people,
through the fault of their elected repre-
sentatives lost a constitutional power-
to control the excesses of the executive.
Plainly and simply, the elected repre-
sentatives abbrogated their constitu-
tional responsibility.
And, Mr. President, if I have been
hardnosed insofar as our colleagues in
the executive are concerned, I think the
record should also show something else.
At a time when we celebrate a Bicenten-
nial In the middle of an election year, I
see from the statistics fewer and fewer
Americans participating In their demo-
cratic processes. I hear the comment
from too many, "I am turned off by those
politics."
Let us make it clear. If we have a job
of oversight as representatives of the
cerning the scare tactic and the scare
talk that if we have accountability, if we
have oversight, we will lose our Intel-
ligence or law enforcement effectiveness,,
how effective is it to be investigating
Americans rather than conveying intel-
ligence about our enemies abroad?
How effective is it to have these agen-
cies involved in politics, on the domestic
side, rather than intelligence gathering?
I remember that one very small in-
stance of military intelligence in West
Berlin which arose during the Watergate
hearings where military intelligence was
.breaking into the rooms of American
citizens in West Berlin and coming out
with autographed pictures of GEORGE
McGOVERN-that was what we were pay-
ing for as taxpayers-rather than giv-
ing us the intelligence which obviously
we needed to know: what the Russians
were doing on the other side of the wall.
That Is what I want to know. I do not
want to know what somebody else's po-'
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE May 13, 1976
litical beliefs are or for whom they are
going to vote.
Have no fear as far as this country is
concerned should this oversight and ac-,
countability come into being. Then we
are going to have them do the job which
is intended, which is intelligence gather-
ing, which is law enforcement, rather
than a political hatchet job willy-nilly
across the world and in this country.
We have before us a compromise which
the members of the Rules Committee,
the Government Operations Committee,
and the Church committee labored dili-
gently to provide this body. This com-
promise sets up the framework for effec-
tive oversight by giving a new commit-
tee strong authority and the muscle to
back up its actions. By requiring rotat-
ing membership, we will avoid making
the new committee a handmaiden of the
agencies it is supposed to oversee.
In essence the compromise substitute
offers the Senate an opportunity for
meaningful oversight-oversight with
authority and constancy.
And most importantly, it offers to the
United States of America a return to its
Constitution.
I received a notification the other day
from some organization that felt that
patriotism could best be served by hav-
ing Senators re-sign the Declaration of
Independence. How Insulting. I think the
time has come ,for every Senator tore-
live the Declaration of Independence, the
Bill of Rights, and the Constitution.
Never mind the business of signing, never
mind the business of buying, but to live
it, to live it legislatively here; for all
Americans to live it in their lives out
there on the streets, when it comes to
these great concepts of equality for all
Americans, due process for all Ameri-
cans, privacy for all Americans, freedom
of speech and assembly and dissent for
all Americans.
What we do on this Senate floor here
in the next several days will not cost
the taxpayers a nickel and it will give
the greatest possible value to the celebra-
tion of our Bicentennial.
I yield the figor.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, the
conduct of America's foreign policy relies
heavily upon accurate and timely intelli-
gence. Since the enactment of the Na-
tional Security Acts of 1947 and 1949,
an intelligence community has been
created which is second to none.
While there have been errors over the
years, in my opinion, the overall per-
formance of the intelligence services has
been outstanding.
There is an old saying among Intelli-
gence officers: The safest operation is
where nothing happens. Once you go
from doing nothing to doing something,
the risk of failure or disclosure must be
accepted.
Vital to the performance of our in-
telligence services is a cloak of secrecy.
Without that cloak of secrecy, sources of
information disappear and those persons
and organizations who would cooperate
with us fall away under the glare of
publicity.
One of the most controversial items
that the Select Committee on Intelligence
had to deal with is the subject of covert
action. I believe the President must have
the ability to carry out covert actions,
because they provide methods short of
war to defend America's interests.
In other words, the President should
not be limited to diplomatic representa-
tion or economic sanctions on the one
hand and the choice of outright war on
the other hand. Covert action offers a
range of options between these two
choices.
The Hughes-Ryan amendment which
requires six committees of the Congress
to receive notification of covert action
has all but destroyed this capability.
Under its provisions nearly 50 Senators,
over 120 Congressmen, and numerous
staff receive this highly sensitive infor-
mation. Disclosure to the press is the
inevitable result.
If the Congress wants to create a new
committee to,have legislative and budg-
etary authority over the intelligence
community, I submit that should be a
joint committee of the Congress pat-
terned along the lines of the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy.
A joint committee combined with a re-
peal of the Hughes-Ryan amendment
could be an attractive proposition. Al-
though the House of Representatives has
taken a dim view of the-creation of joint
committees over the past 15 years or so,
there is reason to believe that the House
may be willing to make an exception
where intelligence jurisdiction is con-
cerned.
Last Friday, one of our most distin-
guished colleagues in the House, Repre-
sentative ELFRED A. CEDERBERG of Michi-
gan, introduced a joint resolution to pro-
vide for the establishment of a joint
committee on Intelligence. Joining him
were the distinguished Minority Leader
of the House, Representative JOHN R.
RHODES and Representative DELBERT L.
LATTA of the House Rules Committee. It
is my understanding that Representative
-CEDERBERG is seeking bipartisan support
for his joint resolution. I ask unanimous
consent that Mr. CEDERBERG'S resolution
be printed at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the joint
resolution was ordered to be printed in
the RECORD, as follows:
JOINT RESOLUTION
Joint resolution to provide for the establish-
ment of a Joint Committee on Intelligence
Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled,
ESTABLISHMENT
SECTION 1. There is hereby established a
Joint Committee on Intelligence (herein-
after in this joint resolution referred to as
the "joint committee").
MEMBERSHIP
SEC. 2. (a) The joint committee shall be
composed of nine Members of the Senate and
nine Members of the House of Representa-
tives to be appointed as follows:
(1) five Members of the Senate from the
majority party and four Members of the Sen-
ate from the minority party, appointed by
the President of the Senate, including at
lease one but not more than two members
from each of the following committees: the
Committee on Appropriations; the Commit-
tee on Armed Services; and the Committee
on Foreign Relations; and
(2) five Members of the House of Repre-
sentatives from the majority party and four
Members 'of the House from the minority
party, appointed by the Speaker of the House,
including at least one but not more than
two Members from each of the following
(b) Vacancies in the-membership of the
joint committee shall not affect the power
of the remaining members to execute the
functions of the joint committee and shall
be filled in the same manner as in the case
of the original appointment.
. (c) (1) The joint committee shall select a
chairman and a vice chairman from among
its members at the beginning of each session
of a Congress. The vice chairman shall act
in the place and stead of the chairman in
the absence of the chairman.
(2) The chairmanship and the vice chair-
manship of the joint committee shall alter-
nate between the Senate and the House of
Representatives with each session of a con-
gress. The chairman during each even-num-
bered year shall be selected by the Mem-
bers of the House of Representatives on
the joint committee from among their num-
ber and the chairman during each odd-
numbered year shall be selected by the
Members of the Senate on the joint com-
mittee from among their number. The vice
chairman during each session of a Congress
shall be chosen in the same manner frolq
that House of Congress other than the House
of Congress of which the chairman is a
Member.
DUTIES
SEC. 3. (a) The joint committee shall exer-
cise exclusive legislative jurisdiction with
respect to any intelligence activity conducted
by any agency or department of the Federal
Government and the authorization of funds
in 'connection with any such activity con-
ducted by-
(1) the Central Intelligence Agency;
(2) the National Security Agency;
(4) special offices within the Department
of Defense for the collection of specialized
intelligence through reconnaissance pro-
grams;
(5) intelligence elements of the military
services, not including tactical intelligence;
and
(b) The Joint Committee shall review and
study on a continuing basis any intelligence
activity conducted by any agency or depart-
ment of the Federal Government, including
any agency or department described in para-
graph (1) through paragraph (6) of sub-
section (a).
(c) The provisions of clause 2 of rule X
of the Rules of the House of Representatives
shall apply to the joint committee.
POWERS
SEC. 4. (a) The joint committee, or any
duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is
authorized to sit and act at such places and
times during the sessions, recesses, and ad-
journed periods of the Congress, to require
by subpena or otherwise the attendance of
such witinesses and the production of such
books, papers, and documents, to administer
such oaths and affirmations, to take such
testimony, to procure such printing and bind-
ing, and to make such expenditures, as it
considers advisable.
(b) The joint committee may make such
rules respecting its organization and pro-
cedures as it considers necessary, except that
no recommendation shall be reported from
the joint committee unless a majority of the
joint committee assent.
(c) Subpenas may be issued over the signa-
ture of the chairman of the joint -ItAdim,
or of any member designated by him o
the joint committee, and may be served
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May 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
any person designated by such chairman or
member.
(:d) The chairman of the joint committee
or any member thereof may administer oaths
or a'mations to witnesses.
Ir ual designated by the President as a
li to the joint committee to attend any
meeting of the joint committee which is
closed to the public.
INFORMATION FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES AND
DEPARTMENTS
SEC. 5. Any agency' or department of the
Federal Government described in section
3(a)(1) through section 3(a) (6) and any
other agency or department of the Federal
Government conducting any intelligence ac-
tivity, shall keep the joint committee fully
and currently informed with respect to any
such activity. Any such agency or depart-
ment shall furnish any periodic reports re-
quested by the joint committee with respect
to any such activity.
REPORTS
SEC. 6. The members of the joint committee
who are Members of the Senate shall from
time to time (but at least annually) report
to the Senate, and the members of the joint
committee who are Members of the House
of Representatives shall from time to time
(but at least annually) report to the House
of Representatives, by bill or otherwise, their
recommendations with respect to matters
withim the jurisdiction of their respective
Houses which are referred to the joint- com-
mittee or otherwise within the jurisdiction
of the joint committee.
CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION
SEC. 7. The joint committee shall classify
information originating within the joint
committee, and the records of the joint com-
mittee, in accordance with standards used
generally by the executive branch of the
Federal Government for the classification of
information. The joint committee shall es-
and (3) made available to any Member of
the Congress who requests such information
or records and has an appropriate security
clearance, as determined by the joint com-
mittee.
RECORDS
SEC. 8. The joint committee shall keep a
complete record of an joint committee ac-
tions, including a record of the votes on any
question on which a record vote is demanded.
All records, data, charts, and files of the
joint committee shall be the property of the
joint committee and shall be kept in the
office of the joint committee or such other
places as the joint committee may direct.
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
SEC. 9. (a) The joint committee shall
establish and carry out such rules and pro-
cedures as it considers necessary to prevent-
(1) the disclosure, outside the joint com-
mittee, of any information which (A) relates
to any intelligence activity which is con-
ducted by any agency or department of the
Federal Government; (B) is obtained by the
joint committee; and (C) is not authorized
by the joint committee to be disclosed; and
(2) the disclosure, outside the joint com-
mittee, of any information which would ad-
versely affect the carrying out of any
intelligence activity by any agency or depart-
ment of the Federal Government.
(b) No employee of the joint committee
or any person engaged by contract or other-
wise to perform services for the joint com-
mittee shall be given access to any classified
information by the joint committee unless
such employee or person has received an ap-
riate security clearance as determined by
joint committee. The type of security
ante to be required in the case of any
such employee or person shall, within the
determination of the joint committee, be
commensurate with the sensitivity of the
classified information to which such em-
ployee or person will be given access by the
joint committee.
(c) (1) The joint committee may take ap-
propriate action against any member of the
joint committee, or any person serving on
the staff of the joint committee, who violates
any provision of this section or any provision
of section 7.
(2) In the case of a member of the joint
committee, such action may include (A) the
censure of such member by the joint com-
mittee; (B) the expulsion of such member
from the joint committee, unless such ex-
pulsion is objected to by a majority vote in
the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case may be; and (C) recommendation
to the Senate or the House of Representa-
tives, as the case may be, by the Senate or
the House of Representatives.
(3) In the case of a person serving on the
staff of the joint committee, such action may
include the immediate dismissal of such per-
son. The joint committee shall report to the
Attorney General of the United States any
apparent violation of any Federal criminal
law committed by any such person in con-
nection with a violation of any provision of
this section or any provision of section 7. The
Attorney General; upon receiving any such
report, shall take such action as he consid-
ers necessary or appropriate.
STAFF
SEC. 10. (a) In carrying out its functions
under this joint resolution, the joint com-
mittee may, by record vote of a majority of
the members of the joint committee-
(1) appoint, on a permanent basis, with-
out regard to political affiliation and solely
on the basis of fitness to perform their duties,
not more than twenty-four professional staff
members and not more than sixteen clerical
staff members;
(2) prescribe their duties and responsi-
bilities;
(3) fix their pay at respective per annum
gross rates not In excess of the rate of basic
pay, as in effect from time to time, for grade
GS-18 of the General Schedule of section
5332(a) of title 5, United States Code;
(4) terminate their employment as the
joint committee may consider appropriate;
and
(5) require, at the time of appointment,
all staff persons to acknowledge their uncon-
ditional adherance to the policy of the joint
committee governing the disclosure of classi-
fied Information.
(b) In carrying out any of its functions
under this joint resolution, the joint com-
mittee may utilize the services, information,
facilities, and personnel of any agency or de-'
partment of the Federal Government, and
may procure the temporary (not to exceed
one year) or intermittent services of experts
or consultants or organizations thereof by
contract at-rates of pay not in excess of the
per diem equivalent of the rate of basic pay,
as in effect from time to time, for grade
GS-18 of the General Schedule of section
5332(a) of title 5, United States Code, includ-
ing payment of such rates for necessary
traveltime.
EXPENSES
SEC. 11. The expenses of the joint commit-
tee shall be paid from the contingent fund of
the House of Representatives, from funds
appropriated for the joint committee, upon
vouchers approved by the chairman of the
joint committee.
DEFINITION
SEC. 12, For purposes of this joint resolu-
tion, the term "intelligence activities"
means-
(1) the collection, analysis, production, dis-
semination, or use of foreign intelligence,
which means information, other than foreign
_ S 7257
counterintelligence, on the capabilities, in-
tentions and activities of foreign powers, or-
ganizations, or their agents; or foreign coun-
terintelligence, which means activities con-
ducted to protect A he United States and
United States citizens from foreign espio-
nage, sabotage, subversion, assassination, or
terrorism;
(2) any action or activity which is under-
taken in support of any activity described in
paragraph (1);
(3) any covert or clandestine activity af-
fecting the relations of the United States
with the government of any foreign country
er with any political group, party, military
force, or other association in a foreign coun-
try;
(4) any covert or clandestine activity un-
dertaken against any person described in
paragraph (4);
but such term does not include any tactical
military intelligence activity which is un-
dertaken in a foreign country and which Is
not related to any policymaking function of
the United States.-
AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
SEC. 13. (a) Clause l(c)(1) of rule X of
the Rules of the House of Representatives is
amended by inserting immediately before the
period at the end thereof the following: "
except for matters exclusively within the leg-
islative jurisdiction of the Joint Committee
on Intelligence". -
(b) Clause 1(C)(2) of rule X of the Rules
of the House of Representatives is amended
by inserting immediately before the period
at the end thereof the following: ", except
for matters exclusively within the legislative
jurisdiction of the Joint Committee on In-
telligence".
(c) Clause 1(c)(10) of rule X of the Rules
of the House of Representatives is amended
by inserting immediately before the period
at the end thereof the following: ", except
for matters exclusively within the legislative
jurisdiction of the Joint Committee on In-
telligence".
(d) Clause 1(k)(1) of rule X of the Rules
of the House of Representatives Is amended
by inserting immediately before the period
at the end thereof the following: ", except
for matters exclusively within the legislative
jurisdiction of the Joint Committee on Intel-
ligence".
CONFORMING AMENDMENT
Sac. 14. Section 662(a) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2420(a)) is
amended by striking out "the 'appropriate
committees of the Congress, including the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the
United States Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the United States House
,of Representatives" and inserting in lieu
thereof "the Joint Committee on Intelligence
and the Committees on Appropriations."
Mr. GOLDWATER. If the Senate
adopts S. Res. 400 as reported by the
Rules Committee, it will enable us to have
immediate oversight of the intelligence
community. More importantly, it will
give the House and the Senate time to
work out mutually acceptable ways of
handling intelligence jurisdiction.
I oppose S. Res. 400 as reported by the
Government Operations Committee for
two main reasons:
1. The Senate has created, under S.
Res. 109, a committee on committees to
go into the whole question of Senate ju-
risdiction.
2. There is no provision for a parallel
organization in the House of Representa-
tives.
. Above all, the disclosure provisions of
S. Res. 400 as reported by the Govern-
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CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD -SENATE May 13, 1976-
ment Operations Committee are so loose on Government Operations under the were only a part of a wider program of
that they would make the functioning of chairmanship of the distinguished floor covert operations abroad. The select com-
the intelligence community almost im- manager (Mr. RIBICOFF) and that of the mittee found that these operations, in the
possible. Committee on Rules and Administration long run, often proved marginal or self-
I would like to draw my colleagues' at- under the chairmanship of the Senator defeating, and when exposed, extrenaly
tention to Sec. 7(c) (2) which states: from Nevada (Mr. CANNON). damaging to our Nation's interna 1
The Committee on Intelligence Activities, I believe the present resolution is a reputation.
or any member of such committee, may, un- well-drafted, carefully prepared, and Covert action was once an extraor-
der such regulations as the committee shall practical document, which gives this dinary measure resorted to by our coun-
prescribe to protect the confidentiality of committee the authority it must have. It try in order to combat the covert opera-
such information, make any information de-
scribed provides a membership that is represent- tions of international communism. But it
other com in mittee ttee r ( available to any ative of the Senate. It provides guaran- went beyond that and took on bureau-
e on on of the Intel- tees that secrets will be kept and, in ef- cratic momentum, and ultimately became
theny other Committee mit Member
Senate. Whenever any
ligence Activities, or any member of such feet, meets the problem that has been a routine part of how our Government
committee, makes such information avail- -unmet, although discussed for years, does business.
able, the committee shall keep a written rec- namely, of creating a requirement of ac- We have paid an enormous price for
ord showing, in the case of any particular countability to Congress over the Intel- excessive use of covert action. America is
information, which committee or which ligence activities of the whole range of now blamed, often falsely, for every ad-
mbers
infor- Mat on. of the ber of the Senate received such who, and who, and intelligence agencies. verse development in the world-from
no committee, Member which, , receives any y informa- I think the bottom line of this issue is the war in Lebanon to the assassination
no c
tion under this subsection, shall make the very simple and yet very profound. If of King Faisal.
information available to any other person, ex- there is one lesson that our committee At home, our committee found that we
cept that a Senator may make such informa- felt above all must be learned from- our came perilously close to a police state:
tion available either in a closed session of the study of the abuses which have been Telephones were tapped at will, with-
Senate, or to another Member of the Senate; reported, it has been the crucial necessity out a warrant, and with little or no au-
inform r, a Senator who communicates such of establishing a system of congressional - thority.
information to another Senator not a mem- oversight. Mail was opened in knowing violation
ber of the committee shall promptly inform
the Committee on Intelligence Activities. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OVERSIGHT of law: no one was safe from having
The Senate confronts today what can their mail opened, not even Richard
I cannot imagine any If this la agree- only be called a historic challenge: Nixon, not Frank Church, not Leonard ing we to adopted, language. If this Lang ewhether our unique system of constitu- Bernstein, not Arthur Burns. Every one
to we a were adopted, I Constitutional believe confrontation would which -lead tional checks and balances, the hallmark of them had their mail opened by agen-
law, Govoveernrnmenant they in knew a viola-
would be contrary to the interests of both of American Government, will be applied ticies es of of a the clear Federal
the President and the Congress.
to a crucial area of Government activ- In fact this language reminds me of ity-the conduct of intelligence opera- be in place. People whom the FBI or the White
Pogo's tions at home and abroad. This is a vital
one of famous quotes: House did not like could be put under
the i mppororttanntt, uas as surveillance, their friends turned into
We have ve met the enemy; and they is us.ityarea: of the Nation intelligence .affects y
informers. They could find themselves
While I believe the Senate should defer we found, it can affect our fundamental bugged and tapped, and indn he subject es
action concerning intelligence jurisdic- constitutional rights-the rights that covert action.
tion until the Committee on Committees make Americans unique among the peo- Their families were disrupted,
has had a chance to act, I am fully aware ples of the world. The question is Their repuiaion were ruined, ,
that there are members of this body who whether the Senate will at last establish their jobs were taken away #rtsm
disagree. I am willing to accept as a com- effective legislative oversight over the them, and all beyond the d process
promise S. Res. 400 as reported by the multibillion-dollar U.S. intelligence them, and l the law. And a proses inevitably,
Committee on Rules and Administration. community. these programs were not enough,
This would be a logical step pending some Some have predicted that the Senate when these pr to incite violence between
form of agreement between the -House will fail to do so. I cannot agree. I be- e
rival groups. And if that led c killings,
and the Senate as to how intelligence lieve there is strong support for a new triva pss. A was that led to those
matters are to be handled in the future. and effective intelligence legislative that apparently was a ceptable to t the
Mr. President, I intend to oppose any oversight committee. There is no better public m we entrus order.
amendments or substitutes that would gift- we could give this country on its these were not
confer legislative or budgetary jurisdic- 200th anniversary than to insure that I isolated emphasize instances thhaat t were major pro-
tion over the intelligence community to the basic principles of American con- ms; they were systematic; they lasted
a new committee of the Senate at the stitutional Government apply to the grams; s; and even decades. They ted
e t, of thousand, decades. They -
present time. powerful secret intelligence activities of for years,'
Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, a par- our Nation. volved tens of tho hudrea I
liamentary inquiry. Why do we need a committee in the thousands thm usas s, that, icans intocenof any -as The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Senate that centralizes' legislative au- unmr. No one was safe.
GLENN). The Senator will state it. thority and oversight of the intelligence Let cite a classic example to convey
Mr. MONDALE. Are we on controlled community? I believe the reasons are how far some in the FBI, in example instance,
time? several, and they are very clear. were prepared s mthe B in one
out secret
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is First, such a committee is necessary e activities to to carry our demo-
Mr. controlled time. in order to help safeguard against the political
cratic system of government. I o-
Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I would kind of abuses and excesses uncovered is the case of government.
Martin Luther
like to speak briefly on behalf of the by the select committee. The intelligence course, atic s King. We are all of Dr. familiar with
pending resolution to create a perms- community has been extremely impor- the outlines of what htpenedi But I with
Went committee on oversight with the tant- to American security. But ,on oc- not tutnk anyone what app bed. But fully
authority necessary to assure that that casion it also has operated beyond the familiar wit how fns the FBI was pre-
formation would be privy to crucial in- law and outside the constitutional sys- pared to it to gain control over re-
formation it must have, and so it would tern of public accountability. We are all ivil rights movement.
have the authority to influence policy in familiar with the results.
secret where, as is often the case, it can Under several administrations, Dem- They They bugged d and ndtroy his tapped D Dr. King.
gonly be handled responsibly in that ocratic and Republican alike, the CIA after his death.
environment. was a party to assassination plots. There even
This resolution is the result of 15 are disturbing questions as to whether They sent a letter which some inter-
months' work of the Select Committee there may be some connection. between preted as a suggestion that he commit
on intelligence, and it is the result of our own Government sponsoring assas- suicide.
several weeks of negotiations and serious sination and our Nation having become a But that was not the end of it. Some
discussion on the part of the Committee victim of it. These assassination efforts the bureau not only wanted to dest
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S 7259
Martin Luther King as a leader, but the Congress, serious, risks have been run Left to themselves, the intelligence
committee found clear evidence that because of practices and policies in those agencies could not make the changes
some even wanted to create a new Black agencies that left us defenseless when necessary to overcome these breakdowns.
leader in his place-a Black leader they we needed a defense. I believe in a strong Counterespionage was isolated, compart-
co consider safe and reliable to head intelligence community. I believe in a mented, and the effectiveness of our ef-
a or social and political movement strong FBI, and I believe in a strong forts declined to the point where Amer-
in s country. CIA. We must have them. I believe, also, ica was, for too long a time, dangerously
How far we have come from the prin- that it is necessary to conduct clandes- exposed to the enemy. Indeed, we may
ciples of American Government estab- tine intelligence activities in order to not know for many years in the future
lished 200 years ago. But how wise the protect this Nation from external ene- just how exposed we were.
founding fathers were to know that this mies. Unfortunately, we do not live in The field of foreign intelligence collec-
could happen without a system of checks the most perfect of all worlds, and it is tion provides another example. For more
and balances. The one thing above all necessary from time to time, I deeply than a decade we concentrated top intel-
that the constitutional framers feared regret to say, to resort to covert activi- ligence priority on the backwaters of the
was abuse of governmental power and ties. world while giving lesser priority to our
secret police. They did not anticipate I believe it is necessary to carry out major adversaries. This misallocation of
that risks to freedom came from the peo- undercover investigations, both to en- effort not only led us into trouble In many
ple. The Founding Fathers, above all, force the law and, in certain selective corners of the world, it got us nowhere
feared that it was the government that cases, to protect our country from ter- with our main enemy.
would subvert and undermine our sys- rorism and from foreign spying. But I do At home, our effort against foreign in-
terns of leadership. not believe that these activities can exist telligence services has taken a back seat
That is the thing they were afraid of outside the law and without accountabil- to domestic snooping. Indeed, even our
beyond all others. ity to Congress and the people. I do not law enforcement efforts have suffered
So, as we consider this question of accept the idea that a strong intelligence by comparison to our domestic intelli-
whether there will be strong oversight, I effort requires a weak Congress. The rec- Bence operations. The FBI has, spent
think we must be very clear about what ord shows that with weak oversight, twice as much on domestic intelligence
we are dealing with. Because the record some of our most vital intelligence has informants than it has on organized
shows that contrary to the constitution, not been as effective as It should be. crime informants. And for all this do-
contrary to the laws, contrary to the au- The Senate Select Committee found mestic intelligence effort, there is so little
thority of Congress, for many years and several extremely important instances in positive to show for it. Few acts of vio-
in many different ways, our Intelligence which the intelligence community has lence can legitimately be said to have
agencies In the foreign field started wars fallen down on the job. These failures been prevented. The number of arrests
without our knowledge and without au- would not, in my opinion, have taken and convictions is paltry.
thority, and subverted foreign govern- place if, there had been an instrument Our task in the Senate Is not to create
ments without our knowledge, for effective legislative oversight. Let me an oversight committee to punish the
Indeed, there is evidence that they cite a few examples. intelligence agencies, or to prevent them
decided to assassinate foreign leaders For many years, our counterespionage from doing the job they have to do. To
without our knowledge and without our effort was in a shambles. Now, we can- the contrary, we want to create a legis-
approval-and, indeed, in some in- not do without counterespionage-it Is lative oversight body that will make it
stances, without the knowledge of some the crucial minimum-we must know possible for the Intelligence community
people high in Government. what our enemies are trying to do to us. to do a better job; because they need to
e intelligence agencies pursued a But for years, the counterespionage ef- do a better Sob.
to foreign policy often based on fort was lost in the past. It ignored the These, then, are the reasons for a
vio ence without the authority or knowl- present. It was paranoid about the ex- strong legislative oversight committee.
edge of the Congress. ploitation of important leads. And the In devising the appropriate kind of
Similarly, at home, there has been a crucial task of coordination of counter- committee, we must begin-by recognizing
pattern of conduct by our intelligence espionage activities between the FBI and two major points:
agencies who illegally and, often uncon- the CIA broke down. It simply did not First, intelligence is a unique form of
stitutionally, infringed upon the rights exist for several years. governmental action:
of the American people. Once again, Many important leads were not fol- Because of the need for secret opera-
without the knowledge of the Congress lowed up because there was a paranoid tions;
and, also, without the knowledge of per- view that they were all plants and were Because of the potential for abuse;
sons higher up in the executive. set up by opposing powers. Because of its importance to the secu-
If that can happen, then it seems to me The second point. That is the crucial rity of this country; and
that we have fundamentally undermined task of coordination of counterespionage Because of the fact that the various
the accountability provisions of the Con- activities between the FBI and CIA forms of intelligence activity blend from
stitution. If uncorrected, then we will broke down. one to another regardless of the agency
have conceded a vast area of authority to
been abhorrent to the framers of our personal reasons, the FBI and the CIA Second, we now have the worst pos-
Constitution. That is the first and fore- had no relationship whatsoever. They re- sible system for congressional oversight
most issue we face. fused to talk to each other. There was no of intelligence. Responsibility 'and au-
Mr. President, the second major reason communication between our two crucial thority are fragmented in several com-
for a strong to protect us in the counterin- mittees; It is impossible to look at intelli-
oversight corn-
for mittee trong legislative t d major
telligence field. That is absolutely crucial, gence as a whole; because authority
more effective, will Induce a stronger, because spies and counterintelligence and responsibility are not welded
activities do not know political bound- together, we are incapable of dealing
I underscore the second point, because aries. They flow in and out of countries; with problems privately, and there is the
practically all the dialog and discussions and sometimes a person we are interested inevitable temptation to deal with them
that have occurred to date in the public in will be overseas and sometimes he will through leaks. And finally, the commit-
has been that we need this oversight be at home, in the United States. You tees that currently examine the intelli-
committee to try to prevent abuses. But must follow them if you are going to pro- gence agencies do so as an adjunct to
the truth of it is that there is an equal, tect this Nation. However, for several their principal business.
though sometimes ignored, argument years, as I say, for silly, personal reasons, Mr. President, let me elaborate a little
that we need this oversight committee the two agencies had no communication on these points. To say that the present
to make certain that those agencies are whatsoever. I believe that an effective system of oversight is inadequate is not
fully protecting us from dangers abroad oversight committee would have per- aimed at criticizing the existing com-
and at home, which was the reason, In ceived that and would have done some- mittees with jurisdiction in this area.
first place, for their creation. thing about it and put us in a better These committees have enormous re-
shall cite some specific examples :that position to defend ourselves than 'that in sponsibilities-the Armed Services Com-
s w that during history, unknown to which we found ourselves. mittee deals with our $100 billion Mill-
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 eral Government. tarily proffered. It is often embarrassing, ness of America's intelligence co -
It is no wonder that these committees and it is the sort of information that we nity depends on vigorous congressional
do not have the time to go into the can expect they will be reluctant to offer. oversight. He sees that the time has
necessary detail which is essential for So there must be the kind of control over come. Now the question is: Do we?
real intelligence oversight, because it is budgets that requires these agencies to Mr. President, I am convinced that we
the details that count. It is in the details provide the information. do. I believe the compromise resolution
that intelligence operations go awry, be- Information that is inconvenient, em- introduced yesterday meets that test. I
come an embarrassment or an abuse. barrassing, or relates to something that participated in developing that compro-
Moreover, each of the standing com- the executive branch simply does not anise, and I support it.
mittees only has a piece of the puzzle. want to give Congress is not shared will- I wish to close with one final obser-
Yet, we have found, it is how these ingly. Without some control over the vation: One cannot have spent the last
agencies interact that is often the crucial budget of these agencies, I believe they 15 months, as many of us have-and I
problem, both from the standpoint of will simply not respond. Subpenas are no see the chairman of the committee (Mr.
$ ith t -4-
)
th
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 13; 1976
tary Establishment; the Judiciary Com- as enhance the effectiveness of Amer- Congress had a strong and responsible
mittee must oversee our extremely com- lea's intelligence operations. hand in intelligence matters.
plicated judicial and legal system, plus First, I believe we must have some The former director of the CIA, Wil-
a host of other matters; the Appropria- control over the budgets of the intelli- liam Colby, who did so much to clear up
tions Committee has responsibility for gene agencies to get information. abuses within that agency, made jx-
if we are able to consider the crucial in- Bear in mind that the intelligence operate in secret. But it is a grevious con-
teraction between the agencies of our agencies have learned the lessons of the cession for a democracy to make. We lose
tiveness.. Second, the power of the budget is
Mr. President, I believe we must estab- needed in order to take action and take
lish a single committee with primary such action in private.
legislative jurisdiction over all national When we are dealing with secret prob-
intelligence: the CIA, the FBI, the DIA, lems, the power of disclosure is empty
the NSA. It should have exclusive author- and possibly even an irresponsible ave-
ity over the CIA for legislation and an- nue of action. Let me take one example:
nual authorization. I the problem of providing better cover
It should also have the power to au- to our secret agents overseas. The Select
thorize appropriations for all national Committee wanted to find better ways
intelligence activities. On this and other to give better cover to our agents. We
legislative matters, there should be con-
current jurisdiction shared with the
Commitees on 'the Judiciary, Armed
Services, and Foreign Relations. They
have a legitimate and real interest in
many of these activities. and it is not
desirable, in my view, to screen them off
from it. What we want to achieve is a
centralization of' basic legislative au-
thority and oversight. balanced -against
the continuing needs of- the standing
committees. -
Congress has only two types of power:
the power to disclose and the power to
control money. For intelligence, disclo-
sure canot be the primary - remedy. An-
nual budget authorization is crucial to
effective oversight for two reasons. -
For example, the CIA Operation Chaos
was done in the name of domestic coun-
terintelligence, ordinarily the FBI's re-
sponsibility. On the other hand, many
FBI burglaries were conducted for the
National Security Agency and other for-
eign intelligence agencies. The National
Security Agency watch lists'for selecting
cable traffic derived mainly from FBI
requirements and those of other domes-
tic intelligence agencies. The IRS was
used by the FBI. The post office was
used by the CIA in support of the FBI,
in violation of the law.
Indeed. it Is not nossible.to_investigate
first cause the Government to govern the
governed, and then in the second in-
stance, how you cause the government to
govern itself.
Madison concluded that the only way
you could do that is through auxiliary
controls, as he put it-outside eqntyols
would not be judged alone by their own
version, their own appraisals of the law-
fulness and appropriateness of their ac-
tion, but that, instead, their behavior
and their performance would be judged
by outsiders.
. I am convinced that the lesson that we
have learned here and the lesson of
Watergate, the lesson of so much in gov-
ernment,- brings us right back to Mad=
ison's point: We always hope for the best
in human nature, and it is our prayer.
That is why we go to church. We are
always happy when human nature ac-
cords with the highest ends. But surely
human history, surely the history of this
country, has established beyond any
doubt that if we are going to say, "Now,
just trust us, we have a better bunch of
people than those who preceded us," it is
a bad bet; it will not work. We have to go
back to the genius of. the Founding
without delving into another. For exam- day. Authority and the dissemination of Fathers to see that the way to make cer-
ple, the Select Committee has recently crucial information would be more di- tain that government works legally and
found new files on foreign assassinations vided and, fragmented. Moreover, the accountably is to make it accountable to
in the FBI which were apparently with- agencies would no longer know to whom outsiders, someone else must judge, not
held either wittingly or unwittingly, they were responsible. Indeed, they just those who are operating those agen-
from the committee despite a request of might be tempted to pick and choose cies. That becomes especially crucial
over a year's standing for all such among the committees, depending on when the agency, by definition, must be
materials. the issue. The result, I believe, would secret.
It is my firm conviction that only if be even less oversight than we have to I am willing to grant that the CIA has
we. can deal across agency lines, only day. to operate in secret, that the FBI has to
.nd our international reputation, as-well realize that they would be better off if done. But when we do it let us hav9' a
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e oor-w ou co g
on
CHURCH
away with some conclusions, perhaps not
very flattering, about how human na-
ture works when it is given this power
and it is permitted to exercise it in
secret.
James Madison, in Federalist Paper 51,
made some conclusions about human
nature' that I think made up the genius
of our Constitution. He said if angels
were governed by angels, we would not
need a government, and if men were
found that this cover was quite poor; governed by angels, we would not need
that there is a real problem here. But -much government. But the problem
the more we talk about it in public, the 'comes when men govern men, how you
less cover there would be. And, since our
committee only had the power of disclo-
sure, we were caught in a very clear di-
lemma-how do we encourage more ef-
fective action on the part of the CIA and
the other agencies of Government with-
out helping-the enemy?
I am firmly convinced that authority
to authorize appropriations is crucial
and this is the only way we can use our
representative institutions to insure ef-
fective oversight.
Some say it is not practical, but I dis-
agree, I, personally, have looked into. the
case of the FBI. It is practical, even
easy, to sort out the budget of the domes-
tic intelligence division. As for foreign
intelligence, the executive branch itself
is putting together a national foreign
intelligence budget. That was the point
of the President's new Executive order-
to make the Director of Central Intel-
ligence responsible for developing such
a budget. The President recognized the
importance of centralizing this authority
within the executive branch. I believe it
is no less important ? to centralize that
authority within the Senate.
A simple oversight committee, with
only the power to subpena, would be
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May 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
system in secret of accountability to Con-
gress. If we do not do that, I think we
have said, it is over; we have had this
study.
ndWtablish accountability in the Con-
gress, we will see it happen again for
sure. And next time, we may not have
somebody find that piece of tape on the
Watergate door.
I thank the Chair.
PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that William N. Rai-
ford of the Library of Congress and staff
members Irene Margolis and Linda
Jacobson be accorded the privilege of the
floor during-consideration and voting on
this matter.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.'
- Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, may I
add to that, I ask unanimous consent
that Tom Susman of the Committee on
Judiciary, and David Aaron of my staff
be accorded the privilege of the floor
during the consideration of this measure.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BROOKE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Unless
the Senator is going to make a unani-.
mous-consent request, the Chair was
going to recognize the Senator from
Idaho next. The Senator from Idaho is
recognized.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent' that the following
members of the staff of the Select Com-
duration of the floor debate and during
any votes on Senate Resolution 400:
William G. Miller, Elliot Maxwell, Rick
Inderfurth, Michael Madigan, Michael
Epstein, Charles Kirbow, Martha Talley,
Mark Gitenstein, and Robert Kelley.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it Is so ordered.
Mr. LEAHY.. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a unanimous-consent
request?
Mr. CHURCH. I yield.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that Paul Bruhn and
Herbert Jolovitz, of my staff, be allowed
floor privileges during discussions and
vote on Senate Resolution 400.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered. .
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Sen-
ator yield for a unanimous-consent re-
quest?
Mr. CHURCH. Yes.
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I ask unan-
imous consent that Mr. Robert Hunter
of my staff have the privilege of the floor
during the debate and Doting on this
measure.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it Is so ordered.
. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. CHURCH. I yield.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask unan-
consent that a statement by the
Wlus inguished Senator from Tennessee
(Mr. BAKER) be printed in the RECORD at -
this point.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
STATEMENT BY SENATOR BAKER
I wish to add a few brief remarks to my ear-
lier statement in support of S. Res. 400-the
Resolution which will create a permanent Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence Activities.
The amendment in the nature of a substi-
tute to S. Res. 400, which has been proposed
today by my colleague, Senator Cannon, and
which I was privileged to cosponsor, repre-
sents a compromise agreement which was ar-
rived at through a lengthy bi-partisan effort.
I am pleased that this version of S. Res.
400 enjoys a wide bi-partisan cosponsorship,
including the distinguished Majority Leader,
Senator Mansfield, and the distinguished
Minority Leader, Senator Scott.
I would like to take this opportunity to
put in the Record my congratulations to all
the Senators who worked so long and so
diligently to arrive at an agreed-upon resolu-
tion which will create what I feel is so vitally
necessary-a single secure Senate committee
to oversee our intelligence community. I ap-
plaud the bi-partisan spirit which existed
throughout the sometimes delicate negotia-
tions which resulted in the drafting of -an
oversight resolution which could be sup-
ported by the vast majority of the Senate.
Thus, we have avoided a divisive floor battle
which would not have enhanced the reputa-
tion of the Senate.
At this time, I would like to comment
upon some of the provisions contained in to-
day's S. Res. 400 amendment in the nature
of a. substitute. The compromise version
which was introduced today and - which I
fully support contains all of the essential ele-
ments for a strong permanent oversight. com-
? mittee. It contains legislative and authoriza-
tion authority; a strong disclosure provision;
and access to all the information necessary
to complete its tasks: It should be noted
that while the Committee is a large one with
seventeen members, it does- have a lengthy
agenda of business which must be accom-
plished. It is required to report back to the
Senate no later than July 1, 1977 with rec-
ommendations for legislative or other actions.
In particular, it is charged with studying the
organization of the intelligence community,
the desirability of developing charters for
each intelligence agency, the desirability of
the Select Committee merging into a joint
committee with the House of Representatives,
with recommending whether there should be
public disclosure of any budget figures. This
is indeed an ambitious and heavy schedule. I
am confident that the new Committee will
soon demonstrate that it will be able to ful-
fill all of these tasks both thoroughly and
responsibly.
- There are two additional- sections of the
resolution to which I would like to address
additional comment. First, with respect to
section 8 of the Resolution I would have
preferred not to have included within that
section the debate limitation contained in
subsection (c). Section 8(c) limits debate
to nine days on the question. of whether clas-
sified information should be released to the
public by the Senate over the objection of
the President. As my colleagues know, the
Resolution as written was the result of a
compromise effort. Thus, I would have pre-
ferred to have the disclosure section provide
that once the matter was referred to the
Senate it would be acted upon by the Senate
in accord with its normal procedure. I believe
that in a matter as serious as the United
States Senate releasing classified information
over the objection of the President of the
United States that the Senate should have
the full and complete opportunity to debate
such a weighty decision. -
I 'would not have provided a specific limi-
S 7261
tation upon the, debate of this serious ques-
tion within the Senate and would have al-
lowed the standard cloture rules to apply.
Nevertheless, I am pleased that the section
provides that if the oversight committee does
not agree with the President with regard to
the release of the classified information the
matter must come to and be voted upon by
the Senate as a whole. This is the provision
which I have long urged be placed in the
oversight resolution because I think It Is ter-
ribly important that if there is going to be
a disagreement between two branches of our
government, that that disagreement be de-
cided upon by the Senate as -a whole and not
by a mere committee of the Senate.
Secondly, with regard to section 11 of the
Resolution, - I would have preferred the
language to read:
It is the sense of the Senate that the
head of each department and agency of the
United States should keep the Select Corn-
mittee fully and currently informed with
respect to intelligence activities which are
the responsibility or engaged in by such
department or agency.
As I have stated on many occasions in the
past, it was my preference to use the "fully
and currently informed" language which has
served us so well in the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy. "Fully and currently In-
formed "'carries with it a body of established
precedent as to exactly what it means; As
part of the compromise agreement, however,
I am supporting section 11 as written which
requires the intelligence community to keep
the Select Committee "fully and currently,
informed with respect to Intelligence activ-
ities, including any significant anticipated
activities."
. The present section 11, however, also con-
tains the following language:
Provided, That this does not constitute a
condition precedent to the implementation
of any anticipated intelligence activity.
.- I would like the Record to reflect that I re-
quested this language be added' to section 11
to make absolutely clear that the inclusion
of the words "including any significant an-
ticipated activities" did not constitute a re-
quiremnt that the Select Committee either
give its consent or approval before any covert
action or intelligence activity could be im-
plemented by the Executive branch. Rather,
the intent of section l1 as written in the
present resolution is to require prior consul-
tation between the Committee and the in-
telligence community but not prior consent
or approval. I am adding these remarks with
regard to section 11 to insure that our legis-
lative history clarifies any doubt with respect
to the meaning of the present language of
section 11. i note that others during the
debate have similarly described section 11
and I am confident that there will be no
doubt remaining as to its exact meaning.
.With these brief comments, I am pleased
to once again announce my unequivocal sup-
port for the present resolution creating a
single permanent oversight committee in the
Senate. I am happy that today the Senate has
acted, it has acted responsibly and it has
fulfilled its commitment to the American
people to do its share in the critical area of
the conduct of our intelligence activities.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I wish
simply to reiterate again my. commen-
dation to Senator BAKER and to the dis-
tinguished Senator from Idaho (Mr.
CHURCH), whose name was mentioned
briefly yesterday during his absence, for
the distinguished leadership they have
provided in this area, which really has
been the forerunner of the legislation-
before us today.
Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator
very much.
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 S 7262
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE May 13, 1976
In this Bicentennial Year, we, have
celebrated the durability of our system
of government and quality of strength
of the Constitution. Part of that endur-
ing strength is based upon the ability to
make changes when we have to of a
pragmatic nature, while remaining
within our basic principles of law and
procedure.
The experience of secret government
activities over the past 30 years argues
indisputably for changes to be made in
both the legislative and executive
branches if we are to preserve our con-
stitutional system of government.
Over the past 15 months, the Select _
Committee on Intelligence Activities has
carefully examined the intelligence
structure of the United States. Consid-
erable time and effort have been devoted
in order to understand what has been
done by the U.S. Government in secrecy
'during the 30-year period since the end
of World War II. It is clear to the com-
mittee that there are many necessary
and proper governmental activities that
must be conducted in secrecy. Some of
these activities affect the security and
the very existence of the Nation.
It is `also clear from the committe's
inquiry that intelligence activities con-
ducted outside the framework of the
Constitution and statutes can under-
mine the treasured values guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights. Further, if the in-
telligence agencies act in ways inimical
to declared national purposes, they dam-
age the reputation, power, and influence
of the United States abroad.
The Select Committee's investigation
has documented that a number of ac-
tions committed in the name of "na-
tional security" were inconsistent with
declared policy and the law.
It is clear that a primary task for the
oversight committee, and the Congress as
a whole, will be to frame basic statutes
necessary under the Constitution within
which the intelligence agencies of the
United States can function efficiently
under clear guidelines. Charters de-
lineating the missions, authorities, and
limitations for some of the most impor-
tant intelligence agencies do not exist.
For example, there is no statutory au-
thority for the NSA's intelligence ac-
tivities. Where statutes do exist, as with
the CIA, they are vague and have failed
to provide the necessary guidelines.
The committee's investigation has
demonstrated, moreover, that the lack of
legislation has had the effect of limiting
public debate upon some important na-
tional issues.
The CIA's broad statutory charter, the
1947 National Security Act, makes no
specific mention of covert action. The
CIA's former General Counsel, Lawrence
Houston, who was deeply involved in
drafting the 1947 act, wrote in Septem-
ber 1947-
We do not believe that there was any
thought in the minds of Congress that the
CIA under [the authority of the National
Security Act] would take positive action for
subversion and sabotage.
Yet, a few months after enactment of
the 1947 legislation, the National Se-
curity Council authorized the CIA to en-
gage in covert action programs. The pro-
vision of the Act often cited as author-
izing CIA covert activities provides' for
e Agent * * * "to perform such other
functions and duties related to intelli-
gence affecting 'the national security as
the National Security Council may from
time to time direct."
Secret executive orders issued by the
NSC to carry out covert action programs
were not subject to congressional review.
Indeed,' until recent years, except for a,
few Members, Congress was not even
aware of the existence of the so-called
secret charter for intelligence activities.
Those Members who did know had no
institutional means for discussing their
knowledge with their colleagues. The
problem of how the Congress can effec-
tively use secret knowledge in its legis-
lative processes remains to be resolved.
It is the Select Committee's view that a
strong and effective oversight commit-
tee is an essential first step that must be
taken to resolve this fundamental issue.
Since World War II, with steadily
escalating consequences, many decisions
of national importance have been made
in secrecy, often by the executive branch
alone. These decisions are frequently
basesd on information -obtained by clan-
destine means and available only to the
executive branch. Until very recently, the
Congress has not shared in this process.
The cautions expressed by the Founding
Fathers and the constitutional checks
designed to assure that policymaking
not become the proviince of a few men
have been circumvented through the use
of secrecy. John Adams expressed his
concerned about the dangers of arbitrary
power 200 years ago:
Whenever we leave principles and clear
positive laws we are soon lost in the wild
regions of imagination and possibility where
arbitrary power sits upon her brazen throne
and governs with an iron scepter.
Recent Presidents have justified this
secrecy on the basis of "national secu-
rity," "the - requirements of national
defense," or "the confidentiality re-
quired by sensitive, ongoing negotiations
or operations." These justifications were
generally accepted at face value. The
Bay of Pigs fiasco, the secret war in Laos,
the secret bombing of Cambodia, the
anti-Allende activities , in Chile, the
Watergate affair, were all instances of
the use of power cloaked in secrecy
which, when revealed, provoked wide-
spread popular disapproval. This series
of events has ended, for the time being
at least, passive and uncritical accept-
ance by the Congress of Executive de-
cisions in the areas of foreign policy,
national security and intelligence activi-
ties. If Congress had met its oversight
responsibilities through the years, some
of these excesses might have been
averted.
The worth of the work done by the
Select Committee on Intelligence Activi-
ties over the past 15 months will be
judged by the outcome of the resolution
now under consideration. A strong and
effective oversight committee of the kind
set forth in the resolution now under
consideration is required to carry out
the necessary reforms contained in the
Select Committee's final report. In
order to restore legitimacy to what are
agreed to be the necessary activities of
the intelligence community, a strong
oversight committee with -a well-trained
vealed enough evidence of the dalWr9
of permitting the intelligence agencies
of the United States to undertake their
necessary activities without the kind of
legislative oversight contemplated by
the Constitution. It is quite clear that
the concerns expressed over 20 years
ago by Senator MANSFIELD have proven
to be correct.
There have been over 200 proposals to
establish an oversight committee since
Senator MANSFIELD introduced his reso-
lution over two decades ago. Surely, we
'do not need further evidence of the
necessity for' an oversight committee
with the powers required to do the job.
It is quite clear that the oversight struc-
tures we have designed in the past have
proven inadequate.
The creation of a new permanent in-
telligence oversight committee is an abso-
lutely necessary first step toward estab-
lishing an agreed-upon procedure by
which problems of national importance
that are necessarily secret in character
can be addressed within the constitu-
tional framework.
The jurisdiction of an effective com-
mittee must include oversight over what
is known as the "national intelligence
community." Because of the limitations
of present committee jurisdictions, no
committee presently is able to exercise
oversight over national intelligence. At
intelligence community. No committee
has had the scope to look at national in-
telligence as a whole.
The resolution now before the Senate
provides that the oversight committee
would have sole jurisdiction over the CIA,
and concurrent jurisdiction over the NSA,
the DIA, the "national intelligence" com-
ponents in the Department of Defense
budget, and the intelligence portions of
the FBI. The Select Committee, over the
past 15 months, has found that these
agencies have worked so closely together,
that unless there is the clear ability. to
look at all of them, oversight cannot be
effectively carried out. The pending reso-
lution would not exclude committees with
existing jurisdictions over particular ele-
ments of the intelligence community that
fall within their larger oversight duties.
Obviously, it is necessary for the Armed
Services Committee to know the require-
ments and, to some extent, the activities
of the NSA- and the DIA to be sure that
the Department of Defense's activities
are of a piece. On the other hand, the
bulk of activities of the CIA, a civilian
agency, are not concerned with military
matters and require a different oversight
focus than is now the case. For a variety
of reasons, the counterintelligence activ-
ities of the FBI have not been the subject
of adequate oversight, in the past. The
new oversight committee would treat
new jurisdiction, which would bring
gether all these disparate elements
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the national intelligence community
which are now scattered among several
Senate committees and some functions
which are not covered by any committee.
le analysis, production, and dissem-
in and use of political, military, and
economic information affecting the rela-
tions of the U.S. with foreign govern-
ments, and other activity which is in sup-
port of or supported by a collection,
analysis, production, dissemination and
use of such information. National intel-
ligence also includes, but is not limited
to clandestine activities such as covert
action and some activities that take place
within the United States such as coun-
terintelligence. In general, these are the
activities that would be supervised.
The main legislative tool required to
effectively carry -out oversight is annual
authorization authority for the CIA, and
the national intelligence portions of. the
NSA, DIA, the counterintelligence por-
tion of the FBI, and some other national
intelligence groups found in various de-
partments and agencies. The power of
the purse is the most effective means
that the Legislature can have to assure
that the will of Congress is observed.
There has never been an annual author-
ization of the intelligence community
budget. The proposed oversight commit-
tee, for the first time, under appropriate
security safeguards, would be able to
consider all budgetary requests of the
national intelligence community on an
annual basis.
The second legislative power required
by an oversight committee to function ef-
pertaining to its jurisdiction. The exec-
utive branch should also be obligated
to answer any requests made by the Com-
mittee for information within its juris-
diction. In my view, the right to infor-
mation provisions of the resolution which
are based upon the existing language of
the Atomic Energy Act, section 202(d),
have served Congress well for more than
a quarter century. The resolution has
added a provision that, consistent with
the intent of section 202 (d) of the Atomic
Energy Act, the oversight committee
should also have the power to require in-
formation concerning activities of the
intelligence community that the commit-
tee believes it should be informed of prior
to the initiation of any such activity.
The effect of such a provision would
be to require prior legislative authoriza-
tion of intelligence activities in the nor-
mal way. This authority lies at the heart
of vigilant legislative oversight. It is the
power of the purse operating in full con-
formity with the Constitution.
Without full knowledge obtained in
sufficient time, meaningful oversight can-
not be exercised. It is clear from present
concerns and recent history that the
country would have been well-served had
a committee of the Congress known in
advance of certain actions, so that the
advice of the Congress might have been
yen, and foolish, costly, ,and. harmful
courses of action might have been avert-
ed.
. Another important provision in the
pending resolution Is the procedure
which should be followed in the event
that the committee wishes to disclose
information obtained from the executive
branch which the President wishes to
keep concealed. The Select Committee
has been involved' in a number of in-
stances over the past year in which there
has been a dispute between the commit-
tee and the executive branch.
Almost all of these points of disagree-
ments were resolved in a manner agree-
able to both sides. However, there were
a few instances in which agreement coula
not be reached. One such example was
the question of the release of the assas-
sination report. But in working toward
the creation of a constitutional procedure
for dealing with issues of a secret char-
acter, the larger question of the proper
role secrecy should play in our demo-
cratic society must be carefully ad-
dressed. The constitutional system of the
United States is ? best suited to make
national decisions through open discus-
sion, debate and the airing of different
points of view. Those who advocate that
a particular secret must be kept should
have the burden of proof placed upon
--them. They must show why a secret
should be -ithheld from public scrutiny.
Inevitably, there will be differences be-
tween the Executive and the Legislature
as to whether the national interest is
served by maintaining secrecy in par-
ticular cases or whether the usual consti-
tutional process of open debate and pub-
lic scrutiny should prevail. It is my view
that important questions of this kind
should be brought to the full Senate for
decision.
The resolution now before the Senate
prescribes the following procedure: If
the oversight committee decided that it
would be in the national interest to dis-
close some information received from the
executive branch, it would be required
to inform the executive branch of its
intention. It would then be required to
enter into a full and considered consul-
tation concernig the problems raised by
disclosure. If, after such full and consid-
ered consultation, the oversight commit-
tee decided to disclose any information
requested to be kept confidential by the
President, the committee would be re-
quired to notify the President of that
decision. The committee could then, after
5 days, disclose the information unless
the President, in writing, informed the
Senate through the committee that he
opposed such disclosure and gave his
views why he opposed the disclosure of
such information. The oversight commit-
tee, after receiving the President's objec-
tions, and if it decided that the Presi-
dent's reasons did not outweigh the
reasons for disclosure, may refer the
question to the full Senate in closed
session for a decision.
In my view, once the Senate accepts
the kind of process set forth in this reso-
tion, it would respect the injunction of
secrecy. We must recognize that at this
time there is no agreement as to what
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a valid national security secret is, and
that the Senate does not now have the
procedural means to make decisions con-
cerning matters classified secret by the
executive branch.
One further step is set forth in this
resolution-sanctions for improper dis-
closure. In my view, if any member of the
Senate or staff disclosed sensitive infor-
mation of the committee outside of the
committee, except in closed session of
the Senate, such disclosure should be re-
ferred to the. Committee on Standards
and Conduct to investigate and recom-
mend appropriate action including, but
not limited to, censure or removal from
office.
The Senate has never addressed this
issue squarely. It is my firm belief that
it should do so now. Once the Senate
comes to agreement as to how secret ma-
terial should be handled, it should also
impose upon itself rules to assure that
improper disclosure, as defined by the
Senate, will be properly dealt with.
We have learned enough from the past
30 years of secret Government activity
to realize that our legislative structures
and procedures are inadequate for the
task. We cannot shy away from the nec-
essity to develop effective procedures to
make legislative decisions concerning
necessarily secret activities of the United
States, but such decisions must be done
in ways consistent with the Constitution.
The history of the past 30 years and
the revelations of the past 2 years are
proof that we have much work to do. Let
us equip ourselves in the Senate to do
our part of the job in the most effective
way. We need an oversight committee to
oversee the activities of the entire intel-
ligence community with the power,
knowledge, and staff required.
The need to bring secret Government
activities under constitutional control is
clear, the means to do so are contained
in the resolution now before the Senate.
We have had 30 years of experience and
15 months of intensive inquiry. What
further proof do we need?
Finally, I want to express my gratitude
to the majority leader, MIKE MANSFIELD,
who has done so much to bring the prob-
lems created by secret activities of our
Government to the attention of the Sen-
ate and the Nation. His leadership in this
and other vital national issues is one of
the brightest chapters in the history of
the Senate.
I also want to thank the chairman of
the Government Operations Committee,
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, his- able colleagues
Senators PERCY, :1AVITS, WEICKER, and all
the members of the Government Opera-
tions Committee, who, through their
hearings and rigorous legislative efforts
have done so much to advance the pro-
posal under consideration today.
The compromise resolution now before
us is also the result of the dedicated and
conscientious work done by the Rules
Committee, under the leadership of its
chairman, Senator CANNON; the majority
whip, Senator BYRD, and Senators HAT-
FIELD, PELL, CLARK and WILLIAMS. In
working out this compromise, I am grate-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE May 13, 1976
ful for the efforts made by Senator ALAN
CRANSTON.
I particularly want to thank the mem-
bers of the Select Committee on Intelli-
gence Activities, of which I am honored
to be chairman, for their devoted and
able efforts over the past 15 months to
come to grips with a most serious na-
tional problem-of how to bring the in-
telligence agencies of the United States
under constitutional government. The
recommendations of the Select Commit-
tee, contained in its final report, are in
essence an agenda for action by the over-
sight committee now under considera-
tion. I especially want to thank Senators
MONDALE and HUDDLESTON for the fine
work they have done in heading the
Select Committee's two subcommittees on
Foreign and Domestic Intelligence. The
work of Senators PHIL HART, GARY HART,
and ROBERT MORGAN, and the able vice
chairman, Senator TOWER, Senator
BAKER, Senator GOLDWATER, Senators,
MATHIAS and SCHWEIKER, has shaped the
nature of the committee's important
findings and recommendations.
Finally, I want to express my thanks
for the work done by our staff, whose
ability, loyalty and devotion throughout
15 difficult months has been a worthy
service to the Senate and the Nation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
HATFIELD). The Senator from New York.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I rise in
support of this compromise measure.
First, I think 'it is rather a triumph
of the wisdom and willingness to see the
other fellow's point of view of the Mem-
bers of the Senate, particularly the prin-
cipal negotiators in respect to this par-
ticular compromise. I refer specifically
to Senator CANNON, who felt very, very
deeply about the substitute which the
Rules Committee recommended, but in
that spirit of knowing that we had to do
something and do something effectively
in this particular field yielding many of
the things he thought he would never
yield in order to gain the greater ob-
jective, which is to bring about a strong
congressional, capability to deal with
the intelligence community. It is so easy
to run down the Senate and other leg-
islative bodies. It is refreshing when we
show we can really fashion a strong
compromise out of so many different
views in order to accomplish a great
public result.
Mr. President, as we begin this impor-
tant debate on Senate Resolution 400,
I believe that there is one fundamental
issue before us. It is whether the busi-
ness of intelligence shall continue to be
the exclusive preserve of the executive
branch, or whether Congress shall finally
also assume its constitutional responsi-
bilities in this field.
For the past 6 weeks since Senate Res-
olution 400 was reported by the Commit-
tee on Government Operations, it has
been debated and discussed formally and
informally in three other committees and
in public media throughout the Nation.
All who have examined this issue agree
that any oversight proposal-if it is to
be worth anything-must contribute sig-
nificantly and constructively to the task
of assuring that the operations of our
intelligence agencies do not exceed laws
and that they do not violate the rights
of our citizens.
The de facto immunity from account-
ability granted for years to the CIA and
the FBI must now cease and never again
recur. This will be the case only if Con-
gress recognizes that it has failed to
take seriously its responsibility to over-
see and check these operations. The Sen-
ate now has the opportunity to write
strong and meaningful oversight legis-
lation. And it can do so without impair-
ing the capacity of the President to ful-
fill his own constitutional responsibilities
in the areas of foreign policy and de-
fense.
Mr. President, the late Chief Justice
Earl Warren once said that if each of
the three branches of the Federal Gov-
ernment pursued its constitutional
powers to the end of the trail, then our
Government simply could not work.
In recent years, we have been engaged
in several major separation of powers
questions with the Executive. War
Powers, impoundment, budget control
and now intelligence oversight. In re-
solving all,of these challenges to our con-
stitutional system, I believe both
branches have understood and heeded
the implicit constitutional mandate for
cooperation and compromise among the?
three branches.
In developing this legislation, the
Committee on Government Operations
and Committee on Rules and Adminis-
tration have made every effort to make
their decision on the issue of oversight
legislation with a keen sensitivity to the
delicate balance which must resolve
every serious separation of powers issue.
I believe that the Committees on For-
eign Relations, the Armed Services, and
the Judiciary-each of whom has major
substantive responsibilities in this field-
aproached the issue with the same sensi-
tivity.
The substitute'?submitted by Senator
CANNON, which I strongly endorse, is the
product of a long process of consultation
and compromise involving many Sena-
tors who have supported the establish-
ment of the strongest possible oversight
committee.
It represents a genuine effort to reach
an accommodation on very difficult is-
sues. Its adoption by the Senate would
constitute a clear and impressive signal
to the American people that the United
States will have a strong, effective and
viable intelligence-gathering apparatus
together with a congressional structure
to assure its effectiveness and also its
lawfulness.
It is designed to offer the Senate a
middle-ground choice between the Gov-
ernment Operations resolution and a
substitute version introduced by Senator
CANNON and reported by the Committee
on Rules and Administration.
in my judgment, adoption of the un-
finished Cannon substitute would fall
far short of doing what is even mini-
mally necessary to resolve this issue.
During the past 35 years there have
been over 200 proposals introduced in
both Houses which -would have estab-
lished a congressional oversight commit-
tee in the field of intelligence. Our dis-
tinguished majority leader has long been
a principal champion of this idea. While
he has long sought to bring this idea
into reality, the need for an effective
oversight mechanism has become more
dents, placed informants within domes-
tic political groups, opened the mail of
U.S. citizens, and assembled secret files
on more than 10,000 American citizens,
this issue reached a new height of im-
portance.
The acknowledgment and apology by
the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation last Saturday that his
agency had committed thousands of
illegal burglaries in its COINTELPRO
program constitutes an unprecedented
challenge to the Congress to reverse dec-
ades of neglect and irresponsibility re-
specting the operation of -the FBI.
Armed with the principal legislative
tool required to carry out effective over-
sight-annual authorization authority-
the committee can meet the responsibil-
ity which has been so long neglected. It
can do so without jeopardizing the au-
thority of other standing committees
with existing responsibilities in this field.
Mr. President, a great deal of effort
has been made over the weekend and
throughout yesterday to bring together
a coalition of Senators who supported
this legislation with those members of
the Rules Committee who had reserva-
tions about provisions, in our version.
Both sides have made significant con-
cessions. I strongly applaud these efforts
and compliment Senators RIBICOFF and
mittee, and Senators MONDALE, CHIIR,
BAKER, and CRANSTON who also contrib-
uted their energy and talents to working
out differences on Senate Resolution 400.
Although there are some provisions of
the new substitute resolution that I am
not altogether happy with-particularly
in section 9 dealing with the procedure
incident to the disclosure of sensitive in-
formation and sanctions against Mem-
bers, officers, and employees of the Sen-
ate-it nevertheless does contain the
essential elements of strong and mean-
ingful oversight legislation. It would give
the new committee budget authority, in-
cluding exclusive jurisdiction over the
CIA, reasonable legislative authority, and
access to information from the agencies
themselves. Also, the committee would be
established on a permanent basis and its,
members would be appointed on a rotat-
ing basis.
I urge the Senate to meet its consti-
tutional responsibility for supervision of
the intelligence community. Only after
we meet that test by establishing a strong
committee can the agencies themselves
recover the .confidence and trust of the
American people. In the long run, such
a committee can and will make an essen-
tial contribution of its own to the
strengthening of our national security.
Mr. President, as important as is the
creation of this committee, we cannot
which have been cataloged and dod
mented during the past several years.
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These abuses constituted clear and
present dangers to the freedom of the
American people.
Yet the problem of limiting those dan-
geramost difficult and complex one,
for seldom easy to separate legiti-
ma om illegitimate investigations or
to enforce constitutional standards.
Nevertheless, it is critically important
for the administration and the Congress
to formulate the clearest possible guide-
lines governing "national security" in-
vestigations and related operations. In-
dividual charters must be developed for
the agencies within the intelligence com-
munity.
While it is necessary for our Govern-
ment to undertake some of its activities
in secret, it is incumbent upon the Con-
gress to participate in the development
of policies which will allow the constitu-
tional processes to be preserved, even
though certain underlying operations
must remain confidential. The enact-
ment of Senate Resolution 400 is only
the first step in assuring a new degree
of accountability for the necessary intel-
ligence activities in the United States.
Mr. President, I participated in the
hearings which helped to fashion the
resolution which was reported out of the
Committee on Government Operations,
and I feel I can assure our colleagues that
we have brought together the essentials
for congressional oversight of the in-
telligence community. To paraphrase
Benjamin Franklin's aphorism, we will
have the ability at long last to see that
the gathering of intelligence by the CIA,
the FBI, and other agencies is not made
a cover or an excuse for unlawfulness, to
e that power does not intoxicate
JEWnen who use it and whom we em-
er to use it, and that it is not im-
provident in terms of the cost, or that it
is ineffective.
All of these things I think now come
within our control, and this is all for the
good after some 35 years without over-
sight. It is also refreshing that a new at-
mosphere of openness and disclosure
concerning what has gone on has devel-
oped.
Mr. President, the point that I wish to
emphasize again, because I really am
very deeply concerned with it myself, is
our responsibility in the Senate. When
this is passed, we will be entrusted, on a
continuing basis in a unique way, which
has hardly happened before, except in
very sporadic instances such as the Man-
hattan project and a few others with
highly sensitive information of high im-
portance to the security of the United
States and, indeed, to the security of the
world.
Mr. President, we must ask ourselves
the question: Will we be trustworthy and
will we be honorable trustees of this tre-
mendous responsibility which we are
asking for.
We have tried to fashion a system, a
methodology, by which there shall be ac-
countability by individual Members. We
have tried to fashion that through the
use of our constitutional power, which is
awesome, to discipline or remove a Mem-
er, a power which we have, which is not
bject to the speech and debate clause.
The job which has been done in our
committee and in the Committee on
Rules and Administration has been to
balance effectively these two congres-
sional responsibilities, on the one hand,
to respect the integrity of intelligence on
the part of our Members in the House of
Representatives and Senate and, on the
other hand, to give freedom to, the in-
dividual Member to express himself,
without fear, as to how he feels about
great public questions.
It is yet to be seen how this is going
to work out. We could easily retrograde
and abuse the powers, which we are now
seeking to avert, and contribute to a cli-
mate of dictatorship in this country if
we abuse what we are here acquiring in
the way of privileges and power.
Mr. President, I believe, as I have con-
cerned myself deeply with this, that we
have fashioned an effective means for
control and discipline in this resolution,
and we fashioned it without being invidi-
ous to any Member, without undertak-
ing proceedings of a mandated character
which could be embarrassing and difficult
for Members, but at the same time doing
our utmost to keep honest and truthful to
what I consider to be a sacred oath when
we pass this resolution, that we are going
to respect what we learn and act with the
appropriate wisdom and discretion, and
we are going to make it our duty to see
that other Members respect it as well.
Mr. President, the resolution has been
very thoroughly analyzed. I have given
all credit to those who have been con-
cerned in fashioning it, but this is going
to be the acid test. And I hope very much
that we will pass the legislation as is, so
as to preserve the machinery which we
think is very, specially and effectively
adapted to this purpose, and that we
are true to our trust. If we do that; I
think we will not only benefit our people
in the way of effective intelligence over-
sight, but also in preserving fundamental.
freedoms in this country.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. JAVITS. Iyield.
Mr. CANNON. First, I thank the Sena-
tor for his kind remarks on behalf of
the committee and myself, and, second,
I think he has put the finger on a very
important point. This was one of the
problems that we found with the initial
Senate Resolution 400 when it came to
the Committee on Rules and Adminis-
tration. That is the necessity for absolute
secrecy in relation to some of the activi-
ties that are carried out.
We do have a responsibility among
ourselves to be sure that information
that should be kept classified is kept
classified, so, in the Committee on Rules
and Administration, we wrote, as the
Senator knows,.a provision that, as the
Senator has suggested to the Members,
if they abide by those guidelines that are
set out we can preserve the secrecy where
it need be preserved, and we will have
the authority to declassify where the
Senate feels that it is a matter that
should be declassified and should be
made public; but we have to keep in
mind that we do have to look after and
protect the security of this country.
I thank the Senator for making that
point. .
S 7265
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am very
grateful to our colleague.
I 'wish to point out another accom-
plishment-of this resolution which ought
to be especially dear to the Committee
on Rules and Administration. It estab-
lishes the absolute paramountcy of the
Senate, that every committee is an agent
of the Senate, and that every individual
Senator is a Member of the Senate.
I thank our colleague very much, and
I yield the floor.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, in the kind
of world we live in, good intelligence in-
formation is essential to sound foreign,
defense, and arms control policies. I be-
lieve that Senate Resolution 400 will
help strengthen the ability of our in-
telligence agencies to perform their very
important tasks.
The investigations have been made and
abuses have been found. It is our pur-
pose now to help these agencies get on
with their jobs and insure that further
abuses do not reoccur. I believe that a
strong oversight committee with legis-
lative authority is needed to change the
atmosphere, dispel the doubts, give the
public confidence in Congress' oversight
job, and thus help the CIA and other in-
telligence agencies get on with their
work.
I am pleased that Senate Resolution
400 incorporates the proposals which
Senator HUDDLESTON and I offered to
protect intelligence secrets and also my
amendment requiring the new commit-
tee to look into a number of neglected
areas vital to effective intelligence, in-
cluding the morale of intelligence per-
sonnel, the analytical quality of our in-
telligence, and duplication within the in-
telligence community.
I hope this legislation will be viewed in
retrospect as having ushered in a new
era of responsibility in the intelligence
field-responsibility in the intelligence
agencies and responsibility in the Con-
gress.
Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, the
Senate has before it today measures
which would greatly alter its institutional
structures for the oversight of the intel-
ligence gathering activities of the execu-
tive branch.
The basic object of these proposals is
to incorporate into the jurisdiction of one
new Senate committee all this intelli-
gence activity, regardless of its nature,
including that conducted for the purpose
of foreign intelligence, military security,
and for domestic law enforcement.
This Senator favors strong and effec-
tive oversight of the intelligence activi-
ties of the Government. The Judiciary
Committee has historically exercised
oversight of the Department of Justice
and its bureaus including the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. The full com-
mittee and at least three of its subcom-
mittees now exercise jurisdiction over the
Bureau and its functions.
A number of the recent "revelations"
of the FBI's activities, it should be noted,
had come to the attention of the com-
mitte and its subcommittees. Prior to the
creation of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, the Judiciary Committee
learned of the FBI's cointelpro program.
At that time the Department of Justice
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 13, 1976
commenced the drafting of guidelines
which would prohibit the abuses of this
program. Under the direction of Attorney
General Levi such guidelines have been
formulated and are being implemented.
A number of other activities - which.
have been revealed in?the past year have
been brought out in an emotion packed
atmosphere. Some of these issued needed
a public airing and debate. Most of them,
however, have been the subject of con-
structive reform and have been covered
by Mr. Levi's- guidelines.
We are at the point today where the
airing of these matters has already oc-
curred and strong measures have been
implemented by the Department of Jus-
tice to correct past abuses. The question
is now how do we best continue Senate
oversight of the intelligence activities of
the FBI.
Mr. President, I strongly suggest that
the best approach is not by including the
activities of the FBI with that of the CIA
and the Defense Department.
In March, the JlLidiciary Committee
held hearings on the question of the.
creation of a new Senate Intelligence
Committee. Throughout these hearings
one theme ran strongly and consistently.
That was that the FBI, unlike other in-
telligence gathering bodies is a law en-
forcement agency. The FBI's intelligence
activity is basically in furtherance of the
prosecution of Federal crimes.
Those who have studied the FBI's or-
ganization and operations are aware
that that its intelligence activities are
closely related to its law enforcement
function. Because this activity is so inte-
grally - related to the criminal investi-
gatory function of the FBI and the De-
partment of Justice, it is my firmest be-
lief that oversight of the FBI should be
continued to be dealt with as a unit.
Far to long there was a public per-
ception, which was perhaps even shared
by some within the FBI, that the FBI
and its intelligence activity was in some
way separate from the Department of
Justice. But thanks to the direction and
management of Attorney General Levi,
with the outstanding cooperation of
Director Clarence -Kelley;- this is no
longer the case in appearance or in fact.
The splitting of th.es Jurisdiction of the
Bureau's nonintelligence activities and
its intelligence operations between two
Senate-committees, would, however, give
renewed credence to this outmoded
notion.
As Attorney General Levi, testifying
before the Judiciary Committee, well put
it:
The Bureau's discipline of perceiving its
intelligence functions as closely connected
to the federal criminal law is important in
that it is a reminder of the need-so clearly
seen in ordinary criminal cases because of the
ultimate scruriity of the courts-carefully
to protect individual rights. Congressional
oversight arrangements that would split off
the intelligence functions from the more
ordinary law enforcement functions of the
Bureau would tend to diminish the force of
this perception.
The. Attorney General and Director
Kelley, testifying before the Senate Ju-
diciary and Government Operations
Committee, both emphasized the need
for vigorous oversight of the Department
of Justice and the FBI. Both, however,
urged that such function could be best
served by retaining oversight in a single
committee.
Mr. Levi noted that the domestic se-
curity investigations of the FBI should
be tied closely with the enforcement of
criminal law. The guidelines which he
issued seek to achieve this objective by
authorizing domestic security investiga-
tions only into ,conduct which will in-
volve violence and the violation of Fed-
eral law.
In the area of foreign intelligence, the
FBI's role 'has been a derivative one.
With the approval of the Attorney Gen-?
eral, the FBI at the request of other in-
telligence agencies does. collect useful in-
formation regarding foreign powers. Be-
cause this activity is at the request of
other agencies, it would, of course, be
within the jurisdiction of any present or
new committee established with over-
sight of the requesting agency.
Unlike agencies such as the CIA,
whose mission is the collection and eval-
uation of intelligence, the FBI is first
and foremost a law-enforcement agency.
Its primary duty is the detection and in-
vestigation of violation of Federal crimi-
nal laws. The gathering of intelligence
is one of the basic tools it employs in
its law-enforcement function. The de-
tection of many crimes often requires
knowledge of their background. This is
especially true in organized crime and in
domestic security investigation. This
connection between investigation and
the criminal statute cannot be ignored.
Those of us who have studied the De-
partment of Justice realize that the FBI
is utilized by the operating divisiosn of
the Department as their sole agent in
gathering evidence for such diversep-
crimes as bank robbery and civil rights.
The intelligence activities of the FBI are
in a true sense interrelated with the
activities of the other parts of the De-
partment.
For effective oversight it is ? required
that a full understanding be had of the
entire Department of Justice.
It is my belief, and One which-is shared
by a number of my colleagues, that over-
sight which is directed solely at the in-
telligence activities of the FBI, as sepa-
rate from its other functions and those
of the Department as an entity, would
create the very real likelihood of con-
flicting and confusing congressional
guidance.
I am a firm believer in Senate over-
sight of the FBI. This is a matter which
neither I nor the Judiciary committee
takes lightly. Serious deliberation was
given this matter by the fulfil commit-
tee following its hearings on Senate Res-
olution 400.
After those deliberations the commit-
tee voted to amend Senate Resouution 400
to delete from it the grant of jurisdiction
to the proposed Committee on Intelli-
gence Activities over the intelligence ac-
tivities of the Department of Justice, in-
cluding the FBI. The effect of these
amendments would retain in the Judici-
ary Committee such jurisdiction.
. The report of the Rules Committee, to
which the resolution was then referred
contained the following language:
Committee on the Judiciary.-For similar
reansons the Committee on Rules and Ad-
ministration believes that legislative author-
ity over the functions of the Justice Depart-
ment, including those of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, should remain with. the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commi on
the Judiciary.
The Committee believes that the in elli-
gence activities of the Department of Justice
are so intertwined with its law enforcement
function that a splitting of, congressional
jurisdiction over these activities between the
Committee on the Judiciary and the pro-
posed Standing Committee on Intelligence
Activities would create confusing and con-
flicting congressional guidance to the agency.
Unlike other intelligence gathering agen-
cies, the FBI is primarily a law enforcement
agency. The intelligence activity of the FBI
is a means by which it detects and investi-
gates violations of federal criminal laws.
Because this activity is so integrally related
to the criminal investigatory function of the
FBI and the Department of Justice, it is
the belief of the Committee that all legis-
lative authority should be continued to be
dealt with as a unit within the jurisdiction
of the Committee on the Judiciary.
Mr. President, Senate Resolution 400
as reported by Chairman CANNON from
the Rules Committee would in effect con-
tinue the work of the present select com-
mittee. Although I believe that task, of
the present select committee, has run its
course; I am not unalterably opposed to
the proposal in this amended version of
Senate Resolution 400. The temporary
committee which is envisioned would be
granted general oversight of all intel-
ligence activity. It would have an op-
portunity to review this subject area
with some detachment and without the
highly charged atmosphere which has
surrounded this matter for the past v
and a half.
I wish to state again, however,
President, that I strongly oppose the
creation of a permanent Senate Intel-
ligence Committee with both oversight
and legislative jurisdiction, concurrent or
exclusive, over the intelligence activities
of the FBI.
Such a move would give strength to the
concept that the intelligence activity of
the FBI is separate from the law-en-
forcement function of the Department of
Justice where it necessarily and properly
rests.
Such a move could easily result in
long-range confusion and conflict of con-
gressional directives to the FBI.
A sharing of access to intelligence
material also provides a much greater
possibility of the unauthorized disclosure
of matter which the Department of
Justice understandably needs to safe-
guard in order to protect its sources and
techniques in investigating criminal
violations.
For these reasons, Mr. President, I urge
my colleagues to reject any measures
which grant any proposed standing com-
mittee the jurisdiction over the intel-
ligence activities of the Department of
Justice.
Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, for the
past several - 'months, the Congress
through the Select House and Senate
Committees on Intelligence Operations
have been reviewing the entire scope o
domestic and foreign American ante
gence operations. One of the conseaw.
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May 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
quences of this effort has been to rec-
ommend the establishment of a congres-
sional oversight committee to monitor
the operation of existing U.S. Intelli-
of all activities of the Federal Govern-
ment including domestic and foreign in-
telligence is an essential obligation of
the Congress, I believe that the proposed
oversight committee as recommended
by the Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence Operations will gravely weaken
our intelligence services rather than
strengthen them. I believe this is so for
several reasons.
First, are the inherent dangers in the
centralization of an oversight function.
We know from experience dating back
to Pearl Harbor, where a failure of our
intelligence services formed the basis
upon which we initiated a major reform
of the intelligence structure of the
United States under the National Secu-
rity Act of 1947 what the consequences
of a failure of intelligence means. The
centralization of intelligence, whether of
collection, analysis, or congressional re-
view, is almost certain to exacerbate some
of the most dangerous failings of any
intelligence agency. The propensity of in-
telligence services from time to time to
overestimate or underestimate the inten-
tions of an adversary or in some other
way to analyze objective intelligence in-
formation-through the filter of parochial
biases and current political fashions will
be exaggerated by centralizing the over-
sight function which is now diffused
through several congressional commit-
cond, the removal of primary over-
sig t responsibility from the traditional
intelligence committees, especially those
in the Armed Services and Appropria-
tions Committees, will inevitably weaken
our ability, to collect sensitive foreign in-
telligence, because of the fact that a
much larger group of individuals may
have access to some of the most sensi-
tive intelligence information relating to
intelligence sources and methods. Wil-
lingness of a potential intelligence oper-
ative to risk his life when facing the
KGB is serious enough; to add the
higher probability of indiscretion or
leaks as a consequence of intelligence
information being placed in the hands of
a much larger group of congressional
Members and staff can only add to the
already severe burdens the prolonged
congressional intelligence investigations
have imposed upon our national secu-
rity.
The intelligence services of the United
States are an essential ingredient in our
ability to guarantee the security of the
citizens of the United States, both as
against domestic and foreign adversar-
ies. Because of the extremely sensitive
circumstances within which intelligence
services must operate, the institutional
arrangements made for the operation
and review of intelligence service activi-
ties must be much more carefully drawn
than those which have emerged from the
enate-Select Committee on Intelligence
Aerations of the Cannon substitute.
e procedures and character of the
proposed Congressional Oversight Com-
mittee on Intelligence are most likely to
hamper the collection of domestic and
foreign intelligence information essen-
tial to the future security of the United
States. There are other ways we can as-
sure proper oversight within the current
committee structure that do not invite
the dangers of the current proposal.
I, therefore, strongly urge that the
present proposal be rejected.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I rise
-to support this resolution. I support the
establishment of a new select committee
of the Senate for the purpose of oversee-
ing the intelligence activities and pro-
grams of our Government and submit-
ting to the Senate authorized budgets
and appropriate legislation relating to
all the intelligence agencies.
In establishing this new committee,
the Senate is thoroughly consistent with
the Constitution's system of checks and
balances under the separation of pow-
ers doctrine; This pattern of checks and
balances is reflected in the constitutional
provisions with respect to foreign affairs
and national defense. Aside from specific
,delegations of power to Congress and the
President in articles I and II, the Consti-
tution states in the last paragraph of
article I, section 8, that Congress shall
have-the power "to make all laws neces-
sary and proper for carrying into execu-
tion" not only its own powrers but also
"all other powers vested by this Consti-
tution in the Government of the United
States, or in any department or officer
thereof."
Moreover, in both foreign affairs and
national defense, ,while the President
makes executive decisions, it is Congress
with. its exclusive power over the purse
-that is charged with authority to deter-
mine whether, or to what extent, Gov-
ernment activities in these areas shall be
funded.
So, Mr. President, there is a solid con-
stitutional base for what we are under-
taking. As one who has long sought more
vigilant congressional oversight over the
CIA and other intelligence agencies, I am
glad to cosponsor the. substitute resolu-
tion establishing a strong intelligence
oversight committee.
Before reviewing the key provisions of
the legislation before us, I wish to ex-
press my appreciation for the work of
so many of my Senate colleagues for
bringing us this far. This country owes a
permanent debt to the members of the
Senate Select Committee to Study Gov-
ernmental Operation With Respect to In-
telligence Activities for the largely pri-
vate labor-labor, Mr. President-they
performed in exposing dangers to our
system. These Senators were: CHURCH,
chairman; PHILIP HART, MONDALE, HUD-
DLESTON, MORGAN, GARY HART, TOWER,
vice chairman; BAKER, GOLDWATER, MA-
THIAS, and SCHWEIKER. Once the Church
committee had reported its recommenda-
tions, the task of reform fell to the mem-
bers of the Government Operations and
Rules Committees, and both committees
held hearings and reported recommen-
dations. Prominent roles were played by
Senators RIBICOFF, PERCY, and GLENN
on Government Operations, and by Sena-
tors CANNON, BYRD, HATFIELD, and CLARK
S 7267
on Rules 'among others. And, in the end,
Mr. President, it remained for the fine
art of compromise to be practiced by
several Senators in order for the logjam
to be broken and the Senate to fulfill its
charge in this matter. Statesmanlike
service was rendered by Senators MANS-
FIELD, BYRD, RIBICOFF, and CANNON-tQ
list a few. We have come a long way, and
we are proving.that we can act as a team.
in the public interest.
-There are several major provisions
of this resolution which I particularly
support.
First of all, as to the nature of the
committee, the intelligence committee
would have the power and authority of
a standing committee, including sub-
pena authority and all administrative
and personnel powers necessary to carry
out its responsibilities. Of course, it will
be up to the members of the committee
to-exercise the prerogatives this resolu-
tion grants. There will be 15 Senators
on the Intelligence Committee, with
eight chosen from the majority party
and seven chosen from the minority
party. It is my hope that the leadership
of both parties will favor the less senior
Members of the Senate in choosing'
who will serve, on a rotating basis, on
the committee. Since no Senator may
serve longer than 9 consecutive years,
and because this is an "add-on" commit-
tee with no Senator having to give up
membership on another committee in
order to serve, it will be possible to reg-
ularly invigorate the intelligence over-
sight body with new blood. This should
insure the vigilance the Senate has failed
to exercise in the past.
Second, the new committee's jurisdic-
tion will extend throughout the national
intelligence community. It will have leg-
islative and budgetary authority over
the Government's intelligence activities
including the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Agency, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Most
importantly, the resolution anticipates
that there will be an annual authoriza-
tion of funds for the different parts of
the intelligence community. This will
help the Senate to better perform its
fiscal and oversight responsibilities, and
make the intelligence agencies accounta-
ble in ways they have not been hereto-
fore. A more coherent approach in the
legislative branch should also facilitate
better fiscal and organizational plan-
ning in the'executive branch.
An important compromise in the res-
olution, that may stimulate other com-
mittees to examine the intelligence-ac-
tivities of a department or agency in
relation to other functions, is the pro-
vision for sequential referral. Any in-
telligence legislation considered by the
new committee that affects the activities
of such departments as Defense, State,
or Justice, will, upon request, be referred
to the committee responsible for general
oversight of these departments.
There is one important exception to
this provision for sequential referral. All
legislation, including authorization mat-
ters, involving the CIA alone will be re-
ferred to one committee, the new Intelli-
gence Committee. There is no sound
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE May. 13, 19.76
argument for placing jurisdiction over
the only independent, civilian-run for-
eign intelligency agency-the CIA-in
the Armed Services Committees of Con-
gress. At long last this practice will end
in the Senate.
There are other important jurisdic-
tional provisions in the substitute resolu-
tion. Any other. committee of the Senate
has the right to conl;inue to obtain direct
access to the product of intelligence it
may need in order to carry out its legis-
lative and oversight responsibilities. Fur-
ther, there is specific provision for the
right of any other committee to study
and review the. activities of the intelli-
gence agencies when they directly affect
matters otherwise within the committee's
jurisdiction.
Third, in listing major sections of the
resolution that I support, I draw atten-
tion to those dealing with access to, and
treatment of, sensitive information. It is
stated to be the sense of the Senate that
the intelligence agencies should keep the
Intelligence Committee "fully and cur-
rently informed with respect to intelli-
gence activities." The importance of this
proviso cannot be overestimated, Mr.
President. The new committee is to have
access to any information within the
possession of the agencies relating to any
matter within the committee's jurisdic-
tion.
Further, the new committee is to be
fully and currently informed with respect
to "any significant anticipated activi-
ties." This, of course, refers to covert op-
erations. While this does not constitute
a condition precedent to "the implemen-
tation of any such anticipated intelli-
gence activity," the Intelligence Commit-
tee would be informed about covert op-
erations and could consider whether or
not to bring these to the attention of the
Senate in closed session. .
When seen in combination with the
1974 Hughes-Ryan amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act-which provided
that no funds might be expended by the
CIA for operations -not intended solely
for obtaining necessary intelligence, in
the absence of a Presidential finding that
the operation is important to the na-
tional security of the United States, and
a timely report to six committees of Con-
gress-this access to information by the
Intelligence Committee should provide a
meaningful check on clandestine opera-
tions abroad without congressional
knowledge, advice, or consent.
And it will still be possible for the
Senate and Congress as a whole to bar
funds for covert operations in a particu-
lar part of the world--as we did in Angola
under the Tunney amendment last De-
cember.
Finally, on this point, I draw attention
to the final section of the substitute reso-
lution:
Nothing in this resolution shall be con-
strued as constituting acquiescence by the
Senate in any practice, or in the conduct of
any activity, not otherwise authorized by
law.
This is to prevent the CIA or other in-
telligence' agencies from citing Senate
Resolution 400 as authority to conduct
covert operations.
In regard to the treatment of sensi-
tive information, the new committee
would not be allowed to disclose on its
own any classified information obtained
from the executive branch if the Presi-
dent objected to disclosure. But the com-
mittee could take the matter to the Sen-
ate, which could approve or disapprove
disclosure. The final decision would rest
with this body. Any person engaging in
unauthorized disclosure would be liable
to sanctions imposed by the Senate after
an investigation by the Select Commit-
tee on Standards and Conduct.
This leads me to some elements in the
substitute about which I wish to express.
some reservations, Mr. President. .
Senate Resolution 400 would estab-
lish a rather elaborate procedure to per-
mit the President to review and object
to every Intelligence Committee decision
to disclose classified information ob-
tained from the executive branch. This
would permit an unprecedented involve-
ment by another branch of Government
in the operations of a congressional
committee. There would be established a
formal procedure for Presidential review
of committee action, thereby injecting
the President into the operations of the
committee.
There is a separate section in the reso-
lution authorizing the Intelligence Com-
mittee to permit, under rules established
by the committee, a personal represent-
ative of the President to attend closed
meetings of the committee. This provi-
sion is totally unnecessary, Mr. Presi-
dent. Any committee can invite such a
representative at any time, in its dis-
cretion. By formalizing the process,
however, I fear that the are establishin&
a bad precedent that reflects adversely
on the independence of the Senate.
Members of Congress are not invited to
sit on the National Security Council, or
with the U.S. Intelligence Board-for
example.
I note the wording of the Government
Operations Committee report on Senate
Resolution 400 in respect to'this matter,
and I urge other Senators to heed the
interpretation contained therein. The
provision for permitting a Presidential
representative to attend Intelligence
Committee meetings "does not require
the new committee to invite a represent-
ative of the executive branch to attend
closed meetings or establish a presump-
tion that the committee will do so. It
merely makes exp]1 it the power that
any committee has to invite a Presiden-
tial representative to attend committee
deliberations if the committee finds such
representation helpful in conducting its
duties."
As a member of the Budget Committee,
I urged, in the work of the compromis-
ing negotiations which led to introduction
of the pending bill, that the new Intelli-
gence Committee be required to submit-
on or before March 15 of each year-the
views and estimates described in section
301(c) of the Budget Act regarding mat-
ters within its jurisdiction. This require-
ment must be met by all the standing
committees. Observance of it by the in-
telligence Committee will push. along the.
goal of making the Intelligence agencies
fiscally accountable, and I am glad that
an appropriate provision is included in
the bill.
I also note that the new committee is
to study the question of whether or-'qt it
is in the public interest to diselo ny
aspect of intelligence budgets. ad
hoped that this resolution would require
public disclosure of the annual lump sum
budget figure for each of the intelligence
agencies. When testifying before the Sen-
ate Government Operations Committee
on Senate Resolution 400, I proposed an
amendment that would have required
than the annual overall budget figure for
each agency be made public. I remind
Senators that article I, section 9, clause
7 of the Constitution states:
No money shall be drawn from the Treas-
ury, but in consequence of appropriations
made by law; and a regular statement and
account of the receipts and expenditures of
all public money shall be published from
time to time. ,
It is now my understanding that the
issue of making public the overall figures
for the budget of the intelligence agen-
cies will be brought to the floor by the
Church committee before its expiration.
I hope the Senate will decide that issue
affirmatively, and thus set a precedent
for the public release of annual figures
for each agency by the new committee..
In conclusion, Mr. President, let us re-
mind ourselves of the mountain of reve-
lations required to bring us to this mo-
ment of reform. The Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities, in seven
volumes of hearings, numerous staff re-
ports, and two books of final reports-
"Foreign and 14ilitary Intelligence"
"Intelligence Activities and the Righ
Americans"-has revealed two great da
gers to the functioning of a free demo=cratic system: First, the apparatus. fora
covert foreign policy not subject to con-
gressional controls and, on occasion, not
accountable to higher authority in the
executive branch; and second, the trap-
pings and practices of a totalitarian "Big
Brother" regime capable of snooping into
the lives and violating the rights of -mil-
lions of American citizens.
I urge all Americans to read carefully
the final reports of the Church commit-
tee, so as to find. out how close we have
come to a repudiation in practice of the
ideals we preach in regard to how we of
our democracy should conduct ourselves
at home and abroad.
But nothing in the revelations warrants
doing away with our intelligence system
in our dangerous world. Rather, the ques-
tion is how best to achieve an effective
and accountable system..In,the words of
Senator MATHIAS, who served on the
Select Committee:
The answer is for Congress to give the in-
telligence agencies the legal. charters and
careful oversight that we all know are the
best guardians against inefficiency and abuse
of power.
Congress, in accepting its constitu-
tional responsibilities- can, assist the in-
telligence community in emerging from
its present state with the renewed confl-
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May 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 7269
tle uneasy with a large secret establish-
ment operating at home and abroad. We
accept its necessity, but we must watch
it vigilantly.
M / SCHWEIKER. Mr. President, Con-
a heavy responsibility for the
pa buses by America's intelligence
' b"
community. For 20 years, since Senator
MANSFIELD and others first introduced
proposals to establish a new Intelligence
Committee, Congress has failed to act
positively to improve oversight in this
vital area. During that -time the CIA
opened hundreds of thousands of first-
class letters. During that time the Na-
tional Security Agency targeted Amer-
icans whose international communica-
tions would be read. During that time the
FBI sent scurrilous anonymous letters
designed to break up marriages, encour-
aged gang warfare, passed along political
and personal gossip to feed the White
House's insatiable appetite and tried
again and again to discredit Dr. Martin
Luther King. The FBI continued these
attempts even after Dr. King was killed.
Congress bears some responsibility for all
of this.
But the failure of Congress to oversee
effectively U.S. Intelligence agencies did
not result only in the derogation of the
rights of Americans. Another result was
less efficient and effective operations by
the intelligence agencies which are vital
to the national security. Congressional
oversight might well have helped to elim-
inate wasteful duplication. Congres-
sional oversight might have prevented
the breakdown in FBI-CIA liaison on
counterintelligence and might have, made
VIKess vulnerable to the activities of
le foreign intelligence agencies
orating in the country. Congressional
oversight might have meant not only
"more bang for our buck" but "more
know for our dough."
The abuses have been detailed. The
wastefulness has been described. If Con-
gress does not set up an effective over-
sight committee now it will be inviting
further abuse, further inefficiences, and
further weakening of our national se-
curity.
The resolution which a number of
other Senators and I have submitted
would set up a permanent select com-
mittee with legislative authority over
America's national intelligence activities.
It would have the power to authorize the
budget for these activities. Unless the
committee has these powers it will face
the same problems faced by the Senate
select committee. Its only power would
be the power to disclose. It might be
tempted to disclose when that would be
inappropriate. Without legislative and
authorization power, the committee
could hardly overcome the intelligence
agencies' reluctance to provide certain
kinds of information. It would have to
confront without real weapons the. in-
telligence agencies' unwillingness to
publicly disclose almost any information
at all.
Power to authorize the budgets for
American intelligence agencies must lie
Aftth the new committee. If it has this
qp1wer it will carefully scrutinize the
whole range of intelligence activities
making choices on the basis of economy
and efficiency, no committee has had the
authority to do this. If it has the power
to authorize the national intelligence
budget it will be able to make public,
with the consent of the Senate, the lump
sum expended for national intelligence
and finally bring our practices into line
with the Constitution which requires that
the people be told how much of their
money is being spent and for what pur-
poses.
Crucial to the new committee is access
to information. The resolution expresses
the sense of the Senate that the com-
mittee must be kept "fully and currently
informed" about intelligence activities.
This language, suggested by Senator
BAxER was drawn from the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy where it has
proven effective in guaranteeing the Con-
gress access to necessary information.
The resolution also notes that the com-
mittee should be informed about "any
significant anticipated activities." While
the committee's consent would not be
required before covert actions could be
implemented, 'it is clear that the com-
mittee must be provided advance notice
about significant activities. As the Gov-
ernment Operations Committee wrote:
It would be in the interest of sound na-
tioiiai policy for the President to be apprised
in advance if the committee is strongly op-
posed to any particular proposed activity.
At the same time the resolution pro-
vides for access to information, it re-
quires the committee to draw up pro-
cedures designed to insure the security
of. information provided to it. This was
done by the Senate select committee. As
a result, there was no leak of national
security material from our committee.
The resolution also calls for the dis-
ciplining of individuals who leak infor-
mation. ,
Finally, the resolution sets out a
method by which struggles over the pub-
lic disclosure of classified information
can be resolved. If the President objects
to public disclosure and the committee
persists the Senate as a whole would
have to resolve the. dispute. This recog-
nizes the importance of the Presidential
decision. It also recognizes that the public
has a right to know as much as possible
about intelligence without the national
security being jeopardized. It should be
remembered that the President objected
to disclosure of information on attempted
assassinations of foreign leaders and dis-
closure of NSA's access to millions of
American telegrams.
This resolution is the product of 15-
months' work by the hardest working
committee on which I have been priv-
ileged to serve. It reflects extensive hear-
ings by the Government Operations Com-
mittee and the Rules Committee. Based
upon my experience on the Armed Serv-
ices Committee and the Senate select
committee I know this resolution is urg-
ently needed and readily workable. The
President, DCI Bush, and former DCI's
Helms, McCone, and Colby all have
called for effective oversight. This meas-
ure would provide it. This resolution
should be adopted now.
Mr. President, I particularly thank the
chairmen of the respective committees
who played a critical role in bringing
this resolution to the floor of the Senate
and in the American constitutional sys-
tem.
I thank Senator CHURCH, the chair-
man of our Select Committee, for the
yeoman job he did and for the great
amount of energy he expended as leader
and member of our Intelligence Com-
mittee.
I thank and commend the chairman
of the Committee on Government Oper-
ations, Senator. RISICOFF, and the rank-
ing member of that committee, Senator
PERCY, for the great work they did in
evaluating and perfecting the resolu-
tion proposed.
I thank Senator CANNON, chairman of
the Committee on Rules and Administra-
tion, for the job that he and the members
of the committee, including the assist-
ant majority leader, did in working out
the compromise proposal which is be-
fore the Senate today and in resolving
some honest and real differences that the
diverse members of the Senate had with
respect to this problem.
I think that when this chapter in
American history is written, it will show
that this was one of the most important
things we have done in this Congress and
several Congresses. The extent to which
all these chairmen and their respective
committees * played a part in a very con-
structive role in that dialog is a real
credit to the Senate of the United States.
- The resolution which is before the
Senate today, for action by this body, is
a- giant step forward for the American
people.
The PRESIDING ? OFFICER (Mr.
CURTIS). What is the will of the Senate?
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that Joseph Trujillo,
of my staff, be granted the privilege of
the floor during the remainder of the
debate on this measure.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
' Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that Fred Ruth, a
member of my staff, have the privilege
of the floor during the consideration of
this bill and votes'thereon.
The PRESIDING OFFICER, Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. GARY HART. Mr. President, 3
weeks after I arrived in the U.S. Senate,
I had the honor of being appointed to
serve on the Select Committee on Intel-
ligence. As others have indicated, the
work that committee has dope over the
past 15 months has been more than sim-
ply normal, routine legislative business.
We have been confronted with perhaps
one of the most serious problems that has
faced this republic in its existence.
It seems to me that tod.- y's resolution
of that problem should represent to the
American people a sense of restoring
their confidence in the system and how
it works. If we have done anything, I
think it is to show that one house of the
legislature of this country can assume
responsibility for a very difficult task,
approach that task, solve it, and move
on.
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The fact that those who had serious
lestions and doubts about this resolu-
ion have been able to-see their way to
support it is a credit not only to them
but also to the institution itself.
As a member of the committee, I be-
lieve it is not unwarranted to say that
we have approached our task hopefully
and in a thoughtful, intelligent, and re-
sponsible way-the way in which the
Founding Fathers intended the Consti-
tution to work.
What we have done, in my judgment,
is to strengthen our intelligence capa-
bilities, not weaken them; and I believe
that is the judgment of most intelligence
professionals in our country. What we
are accomplishing here today is to share
the responsibility for one of the most
difficult tasks that any nation may en-
counter-certainly, any democracy-and
that is to gather information on an
hourly basis around the world and base
our policies upon that information, and
not jeopardize or threaten the constitu-
tional rights of our citizens or the rights
of other people around the world.
The intelligence oversight resolution
currently before us is unclear on one very
important point. It does not contain un-
ambiguous language with respect to
prior notification by the Executive to the
Senate Oversight Committee of signifi-
cant CIA covert operations. Section
11(a) of the resolution states:
It is the sense of the Senate that the head
of each Department and Agency of the United
States should keep the select committee fully
and currently Informed with respect to Intel-
ligence activities, including any significant
anticipated activities, which are the respon-
sibility of or engaged in by such department
or agency: Provided, That this does not con-
stitute a condition precedent to the imple-
mentation of any such anticipated Intelli-
gence activity.
It is my understanding that the intent
of this language, offered by Senator
BAKER, is to preclude prior consent or
approval of CIA covert operations by the
Senate oversight committee, not to pre-
clude prior notification. Given this .in-
tent, the wording of section 11(a) is
ambiguous. Congressional intent is un-
clear. I propose that we make it clear
today just what our intent is with respect
to prior notification. First, let me trace
the legislative history of the prior notice
provision.
Over 3 months ago, on January 29,
the chairman of 'the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, Senator CHURCH,
introduced the Intelligence Oversight Act
of 1976. That bill, S. 2893, was the com-
mittee's best judgment as to the respon-
sibilities and authority of a new stand-
ing Senate intelligence oversight com-
mittee. It was cosponsored by 8 of the
11 members of the committee, including
myself. Section 13(c) of S. 2893 called
for the Executive to notify the Senate
Oversight Committee of "significant" co-
vert operations-prior to their imple-
mentation. I ask unanimous consent that
S. 2893 be included in the RECORD fol-
lowing my remarks..
In S. 2893, the select committee did
not call for prior approval of CIA covert
operations, only prior notice. It did not
call upon the Executive to notify the
committee of all CIA covert activities,
only "significant" ones. In short, section
13(c) was not drawn to infringe upon
the Executive's constitutional duties or
responsibilities, or to hamper the effec-
tiveness of the CIA. The sole intent of
section 13(c) was to allow Congress to
advise the Executive before significant
CIA covert operations are begun. -
The committee chose the word "sig-
nificant" carefully. During the course of
the select committee's investigation, we
found that, since 1961, the CIA has con-
-ducted some 900 major or sensitive
covert action projects and several thou-
sand smaller ones. Most of the CIA's
covert action projects are approved in-
ternally. Those that are considered po-
litically risky or involve large sums of
money go to a National Security Council
Subcommittee, known until recently as.
the 40 Committee, for review and policy
approval. As a general rule, the 40 Com-
mittee reviewed political and propaganda
programs, including support for political
parties, groups, or specific political or
military leaders; economic action pro-
grams; paramilitary operations; and
counterinsurgency programs. These are
"significant" covert activities. They are
the type that go to the NSC Subcommit-
tee for policy approval. They are the type
that would require prior notice to the
Senate oversight committee.
The Government Operations Commit-
tee,. to which the select committee's
oversight proposal was referred, also en-
dorsed the concept of prior notification.
Section 10(a) of the committee's over-
sight proposal, Senate Resolution 400,
stated that the new Intelligence Over-
sight Committee should be kept "fully
and currently informed with respect to
intelligence activities, including any sig-
nificant anticipated activities." I ask
unanimous consent that Senate Resolu-
tion 400, as reported out by the Govern-
ment Operations Committee, be included
at the end of my remarks.
The Government Operations Commit-
tee defined "any significant anticipated
activities" as those activities which are
"particularly costly financially" and
those which have "any potential for af-
fecting this country's diplomatic, . po-
litical, or military relations wtih other
countries or groups." In short, the Gov-
ernment Operations Committee defined
significant activities as those which have
policy implications.
In its report on Senate Resolution 400,
the Government Operations Committee
explained that advance notice of "sig-
nificant anticipated activities" was not
equivalent to a veto of these activities.
According to the committee report:
The committee will not be able formally
to "veto" by a veto of its members any pro-
posed significant activity it learns about in
advance. As a number of present and former
Government officials point out, however,
including Secretary Kissinger, Mr. Rusk, Mr.
Phillips, Mr. Colby, Mr. McCone, Mr. Clif-
ford, and Mr. Helms, it would be in the in-
terest of sound national policy for the
President to be appraised in advance if the'
committee is strongly opposed to any par-
ticular proposed activity. In making his
final decision, the President should have
the benefit of knowing the view of the, com-
mittee on such Important matters.
Neither the original language of Sen-
ate Resolution 400, as ? offered by the
Government Operations Committee, nor
the language contained in the coinpro
mise resolution before us today would
legally bind the Executive to notify the
oversight committee in advance: of a-
presses the "sense of the Senate." The
Select Committee on Intelligence took
this into account when it issued its for-
eign intelligence final report on April 26.
In that report, the committee recom-
mended that, by statute, the Director
of Central Intelligence keep the new
intelligence oversight committee fully
informed of each covert action prior to
its initation.
The only statute we now have relating
to notification of Congress by the Execu-
tive of covert operations is the Hughes-
Ryan amendment to the 1974 Foreign
Assistance Act. That amendment re-
quires the President to certify that co-
vert operations in foreign countries,
other than those intended solely for ob-
taining necessary intelligence, are "im-
portant to the national security of the
United States" and to report, "in a timely
fashion," a description and scope of
these operations to the appropriate com-
mittees of Congress.
This has meant, in practice, reporting
to the Armed Services, Foreign Relations,
and Appropriations Committees of both
Houses as well as two select intelligence
committees. The Senate select commit-
tee recommended that the Hughes-Ryan
amendment be amended, once the Sen-
ate established an intelligence oversight
committee with authorization authority,
to provide that the covert action notifi
tions and Presidential certifications
the Senate be consolidated in the Zi
oversight committee. I support this rec-
ommendation, although I will propose
that prior notification be a part of any
amendment to Hughes-Ryan.
The Senate must have prior notifica-
tion of significant CIA covert operations.
The Senate must know about and be able
to advise the President if he intends to.
mount a paramilitary operation-such
as in the Congo, Laos, or Angola, promote
a military coup-as in Chile between
September 15 and October 24, 1970, or
wage economic warfare such as opera-
tion mongoose, directed against Cuba.
Covert activities are too dangerous-and
too controversial-to be a tool used by
the President without congressional con-
sultation.
Prior notification is essential for an-
other reason. The select committee
found that the secrecy and compartmen-
tation which surrounds covert operations
contributes to a temptation on the part
of the Executive to resort to covert op-
erations to avoid bureaucratic, congres-
sional, and public debate. The select
committee found that the Executive has
used the CIA to conduct covert opera-
tions because it is less accountable than
other government agencies. Further, the
committee found that the temptation of
the Executive to use covert action as a
"convenience" and as a substitute for
publicly accountable policies has been
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May 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
to alleviate, if not solve, many of these
problems.
The select committee and the Gov-
ernment Operations Committee have not
bee lone in calling for prior notifica-
tiopr example, former Secretary of
De a Clarkin
lark Clifford told the select
committee:
With reference to covert activities, I be-
lieve it would be appropriate for this com-
mittee to be informed in advance by the
executive branch of the Government before
a covert project is launched. The committee
should be briefed and, if it approves, then
the activity can go forward. If the commit-
tee disapproves, it should inform the Presi-
dent of its disapproval so that he will have
the benefit of the Joint Committee's reaction.
If necessary, the President and the commit-
tee can confer, after which the President
may decide to abandon the project or
possibly modify it. If he persists in going
ahead despite the committee's disapproval,
then the committee might wish to withhold
funds necessary to finance the activity in
question. It is my feeling that the impor-
tance of the decisionmaking process in this
very delicate field is such that there should
be a joint effort by the executive and legis-
lative branches.
Cyrus Vance, a former Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense and a member of the
predecessor to the 40 Committee-the
303 Committee-had this to say about
prior notice:
I would recommend that the President be
required to give his approval in writing,
certifying that he believes the proposed
[covert] action is essential to the national
security. After the President's approval, I
would suggest' that a full and complete
description of the proposed action be com-.
municated immediately to a joint congres-
siQQ&S~al oversight committee .. , I believe
u,
,h a step would then put the com-
i e or any of its members in a position
to express their disapproval or concerns about
the proposed action, and communicate them
to the President of the United-States.
I am not suggesting that the committee
should have a veto. I do not believe that
is necessary. I am suggesting that the com-
mittee or its individual members would be
able to communicate with the President,
thus giving him the benefit of the commit-
tee's advice or of the advice of individual
members.
Finally, former CIA Director Richard
Helms has also come out in support of
prior notice. In an exchange with Sen-
ator RlslcoFF of the Government Opera-
tions Committee, Mr. HELMS stated:
Senator RiBIcorF. At what stage should an
oversight committee be brought into the
covert activity, or the covert plannin
which should be the relationship been
the Intelligence Agency and the Oversight
Committee?
Mr. HELMS. It seems to me that on this
question of oversight, one should be able to
come to the committee and sit down and
discuss a proposed operation to find out
whether or not this was something that was
going to.be supported by the committee.
I say this for a very simple and prac-
tical reason. That is, if you are going to
embark on some covert action which in-
volves money, relationships, assets and all
the rest of it, it seems hardly sensible to
embark on some ambitious program like that,
if your leg is going to be cut out from under
you two or three months later when you are
in mid-stream.
Therefore, if there Is going to be congres-
nal oversight and the Congress is going
work with the executive branch in these
titters, then it seems to me that it has to
go along hand in hand, for practical, if not
legal, reasons.
Mr. HELMS concluded by saying that
as a practical matter, "if there is going
to be an Oversight Committee I think
they ought to be in on the takeoff."
The Senate must have prior notifica-
tion of significant CIA covert operations.
The resolution before us does not state
that explicitly. Although the resolution,
if passed, will not bind the Executive, I
believe it is important to place the Ex-
ecutive on notice that it is the clear in-
tent of the Senate that it be given ad-
vance notice of approved CIA covert
operations before'they are implemented.
In closing, I quote from the select
committee's final report on foreign in-
telligence: -
The committee's review of covert action has
underscored the necessity for a thorough-
going strengthening of the Executive's in-
ternal review process for covert action and
for the establishment of a realistic system
of accountability, both within the Executive,
and to Congress and to the American people.
The requirement for a rigorous and credible
system of control and accountability is com-
plicated, however, by the shield of secrecy
which must necessarily be imposed on any
covert activity if it is to remain covert. The
challenge is to find a substitute for the pub-
lic scrutiny through congressional debate and
press action that normally attends Govern-
ment decisions:
I believe this challenge can be met. But
Congress and the Executive must work
together. It is for this reason that I be-
lieve prior notification is essential.
I think the feeling on the part of the
members of the Select Committee is that
those who will have the responsibility of
watchdogging intelligence gathering
through agencies of our Government
should have cooperation and timely no-
tice of the activities being undertaken by
those agencies on behalf of the American
people.
X join my colleagues in congratulating
not only the leadership of the various
committees, but Members of the Senate
who have seen fit to support this measure
as a sound, reasonable, thoughtful, and
intelligent approach ' to this kind of pe-.
culiar problem in this country. I think
that history will have to judge whether
we have, done the right thing or the
wrong thing, but I believe that the facts
speak for themselves: that we have taken
the steps that have to be taken to pre-
serve and protect our own liberties and
safeguard the future of this country.
I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. What is
the pleasure of the Senate?
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I send to
the desk an unprinted amendment and
ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The legislative clerk read as follows:.
The Senator from Illinois.(Mr. PEacY) pro-
poses an amendment on page 3, line 24, strike
"nine" and insert "eight".
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the
amendment would simply do this: Under
the agreement that had been reached in
the compromise amendment, every mem-
ber assigned to this committee would
serve for a term of no longer than 9
years. Members of the staff pointed out
S 7271
to the distinguished chairman of the
Committee on Rules and Administra-
tion that a 9-year maximum term would
require the interruption of a Congress
and that it would be better to have an
even number of years. Therefore, the
purpose of the present amendment is to
reduce the maximum number of years
that any Senator can serve on the Intel-
ligence Oversight Committee from 9 to 8
years. Obviously, it could be 10. The Sen-
ator from Illinois prefers 8. I so offer this
amendment.
I understand that it has the accept-
ance of the chairman of the Committee
on Government Operations, the manager
of the bill, and that the distinguished
Senator from Nevada, the chairman of
the Committee on Rules and Administra-
tion, may wish to comment on it. It was
the impression of the Senator from Illi-
nois that he concurred, as I do, with 8 of
10 years.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I have no
problem with the proposal. I do think it
is better to have 8 or 10 than it is the 9-
year period of limitation, because it
would coincide with terms of Congress.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I ac-
cept the amendment of the Senator from
Illinois as the manager of the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER, The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there
further amendments?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr, President, I ask
that all those who have amendments-I
understand there are one or two on the
Republican side and one on this side-
come to the floor, because there is a rea-
sonable chance that we can finish this
bill today if the Members are ere and
we dig in. If we cannot do it by' 6:30, we
shall go over until tomorrow. If we can
finish it by 6:30, we shall go over at the
end of business today to Monday.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The -clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER, Without
objection, it is so ordered.
SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 196-
PERTAINING TO THE ESTABLISH-
MENT OF THE SMITHSONIAN IN-
STITUTION
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I send to the
desk a joint resolution on behalf of my-
self, Mr. Hugh Scott, and Mr. Jackson
and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint
resolution will be stated by title.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A joint resolution (S. J. Res. 196) providing
for the expression to Her Majesty, Queen
Elizabeth II, of the appreciation of the peo-
ple of the United States for the bequest of
James Smithson to the United States, en-
abling the establishment of the Smithsonian
Institution.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to its immediate consideration?
The Chair hears none, and it is so
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 13, 1976
ordered. Without objection, the joint re-
solution will be considered as having been
read the second time at length.
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, this is sim-
ply an expression of Congress to be pre-
sented to the Queen when she appears
here on the 8th of June, of appreciation
for the bequest of James Smithson, who
founded the Smithsonian Institution, in
which we express gratitude that Mr.
Smithson, a British subject, did that for
the United States.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on the engrossment and third
reading of the joint resolution.
The joint resolution was ordered to be
engrossed for a third reading read the
third time, and passed.
The preamble was agreed to.
The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 196),
with its preamble, reads as follows:
S.J. REs. 196
Joint resolution providing for the expression
to Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II, of the
appreciation of the people of the United
States for the bequest of James Smithson
to the United States, enabling the estab-
lishment of the Smithsonian Institution
Whereas James Smithson, British subject,
scholar and scientist, bequeathed his entire
estate to the United States of America "to
found at Washington under the name of the
Smithsonian Institution an establishment
for the increase and diffusion of Knowledge
among men;" and -
Whereas the Congress of the United States
in 1836 accepted the bequest and pledged the
faith of this nation to the execution of this
trust, and in 1846 provided for the establish-
ment of the Smithsonian Institution; and
Whereas the Smithsonian Institution, since
the time of its founding, has been mindful
of the charge stated in the will of James
Smithson and has, through research and pub-
lication, through the collecting of natural
history specimens and objects of art, culture,
history and technology, and through the
creation of museums for the display and in-
terpretation of these collections, been privi-
leged to share its resources, not only with
the people of the United States, but with the
world community, for purposes of education,
enlightenment, and betterment; and
Whereas the generous and inspiring be-
quest of James Smithson continues to en-
rich the lives of citizens of every nation:
.Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That on the occasion
of the visit of Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth
II, during this year of the Bicentennial of
the United States, the people of this nation
make known their appreciation and gratitude
for the gift of James Smithson, a gift whose
significance grows with the passage of time
and remains a lasting symbol of the indi-
visible cultural bonds which link Great
Britain and the United States of America.
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I suggest the
absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. PHILIP A. HART. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. PHILIP A. HART. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that during fur-
ther consideration of Senate Resolution
400, Burton Wides of my staff be Per-
mitted access to the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. PHILIP A. HART. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER DISCHARGING COMMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
FROM FURTHER CONSIDERATION
OF S. 2715
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Committee
on Government Operations be discharged
from further consideration of S. 2715,
and that the Committee on the Judiciary
be authorized to report the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, yester-
day the Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary ordered reported S. 2715, a bill to
amend the Administrative Procedure Act
to permit awards of reasonable attorney
fees and other expenses of participation
in proceedings before Federal regulatory
agencies and on judicial review of agency
actions. This bill was introduced Novem-
ber 20, 1975, by Senator KENNEDY, and I
was pleased to join him as cosponsor of
this important measure. At the time the
bill was introduced, unanimous consent
was obtained to. have the bill referred to
both the Committee on the Judiciary and
the Committee on Government Opera-
tions, with instructions that either com-
mittee report within 30 days of the other
committee.
With the agreement of the ranking
minority member of the Committee- on
Government Operations, Senator PERCY,
I have requested unanimous consent to-
day that our committee be discharged
from further consideration of S. 2715. I
have done so in light of the requirements
under the Senate's new, budget process
that each bill authorizing the expendi-
ture of Federal funds be reported to the
floor by May 15, 1976. I had hoped that
the Committee on Government Opera-
tions would have had the opportunity to
consider fully S. 2715 before Senate ac-
tion, but the present workload of the
committee makes it impossible for us to
consider the bill formally by the time
deadline. However, I believe that this bill
would provide such significant and neces-
sary assistance to both the public and
the agencies that any delay in passage is
highly undesirable. I certainly do not
want our heavy agenda to impede in any
way the chances for obtaining appro-
priations under- this legislation for fiscal
year 1977.
The Committee-on Government opera-
tions has a direct and strong interest in
the subject matter of this bill. Providing
support for citizen involvement in our
agency processes is an integral element of
strengthening the institutions of govern-
ment. It is a matter which our special
study on regulatory reform is addressing.
It is consistent with and complementary
to the institutional advocacy of consumer
interests in Government proceedings that
would be afforded by the Agency for Con-
sumer Advocacy, which our com ttee
developed anc_ which would be esta cd
by a bill that has passed both these
and Senate earlier in this Congress.
Furthermore, in the 93d Congress, the
Government Operations Committee re-
ported out the legislation which estab-
lished the Energy Research and Develop-
ment Administration and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. The bill which
passed the Senate contained a provision
similar to S. 2715 which would have pro-
vided financial assistance to intervenors
in NRC proceedings. While that provision
was subsequently deleted in the con-
ference, the Government Operations
Committee had and continues to have
a great interest in the concepts em-
bodied in S. 2715.
While I believe that the bill ordered
reported by the Committee on the Judi-
ciary contains substantial improvements
and useful clarifications as amended by
that committee, I doubt that the 3-year
authorization imposed, by that com-
mittee will give the legislation enough
time to have the fullest possible impact.
This may not be an adequate amount of
time for Congress to evaluate adequately
the success of the program, and I hope
this matter can be addressed when the
bill comes up for deliberation on the
floor.
I also want to commend Senator
Kennedy, the Committee on the Judi-
ciary, and its Subcommittee on Admin-
istrative Practice and Procedure r
their efforts which led to the repo
of this important bill.
The Committee on Government Opera-
tions, while being discharged from formal
consideration of S. 2715, will certainly
continue to examine both the specific
provisions of the bill and the general
principles it embodies, so that we con-
tinue to make our own contributions to
the development of legislation in this
area.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence
of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll. -
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll. -
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President, I
ask. animous consent that the order for
thec forum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400)
to establish a Standing Committee of
the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and
for other purposes.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President, on
behalf of Senator Roris, Senator JAVITS,
and myself, I send an amendment to the
desk and ask for its immediate consid-
eration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. A
amendment will be stated.
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1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-
13
M
,
ay
The assistant legislative clerk read as I consider this, as Senator CANNON
follows: said, a key element-perhaps the key
The senator from Kentucky (Mr. HUDDLE- element-in the bill. Are we worthy of
sToN) for himself and Mr. ROTH and Mr. this trust?
JAVITS proposes an amendment: _ I am deeply indebted to both my col-
mitte'e on Standards and Conduct to investi-
gate any unauthorized disclosure of intelli-
gence information by a Member, officer or
employee of the Senate in violation of sub-
section (c) and to report to the Senate con-
cerning any allegation which it finds to be
substantiated.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President,
one of the major concerns of many of
us interested in developing an oversight
committee for our intelligence operations
has been that such a committee be
responsible in its handling of secret and
sensitive information.
Many of us felt from the beginning
that the Senate should be willing to
impose upon itself a certain restraint-
a certain discpline-with regard to the
manner in which such information is
handled.
This particular section of the sub-
stitute represents an effort to set out a
procedure for handling any unauthorized
disclosure of information that the com-
mittee had determined should not be
disclosed. That procedure envisions an
investigation by the. Select Committee
on standards and conduct and recom-
mendations from that Committee in
cases where the allegation is sub-
stantiated.
The amendment that is before the
Senate at this time is designed to clarify
section (d), which is found on page 15
also to provide flexibility so that unsub-
stantiated or frivolous matters would not
have to be reported back to the Senate.
The other sections of the so-called
sanctions provision which are not being
modified seek to delinate what informa-
tion is to be protected and to suggest
procedures which should be followed
when an investigation is pursued.
it is my judgment that the amend-
ment I have, just offered does clarify this
matter and does provide a viable and
workable procedure whereby we can
exercise the proper discipline and the
proper restraint upon Members of the
Senate, members of the Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence, and staff so that the
new committee can enjoy the confidence
that will be necessary if it is to carry
out its duties in a responsible way.
I move that the amendment be
adopted, and I yield to the Senator from
New York.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from New York.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, this is a
subject in which I am deeply interested
myself. I was a party to the proceedings
before the Government Operations Com-
mittee respecting it. I worked out the
amendment. _
I felt, Mr. President, just to present
my remarks of record, that if we could-
I emphasize this-if we could, we should
avoid any appearance of pitting Mem-
ber against Member or of any appear-
ance of indictment. I believe that what
we have worked out admirably does this.
I hope very much that the managers
of the bill will agree.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I am
pleased to join the two Senators in spon-
soring this compromise. I would like to
point out that in the Government Opera-
tions Committee I was particularly con-
cerned about assuring that sensitive in-
formation supplied to the oversight com-
mittee would be held in confidence and,
in the event of any violation of that con-
fidence, the Senate would discipline any
Member of the Senate or any employee
according to its own rules.
I think the only way we can be certain
that the Oversight Committee is going
to secure the information from the ex-
ecutive branch that it needs to provide
effective oversight is to make certain-
that the executive branch believe that
we will exercise the self-discipline that is
necessary. I am pleased that the com
promise legislation essentially adopts the
language that I sponsored in the Gov-
ernment Operations Committee.
I think the final proposal that Senator
HUDDLESTON just suggested is a reason-
able compromise as to how we initiate
action to require an investigation of un-
authorized disclosures.
We want to assure that the Ethics
Committee will take action any time a
serious charge is made.
I find in my home State that many
people are concerned whether. or not
Congress is exercising the same disci-
pline on itself that it expects from the
private sector and executive branch. For
this reason, I think it is very important
that we show that we are deadly serious
that the Senate and its Members, like
everyone else, must abide by any secrecy
that we have ourselves established on
this information. For that reason, I- am
happy to join in sponsoring the com-
promise.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I commend
Senator HUDDLESTON, Senator JAVITS and
Senator ROTH for this amendment. I ask
unanimous consent that I be added as a
cosponsor of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
PEARSON). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. PERCY. I think the heart of a
cooperative relationship between the in-
telligence community in the executive
branch of Government and the Congress
is a feeling of confidence on the part of
the intelligence community that infor-
provision which is now in the bill. mation transmitted to the Congress and
I share completely the sentiments and its appropriate committees will be treat-
disquiets voiced by my colleague from ed in confidence. There can be no rela-
ntucky and my colleague from Dela- tionship of mutual confidence estab-
e. - lished if there is a feeling that what-
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ever is given in classified form is going
to be dispersed without adequate check-
ing procedure, and that if any member
does breach confidentiality no action
would be taken.
There is a cynical feeling that the
Congress is reluctant to discipline its
own membership, that it is a sort of in-
side club where sometimes indiscretions
are overlooked.
This amendment specifically addresses
itself to the fact that it is the 'duty of
the Committee on Ethics and Conduct to
investigate, look into, and take action
with respect to a breach of confidential-
ity in intelligence matters.
I believe the amendment is sound. It
not only is needed and necessary, but it
will help establish the kind of a rela-
tionship which can, should, and must
exist between the executive branch of
Government and Congress, if the Con-
gress is to fulfill and carry out its duties
and obligations. It will be reassuring in
that respect.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I find no
difficulty with the amendment as pro-
posed.
I would say to my colleague from Il-
linois, however, when he pointed out
it would be the duty of the committee
to investigate, we have rules within the
committee which we have defined to say
when we will investigate matters and
when we will not, so that we do not go on
witch hunts into unsubstantiated infor-
mation.
I want to make it clear to the Sen-
ator that, as chairman of the commit-
tee, if I am still chairman, we would
consider it our duty but we would still
require that any allegation comply with
the rules the committee has adopted, so
that we would not necessarily be investi-
gating on the basis of anonymous com-
plaints or a statement someone has
made, and things of that sort, without
having some kind of substantiation.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. CANNON. Yes.
Mr. PERCY. As a further clarifying
comment, as I read the amendment
which has been worked out now and
agreed to by the authors, a duty is im-
posed upon the Select Committee on
Standards and Conduct to make an in-
vestigation of any unauthorized dis-
closure of intelligence information.
In conversations about this, there was
a proposal, and it was discussed at great
length in the Government Operations
Committee, as to whether it would be
necessary before an investigation was
made for any Member of the Senate or
a group of Members of the Senate to
actually make charges and request that
such an investigation be made. It was
felt, and I believe very wisely so, by the
distinguished Senator from New York
(Mr. JAVITS), that that might, in itself,
almost constitute, an indictment.
If the committee had that duty, and
it is the duty of the committee to make
such an investigation, it is up to it to
determine whether, in fact, there has
been an unauthorized disclosure of in-
telligence information. Then it automat-
ically is their duty to follow through.
No other Member of -the Senate need
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take' action other than the members of
that committee.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield to me so the intent will
be clear?
Mr. CANNON. Certainly.
Mr. JAVITS. There is nothing in here
which interferes with the internal ad-
ministration of the committee and its
rulings. In short, it is like an appellate
court, which might meet in confidence
on a particular decision. The committee
will decide whether it is frivolous,
whether it is unauthorized, and an ad-
ditional factor, whether it is substanti-
ated. Then they are required to report
to the Senate. The responsibility is in
their hands but we give them the guide-
lines. As to how they discharge that re-
sponsibility is internal to the committee.
Mr. CANNON. I thank the Senator.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield at that point?
Mr. CANNON. I yield.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. I wanted to con-
firm the position taken by the distin-
guished-Senator from New York. I point
out that one of the important aspects
of the responsibility of the Select Com-
mittee on Standards and Conduct would
be to eliminate- frivolous charges which
might be made. I believe we ought to be
aware that one way to harass the com-
mittee in the -performance of its duty,
regardless of what the source might be,
whether it be an agency downtown, the
White House, the press, or Members of
the Senate, would be a series of charges
regarding release of information which
should not be disclosed.
This does impose on the Select Com-
mittee on Standards and Conduct a con-
siderable responsibility in reviewing
these charges, of examining the infor-
mation which comes to them,. and re-
porting back to the Senate on those
which seem to be substantiated. But, it
also seeks to make it clear that the com-
mittee is to have the flexibility, the dis-
cretion, to dismiss frivolous and unwar-
ranted allegations.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, this is
an excellent amendment, and as man-
ager of the bill I find it acceptable.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I move to
reconsider the vote by which the amend-
ment was agreed to.
Mr. RIBICOFF. I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
Mr. CANNON, Mr. President, I send
an amendment to the desk and ask for
its immediate consideration. -
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
The Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON)
proposes an amendment.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that further reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 2, line 19, strike out "seventeen"
and insert "fifteen"; on page 3, line 3, strike
out lines 3 through 5 inclusive and insert
in lieu thereof "seven members to be ap-
pointed from the Senate at large." On page
3, line 12, strike out "five" and insert "four";
on page 3, line 15, strike out "four" and
insert "three."
Mr. CANNON. What this amendment
does is change the membership of the
committee from 17 to 15. It leaves the
basic appointments the same: two mem-
bers from the Committee on Appropria-
tions, two members from the Commit-
tee on Armed Services, two members
from the Committee from the Commit-
tee on the Judiciary. Then it says that
the remaining seven members shall be
appointed from the Senate at large. The
manner of appointment is the same, four
appointed under the clause E by the
President pro tempore of the Senate
upon recommendations of the majority
leader, and three by the President pro
tempore upon recommendations of the
minority leader.
Mr. President, first with respect to the
size of the committee: The Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, which did such
a fine job for us, was composed of 11
members, and they were able to do their
job very well. This amendment would re-
duce the proposal from 17 to 15.
Mr. President, I offer this amendment
because it proposes to create a select
committee composed of Senators selected
on a basis that would not give due repre-
sentation to the Senators who make up
the standing committees on Appropria-
tions, Armed Services, Foreign Relations,
and the Judiciary. The formula as pro-
posed in the amendment would allow only
8 Senators to represent the members-
ship on those 4 committees which now
have jurisdiction over the intelligence
activities of our Government which num-
ber 61 of the total 100 Senators while 9
would be appointed from among the other
39 Senators.
It should be emphasized that a mem-
bership of 17 tends to maize a somewhat
unwieldy committee. Compare this with
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
for example, the most comparable situa-
tion that we now have. That committee
has only 18 members consisting of 9 from
each House.
In the case of the Select Committee on
Government Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities, it had only a
membership of 11; only 3 of that 1l were
not members of the 4 standing commit-
tees enumerated above. What we propose
in the pending substitute would prohibit
.the Senate from appointing all of those
illustrious Senators who made up the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Activities which did a job which was so
highly commended by the Senate. There-
fore, it would appear to me that we should
look at this situation very seriously with
a. view that with a smaller membership
the committe could work more efficiently
and reduce the possibility of sensitive or
secret information from being improper-
ly disclosed at the same time give the
four standing committees concerned and
the other Members of the Senate not on
those committees a more equally bal-
anced representation.
I point out that even the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy, which is the
joint committee going into investigative
matters, is composed of only 18 members,
9 from the Senate and 9 from the House
of Representatives.
With respect to the other 1' provisions that we had in the #ion
nal
resolution, it was drafted so that only
eight members of the committee could be
from the four committees enumerated
and nine members would be from the re-
mainder of the Senate, exclusive of those
four committees, which meant there
were 59 Members of the Senate who are
members of those four committees, so
59 percent of the Members of the Sen-
ate would make up eight members of the -
committee and 41 percent of the Senate
would make up nine members of the
committee. This gives a more equitable
balance, but if the leadership in its wis-
dom should happen to select a Senator
for that committee who happened to be a
third person on one of the other commit-
tees, the leadership would not be pre-
cluded by law from so doing.
I point out to the Senate that under
the original language in the substitute,
as it now exists, there are two members
of the present Select Committee To Study
Governmental Operation With Respect
to Intelligence Activities who could not
serve or be reappointed to the new com-
mittee under that type of a ground rule.
I think we have reliance on our major-
ity and minority leaders; and the
amendment would remove the prohibi-
tion, so we would not be in- a position
that we could not appoint, if the leader-
ship so desired; three members from the
who served so well on this commie,
simply because they were the third
person.
I have cleared this amendment with
Senator PERCY, Senator RiBICOFF, and
Senator MANSFIELD.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, the
amendment is acceptable to me. I have
talked with Senator MANSFIELD, Senator
PERCY, and Senator CANNON, and it is ac-
ceptable to them as well.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment.
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. President, I desire
to be heard on this amendment.
While I first heard about this proposed
amendment only a few moments ago, it
strikes me as an extremely dangerous
amendment for the effectiveness of the
resolution.
I do not wish to be the only Senator to
object, but I feel strongly about this
situation.
I agree with the distinguished Senator
from Nevada that a committee of 17
members is rather large, and while we
were trying to reach some understanding
with regard to the resolution I express
my concern about, this amendment, but
I thought, in order to go along with the
resolution and to have a resolution con-
sidered and agreed to, it would be better
to proceed, accomplish that, and have it
over with.
But it seems to me that what we i
doing now is we are giving control
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this new committee, that is being created
for the purpose of oversight of intelli-
gence agencies, back to the same commit-
tees that have had the oversight of these
into ence agencies during the period
of when so many of these abuses
too ce. ,
One of the compelling arguments for
the creation of this, committee was the
fact that these very committees from
which we are now proposing to select
the majority, the Committees on Appro-
priations, Armed Services, Foreign Af-
fairs, and the Judiciary, carry the heavi-
est load in the Senate, and one of the
reasons that was given for the creation of
a special committee was to create a com-
mittee that would have adequate time to
devote to the oversight functions of the
committee.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a question?
Mr. MORGAN. I yield.
Mr. CANNON. Was the Senator aware
of the fact that the Intelligence Commit-
tee itself, made up of 11 members, was
composed of 8 members from those 41
committees?
Mr. MORGAN. I am very well aware of
that fact. But the committee was created
for a special purpose with an extremely
large staff, a much larger staff than we
are ever going to have, I certainly hope,
in this oversight committee, but as it
now is set up we would have a majority
of Senators from these same four com-
mittees, that day after day, week after
week, month after month, and year after
year are going to have the responsibility
for proposing legislation concerning the
AU&ed Forces and the foreign affairs of
t nited States, and the apropriations,
TAW affect every espect of Government,
including the judiciary, and the affairs of
this country.
This, does not strike me as being in
the best interests of the Oversight
Committee.
7f we are going to place all the re-
sponsibility right back in the. hands of
those where it has been through all the
period of time when the abuses took
place, I am not, sure we will have
accomplished very much.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence
of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. President, there is
objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection
is heard.
The call of the roll was continued.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER . (Mr.
TAFT). Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, r modify
my amendment by the addition of the-
owing:
Wn page 3, line 11, strike commencing with
the word "after" to and including the word
"member" on line 12.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment is so modified.
Will the Senator send the modification
to the desk?
The modification is as follows:
On page 3, lines 11 and 12, strike the fol-
lowing "after consultation with their chair-
man and ranking minority member."
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, the part
I have just stricken removes the pro-
vision limiting the appointment by the
majority leader and the appointment by
the President pro tempore upon recom-
mendation of the majority and minority
leaders, to after consultation with the
chairmen and ranking minority mem-
bers of the four committees concerned.
This,gave some members a problem.
However, I want to make it clear that we
would certainly expect that the majority
and minority leaders would consult the
chairmen of the respective committees
involved before naming Senators to the
membership of the committee.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. CANNON. I yield.
Mr. PERCY. The Senator from Illi-
nois addresses this question to the chair-
man of the Committee on Rules and
Administration and to the distinguished
majority and minority leaders.
It is the understanding of the Sena-
tor from Illinois that it would be the in-
tention of the majority and minority
leaders, in the case of membership to be
drawn from these four named commit-
tees, to-consult the chairman and the
ranking minority member-not be bound
by their judgment, but certainly discuss
the issue with them. In the selection of
the at-large members, they would make
their selection, and then the entire slate
would be submitted to the caucus, for
the reaction of the caucus, on both the
majority and minority sides.
The Senator from Illinois would ap-
preciate a clarification as to how the ma-
jority and minority leaders would in-
tend to act under the provisions of this
particular section.
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, if
the Senator will yield, that would run
counter to the rules of the Senate and
the provision of the law, which require
that when appointments are made by
the majority and minority leaders, or by
the President pro tempore on the recom-
mendation of the majority and minority
leaders, that is the way it is done. There-,
fore, it could not be further limited as
the Senator from Illinois suggests.
Mr. CANNON. In other words, those
appointments are subject to the ap=
proval of the Senate as a whole but not
required to be approved by the caucus,
and there is no provision written into the
law with respect to the caucus.
Mr. PERCY. Could you clarify as to
how the procedure actually is carried
out?
Mr. CANNON. I would have to yield
to the majority and minority leaders to
explain their position on that.
.. Mr. HUGH SCOTT. If I may speak for
the time I have remaining in this body,
it would be obvious, I think, that the
minority leader always consults with the
ranking minority member. I cannot
imagine a future minority leader putting
at risk the further hazards of his job by
S 7275
doing otherwise, and I am sure the ma-
jority leader has the same opinion.
Mr. PERCY: With respect to those to
be drawn at large-
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. I am speaking of
those to be drawn at large.
Mr. PERCY. Then there would be pres-
entation of those names to the-
Mr. MANSFIELD. To the full Senate.
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. That is in accord-
ance with law.
? Mr. RIBICOFF. Will the Senator
yield?
Mr. CANNON.'Yes, I yield.
Mr. RIBICOFF. It is my understand-
ing and has been my understanding
throughout these discussions that the
appointing authority ultimately and ab-
solutely rests with the majority and
minority leaders. Is that not correct?
Mr. CANNON. That is correct.
Mr. RIBICOFF. It is expected, as a
basis of comity, ? that the majority and
minority leaders will discuss the ap-
pointments with the chairmen and rank-
ing minority members of these four com-
mittees. Is that not correct?
Mr. CANNON. The Senator is correct.
Mr. RIBICOFF. But is it not also true
that there is no obligation on the part of
the majority and minority leaders to
take the recommendations of the chair-
men and ranking minority members?
Mr. CANNON. The Senator is correct.
Mr. RIBICOFF. During all these dis-
cussions and at the hearings, and, as a
matter of fact, questioning Senator
MANSFIELD when he appeared before the
Committee on Government operations
as to the makeup, Senator MANSFIELD-
speaking for himself, of course, and not
for Senator ScoTT-pointed out,-that in
making these appointments, he would
take into account the makeup of the
entire Senate to reflect, for example, the
sectional diversity of the Senate,.the dif-
ferences in seniority, and age, and the
like. I have the utmost confidence in the
appointing discretion of Senator MANS-
FIELD and his wisdom and judgment. No
matter what we write in as formula, I am
confident that Senator MANSFIELD and
Senator ScoTT on this first committee
will see to it that the first appointments
to the committeee reflect the composi-
tion and the philosophy of the entire
Senate.
?I am sure that whether this committee
will be a success or a failure will depend
upon the 15 Members chosen by the ma-
jority and minority leadership. I am also
confident that they will exercise this re-
sponsibility to make sure that the Intelli-
gence Committee will do the job it has
been intended to do by the legislation
before us.
Mr. CANNON. I agree completely with
the Senator.
I yield to the Senator from North
Carolina.
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. President, I would
have, of course, preferred that the com-
-mittee remain as it was constituted be-
fore, but I do think that the Senator's
modification of the amendment makes it
more acceptable. It may appear to some
to be just a question, of semantics, and
I certainly agree that no majority leader
would make an appointment to this
committee from any given one of the
four committees without first conferring
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
with the chairman or the ranking mi-
nority member. But it seems to me that
when we write it into the statute or into
the resolution, it carries an implication
that could be drawn from it that it would
be mandatory. You and I know that that
is not what the language says. What
gives me some concern is that, years
down the road, after some of us are gone,
or most of us are gone, it could be in-
terpreted that way. So with the modifi-
cation, Mr. President, I think the
amendment, as I say, is more acceptable,
and I shall vote for Win the interest of
trying' to get this resolution through,
but, I would have to say reluctantly.
Mr.- WEICKER, Mr. President, I rise
to oppose the amendment. I think it is a
bad amendment. I think it is- a bad
amendment in view of the history that
we have before us.
When the compromise was worked out,
I think it should be clearly stated that
it was between those of us who felt there
should be no designation at all from any
committee and those who. wanted to
have a membership which was very
heavily from the existing oversight com-
mittees. The compromise that was ar-
rived at provided that - those existing
committees can still be represented- in
large measure, but there would be a ma-
jority in the hands of "outside mem-
bers." - - -
I do not see where the track record is
deserving of any vote -of confidence by
this body in the existing committees. I
am -laying it right on the -line. The job
of oversight has always been within our
powers as a body. We have failed to ex-
ercise those powers through the various
committees responsible for oversight:
We are all human and finite. Nobody
wants to say that those committees
should not be entrusted with that re-
sponsibility, but I see no reason why
they, once again, should be put in the
driver's seat. They have been in the
driver's seat and the track record is an
unmitigated disaster. .
I could probably guess, from those who
are agreeing to this amendment, that it
will pass, but I want to voice very strong-
ly my objections to it. I think the initial
compromise was a good one for all hands
and, yes, I think there ought to be a com-
mittee which is controlled, in the main,
by those who have not participated pre-
viously in the oversight process, but still
having the expertise and the knowledge
that can be afforded by our colleagues
who have been dealing with these sub-
jects over a long period of time.
I do not know if the yeas and nays
have been requested on this amendment,
but I feel so strongly on this point, that
it goes to the essence of this whole
matter before the Senate-I must *con-
fess I am quite surprised at having to
rush in here and find that such a vital
point, which is a key part of the negotia-
tion, has just been blithely dealt off.
Mr. President,-I ask for the yeas and
nays on this matter. -
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
a sufficient second?
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment of
the Senator from Nevada, as modified.
On this question, the yeas and nays have
been ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce
that the Senator from Missouri (Mr.
EAGLETON), the Senator from Hawaii
(Mr. INOUYE), the Senator from Arkan-
sas (Mr. MCCLELLAN), and the Senator
from California (Mr. TU GeEY) are nec-
essarily absent. -
I further announce that the Senator
from New Hampshire (Mr. DURKIN) is
absent on official business.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the
Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER),
and the Senator from Hawaii (Mr.
FONG) are necessarily absent.
I also announce that the Senator from
Nebraska (Mr. HRUSKA) is absent on
official business.
The result was announced-yeas 75,
nays 17, as follows:
[Rolloall No. 176 Leg.]
YEAS-75
Allen
Hansen
Nunn
Bartlett
Hart, Gary
Packwood
Bayh
Hart, Philip A.
Pastore
Bellmon
Hartke -
Pell
Bentsen
Hatfield
Percy
Brock
Helms
Proxmire
Buckley
Hollings
Randolph
Burdick
Huddleston
Ribicoff
Byrd,
Humphrey
Roth
Harry F., Jr.
Jackson
Scott, Hugh
Byrd, Robert C. Javits -
Scott,
Cannon
Johnston
William L.
Case
Leahy
Sparkman
Chiles -
Long
Stafford
Church
Magnuson
Stennis
-Curtis
Mansfield
Stevens
Dole
McClure
Stevenson
Domenici
McGee
Stone
Eastland
McGovern
Symington
Fannin
McIntyre
Taft
Ford
Metcalf
Talmadge
Garn -
Mondale
Thurmond
Glenn
Montoya
Tower
Goldwater
Morgan
Williams
Gravel
Moss
Young
Griffin
Muskie
NAYS-17
Abourezk
Cranston Mathias
Beall
Culver Nelson
Biden
Haskell Pearson
Brooke
Hathaway Schweiker
Bumpers
Kennedy Weicker
Clark
Laxalt
NOT VOTING-8
Baker
Fong
McClellan
Durkin
Hruska
Tunney
Eaglet-on
Inouye
'
So Mr. CANNON'S amendment, as modi-
fied,-was agreed to.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. TALMADGt. I move to lay that
motion on the table. '
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
BUCKLEY). The Senator from Iowa.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I. rise in
support of Senate Resolution 400; but
not without reservation.
My colleagues have spoken very clearly
and convincingly about the need to es=
tablish a permanent, strong, and effec-
tive Senate committee with authority
over the entire U.S. Intelligence commu-
nity. I will not repeat their arguments.
Rather, I wish to speak-ever so
briefly-about what.this resolution does
not do. As a strong supporter of- Senate -
Resolution 400, perhaps I am entitled
to discuss its omissions; that is, those
issues which are not dealt with in this
resolution.
Mr. President, it has been diffic Lt even
to keep track of the recent revel of
frightening abuses committed b in-
transgressions brought to light through
the outstanding efforts of the Church
committee need no further documenta-
tion from me.
The sheer magnitude of abuse has left
many of us numb.
I hope it has not left us blind.
I hope nobody is suffering from the
misconception that any action we take on
Senate Resolution 400 will, by itself, bring
a halt to the appalling activities in which
the intelligence community has engaged.
I hope nobody believes that Senate Reso-
lution 400 really addresses the most diffi-
cult and controversial issue we face; that
is, what are the limits of intelligence ac-
tivity in a free and democratic society?
I want just to touch on one aspect of
that central issue with which Ijsave some
familiarity: the use of covert action as a
primary tool in the execution of Ameri-
can foreign policy.
The final report of the Church commit-
tee documents the fact that CIA con-
duct of covert operations may well have
eclipsed the primary purpose for which
the agency was established; namely,
foreign intelligence gathering. The sheer
volume of covert operations has been
staggering-at least 900 major covert ac-
tion projects, plus several thousand
smaller operations, in the last 15 years,
an average of -more than 1 a week.
lation of the affairs of other nations. .
Are we going to allow that kind of
activity to continue? Is it wise for the
United States to have an avowed policy
of violating the laws of other nations
whenever we think it appropriate?
Should we continue to contend that we
somehow have the right to intervene se-
cretly in the free eletcions of other na-
tions, as we have done in Chile and Italy
and Portugal? Do we want to assert, as
a principle of our foreign policy, that we
may assassinate heads of state, finance
military invasions, or provide military
training and equipment to political fac-
tions whenever and wherever it is deemed
to be in our own national interest? None
of these abuses are halted by this reso-
lution; that is not the purpose of -the
resolution.
Do we want the United States to stand
for such principles of international i1=
legality and unrestrained foreign inter-
vention? Is that the role we choose to
play in the community of nations?
Must we continue our heavy reliance
on covert action in order to survive? Must
we adopt the tactics of the enemy? Must
we play by their rules? And if we do, and
if we should prevail, what will we have
gained? What kind of nation will we'be
if, in order to survive, we have cast-aside
the basic principles on which our Nation
was founded? If we become the same as
our adversaries, what differences Will
winning have made?- -
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PW1 ii. y 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
t d
-
I believe we must face up to these ques-
tions, . and simply forming a new com-
mittee is not enough. I believe we must
chart a new course for our intelligence
comma ity, and for our foreign relations.
I ho at creation of the right kind of
Intel ce committee, with the right
kinds o powers, at least can help chart
that course.
I yield to the Senator from South Da-
kota.
Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, I send
an amendment to the desk and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The . PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from South Dakota (Mr.
ABOUREZK) proposes an amendment.
Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that further reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 12, lines 10 and 16 strike sections
8(b) 3 and 4 and, insert the following:
"8(b) (3) If the President notifies the Select
Committee of his objections to the disclosure
of such information as provided in para-
graph (2), such committee may decide, by
majority vote, to disclose such information
or not to disclose such information. If within
3 days of the committee vote, 5 or more
members of the Select Committee file a re-
quest with the chairman that the decision
be referred to the Senate for consideration,
such information shall not thereafter be
ev
actions. This, I believe, is the mos
astating provision of the resolution. We
abdicate our legislative responsibilities
and destroy the doctrine of separation
of powers if we permit the President to
control decisions that are properly with-
in the scope of. the legislative function.
Do we wish to establish such a precedent,
one which robs the Senate of its freedom
to operate, through this unprecedented
involvement by the President in the day-,
to-day operations of a Senate commit-
tee? Suppose, for example, that Presi-
dent Nixon had had such a power over
the Watergate committee. Would we ever
have learned what was discovered
through that committee's inquiries?
Should we ever permit a President to
hold such power? And is it not an uncon-
stitutional delegation of authority, for us
to legislate such a usurpation of power.
There is absolutely no need to institute
a provision like this. The two branches
of Government ought to be able to ac-
commodate conflicting policies through
cooperative negotiation. The Church
committee itself is a fine example of
how the executive and legislative
branches can come to a solution if each
side respects and trusts the legitimate
demands of the other. Why should we
establish -formal procedures that abolish
proper Senate prerogatives when we are
able to operate effectively with our own
procedures?
Rather than fostering cooperation, in-
stitution of such a formal procedure
would provide. incentive for the President
not to negotiate with the committee.
Simply by making the required certifica-
tion. he removes the decision from the
committee and moves the controversy to
the Senate. I can only presume that the
drafters of the compromise have more
confidence in the judgment of the Presi-
dent than they do in the judgment of
their own colleagues who will serve on
the new committee. I would have thought
that a hard-working committee that is
well acquainted with the issues before
it could be trusted to make responsible
decisions as to what information could
be disclosed without endangering the
Nation. Instead, the new committee will
be saddled with formal procedures for
declassifying information buttressed by
sanctions in contrast to the President
who is free to declassify in an ad. hoc
manner as it suits his political needs.
While I recognize the concerns which
lead to the inclusion of this provision,
this procedure is the wrong remedy. The
procedure is ostensibly directed to the
publicly disclosed without leave of the Sen-
ate new intelligence committee, what will
"(4), whenever the Select Committee refers prevent the President from requiring
the matter to the Senate under paragraph that every Senate committee adopt the
sional prerogatives and skew the balance Seventy-five percent of classified docu- tion by senate committees, but the real
of powers. This amendment corrects this meats should never have been classified in
imbalance in favor of the Executive by the first place, another 15 percent quickly concern behind it is the leaking of sensi- -
permitting the committee, by majority outlive the need for secrecy; and only about tive information by individual members.
vote, to disclose or to keep confidential, 10 percent genuinely require restricted access Therefore, a procedure to preclude the
information to whose disclosure the over any significant period of time. committee's release of information is
President objects. Once the committee Do we want to ratify this system inad- simply not a remedy for the problem that
makes its decision, five or more members vertently, without devoting to it the at- prompts it.
of the committee may appeal the vote, tention it deserves? The distinguished What is more, it is not clear that the
by directing the chairman to refer the senior Senator from Maine (Mr. MusictE) problem of leaking of sensitive infor-
question of disclosure to the full Senate has already devoted considerable time to- mation by individual members is really
for resolution. remedying the problem of executive over- the pernicious problem it is made out to
Section 8(b) (3) provides that if the classification. We should not undercut be. The administration has engineered
President properly notifies the committee his efforts by acting hastily today. a public relations campaign designed to
of his objections to the disclosure of in-. Second, one reading of the ambiguous show that sensitive information in pos-
ation, the committee "may, by ma- provision would establish a formal pro- session of the executive branch is always
y vote, refer the question of the dis- cedure for Presidential veto of committee protected, but always leaks in the hands
filedreport the matter to the Senate for its lure,-we might never have known the
consideration." contents of the Sinai accords that were
Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, I ask published by the committee over execu-
for the yeas and nays. tive protest. Are the members-of commit-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a tees, such as Foreign Relations, Appro-
sufficient second? There is a sufficient priations, and Armed Services prepared
second. to, sacrifice to Presidential Prerogative
The yeas and nays were ordered. the independence they have to negotiate
Mr. ABOUREZK. This amendment questions of disclosure of sensitive infor-
would modify section 8 of Senate Resolu- mation? Are the Members aware of the
tion 400 so that the new Intelligence precedent that- this procedure sets for
Committee would have greater discretion every committee of Congress?
over the release of sensitive information. The classification system is both
May we have order in the Chamber, abused and overused. It is estimated that
Mr. President? there are well over 100 million pages of
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- classified records and that over 3,000 of-
ate will be in order. ficials have top secret classification au-
Mr. ABOUREZK. Section 8, as it now thority. Former Supreme Court Justice
stands, would encroach upon congres- Arthur Goldberg has said:
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closure of such information to the Sen-
ate-for consideration." if the question is
referred, the information may not be
publicly disclosed without leave of the
Senate. The principal problem with this
provision is that it is ambiguous: it pro-
vides that the committee "may" refer
the question to the Senate. What hap-
pens if it does not? May it decide on its
own, by majority vote, to disclose infor-
mation? Is referral to_ the Senate the
only procedure bywhich information can
be disclosed, or is it only the procedure
to be followed when the committee feels
that the issue is so controversial that it
requires consideration by the full body?
I fear that the reading intended by the
drafters is that referral to the Senate is
the only procedure by which information
can be disclosed. If that is so, adoption
of the provision will have momentous
consequences. Do we even know what
those consequences are? I think we will
be creating two dangerous precedents.
For the first time the executive branch
classification system will be applied to
Congress. The classification system was
not established by an act of Congress. It
was promulgated without consultation
with, or approval of, Congress by a series
of Presidents in executive orders that
properly apply to members of the execu-
tive branch. My enacting legislation that
recognizes the application of the classi-
fication system to Congress, we could sur-
render our independent power to classify
or declassify sensitive information. And
opted f
fho
_._ __
ad
or
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S 7278 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 13, 1976
of Congress. This campaign has met with I think that I should explain the sit- Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
success primarily because leaks by the uation to the Senate so that it is aware Mr. CANNON. The amendment that
executive branch go by different names: of the situation which confronts us at is now pending is obviously a very con-
written leaks are "declassifications," ver- this time. - troversial amendment. This relates' to
bal leaks are "blackgrounders." The Senator from Mississippi and his! the question of secrecy and whet we
Examples of self-serving executive de- associates are in the process of preparing are going to disclose secrets th ay
partmerlt leaks abound. It is well known an amendment-perhaps they have done best be kept undisclosed in the rest
that Pentagon officials reveal classified so already-which, if I understand it of the United States.
information about new weapons systems, correctly, seeks to keep all the segments We will have considerable discussion
particularly at budget time, in order to of the military intelligence community on this amendment, and if at the conclu=
obtain public and congressional support within the Committee on Armed Services, lion my motion to table is not agreed to,
for them. And a few months ago it was I had hoped that we could finish this then I would not be in a position to agree
revealed that the Henry Kissinger who resolution tonight, but because of the to any unanimous consent request with
excoriated the Pike committee for leak- amendment offered by- the distinguished respect to this particular amendment.
ing information unflattering to himself Senator from South Dakota, which might I have no problem with the remainder
was the source of the classified informa- take some time and which, in my opinion, of the provisions.
tion Edward R. F. Sheehan used in an goes contrary to the compromise, and the Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
article in Foreign Policy that was compli- amendment which will be suggested by the Senator yield?
mentary to the Secretary of State. the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STEx- Mr. CANNON. I yield.
The Senate mivqf n.l.- fnn- 0- 4-- xrs7 and h'
rs
whether as a policy matter it wants the
full body continually to turn its attention
to the daily affairs of the committee.
Such a situation necessarily envisions
the prospect of the full Senate making
decisions about matters on which it is
not informed because of the difficulty of
keeping the full body apprised of the de-
tails of the issues, and because of the re-
strictions that section 8(c) (2) of the
compromise imposes upon communica-
tion between Members of the Senate.
Under that provision no Member of the
Senate who is In receipt of sensitive in-
formation from a -member of the com-
mittee is permitted to communicate the
Information to a fellow Members. This
restriction can only have a chilling effect
on full and robust discussion of pro-
foundly important issues. Aside from the
constitutional considerations, we should
be reluctant to place obligations upon the
full Senate that it is prevented from ful-
filling in a responsible fashion.
Moreover, this continual resort to the
full Senate for decision on matters for-
merly reserved for committee determina-
tion undercuts the entire committee sys-
tem. It is only the first assault upon the
integrity of Senate committees when we
suggest that they are not to be entrusted
to carry out fully the duties that we have
delegated to them.
I reserve the remainder of my time..
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, Is there
a copy of the amendment at the desk we
could have?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator will be supplied with a copy of the
amendment.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
'UNANIMOUS-CONSENT REQUEST
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I un-
derstand that a request has been made
by Senators SYMmGZON and STEmus, and
other Senators that no time limitation
be placed on the present bill.
assocates, that will not be Mr. MANSFIELD. It is my intention
possible. to support the Senator's motion to table,
However, in talking to the Senator because I do not think that this amend-
from Mississippi earlier, he indicated ment has any place in this compromise,
that it might be possible to vote on his which a lot of us worked awfully hard
amendment Monday or Tuesday, because to achieve and to bring about the great-
he needs time to develop some of the est degree of unanimity therein.
intricacies connected with the amend- So I wish to assure the Senator and
ment itself. the Senate that I will vote in support of
So, in spite of the suggestion which the Senator's motion to table because
was conveyed to me by the ranking we have other things to do, and I want
Member of the Committee on Rules and to see something done which will bring
Administration, I am going to make a about a change in the situation affecting
unanimous-consent request at this time, the intelligence community which has
because time is running out on this body. been ignored by too many in this Cham-
There will be an awful lot of legislation ber for too long.
on the caleirdar next Monday because of Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, will the
the budget set Ma
15 dat
Th
y
e.
ere will majority leader yield?
be a convention for which the Democrats M
M
r,
ANSFIELD. I yield.
will take off about 3 weeks In July, In- Mr. RIBICOFF. The amendment by
eluding the Fourth of July, to attend. the distinguished Senator from South
There will be a 2-week convention for Dakota is taken . practically verbatim
the Republicans in August Thera will b
e
September, and there will be an election one of on
the main ain a items e was. I
in November. In the meantime, if the one of ems s that that was rove ed
Senate does not complete its work by Oc- sthe of the Committee out by rverrn-
tober 2, we will stay in at least until Oc- ment sentatives
hs and d the Committee C -
tober 10, and if we cannot complete it Rules Rent and- Administration. Aand on
dmWe do be-
then, we will go out and come back, after lieve that we have protected the rights
the election, to finish the peoples' bust- of the Senate by assuring that rule
ness. XXXV still will be applicable so that
So I am not trying to scare anyone, but. any two Senators would have the oppor-
I am trying to lay out exactly what we tunity of bringing to a closed session of
have before us and will have in the way the Senate any differences with the
of legislative responsibility. President of the United States over the
We have nothing we can take up, if disclosure of information. The Senate
we do not continue with this resolution then in closed session would have an op-
today, tomorrow, or Monday. portunity of making its will known.
So, Mr. President, it is my Intention Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
to go over until Monday at the conclu- the Senator yield right there?
sign of business today, but in order to M
R
r.
IBICOFF. I am pleased to yield
give some assurance to the Senate that to the majority leader.
this matter will not be summarily thrown, Mr. MANSFIELD. And that was dis-
aside, but that we will face up to our cussed by the combination that consid-
responsibilities within a reasonable ered the substitute offered by the Senator
length of time-I think it is unreason- from Nevada which is now before us.
able to be honest about it-1 ask unani- Mr. RIBICOFF. That is absolutely
rnous consent that debate on Senate correct. It was cleared with, we thought,
Resolution 400 be limited as follows: Six almost every element involved in this en-
hours on the resolution, 1 hour on each tire problem, including Senator CHURCH,
amendment, and 4 hours on the Stennis with whom I was in constant contact
-amendment, with time to be equally di- during his absence from the Senate.
vided and controlled in the usual man- I would be reluctant to see the Cannon
rier; that the vote on final passage occur substitute In Jeopardy. I would oppose
not later than 5 p.m. on Tuesday next; the distinguished Senator from Missis-
and that this request be made under the sippi, because that, too, would invade the
usual rule. compromise. Consequently, I will support
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, reserv- the distinguished Senator from Nevad
ing the right to object and I shall object and vote with him to table the Abour
subject to the following conditions- amendment.
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May 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 7279
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the I was in the executive branch, working haven. if it were not unjustly accused,
Senator yield? with Secretary Forrestal and the Presi- then an explanation would be forth-
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. dent's counsel, Clark Clifford, when this coming.
Mr. PERCY. I have a similar comment, act was written. Secretary Forrestal him- I believe that the way we have been
for tl1*\ identical reasons, but also be- self stated-and he was very friendly to operating has been a crying shame. Here.
taus think the amendment of the the military-that the reason for the for the first time, we have a chance to
Senrom South Dakota would really CIA was to provide the people of the do something constructive. There have
destroy the relationship of cooperation United States a brake on the military been 15 months of hearings. What do
that must be established between the description of the threat. That Agency they mean to Senators? Have Senators
intelligence community and Congress. I should always remain independent of read the reports? Have they even read
certainly would support the tabling mo.- the military. the newspapers? Are they going to al-
tion of the Senator from Nevada. Some kind of reorganization is going low this lack of supervision to continue?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will on in the executive branch today which I hope not.
the Senator yield? worries me, because it seems they are be- I yield to the Senator from South Da-
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. ginning to pull the CIA somewhat closer kota, briefly.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I to the military. Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, a parlia-
have not taken part in this debate, but Ninety-five' percent of the work of the mentary inquiry. What is the pending
many years ago we had the Kennedy let- Central Intelligence Agency today has item?
ter. The reason for the Kennedy letter, to do with countries with which we are The PRESIDING OFFICER. A unan-
to the best of my knowledge, was that not at war. Think of that. All over the imous-consent request is outstanding,
the Central Intelligence Agency was by- world, we have agents who are reporting proposed by the distinguished majority
passing the Ambassador. That situation to the ambassadors. When they report to leader.
was corrected by the Director of the Cen- the ambassadors, the ambassadors report Is there objection to the unanimous-
tral Intelligence Agency at the time, Mr. to the State Department. When they consent request?
John McCone. come back here with the reports, they Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, reserving
Then we had the extraordinary situa- do not go to the Committee on Foreign the right to object-
tion in which the Kennedy letter resulted Relations; they go to the Committee on Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, re-
in an ambassador directing a war; he Armed Services, which knows little, if serving the right to object, I do not want
would call up Saigon to tell them what anything, about the conditions of the to let 2 or 3 minutes pass without ob-
to bomb and what not to bomb, and he country in question. jection to the announcement by the dis-
did it through the Central Intelligence I ask Senators whether they know of a tinguished majority leader, the distin-
Agency. more absurd setup from the standpoint guished chairman of the Committee on
I have been the only Member of the of structure and function. And unfor- Rules and Administration, and the dis-
Senate for some 16 years who has been tunately it has resulted in the loss of a tinguished Senator from Illinois that the
a member of both the Committee on great deal of money and in the loss of Abourezk amendment is outside some
Armed Services and the Committee on many lives. I can say that without res- compromise that a great many Members
Foreign Relations. For years I have ervation, as a member of both those com- of the Senate, including myself, did not
urged that the Committee on Foreign mittees and as a member of the Com- sit in on.
Relations have some representation on mittee on Appropriations, where as an Mr. MANSFIELD. There were many
the committee responsible. for Central ad hoc member I see what they want me other Members who did not sit in on it,
Intelligence Agency oversight. However, to see; but I am not allowed to look at but we could not bring in all 100, so do
ers of intellige
been senio
eAge
ll
-__,,.
r ....,....
have
-?,
w~cazscve a
the Committee on Appropriations; there- This setup, Mr. President, is no good. leader to imply that there is some unani-
fore, to the best of my knowledge there We should have the same type of con- mous-consent agreement not to accept
never has been any real supervision of gressional supervision of this agency as any amendments in order to defeat this
the Central Intelligence Agency, we have of every other agency. Here the amendment. I want to respond very
It was Senator Fulbright, - I believe, President asks one Member of the Sen- briefly, if I may, Mr. President.
who on the floor of the Senate asked the ate or one Member of the House to come Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator may,
distinguished chairman of the Commit- up to the. White House, and then says but the Senator has misquoted me.
tee on Appropriations, one who presum- to the press, "I have discussed this mat- Mr. ABOUREZK. I shall be happy to
ably knew all about the Central Intelli- ter with Congress." It does not add up; correct that misquote.
gence Agency, "Do you know what they and that is the reason why, in my opin- Mr. MANSFIELD. Well, the record will
do with the money?" His answer was, ion, we are in this trouble today. speak for itself. I did not say that there
"No, and I don't want to." .One final point the Central Intelli- should be no amendments offered, be-
That is not how to oversee this Gov- gence Agency. oversight subcommittee of cause amendments have been offered and
ernment agency. the Committee on Armed Services, on have been accepted.
Many suggestions have been made. In which I have had the privilege to serve Mr. ABOUREZK. At any rate, the im-
my opinion there should be a joint com- for many years, in a recent year did not pression was given by the majority leader
mittee composed of members of the Com- meet even once. How can we supervise that this amendment was outside of some
mittee on Foreign Relations and the anything if we never meet? strange agreement that a lot of us did
Committee on Armed Services, with Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will not sit in on, including myself.
alternating chairmen every few years, so the Senator yield? Mr. President, this particular section
that if one chairman would not want to Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield. of the bill, compromise or no compro-
look at a situation, presumbaly the other Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I mise, does one thing. That is, it com-
would. have the floor. I will yield to the Senator promises the power of the U.S. Senate
This is the only case I know of in from South Dakota next. to the President. If there was one thing
which the Committee on Appropriations It has been all shadow so far as the that the 18 months of hearings brought
does everything. It regulates, it decides, oversight of the CIA has been concerned, out, it was that the anger of the coun-
it appropriates, and it says, in effect, "It Mr. SYMINGTON. That is right. try is directed toward Congress, and to-
is none of your business what we are do- Mr. MANSFIELD. There has been no ward Washington in general, because,
ing with the taxpayers' money." I do not substance. over all of those months and the years
go for that. There are members of the I came to the Senate with the Sena- preceding them, we did not fulfill our re-
Committee on Armed Services who know tor from Missouri in 1953. We are going sponsibility to the people who elected us
at least as much, if not more, about in- out together next year. When I was in to the U.S. Senate..Instead we handed
telligence than do the members of the the House before that, I tried to bring over too much of our power to the Presi-
Appropriations Committee. about, through legislation,, the establish- dent, especially 'to President Nixon.
.is o, this is not a military agency. Pea- ment of a joint committee to oversee We are seeking by voluntary action to
seem to forget that fact. This is a the CIA. Why? To protect the CIA. If it do the same thing today, by giving the
lian agency. were unjustly accused, it would have a President the power to regulate our
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
schedule, our agenda, and to regulate
what is to be disclosed and not disclosed.
Mr. President, if I may, I want to read
the existing language of section 8(b) (3) :
If the President notifies the select com-
mittee of his objections to the disclosure of
such information as provided in paragraph
(2), such committee may, by majority vote,
refer the question of the disclosure of such
information to the Senate for,consideration.
Such information shall not thereafter be
publicly disclosed without leave of the
Senate.
The folly of this language can be il-
lustrated by the example of the Pike
committee report. The Pike committee
itself, which knew the contents of that
report, voted to disclose the report pub-
licly. By a parliamentary maneuver, it
was brought to the floor of the House,
and the Members who had not read the
report and did not know the contents of
it, voted, under pressure by the Executive
to withhold the report from the public.
The amendment that I am offering pre-
cisely addresses this problem. It will al-
low the Intelligence Committee, which
ought to know its ? business and ought
to know the contents of the information
and ought to know what is In the interest
of the United States, to vote one way or
the other, to disclose or withhold. There
Is a procedure in the amendment to al-
low any five members of the commit-
tee to refer the vote in the committee,
whichever way It goes, to the full body
of the Senate. That means that the Sen-
ate Itself decides what its schedule will
be and what its agenda will be, and not
the President of the United States.
How many times have we seen the
President exerting pressure upon Con-
gress to withhold information? How
many times has. the executive put out
news stories and wrongly attacked Con-
gress for leaks and unauthorized dis-
closures of Information? How much
longer are we going to stand for it? This
is the question I am asking.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield to me?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, I yield.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, reserv-
ing the right to object, and I shall object
In a moment and make a motion to table
the Abourezk amendment, I say to the
majority leader that if the motion to lay
on the table carries, I shall then have no
objection to proceeding.
Mr. President, I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection
is heard.
.Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I move
to table the Abourezk amendment.
Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, I ask
for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
a sufficient second?
W. ABOUREZK. A parliamentary in-
quiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator will state the Inquiry.
Mr. ABOUREZK. Is there a time
agreement on this amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is
not. And the motion to table shuts off
debate.
Is there a sufficient second for the
yeas and nays? There ? is a sufficient
second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the motion
to lay on the table the amendment of
the Senator from South Dakota. The
yeas and nays have been ordered, and
the clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce
that the Senator from Missouri (Mr.
EAGLETON), the Senator from Hawaii
(Mr. INOUYE), the Senator from Ar-
kansas (Mr. MCCLELLAN), the Senator
from California (Mr. TUNNEY), the Sen-
ator from South Dakota (Mr. McGov-
ERN), and the Senator from New Mexico
(Mr. MONTOYA) are necessarily absent.
I further announce that the Senator
from New Hampshire (Mr. DURKIN) is
absent on official business.
Mr. GRIFFITH. I announce that the
Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER),
and the Senator from Hawaii (Mr.
FONG) are necessarily absent.
I also announce that the Senator from
Nebraska (Mr. $RUSKA) Is absent on
official business.
I further announce that, if present
and voting, the Senator from Nebraska
(Mr. HRUSKA), would vote yea.
The result was announced-yeas 77,
nays 13, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 177 Leg.]
YEAS-77
Allen Griffin Pastore
Bartlett Hansen Pearson
Beals Hart , Gary Pell
Bellmon Hartke Percy
Bentsen Haskell Randolph
Biden Hatfield Ribicoff
Brock Hathaway Roth
Buckley Helms Schweiker
Bumpers Hollings Scott, Hugh
Burdick Huddleston Scott,
Byrd, Humphrey William L.
Harry F., Jr. Jackson Sparkman
Byrd, Robert C. Javits Stafford
Cannon Johnston Stennis
Chiles Laxalt Stevens
Church Long Stevenson
Cranston Magnuson Stone
Curtis Mansfield Symington
Dole Mathias Taft
Domenici McClure Talmadge
Eastland McGee Thurmond
Fannin McIntyre Tower
Ford Mondale Weicker
Garn Morgan Williams
Glenn Moss Young
Goldwater Nunn
Gravel Packwood
NAYS-13
Abouaresk Culver Muskie
-Bayh Hart, Philip A. Nelson
Brooke Kennedy Proxmire
Case Leahy
Clark Metcalf
NOT VOTING-10
Baker Hruska Montoya
Durkin Inouye Tunney
Eagleton McClellan
Fong McGovern
So the motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
UNANIMOUS-CONSENT REQUEST
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent again that debate on
Senate Resolution 400 be limited as fol-
lows: 6 hours on the resolution, 1 hour on
each amendment, 4 hours on the Tower
amendment,, time equally divided- and
controlled in the usual manner and un-
der the usual rule; and that the vote on
passage occur not later than 5 p.m. on
Tuesday next.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, reserving the
right to object, I do not know of any-
thing that has got the people in my State
more upset than this entire intelligence
matter, and I firmly believe we nee? some
legislation on it.
At the time of the Angola affaii ent
into this in some detail to find what ac-
tually had gone an so far as consultation
with regard to providing of funds for
that particular operation.
Frankly, I was unable to find out any-
thing other than the fact that there is
statutory authority for making it, but as
to who was consulted, or whether any-
body was, or, really, any procedures for
consultation, I do not know.
Before the Armed Services Committee
this morning, I asked Deputy Secretary
Robert Ellsworth if he knew of any pro-
cedure for consultation anywhere In the
Senate resolution or my any written
document anywhere. He assured me he
did not.
So it is very apparent we do need some
institutionalization on this problem.
At the same time, I must say I feel that
it would be a great mistake for the Sen-
ate at this point to go ahead and agree
to the manner of handling this particu-
Iar bill next week without at least taking
the weekend to think about it.
I call to the attention of the Senate
that this is the final action we will be
taking to vote on this bill. There is no
matter of this bill going to the House to
be acted upon. There is no conference
committee. There is no. referral to the
White House. There Is no time to cor-
rect any mistakes we might make. There-
fore, I think it calls for a degree of cau-
tion on our part in acting upon thi
ticular legislation.
I have reviewed the legislation in at
detail. One thing that many Members of
the Senate do not know, for Instance, is
that Deputy Secretary of Defense Ells-
worth appeared before the Armed Serv-
ices Committee this morning and testi-
fied in a closed session. I have asked to
make his testimony public. The chair-
man has agreed, as I understand It, that
it will be made public. It goes directly
and vitally to some of the Issues before
us. I think the Senate, before it agrees
to act on this measure, or agrees as to
how long it will take to act on it, should
have the benefit of that testimony, which
I hope to get approved by Mr. Ellsworth
to make sure there is not anything classi-
fied in it, and get it into the RECORD for
the benefit of the Members of the Senate.
This is the first time I have seen this
compromise measure, which is quite dif-
ferent from some of the other proposals
that have been considered, and I have
been keeping upon the matter.
I testified before the Rules Committee
with regard to the proposals before it.
The first time I saw this proposal was
when I read it in the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD delivered to my house early this
morning.
I do not think the Senate has had
sufficient time to look at the many items
involved in this particular piece of leg-
islation. Some members of the commit-
tee may feel that they do, in tl
confidence, but I cannot say I' To.
I
not wish to see myself, or any of , _
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Senators who might feel the same way,
tied in a straitjacket procedure by enter-
ing into a unanimous-consent agreement
at this time and, for that reason, I ob-
before the Armed Services Committee
and other committees would be made
public. The more I -see of how things
operate around this Chamber the more
I become enamored of. the Chiles-Stone
sunshine bill. I would hope that rather
than have these subterfuges of executive
hearings, and I have attended more than
my share of them at which very little of
any importance is really discussed or dis-
closed, we would have more open hear-
ings. I would hope also that in that re-
spect there would be more consideration
given to proposals seeking to achieve
that end.
I yield to the Senator from Mississippi.
Will the Senator yield first?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I would repeat my
request just for the record and make It
the same except that the vote on final
passage occur not later than 5 p.m. on
Wednesday next.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, for the same
reasons I have indicated, I would feel
constrained to object, if that were In-
sisted upon. I would withhold objecting
If- other Members wish to be heard.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection
is heard.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator objects.
I yield to the Senator from Mississippi.
STENNIS. Mr. President, if the
to will indulge me just a very few
m cites since discussion has been had
about diligence, let me assure the mem-
bership that just as soon as we knew the
final form of what is now called the
Cannon compromise, or the compro-
mise-and Senator CANNON was very
kind to give me a copy of it as early as he
could-we had just finished up a mili-
tary authorization bill with our sessions
continuing over several weeks. I immedi-
ately started a staff study of the Cannon
compromise that day. That was Yester-
day.
We had a meeting this morning of our
committee. We went into this matter as
much as we could.
I do not want to cause undue delay,
or any kind of delay, but I have felt
compelled, along with the Senator from
Texas, who is a member of the commit-
tee, to offer some amendments to get into
the very heart of this discussion. My ex-
perience makes me believe that any kind
of an effort, so broad and so far-reaching
as this matter, will have to have the co-
ordination and participation of the
House of Representatives. Having been
to many, many conferences on money
matters. I know it is just absolutely im-
possible to have an effective way of going
Into these vast problems-and they are
great-without participation by the
House of Representatives. I am afraid
otherwise this effort will fall on its face
omewhere during the first year. I want
t least debate that point.
The requirement in the compromise
for an authorization for all intelligence
is something that I believe every Mem-
ber of the Senate ought to be fairly cer-
tain he fully understands, with the com-
plications and the chance that we would
be taking. To really have the Senate en-
act an authorization bill through the
ordinary processes, with the chances for
disclosure-not just the leaks but also
the inferences that will be built up
from year to year by these foreign intel-
ligence agents who are very perceptive-
I think would be very, very harmful to
our security. I want a chance to tell Sen-
ators that.
This amendment I have prepared,
which will, be presented by the Senator
from Texas, does not attempt to touch
the CIA. It does not attempt to touch it.
This amendment is going .to put squarely
In issue the matter of jurisdiction over
military intelligence. CIA is partly mili-
tary. But the amendment will refer to
those things which are primarily and
fundamentally military. This amend-
ment draws a line and presents to the
Senate the chance to pass on that mat-
ter.
I do not want to speak at length, but
I wanted to say those things. Criticism
has been made, and I do not blame any-
one. I thought we could get through this
thing by Tuesday, but there is no com-
mittee report on the resolution as it is
now. The chairman and the committee
have done fine work, as they always do,
on the subject matter.
The interpretation of a great deal of
this is difficult. The idea of trying to
operate by amending the Senate rules
but saying we are not amending the Sen-
ate rules is beyond my conception. That
is what this proposal does, with all due
respect.
I thought we could debate those points
by Tuesday, but others do not believe so.
We will find a way. This bill will be
disposed of.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I will yield in a mo-
ment.
I do not think anyone is trying td get
by with something. There are other
views to be expressed here which have
not been expressed.
I would yield to the Senator from
Kentucky, but I do not have the floor.
The Senator from Montana has it.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. I want to make
one comment. The amendment which
the Senator will introduce will be dis-
cussed at length at the appropriate time.
But I wanted to refer to one comment
the Senator from Mississippi made re-
garding his concern about this new com-
mittee taking jurisdiction away from the
Committee on Armed Services relating
to. tactical military intelligence. I recog-
nize that some of the language in the
resolution is broad, but on page 21 of
the substitute there is a definition which
indicates that intelligence activities as
used in the resolution does not include
tactical foreign military intelligence
serving no national policymaking func-
tion. Military intelligence is that intel-
ligence used by military commanders.
S 7281
That intelligence, under the Department
of Defense, relating to military affairs,
is not national intelligence, in the sense
we were addressing.
So I simply make that point at this
time and, of course, as I say, we will
address the total amendment when it is
-presented.
Mr. STENNIS. We can turn to that.
If I may respond briefly, Mr. President,
we find here the words "authorizations
for appropriations both direct and indi-
rect"-I do not know what an "indirect
appropriation" is. But It Is for the fol-
lowing, "Defense Intelligence Agency,"
the "National Security Agency," and so
forth. There are also others that are con-
nected with the Department of Defense.
So there is that kind of evidence there.
I do not see how we can draw a clear line
between the different kinds, but it is as to
that that the amendment seeks to draw
the issue.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator
from Missouri.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I will ask my able
chairman: What in your view is the dif-
ference between the intelligence of Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and military
intelligence?
Mr. STENNIS. Central Intelligence is
the broader activity, I say to the Senator.
A great deal of its activity is concerned
with military matters. But it is a purely
civilian agency, and it has a great many
activities, as the Senator knows.
But we are not invading that field,
simply for practical reasons, in this
amendment.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, let
me note that it was Secretary Forrestal
who, back in 1947, felt that there would
be no limit to the military budget if the
threat was described solely -by the mili-
tary to Congress and the people; and to
me the Central Intelligence Agency has
always acted as a brake on the things
that were needed by the three services
and their advocates. If we get the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency over on one side
and military intelligence on the other,
I think we defeat the very purpose of
having the Central Intelligence Agency
as a civilian agency to balance the mili-
tary.
I do not see how we possibly can split
the all-civilian intelligence review from
the military, and vice versa.
What I would hope we could do before
we get through is to have the Committee
on Foreign Relations and the Committee
on Armed Services jointly review na-
tional intelligence in all its ramifications.
I hope we would end up by doing that
because, if we give the military military
intelligence, that, would include the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the Na-
tional Security Agency, the Office of
Naval Intelligence, Army Intelligence,
Air Force Intelligence, and other
agencies; and they are the ones that
receive billions of dollars more than the
Central Intelligence Agency; and because
of their parochial appeal to various
segments of the economy have tremen-
dous pull when they come up to obtain
their money.
I think what we have to do, as I have
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mentioned, is have the Committee on
Foreign Relations join with the Com-
mittee on Armed Services in looking into
the whole question of intelligence, par-
ticularly inasmuch as 95 percent of our
intelligence in peacetime has to do with
foreign relations as against military
operations.
So, I would hope that we do not
separate these functions into two dif-
ferent committees and two different cate-
gories. It is all related intelligence for
the same country. I feel very strongly
about this, having been involved in it for
31 years. -
Mr. THURMOND and Mr. TOWER
addressed the Chair.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Sen-
ator from Texas.
Mr. TOWER. I defer to the ranking
minority member of the committee.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I have the floor.
Does the Senator want me to yield to
him or the Senator from South Carolina?
Mr. TOWER. Yield to him instead of
me.
Mr. THURMOND. I thank the Senator
very much.
I was going to inquire of the Senator
from Missouri. Through his long and
capable experience as Secretary of the
Air Force, as a member of both the Com-
mittee on Armed' Services for many
years and of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, from this broad experience
that he has had, is it his thinking that
it might be preferable to consider a small
committee, maybe, and have representa-
tives from the Committee on Armed
Services, say, from the majority and
minority, to have the same number from
the Committee on Foreign Relations,
from the majority and the minority,
have the same number from the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, from the ma-
jority and the minority? That is six
members. And then possibly have the
majority leader and the minority leader.
That ?n'akes eight members. Then in
order not to have an even number, have
the President pro tempore of the Senate.
Would the Senator view a committee
with that composition' as possibly being
in line with his thinking?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I will answer my
able friend from South Carolina this
way: That is far closer than anything else
that has been suggested up to this time
in this Chamber about what we do with
our future intelligence.
I presume that, when you suggest the
addition of members of the Committee
on the Judiciary, the -premise is that the
FBI setup would be under the committee
in question as well as the Central Intel-
ligence Agency. Am I correct on that?
Mr. THURMOND. That is correct.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I would have no
objection to that, and I would hope that
we could work something out because, as
is known, up until now we have not had
an adequate review of our intelligence,
and that is why we are in this jam today.
I would hope that the committee would
be held to the lowest possible number
commensurate with what is essential to
do the job.
Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true that
the more exposure we have the greater
the jeopardy to the national security?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I would say that
the American people have the right to be
informed, and we have the duty to so
inform them, on many matters relating
to our country's security. Many national
security matters must of course be
protected.
On the other hand, there has been less
disclosure about intelligence activities in
the Senate than any other activities
about which I know.
At one time, by request of Senator
Russell, we had members of the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations meeting with
the Committee on Armed Services. I
think that should now be made statu-
tory; and I am confident that the mem-
bers of the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions will have the same high regard for
the importance of not divulging secrets
as do members. of the Committee on
Armed Services.
I do feel, however, that one of the rea-
sons we have gotten into trouble in this
area is that we have been so secret that
the only people who really knew any-
thing about the Central Intelligence
Agency over a long period of years were
the five senior members of a committee
that is not a legislative committee, name-
ly, the Committee on Appropriations.
Mr. THURMOND. Under this proposal
that we have just discussed, where we
would have a broad base of the Senate,
we would have the majority and minor-
ity leader, and in addition, representa-
tives from the three main committees
affected.
Mr. PERCY. Four committees,
Mr. THURMOND. Not under the pro-
posal that the Senator from Missouri was
discussing.
And does the Senator from Missouri
feel that that would be fair, practical,
and a wise way to handle it, rather than
have a committee composed of 17 or more
members?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I could not agree
more with the able Senator. I think that
committee is much too large. We would
go from 5 to 17 overnight.
Mr. THURMOND. I thank the able
Senator from Missouri.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
point out that the Senate this afternoon
reduced the number to 15 from 17. In
talking about numbers, there are more
than five on the Appropriations Commit-
tee and three to five on the Armed Serv-
ices Committee, and one or two on the
Committee on Foreign Relations. But this
new way will be more democratic, more
widespread, and I think more representa-
tive of the Senate. It certainly will give
the younger Members a chance which
they have not had up to this time.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. .
Mr. SYMINGTON. Will the Senator
agree that the chairmanship of this sub-
committee should alternate and there
should be relative equality among the
committees? Ninety-five percent of the
work that is done in peacetime intelli-
gence has to do with the Committee on
Foreign Relations.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, I agree. That
could be up to the committee itself.
Mr. SYMINGTON. That is right.
Mr. MANSFIELD. But it could rotate,
just as the members are going to have to
rotate, because I believe the Senate this
afternoon agreed to an 8-year term.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I appreciate thatI
ask it because with respect to the. int
gence budget, the Central Intellig
Agency receives between 17 and 20
cent of the total intelligence budget. o
whatever we do with respect to the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, there will be a
tremendous amount more money spent
on the military on this, regardless. On
the other hand, I would like to see the
Committee on Foreign Relations, based--
on my experience, have a position equal
with that of any other committee when
it comes to intelligence in peacetime.
Mr. MANSFIELD. It does, under this
substitute.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the major-
ity leader.
. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
yield to the Senator from Texas.
Mr. TOWER. I thank the majority
leader for yielding to me.
Mr. President, I think what we have
done in Senate Resolution 400 is to over-
react to the fact that we have discovered
abuses in the activities principally of
the CIA and the FBI. I am afraid that
in so overreacting, we have created a
Frankenstein monster that will come
back to haunt us.
The abuses can be dealt with, without
proliferating day-to-day access to sensi-
tive information and activities. I believe
that ultimately the result of the estab-
lishment of this committee, rather than
working through the normal committee
process, is going to be more inhibition on
intelligence-gathering capability, more
revelations of matters that for disclos
are inimical to the security of the Uni
States; and this so-called comprom
comes to us without any report, without
any hearings, with very little chance for
input on the part of those who have
serious reservations about the concept of
an omnibus oversight committee in the
Senate.
The Committee on Armed Services,
with as much dispatch as possible, has
taken a look at this, and we find that
there are serious objections to be raised.
At least, some members of the committee
find that serious objections can be raised
to certain aspects of this resolution. We
do not seek to gut the jurisdiction of the
committee. We seek only to retain that
which is essentially defense-related and
defense-managed in the Armed Services
Committee.
I am aware that the distinguished ma-
jority leader desires to act with dispatch
on this measure, but there are those of us
who feel strongly about it. The matter
is so important that some time and ef-
fort'should be given to considering the
merits of what the distinguished chair-
man of the Armed Services Committee
and the distinguished ranking minority
member and some other members feel
is a matter that should be given very
careful consideration, indeed. --
It is not our desire to delay, and I
would be prepared to agree to a vote at a
time certain.
I do feel that the Senator from Ohi
made a very good point in raising
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May 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
objection. But all I ask for is careful con-
sideration of what we are doing.
I honestly feel that the Defense De-
partment would be somewhat hamstrung
in be conduct of its business if this
oversight committee and di-
rom the committee of primary
authorization and jurisdiction on defense
matters, the Committee on Armed
Services.
I hope that Members of the Senate
will reflect carefully on what we have
proposed here and that we can have
statesmanlike debate on the matter when
we return next week.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ap-
preciate the remarks of the distinguished
Senator from Texas. I think they are
moderate in vein and tone and worth
every consideration. I am only unhappy
that we have not been able to achieve a
figure was subject to a number of qualifi-
cations described in chapter 5 of the
annual report.
On May 3, Senators KENNEDY and
HASKELL released a study by the Library
of Congress which concluded that "the
repeal of DISC does not appear to have
major implications for either exports or
the level of domestic employment." In
their press release the Senators stated
their belief that the Treasury's 1974 an-
nual report was "a grossly misleading
presentation of the economic data on
DISC." The Treasury Department has
responded with a memorandum of its
own which challenges the methods and
assumptions used by the Congressional
Research Service in its critique of the
Treasury study. I ask unanimous con-
sent that the Treasury response to the
Library of Congress study on DISC be
incorporated in the RECORD after my re-
at a time certain on final passage.
The Senate should be notified that. the
appears in the RECORD of May 3 at page
S6323.)
The Treasury Department feels that
its analysis of the export effects of DISC,
which was carefully qualified in its report, is based on a sounder aproach than
that of the Library of Congress. The
Congressional Research Service adopted
what economists call "price elasticity"
approach in estimating the effects of
pending business, Senate Resolution 400,
will" remain the pending business until
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that when the Senate
completes its business today, it stand in
adjournment until 12 o'clock noon on
Monday next.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
CLOTURE MOTION
MANSFIELD. Mr. President, .1
se cloture motion to the desk, and I
do so reluctantly.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clo-
ture motion having been presented under
rule XXII, the Chair, without objection,
directs the clerk to read the motion.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
CLOTURE MOTION
We, the undersigned Senators, in accord-
ance with the provisions of Rule XXII of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, hereby move
to close debate on the pending substitute
amendment to S. Res. 400, a resolution to
establish a Standing Committee of the Sen-
ate on Intelligence Activities, and for other
purposes:
Robert C. Byrd, Walter F. Mondale,-Mike
Gravel, Claiborne Pell, Lowell P.
Weicker, Jr., Abraham Ribicoff,
Charles H. Percy, Jacob K. Javits, mark
0. Hatfield, William D. Hathaway, Lee
Metcalf, Mike Mansfield, Charles McC.
Mathias, Jr., Edward -M. Kennedy,
Stuart Symington, Hubert H. Hum-
phrey, Frank, E. Moss, Dale Bumpers,
Gaylord Nelson, Gary Hart, Walter D.
Huddleston, Wendell H. Ford, Alan
Cranston, Clifford P. Case, Hugh Scott,
John C. Culver, Thomas J. McIntyre,
and Patrick J. Leahy.
TREASURY REPORT ON THE DISC
Mr. LONG. Mr. President, on April 13,
the Secretary of the Treasury transmited
to Congress a study on Domestic Inter-
national Sales Corporations, DISC, which
sted that DISC stimulated U.S. ex-
by about $4,6 billion in 1974. That
DICS on employment and exports.-
That approach requires a great
many assumptions about the function-
ing of international economics and key
economic parameters, including price
changes. There is a tendency on the parts
of economists to assume an aura . of
scientific exactitude in their estimating.
The area of price elasticities is so com-
plex that the variety of estimates is
only exceeded by the numer of scholars
making them. In commenting on the use
of estimates of demand elasticities, Pro-
fessors Cave and Jones, the authors of a
well-known text book on international
economics, have this to say:
Iii proceeding from the theoretical elastici-
ties to real-world measurements, the econ-
omist runs into many difficulties, which we
can only hint at ... How- can the influence
? of changes In the terms of trade be filtered
out when imports are affected by many' dis-
turbances, such as changes in employment
levels and tariff rates? How does one allow
for the varying periods of time people re-
quire to adjust their plans and purchases
when the relative price of imports changes?
Because of these and other problems, econ-
omists are reluctant to-bet heavily on the
-predictive accuracy of the elasticities they
have estimated. -
As Treasury points out-
Despite these difficulties, the Congressional
Research Service did no original research on
the appropriate elasticity value, and instead
considered only two "widely quoted" elastic-
ity estimates, a low value of 1.51 and a high
value of 2.85.
The Congressional Research Service
was apparently unaware that elasticity
estimates as high as five are also widely
quoted. The Congressional Research
Service's "best- case" estimated that
DISC generated $1.35 billion in addition-
al exports.
The Treasury further states that-
The large downward biases inherent in the
Congressional Research Service's best case
parameters dramatically reduce the "best
S 7283
case" export estimate. Using reasonable "best
case" parameters within the framework of its
approach, the Congressional Research Serv-
ice should have reached a "best case" esti-
mate of the DISC effect of $8.5 billion rather
than $1.35 billion for DISC year 1974. The
$8.5 billion "best case" figure would be cal-
culated as follows:
[Billions of dollars]
Actual total exports in DISC year
. 1974 ------------------- -----------
$73.2
Estimated total U.S. exports in DISC
year 1974 wiihout DISC ------------
64.7
Estimated "best case" DISC effect____
8.5
In short, -proper application of the Con-
gressional _Research Service methodology
would lead to estimates of the 1974 DISC
year impact ranging between zero in the
"worst case" and $8.5 billion in the "best
case". Treasury questions the validity gf the
price elasticities. appraoch for analyzing
DISC. Equally important, the Treasury
doubts that the Congressional Research Serv-
ice "worst case"-"best case" approach,
which does no more than suggest a range of
estimates between zero and $8.5 billion, sig-
nificantly contributes to the public debate on
DISC.
Some of the misunderstanding of the
impact of DISC may stem from a mis-
conception of how DISC stimulates
exports. Price is only one element in
making U.S. exports more competitive.
Proponents of DISC do not claim that it
reduces prices. Export trade involves
added expenses in selling and marketing
abroad. DISC offsets some of these added
expenses; enables U.S. exporters to ex-
tend better credit terms to foreign
buyers; compensates for greater finan-
cial risks; provides positive cash flows
and greater liquidity for financing sales;
and furnishes funds for plant and equip-
ment modernization and expansion.
Perhaps, most importantly DISC in-
duces exporters to locate. plants and
facilities in the United States that would
otherwise be established abroad. The
original purpose of the DISC was to
neutralize tax and foreign incentives too
locate plants abroad. Testimony offered
during the Senate Finance Committee
hearings attested to the success of that
purpose.
Robert Malott, for example, stated:
For FMC, DISC has also meant increasing
investment in the U.S. in plants producing
-for exports. It was a major factor in our
recent decision to invest in the U.S., rather
than off-shore, about $100 million in three
plants that we hope will export more than
50% of their production. In our special report
on DISC you will find the comments that we
received from the men on the front line of
our export activity. I submit that their com-
ments are persuasive testimony to the key
role of DISC as an inducement to invest in
America rather than go abroad.
It is this effect of DISC which most
troubles our trading partners. Congress-
man JOSEPH KARTH, upon completion of
his-study of EC complaints on DISC at
the GATT convention found:
That what the EC members and presum-
ably other countries are worried about, is
that the future of DISC hold such promise,
that U.S. businesses will greatly increase
their efforts to export more and more of their
production . rather than our jobs. .
This would, of course, result in U.S. multi-
nationals providing fewer jobs in those coun-
tries than they desire or expect.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 13, 1976
Mr. President, I have concluded that
the Congressional Research Service's
study is not as scientific and accurate as
its authors pretend. In fact, I think it is
downright misleading. Like anything
else, the conclusions of "the science of
economics" are only,as good as the as-
sumptions. One can go around and
around juggling revenue loss figures with
changes in the exports, in the way that
both the Treasury. and CRS studies do,
without ever coming home to the heart
of the matter. The option for a corpora-
tion which considers selling products to
a foreign country is to either manufac-
ture them in the United States or to
manufacture them abroad. To the extent
that DISC results in a higher rate of
return for a corporation to manufacture
domestically rather than abroad, its ef-
fect is to increase production, and, there-
fore, employment, at home. The Con-
gressional Research Service, although it
does not come to grips with this proposi-
tion, realizes that "DISC and their re-
lated suppliers typically earn a relatively
higher profit margin on sales. The com-
bin,ed profit margin of about 17.3 percent
apparently earned by DISC's is much
higher than the combined profit margin
of 8.4 percent estimated for manufactur-
ing and distribution of goods in the
domestic economy." It is this difference
in rates of return which causes com-
panies to concentrate on exporting from
the United States.
We have had some interesting history
with regard to Congressional Research
Service's objective analyses. When the
Finance Committee reported out a wind-
fall profits tax in July of 1975 which was
designed to meet the imminent prospect
of oil decontrol, the Congressional Re-
search Service, under the same lead
author who wrote the DISC study, issued
a widely publicized study of the impact
of oil price decontrol on the consumer.
The original study concluded that the
first full year of price decontrol would
involve a $26.7 billion cost to the con-
sumer. Because the Finance Committee
had doubts about the assumptions used
in the windfall profits study, it asked the
Congressional Research Service to re-
calculate its figures. Unfortunately, the
revision by the Congressional Research
Service was not widely circulated or pub-
licized. However, it indicated that by
using different assumptions which, in
the words of CRS, were considered more
reasonable, the cost of decontrol was
$7.85 billion-not $26.7 billion.
A comparison of the original. Congres-
sional Research Service analysis and its
revision are shown below.
[In billions] -
August 6
analysis Revision
Crude oil----------------- $16.3 $6.0
Natural gas--------------- 3.9 .6
Coal --------------------- 3.6 .6
NGL --------------------- 2.9 .65
Total --------------- 26.7 7.85
The Congressional Research Service
explained the difference in results as
follows:
These amounts are the annual cost of fuel
increases to consumers in 1976, the first full
year in which all decontrol impacts are felt.
Quite obviously, removal of the $2.00 tariff
effect on exports of between zero al3W8.5
billion. This range is. so large that the
estimates can serve little useful purpose in
a public debate over DISC. Moreover, as the
memorandum points out, the price elastici-
ties approach analyzes the DISC export ef-
fect solely in terms of an effect on prices.
DISC was never intended to operate by
lowering prices. There is no quantitative
evidence that DISC has affected export
prices. The purpose of DISC-is to focus the
attention of U.S. firms on exports and to
provide a tax deferred source of capital for
use in the export business.
The Treasury analysis of the export effect
of DISC is based on a careful comparison of
the actual export experience of firms with
DICSs and firms without DISC's. This ap-
proach suggests that DISC stimulated U.S.
exports by about $4.6 billion in DISC year
1974, subject to the qualifications stressed
in Chapter 5 of the Report. The Congression-
al Research Service has challenged certain
statistical procedures used by the Treasury.
While reasonable analysts might differ on
some of the procedures, the Treasury believes
that its methods are defensible for the
reasons explained in the enclosed memoran-
dum.
I believe that a careful reading of the
enclosed memorandum will further demon-
strate that the repeal or reduction lof DISC
benefits would adversely affect exports and
export-related jobs.
I am sending a similar letter to Senator
Curtis, with copies to Senators Kennedy and
Haskell.
Sincerely yours,
CHARLES M. WALKER,
Assistant Secret
ar
CONGRESS STUDY OF Disc
-
Senators Kennedy and Haskell recently re-
leased a Library of Congress study of DISC.'
In their accompanying press release, the
Senators accuse the Treasury's 1974 Annual
Report 2 of containing a "grossly misleading
presentation of the economic data on DISC."
In other ways, the Senators impugn the
credibility of the Treasury and its profes-
sional staff. These accustations have no basis
in fact, and do not serve the cause of rational
public debate. The Treasury Department be-
lieves that its Report clearly and accurately
sets forth the data. The Treasury further
believes that its analysis of the export effect
of DISC, which was carefully qualified in the
Report, is based on a sounder approach than
that adopted by the Library of Congress.
When DISC. was enacted in 1971, Congress's
directed the Treasury to prepare an annual
report on its operation and effect. In fulfill-
ing this request, the Treasury has prepared
three annual reports. The Treasury has de-
voted more effort to these annual reports
than to any other evaluation of a special
purpose tax measure. The 1974 Annual Re-
port is a carefully prepared study which re-
presents months of statistical tabulation and
analysis. The Report is authored by experi-
enced international tax economists and law-
'Library of Congress, Congressional Re-
search Service, The Domestic International
Sales. Corporation (DISC) Provision and Its
Effect and Unemployment: A Background
Report, May 3, 1976.
2 Department of the Treasury, The Opera-
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and more reasonable assumptions as to im-
pact of crude oil price increases on prices
of related products results in a much more
limited impact of decontrol. As shown under
paragraph 5.1, there is an increase of 7.1
cents per gallon of typical refined product
upon decontrol, using the assumptions of
the Library of Congress CongressionalRe-
search Service in the August 6th analysis,
and only a 2.6 cents a gallon increase in
refined products under the assumptions in
the Revision. (Calculations by Library of
Congress CRS in both cases.)
The revised study spoke for itself: The
assumptions of an economic study deter-
mine the conclusions; more reasonable
assumptions result in more reasonable
conclusions. I hope that before we get
into the debate on DISC the Senators
will have a chance to examine for them-
selves the objectivity of the various stud-
ies made on the impact on unemploy-
ment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD a
Treasury response to the study.
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
Washington, D.C., May 7, 1976.
Hon. RUSSELL B. LOgG,
Chairman, Finance Committee, U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On Monday, May 3,
1976, there appeared in the Congressional
Record, at S. 6323, a joint statement of Sen-
ators Kennedy and Haskell releasing a Li-
brary of Congress study of the DISC provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code. I am
deeply concerned with this statement be-
cause it accuses the Treasury Department of
a "grossly misleading presentation of the
economic data on DISC" in its 1974 Annual
Report, and impugns the credibility of the
Treasury,and its professional staff. These ac-
cusations have no basis in fact, and do not
serve the cause of rational public debate.
The 1974 Annual Report clearly and accu-
rately presents the data which will make
possible a rational debate on the merits of
the DISC provisions. The major purpose of
the Report is to provide data which will en-
able readers to make their own determina-
tions concerning the merits of DISC. Most of
the Report presents statistical tables and
background explanation.
Chapter 5 of the Report represents an at-
tempt by the Treasury Department to ana-
lyze the impact of DISC on exports and em-
ployment. This analysis was made in response
to inquiries from members of the Senate and
the House. Chapter 5 contains a clear state-
ment that the estimates must be viewed with
extreme caution. The statistical procedures
are spelled out in the text and tables, and
Chapter 5 emphasizes that other statistical
methods and assumptions might produce dif-
ferent estimates.
The Congressional Research Service of the
Library of Congress has relied on the statis-
tics, the analysis, and the qualifications of
the Treasury Report in preparing it own
study. The Congressional Research Service
employed different methods and assumptions
to estimate the impact of DISC. on exports.
It is therefore not surprising that the Con-
gressional Researce Service reached different
results than the Treasury. What is surpris-
ing is the unsupported assertion of the Con-
gressional Research Service that the Treasury
estimates "cannot be viewed as a measure
of the impact of the DISC provision on the
total value of U.S. exports." Even more sur-
prising is the Congressional Researce Serv-
ice's embrace of an estimating approach
which, in the Service's own words, depends
on "extremely uncertain" parameters.
There is enclosed for your information a
Treasury staff memorandum contrasting the
approaches used by the Congressional Re-
search Service and the Treasury. The Con-
gressional Research Service analysis relies
C
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May 17, .1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
ferred to the Committee on Interior and true in the past, which is, I think, a very
Insular Affairs. Serious question.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without I also believe there are very serious
s(3~ction, it is so ordered. questions relating to the provisions of
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400)
to establish a Standing Committee of the
Senate on intelligence activities, and for
other purposes.
AMENDMENT NO. 1647, AS MODIFIED
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, ,I call up my
amendment No. 1647, and I send a modi-
fication to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment, as modified, will be stated.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Ohio (Nir. TAFT) pro-
poses an amendment (No. 1647), as modified.
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that further reading of the
.amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment, as modified, is as fol-
lows :
On page 8, lines 13 and 14, delete the term
for public dissemination".
On page 8, line 17, delete all after the
,period and delete all of line 18.
On page 8, line 22, before the period insert
'or the amount of funds authorized to be
appropriated for intelligence activities."
The PRESIDING OFFICER. May the
Chair ask the Senator, is this the amend-
ment which has the time limitation of
2 hours?
TAFT. Mr. President, this is not
amendment that I referred to in the
ent agreement for 2 hours. It is
.r.
merely a 1-hour amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I yield my-
self such time as I may consume.
Mr. President, first of all, let me say ?
with regard to this entire measure that
I have very serious reservations about,
it. I am glad that we are going to dispose
of it. In delaying action on it last week,
I did so because I thought that while
the Senate ought to act on it, while I
think we need some type of an institu-
tionalization of the reporting process of
our intelligence agencies, the one we have
today being either nonexistent or at least
wholly inadequate in my opinion, never-
theless the approach that was taken by
the substitute which is before us at this
time, amendment No. 1643, should be of
great concern to all Members of the Sen-
ate. I am not sure whether I am going
to vote for it or not. I am going to listen
to the debate with interest and observe
what happens with regard to the amend-
ments before making up my mind
whether I will support it or not.
I think it raises questions as to our
security insofar as intelligence operations
are concerned which give me serious
pause.
The fact that we are going to have 15
Members of the Senate, and still the
same reporting or some other reporting
this bill which go toward the reports that
the select committee is directed to make.
In that regard, I want to go over some of
the specific provisions in the substitute
amendment with the Senate.
I am certain that there is no Senator
who wants to see abuses of power or
authority in or by any arm of the Gov-
ernment, and the control of abuse in
intelligence matters is properly a func-
tion of the Congress which we should
not avoid. But we must exercise control
in a careful and deliberate manner to
insure that our oversight activities do
not undermine effective intelligence op-
erations, to the advantage of our adver-
saries.
- We have seen around the world too
many cases where national security is
used as a justification for domestic re-
pression. Equally, we see cases where for-
eign intelligence services of various
States, especially the Soviet Union, en-
gage in practices on foreign soil that
violate the rights and sovereignty of
other States. We cannot and should not
view any of these practices with equa-
nimity or approval.
At the same time, I would hope that
there is no member of this body who is
not aware of the vital national need for
adequate and accurate foreign intelli-
gence. Our international opponents, par-
ticularly the Soviet Union, are closed
societies. They do not publicize their
capabilities or their intentions. I think
the question of intentions is particularly
acute for this country. We know that
the ideology of the Soviet Union calls for
the spread of communism worldwide.
What we do not know is how seriously
that ideology is taken, in terms of policy
plans. We cannot obtain such knowl-
edge without using covert intelligence
collection; yet without it, how can we
establish a policy toward the Soviet
Union other than one based on general
mistrust and suspicion of Soviet in-
tentions?
This is, of ,course, only one example of
the need for intelligence, but at a time
when we are hotly debating the merits of
detente, it is a timely example.
There are, Mr. President, many aspects
to the problem of how to exercise ade-
quate oversight over the intelligence
community so as to prevent potential
abuses, while at the same time not im-
paring our vital intelligence gathering
capability.
In this respect, I see a number of ways
in which amendment No. 1643 to Senate
Resolution 400 may be improved. My
amendment No. 1647 seeks- to avoid one
of the potential problems created by the
resolution by prohibiting the public dis-
semination of annual reports required
under section 4(B) of the substitute
amendment. My colleagues will recall
that the section 4(B) presently reads:
(B) The Select,Conimittee shall obtain an
annual report from the director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of State, and the
re
ti
Director of the Federal B
f I
u
ga
a o
nves
i7'rivy to the information than has been shall review the intelligence activities+of the
S 7349
Agency or Department concerned and the
intelligence activities of foreign countries
directed at the United States or its interests.
An unclassified version of each report shall
be made available to the public by the Select
Committee. Nothing herin shall be construed
as requiring the disclosure in such reports
of the names of individuals engaged in Intel-
ligence activities for the United States or,
the sources of information on which such
reports are based.
Mr. President, last week after this sub-
stitute had appeared on the scene, the ?
Armed Services Committee, under Chair-
man STENNIS, called the Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense, Mr. Robert Ellsworth,
before that committee to testify on this
subject. Secretary Ellsworth's testimony
is now printed and available for study
and we are making oppies available to
any Senators here today who would like
to read that testimony.
I was concerned in this hearing about
the effects of section 4(b) on foreign
intelligence sources because of the re-
quirement of annual public disclosure.
In response to my questions about the
effects of the section, Mr. Ellsworth had
a good deal to say. I want to read spe-
cifically from some of his testimony be-
fore the committee just last week with
reference to this particular section, sec-
tion 4 (b), appearing on page 8 of the bill.
Mr. President, at that time, I asked
as follows:
Senator TAFT. I would like to ask Secretary
Ellsworth, in section 4(b) is a provision that:
"The select committee shall obtain an an-
nual report from the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of State, and-the Director of
the Federal Bureau of investigation for pub-
lic dissemination. Such reports shall review
the intelligence activities of the agehcy or
department concerned and the intelligence
activities of foreign countries directed at the
United States or its interests. An unclassified
version of each report shall be made avail-
able to the public by the select committee.
Nothing herein shall be construed as requir-
ing the disclosure in such reports of the
names of individuals engaged in intelligence
activities for the United States or the sources
of information."
And so forth.
What in your opinion would be the effects
on foreign intelligence sources to us of it
being known that there will annually be
such a report made public?
Mr. ELLSWORTH. I think that the effect of
that report would be to apprise foreign na-
tions of the extent of our familiarity with
their operations against us, and would assist
them in perfecting and strengthening their
operations against us.
That appears on page 11 of the tran-
script.
On page 13, a question was-asked by
Senator STENNIS, the chairman of the
committee:
Now, Mr. Secretary, are there any other
points that you can think of? And I want
you to answer questions here by our Chief
of Staff, too. But make your points further.
Mr. ELLSWORTH. The only other point. Mr.
Chairman, is a personal point that-comes out
of what some of my friends, for example, in
the academic community have been saying
for a couple of years, before I came into the
Defense Department, to the effect that it is
logical, if we are going to spend that amount
of money on intelligence, to have a coherent,
unitary budget for that, and logical there-
fore to give the jurisdiction for authorizing
that budget and for overseeing its perform-,
ante, and so forth and so on, into a separate
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S 7350 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.- SENATE May 17, 1976
committee in the Congress. They use words
like logical and coherent. But I want to stress
again that notwithstanding the appeal of
logic and coherence, the fact of the matter
is that in real life this is going to give us
tremendous problems in our responsibilities
as far as the Defense Department is con-
cerned, first of all, because naturally when
you get things into a coherent, unitary pic-
ture in the intelligence field, foreign intelli-
gence specialists and ,analysis-the analysts
who work for foreign powers-are not so
dumb that they can't figure out on the basis
of a year-to-year comparison basis what is
going on in our intelligence collection effort
on more effective and efficient basis than they
are today.
The CHAIRMAN. YOU mean intelligence
from foreign nations?
Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is right. A foreign
analyst analyzing our program is going to
have a tremendous edge when he can look
at our unitary defense overall intelligence
budget and compare it from year to year and
put it together*with other bits of informa-
tion that he has assembled on the worldwide
basis. It is going to be a tremendous help
to him with "his problem, figuring out what
we are doing and how he can counter it.
That is one problem.
Another problem is a reflection of the
point you yourself made, Mr. Chairman, and
that is if the Senate has this process, it is
just going to mean double accounting, it is
going to mean double automation, and dou-
ble staffing as far as we are concerned in
presenting our budget to the two bodies.
So those are our points.
Senator THURMOND then asked the
following question:
I might ask you this. Have you any
thoughts or recommendations on the way
you think intelligence might be handled by
the Congress to provide the greatest protec-
tion to the Government?
Mr:'ELLSWORTH. Well, I would think-and
speaking again for Secretary Rumsfeld-that
it would be desirable as well as-it certainly
would be desirable from the standpoint of
the public confidence and support in in-
telligence operations, and completely accept-
able to us, there could be either in the one
body, or in the other, or both, or on a joint
basis, an oversight committee which would
have an exercise a rigorous oversight function
over the various intelligence activities of the
Government, which would not imply involv-
ing itself in these other problems which I
have mentioned; that is to say, the admin-
istrative problems and the unitary budget
presentaiton problem which I have men-
tioned.
something that could be and would be Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, before we
beneficial to- everybody in the Government into a quorum Call, I should like to
and to everybody in the intelligence com- ga
munity, because of the fact that it would im- respond.
prove and increase, presumably, the public's The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the
and therefore support, for"neces- Senator from Connecticut withdraw his
confidence
,
sary information-gathering functions. request? Secretary of State, and the Director of
Then, continuing on, Senator TiruR- Mr.RIBICOFF. I withdraw my request. the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It
MOND asked the following question: Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I would provides also that:
I believe Mr. Colby said he would welcome like to reserve final judgment until Sen- Nothing herein shall be construed as re-
a small joint committee on the matter of sur- ator BROCK has taken the floor, but my quiring the disclosure in such reports of the
veillance. There would be no objection to initial reaction to the amendment of the names of individuals engaged in intelligence
that, as I see it. As the chairman mentioned, a Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) is a favor- activities for the United States or the sources
joint committee would save intelligence of- of information on which such reports are
ficials from making so many appearances. able one. I really cannot imagine what based.
They have to appear before the Armed Serv- value a, report for public dissemination
ices and Appropriations Committees of the would really have. I am concerned that The language of the resolution does
Senate, and the Armed Services. and Appro- it might actually.be misleading. not cover the leaving of inthe telligence
priations Committees of the House. If you Certainly to have a report from the in- the matter of divulging
.
naa a Jul- telilgence Culnmuluby w ~..~ ..................
could make one appearance instead of four. on its activities would be.highly valuable. Without an amendment, it could be
be
4.1, + at could
all t
d
And so forth. But I think the general im- . It would be comprehensive in scope, and co rsstf e
would be t
n reDort
the
d
bl
ro
__ _
-- -- - -
e w
worth makes it perfectly clear that there the committee has availa
is a real danger, even on an unclassified cedures, as provided for in the resolution, lution, that is, that the report did not
basis, in making these annual reports to for public dissemination of such infor-
the public, reports that the committee is mation in that report as it feels is desira-
ing or not. terests of the intelligence communitin
tided it wanted-to do so in the public But it does seem to me there is value in
interest, but it would be mandated by the the amendment being offered. I would
language of this section 4(b) to go ahead like to wait to hear a final argument by
annually with an unclassified version of the author of this particular section,
the report, and it would be required also Senator BROCK, because I feel he should
to have this report, and I think to have have that privilege; but my initial re-
it become public property, in effect, un- action to the amendment is favorable.
less some matter in it were specifically Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President' I sug-
classified; and I question whether it gest the absence of a quorum, and ask
would be possible to segregate out the unanimous consent that the time con-
unclassified portion and have the report sumed by the quorum call not be charged
mean. anything so far as the public is to either -side.
concerned; or, on the other hand, not The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
face the alternative Secretary Ellsworth objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will
talked of, of providing a pattern of in- call the roll.
formation as to how our intelligence The second assistant legislative clerk
gathering is proceeding and what kind of proceeded to call the roll.
authorization we are giving to it. Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I ask
My amendment would take out the re- unanimous consent that the order for the
quirement that such reports be made quorum call be rescinded.
public, and take out the requirement that The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
the unclassified version be made avail- objection, it is so ordered.
able to the public by the select commit- Mr. ALLEN., Mr. President, -I ask
tee, and this modification, which - was unanimous consent that the pending
added today, would also add at the end amendment may be set aside tempo-
of section 4(b) the words "or the amount rarily in order that I might call up an
of funds authorized to be appropriated amendment which the managers of the
for intelligence activities," which is an bill have agreed to accept, and which I
attempt to help meet the last objection of believe we can dispose of in about a
which Secretary Ellsworth was speaking. . minute. -
Mr. President, I urge the passage of The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
the amendment, and reserve the .remain- objection? Without objection, it is so or-
der of my time. dered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who Mr. ALLEN. I call up my amender"
yields time? - which is at the desk, and ask for its_
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, let me mediate consideration.
respond briefly to the distinguished Sen- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
ator from Ohio: amendment will be stated.
The part of the section that the Sen- The second assistant legislative clerk
ator seeks to have stricken was put in read as follows:
the bill by the Senator from Tennessee The Senator from Alabama (Mr. ALLEN),
(Mr. BROCK). We have sent for Mr. from himself, Mr. PERCY, and MT. CANNON,
BROCK, and would like to have him here proposes an amendment to amendment No.
before we take.further action. 1643, as follows: -
Mr. President, I suggest the absence on page 8, line 21 between the words "or"
of a quorum, and ask unanimous consent and "the" add the following: "the divulging_
that the time for the quorum call not of intelligence methods employed or"
be charged to either side. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I yield my-
self such time as I may use.
Mr. President, the resolution calls for
the select committee to obtain an annual
report from the Director of Central In-
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May 17, 1976 , CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 7351
have to include the names of the indi- The additional clause that would be Mr. TAFT. I yield 5 minutes to the
viduals engaged in intelligence activi- added at the end of that sentence on line distinguised Senator from Alabama.
ties for the United States, or the sources 22 would still be governed entirely by Mr. ALLEN. I thank the Senator.
rmation on which such reports are the language in line 19. The language in Mr. President, I support the amend-
f info line 19 says that "nothing herein shall be ment offered by the distinguished Sen-
ls amendment would add a third bit construed as requiring the disclosure in ator from Ohio.
o information that would not have to such reports of * * *" and then referring The resolution calls for the annual
be disclosed, and that would be the in- to the language I added, "the amount of report that the committee obtains from
telligence methods employed by the funds authorized to be appropriated for the intelligence agencies to be obtained
agencies. Otherwise, if they were re- intelligence activities." In other words, for public dissemination and would seem
quired to disclose the intelligence meth- it would relate only to a requirement to contemplate that possiblyit could be
ods employed, the methods, of course, that it be disclosed. If the committee de- classified and unclassified information,
would be made available to adversaries cided it wanted to disclose it, or if the from the language of the resolution; be-
and would become common knowledge. Senate overruling the committee decided cause farther down in the section it says
All the amendment does is to provide it wanted to disclose the amount of funds that an unclassified version of each re-
that, in addition to not disclosing the authorized to be appropriated, it could port shall be made available to the. public
names-of the individuals carrying on in- do so and there would be nothing in the by the select committee.
telligence activities, or the sources of language that would prevent it. I would Obviously, there is no need, then, for
information, they should not be required like to go on to say, however, that this the first phrase that the distinguished
to give information as to their methods is the very point on which Secretary Senator from Ohio is seeking to strike,
of operation. Ellsworth was, I ,think, abundantly clear. to eliminate the "for public dissemina-
So the manager of the bill, the dis- He made the point that the disclosure of tion" of the annual report.
tinguished Senator from Illinois' (Mr. the authorization of appropriations was So the report can be obtained; but
PERCY), and the distinguished chairman very likely to be helpful to possible ad- what the first `phase of the Senator's
of the Committee on Rules and Admin- versaries in interpreting our intelligence amendment does is to eliminate the "for
istration (Mr. CANNON) have approved activities. public dissemination." That would
the amendment,. and I hope that the . So I think a specific indication that leave, then, the unclassified version be-
Senate will accept the amendment. there is no authorization or no require- ing made available to the public by the
I reserve the remainder of my time. ment that,, such "a disclosure be made select committee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who would be desirable at this point. It is The second phase of the amendment
yields time? only that. would strike that out, because the com-
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, as the MT. RIBICQF'F. Will the-Senator agree mitte.e has authority, under other sec-
manager of the bill, the amendment of- that it is not his intention, and he does tions, to divulge information, if it sees
fered by the. distinguished Senator from not interpret the language to foreclose, fit to do so, subject to an appeal to the
Alabama. is acceptable. the Senate after meeting in executive Senate. So a method is provided, with-
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, speaking session. to vote by majority vote to dis- out this sentence, for this disclosure of
on behalf of the minority I know of no close the amount of authorization? information.
objection on this side and certainly the . Mr. TAFT. I certainly take that inter- Further, the sentence which the Sena-
amendment is acceptable to the Senator 'pretation,, again saying I would hope, if tor seeks to delete provides that it shall
from Illinois. Just looking at a tech- the Seflate ever gets to that point, it be made available, which is directory
E. cal point- would take a very careful look at it be- and mandatory; and by eliminating this
r. ALLEN. I wish to touch that. cause of the danger I have just outlined. sentence, it would be discretionary with
r. PERCY. Have the two "ors" been . Mr. RIBICOFF. But we do have to the committee to take the necessary
eliminated?. have faith and trust in the Senate as a steps to divulge the information. So that
Mr. ALLEN. Yes.. whole to make the decision and not to sentence is not needed.
Mr. PERCY. Fine. foreclose the Senate from making it. Also, the third phase of the amend-
I have no further comment. Mr. TAFT. There is no question about ment provides that this section shall not
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The it. As .I indicated, I do not think the be construed as requiring. a report on
amendment was agreed to. language forecloses the committee from the amount of the appropriation to the
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, May I making the disclosure if it decided it intelligence agency. Obviously, a dis-
have the attention of the distinguished wanted to do so. I think it would be closure of the amount of the appropria-
Senator. from Ohio? unwise to do so, but if it wanted to do tion would give much valuable informa-
I have just noted that the distin- so, it could do so under the language of tion to adversaries as to. the extent of
guished Senator from Ohio.changed the - the amendment. our intelligence activities.
printed amendment 1647: Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I sug- The colloquy that just occurred be-
On page 8, line 22, before the period, in- gest the absence of a quorum, and ask tween the distinguished Senator from
sert the following: "or the amount of funds unanimous consent that the time allotted Connecticut (Mr. RisicoFF) and the dis-
authorized to be appropriated for intelii- to the quorum call not be charged to tinguished Senator from Ohio (Mr.
Bence activities." either side. TAFT) indicates that if the committee
What concerns me is that, while it is The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without wished to divulge this information, it
not the intention of the resolution to re- objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will could do so if it were allowed to do so
quire that the amounts appropriated be call the roll. by the Senate.
made public, yet there is provision in the The assistant legislative clerk pro- So the amendment in all three of its
legislation providing that, under rule ceeded to call the roll. aspects, it seems to me, is a constructive
XXXV, any two Senators in a closed ses- Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I ask amendment, and I hope it will be agreed
sion, could debate the question of the unanimous consent that the order for the to by the Senate.
amount of funds. The Senate then by quorum call be rescinded. I yield back the remainder of the time
majority vote could make the decision to The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. allotted to me.
make public the amount appropriated. BEALL). Without objection, it Is so The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
This would be the Senate's decision in ordered. yields time?
that case. What concerns me is that the Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, will the
additional language might foreclose the Senator from Ohio yield me about 5 min- Mr. the absence RIBICOFF. a Mr. quorum, President, I I sug-and Senate Senate itself by majority vote in making utes on the amendment? unanimous e absence of that the time cask
public the amount of the appropriation. Mr. TAFT. How much time do I have the quorum not be charged t-
This is what concerns me. - remaining on the amendment, Mr. either side.
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, if the Sen- President? ING OFFICER. Without
atorr will yield on that point, I do not The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- The
Objection. PRESit is IDING
ordered.
ink the Senator's fears would be justi- ator from Ohio has 15 minutes remain-
IWd here. ing. The clerk will call the roll.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 17, 1976
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BROCK. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING' OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I yield
such time as he may require to the dis-
tinguished Senator from Tennessee.
Mr. BROCK. I thank the Senator from
Connecticut.
Mr., President, I should like to dis-
cuss the proposed amendment with the
Senator from Ohio and be sure that we
are on the same track.
I wish to explain, first of all, the pur-
pose of the language as it was inserted
by me in the committee. What we hoped
to obtain by this language was at least,
on an annual basis, some sort of gen-
eral overview of our intelligence opera-
tions to be made available to the Amer-
ican people so that they could under-
stand the need for maintenance of a
basic intelligence capability.
I understand what the Senator is try-
ing to do. I just want to be certain that
it leaves us the opportunity to present
to the American people, in a completely
unclassified sense, a report on why we
need an FBI, a CIA, and so forth. I
think most people know, but I am not
sure that we are reminded of it in a
tangible fashion, on a regular basis.
Those two agencies particularly have
come under massive assault in recent
months-for some valid reasons on oc-
casion, but generally the assault has ex-
ceeded the crime, in my opinion.
I think we have done -a great deal of
damage to our capacity for national se=
curity. In that sense,. then, I was hop-
ing that this 'report would afford the
agencies an opportunity to present their
side of the case to the American people
and to justify the foundation for their
actions, not only with regard to their
basic intelligence activities, but with re-
gard to the intelligence activities di-
rected against the interest of this coun-
try and its people. That was the purpose
of the language.
I am not so sure that the language
is perfect. I certainly have no pride of
authorship in it. But I do think it is im-
portant that we provide an opportunity
for the American people to see just what
threats are being raised against this
country and what we are trying to do to
deal with those threats.
Mr. TAFT. I yield myself 2 minutes.
Mr. President, I appreciate the posi-
tion taken by the Senator from Tennes-
see. Basically, I do not think I have any
real disagreement with him. It does seem
to me that the public should have from
the select committee and from Congress
a. general indication as to the need for
our intelligence activities. The difficulty
I have is in going into a formal report of
them and setting, out exactly what we
are doing anywhere. As- Secretary Ells-
worth pointed out in the testimony I re-
ferred to earlier, there- is a substantial
danger that adversaries, looking at that
information, maybe able to detect major
intelligence activities.
I did go on and read another part of
this report of the same hearings before
the Committee on Armed Services. I shall
ask unanimous consent that it be printed
in the RECORD at the conclusion of my
remarks.
I cite the question raised by-Senator
Nuwrr, to which Secretary Eflswortli re-
plied later by a letter at the end of the
testimony. Senator Nvs w pointed out
that, for instance, with the Glomar Ex-
plorer, the U-2, and other similar situa-
tions, the nature and size of those very
activities could show a bulge in intelli-
gence activities that might be of some
use to those who are making a constant
analysis of any information they can get
as to what we are doing in the intelli-
gence agencies. I do not disagree with
the Senator at all. The committee, if it
decides to do so, can make available gen-
eral information if it becomes convinced
that it is -not going to be detrimental
from the point of view I am concerned
with.
I tell the Senator one thing: The
American people are deeply concerned
with the whole problem of intelligence.
They are deeply concerned with the
abuses that have been described by the
committee that the Senator from Minne-
sota was talking about earlier. They are
even more concerned about the possibil-
ity that some of this information that is
classified or information that can be of
use to those who are our adversaries in
the international intelligence community
might become available to them. The
American people are in an uproar about
that. Everywhere I. go, people are con-
cerned about it. They want to see Con-
gress do something to try to tighten up
this entire area. I hope the legislation
that we pass eventually will have that
effect. I do not want anything counter-
productive to that in the language here.
I had the feeling, reading this language
in the bill, that it might be so inter-
preted.
Mr. BROCK. The President has ex-
pressed a concern, and I share it. I am
disgusted, frankly, with some of the ma-
chinations with regard to this Investiga-
tion. There clearly were abuses; they
must be cleared up, But, there clearly
have been excesses in reporting those
abuses. I think that is a tragedy for
Congress and for the American people.
I want no part of that kind of action.
What I am reaching for, and may be the
Senator can help me find a better way to
do it, is an opportunity for these agen-
cies to demonstrate to the American
people in some. fashion why we need an
intelligence capability. I should like for
them to have an opportunity to present
their side of the case. That is all I am
reaching for. If the Senator finds the
words, "for public dissemination" on
line 13 excessive or unnecessary, then,
that is fine to strike that.
I am not trying to give the committee
an opportunity to make a report on why
we: need an agency; I am trying to get
the agencies a chance to present their
case. What I am asking is that the com-
mittee get. the full report and that. an
unclassified. summary or synopsis be
made available so that we can at -least
make, some judgment as to protecting
that national interest.
Maybe that is not necessary, but I do
not know how else to do it, I say to my
colleague from Ohio. I know that he and
I seek exactly the same objectives with
regard to this total bill. We are not in
disagreement.
Mr. TAFT. I reply to the Senator i_b,
under which reports would be made by
the various agencies involved and going
for a review of the intelligence activities
or department concerned and intelli-
gence activities of foreign countries di-
rected at the United States. It would
take out "for public dissemination" and
would leave that entirely up to the com-
mittee or the Senate.
As I discussed earlier with the dis-
tinguished chairman of the committee,
the Senator from Connecticut, there is
nothing in the language of the amend-
ment that would prevent the committee
or prevent the Senate, either with the
committee or without the committee,
from going ahead and making public
such aspects of any reports from the var-
ious departments that they think it is de-
sirable to make public. I do not intend to
cut off that right at all. In fact, I think
it would be a mistake to cut it off.
Mr. BROCK. But by striking the lan-
guage, I think-let us just talk about
some future Senate with some future,
different composition. Reading the legis-
lative history in which we simply strike
the language on lines 17 and 18, the sec-
ond part of the amendment, it would
read that the committee could write its
own report or could not issue any report
at all. I almost would rather, if the
Senator wants to allow them the privi-
lege of passing on this report-because.
I think this is a passthrough thing. I d
not want it completely rewritten
turned around by the committee. I th
the agencies ought to have the right to
present their own case.
I wonder if the Senator would allow
me to keep lines 17 and 18 and, instead
of the word "shall," write "may." That
would allow the committee to release it,
but that still leaves the decision with the
committee. It still implies that they are
releasing a report which came to them
and not writing their own.
Mr. TAFT. I do not think I would have
any objection to that. I think that would
leave it optional ' to the committee still
and not mandatory. I must say, however,
that I would rather expect, from any
knowledge I have of the intelligence
agencies- Involved, that the last thing in
the world they are going to want done is
to have a copy of their reports made
public.
Mr. BROCK. It may be. It is quite pos-
sible that the committee would agree with
that and say no report at all.
You see, there is not any reason for
this whole paragraph on page 8, subpara-
graph b, without the report, though, be-
cause the rest of the bill deals with re-
quiring the CIA and the FBI to come be-
fore the committee and testify as to what
they are doing and why. We might be
better off just to eliminate. the whole par-
agraph, because that annual report is
part and parcel: of the whole bill. If the
Senator wants to do that, fine.
Alternatively, we could strike the wo
"shall" and substitute "may" and leave.
'to the discretion of the committee.
I think the Senator can see what I
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May 17, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
am reaching for. I am a little reluctant
to deny these agencies an opportunity for
presentation of their own case to the
American people at large without--
r. TAFT. I can understand the Sena-
feeling. The only thing I would say
ut t it is if there is a report of that kind
made, I think it ought to come from the
President of the United States to the peo-
ple of the United States, anyway.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. TAFT. Yes.
Mr. RIBICOFF. I wonder if we could
reconcile the differences in emphasis
here? If on line 17, we struck the word
"shall" and substituted "may" and on
line 18, after the word "public," "at the
discretion of" the select committee, would
that satisfy the Senator from Tennessee
and the Senator from Ohio?
Mr. BROCK. It would be all right with
me.
Mr. TAFT. I think that would satisfy
our need in what we have here. Mr.
President, I move to modify the amend-
ment by deleting lines 3 and 4 of the
amendment and on page 8, line 17 that
the word "shall" be stricken, and that
the word "may" be substituted for it; and
in line 18 after the word "public" strike
the word "by" and insert the words "at
the discretion of."
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the amendment is so modi-
fied.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Another question
arises, if I may have the attention of the
distinguished Senator from Ohio, on line
19, page 8, after the word "the" and
the word "disclosure" insert the word
Mstion blic" because we have now added the
of methods of gathering infor-
tion and the amount of authorization.
While this information should not be
'made public by Senate Resolution 400,
we should not deprive the select com-
mittee of the information.
Mr. TAFT. I think that suggestion is
proper, and I agree to that modification.
Mr. RIBICOFF. I wonder if the Sen-
ator would modify it to insert the word
"public" at that point?
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I--move to
modify the amendment to insert the
word "public" in line 19 before the word
"disclosure."
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment is so modified.
The modifications are as follows:
Delete lines 3 and 4 of the amendment
(No. 1647).
On page 8, line 17 strike "shall" and in-
sert in lieu thereof "may".
On page 8, line 18 strike "by" and insert
in lieu thereof "at the discretion of".
On page 8, line 19, after "the" insert
"public".
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, under
these circumstances the amendment of
the distinguished Senator from Ohio, as
modified, is acceptable by the manager
of the bill.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I should
like to commend both the Senator from
Ohio and the Senator from Tennessee,
who originally wrote this section, for fur-
ther clarification of its intent and pur-
pose.
e senator from Illinois is delighted
earn the objective is exactly the same,
and I think the compromise language
that has been worked out with the many
ager of the bill is entirely acceptable.
Mr. BROCK. Mr. President, may I say
that I too appreciate the efforts of the
Senator from Ohio. I think we have an
absolutely common purpose in this de-
bate, and I appreciate his pointing out
the possible dangers as the wording was
originally. I could not more thoroughly
agree with his concern about the releas-
ing of any classified material that would
damage our security and our intelligence
activities. I appreciate the fact that he
brought it up, and I shall support the
amendment, as modified.
Mr. TAFT. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, I am ready to yield back
the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is all time
yielded back?
Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield back the re-
mainder of our time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment, as
modified, of the Senator from Ohio.
The amendment, as modified, was
agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. RIBICOFF. I suggest the absence
of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. TAFT and Mr. THURMOND ad-
dressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from South Carolina is recognized.
W. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise
in opposition to Senate Resolution
The PRESIDING OFFICER.' Who
yields time--to the Senator from South
Carolina?
Mr. RIBICOFF. The Senator is in op-
position.
Mr. THURMOND. I yield myself 10
minutes. -
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
being under the control of the minority
leader or his designee, the Senator from
South Carolina is recognized for 10 min-
utes.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise
in opposition to Senate Resolution 400
and the proposed substitute amendment
which would establish a committee of
15 members plus the minority and ma-
jority leaders.
Mr. President, my opposition to this
substitute revolves around a number of
issues. As each member of this body re-
alises, this substitute constitutes an en-
tirely new bill and poses far-reaching
ramifications. This legislation was not
written in the Government Operations
Committee and has not had the benefit
of hearings.
Once again we are witnessing an effort
to push through the Senate highly sig-
nificant legislation without the benefit
of the views of the executive departments
involved, or the President of the United
States. While this bill deals with the re-
sponsibilities of the Senate, it impacts
S7353
on the, responsibility of the President,
who is charged with management of the
intelligence agencies.
Obviously, the Senators who wrote this
legislation are attempting to do what
they' consider best for this country. But
I feel if other Senators were brought into
the legislative process in the-calm of a
committee hearing and markup, we
could come up with better legislation.
Therefore, it would be my hope the
Senate would recommit Senate Resolu-
tion 400, as amended, to the Govern-
ment Operations Committee with the
requirement it come back to the floor
in about 30 days. Otherwise, we will be
asked to approve.a very important bill
which most of us had not even seen be=
fore last Thursday.
Now moving to the issue of the Select
Committee on Intelligence Activities, I
would like to make three, or four points:
First, it is my view this step by the
Senate will result in disclosure of sensi-
tive information relative to our intelli-
gence activities. This may not come as a
result of disclosure by any particular
Senator, but when highly sensitive in-
telligence is handled by such a large
committee and responsibility is shared
with many other committees, it is much
more difficult to protect classified data.
Furthermore, if this bill is adopted I
would estimate 50 to 60 staff people will
be privy to the most sensitive matters
of our Goverment. The Soviets must be
laughing at us and the rest of theworld
looking on with shocked amazement.
The Senate must realize that by pass-
age of the proposed substitute we are
moving toward a vast proliferation of
sensitive data. In my opinion, it will lead
to our Nation becoming No. 2 as to the
effectiveness of its intelligence gathering
apparatus.
As presently written, the substitute
amendment requires notification prior to
any significant activities. This obviously
refers to covert operations. If this had
been in effect during the Vietnam war it
would have required notification to the
Senate of highly sensitive military in-
telligence operations such as the mining
of Haiphong Harbor, the Son Tay Prison
raid, and the Mayaguez rescue effort,
prior to execution. Any leak, however in-
advertent or unintended, would endanger
the lives of the personnel carrying out
such operations.
Our foreign intelligence agents are al-
ready shaken by the murder in Athens,
Greece, of an agent whose name was
published by enemies of the Central In-
telligence Agency.
Furthermore, by putting intelligence
funds under the authority of a large
select committee, the size of our intelli-
gence budget will become public knowl-
edge as the annual authorization of the
budget proceeds through the legislative
process. This means our enemies will be
able to assess our intelligence efforts by
evaluating changes in increases and de-
creases of funding for our intelligence
agencies.
Finally, on the subject of disclosures,
this committee will be vested with the
authority to reveal to the public, after
a vote of the full Senate, the most sensi-
tive information provided by the Director
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 S 7354
of Central
gressional
be so power
an arm of
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STATEMENT
PARLIAM
Mr. RIDDI
have Chang
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mittee did,
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ution, or ax
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brought up
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ing authori
So you reta to a point oJ
for any pur
in to the Appropriations Com-
if this is retained as is, the exist-
in funds
ty it has now to bring
pose ndt authorized, not subject
Intelligence. This means con-
control over the Agency will,
f it would virtually become
ul
Congress-rather than an arm
mander
-in-Chief.
des authorization
des to the select
to reveal to any other com-
.
the select
matter which
determines requires such at-
isis approach is a step toward
n of vital information,
n a smaller portion of the
p, such as a subcommittee.
paration of the intelligence
rom the defense committees
. On this
defense committees.
ter the following points:
hened oversight through
gt a
subcommittee with highly
affs- in the four defense com-
he
uld at least hold
.
roposal
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ing no objection, thi
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OF FLOYD U. RIDDIC
NTARZAN OF THM U.S.
OK. Mr. Chairman, I
ed the resolution c
Opera
h
e Government
as far as protection
ncerned, and also
as
s It had previously. W
ds as follows:
o the Standing Rules
d
cetera, just as M
s shall be appropriats clause, "Subject to
et
i
f the Senate " retains
think we
onsiderably
tions Com-
of infor
-
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r. Braswell
Stand-
the
rule 16
as
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roga-tives of the Senate to organize its vari-
ous committees and their jurisdictions in
whatever way the Senate sees fit.
But this proposal to create authorization,
for appropriations jurisdiction in a new Sen-
ate committee does give the Secretary
me some concern as far as our ability to
charge our responsibilities in the Defense -
partment is concerned. And principally those
concerns are two as far as we are. concerned.
We operate our intelligence- responsibility
in a somewhat different world- from the CIA
or the F51. We operate in an extremely, high-
ly technological world, which with our facili-
ties, is very sensitive and very delicate: And
that is the basis for our first concern from
the standpoint of maintaining the. overall
confidentiality of our sensitive and expensive
military and defense intelligence- sources and
methods-and you. know what I 'mean, par-
ticularly our most modern collection sys-
tems-the visibility that is created by a sep-
arate budget formulation process would en-
tail, as we see it, grave risks. That is our first
concern about the creation of a committee
with the authorization for appropriations
jurisdiction over these matters.
And then in addition, our Department
would still be required, should the Senate
create this new committee, to maintain a
budget. formulation process for the House of
Representatives which would- continue to
conform to, an appropriation account. And
those two separate processes would require
double accounting, and would require addi-
tional expense, and additional staff, and addi-
tional automation equipment. So that we
would hope that the Senate in its wisdom
would not create this additional committee
having additional authorization for appropri-
ations jurisdiction over these intelligence
matters.
Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, Is the Secre-
tary going to come back and tell us what
these grave risks are? He just leaves the
phrase hanging there and I wonder if he is-
prepared to tell us what these -risks are?
The CHAIRMAN. I do not know. We can
it up *ith him a little later. I invited
to come here just to put before the -commit-
tee whatever he saw in this matter and what
problems would be created.
Senator HART. I.think- the committee ought.
to know what the grave risks are, instead of
just floating a phrase like that.
The CHAIRMAN. You will certainly have a
chance to question him on it.
senator TOWER. I might say.that this is
extremely sensitive, Mr. Chairman. I know
what the risks are. It is extremely sensitive.
The. CHAIRMAN. For the time being, as I
understand it, we will pass it over and give
you a right to examine him.
All right, Mr. Ambassador, go ahead.
Mr. ELLSWORTH. Those are my two points,
Mr. Chairman, the points of the Secretary of
Defense and myself.
The CHAIRMAN. When you refer to the
budget of the Defense Intelligence Agency-
you are talking about military intelligence?
Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is right.
The CHArssAN. That Is the DIA?
Mr. ELLSWORTH. The DIA and the NSA and
those are the principal subject matters.
The CHAIRMAN. And those are the concerns
that you carry primarily?
Mr. ELLSWoRTH. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. And you are not thinking
in terms of the CIA as such?
Mr. ELLSWORTH. No.
Senator SYMINGTON. If the Chair will yield.
The CHAIRMAN. I will yield to you, Senator.
Senator SYMINGTON. I would like you to ex-
plain to us, if you will, Mr. Secretary-you
say exclusively CIA. As I understand, there
is now an effort to put the CIA in as a
part of the military intelligence setup, or
as an equal member of it, perhaps a sent,
member of it. I have always been very st
picious after General Graham's speech as just what the military thought about the
position of the CIA. And you have talked a
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE , May 17, 1976
- I think that is- a very significant point. For
example, if you wanted to hire- a group to do
some spy work in Cuba and- there, was no
legislative authorization. foF It, and you
wanted them to go in on a submarine, you
could just put an item for an intelligence
activity in South America, for $500 millten
or whatever you wanted, and no authorizer
tion would be necessary under this proviso.
Senator SYMINGTON. But then you bypass
the supervisory commtlee, the regulatory
committee.
Mr. Rwnxcxi. Senator, that is not the in-
tent of this appropriation.
Senator SYMINGTON. I know it is not the
intent, but. it is what has been going on for
25 years, and it is one. of the chief reasons
we are in this mess.
Mr, RIBDICK. What the Authorization Com-
mittee can do is to come in with legislation
that. would say, no funds shall be spent,
which would give them authority that we
now have under this legislative authorization
authority. The only thing is, as the confer-
ence was agreed upon, if this committee
acted to take negative action against a cer-
tain activity, it certainly would not be ex-
pected that the Appropriations Committee
would come in unless there was an extreme
crisis, and define what the legislative au-
thorization committee had done.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask a question
right there.
If you had this, proposal for this activity
in South America, you would have to dis-
close it right there if you have the authori-
zation, you might say, from the floor in the
method. thatyou describe?
Mr. RmDrcx. That is true. But there are
other aspects in there, Senator, that are go-
ing to be more exposing than this. For exam-
ple, the proviso which reads here:
"On or before March 15 of each year, the
select committee shall submit to the Corn
mittee on the Budget of the Senate the views
and estimates described in section 301(c) of
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, regard-
ing matters within the jurisdiction of the se-
lect committee."
So the select committee has to submit its
information to the Budget Committee just
like any other committee, which, if they
want to, can expose the details of what they
are proposing.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. But that increases
rather than takes care of the problem as
some of us see it at least about unnecessary
or undue disclosure.
Mr. RI)DICK. The way this substitute tight-
ens up on the flow of information is that it
prohibits any member of the select commit-
tee from exposing any of the information
submitted to the select committee until the
committee votes.
Now, if it is lawfully classified information,
then they must, before the information can
be released, submit a report to the Senate in
closed session, which the Senate will debate
in closed session, as opposed to the way this
committee decides whether information of
that nature is to be exposed. And if the Sen-
ate says yes, it. will be exposed, and if the
Senate says no, it will not be exposed.
The CHAIRMAN. We especially appreciate
your being here.
I will now call on Mr. Ellsworth to discuss
further some matters already touched on.
Now, the general situation. Mr. Ellsworth,
is that we want to know your analysis. You
represent the executive branch that is go-
ing to have to deal with whatever is done.
I am glad you arrived Senator Hart.) We are
just having a roundrobin table discussion on
this whole matter.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT ELLSWORTH,
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I do speak for the Secretary on this
matter.
First of all, he understands, and so do T.
and fully respect the responsibilities and pre-
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 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5
May 17, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL ,RECORD - SENATE
little at- length about this with Director tee to perform the jurisdictional responsi-
Bush. Now, Director Bush has a political bility that it already at this moment has,
base, and he has trenmedous popularity and try that system for a while. I believe
among the people and the Congress, and he that this oversight committee is going to
strong man. But the way he explained the result in a proliferation of disclosures of
plans that he had for an overall com- sensitive information. And I think the po-
tee on intelligence, it seems to me that a tential is very much there. I think that we
normal man in that position could be have typically overreacted in the Congress
drowned by military intelligence people. The to things that have been said in the press.
whole idea of setting up the CIA was to Now, the press may have often reflected
have a brake against the estimate of the public sentiment. In this particular in-
threat by the militarry. He assured me that he stance, I don't believe that the press does.
did not have that appehensiOn. But I can- The overriding concern of the constituents
not get it out of my mind. I would like to that I have heard 'from on this matter is
ask you, what is the revised plan that you that we disclose too much, not too little.
plan to have from the executive aspect as Most Americans, I think, want an effective
against what we are discussing here from a intelligence-gathering capability, and do not
legislative aspect? insist on the disclosure of smoking tidbits of
Mr. ELLSWORTH. Well, I have not heard classified information to get their kicks. I
about any plan to swallow the CIA up into think, too, that these kinds of disclosures
military intelligence. Of course, for a num- taken out of context very often create distor-
ber of years, as I understand it, the CIA tion in the popular mind of what our for-
program has been presented to the Congress eign policy is or should be, and where the
as a part of what is called the consolidated national interest lies. I see the potential for
this committee
ief f
defense intelligence program.
Senator SYMINGTON. Ism talking about the
new structure you plan.
Mr. ELLSWORTH. The new structure which
the President established in his Executive
order of February 18, 1976, simply creates a
national Committee on Foreign Intelligence,
of which Mr. Bush as the DCI is the Chair-
man. And I, as Deputy Secretary of Defense,
am one of the members. The other member
is Mr. William Hyland, who is Deputy Assist-
ant to the President for National. Security
Affairs. And our charge is to see that a na-,
tional perspective is imposed on the devel-
opment of the planning, the programing,
and -the budgeting of all of the intelligence
activities of the various branches of the
Federal Government, so that there is a re-
source allocation process that insures that
the President's perspective is brought to bear
In connection with it. But there is certainly
thing in that about the military intelli-
ce swallowing up he CIA, or dominating
CIA, or even getting involved in the CIA
estimating.
Senator SYMINGTON. One more question.
listening to it-and I did it with complete
sympathy-in fact, it seemed to me that
there was a meshing of the CIA into the
military intelligence apparatus. If that is
going to be the executive branch, then I
would lean toward something of the Church
recommendation, because if you are going
to have an overall setup, including all in-
telligence, then you might as well have an
overall setup from a regulatory standpoint
that includes all intelligence. For example,
under the Kennedy letter, the Ambassador
in a foreign country had complete supervi-
sion of the Central Intelligence 'Agency man.
But when it got back to Washington, the
Foreign Relations Committee was cut out of
it entirely, and the Armed Services Com-
mittee took it over. There never could have
been any original chart that explained that
absurd situation. And it cost us.-a lot of
and it cost us a lot of lives, in my
money
,
opinion. And I was on both sides of the fence. Haiphong Harbor, the Son Tay Prison raid,
So what I am saying is that before we adopt and the Mayaguez rescue effort prior to exe-
any committee, whether it be Rules, Govern- cution. Any leak, however inadvertent, would
ment Operations, the Church committee, or endanger the lives of the personnel carrying
this committee, we ought to know what the out these orders.
plan is in the executive branch that you In addition to the fact that it will lead to
have for reorganizing intelligence in the the disclosure to our enemies of classified
executive branch. I think we ought to base information, separation of intelligence over-
a lot of our committee decision on that sight from the Defense committees will weak-
decision. an the intelligence agencies, as well as the
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. Defense committees. Defense and intelligence
Senator TowER. I call you on for questions are inseparable. Actions taken on the part
and comment. You are a member of the of Defense depends upon intelligence. De-
Intelligence Committee. fense decisions are predicated on foreign
Senator TOWER. Mr. Chairman, for the rea- intelligence.
ons stated by Mr. Ellsworth and-for others, - The level of our intelligence activities can
oppose the creation of this committee. be known to Members of Congress, but fund-
approach would be that we should bring ing levels should be hidden within defense
propriate resolution, a permanent sub- programs, as is now the custom in the De-
committee of the Armed Services Commit- fense committees. That is, the two Armed
S 7355
Services and the Appropriations Defense Sub-
committees. The House has decided not to
add another layer of supervision, but un-
doubtedly will strengthen present oversight.
In conclusion, I would merely say this. The
new committee may lead to placing the Unit-. -
ed States in the No. 2 or No. 3 position in
the world when it comes to the effectiveness
of -our intelligence activities. I want to re=
peat that. This new committee may lead to
placing the United States in the No. 2 or
No. 3 position in the world when it comes
to the effectiveness of our intelligence activ-
ities.
Next the Mansfield substitute does not
offer any means of improving our system of
capabilities. It merely changes present over-
sight and increases the numbers of managers
in the Congress of intelligence activities.
And for those reasons, Mr. Chairman, I am
very strongly opposed to the establishment
of this Select Committee.
The CHAIRMAN\, All right, Senator, thank
you very much.
Senator Hart, that brings us to you. Right
now we are questioning Secretary Ellsworth.
Senator HART. It sounds more like stating
our position, so I will state mine. Much of
what we have heard Here this morning is
what we heard when we established the Sen-
ate Select Committee on Intelligence 15
months ago. The committee was going to
be a big sieve, 11 Senators and 100 staff mem-
bers could not keep secrets, and Members
of Congress did not have a right to know
what was going on in this country, and on
and on. And some of us have been directly
the victims of administration leaks. I do
not know why it is we have 'that double
standard. Members of Congress and their
staffs cannot keep secrets, but the admin-
istration is leakproof. Well, the administra-
tion under all Presidents and both parties
have leaked like sieves when they want to.
And, as I said, I have been a victim of that,
so I know how it works.
Senator Tower knows as well as I that
we have operated for 15 months with 11
Senators-and over 100 staff members and
have had no leaks. So this business about
you can't have a congressional committee
temporary or permanent without leaks is
just preposterous. The record shows other-
wise. And who is to say that because you
wear an armed services hat that you are
more leakproof than if you wear some other
hat?
I don't, like the size of the proposed com-
mittee. I would prefer that it be nine. But
it is 17 members because of the compromise
to accommodate those who oppose this to
to begin with. The people who proposed this
committee and support it don't want 17
members. I would not have 17 if it were my
choice. Every living CIA Director has, on the
record, supported this committee. The ad-
ministration indicates that a single oversight
committee is much better than the present
confused situation.
I would, as I said before, be extremely in-
terested in hearing from the Secretary
rather than all of us just rehashing what
our positions are on this, as we have been all
along, particularly in the area where he talks
about serious threats. If we have to empty
the room to do it, I think we ought to hear
it. Because that is what he is here for.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not try to control any
Senator. I think we can have either com-
ments or questions during this first round.
Senator Taft.
Senator TAFT. I must say I share some of
the serious doubts about this already ex-
pressed by my colleagues, Senator Tower and
Senator Thurmond. There are some practical
things I would like to ask. Maybe Dr. Rid-
dick or Mr. Ellsworth can comment on them.
But the question I have is that under
the procedures involved, as I read them, the
Armed Services Committee would be en-
titled to ask for a referral of a particular
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.
or
all kinds of misch
And therefore I oppose its creation.
Those are my sentiments.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, do you have any
questions for Secretary Ellsworth?
Senator TOWER. I have no particular ques-
tions for him, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. We will continue, Senator
Jackson.
Senator JACKSON. I will defer for now.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thurmond.
Senator THURMOND. I am very strongly op-
posed to this Select Intelligence Committee.
In the first place, I think it will lead to the
disclosure to our enemies of vital informa-
tion relative to our intelligence activities.
I think it will do that in these ways. The size
of the committee, with 19 members, plus a
staff of 25 to 30, presents problems in pro-
tecting information. I don't believe you can
keep information confidential when you have
19 Senators and 25 to 30 staff members deal-
ing with it. I have been around here for 22
years. And I have seen information released
when the Senate was cautioned that it would
be improper and illegal to disclose informa-
tion, but it got out. The newspapers, specif-
ically the New York Times and the Wash-
ington Post, managed to get it some way.
A separate committee means a separate
budget for intelligence, and thus public dis-
closure. If you are going to have a separate
budget, people are going to inquire as to
where this money goes and how it is author-
ized. -
Next, the proposal requires the President
to advise the committee in advance of any
covert operations. I think that is ridiculous.
The President of the United States has got
to have some flexibility in when to move.
This information is highly confidential, and
the lives of those carrying out such opera-
tion'; could be subject, I think, to undue
hazards.
I will give you an example. For instance,
future Presidents will have to notify the Sen-
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S 7356 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE
matter to the Armed Services Committee
for a period of time, is that correct?
Mr. RmmrcK, For 30 days. It goes two ways,
it is sequential concurrent referral, except
for CIA. Now, the CIA project does not come
to any committee except to the Select Com-
mittee.
Senator TAFT. There is also in the bill a
ban on the disclosure of information by any
member of the committee to any other Sen-
ator outside of the committee of the classi-
fled information.
Mr. RIDDICK. There are two aspects in
there. One is, until the committee has acted,
you may not. After the committee has acted
to divulge under certain circumstances, after
this has been submitted to the Senate, they
can pass it onto a committee or to a Sen-
ator. But the staffs are pretty well-
Senator TAFT. Only after the committee
has acted and there has been an appeal to
the President and so forth.
Mr. RmnzcK. That is correct.
Senator TAFT. The question that comes up
to me, substantively, then is, how is the
Armed Services Committee going to have
enough jurisdiction?
Mr. RmDICx. The Armed Services Commit-
tee also has a right to make investigations.
The resolution specifically states that noth-
ing given to the select committee shall pro-
hibit any standing committee from making
investigations- within their respective juris-
dictions that they already have.
Senator TAFT. But in order to find this out
they are going'to have to call in the various
intelligence agencies, they can't go to the
select committee and ask for it?
Mr. Rmnrcx. This is a part of that compro-
mise that Senator Hart was talking about
there.
Senator TAFT. -How are they going to know,
unless they- have an independent investiga-
tion? I do not know how they are going to
know that they are going to get juris-
diction?
Mr. RmnIci . That is what I was going to
explain. Part of the reason that the com-
mittee got so large is the fact that they
wanted two representatives from each of
these committees.
Senator TAFT. But the ban on disclosure of
information that is presently In the bill as
I read it would apply even to a disclosure
of information by the ex officio Armed Serv-
ibes Committee member to the chairman of
the Armed Services Committee, if he is not
a member:
Senator HART. If the Senator will yield,
I think a portion of the bill may touch on
that. Section 4(a) states:
"The select committee, for the purposes of
accountability to the Senate, shall make reg-
ular and periodic reports to the Senate on
the nature and extent of the intelligence
activities of the various departments and
agencies of the United States. Such commit-
tee shall promptly call to the attention of
the Senate or to any other appropriate com-
mittee or committees of the Senate any mat-
ters-deemed by the select committee to re-
quire the immediate attention of the Senate
or such other committee or committees."
Senator TAFT. Would that apply to classi-
lied information?
Senator HART. That Is what it does apply
to.
Senator TAFT. But the same question
would remain, I think, because the judgment
would then be made by the Armed Services
Committee unless the select committee de-
cided to turn the matter over to the Armed
Services Committee; the Armed Services
Committee would have no way to know
whether or not there would be a referral.
Senator HART. I think it is mandatory lan-
guage. They don't have a choice.
Senator TAFT. It says deem, and deem to
me confers a choice. They have to make a
judgment, the legislative committee makes
a judgment as to whether they think the
Armed Services Committee ought to have
this. If they decide that, then they have to
defer it.
Senator HART. It is.not an arbitrary kind
of power that they have to decide whether
to turn something over to the Armed Serv-
ices Committee or not. If it is a defense-re-
lated matter, they have to. That is the, way
I read this language.
Senator TAFT. I don't read it that way,
Senator. I think that is something that ought
to be cleared up. I am thinking about an
amendment, is why I am. asking these ques-
tions along this line.
Senator HART. And you do have two mem-
bers of the Armed Services Committee on
this 17-member committee. -
Senator TAFT. I understand that. I might
comment that the 8 and 9 setup that you
are advocating is that the 8 members involved
are represening 61 Senators and with 9 Sen-
ators representing 39 Senators who aren't on
the committee. It doesn't seem to me it be
a very equalized situation. It seems to me
that there ought to be an amendment saying
that not more than two, because I don't ban
the other members of the committee from
serving on the Intelligence Committee.
Mr. Rmnrcx. Here is another point on
that:
"The select committee under such regula-
tions as the committee may prescribe to pro-
tect the confidentiality of such information,
make any information described in para-
graph. (1) available to any other committee
or any other Member of the Senate."
Senator TAFT. Again, this is a judgment of
the select committee, not of the various other
respective committees involved?
Mr. Rmnrcx. That is correct.
Senator HART. Would the Senator yield
again? -
One other section is 3(c) on page 4:
"Nothing in this resolution shall be con-
strued as prohibiting or otherwise restricting
the authority of any other committee to
sudy and review any intelligence activity to
the extent that such activity directly affects a
matter otherwise within the jurisdiction. of
such- committee."
Senator TAFT. This is a separate investiga-
tion such as we mentioned earlier?
Senator HART. That is right.
Senator TAFT. I would like to ask Secretary
Ellsworth, in section 4(b) is a provision that:
"The select committee shall obtain an an-
nual report from the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of State, and the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation for pub-
lic dissemination. Such reports shall review
the intelligence. activities; of the agency or
department concerned and the intelligence
activities of foreign countries directed at the
United States or its interests. An unclassified
version of each report shall be made available
to the public by the select committee. Noth-
ing herein shall be construed as requiring the
disclosure in such reports of the names of
individuals engaged in intelligence activities
for the United States."
And so forth.
What in your opinion would be the effects
on foreign intelligence sources to us of it
being known that there will annually be such
a report made public?
Mr. ELLSWORTH. I think that the effect of
that report would be to apprise foreign na-
tions of the extent of our familiarity with
their operations against us, and would assist
thejn in perfecting and strengthening their
operations. against us.
Senator.TAFT. Thank you. That is. all the
questions I have.
Mr. REMICK. The purpose of that com-
promise, Senator, was to not prevent the
select committee from collecting sensitive in-
formation, but then the next paragraph, an
unclassified report is, after they sift it out
they should make that public. But it was to
May 17, 1976
get all such information they wanted, and
then make unclassified reports pursuant to
the information they obtained.
Senator TAFT. Mr. Riddick, you are our
Parliamentarian, and I always though
very good one, for many years. Doesn't
subsitute amendment really involve a cha
in the Senate rules?
Mr. Rmnrcx. Not directly. It is sort of like
the concept that you may not put legislation
in an appropriations bill. But by the use of
a limitation you can prohibit the operation
of existing law which does not amend that
law, and therefore is not subject to a point
of order.
There was one thing in here, the reason
for-and I wish Senator Symington was still
here, because he was disturbed about this
particular point-on section 12, getting back
again. to the phrase "subject to the Standing
Rules of the Senate," when you begin to
adopt this as proposed to a provision in the
law, you are beginning to adopt orders for
the Senate. And when you adopt an order for
the Senate, you. are subjecting anything to
the contrary of this resolution to a point of
order, whereas if you write, as you did In
your law'or procurement, that no appropria-
tion should be made unless they are author-
ized, that presents a different problem, be-
cause the Chair is not called upon to inter-
pret the law. And it would not subject that
to a point of order. If you put this in one
single man, not the Senate, can make a-point
of order and knock the thing out. Whereas
if you leave this language in there, "Subject
to the Standing Rules of the Senate," you do
not throw everything subject to a point of
order and let one man kill it, it' becomes a
vote of the majority of the Senate. That Is
the main purpose of this proviso here- as
designed.
Senator STENNIS. Yes, let me say a few
words here, with as much emphasis as I can.
Of course the membership is not- as numer-
ous as it was a minute ago. -
Based on any experience as a Member
the Congress, the legislative body, any le
lation or activity as broad and as far-reach-
ing as this that is not done in conjunction
with the House of Representatives .is going
to fame; it doesn't make any. difference what
kind of a. rule we. adopt. It encircles the
globe; it goes to the Innermost. Operations of
the Government, it, goes to every diplomatic
post that we have arourfd the world, the sub-
ject matter of this legislation. And also, to
the very heart of the operations of our Gov-
ernment, far beyond the military, to the op-
eration of any major enterprise in the United
States and foreign countries that is involved
in all the matters that come Into these ap-
propriation bills and the other legislation.
. I am not talking about surveillance now,
I am talking about legislation.. And to try
to have anything that is as involved as that
controlled by the Senate that is also not
binding on the House of Representatives is
just not going to go in my opinion.
Imagine the Appropriations Committee of
the House- sitting around their table and be-
ing bound by a Senate rule. They would look
upon it as being ridiculous. And I say that
with all respect to the author of this meas-
ure. They are trying to meet a problem, that
is what they are doing, the Senators on the
Church committee, the Rules Committee and
the others, they are trying to meet a prob-
lem. But to those of us who have been here
for years; and have-been in these conferences
meeting with the very fine Members of the
House, we know that they will snort at these
limitations that you put on the Senate.
I said way back there that I would favor,
if it is worked out, very carefully, a- joint
committee on intelligence. I think the prob-
lenr has grown, and everything, and r think
perhaps that is the best way to handle I
Butanything that concerns majorlegislati
is just not going to make a go of it with- tHouse Armed Services Committee and tlrl '
House Appropriations Committee if they are
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S 7357
not included in the guidelines, the legisla- The CHAIRMAN. You mean intelligence from Senate could cite another Senator for con-
tion, or whatever you may call it. foreign nations? tempt. Certainly they could apply-
So, I emphasize with all deference to every- Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is right. A foreign Senator TAFT. Not under this rule they
one that a plan that doesn't include them analyst analyzing our program is going to couldn't. They can cite employees for con-
is going to prove unworthy. have a tremendous ed
e when h
l
k
g
e can
oo
tempt, but they can't cite Members for con-
we have to remember too that this at our unitary defense overall intelligence tempt.
m of getting up an authorization bill budget and compare it from dear to year and
ization bill now that goes into the matters Lion that he has assembled on the worldwide constitutional power-that is the only place
here that are necessary-you can figure out basis. It is going to be a tremendous help to that the rules provide as the basis on which
p we have censured anyhow, under the power
something on paper, but an authorization him with his problem, figuring out what we of the Senate to censure its Members.
bill or a budget, or whatever you may call are doing and how he can counter it. ' Senator TAFT. Let's go to another point on
this intelligence operation that will be passed That is one problem. the same question. Isn't it true that the rules
on and adopted at some point by the entire Another problem is a reflection of the currently set the jurisdiction of the various
Senate, and then be the controlling guideline point yourself made, Mr. Chairman, and committees?
for the appropriation bill of the Senate and that is if the Senate has this process, it is Mr. RIDDICK. Yes. And his is a question that
not the House that is something. The under- just going to mean double accounting, it is I raised, Senator. When they are. talking
taking itself, dealing wtih those annual au- going to mean double automation, and dou- about giving the exclusive jurisdiction to this
thorizations, and then the other phases of ble staffing as far as we are concerned in pre- committee. And I don't know how you are
legislation, is just a monumental under- senting our budget to the two bodies, going to get a ruling to that extent, unless
taking. And I don't think it can be done as So those are our points. somebody later on makes a ruling, I mean,
well and as thoroughly as required by this The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thurmond. focuses a point of order to the question. And
resolution, and it is impractical to start with. Senator THURMOND. I might ask you this. that is it. If you go back to rule 25 and look
But I felt like Senator Hart wanted to go Have you any thoughts or recommendations at the jurisdiction set forth to the various
further in cross-examining the Deputy Sec- on the way you think intelligence might be committees there, you won't find anywhere
retary here that he is entitled to. handled by the Congress to provide the great- that it specifically says that the Armed Serv-
But, it is sensitive that we would have to est protection to the Government? ices Committee shall have jurisdiction over
.largely clear the room, because I don't want Mr. ELLSWORTH. Well, I would think-and CIA.
to take all that responsibility. speaking again for Secretary Rumsfeld-that Now, this proviso here merely says that
But I can illustrate here something that it would be desirable as well as-it certainly there shall be referred to this committee
has come out. Now, there has been a project would be desirable from the standpoint of these following suggestions, and there it
that went on for years which was finally dis- the public confidence and support in Intel- stops.
covered, this Russian submarine that we un- ligence operations, and completely acceptable Senator TAFT. The rules set up what the
dertook to surface. to us, there could be either In the one body, committees are; doesn't it?
That went through many appropriation or in the other, or both, or on a joint basis, an Mr. RiDnicir. Yes.
bills, and so forth. oversight committee which would have and Senator TAFT. Isn't that a permanent
Finally, the cable broke, we actually had exercise a rigorous oversight function over change in the rules to set up a new commit-
It fastened, and almost to'the surface. the various intelligence activities of the Gov- tee?
I know what all they went through. It was eriiment, which would not imply involving Mr. RIDDICK. That doesn't block the Sen- ~
just impossible for all that to have gone itself in these other problems which I have ate-just like we did in the Small Business
through all those processes that we discussed mentioned; that Is to say, the administrative Committee, in my opinion-that doesn't
this morning without that having been?dis- Problems and the unitary budget presenta- block the Senate from giving limited jurisdic-
closed. And of course, first, it didn't have tion problem which I have mentioned. tion to the Select Committee on Small Busi-
to be disclosed to become worthless,. once it And it seems to me that that would be ness.
was suspected that we were trying to do something that could be and would be bene- However, if there was something, say, for
something with that submarine we were out ficial to everybody in the Government and example -and I am not sure, I have not in-
ofness, and everything was lost. to everybody in the intelligence community, -vestigated all aspects of it-as I said to the
they illustrations could be given that because of the fact that it would improve
i
comm
ttee when they were talking about
haltW't become known yet. and increase, presumably, the public's con- this, if you try to take something away-from
So, I don't see how any President of the fidence, and therefore support, for necessary a committee that was specifically set forth in
United States can be held accountable for information-gathering functions. -rule 25, giving that committee specifle juris-
the security of this Nation, or the Congress Senator THURMOND. I believe Mr. Colby said diction over it-say, for example, It did say
either, unless we can work out some system he would welcome a small joint committee on in rule 25 that the CIA shall go to the Armed
that is simpler than this. It may have its the matter of surveillance. There would be Services Committee-then to do this-
defects and it will. Our present system has no objection to that, as I see it. As the chair- Senator TAPT. The CIA is a part of the
its defect, and plenty of them. man mentioned, a joint committee would Armed Services and the Rules; the committee
So, I have to oppose that general concept. save intelligence officials from making so should have jurisdiction over the Armed
Now, Mr. Secretary, are there any other many appearances. They have to appear be- Services.
points that you can think of? And I want you fore the Armed Services and Appropriations Now, it has taken that way.
to astha gousc nt here our Chief of Committees of the Senate, and the Armed Mr. RmDicit. I know what you are saying.
Staff, too. But coons your by oints further. Services and Appropriations Committees of But the point is, you have got to get a ruling
Mr. too.sBu m The only other fuint, r. the. House. If you had a joint committee of from the Chair. on it. And I would say that
Chairman, is a e he of Mr- both Houses, they could make one appear- if the proviso in rule 25 gave the Armed
p point that comes ance instead of four. Services Committee specifically the CIA, and
out of what some of my friends, for example, I often thought that if we could save the somebody should introduce a bill, and you
in the academic community have been say- time of these officials in the executive branch could ask the Chair where he was going to
Ing for a couple of years, before I came Into that have to come up here before the Con- refer it, and he said to the Select Committee
the Defense Department, to the effect that gress, it would mean a
it is logical, if we are going to spend that great del. on intelligence, why you could make a point
amount of money on intelligence, to have a Sr, a joint committee
is not would appear to be of order, Mr. Chairman, that rule 25 provides
coherent, unitary budget for that, and to cal all right if it is not too large; wouldn't tr the reference of the CIA to the Armed
therefore to give the jurisdiction for author- A joint t committee of both Houses, possibly? it? for
Services Committee. And then the Chair
Izing that budget and for overseein its er- WouMr. ld that be your
H. would have to rule, and you could t take l-
formance, and so forth and so on, in to a That hat would certainly be in appeal, and the Chair would submit the a it
the the right ht direction. e
i use eparateds like itteec In anthe d ongresss They Senator THURMOND. These are all the ques- .is sf ent a de it doesn'tispecify$intthe rules
want
want to stress, again that notwithstanding tions I have. that some of these things go-
appeal of logic'and coherence, the fact The CHAIRMAN. NOW, Senator Taft, do you Senator TAFT. It does specify the Armed
of the matter is that in real life this is going have any questions? Services as to the DIA. The DIA is part of the
to give us tremendous problems in our re- Senator TAFT. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Armed Services.
sponsibilities as far as the Defense Depart- Mr. Riddick, going back to the rules ues- The CHmR"co Will you yield to what ment is concerned, first of all, because natu- tion, isn't ' it true that this resolution In. The eerctmmon defense" is what is in
rally when you get things into a coherent, volvs changes in - the provisions relating the rule, isn't it?
unitary picture in the intelligence field, for- to disciplining of members? -common def n: I think that is it exactly, se, eign intelligence specialists and analysis-the Mr. RiDDics. Well, I don't know of any rules .T The CHAIRMAN. Y Yes; ; common.defense.
analysts who work for foreign powers-are in the standing rules except rules 35 and 36 Senator TAFT. I won't belabor this point,
not so dumb that they can't figure out on ti}e and 37 of the executive operations of the Sen- Mr. Chairman. It is obviously one that is go-
basis of a year-to-year comparison basis what ate that in any way penalize. Of course, we ing to be brought up.
is g
f ion in our intelligence collection ef- have got In the constitution the power to For my own Information, however, I would
ilore effective and efficient basis than expel them, and we have got the practice of like to ask Dr. Riddick to describe as he un-
t re today. censuring them. And I would assume that the . derstands it the current situation with re-
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S 7358 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 17, 1976
gard to the finance backing, whatever the I asked Senator Cannon to come, but he Mr. BRASWELL. Everything requires an ap
procedure might be, of the CIA. could not. He suggested Dr. Riddick, and I propriation.
In other words, I understand there is a was glad to invite him. Senator NuNN. So, everything right now for
code section which permits transfer of funds The Deputy Secretary of Defense for in- intelligence has to be appropriated every
to the CIA from other areas, it does nothing telligence, Mr. Ellsworth, was invited to come year?
through authorization committees today, it here to give us what he saw in this matter. Mr. BRASWELL. Yes, sir.
goes through the Appropriations Committee. I called on W. Braswell to state what he Senator NUNN. And it is all in the .-
And there is some kind of an information saw in it. priations bill in the DOD budget?
procedure. Is that information procedure to All who have been here have not only Mr. BRASWELL. Yes, sir. And so has been
various committee chairmen, and so forth, impressed the Members, but have also asked authorized-
in writing? What is its history, and where do questions of Mr. Ellsworth and Dr. Riddick. Senator NBNN. It could be in the DOD
we stand today? What is the current proce- So, I call on you gentlemen now. under . authorization, in procurement, in
dure? I don't really understand that. I tried Senator Nunn, I call on you. manpower or O. & M.
to find out about it 'at the time of Angola, Senator NUNN. I am taking up where Sen- Mr. BRASWELL. Half and half. But this is
and I couldn't get any help; I couldn't find ator Taft left off. I don't know what has been totally different here, in having by rule a bill uch anything in writing as to the current pro- talked out before he started because I wasn't coming or out sayin g, That so is m the for nttIllig
Mr. ence.
cedure. here.
Mr. RIDDICK. I am in your predicament, The thing that bothers me, that I have get to. In the Cannon substitute, as I under-
too. I know in the appropriations bill they the most questions about,. is how'the budg- stand it, would say that all the authorization
did provide for the transaction not to exceed etary part of this is going to work. I am like for all the intelligence community would
a certain amount for certain purposes. Senator Taft, I am not sure what the status come in this one bill?
Senator TArr. There is a code authoriza- quo Is now. I don't know how it is working Mr. BRASWELL. It says you shall not appro-
tion for the transfer, I understand that. But now. I am not on the Committee that deals priate after September 30, 1977, unless such
as to what checking is done and why the with it. So let me start there. funds have been previously authorized by a
checking is done, is there anything in writ- Is there an authorization process for the bill or joint resolution passed by the Senate
ing at all? CIA budget? Is there an authorization proc- during the same or preceding year. That.
Mr. RIDDICx. That is kind of a legal ques- ess at the present time? raises the whole issue of disclosure, and
tion that gets a little out of my field. I will call on Mr. Braswell. these are for designating the activities of
Senator TAPr. I don't think it is legal. Mr. BRASWELL. Senator Nunn, in the basic CIA, DIA, NSA, and so forth.
There isn't anything in the Senate rules that law there is a provision that gives CIA au- Senator NUNN. My next question is, how
you know of that relates to this consultation thorization, but I do not have the annual do you have an authorizing bill that comes
process, is there? process required by law. out of the Senate if you don't have the same
Mr. RIDDICK. I don't know of anything Moving to the appropriation process, they thing coming out of the House?
that would prohibit it in the rules. obviously get annual money every year, and Mr. BRASWELL. That is the issue, it will be
Senator TAFT. Can you tell us what the then that becomes a question of in what ac- controlling on the Senate appropriation,
practice has been? This goes directly to '- is counts the money will be placed. Part of that which the House does not control.
subcommittee question. intelligence money, in order to spread it The CHAIRMAN. That is the point I made;
Mr. RIDDICx. The practice has been that around, and to require the least amount of there is no such legislative channels that I
when the budget comes up for estimate on disclosure, is in the authorization bill. All ever heard of, an authorization bill or a joint
the various purposes, even though they the CIA money is in defense appropriations. resolution passed only by the Senate.
might be silent and give it in a lump sum, So then, the question is, what portion do Senator NUNN. We are going to get up on
we refer the whole thing to the Appropria- you want authorized which covers procure- the-floor and have an authorization bill on
tions Committee. merit, R. & D., but not O. & M. in support? the intelligence budget, and are we going to
Senator TAFT. If there is a desire to get an Now, for the CIA alone, that is not car- debate that authorization bill separately
appropriation after the bill is passed, and a ried in the authorization. So, technically it from everything, is that right?
desire to transfer for.a new project of the is not authorized in the sense that it is cov- The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. Dr. Rid-
CIA, some money from another department, ered in the military authorization bill on the dick.
what happens? floor, it is covered in other elements of the Mr. RmDlcx. That is what the rul Mr. Rmnlcx. I don't think it is spelled out DOD appropriation. There are other large vide.
any. more, Senator. elements of the intelligence activities of de- Senator NUNN. I don't see how that is pos-
Senator TAFT. Do you know as a matter%f fense that are authorized, and some of them sible.
practice what happens? Because I got the are split, some in one side and some in the The CHAIRMAN. That is what the argument
same kind of answers from where I asked. other. But then that is a division of how you is about, Senator.
And I think it does show the need for some are going to cover it. Mr. RIDDICK. If we should pass the billand
institutionalization here. Senator NUNN. I am not sure i understand send it over to the House, they would do
Mr. RIDDICK. I would assume that it is ad- now. You are saying that none of the CIA something with It.
ministrative action pursuant to that transfer -budget is authorized in our military bill The CHAIRMAN. I know what they would
of power. . now? ' do( with it. They would laugh at it.
Senator TAP-i. Purely the matter of CIA Mr. BRASWELL. It could be, as a cover. ' BRASWELL. They cannot do aoming to various Members of Congress of . Senator NuNN. If it has got a permanent Mr.
in the House, because there is do anything
nyt require-
ment ng
their choice or understanding and telling authorization anyway, why would you need for authorization within the House
them about it, is that right? to reauthorize it? House rules.
Mr. RIDDICK. After consultation, I assume, Mr. BRASWELL. It is not a question that under The the theeHouse I made the point, Senator
with certain Senators who have been doing you do not have to, but it is a question of Nunn, if you will yield the of Wien all to me,
some oversight in that area. when you want to hide the money, put it in deference to every Senator, ,and ecoral
Senator TAFT. There is nothing in writing two places. It does not have to be locally. defe defe mittee, and the author to and bill, every a plan
that requires in any way that they consult Senator NUNN. You are saying that part of cannot be successful if it does not iacplan
with the chairman of the Armed Services the intelligence budget now is authorized. can of be a fIf ve plan.
Committee or the chairman of the Foreign Mr. BRASWELL. Yes.
Relations Committee or the chairman of the The CHAIRMAN. And the DIA budget? R Ssa OrTNUN N. I ittee rlec bmeh Y before the
Appropriations Committee, or the ranking Mr. BRASWELL. Some.
membership. - Senator NUNN. I can't judge this proposal . it and rejected it-I recommended that the
Mr. RIDDICK. Not that I know of. until I, know what the situation is. I don't oversight committee-maybe Senator Culver
Senator TAFT. Thank you. That is my un- know how much you want to go into. It is and Senator Taft could listen to it-that the
derstanding, but I am amazed by it. Every- impossible for me to judge a new proposal. I oversight committee, if there is going to be
thing I understood was to the contrary until know where we are, now. And I don't have aa annonosve sghtof mmitte , behgivin the re-
this came up. Everybody thinks that there is any idea. g bud et. And then making a recommendation
a definite procedure, but there isn't any. Mr. BRASWELL. The big distinction as to on that i And igence budget to ohm endation
The CHAIRMAN. We will come back to that. this proposal and the way it is done now ng committee, which would be Armed
chance to ask questions. This isna general bill to authorize any intelligence activity, Services Committee, and then have it built ion
have discussion and inquiry about the pending it is, hidden entirely in the appropriations ninto ow, h is am author noo be that t e floor so we would resolution being debated on the floor now. without authorization, or it is hidden under
k
We went into the version known as -the Can- missiles or something else in the defense, but debating practicalthe Individual Iit ems thi 'ti think
non amendment, that was filed yesterday; it is never surfaced as an intelligence func- tpossibly work.
it goes back to the resolution by the Rules tion.
Committee, and also Government Operations Senator NUNN. Let's put it this way. If you Senator TAFT. I agree with you totally. if that co Committee. Dr. Riddick has been with them do. have. part of the DIA budgetit on authorized adds, . And if authors ymit ee had then theft r eco en-
during the course of the proposals so I in- thou?still requires an app oP built into our budget.
vited him to be here.
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Mr. BRASWELL. But that is not what this Senator NUNN. This is such an important The CHAIRMAN. Senator Taft.
provides. point .that it seems to me that it is a very Senator TAFT. I would like to ask Mr. Ells-
Senator NuNN. I know it. I don't -see- bad situation we are in. I am sure that most worth one thing. Do you have any comment
maybe-Dr. Riddick can explain to me how of the people that are for ;thin substitute, on what the effects would be of the pro-
this oing. to work as a practical matter. probably part of their premise of being for it posed changes insofar as the commitments
Wo we, be involved in a detailed de- would be that they think there is going to in time of the executive branch versus con- -
bathe intelligence budget on the floor be an annual authorization bill. And most tern with intelligence might turn out to be?
of the Senate every year? of the people who are opposed to it are wor- Mr. ELLSWORTH. Yes, If this were to be
Mr. RIDDICx. That Is If the Select Com- ried about that particular point for the adopted by the Senate, then it would mean,
mittee on Intelligence reported such a bill. same reason as those with opposite opin- as far as our time is concerned in the Penta-
Senator NUNN. You meant, no, they don't Ions. And what we are realy finding out with ? gon, in the preparation of our budget, and th
have? it is that it is strictly up to the commit- justification of it in detail, that we would
Mr. RIDDICx. It says matters coming up tee as to whether there is going to be an have to have, because of the necessity to go
here for reference. If we have got a perma- annual authorization bill or not. ahead and follow the regular procedures, or
nent authorization for the CIA, we 'could Mr. RIDDICK. The presumption is that the the existing procedures, I should say, that
go ahead and appropriate without provid- committee would report something prema- would continue in the House, that we would
ing the legislation if. the select committee ture to their assignment. under this resolu- have to have double accounting, probably not
did not report the legislation. tion. double staffing, but we would have to have a
Senator NUNN. They don't have to do it, Senator NuNN. And if they do, we are considerable increase in our staff, and a con-
then, under this. going to be in the business of reporting on siderable increase in our automatic data
Mr. RIDDlcx. If any requests for it come the floor of the Senate at the authorization processing machinery equipment and capa-
up, it would be referred under this resolu- debate containing the whole intelligence bility, and It would be a very considerable
tion to the Select Committee on Intelligence. budget. And there would be no way to get add-on.
Senator NuNN. Where is this permanent into a breakdown, would there? Senator TAFr. I was thinking about the
authorization in the law? Is it in the law Mr. BRASWELL. Let me interject that the time of the Secretary and various others un-
there? CIA is only one of five activities which must der the Secretary testifying on the Hill as
Mr. RIDDICK. I am starting from what be authorized for appropriation, and the well.
Mr. Braswell just gave us. DIA as such has no permanent language. Mr. ELLSWORTH. Of course, there would be
Senator NUxN. You are saying that that Senator NuNN. You mean if the committee that addition also.
permanent authorization Is continuing on did want to authorize that- Senator TAFT. I would like to raise a point'
the books in law now? Mr. Bmsws .L. They have got to authorize at this time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. RIDDICx. I'es. We have got--as I under- for the rest. The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator.
stand it, I am citing from experience-we Senator NuNN. This was the main question Senator TAFT. I think the Secretary's testi-
have got a few legislative authorization pro- I had. I really think there ought to be at mony has been extremely interesting, and I
visions that dates back clear to 1789, we still least an effort to amend that part of this think very relevant, and should be available
appropriate every year. Where there is no bill by this committee. And my suggestion Is to Members of the Senate during the debate
annual appropriation required, or where a that we consider and let counsel consider on this measure. And I wonder what would
legislative authorization bill does not put having a committee with the duty to review be the disposition of the chairman or the
a limitation on the years, it becomes a the overall intelligence budget, or whatever committee with regard to making the testi-
permanent authorization. they have under that jurisdiction, and make mony of the Secretary public after this meet-
Senator NUNN. Where is that provision in a recommendation to the authorizing com.- lug and making it available, and the debate.
law? Have you cited that, on the CIA? mittees as to what that budget should be, And I would particularly like to ask the Sec-
Mr. Rmnzcx. Mr. Braswell has it. and then let the authorizing committees retary if there is anything that he has gone
Senator NuNN. I think Ed Braswell doesn't make the final'decision. ' into here that is so sensitive that it should
agree completely with this. The CHAIRMAN. All right. not be discussed or included in any such dis
1
f HAIRMAN. Would you like to ask him May I ask one question gentlemen? Fol- closure of information?
or-
th a questionf now? This is purely an in- lowing Senator Nunn's questions, directing Mr. ELLSWORTH. Not that I can think of.
meeting. It is a key question, and your attention to what you said this morn- But if the committee wants to do that I
there is some dispute about it. ing about the perceptiveness of foreign Intel- would like to have an opportunity to review
Senator NUNN. Yes. ligence analysts and how they watch our it, if I could get it quickly, I will review it
Mr. BRASWELL. I would be the last one expenditure. Let me re-ask that question immediately, i don't think I have anything,
to argue with Mr. Riddick on parliamentary now, with reference to the budget that he but I would like to have that opportunity.
law. This is a new Senate rule which says brought up. The CHAIRMAN. Subject to review, the
that no funds shall be appropriated for any ' Mr. ELLSWORTH. The point was that even if chairman would be glad to release it.
fiscal year. I realize this is subject to the the Senate didn't get into the details of Senator THuzMoNn. I think it would be a
old standing rule. But this amends it unless what was In a national intelligence budget, good idea to have his testimony available to
such funds have been previously authorized the fact of the matter is that by watching show just how the burden is going to be in-
by a bill of joint resolution by the Senate changes in the size of the budget from year creased on the Defense Department, their
during the same preceding year to carry out to year, if a coherent, unitary intelligence time, and their efforts, and additional per-
such activity for such fiscal year. budget was offered publicly and discussed sonnel, and so forth. And if this could be
The CHAIRMAN. What are you reading publicly, putting that together with other made available, I think that would be help-
from? pieces of intelligence information gathered ful.
Mr. BRASWELL. This is the Cannon substi- over a period of years and all around the Senator NtNN. If the, Senator will yield
.tute. world, foreign intelligence analysts, that is just a moment for one point here, I had con-
Mr. Rmnzcx. But you didn't read the open- to say the intelligence analysts. in foreign , versations with Bill Tobey, and he gave me
ing phrase, "Subject to the Standing Rules capitals could very quickly, flesh out the a concrete example. Sometimes I think they
of the Senate." intimate details of all of our intelligence pro-
Mr. BRASWELL. You are reading to get in a grams and their capabilities and it would be are necessary when you are talking about
point of order issue there. The question is, quite a revelation to them, and quite an ad- debate.
what does this really mean then if you adopt dition to their overall capability. For instance, the Glomar Explorer-is that
this as a rule, then you do not have an an- The CHAIRMAN. Let me say here, gentle- the name of the ship that they sent out? The
nual appropriation or authorization. Are you men, in the time I have been into this work, funding on that, if it has been disclosed, the
saying that you do not really have to do I have been tempted many times to make total budget, there would have been a bulk
it? more disclosures as to the money part. It in the intelligence budget for 'certain years
Mr. Rmnzcx. My point is, under this as it has always been embarrassing to me-I mean, while that was being built, and then inevi-
Is written, if there were no additional au- disclosures to my colleagues about the money tably the foreign agent would have been able
thorization, and the appropriations commit- . part. If it comes up, we can debate it on to tell there was something up, and they
tee recommended funds for said purposes, it the floor many times.' But I am always re- would have sent it in and probably found
would not ha -hi-4. +?
the Senate fl
A
oor.
nd therefore the Senate nately or even moderately because of the Now, is there any way without breaching
could go ahead and pass that appropria- point that the Secretary has made. Foreign confidence that you can be more specific and
tion bill, including those funds. Intelligence analysts have the capacity to give us, at least for the record, to be used in
Mr. BRASWELL. I guess the issue that Mr. Interpret, directly and Indirectly, and put debate, some examples that occurred in the
Riddick is making -is that if the new select things together as they watch you from year years Past that would have led to disclosure?
committee chose not to carry out this man- to year. The more I got Into it, the more I We have to talk In the abstract so much
date under the rule in the form of an an- am convinced that it just has to be kept about this thing so that nobody-can appreci-
nual authorization, 'the action of the Ap- under the h
t t
l
a
o a
arge degree. ate the reality of it.
pr tions Committee, the funds would not Senator Thurmond, do you have any ques-. Mr. ELLSWORTH. Let me do the best I can. I
beect to a point of order. tions? will draw on that example, and see if I can
mDICK. That is right. Senator THURMOND. I don't have any other find some others, Senator. I will be glad, to
The CHAIRMAN. I think that clears it up. questions, try.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May -17, 1976
Senator THURMOND. That would be help- rectly-would be damaging In that they THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
ful. would force the presentation in public, of a Washington, D.C., May 14, 1976.
Mr. ELLSWORTH. I will have to go back into unitary, coherent budget for intelligence Hon. JbHN C. STENNIS,
history. operations and organizations. Chairman, Armed Services Committee; U.S.
efec+ Senate Washington
th
t dama
in
D.C.
-- - - - - ------ ?
a
g
g
,
nd
-dent? I tninx if you could show us
would have happened under this procedure. would have to be disclosed? testimony of yesterday and would HMW no
if it had existed at certain points in our Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is correct. problem with its being released.
history about certain intelligence informa- Mr. BRASWELL. Dr. Riddick, would you be You will recill that Senator Hart indicated
tion,. it would be very useful. But if we have able to shed any light on what was intended he would like to know "what the grave risks
to just talk in' abstractions about what we under this 11(b) when It says, "It is .the are" which I had mentioned in setting forth
fear may happen, I don't think it is going to sense of the Senate that the head of any Department of Defense concerns with regard
convince many people. department or'agency involved in any intel- to the visibility that would be created by a
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, is there ligence activity should furnish any informs- separate budget information process. Inas-
something else you want to say? tion or document in the possession, custody, much as the Committee did not have the op-
Mr. ELLSWORTH. No. or control of the following agencies," et portunity at yesterday's meeting to return to
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Riddick? cetera. Now, that has no limitations on it in that question, I thought it might be helped
Mr. RIDDICK. No, sir. terms of words. Was it intended that this if I were to spell out in a little bit more de-
The CHAIRMAN. We thank both of you very would be no limitation? Could the commit- tail what I had in mind.
much for coming. tee put a demand on all our agents in foreign As you know, the Department of Defense
Senator NUNN. May I ask Dr. Riddick one nations to furnish this to that committee? Plans, programs, budgets and operates several
question. What would be wrong with having Mr. RiDDICK. That sense of the Senate very expensive high technology collection sys-
the Select Committee on Intelligence mak- doesn't give the committee' any additional tems, which collect foreign intelligence fin-
ing a budget recommendation that would Power, in my opinion. formation not only for the Department of
then be built into the authorizing legisla- Mr. BRASWELL. What was the sense of those Defense but also for the Department of State,
tion of existing committees? words as far as furnishing documents? for the Central Intelligence Agency, for the
Mr. RIDDICx. We have got a proviso in the Mr. RIDDICK. My humble opinion is, the NBC Staff, and for the President. The .very
resolution that requires the committee to, purpose at the time the Government Opera- I am of the existence the specific stems
'.'the select committee on or before tions reported this resolution, the feeling referring to is never officially acy
March 15th of each year, the select com- was that they couldn't do, get a law passed, edged. First, because the fact of the existence
mittee can submit to the committee on the by joint resolution, what they could do by of a given system could, when combined with
other facts, expose United States foreign in-
that committee have to make a report to Senate resolution. s not it going to came consider me telligence collection sources and methods-
how on all the in detail But to that the House e H was no Because
thereby enabling foreign powers to deny that
how this can be handled in the authoriza- such, and.that they were just putting in the information us.
tion, if you, amend that section that spells sense of the Senate as provided by that law, difficulty of proving
validity of recognize the tthe he difficulty
out the details of how the authorizations knowing full well that you can't legislate I the fully
proposition in
are to be made and so forth, you could ac- by simple resolution, emphasizing that these debate. It is not a matter which can
complish whatever you wanted to accom- were the things that they wanted the de- public ebated 3n public w matter at the same
plish if you wanted to change the present partments to know that the select commit- be d doing the very damage which the policy
rules. tee would be concerned about. time ve is designed which prevent.
Senator NUNN. What would be the main Mr. BRASWELL. Do you think they intended of nondisclosure the nondi l order sgthe validity prevent.
arguments against this? That it would di- that they furnish everything that the com- the Therefore, , eit is r to absolutely necessary of
minish the authority of the committee? mittee might ask for, anything? above informed judgment of c necessary
Mr. RIDICK. Senator, I win tell you, I have Mr. RIDDICK. I would hate to interpret their rely dent and the point,
inform ud full knowledge i-to whom
been into about 20 conferences with these motives. these extremely expensive and sensitiv sys-
people trying to reach compromises. And Senator THURMOND. This is a Senate reso- terra and programs has been entrustei
-
_
didn't do anything to go along with them to Mr. RmDICK. That is correct, a simple res- save intelligence budget, as would be reglYire try to get language that would be-acceptable. olution. by the separate budget formulation process
Senator NIINN. I understand that. But Senator THURMOND. Is the effect of that a now being considered, would Inevitably bring
-that would probably be the objection, that- concurrent resolution? these matters into much wider knowledge, in
it would dilute the authority of the new Mr. RmDICx. No sir. This has no relation two ways:
committee. with. the House, nor can it concur in the a. Such a budget could hardly he debated
Mr. RIDDIcx. I think that is true, I think legality. without debating the particular parts
that what they want to do is to make it Senator THURMOND. It is not legislation, thereof; and
more public, make the information more and it is not law. Would the Defense Depart- b. The exposure of changes in the overall
public, and 'at the same time try to protect ment be bound by it? intelligence budg-
security. Mr. RmDICx. No more so than they would size of over a a comprehensive
of years, years, would give
Senator THURMOND. How can they do under any situation in the case of investigat- the a per analysts r would powers a
that? - tag committee that had subpena power. e intelligence f foreign
they
Mr. RIDDICIt. It Is a difficult problem, Sen- - Senator THURMOND. I imagine they would combined substantially increualys s se of phbil ich when rs anges theh
ator. I don't know how you can do it. As the contest this, if .they are not bound by it. cninformation information available to
Secretary has indicated, if you' go a certain Because if the national security of the other intelligence begin tinf r the programs and
way, like if you publish information to country Is jeopardized by some resolution them, t I have it mind, a h the capabilities
whom you are giving contracts for defense of either body of the Congress, i presume thereof. The intelligence analysts of foreign
purposes, that sets up a picture for the sthe executive branch would make a test of powers are not a dull and alyst oftso as
intelligence of foreign countries to plant that in court, if necessary. overlook the shifting patterns of expend-
spies in that plant and locate what they Mr. RIDDICK. I would say this, Senator, as a iture and programming which would be
can. if you give them an indication that procedure to be binding on the Senate, It revealed.
you are doing so and so, it gives them an endeavors to set up a procedure for the I think it is important to keep in mind
idea where they can plant spies. I don't Senate to follow. It does not give any select that the very openness of our society already
know how,you can do it. committee any legal authority to get infor- gives to the intelligence analysts of foreign
Senator THURMOND. As I see it the more mation that it doesn't have already. powers a considerable advantage as they work
information disclosed the more our security Senator THURMOND. It would be a resolu- to collect and understand information on our
is subject to being jeopardized. I can't see tion that would be a guide and to the Senate capabilities and intentions, as well as our
ad-
it any other way. to get what information they could, but it is
of . details To of give programs them ms the and s added ed ad-
Mr. RIDDICx. I don't feel that f am en- not law, another branch of Government vulnerabilities.
titled to express an opinion. I just say what would not necessarily have to be bound by which heretofore have been fully protected
the problem is. ' it, would they? from their scrutiny would be quite unde-
Senator THURMOND. Sure. We understand RIDDICx. The extent of the committee suable. Mr. your position. is its subpena power to get information. In reviewing some recent history, for exam-
Mr. BRASWELL. Mr. Secretary, just to wrap The CHAIRMAN. Gentleman, do we have fur-
this up, say that there are certain ele- T pie, it is interesting to note that overall na-
ments of this bill, the proposed resolution, ther questions? If not, Mr. Ellsworth and Mr. tional intelligence funding showed a bulge
that would be damaging to U.S. intelligence Riddick, thank you very much. from fiscal year 1969 to fiscal year 1972, then
efforts. We will take a recess, gentlemen, subject to a slight decrease to fiscal year 1976, then a
the call of the Chair. more marked decline. The initial bulgerre-
We feel that the authoriz-Mr. ing for ELLSWORTH. appropriation provisions in sec-. [The attached letter from Secretary 'Ella- flected initial funding of the Glom
been submitted for inclusion in plover; the slight decrease represent
h
t
as
h
t the numbers wor
tions-I don't remember wha are, 3 and 12 if my memory serves me cot- the record at this point; I conclusion of the initial production :; W se
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May 17, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 7361
and the more marked decline coincided with
the public disclosure of that operation and
its abandonment. If that pattern had been
available to the intelligence analysts of for-
ble, when combining that pattern with
bits and pieces of information avail-
partment of Defense would still be required
to maintain a budget formulation process for
the House of Representatives which would
continue to conform to an appropriation ac-
count. The two separate processes which
pose upon us the necessity to maintain
double accounting for our intelligence pro-
gramming and budgeting. It would also re-
quire additional expenses,. additional staff,
to yourself and to the Committee and to the
Senate.
ROBERT ELLSWORTH:
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Mc-
CLURE). The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant. legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
AMENDMENT NO. 1646
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I call up my
amendment No. 1646.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
e assistant legislative clerk pro-
d to read the amendment.
TAFT. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that further reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 6, line 12, delete paragraph (b)
and substitute the following provision:
(b) Any proposed legislation or other in-
telligence matter considered by the select
committee, except any legislation involving
matters specified in clause (1) or (4) (A) of
subsection (a), containing any matter other-
wise within the jurisdiction of any standing
committee shall be communicated to the
chairman and ranking member, respectively,
of such standing committee, and at the re-
quest of the chairman of such standing com-
mittee any proposed legislation shall be re-
ferred to such standing committee for its
consideration of such matter and be reported
to the Senate by such standing committee
within thirty days after" the day on which
any proposed legislation is referred to such
standing committee; and any proposed legis-
lation reported by any committee, other than
the select committee, which contains any
matter within the jurisdiction of the select
committee shall, at the request of the chair-
man of the select committee, be referred to
the select committee for its consideration of
such matter and be reported to the. Senate
by the select committee within thirty days
after the day on which such proposed legis-
lation is referred to such committee. In any
case in which a committee fails to report
any proposed legislation referred to it within
the time limit prescribed herein, such tom-
e shall be automatically discharged
further consideration of such proposed
ation on the thirtieth. day following
thWciay on which such proposed legislation
is referred to such committee unless the
Senate provides otherwise. In computing any
thirty-day period under this paragraph there
shall be excluded from such computation any
days on which the Senate is not in session.
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, this amend-
ment relates to section 3(b) of the pro-
posed substitute, page 6 of that substi-
tute, which sets up a procedure under
which any proposed legislation reported
by the select committee, except legisla-
tion relating to authorizations and leg-
islation relating to the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, or the Director of Central
Intelligence, containing any matter
otherwise within the jurisdiction of any
standing committee shall, at the request
of the chairman of such standing com-
mittee, be referred to such standing com-
mittee for its consideration of such
matter.
Then it goes on to the procedural as-
pects of how this is handled requiring
the standing committee to act within a
specified period of time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Chair inquires of the Senator if this is
the amendment upon which 2 hours
have been designated.
Mr. TAFT. No; this is a 1-hour
amendment.-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. I thank
the Senator.
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, the question
that occurred to us "in the hearings be-
fore the Armed Services Committee
with regard to this amendment was
whether there was any way in which the
chairman of the standing committee
could possibly know what matters were
before the intelligence committee so
that he could ask for jurisdiction to be
asserted under this particular clause.
Let me read briefly from the tran-
script of the committee hearings before
the Armed Services Committee in this
regard, page 9 of that transcript:
Senator TAFT. I must say I share some of
the serious doubts about this already ex-
pressed by my colleagues, Senator Tower and
Senator Thurmond, There are some practical
things I would like to ask. Maybe Dr. Riddick
or Mr. Ellsworth can comment on them.
But the question I have is that under the
procedures involved, as I read them, the
Armed Services Committee would be entitled
to ask for a referral of 'a particular matter
to the Armed Services Committee for a period
of time, is that correct?
Mr. RIDDlcx. For 30 days. It goes two ways,
it is sequential concurrent referral, except
for CIA. Now, the CIA project does not come
to any committee except to the select
Committee.
Senator TAFT. There is also in the bill a ban
on the disclosure of information by any
member of the committee to any other Sen-
ator outside of the committee of the classified
information.
Mr. RIDDICK. There are two aspects in there.
One is, until the committee has acted, you
may not. After the committee has acted to
divulge under certain circumstances, after
this has been submitted to the Senate, they
can pass it onto a committee or to a Senator.
But the staffs are pretty well
Senator TAFT. Only after the committee has
acted and there has been an appeal to the
President and so forth.
Mr. RIDDICK. That is correct.
Senator TAFT. The question that comes up
to me, substantively, then is, how is the
Armed Services Committee going to have
enough jurisdiction?
Mr. RIDDICK. The Armed Services Commit-
tee also has a right to make investigations.
The resolution specifically states that noth-
ing given to the select committee shall pro-
hibit any standing committee from making
investigations within their respective juris-
dictions that they already have.
Senator. TAFT. But in order to find this out
they are going to have to call in the various
intelligence agencies, they can't go to the
select committee and ask for it?
Mr. RIDDlcx. This is a part of that compro-
mise that Senator Hart was talking about
there.
Senator TAFT. How are they going to know,
unless they have an independent investiga-
tion? I do not know how they are going to
know that they are going to get jurisdiction.
Mr. RIDDlcx. That is what I was going to
explain. Part of the reason that the commit-
tee got so large is the fact that they wanted
two representatives from each of these com-
mittees.
Senator TAFT. But the ban on disclosure of
information that is presently in the bill as I
read it would apply even to a disclosure of
information by the ex officio Armed Services
Committee member to the chairman of the'
Armed Services Committee, if he is not a
member.
Senator HART. If the Senator will yield, I
think a portion of the bill may* touch on
that. Section 4(a) states:
"The select committee, for the purposes of
accountability to the Senate, shall make reg-
ular and periodic reports to the Senate on
the nature and extent of the intelligence ac-
tivities of the various departments and agen-
cies of the United States. Such committee
shall promptly call to the attention of the
Senate or to any other appropriate commit-
tee or committees of the Senate any mat-
ters deemed by the select committee to re-
quire the immediate attention of the Senate
or such other committee or committees."
Senator TAFT. Would that apply to classi-
fied information?
Senator HART. That is what it does apply to.
Senator TAFT. But the same question would
remain, I think, because the judgment would
then be made by the Armed Services Com-
mittee unless the select committee decided
to turn the matter over to the Armed Serv-
ices Committee; the Armed Services Commit-
tee would have no way to know whether or
not there would be a referral.
Senator HART. I think it is mandatory lan-
guage. They don't have a choice.
Senator TAFT. It says deem, and deem to
me confers a choice. They have to make a
judgment, the legislative committee make a
judgment as to whether they think the
Armed Services Committee ought to have
this. If they decide that, then they have
to defer it.
Senator HART. It is not an arbitrary kind
of power that they have to decide whether
to turn something over to the Armed Services
Committee or not. If it is a defense-related
matter, they have to. That is the way I read
this language. 11
Senator TAFT. I don't read it that way,
Senator. I think that is something.that ought
to be cleared up. ..1 am thinking about an
amendment, is why I am asking these ques-
tions along this line.
Senator HART. And you do have two mem-
bers of the Armed Services Committee on
this 17-member committee.
Senator TAFT. I understand that. I might
comment that the 8 and 9 setup that you
are advocating is that the 8 members in-
volved are representing 61 Senators and with
9 Senators representing 39 Senators who
aren't on the committee.
The point that I would make is that
there is no way under which the Armed
Services Committee can know what is
before the Select Committee on Intelli-
gence unless the Select Committee on In-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE . May 17, 1976
telligence itself makes a judgment that
it wants to refer to the Armed Services
Committee. If the select committee
wants to leave the Armed Services Com-
mittee in the dark, they can leave them
in the dark because they would deem it
was not within their jurisdiction or area
of interest.
So I think we have a real question
here. I attempt, by this amendment, to
clear it up by changing the language
saying that any matter otherwise under
the jurisdiction of any standing commit-
tee shall be communicated to the chair-
man and ranking minority member,
respectively, outside the standing com-
mittee. Then we would go ahead with
the same language for concurrent juris-
diction that is included in the substitute
as it presently stands.
Mr. President, with regard to that, the
committee never really did resolve the
question. I would be interested in hearing
from the distinguished chairman of the
committee and the ranking minority
member as to what their understanding
is in this regard and how mechanics of
this can work.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. RIBICOFF. I would be pleased to
respond. Senator TAFT's amendment re-
quires the new committee under section
4(a) to communicate to the appropriate
standing committee any . intelligence
matter, as well as any legislation con-
sidered.
Section 4(a) already requires this new
committee to promptly communicate
with the appropriate standing commit-
tee any matter deemed by the select
committee to require the immediate at-
tention of such committee. What worries
me is that the mandatory nature of the
proposed language, in conjunction with
its vague reference to the words "any
matter," could unduly hamper the new
committee's operations. If it requires dis-
closure of all the details of an intelli-
gence activity, for example, it could be
a burdensome requirement. The general
language in 4(a) is preferable. Under
section 3(d) on page 7 the other stand-
ing committees will be able to obtain
directly from the intelligence commit-
tee the information they need.
I read:
(d) Nothing in this resolution shall be con-
strued as amending, limiting, or otherwise
changing the authority of any standing com-
mittee of the Senate to obtain full and
prompt access to the product of the intelli-
gence activities of any department or agency
of the Government relevant to a - matter
otherwise within the jurisdiction of such
committee.
And on page 7 is 3 (c) :
(c) Nothing in this resolution shall be
construed as prohibiting or otherwise re-
stricting the authority of any other commit-
tee to study and review any intelligence ac-
tivity to the extent that such activity directly
affects a matter otherwise within the juris-
diction of such committee.
I would like to point out that last
Thursday the distinguished Senator
from Nevada (Mr. CANNON) introduced
an amendment cutting down the size of
the committee from 17 to 15. The pending
substitute also mandates that two mem-
bers on that committee be from Armed
Services, two from Foreign Relations, two
from Appropriations and two from the
Judiciary. So the standing committees
that have jurisdiction generally over the
agencies that engage in intelligence will
have the majority of the 15 members on
that committee.
Mr. TAFT. Will the Senator yield at
that point?
Mr. RIBICOFF. I would be pleased to
yield.
Mr. TAFT. What confused me is the
fact that, as I understand the prohibition
on communication of information by
members of the Select Committee on In-
telligence even though there are ex
officio members on that committee from
various other standing committees with
concurrent jurisdictions, there would not
be any authority on their part to even
communicate to their own chairmen
something before the Select Committee
on Intelligence that they felt also would
entitle the other standing committee
with concurrent jurisdiction to receive it.
Mr. RIBICOFF. May I point out they
are not ex officio. They are actual, voting
members of that 15-member committee.
There is a provision that at the request
of the so-called parent committee there
is a sequential referral for a period of 3Q
days. So the other committee can ask
that it be referred on to them.
If this is going to work at all, there
has to be comity between the standing
committees, the select committee, and
the executive branch of our Government.
If there is not this comity, it is not going
to work. It is inconceivable to me that
any intelligence matter would be kept
back from the parent committee.
Mr. TAFT. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. RIBICOFF. I am pleased to yield.
Mr. TAFT. Can the Senator answer
specifically under the legislation as it is
now proposed, without any amendment,
whether the members of the Armed Serv-
ices Committee, who also are Members
of the Select Committee on Intelligence,
have the right-never mind the duty-
to communicate information that they
get on the select committee to the chair-
man I of the Armed Services Committee
and the ranking minority member of the
Armed Services Committee?
Mr. RIBICOFF. It is my understand-
ing that when it comes to communica-
tions the communications will be in ac-
cordance with rules and regulations
established by the select committee. We
did not try to write into the legislation
how they were going to communicate
with one another. But the select com-
mittee, with eight members being from
the four other committees, could sit down
and make the rules and regulations of
the select committee which could pro-
vide under what circumstances there
would be communication from the select
committee to the other standing com-
mittees. I am sure the eight members
would see to it that they would be able
to communicate to the so-called parent
committee a matter that affects the
standing committee and its operating
functions.
I wonder if my distinguished colleague
from Illinois interprets the resolution
the same way that I have.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, if the
Senator will yield for just a comment,
on line 22 on page 14, paragraph 2, the
language says:
regulations as the committee shall pr
to protect the confidentiality of such
paragraph (1) available to any other com-
mittee or any other Member of the Senate.
It certainly seems that by our pre-
scribing that two Members shall come
from each of the four committees, the
intent and purpose is to be certain that
those committees, each of which do deal
with one aspect of intelligence, are fully'
apprised, and that there shall be a mem-
ber of both the majority and the
minority. -
Any time any member of that com-
mittee feels that certain matters are be-
ing discussed that the other cognizant
committees should be aware of, there is
adequate procedure for making certain
that that information can be trans-
mitted.
The problem I have with the pending
amendment is that it would require a
tremendous amount of reporting by the
intelligence committee of a broad range
of matters not requiring legislation,
simply by those words "or other intelli-
gence matter considered by the select
committee." The burden of responsibility
would be tremendous, and much of that
material might-be highly sensitive. That
would seem to drastically reduce the in-
dependence of the intelligence commit-
tee, and place a burden ? upon it which
hopefully the group working on the com
itself, and that the four cognizant com-
mittees are fully represented on that
committee at all times.
Mr. RIBICOFF. If I may add further,
,we were careful not to try to write all
the rules and procedures in the legisla-
tion. You have to read 8(c) (2) on page
14 with section 3 (c) and. (d) on page 7
and section 4(a) on page 7 together. I
look at all those provisions to be taken
together.
These provisions show that it Is the
intention of the resolution that the new
committee keep informed all these other
committees sharing responsibility. I do
believe that we have, in 3 (c) and (d)
and 4(a), combined with 8(c) (2) on page
14, the method by which to keep the
Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Ju-
diciary, and Appropriations Committees
completely, informed. I would be very
-disappointed in the intelligence of the
Senate as a whole and the select com-
mittee if they were not able to prescribe
rules to assure that the Armed Services,
Foreign Relations, Judiciary, and Ap-
propriations- Committees could exercise
their-appropriate functions.
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I yield my-
self such time as I may consume.
I appreciate the good intentions of the,
distinguished Senator to discuss the fact
that there would be good coordination
under the regulations of the Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence. But I still
not received an answer to the basic
tion as to whether there is any
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
right under the resolution as drafted for apparently it is an intended deficiency.
a member of the Select Committee on Apparently the intention of the draftees
Intelligence who is also a member of the of the substitute is that individual mem-
Committee'on Armed Services to go to bers of the select committee who are
tile irman of the Armed Services members of another standing committee
Co tee, or the ranking minority which has concurrent jurisdiction may
menr if he be a member of the minor- not communicate to the chairman or
ity, and tell them about a matter that is the ranking minority member of that
being heard by the Select Committee on committee information that they get
Intelligence which comes also within the with regard to a matter properly within
concurrent jurisdiction of the Armed the jurisdiction of the Armed Services
Services Committee.- - Committee or the other standing com-
I point out With regard to that the mittee.
specific language included in section 8 This seems to me to put them in a di-
(c) (1). We have been talking about ?rect conflict of interest position insofar
section 8(c) (2), but I would call atten- as their position on the standing com-
tion to section 8(c) (1), which is a flat mittee is concerned. The amendment is
prohibition, saying that no information designed to correct that, and I do not
in the possession of the select committee see what harm the amendment does in
relating to the lawful intelligence activi- correcting it. It merely says they have
ties and so forth, which has been classi-
fied, can be disclosed to any other Mem-
ber or anyone else.
Mr. RIBICOFF. I would say it could
not without action by a majority of the
select committee.
Mr. TAFT. So it would be up to the
select committee to vote.
Mr. RIBICOFF. To the select commit-
tee, by a majority vote; and the select
committee may have regulations requir-
ing a written record of who was disclos-
ing what to whom.
Mr. TAFT. Then I go on to point out-
I do not really agree with the Senator
in that statement, because it seems to
me the prohibition in (c) (1) is so clear it
is not even amended by (c) (2). The Sen-
ator says it is amended by (c) (2) ; I
would take it this would be legislative
hist r on that point: But it still does
nove in the control of the member
of SWRrmed Services Committee the de-
cision as to whether he talks with the
chairman of the Armed Services Com-
mittee, which I think is an intolerable
burden to put on the man, and he is in a
conflict of interest position, basically.
Mr. RIBICOFF. No, I would say that
(c) (1) provides in line 21, "or as pro-
vided in paragraph (2)." If you go now
to (c) (2), it gives the select committee
the authority to make regulations to
communicate this matter to the other
committees.
I have complete confidence that the
select committee will be able to make
sure that they transfer from the select
committee to the other committees the
knowledge and information as provided
under section 4(a) .
I think we are making the legislative
history right here today indicating how
that would be-achieved.
Mr. TAFT. I would just say with regard
to that, I am afraid I cannot agree with
the Senator on it. It seems to me that
subsection (2) merely applies to the way
the regulations of committees will oper-
ate. It does not really say what the in-
dividual member of the committee may
or may not do with regard to his other
standing committee. It gives me 'a good
deal of pause about this. I do not see any
way in which there is direct authority
for a member of the select committee to
refer a matter to the standing commit-
teeA&lvhich he is a member.
that authority. I am not attempting to
take it one step farther than that.
But if the matter also comes before
the Select Committee on Intelligence, I
think the member of the select commit-
tee should be authorized to go before the
chairman.of the committee.
The matter might be solved if the only
members of the select committee who are
members of the standing committee were
the chairman and the ranking minority
member of the standing committee. That
might resolve it, although then perhaps
someone would even find within him-
self a conflict as to whether he could
take that information and move with
his committee.
Mr. RIBICOFF. I wonder if the Sen-
ator would concur-and I would have to
check also with the distinguished Sena-
tor from Nevada and the distinguished
Senator from Illinois-if, on page 8, on
line 5, we deleted the words "deemed by,"
crossing out the select committee, and
then having "requiring," so as to make
it read "such committee shall promptly
call to the attention of the Senate or to
any other appropriate committee or com-
mittees of the Senate any matters re-
quiring the immediate attention of the
Senate or such other committee or com-
mittees."
So anything of importance would
immediately be sent over to the com-
mittee having sequential jurisdiction,
without requiring such committee to
take all the minutia that comes to it, and
give it to the other * committees, or all
the details which would not concern
the other committee. Does the Senator
from Ohio think that would solve his
problem?
Mr. TAFT. It does solve my problem
in some part anyway because it seems
to me, 'to, go to matters requiring im-
mediate attention. I do not know why
it should be limited to those matters,
but it is a step in the right direction
certainly so if the matter does require
immediate attention, of course, we have
it all. What it would do practically is
give the member of the Intelligence
Committee, who is a member of the
standing committee, a basis for raising
the question and saying this is a matter
requiring the immediate attention of
the committee.
Mr. RIBICOFF. I am even willing to
we have a deficiency here, which take out the word "immediate" so then
is a rather serious one insofar as there would be no problem what our i
n-
the committee referral is concerned, and tention is. It is definitely our intention
S 7363
if there is any matter of importance in-
volving any other committee that that
matter should go to this other commit-
tee for its attention. If we took out the
word "imingdiate" that would-indicate
that it is the intention of this resolution
that when a matter of substance comes
before they Intelligence Committee it then
goes over to the Committees on Armed
Services, Foreign Relations, Judiciary,
or Appropriations.
Mr. TAFT. I think with that change
it meets substantially the objections I
have been raising.
Mr. RIBICOFF. I would suggest the
absence of a quorum so I could consult
with the Senator from Illinois and the
Senator from Nevada.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll. The time is to
be equally charged against both sides.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
yield myself 1 minute on the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Montana is recognized.
PUBLIC WORKS EMPLOYMENT ACT
OF 1976 .
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, t on
behalf of the Senator from West Virginia
(Mr. RANDOLPH) I ask the Chair to lay
before the Senate a message from the
House of Representatives on S. 3201.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
MCCLURE) laid before the Senate a mes-
sage from the House of Representatives
insisting upon its amendments to the bill
(S. 3201) to amend the Public Works and
Economic Development Act of 1965, to
increase the antirecessionary effective-
ness of the program, and for other pur-
poses, and requesting a conference with
the Senate on the disagreeing votes of
the two Houses thereon.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I move that the
Senate agree to the request of the House
for a conference, and that the Chair be
authorized. to appoint the conferees on
the part of the Senate.
The motion was agreed to; and the
Presiding Officer appointed Mr. RAN-
DOLPH, Mr. MUSKIE, Mr. MONTOYA, Mr.
BURDICK, Mr. RiBrcoFF, Mr. GLENN, Mr.
BAKER, Mr. MCCLURE, Mr. STAFFORD, and
Mr. JAVrTS conferees on the part of the
Senate.
PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400)
to establish a Standing Committee of the
Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for
other purposes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Clerk
will call the roll. The time is to be
charged equally to the proponents and
opponents of the Taft amendment.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE May 17, 1976
Mr. TAFT. Mr.. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered. ,
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I -:asktla:
modify my amendment.
The- PRESIDING OFFICER. The
modification will be stated.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
On page 8, line 5, delete the words
"deemed by the" and substitute: the words,
"requiring the".
On page 8, line 6, strike the words, "select
committee to require the immediate".
Mr. TAFT. I appreciate the considera-
tion this matter was given by the Sena-
tor from Connecticut and the Senator
from Illinois.
I believe this largely does meet the
problem that I have raised. I think, prac-
tically, with this language as modified
that the intention will be clear that the
individual members of the Select Com-
mittee on any matters affecting the other
standing committee on which they serve
will be in a position to ask the Select
Committee to call the matter to the at-
tention of the other standing committee
for their possible assertion of concurrent
jurisdiction.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, the
amendment, offered by the distinguished
Senator from Ohio is acceptable to me.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, a point of
clarification.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator will state it,
Mr. PERCY. Is the language substi-
tuted for the language offered before by
the distinguished Senator from Ohio?
Mr. TAFT. Yes. That was the inten-
tion of the Senator from Ohio. The
language is. a substiute for the amend-
ment previously offered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the
Chair understand that-the Senator from
Ohio states this Is a substitute for the
entire language?
Mr. TAFT. It is a substitute for the
amendment. -
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment is so modified. -
Mr. PERCY. Mr_ President, with
that understanding and also taking into
account the wording of the substitute,
the objection the Senator from Illinois
had before has now been fully taken
satisfied. The concern that I had before
was that it imposed a tremendous bur-
den upon the committee to refer all other
intelligence matters considered by the
Select Committee to another committee
whenever it involved their work. This
clearly delineates the difference now be-
tween all matters, which might include
minor matters, and matters of consider-
able importance. With that modification
and substitution, it is acceptable.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the substitute
amendment of the Senator from Ohio.
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
COMMITTEE. DISCHARGED FROM
FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF S.
1174, EARTHQUAKE HAZARD RE-
DUCTION ACT
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, this
request has been cleared on both sides
of theraisle, with all concerned.
S. 1174, the Earthquake Hazard Reduc-
tion Act, originally called the Earthquake
Disaster Medication Act of 1975, was in-
troduced on March 13, 1975. It was re-
ferred by unanimous consent to the Com-
mittee on Commerce, with an additional
referral to the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare for a period not to exceed
30 days, if and when it was reported by
the Committee on Commerce.
I now ask unanimous consent that the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
be discharged from further consideration
of this bill as of the time it was reported
by the Committee on Commerce, so that
the bill will be placed directly on the cal-
endar as of that time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum, in accord-
ance with the previous request.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SEN-
ATOR PROXMIRE ON WEDNESDAY
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that on Wednesday
next, after the joint leaders have been
recognized, the Senator from Wisconsin
(Mr. PROXMIRE) be recognized for not to
exceed 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE -
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400)
to establish a. Standing Committee of the
Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for
other purposes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is
my understanding that the Senate has
agreed to a 20-minute limitation on de- -
batable motions or appeals under the
unanimous-consent agreement. Is that
correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is
correct.
Mr. MANSFIELD. It is my further
One Taft amendment, which is"lfaw
the pending business; a possible Taft
amendment with a 2-hour limtiation,
which will be offered tomorrow; one Allen
amendment, and one Tower-Stennis- -
Thurmond amendment which will take
not to exceed 4 hours, plus the remainder
of the 4 hours on the bill.
ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M.
TOMORROW
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if -
there is no further business to come be-
fore the Senate, I move, in accordance
with the previous order, that the Senate
stand in adjournment until 10 a.m. to-
morrow.
The motion was agreed to; and at 4:15
the Senate adjourned until tomorrow,
Tuesday, May 18, 1976 at 10 a.m.
. NOMINATIONS
Executive nominations received by the
Senate, May 17, 1976:
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
The following-named persons to be mem-
bers of the Federal Election Commission for
the terms indicated (new positions) :
For terms expiring April 30, 1977:
William L. Springer, of Illinois.
Nell Staebler, of Michigan.
For terms expiring April 30, 1979:
Vernon W. Thomson, of Wisconsin.
S
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The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
.Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
AMENDMENT - NO. 1645
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I call up
my amendment No. 1645.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
The Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) proposes
amendment numbered 1645.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 4, line 20, delete the word "not".
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, for the ad-
vice of the Chair, this is a 1-hour amend-
ment, not the 2-hour amendment in the
unanimous-consent agreement.
-I reserve the remainder of my time.
'The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. MANSFIELD. W. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time to be charged to the bill or to the
amendment?
Mr. MANSFIELD. To the bill.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator withhold that, for a unani-
mous-consent request?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.
ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SEN-
ATOR MANSFIELD TOMORROW
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that, on tomorrow,
I be allotted not to exceed 15 ml,
after the joint leaders have been
nixed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
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May 17, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -=SENATE
international model.'Although most analysts
agree that the long term price elasticity of
exports Is greater than one, it may be more
d`thth whether the elasticity is as high as 5.4
B. Price passthrough
the May 4, 1976 CRS report on the DISC
export subsidy, CRS noted that the potential
price passthrough could be calculated on
the basis of recorded DISC profits, or on the
assumption that firms would react to DISC
by seeking to maintain the same after-tax
profit margin. Using the latter method would
lead to the possibility of a somewhat larger
reduction in export prices. The second
method for computing the potential price
passthrough, however, was not used in an
earlier CRS report on DISC that was also
released to the public. Quoting the first
rather than the second study, the Treasury
quite rightly points out the implications of
the second method.
CRS, however, does not agree with the
Treasury that a reasonable estimate of the
maximum price passthrough is 3.3% DISC
of export revenue, and consider it to be not
very significant In any case. The 3.3 % effect
estimate by Professor Horst in the Senate
"Budget Committee's hearings cited by Treas-
ury is based on the assumption that the
effective corporate tax rate is the statutory
sate. We believe that this assumption is not
reasonable and suggest the use of 30% tax
rate. The 30% rate is approximately the
average effective domestic tax rate or man-
ufacturers as relforted in the National In-
come Accounts and is adjusted by various
factors .5 While it is true that the marginal
tax rate is equal to the statutory rate, it 1s
'not appropriate to use the marginal tax rate
unless it is being applied to the marginal
rate of return. In this instance, since the
average rate of return can be calculated, and
not the marginal rate of return, it is'more
appropriate to use the average effective tax
fact, use of a 30% tax rate may be too
-since exported products tend into fall
In industry categories relatively favored by
U.S. tax law-agriculture, timber and paper
and allied products, and "manufacturing.
Using an effective tax rate of 30% to com-
pute the price passthrough results in a
maximum estimate of price passthrough to
export revenues, when after tax returns are
equated, of 2.4%. The "best case" estimate
of increased export revenue would then be
$1.9 billion. In the May 4 CRS report is is
noted that such an estimate is somewhat
above the $1.4 billion CRS estimate, but is
substantially below the $4.6 billion Treasury
estimate.
In addition, if a comparison of the impact
on revenue with the subsidy provided by the
DISC provision is made, the tax revenue loss
estimate resulting from DISC should be ad-
justed to take Into account the changes in
export prices and quantities. Rather than
comparing the $1.9 billion estimate with a
$756 million revenue loss, the estimate
should be compared with a $1.06 billion reve-
nuie loss, (2.4% of export value). This larger
tax revenue loss takes into account the
DISC-induced reduction in the taxable in-
come: base as well as the rate change.
0. Export base
Treasury also argues that optimistic as-
sumptions about price passthrough and
elasticity effects may be applied to the en-
tire volume of U.S. exports-rather than
merely those that are eligible for and use
d It should be noted that a price elasticity
of 5 implies that a 10 percent fall in the price
of exports Would result in an increase in
uantity demanded of 50 percent.
Effective Corporate Tax Rate: Toward a
e Precise Figure," by Emil M. Sunley,
ax Notes, March 1, 1976, pp. 15-24.
DISC privileges. Treasury argues: "If all U.S.
exports of a certain product type are sold at
the same price, it would then. be reasonable
to assume that the 'passthrough' price re-
duction would lead to an Increase in foreign
demand for all U.S. exports."
A logical extension of the argument could
say: and if, as generally understood, do-
mestic sales of U.S. products must compete
with our export markets it is reasonable to
assume that the price relief deriving from
DISC on exports might soon filter down to
entire trillion and a half dollar economy with
a. diminished inflation, reviving sagging con-
sumer demand and boosting job and otuput
levels. This is undoubtedly true. However, it
is unsound to assume that the passthrough
-effect to the entire economy would remain
at 3.3%. It is equally wrong to apply the
-3.3% calculated for the DISC export market
to the entire market.
DISC, or other special tax privileges, cut
the cost of doing a particular kind, of busi-
ness for a particular kind of businessman
(the taxfavored firm). The effects on increas-
ing production depend on decreasing the ex-
pense of operating at a particular level of
output (or maintaining the same unit costs
as output is pushed upward). Assuming that
the full benefit of decreased costs flows
through to purchasers, an- estiamte of de-
mand elasticity can be applied to guage the
likely market for the favored, now cheaper
goods. But we cannot legitimately apply this
same elasticity to all the product markets
conceivably competitive with those of the
privileged firms. To do so would presume
that output would be expanded, and adds=
.tional costs Incurred, by producers who are
not only unfavored by tax preferences, but
see their selling prices falling as, well. Con-
sumers might well enjoy such an arrange-
ment. But profit-making U.S. enterprise rare-
ly operates in this fashion.
In short, Treasury uses the price pass-
through presented by Professor Horst, for
DISC related exports only. Treasury, however,
applies the DISC pasathrough to all exports,
which obviously are much greater. If the
DISC passthrough estimate is to be applied
to all exports, then the passthrough must be
calculated from a base that includes all
exports. When this calculation is made the
passthrough effect to all exports is found to
be 2.4%, not 3.3%. When the more reasonable
assumption of a 30 % effective tax rate is
used, the 2.4% passthrough effect to all ex-
ports is reduced to 1.5 %, and the "best case"
effect on export revenue is $1.9 billion, the
same result as using only the DISC export
base.
Aside from the questions of appropriate
price elasticities, the fact that an estimate
of 5 should be viewed as too high should
be reemphasized. None of the discussed esti-
mates take into account the secondary effects
of flexible exchange rates which would act
to reduce the initial export gains. Nor should
calculations of the impact on export revenues
and employment-obscure the 'central ques-
tion of DISC-is it an appropriate policy In
a world of flexible exchange rates? As the
original CRS report suggests, there is no way
to determine, given a specified level of fiscal
stimulus, whether the effect on jobs is posi-
tive or negative.
The Treasury Department also argues that
the price elasticity approach is inappropriate
because DISC was never--intended to reduce
price. The critique then goes on to point
out that the function of DISC is to increase
the quantity of exports through a higher
rate of return to the manufacturer, and to
draw attention to the export market. Unless
there are severe barriers to entering the ex-
port market, for each and every product
exported, any increase in the rate of return
from exporting must be short-lived. A rate of
return to exports higher than the rate of
return available elsewhere would attract new
investment to the export sector and thereby
S 7339
increase the quantity of exports. This In-
creased supply, however, normally would re-
sult in lower prices and a reduction in the
rate of return back towards that available
in the other markets. The net effect would
be an increase in the U.S. export market at
the expense of domestic markets. In effect
DISC acts as a subsidy to foreign consumers
of U.S. products. It would also seem reason-
able that more cost effective methods of
drawing attention to the export market exist.
It is hard to imagine that over $700 million-
Treasury's estimated cost of DISC for 1973-
is a cost effective way to accomplish this
purpose.
CONCLUSION OF MORNING
BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
any further morning business? If not,
morning business is closed.
PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the
previous order, the Senate will now re-
sume consideration of the unfinished
business, Senate Resolution 400, which
the clerk will state.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
A resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish a
Standing Committee of the Senate on Intel-
ligence Activities, and for other purposes.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
ALLEN). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
FURTHER AUTHORIZATIONS FOR
THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the pending
business be laid aside temporarily and
that the Senate turn to the consideration
of Calendar No. 773.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
will be stated by title.
. The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
A bill (H.R. 11619) to authorize further
appropriations for the Council on Environ-
mental Quality.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request of the Senator
from Montana?
Without objection, the bill was con
sidered, ordered to a third reading, read
the third time, and passed.
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
SPACE ADMINISTRATION AU-
THORIZATIONS, 1977-CONFER- '
ENCE REPORT
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I submit a
report of the committee of conference on
H.R. 12453 and ask for its immediate
consideration.
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The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
ALLEN). The report will be stated by
title.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows :
The committee of conference on the dis-
agreeing votes of the two Houses on the
amendment of the Senate to the-bill (H.R.
12453) to authorize 'appropriations to the
National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion for research and development, construc-
tion of facilities, and research and program
management, and for other purposes having
met, after full and free conference, have
agreed to recommend and do recommend to
their respective Houses this report, signed
by a majority of the conferees.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the Senate will proceed to the
consideration of the conference report.
(The conference report is printed in
the House proceedings of the RECORD of
today.)
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, the confer-
ence agreement authorizes to the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration for fiscal year 1977 $3,695,170,000.
This is $1,830,000 below the NASA budget
request for the fiscal year. This confer-
ence report authorizes $2,761,425,000 for
research and development; $120,290,000
for construction of facilities; and $813,-
455,000 for research and program man-
agement. The actions of the conferees
on the differences between the House. and
Senate bills are recorded in the joint ex-
planatory statement accompanying this
conference report.
Mr. President, I believe the conference
report now before the Senate reflects a
balanced program for the NASA for the
forthcoming fiscal year. I believe that
the conferees have exercised budgetary
restraint and have agreed upon a pro-
gram which makes the maximum use of
the resources which are recommended
herein for the Agency. It is forward look-
ing. It is constructive and in addition to
supporting sound ongoing activities it
will provide a good base for future re-
search and development activities in
space and aeronautics.
While there was some reduction in the
NASA request and the amount approved
by the Senate, I am pleased that the con-
ferees agreed to provide $2.2 million to
construct an addition to the lunar sam-
ple curatorial facility at the Lyndon B.
Johnson Space Center for the storage of,
and more importantly, to provide the
capability to process the 842 pounds of
lunar samples returned to Earth by the
highly successful Apollo program. This
facility addition will provide the support
necessary to conduct a program of sci-
entific research on these materials, ac-
quired at great cost to the Nation, with
the objective of increasing our knowl-
edge of the Earth's space environment.
These materials represent hard evidence
in the overall study of the processes tak-
ing place in the space environment and
they may well prove to be extremely im-
portant to understanding the factors in
that environment that impact the Earth
on which we work and live. This facility
requirement was examined carefully'by
the Committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences prior to its being recom-
mended to the Senate. The committee, in
its report on the fiscal year 1976 NASA.
authorization bill, requested further
study and a report on this requirement
by NASA. The report was submitted on
October 23, 1975. This study considered
remote storage, use of alternate facilities
at the Johnson Space Center, a facility
at another location, and the facility
project as originally proposed. Also, upon
receipt of the fiscal year 1977 budget re-
quest restating this facility item the
committee asked the Comptroller Gen-
eral to review the location of and the
design plans for the facility. I think this
facility project has been reviewed ade-
quately -and responsibly. I think it is
necessary, it is supported by the scien-
tific community, and I believe the sup-
port that the Senate has shown for this
project is fully warranted.
Mr. President, I move the adoption of
the conference report.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the conference
report.
The conference report was agreed to.
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will please call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The Senate continued with the consid-
eration of the resolution (S. Res. 400) to
establish a standing committee of the
Senate on intelligence activities, and for
other purposes.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, it is antici-
pated that sometime tomorrow votes will
be held on Senate Resolution 400. I am
anticipating some of the concerns that
Members of the Senate have expressed
about the proposed compromise resolu-
tion that will hopefully be voted upon.
Some Members have expressed con-
cern as to why the new committee on
intelligence is embracing defense intelli-
gence.
I would like to comment briefly on this
point, because it may be that there will
not be too many Senators on the floor
today. Possibly some might be interested
in some of the deliberations that have
occurred and the hearings that have
been held over a period of many weeks
under the chairmanship of the Senator
from Connecticut (Mr. RIBIcoFF). They
have brought out testimony which cer-
tainly has caused the Senator from
Illinois to conclude that it would be in
the national interest and in the interests
of senatorial oversight for the new pro-
posed Committee on Intelligence to in-
clude defense intelligence as well as all
other aspects of the intelligence commu-
nity.
I shall be very brief, but I would like
to make the following points:
First, DOD does represent a huge por-
tion of the overall intelligence budget.
The Church report says:
DOD controls nearly 90 percent of the
Nation's spending on intelligence programs.
These programs are clostly, and the
fully draws in attempting to formulate
judgments in many areas. The Senator
from Illinois himself has found this in-
formation valuable. '
But for the Senate of the United
States, after extensive inquiry, the estab-
lishment of select committees, the
months of hearings, and voluminous re-
ports, if we were to establish a commit-
tee on oversight over the intelligence
community and then to exclude from
that committee 90 percent of its expendi-
ture, I wonder if we would not be in a
position' where we would be presuming
to say to the country, "We have seen the
nature of this problem; we intend now
to exercise diligence in connection with
our oversight responsibilities; and yet we
are establishing a committee that would -
have only 10 percent of the intelligence
budget under its jurisdiction for authori-
zation and oversight." So, for that rea-
son alone, I should think we would want
to include DOD.
Also, if for any reason, in any amend-
ment proposed, the Senate voted in favor
of excluding the Department of Defense
intelligence from oversight responsibil-
ities of the overall committee, would- we
not then go to the heart of breaking the
compromise that has been reached
wherein concurrent responsibility was
assigned to The intelligence committee
diciary for oversight over Defense, State.
and FBI intelligence?
So, once we invade this area and break
the compromise that had been so pain-
stakingly worked out, would we, not then
establish a precedent to say, then, let us
take everything else back into the other
committees? Instead of having a focused
responsibility in the hands of one com-
mittee clearly by its own charter and by
its name, with the implication that it is
going to have that oversight responsi-
bility as one of the major functions of
that committeee, would we not in a sense
even fractionalize further a Senate pro-
cedure which has led us to the present
point? The past procedure has really
meant we had implied oversight, but with
so much diversified responsibility that, we
never really did have effective oversight.
It was even up to the point where the
Secretary of State testified before the
Committee on-Government operations
that he thought he knew what the in-
telligence community was doing as it af-
fected foreign policy, but he was shocked
and surprised in the hearings and revela-
tions of the Church committee to find
that he did not know what he should
have as Secretary of State.
I wonder if any Member of the Senate
who has exercised oversight responsibil-
ity in the past could today say that, as
a Member of the Senate assigned to that
particular oversight responsibility, he
not shocked and surprised to find m
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had it. Is it not better to focus oversight
on one committee that has that overall
picture and overall responsibility and
then, just so that there is no chance that
we would not exercise proper responsi-
bility within a chosen field, have con-
current oversight responsibility as is pro-
vided for in the compromise?
The second point that I mention is
that the armed services are a major con-
sumer of finished intelligence, and obvi-
ously those framers of the compromise
have determined for that reason the
Committee on Armed Services should
have concurrent jurisdiction.
But the Senator from Illinois points
out that those who worked out the com-
promise, and from the inception of the
construction of the bill in the Committee
on Government Operations we always
drew the distinction between exercising
oversight over a particular activity and
having the benefit of the end product of
intelligence. We have tried to make it
very clear in this legislation and this res-
olution before us that any committee of
the Senate that requires the end product
of intelligence to carry out its responsi-
bilities should have that end product. It
Is not necessary for that committee to
feel that it is only going to get that In-
formation if it happens to set the budget.
That is not necessary at all.
In the number of years the Senator
W Illinois has served in the Senate,
r once has the Senator from Illinois
e r been deprived of proper end product
intelligence in formulating judgments
and obtaining information from the CIA,
Defense Intelligence Agency, or whoever
it may be, simply because the Senator
from Illinois did not sit on a committee
that happened to set the budget. I do
not think we have to feel in that respect
that that is the only way we can receive
the end product of intelligence.
The third point I make is that DOD In-
telligence has been subjected to much
criticism on managerial grounds. DIA
was created - to provide a single intelli-
gence voice for the Secretary of Defense.
In point of fact, it has constituted an
additional layer over the parochial in-
terests of the individual service intelli-
gence branches. DIA's defense attach6
program has been much criticized for in-
competency and mismanagement. NSA
is often accused of gathering too much
information at too great a cost.
I do not believe that this area is so
sacrosanct that we should not oversee it,
when the power of the purse has been so
clearly given to Congress in the Consti-
tution. Even through the area is sensitive
we have the ability, the right, and the
duty to go in and say how much Is it
costing, how much duplication exists,
and what is the end product that we are
getting, is it cost effective? Someone
must ask those questions in the frame-
rk where the-whole picture is available
ose who are asking the questions.
ess Members of the Senate have that
total picture they would be the first to
say they are not truly competent to ask
the right questions and to exercise the
kind of oversight that can and must be
made over every expenditure of the
Government no matter how sensitive it
may be, in order to see whether we have
the overlapping and duplication that
has been so apparent in the Church
committee report. All of this goes back
to the fact that 20 years ago the now
majority leader of- the Senate had the
wisdom and the foresight, as he so fre-
quently has had, to say tha) we cannot
exercise this responsibility that Congress
must and should carry out unless we
have a committee given the full respon-
sibility and authority to carry out this
function. Are we then, after all of these
years, after the wisdom of that judg-
ment at that time has now been so
unmistakably proven, to once again
fractionalize the intelligence oversight
functions now to be asusmed and that
the country is insisting that Congress as-
sume? All we know is that in the past
Men of goodwill, with- indefinite au-
thority and fractionalized responsibility
have not fulfilled and carried out the
function the Nation throught they were,
carrying out. And to the shock and
amazement of the Senate itself, we had
not organized ourselves in such a way to
carry out the duty, function, and re-
S 7341
sponsibilities -of NSA. Certainly, one of
the purposes-of this committee would be
to establish such a charter and, hope-
fully, place it-in legislation:
Recently, the Senate proposed, and
Congress now has adopted, a charter for
the Voice of America. It never was a
legislated charter. It was always an Ex-
ecutive order, subject, therefore, to in-
terpretation by the executive branch
only.
The Senator from Illinois felt very
strongly that VOA should have a charter
that is in law. The Congress of the
United States would have a duty and a
responsibility then to see that that law
was effectively carried out, not simply
subject its executive branch charter. The
Senator from Illinois felt the charter
was being abused in such a way as to de-
tract from the value of VOA.
Having it in law now clearly enunciates
what the rules should be.
NSA likewise carries on a function so
vital that a legislated charter should be
undertaken.
With respect to Army intelligence, un-
der the guise of quelling civil disorders,
Army intelligence gathering covered not
only "subversion" and "dissident ele-
ments"-and there was no further defini-
tion of what "dissident elements" were-
but also the civil rights movement, the
anti-Vietnam-antidraft movement, and
The fourth point I make is simply this:
Many abuses have been committed by
Defense Department agencies. We know,
for instance, In NSA, in the question
of cable traffic alone we have had abuses
that are on the record for all of us to
study. From 1947 until May 1975, NSA
received from international cable com-
panies millions of cables which had been
sent by American citizens in the reason-
able expectation that they would be kept
private. Many questions could be raised
about this practice: Was it necessary to
protect the national interest? Was it
necessary and was it cost effective? What
end result came from all of that cable
traffic that was reviewed?
Talk about a make-work project. The
PWA was small compared to the make-
work that was created by this oversight
operation scanning and reviewing, read-
ing and looking at, passing around,
making copies of millions of pieces of
paper involving private transaction of
business. Where is the proof that this has
been a cost-effective operation?
Another point I should like to raise is
in connection with watch lists. In the
late 1960's and early 1970's, various Fed-
eral agencies gave NSA names which
went into so-called watch lists, names of
Americans whose communications were
selected for monitoring, without a war-
rant. Where is the protection to the civil
rights of those individuals?
I wonder whether it does not come
right down to the fact that NSA op-
erated without a charter.
My point, therefore, is this: should not
NSA operate with a charter?
The Church report, under the section
on defense, if I recall correctly, indicated
that the Senate and Congress should set
out in charter form the duties and re-
nent persons" who were "friendly" with
the "leaders of the disturbances" or
"sympathetic with their plans."
I wonder, Mr. President, whether that
Is under the charter under which the
5th Army, in Chicago, had dossiers,
files, and surveillance over some of our
most prominent citizens.
In a newspaper report--and- I say a
newspaper report, only-I discovered, to
my shock and horror, that a Member of
the Senate, my distinguished colleague
from Illinois, ADLAI STEVENSON III, was
under the surveillance of the Fifth Army
in Chicago. By what right does Army in-
telligence place surveillance over civil-
ians, particularly Members of Congress?
Why? Because they might happen to dis-
agree on a Vietnam war policy? Millions
of Americans disagreed with that policy.
The distinguished majority leader of the
Senate disagreed with that policy. Does
.that give the Army the right to place
them under surveillance?
It is almost as bad as the "plumbers"
who wasted I do not know how much tax-
payers' money, placing other people un-
der surveillance. I understand, from
testimony given to the Watergate Com-
mittee, that the senior Senator- from Illi-
nois- was placed under surveillance by an
operator of the "plumbers" who testified
that he did not know why he was placed
outside my office. He was to record the
name of everyone who went in and out,
and he said, "I don't know why they
picked me. I'm not from Illinois, and I
knew virtually no one who went in or out,
and I couldn't say it In my report, But
I was there for 3 weeks, outside the Sen-
ator from Illinois' office, recording, pre-
sumably, who goes in and out."
I do not know that their thought was
In doing that. Was it their thought to de-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 17, 1976
termine the protesters going into the
Senator from Illinois' office, to talk to the
Senator, who might subvert his kind of
thinking?
Heaven knows what goes on in an in-
telligence operation that is as big as 90
percent of our entire intelligence budget.
It is a confidential figure, but it is not. in
pennies, dollars, tens of thousands of dol-
lars, hundreds of thousands of dollars,
millions of dollars, or hundreds of mil=
lions of dollars. It is in the billions of
dollars, and we know that.
So should there not be a concentrated
oversight of this operation? Is it right
and proper to exclude 90 percent of the
entire intelligence budget and kid the
people of this country into thinking that
we are setting up an intelligence over-
sight committee, and then exclude 90
percent of it?
The fifth point I should like to make
Is that it is not true that national-
that is, strategic-intelligence cannot be
separated from tactical` -intelligence,
although there is much overlapping. I
say this first because both DOD and the
DCI and their budget procedures make
the clear distinction themselves. So when
we say that we cannot separate them,
they belie it themselves by having
separated it in their budget procedures.
Further, the President, in his execu-
tive order on intelligence, has given the
DCI clear authority over all national
intelligence, thus providing that it can
in fact be' distinguished from tactical
intelligence.
In any case, the proposed new com-
mittee merely would have shared juris-
diction with the Committee on Armed
Services. Thus, Armed Services will re-
tain its input into all military intelli-
gence legislation and authorization, both
national and tactical.
But the citizens of this country and
the Congress of the United States will
know that that shared jurisdiction in
this particular area with the Armed
Services Committee, in the case of the
FBI, with the Committee on the Judici-
ary, and with the Committee on Foreign
Relations in State Department intelli-
gence, will not mean that the intelligence
oversight committee to be established
has been relieved of oversight responsi-
bility. It will have concurrent responsi-
bility, and in one committee we can hold
15 members, 17 members-however many
members we put on for the 8-year period
In which it is now determined they will
serve-fully and effectively responsible
for oversight.
The intelligence committee has re-
sulted from a great deal of soul-search-
ing, a great deal of earnest negotiation.
We feel that an extraordinarily good
job has been done. Not a single Member
who engaged In those negotiations ever
achieved everything he wanted or would
have built into the resolution before the
Senate. Everyone entered into the spirit
of compromise, that everyone had to
give up some of his own sacred cows.
But in the-interest of reaching a broad-
based agreement, we tried to arrive at a
consensus, and this consensus was ar-,
rived at:
Certainly, many important issues were
debated. Originally, it was conceived by
some Members of the Senate that the
intelligence committee should have prior
knowledge of any covert activity car-
ried on and, in a sense, should have the
right to veto it. After a great deal of
deliberation, after hearing many wit-
nesses, the Committee on Government
Operations wisely agreed, and the
framers of the compromise retained, the
provision that provided that information
always should be available to the intelli-
gence oversight committee, but that
prior approval of activities would, in a
sense, make the oversight committee
part and parcel of the original decision.
How can we exercise oversight if we are
a part of the dction that has been
taken? So it was determined that these
activities should be committed to, writ-
ing and should be signed by a high offi-
cial. The options that went into the
thought process should be committed
to writing so that they always could be
subsequently reviewed.
The Senator from Illinois made the
point in those hearings and in the delib-
erations at markup that if something
were committed to writing, a proposed
activity, and someone at high levels had
to sign it and authorize it, many, many
times, the activity would not even be en-
gaged in. Because, when you Put some-
thing down in black and white and you
analyze it and appraise it, some of these
foolish activities that were carried on,
that ended up to be on the wrong side of
the national interest, would not be en-
tered into in the first place.
But . if the Senate, through the over-
sigkt committee, actually approved these-
operations in the first place, how could
Congress subsequently have oversight
over that activity in which it shared re-
sponsibility? How could it then be in a
position to criticize or find fault with
it?
For these and other reasons, Mr. Pres-
ident, I hope that my distinguished col-
leagues who are not on the floor today
will have an opportunity to look over the
RECORD in the morning and, when we
vote tomorrow, I hope we can move for-
ward with great dispatch. I trust that the
spirit and the principle of the compro-
mise can be achieved in our utimate vote,
which I.hope will come at the earliest
possible time.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous coll-
sent that an article dated May 17, 1916,
from the New York Times entitled "Mil-
itary Flouted Civilians' Rights, Senate
Unit Says", written by John M. Crewd-
son, be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the few York Times, Monday,
May 17, 1976]
MILITARY FLOUTED CIVILIANS' RIGHTS, SENATE
UNIT SAYS-INTELLIGENCE AGENTS ACCUSED
OF IGNORING LEGAL CURBS IN SPYING ON
DISSENTERS
(By John M. Crewdson)
WASHINGTON, May 16.-Military intellig-
ence agents have violated the rights of United
States citizens in the agents' investigations
of domestic political and protest groups, and
in the process have threatened "to violate
the traditional and legal restraints which
govern the use of military forces in the ci-
vilian community," the staff of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence Activities
has concluded.
said in a report released today, Defense De-
partment agents, principally those of Army
ganizations, intercepted those groups'
communications and cooperated with ci
law-enforcement agencies in monitoring the
activities of private citizens.
REPORTS CONFIRMED
The Senate staff termed those activities
"improper" and went on to confirm reports
published yesterday in The- New York Times
indicating that the Army has also conducted
active surveillance of United States citizens
living in West Germany and West Berlin
whom it considered to be "threats" to its
operations.
Until 1968, according to the Senate staff's
report, Army commanders in West Germany
had unilateral authority to open mail to
and from such individuals and to subject
them to wiretaps.
Since then, the West German Govern-
ment has forbidden the Army to conduct
such activities, but the 1968 restrictions
do not apply to the American sector of
West Berlin where "mail openings and wire-
taps continued to be employed against Amer-
icans and groups of Americans," according
to the report.
FILES ON ALL DISSENTERS
Affidavits from Army Secretary Martin R.
Hoffman recently filed in two civil court cases
show that Army intelligence officers opened,
mail in West Berlin as late as 1972, and the
affidavits carried the strong impication that
such practices were conti4nuing there.
As' the Army was called upon with increas-
ing frequency in the early 1960's to respond
to civil disorders, the report said, it began
what later became a "massive" intelligence
collection effort that eventually produced
files on "virtually every group engaged in
dissent in the United States."
The military's rationale for such su
lance, the staff noted, was that, to enab
forces to respond effectively to Presidential
requests for assistance in times of civil dis-
order, it was necessary to learn about the
goals of dissident groups.
Although there is no statute authorizing
military surveillance of the political activi-
ties of private citizens, the report said, the
Constitution gives the Federal Government
the responsibility of protecting each of the
states "against domestic violence."
1971 INoUIRY CITED _
The committee staff noted, however, that
the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights, which conducted an extensive in-
vestigation of military intelligence activities
in 1971, had been "unwilling to imply the
authority to conduct political surveillance of
civilians from the role assigned by statute
to the military in the event of civil disturb-
ance."
In all, the committee staff estimated, 100,-
000 indiivduals and a "similarly large" num-
ber of domestic organizations were subjected
to surveillance by Army intelligence agents
"who were young and could easily mix with
dissident young groups of all races."
In addition to civil rights protests, such
as the 1968 Poor Peoples' March on Washing-
ton, and anti-Vietnam war organizations like
the National Mobilization Committee, Army
agents penetrated a coalition of church
youth groups, classes at New York Univer-
sity, a conference of priests convened to dis-
cuss birth control and the late Rev. Martin
Luther King Jr.'s Southern Christian Leader-
ship Conference.
- POSED AS NEWSMEN
While the covert infiltration of such or
nizations was a principal technique, th
port said Army intelligence agents moni
protest marches and rallies by posing+a?
newsmen and by recruiting civilian inform.
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May 17, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
ers to work in the agents' behalf, before
the defense department's nationwide intelli-
gence collection effort was declared to have
been ended in 1971.
n an effort reminiscent of, but narrower
scope than the "Cointelpro" domestic'
nter-intelligence programs of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, military officers and
enlisted men also set out to harass and dis-
rupt attempts of some antiwar groups to
organize public demonstrations, the report
said.
Among the individuals on whom the army
maintained intelligence files, it added, were
Dr. King; the late Whitney M. Young, head
of the National Urban League; Julian Bond;
the Georgia State legislator; Arlo Guthrie
and Joan Baez, folksingers; Dr. Benjamin
Spock, the child care specialist and antiwar
activist; and Senator Adlai E. Stevenson 3d,
democrat of Illinois.
"WORST INTRUSION"
The experience of the late 1960's which the
committee staff termed "the most intrusion
that military intelligence has ever made into
the civilian community," resulted in the is-
suance of new Defense Department directives
that presumably eliminated some intelli-
gence activities against United States citi-
zens and sharply curtailed others.
The Senate report pointed out, however,
that the 1971 restrictions, while barring the
collection of intelligence about individuals
"unaffiliated" with the military, excepted
from that prohibition individuals or groups
that the Pentagon considered "threats" to its
operations or security.
Although the committee staff said it had
found very few apparent violations of the
1971 directive, it pointed out that the direc-
tive was an administrative one, and that
"no matter how effective it may have been
in the past, the directive can be rescinded
or changed at the direction of the Secretary
of Defense."
r. RIBICOFF. Mr. },'resident, I sug-
Wst the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER TO VITIATE ORDER FOR
VOTE ON CLOTURE PETITION
TOMORROW
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for a
vote on a petition of cloture to occur
tomorrow be vitiated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
TIME LIMITATION AGREEMENTS-
SENATE RESOLUTION 400
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that on the amend-
ment to be offered by Senators TOWER,
STENNIS, and THURMOND, there be a time
limitation of not to exceed 4 hours, the
time to be equally divided between the
sponsor of the amendment and the
manager of the bill; that on one of the
Taft amendments, there be a time limita-
ion of not to exceed 2 hours, the time to
equally divided between the Senator
In Ohio and the manager of the bill;
t on all other amendments, there be a-
period of not to exceed 1 hour, with the
time to be equally divided between the
sponsors of the amendment and the
manager of the bill; and that on the res-
olution itself, there be a time limitation
of 4 hours under the usual rules of pro-
cedure, the time to start immediately.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FAN-
NIN). Without objection, it is so ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
vote on the cloture petition has been
vitiated?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator is correct.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Sena-
tor from Illinois.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, as the
majority leader knows, the entire Illi-
nois delegation will be at Arlington
Memorial Cemetery tomorrow for a pe-
riod of about 2 hours. Will it be possible
to have no vote scheduled during that
period, and if debate has been finished,
that votes be set aside until, say 4'clock
tomorrow?
Mr. MANSFIELD. We shall pile up the
votes, if need be, in view of the sad cir-
cumstance involved.
Mr. RIBICOFF subsequently. said. Mr.
President, I ask unanimous consent that
under the previous consent agreement
on S. 400, all motions, appeals, points
of order, be limited to 20 minutes, equally
divided.
The.PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered. .
The text of the agreement is as fol-
lows: -
Ordered, That during the consideration of
S. Res. 400 (Order No. 728), a resolution to
establish a Standing Committee of the Sen-
ate on Intelligence Activities, and for other
purposes, debate on any amendment (ex-
cept an amendment by senators Tower,
Stennis,, and Thurmond, on which there
shall be 4 hours debate, and an amend-
ment by Senator Taft, on which there shall
be 2 hours debate) shall be limited to 1
hour, to be equally divided and controlled
by the mover of such and the manager of
the resolution, and that debate on any de-
batable motion, appeal, or point of order
which is submitted or on which the Chair
entertains debate shall be limited to 20 min-
utes, to be equally divided and controlled by
the mover of such and the manager.of the
resolution: Provided, That-in the event the
manager of the resolution is in favor of
any. such amendment, debatable motion, ap-
peal, or point of order, the time in oppossi-
tion thereto shall be controlled by the
Minority Leader or his designee: Provided
further, That no amendment that is not ger-
mane to the provisions of the said resolu-
tion shall be received.
Ordered further, That on the question- of
agreeing to the said resolution, debate shall
be limited to 4. hours, to be equally divided
and controlled, respectively, by the Majority
and Minority Leaders, or their designees:
Provided, That the Senators, or either of
them, may, from the time under their con-
trpl on agreeing to the said resolution, allot
additional time to any Senator during the
consideration of any amendment, debatable
motion, appeal, or point of order.
ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL
10 A.M: TOMORROW
Mr. MANSFIELD. - Mr. President, on
my own initiative, I ask unanimous con-
sent that when the Senate completes its
business today, it stand in adjournment
until the hour of 10 o'clock tomorrow
morning; and that no later than the
hour of 11 o'clock tomorrow morning,
the Senate will return to the pending
business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I wish
to speak to the pending Stennis-Tower
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the
Senator from Minnesota suspend? -
Who yields time?
Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I ask
the distinguished floor manager if he
will yield to me such time as I may re-
quire-15 minutes?
Mr. RIBICOFF. I am pleased to yield
15 minutes to the Senator from Minne-
sota.
PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400)
to establish a Standing Committee of
the Senate on Intelligence Activities,
and for other purposes.
Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, the
Stennis-Tower amendment would delete
from the jurisdiction. of the oversight
committee which-we seek to create ap-
proximately 80 percent of the Nation's
intelligence budget. The overwhelming
proportion of the activities of this Na-
tion in the intelligence field would be
outside the jurisdiction of the new com-
mittee. The amendment proposes to
delete from the jurisdiction of the new
committee all of the Defense intelli-
gence activity. That would mean the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the Na-
tional Security Agency, and joint pro-
grams with the CIA. It seems to me that
the arguments for turning that amend-
ment down and including these activi-
ties within the jurisdiction of the new
committee under the terms of the Can-
non resolution are overwhelming. First
of all, the abuses that we have uncovered
in the 15 months of the work of our com-
mittee have shown that there have been
as many abuses committed by these
agencies as by the agencies that would
remain within the jurisdiction of the
new committee, the CIA and the FBI.
The DIA played a role in covert action.
One of the classic examples of mis-
guided, counterproductive, and, I think,
inexcusable covert actions that we found
was so-called Track 2 in Chile. Track 2
was the strategy ordered personally by
the President, under instructions to go
around the institutions that exist for
intelligence decisions in this country,
and the CIA going directly to the DIA
operatives in Chile. The idea behind
Track 2 was, stripped to its essentials,,to
depose Mr. Allende, who was the duly
elected President of Chile. One of the
things that was decided in Track 2, was
that a General Schneider, who was a
constitutionalist and therefore refused
to cooperate in the attempt to overthrow
President Allende by a coup to be re-
moved because he insisted on complying
with the constitutional requirements of
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 S 7344
meeting of OPEC. Tens of thousands of such tnem in riew fora, auu ~tau- ~? -.-~" u"~~" -- w- ?-- - - _
messages are intercepted daily around the were distributed to other Government shown itself capable of undermining?
world and beamed to a complex at Fort bodies. Congress got wind of Shamrock, how- did the whole problem originate?
the broad range of abuses interfering activity.dubbed the "watch list." Two Stanford University computer scien-
with constitutional and legal rights of General Allen testified that, in the early tists have recently accused the N.S.A. of pro-
the American people conducted for sev- 60's, domestic law-enforcement agencies ? rooting its own interests at the expense of
eral years and with practically no limits asked the N.S.A. for information on Ameri- the public's in a standard cipher proposed
whatsoever by the National Security can citizens traveling to Cuba. The assign- by the Government for computer networks.
Agency. ment, he said, was reviewed by "competent At issue is the key that would afford secrecy
external authority"-two Attorneys General between pairs of users. The scientists
I ask unanimous consent that that and a Secretary of Defense. All approved it, cuse the N.S.A. of maneuvering to get
article be printed at this point in the and the idea of using the N.S.A. for such dustry to accept a key that, while too co
RECORD. purposes spread rapidly through the Gov- plex for rival businesses to try to solve would
There being no objection, the article ernment. The drug bureau submitted the be susceptible of cracking by the N.S.L s su-
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, names of 450 Americans and 3,000 foreigners perior capabilities. That would permit the
as follows: whose communications it wanted the N.S.A. agency to raid the'economic data flowing into
to watch. The F.B.I. put in a list of more the computer network, and to penetrate
[From The New York Times Magazine than 1,000 American and 1,700 foreign in- personal-daa files enciphered for security.
May 16, 19761 dividuals and groups. The Central Intelli- In the whole area of economic intelligence,
BIG EAR OR BIG SsoxaEat gence Agency, the Defense Department and N.S.A. interception has been developing rap-
(NoTE -David Kahn, assistant professor of the Secrete Service also submitted watch idly. The House Intelligence Committee, in-
journalism at New York University, is the lists. Altogether, General Allen said, some its report, expressed concern over the resul-
author of "The Codebreakers.") 1,650 American names were on the lists, and tant `intrusion ... into the privacy of in-
(By David Kahn) the N.S.A. issued about 3,900 reports on ternational communications of U.S. citizens
them.
6510 at the State Department Is a and organizations."
But all this is over, he said; he personally At the root of General Allen's appearance
warren of windowless offices with a special abolished the "watch list" when he took before the Senate Intelligence Committee,
cipher lock on the door. Scrambler teletype- over the agency in 1973. and of the entire Congressional investigation
writers, shielded by special walls so that The general's assurance did little to over- of the N.S.A., lay the question: Who author-
none s their radiation escape, d door tick out a stream of of material. . Another oor bars an come the committee's overall concern--and ized these abuses? What was there about the
inner area to all but perhaps 5 percent of that of many other Americans. For both agency's legal basis that permitted it. to in-
the officials at State. This Is the LDS room- prior to and since that hearing, disclosures vade privacy at the request of other Govern-
long-distance Xerox. Here, the scourings of in Congress and elsewhere have indicated ment agencies-and with so little qualm?
the globe's electronic environment flood in. a multifaceted practice of using the N.S.A. Was the final authority the President's-
The environment is heavy with traffic- in ways that threaten American freedoms, and, in that case, was he not armed with
For instance: powers to play Big Brother beyond the worst
in ne code o or r In fa c c didahdidah lea of r, the Soviet Army buzzings of foreign The N.S.A. persuaded three major cable imaginings of the recent past?
air-defense radars; the whines of high-speed companies to turn over to It much of their "[The N.S.A.'sl-capability to monitor any-
radio-teletypewriter circuits carrying diplo- traffic overseas. It was partly through this thing . . . could be turned around on the
matic dispatches; the bleeps of missile te- operation, code-named Shamrock, that the American people," said the committee's
lemetry; the hums of the computer-data N.S.A. complied with the "watch list" assign- chairman, Senator Frank Church. "And no
liks
any plat language mt of tors na corporations; imessat se shment. ow uptb bone etween 5eA.M. and 6 A.M. pick up wouldc be no would p ace eto h de. If a (dictator
the chiming ing-song of scrambled speech. the foreign message's sorted out for him by ever took charge in this country, the tech-
Moving on these varied channels may be company employees (who were said to have nological capability that the intelligence
Soviet orders to transfer a regiment from been paid $50 a week for their cooperation), community has given the Government could
one post to another; Chinese Air Force pilots microfilm them and hand them back. When enable it to impose total tyranny."
complaining during a practice flight about messages began to move on tape, the N.S.A. How essential to the nation's security is
deficiencies In their equipment; Saudi got them in that form. The agency took some the National Security Agency? How can a
ti.o+nroa? +ha 1Pe1tlmate
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 17, 1976
the government that he took an oath of Meade, Md., for decoding and relaying to ever, and a year ago, after 28 years and mil-
office to uphold. the State Department and, simultaneously, lions of private telegrams, Secretary of De-
Of course that effort, although we had to the White House, the Defense Depart- fense James R. Schlesinger had to terminate
not intended it that way, led indirectly ment and the C.I.A. the operation.
The tall, bespectacled Air Force general A previous N.S.A. director, co-signed t e
to the assassination of General Schneider at down behind a table in the high, colon- notorious plan of White House aide T
because, after being abducted, General naded Caucus Room of the Old Senate Office C. Huston to penetrate organizations c
Schneider was assassinated. Building. Television focused its dazzling sidered security threats by the Nixon A
That one example, it seems to me, lights upon him and recorded his gestures. ministration. The agency furnished Huston
stands as a classic example of a miS- Two business-suited aides pulled up their with several suggestions; one of them seems
guided, poorly conceived, immoral and chairs on either side of him. Before him sat to have been to let the N.S.A. eavesdrop
tactic of the kind that the members of the Senate's Select Com- on domestic American communications.
counterproductive
mittee on Intelligence. A gavel banged, and Huston conceded that the plan would use
not the hearing began. "clearly illegal" techniques. But the N.S.A.
shames this in terms bountry our and is souind relationship that
ductive In appearance, the event resembled the has acknowledged that it "didn't consider
only with Chile, our responsibility indi- start of thousands of Congressional hearings. . . at the time" whether its proposal was
rectly for the present repressive and ter- what distinguished this one, last Oct. 29, legal or not. The Huston plan was never im-
rorist administration which runs Chile, was that, for the first time, the`head of the plemented, but, said the Senate Watergate
but also has humiliated us in the eyes largest and most secretive of all American Committee, the "memorandum indicates
of Latin America. Intelligence organs had emerged from ob- that the N.S.A. D.I.A. (Defense Intelligence
Another agency that would be exempt scurity to describe some of his agency's work Agency), C.I.A. 'and the military services
and respond to charges that it had invaded basically supported the Huston recommenda-
under the proposed amendment is NSA, Americans' privacy. The big officer was Lieut. tions."
the National Security Agency. There was Gen. Lew Allen Jr., current director of the Former President Nixon acknowledged in
a separate report put out by our Commit- National Security Agency. N.S.A. is America's a recent deposition to the Senate Intelligence
tee on the activities of NSA. It was this phantom ear. And sometimes it has eaves- Committee that he had used the N.S.A. to
agency that had a watch list on 1,600 dropped on the wrong things. Intercept American nonvoice communica-
innocent Americans, and established an In addition to sucking up and disgorging tions. He said he wanted to discover the
operation called "Shamrock," which its daily load of intercepts from abroad, the source of leaks from the staffs of the Na-
operation had improperly eavesdropped on the tional Security Council and the Joint Chiefs
read all of the cable traffic out of the . conversations of many Americans, such as of Staff.
city of New York, none of it Comply- the antiwar protesters Benjamin Spock and The agency is said to have passed reports
ing with the requirement for" a court Jane Fonda and the Rev. Ralph Abernathy, on what prominent Americans were doing
warrant. successor to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., cur- and saying abroad directly to Presidents
Mr. President, in addition to the report rent director of the National Bureau of Johnson, and Nixon. Once, for example, the
put out by the committee, there was in Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and other agency informed Johnson that a group of
this Sunday's New York Times Magazine Government agencies, its vast technological Texas businessmen involved in private nego-
this had invaded the domestic field, tiations in the Middle East had claimed a
an article entitled "Big Ear or Big which they were never intended to do. The close relationship with him to improve their
.Brother?" by David Kahn, spelling out committee wanted to know about an N.S.A. bargaining position.
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May 17, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE
Signals intelligence reaches back in Amer-
ica to the' founding days of the Republic.
But it matured only in World War I, with
widespread use of radio. During World
}hee II, it became the nation's most im-
ant means of gathering secret informa-
nt. When the Iron Curtain clanged down,
the United States wanted to preserve these
extraordinary capabilities. In 1952, President
Truman issued a directive transforming the
Armed Forces Security Agency, the inter-
service arm for signal intelligence, into the
National Security Agency, serving all branch-
es of government. -
Therein lay the first pitfall. Unlike the
C.I.A., in which' all intelligence functions
were centralized in 1947, the N.S.A. was not
formed by act of Congress, with a legislative
charter defining the limits of its mission.
The cryptologic empire has only a Presiden-
tial directive as its legal base. So shadowy
has been the N.S.A.'s existence, however, that
the text of the seven-page directive has never
been made public.
This obsession with secrecy is well reflect-
ed by the agency's headquarters. At the edge
of Fort Meade, just off the Washington-Bal-
timore Parkway, it is ringed by a double
chain-link fence topped by barbed wire with
six strands of electrified wire between them.
Marines guard the four gates. Inside lie a
modern, three-story square-A-shaped struc-
ture and, within its arms, a boxy nine-story
bullding: From the latter, in particular, ema-
nates a chill impersonality, quite different
from the flashiness of C.I.A. headquarters in
McLean, Va. Topped by a frieze of antennas,
the only sign of life a plume of white steam
rising from the roof, the afternoon sun
gleaming off its glassy facade, it stares bleak-
ly south, toward Washington, the White
House, and the centers of national power.
All around sprawl the vast macadam park-
ing lots for the 20,000 employees who work
there. They have passed some of the most
orous security tests in the Government,
they may be fired merely on a suspicion.
ty are enjoined from talking even to their
spouses about their work. And inside the
building they are physically restricted as
well. The colored badge each of them wears
tells the patrollling Marine guards into which
areas they may and may not go.
Their work is of two kinds. Some of them
protect American communications. They de-
vise cryptosystems.They contract for cipher
machines, sometimes imposing performance
standards so high and tolerances so close
that suppliers quit in despair. They promul-
gate cryptologic doctrine to ensure that the
procedures of, say, the State Department do
not compromise the messages of Defense.
But the main job is'SIGINT-signal intelli-
gence-listening in. To do all its work, the
N.S.A. alone spends about $1 billion a year.
The agency also disposes of about 80,000
servicemen and civilians around the world,
who serve in the cryptologic agencies of the
Arn y, Navy and Air Force but stand under
N.S.A. control, and if these agencies and
other collateral costs are included, the total
spent could well amount to $15 billion.
The N.S.A.'s place on the organizational
chart is ambiguous: It is "within but not
a part of" the Defense Department. Th(Z
Secretary of Defense merely serves as the
"executive agent" of the President in carry-
ing out the functions assigned to the agency.
It is not subordinate to the C.I.A., but its
director sits on the United Sates Intelligence
Board, the intelligence community's steer-
ing committee, whose chairman is the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence-the C.I.A. chief.
The N.S.A. director is always a three-star
general or admiral. (The deputy director
must be a career cryptologist.) The Presi-
dent appoints the director, rotating among
e three services, which get 85 percent of
output. The seven directors before Gen-
Allen held the job for an average of
three and a half years each.
The agency's orders-Truman's 1952 direc-
tive-are to "obtain foreign intelligence from
foreign communications or foreign electronic
signals," General Allen is said to have told
the House Intelligence Committee. The agen-
cy can be remarkably successful.
. "Most collection agencies give us history.
The N.S.A. is giving us the present," said
Lieut. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, a former
head of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence
Agency (D.I.A.). "Spies take too long to get
information to you, [satellite] photographs
as well. N.S.A. is intercepting things as they'
happen, N.S.A. will tell you, "They're about
to launch a missile. The missile is
launched' We know in five minutes that a
missile has been launched. This kind of in-
telligence is critical to the warning busi-
ness."
During the Strategic Arms Limitation`
Talks (SALT) of 1972, the N.S.A. reported
on the precise Soviet negotiating position
and on the Russian worries. "It was abso-
lutely critical stuff," said one high intel-
ligence officer. The information was passed
back quickly to the American diplomats, who
maneuvered with it so effectively that they
came home with the agreement not to build
an antiballistic missile defense system.
"That's the sort of thing that pays N.S.A.'s
k -.ges for a year," the officer said.
In 1973, large antennas appeared in satel-
lite photographs of Somalia, which lies east
of Ethiopia on the Indian Ocean. They
looked like Soviet models. But not until
the N.S.A. had learned where the anten-
nas' signals were going to and coming from
was the Government certain that the Rus-
sians, who had been kicked out of Egypt,
had moved their military advisers into So-
malia in force and were controlling their
warships in the Indian Ocean from there.
Examples like these made General Allen's
task a little' easier when he appeared be-
fore the Senate Intelligence Committee.
Senator Walter F. Mondale, the Minnesota
liberal, told the general, "The performance
of your staff and yourself before the commit-
tee is perhaps the most impressive presenta-
tion that we have had. And I consider your
agency and. your work to be possibly the
single most important source of intelligence
for this nation."
Senator- Church concurred. "We have a
romantic attachment to the days of Mats.
Hari that dies very hard. The public has the
impression- that spies are the most import-
ant source of information, but that is defi-
nitely not so. The more authoritarian the
Government being penetrated, the less re-
liable the information derived from secret
agents. In the Soviet Union and other Com-
munist countries, the penetrations are like-
ly to be short-lived and the information lim-
ited. But information obtainable through
technical means constitutes the largest body
of intelligence available to us, except by overt
means."
And, he might have added, the most reli-
able. It is free of the suspicion that blights
a spy's reports: Is he a double agent? Photo-
graphs7from satellites also provide data as
hard as can be, but, as Schlesinger once re-
marked, "nobody has ever been able to photo-
graph intentions."
On the other hand, communications intel-
ligence is far more easily jeopardized than
other forms of information gathering. If a .
Government merely suspects that its com-
munications are compromised, it does not
have to hunt down any spies or traitors-
it can simply change codes. And this will cut
off information not from just one man but
from a whole network. That is why the Gov-
ernment is so hypersensitive to any public
mention of the N.S.A.'s work. When President
Ford last September refused to send classi-
fied material to the House Intelligence Com-
mittee after it made public four apparently
innocuous words-"and greater communica-
tions security"-it was because of fears that
S 7345
the words would reveal to the Egyptians, to
whom they referred, that the United States
had pierced deeply enough into their com-
munications to detect Important changes.
When last February he invoked executive
privilege for private firms to keep them from
furnishing information to a House commit-
tee looking into Government interception
of private telegraph and teletypewriter mes-
sages, it was also for fear of compromising
N.S.A. procedures.
In doing its work, the agency doesn't just
tune up its receivers and go out hunting for
codes to break. It gets its assignments from
other elements of the Government. They tell
the United States Intelligence Board what
information they need that the N.S.A. can
probably provide. After board approval, the
Director of Central Intelligence levies the
requirements upon the N.S.A. Typical assign-
ments might be to locate and keep track of
all the divisions of the Chinese Army, to
determine the range and trajectory of Soviet
ICBM's, to ascertain the characteristics of
radars around East Berlin. In all of these,
the first step is to seek out the relevant
foreign transmissions.
Some of the intercepts come from N.S.A.
teams in American embassies. The team in
Moscow has been spectacularly successful-
at least before the Russians began flooding
the building with low-intensity microwave
radiation. It had picked up the conversations
between - Soviet leaders in their radiotele-
phone-equipped automobiles and other offi-
cials in the Kremlin. -
More intercepts come from special satel-
lites in space called "feerrets. " Swinging si-
lently over the broad steppes and scattered
cities of the Communist world, or floating
permanently above the golden deserts and
strategic gulfs of the Middle East, these giant
squat cylinders tape-record -every electric
whisper on their target frequencies. These
they spew out upon command to American
ground stations.
Most 'radio intercepts come from manned
intercept posts. Some of these are airborne.
The Air Force patrols the edges of the Com-
munist bloc with radio reconnaissance air-
planes, such as the supersonic SR-71, the EC-
135, and the EC-121, which, carries a crew
of 30 and six tons of electronic equipment.
These planes concentrate not on communica-
tions intelligence (COMINT) but on the sec-
ond branch of signals intelligence-
elec-tronics-intelligence, or ELINT.
ELINT plays an important role in modern
war. Suppose the Air Force were to send a
bomber force against Moscow, Soviet radars
would detect, the force and report its range,
direction and speed, enabling their fighters
to attack. To delay this, the Americans would
have to jam the radars, or "spoof" them-
i.e., emit counterfeit pulses that would in-
dicate a false position and speed for the
bombers. But to to do this, the Air Force
would first have to know the frequency,
pulse rate, wave form and other character.
istics of the Russian radars. That explains
why, in fiscal 1974, according to a report of
the Center for National Security Studies in
Washington, the Air Force flew at least 38,000
hours of ELINT flights--better than a hun-
dred hours a day-dissecting radar signals
with oscilloscopes and other electronic
means. The game is not without its risks.
No nation leaves all its radars turned on all
the time. So the planes sometimes dart to-
ward the country's territory. They hope the
target will turn on its more secret radars.
The danger, particularly at a time of inter-
national tension, is that the target will take
the tease for the real thing and start World
War III.
Other N.S.A.-directed posts lurk in the
depths of the sea, aboard submarines in the
Navy's Holystone program. This seeks, among
other things, to "fingerprint" the acoustics
of Soviet missile submarines. Aboard the
Holystone submarine Gato, when it collided
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with a Russian sub in the Barents Sea in
1969, were eight sailors working for the
Navy's N.S.A.-related security group. The
Navy also used to have nine noncombatant
surface ships collecting signal intelligence.
But after the Liberty was strafed by Israeli
forces during the Six-Day. War of 1967 and
the Pueblo was captured by the North Ko-
reans, it decommissioned this mode.
The vast majority of the manned posts are
fixed on the ground. They ring the Soviet
Union and China-clusters of low huts
huddling on a dusty plain or in the foothills
of some remote Karakoram. In Turkey, they
nestle close to the Russian underbelly. The
post at the Black Sea port of Sinop-the an-
cient Sinope, which centuries ago colonized
the shores of the Euxine-strains to hear
Soviet voices. At Okinawa, the antenna field
cobwebs a mountainside.
But much of the interception is done by
servicemen. Earphones clamped to their
heads, they hear the staccato of Russian
Morse: One Soviet Army post reports the
movement of half a dozen trucks to another.
Other messages are in cipher. On a voice cir-
cuit, soldiers can be heard talking on
maneuvers.
During moments of tension, the routine
changes. Transmitters will vanish from their
usual points on the dial. Station call signs
will cease following their normal pattern of
changes. Yet this is when information is
most needed. The monitors hunch over their
radio sets as they hunt up and down the
frequency spectrum for their target trans-
mitter. They can recognize him by peculiar-
ities in sending or Hy the tone of his trans-
mitter. One may sound like dowdy-dowdow,
another like doodee-doodee. One may sound
as if he's sending from inside a can; another
may let his frequency slide up two or three
kilohertz during a message.
They type out their intercepts on four-ply
carbon paper and pass them back to the
analysts. These men graph message routing
to deduce organizational relationships. They
monitor traffic volume for an upsurge that
might indicate unusual activity. They ex-
tract from the message content indications
of equipment capabilities, unit morale,
names and characteristics of commanders.
And they send the messages in cipher back
to the cryptanalysts.
These are the aces, the shamans, of the
communications intelligence business. They
are the descendants of the ruffed divines and
mathematicians who broke codes in cur-
tained, candle-lit black chambers to ;urther
the grand designs of their absolute monarchs.
The N.S.A.'s modern Merlins work in large
open spaces filled with rows of gray steel
desks. They pore over green-striped sheets,
tap on computer terminals print letters with
colored pencils in rows and columns on cross-
ruled paper, sip coffee, confer. Their successes
become the agency's most jealously guarded
secrets.
They succeed, however, mainly with the
ciphers of third-world countries and with the
lower-level ciphers of major powers. Under-
developed nations have neither the money
nor-the expertise to secure their messages
from American-and Russian-exposure.
Anyhow, they mainly want to keep things
secret from their neighbors-Pakistan from
India, Egypt from Israel, Argentina from
Chile. So they buy commercially available
cipher machines. But N.S.A. cryptanalysts,
backed up by probably the largest concentra-
tion of computers under one roof in the
world, some of them perhaps a generation or
two ahead of any others in existence, can
often beat these.
The major powers, on the other hand, use
machines to generate ciphers so strong that,
even given a cryptogram and its plaintext,
and all the world's computers of this and
the next generation, a cryptanalyst would
need centuries to reconstruct the cryptosys-
tern and use the reconstruction to read the
next message. The N.S.A., in other words, can- overwhelming volume can stifle results. In
not get the most desirable communications late September 1973, just before the start
intelligence-the high-level. messages of the of the Yom Kippur War, "the National Se-
Soviet Union and Communist China. (The curity Agency began picking up clear sign.
SALT coup was partly the , result of a Soviet that Egypt and Syria were preparing for
enciphering error.) Worse, the area in which major offensive," the House Intellige
cryptanalysts may expect success is shrink- Committee reported. "N.S.A. information i
ing. The main reason is the declining cost ?dicated that [a major foreign nation] had
of computation. This is falling by 50 percent
every five years; the most obvious example
is the price of pocket calculators. For the
same amount of money as it spent five years
ago, a nation can buy a cipher machine to-
day with double the coding capacity. But
doubling the coding capacity squares the
number of trials the cryptanalyst has to
make. Very quickly this work rises beyond
practical limits.
So the N.S.A. asks for help. The F.B.I. bur-
glarized embassies in Washington for it. The
C.I.A. has subverted code clerks in foreign
capitals: It once offered a Cuban in Mon-
tevideo $20,000. In 1966, it bugged an Egyp-
tian code room to pick up the vibrations of
the embassy's cipher machine. The N.S.A.,
which could not cryptanalyze this machine,
though it was commercially available, ana-
lyzed the recordings, revealing the machine's
settings-and hence the messages. The
C.I,A: s most spectacular assist came in 1974,
when it spent $350 million in an unsuccess-
ful secret effort to raise a Soviet submarine
from the depths of the Pacific, with missiles
and cipher machines intact.
In Room 6510 at the State Department,
the intercepts come in on white sheets of
paper bearing the heading "To Secretary of
State from DIRNSA [Director, N.S.A.]."
Several lines of gibberish indicating the dis-
tribution are followed by the text of the in-
tercept, unscrambled on the spot. R.C.I. offi-
cers (for "research-communications intelli-
gence"), one for each geographic area, insert
the new material into fat loose-leaf binders
and pull, out the old. Once a week or so, the
country directors mosey on down to Room
6510 and leaf through the file to keep cur-
rent with their areas. If something urgent
comes in, the R.C.I. officer calls the country
director, who comes right down. Daily, an
R.C.I. officer conceals the more important in-
tercepts under black covers (the C.I.A.'s col-
or is red) and carries them in a briefcase to
the several Assistant Secretaries of State.
Dramatic intercepts are rare.' And when
they come, they seldom have much impact.
Once, an intercept arrived suggesting that a
coup d'etat could take place in a certain
country in a matter of hours. It was rushed
to U. Alexis Johnson, then Under Secretary
of State. He read it, nodded, said, "That's
interesting," and handed it back to the
R.C.I officer. There was simply nothing he
could do about it.
The vast majority of the intercepts are
low-level routine. At State, they deal largely
with the minutiae of embassy business, such
as foreign messages dealing with Soviet visa
requests to foreign governments, reports of
foreign ambassadors about meetings with
American officials, foreign businessmen's or-
ders. At Defense, they may include foreign
ship locations, a reorganization in a Soviet
military district, the transfer of a flight( of
Iranian jets from Teheran to Isfahan. Nearly
all come from third-world countries. Usually
they are of secondary interest, but some-
times their importance flares: Korea, the
Congo, Cuba, Chile. And since these coun-
tries are spoken to by the major powers,
their messages may carry good clues to the
major powers' Intentions. (This was another
of the sources for the SALT Intelligence.)
The quantity is enormous. In part this
reflects the soaring increase in communica-.
tions throughout the world. In part it marks
a shift to the more voluminous peripheral
sources, such as observing message routings,
to compensate for the growing difficulty of
cryptanalysis in areas of central interest,
sucti as Russia and China. Unfortunately this
of war and concerned about their, citizens
and dependents in Egypt. N.S.A.'s warnings
escaped the serious attention of most intelli-
gence analysts responsible for the Middle
East."
"The fault," the committee concluded,
"may well lie in the system itself. N.S.A.
intercepts of Egyptian-Syrian war prepara-
tions in this period were so voluminous-an
average of hundreds of reports each week-
that few analysts had time to digest more
than a small portion of them. Even fewer
analysts were qualified by technical training
to read raw N.S.A. traffic. Costly intercepts
had scant impact on estimates."
If N.S.A. failed in this major test, how does
it do in its day-to-day operations?
A'survey at the State Department showed
that most desk officers felt that while the
N.S.A. material was not especially helpful,
they didn't want to give it up. It made -their
job a little easier. A former top State Depart-
ment official was always glad to see the man
with the locked briefcase. "I got some good
clues on how to deal with various countries,"
he said, "and I quickly learned which ambas-
sadors I could trust and which not."
At the Defense Department, most officials
said they appreciated the help they got from
the agency. "D.I.A. relies very heavily on
N.S.A.," said General Graham, "because D.I.A.
puts out a warning document to American
units all over the world and to Washington,
and whether the warning lights are green or
amber or red comes mostly from the N.S.A."
For policy makers, naturally, the more in-
formation the better. But is this margin.
advantage worth the billions it costs in
nation that has so many other vital human
needs unfulfilled? Put that way, the ques-
tion poses a false dilemma. The money for
health and housing and education can-and
should-come from elsewhere. It is on the
vastly larger arms . budget, on atomic over-
kill and obsolescent nuclear aircraft carriers,
that the nation overspends. Intelligence is
far cheaper and usually saves more than it
costs. In general, with its record of some fail-
ures and some successes, and the incal-
culable potential value of its sleepless watch
around the world, the N.S.A. is worth the
money the nation spends on it.
The real question fora nation reappraising
its intelligence community is not one of fi-
nancial priority but of legal basis. There is
no statute prohibiting the N.S.A. from activ-
ities that encroach on Americans' constitu-
tional rights. In response to criticism, Presi-
dent Ford recently issued an executive order
on intelligence that seems to forbid the
N.S.A. from intercepting American commu-
nications-but also seems to leave a loophole.
Even with the best of intentions, however,
that cannot be an adequate approach. For
what one President can order another-or
even the same-President can abrogate or
amend.
The final responsibility for all those im-
proper activities by the N.S.A. was, in each
case, the President's, even though it remains
unclear whether all of them were reported to
the Oval Office. That alone should illustrate
the hazards of an arrangement under which
the powers of an intelligence service derive
not from Congress but from the White House.
As a basic reform, Congress should replace
Truman's 1952 directive with a legislative
charter for the N.S.A.
That, in fact, was the view that underl
much of the questioning of General All
before the Senate Intelligence Committ ,
and that is the substance of the recommen-
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May 17, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
dations on the N.S.A. contained in the com- would be no constitutional protections
mittee s recent report on the intelligence at all, and once again another area of
establishment as a whole. "The committee abuse, another area of major significance
ds," said the report, "that there is a com-
need for an N.S.A. charter to spell out that would be beyond reach of this over-
ling
tations which will protect individual sight committee if this amendment is
stitutional rights without impairing adopted. ,
N.S.A.'s necessary foreign intelligence mis- The military clandestine intelligence
sion." The committee also made specific rec- activities are supervised by the CIA. Only
ommendations designed to prevent a repeti- half of what the CIA spends comes from
Con of the known abuses of the past. t its own appropriations. The other half
The House Intelligence Committee, in its
-own report, came to the same basic conclu- comes out of defense appropriations
sion. declaring that "the existence of the through transfers or advances, and thus
National Security Agency should be recog- if you controlled only the CIA it would
n3zed by specific legislation," which should be a simple matter to shift intelligence
"define the role of N.S.A. with reference to- operations, covert operations, dirty
the monitoring of communications of Ameri- tricks, into agencies not under the juris-
caps." diction of this oversight committee.
There-is no question that the National . Anything the CIA does or the FBI does
Security Agency, in the words of the Senate the military can do and has done. You
committee report, is "vital to American secu-
rity." In fact, in this nuclear age, when either have to oversee all of them or, in
danger-fraught situations can be best han- all likelihood, we will not have had re-
dled with knowledge about the "other side," strained what we are seeking to restrain.
and when many international agreements, Finally, let us look at the Huston re-
such as SALT, are dependent on, say, Amer- port. The Huston report or the Huston
ica's ability to verify Soviet compliance by plan is probably the most classic official
its own technical means, N.S.A. intelligence, document of lawlessness ever prepared
like all intelligence, can be a stabilizing fac- and signed off b
for in the world. by high officers in the his-
There is also no question that we need a tory of America. It was approved by the
new statute. No law can guarantee preven- President, it was approved by repre-
tion of abuses, especially if lawlessness is sentatives of every intelligence agency in
condoned in the higher echelons of govern- 4%he Federal Government. On its face it
ment, and the C.I.A.'s charter did not prevent sanctioned a broad range of illegal and
that agency from overstepping its bounds. unconstitutional activities: reading mail
But a gap in the law is an invitation to abuse. without a court's warrant, contrary, to
An institutionalized mechanism to seek out
violations and punish the guilty can best law; black bag jobs; breaking and enter-
deter the sort of intrusion that so many ing the homes of American citizens, con-
Americans fear-and that destroys the very trary to the fourth amendment; tax re-
freedom the N.S.A. was created to protect. turns and a whole range of activities that
Mr. MONDALE. Next, the Army count-* we have revealed and which were to be
erintelligence, which would be another officially -sanctioned by Presidential pri-
.ncy- exempt under this pending vate plan, the Huston,plan, and the rea-
endment, was found spying on inno- son I raise this point is that a majority
cent Americans, bugging, tapping, and of the participants in the committee, who
illegally opening mail. That record is prepared that plan, were representatives
also spelled out in the, reports of our of the military agencies, the DIA, the
committee. Some of the early pioneering NSA, Army Intelligence, Navy Intelli-
work in the area of intelligence abuse gence, Air Force Intelligence, and each
came as a 'result of the hearings before had a representative on the committee
Senator Ervin on the Constitutional that prepared the Huston plan.
Rights Subcommittee relating to the . So if what we are trying to do here is
abuses of the Army Intelligence Agency designed to try to prevent the recurrence
against innocent Americans. Thus there of abuses that threaten American de-,
is a very rich and broad record that dem- mocracy and threaten the accountability have seen here were not the contribution
onstrates that abuse has occurred within for U.S, foreign policy to Congress and to of Mr. Hoover.
the authority and under the jurisdic- our constitutional system, then the argu- Mr. Hoover had little or nothing to do
tion of Army intelligence. ment is overwhelming that these agen- with the bomber raids in World War II:
Next, the military has provided the ties must be included within the juris- What we have seen, if we look at the
backbone for the major paramilitary ac- diction of this new oversight committee. history of secret intelligence agencies, is
tivities. These are activities which have Moreover, the reason for the oversight that if we are not careful and if we do
been carried on in Laos, the Bay of Pigs, committee is not simply to prevent not have oversight, we can expect, based
in which an attempt is made to suggest abuses, as important as that is, but to on the record, that human nature is such
that it is not direct U.S. military inter- assure that these agencies are acting ef- that those who wield this power will find
vention but which, in fact, have been fectively to defend us. The record is re- it very hard to restrain themselves from
under our control and direction, often plete with failures on the part of these ' abusing it. It is hard to refuse to play
U.S.-trained military personnel who agencies to effectively defend our in- God when we have the right to do it
have been, in the jargon of the business, terests. For years the CIA. and the FBI outside the law and protected by censor-
"sheep-dipped." They have been clan- did not talk to each other at top levels, ship.
destine in their outward marks, but they risking this Nation's defense because of That is why, above all, we need what
are, in fact, U.S. military personnel in- the petty personal disputes. No one knew Madison once called auxiliary precau-
volved in those activities, about it because there was. no oversight. tions.
Those paramilitary activities occurred For years there had been private talks I do not think it is any insult to those
outside the Constitution. If you read the within the Defense Department about the now running these agencies to say that
Constitution and the declaration-of-war effectiveness of the DIA. on which we we need that oversight and that we can-
powers contained therein you will find -spend millions and millions of dollars. not accept their argument that, "we are
no exception in there permitting military The Murphy Commission recommended different people than those other people
activities run and conducted by the that it be terminated; the House com- who did wrong, but we don't do wrong."
United States except through a declara- mittee, after studying it; recommended I do not think that answers the ques-
JEW war, and there is no exception in that it be terminated, and we understand tion. I do not think the experience and
re for such activities if you call them there is a good deal of private talk in the history justifies it.
amilitary. If you did, of course, there Defense Department toward that same I often like to quote Madison's Fed-?j
S 7347
end, because it has not proven to be as
effective and to serve the purpose it was
supposed to serve in helping to protect
this country.
For many years there was a paranoid
attitude in the CIA that viewed possible
agents that we could work with or pos-
sible leads as all plants presented by the
Russians. Maybe and undoubtedly many
of them were, but not all of them, and
.very few, if any, were pursued.
That shows, in my opinion, the need
for oversight not only to prevent abuses
but to make certain that these agencies
are performing effectively to defend our
country against real dangers.
If we do not have oversight of the mili-
tary agencies; I think we have largely
failed-largely failed in our effort.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's 15 minutes have expired.
Who yields time?
Mr. MONDALE. May I have 5 more
minutes?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator is recognized for 5 more minutes.
Mr. MONDALE. It seems to me that
there are three or four fundamental
principles that justify and demand over-
sight of all of these agencies.
First of all, if there is one thing we
have learned from this long study, it is
that we must be very concerned about
how human nature works when we clothe
people with secret power, particularly
with great secret power. If we are not
careful, it will almost inevitably lead to
abuse.
Recently, the Director of the Bureau.
Mr. Kelley, said, "Well, the real problem
is that in Hoover's, twilight years he was
acting foolishly," and I think. that is true.
But I do not think the villain theory an-
swers our question becailse many of these
things occurred before Mr. Hoover's twi-
light years. They were committed by
many people in the Bureau and in these
other agencies, other than Mr. Hoover.
Mr. Hoover does not explain the CIA;
he does not explain the DIA; he had
nothing to do directly with assassina-
tions, but many of the abuses that we
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD = SENATE May 17, 1976
eralist Paper No. 51, which I think un-
derscores the need for what he called
"auxiliary precautions."
He said this :
If men were angels, no government would
be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither external nor internal controls on
government would be necessary. In framing
a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in
this: you must first enable the government
to control the governed; and in the next"
place oblige it to control itself.
and that he said
Experience has taught mankind the neces-
sity of auxiliary precautions.
clearly defend itself within the law and
within the Constitution from every
threat to this country, terrorists, bomb-
ers, foreign spies, rioters, civil unrest.
We can do all that within the Constitu-
tion and within the law.
I want to know what right any of us
have, those of us who have taken the
oath to uphold the Constitution of the
United States, to grant authority to any-
one, the President. or anyone in his be-
half, or ourselves, to take the law into
his own hands and in secret and in that
fact threaten 'the constitutional rights
and the constitutional system of this
Nation.
It is not necessary and it is the most
dangerous thing that this Nation can do.
If our study has concluded anything,
it is this, that those framers of our Con-
stitution nearly 200 years ago came up
with a document that was shrewd and
profound interms of how human nature
worked, but shrewd and profound in
terms of giving us the full authority we
needed. The power we needed to protect
us from our dangers at home and
abroad, plenty of power, and at the same
time to restrain the hand of government,
because we do not go beyond that line,
beyond enforcing the law, and interfer'
ing in the political rights and freedoms
of the American people.
It is the most sacred and important
line drawn in the Constitution. I can-
not think of anything better that we
could do to celebrate this Bicentennial
and more meaningful than to say that
200 years later we agreed that line is right
and in the face of this record we are go-
ing to insist these agencies observe the
law and to make certain they obey it,
they are going to'have to report their
activities to this Congress, all of them.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
able economic effect of trade conces-
sions. Additional work in this area has
representatives as negotiations intensify
in fiscal- year 1977. The new escape
clause criteria have -resulted in a total
of 14 industry investigations in less than
a year since the Trade Act's effective
date, compared to a total of only 1
'such investigation initiated in the pre-
vious 21 months. Intensive efforts are
being devoted to completion of unfair
import practice investigations under the
new rules and time limits established by
the Trade Act .of 1974.
Mr. President, the Commission's pres-
ent efforts, such as its recent advice to
the President on the probable effect of
tariff concessions and the generalized
system of preferences, its reports on
East-West trade, its studies of interna-
tional commodity agreements and the
United States-Canadian automotive
agreement, and its series on the com-
petitiveness of the United States and
other major trading countries, have
greatly impressed the members of the
Committee on Finance.
Further, as the multilateral trade
negotiations proceed in Geneva the
Commission will play an increasingly
important role regarding the economic
impact of proposed tradeoffs and the
Commission must be adequately staffed
to carry out this important task.
I think that is what this record shows:
experience has taught us that we need
auxilitary precautions against abuse,
particularly the abuse of power in the
intelligence field which, ' by necessity,
operates in secret.
Secrecy, yes. Unaccountability, no.
That is why we simply must have full
jurisdiction in this oversight committee.
It seems to me that, when we strip
the arguments down to their essentials,
what many people are really arguing in
these agencies is that this Nation can-
not defend itself unless it can do so with
the protection of the censorship and un-
less it can from time to time proceed
illegally. In other words, in order to de-
fend this country, it is necessary to do
something that the framers of this coun-
try found abhorrent, namely, to have
censorship-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's time has expired.
Mr. MONDALE. May I have 5 more
minutes, please?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. RIBICOFF. Yes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. MONDALE. So that we can pro-
ceed with secrecy and protect ourselves
from the Congress, from the American
people, and, second, to have the right to
act illegally and in violation of the rights
of the American people from time to
time in order to defend this country
from its real dangers.
I say that is their essential argument;
when we get down to it, and certainly
the record will demonstrate that time
and time again they said almost exactly
that, because that would be the only rea-
son for saying that they should have the
right to operate in secret and beyond the
reach of the Congress.
Why do they want that right if they
are operating legally and responsively?
What is their fear?
I think the fear is that it would deny
them this broad freedom they have had
to pursue whatever course they wanted,
no matter how illegal or disruptive of
constitutional rights it should be.
What we found, if we found anything,
is that this Nation can defend itself fully
and effectively, as it has for 200 years,
within the law.
For some months we have looked
through the.FBI files; we asked them
which dangers they wanted to defend us
from. We did not look at logic, we'did
not look at theory, we looked at real life,
and we found out that this Nation can
munity and I strongly urge my col-
leagues to support S. 3420.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
is open to amendment. If there be no
amendment to be proposed, the ques-
tion is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed
for a third reading,-read the third time.
and passed as follows:
S. 3420
Be it enacted by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That (a)
there are authorized to be appropriated to
the International Trade Commission?$11,789,-
000 to carry out its duties and functions dur-
ing fiscal year 1977.
(b) There are authorized to be appropri-
ated to such Commission $12,036,000 to carry
,out its duties and functions during fiscal
year 1978.
(c) In addition to the amounts authorized
under subsections (b) and (c), there are au-
thorized to be appropriated to such Commis-
sion such amounts as may be necessary for
fiscal years 1977 and 1978 for increases re-
quired by law during such fiscal years in
salary, pay, retirement, and other employee
benefits.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMIS-
. SION AUTHORIZATIONS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in
order to keep the calendar clear and to
take only a few minutes of the Senate's
time, I ask unanimous consent that the
Senate turn to the consideration of
Calendar No. 776, S. 3420.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
will be stated by title.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 3420) to authorize appropriations
to the International Trade Commission.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the present consideration
of the bill?
.There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to consider the bill.
Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I fully
support S. 3420 which provides budget
authorization for the United States
Trade Commission. The Finance Com-
mittee has approved the amount re-
quested by the Commission for fiscal year
1977 and 1978, and I would like to briefly
explain the need for this level of funding.
The Trade Act of 1974 has placed in-
creased responsibilities on the Commis-
sion. For example, in fiscal year 1975,
about one-third of all Commission re-
sources were devoted to the development
of advice to the President on the prob-
ORDER REFERRING S. 3091 TO
COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND
INSULAR AFFAIRS
Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I ask
mittee on Agriculture and Forestry be
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May 18, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
tinue to speak tough words about returning
them home, even they allow refugee
"camps" to become gee "villages" under
controlled conditions.
III. Refugee resettlemen i. the United States
21. In little more than ear, some 131,000
Indochina refugees move rom boats and
crowded processing center to reception
areas in the U.S., to sponsor d homes in
local communities. By this Ju 30th, when
the parole program comes to end, the
22. Despite the chaos of the a nation,
and the lack of leadership and dir on in
the early stages of the resettlement p ram,
substantial progress has been achieved re-
settling a majority of the refugees. Ho _ Pr,
serious problems remain, contrary to
timistic reports from the Task Force.
agree that unemployment, underemploy-
ment, welfare and other problems have gen-
erally increased among the refugees-and
increased very dramatically in some areas of
the United States.
24. A clear indication of the adjustment
and integration problems among the refugees
can now be seen in their frequent movement
from their initial resettlement areas of last
year, to new areas. The movement is largely
towards the so-called "sun-belt" from the
northeast and midWest. The reasons for mov-
ing are usually personal-climate, the pres-
ence of family or friends elsewhere, better
job opportunities, the lack of acceptance in
a community, etc. ' -
25. For a significant number of refugees
the optimism and hope of last year has faded
into feelings of frustration,. failure, loneli-
ness and general depression. There are un-
doubtedly legitimate reasons for, this situa-
tion, including the ptate of the nation's econ-
omy, lack of resources of many refugees, poor
job skills, lack of English language, etc. But
these problems have also come from some
"failings in the President's resettlement pro-
gram: early pressures to-empty the camps at
the expense of good resettlement; emphasis
on the widest dispersion of refugees, leading
to unrealistic resettlement situations; the
limited scope of the program; the lack of
federal programs available for job training,
etc.
26: There are no quick remedies for these
problems, and the refugess resettlement pro-
gram is in a period of transition. So the
refugees must try to cope, and officials are
still trying to "catch up", even as they talk
about phasing out the program.
MISS LAURA JOHNSON
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, Miss
Laura Johnson, who for many years was
president of Hartford College for Women,
recently retired. Her achievements were
many in the fields of education and com-
munity affairs. The Hartford Courant,
in a recent editorial, commented on her
accomplishments.
I ask unanimous consent that the edi-
torial be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Hartford (Conn.) Courant,
May 14, 1976 ]
Miss LAURA JOHNSON RETIRES
When a college president retires, it is ex-
pected that tributes will outline numerical
gains: Acreage added to a campus, how many
new buildings were erected and how much
the student body grew. All these are evident
achievements when reviewing the 33 years
spent by Miss Laura Alice Johnson, first as
dean, then as president of Hartford College
for Women.
But the main concern of Miss Johnson,
who retires next month, always has been the
broadening of student minds, not particu-
larly their growth in numbers on the campus
of- the two-year liberal arts college. Widened
horizons and expectations for them as per-
sons have been nurtured by Miss Johnson
rather than focusing only on the narrower
stereotyped role of women.
Indeed, Miss Johnson herself epitomizes
that philosophy. When she became the first
woman to be named as a director of a Hart-
ford-based insurance company-Phoenix
Mutual in 1972-she described that unique
honor as "nothing special; not a big thing."
Rather she hoped her selection was based on
her talent as an individual, not as a woman.
She again became a "first woman who"
when in 1974 The Courant asked her to be a
member of its Board of Directors. The year
before that she became a director of the
couraged
time to
Laura Johnson's infi
in its graduates, as
will help to maintain
Bard higher education
College where Miss
oe long will be felt,
their places in the wor
and potential.
confidently take
persons of talent
SHIPBUILDING CLAIMM AGAINST
THE NAVY: A M ACTURED
CRISIS '
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. Pres t, Wil-
liam P. Clements, Deputy S Lary of
Defense, has formally notified gress
that the Pentagon is invoking
emergency powers under blic
Law 85-804 to pay over half a billio 1-
lars to two Navy contractors. The o
lion worth of shipbuilding claims against
the Navy.
In addition, Mr. Clements says that
about $300 million in claims is about to
be filed by the Electric Boat Division of
General Dynamics. These claims have
not yet been received by the Navy.
THE CLAIMS HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY AUDITED
Part of Mr. Clements' argument in
support of emergency treatment of the
claims, rather than the normal settle-
ment procedures followed by the Navy, is
that the claims represent long-standing
disputes and therefore must be quickly
resolved. The impression has been cre-
ated that the claims are old and that
they have been unresolved for a long
period of time.
The facts are that most of Newport
News' claims were either filed for the
first time or revised this year, and that
the backup documentation for Litton's
claims has still not been submitted to the
Navy.
S 7407
What this means is that the Navy has
still not had a chance to fully audit or
analyze the claims. For the Government
to pay the claims wholly or in part with,-.,
out a full audit and analysis would with,--,-,
like buying a pig in a poke.
Such an action is objectionable as
matter of principle. The taxpayer should
not have to pay for unaudited, unan-
alyzed claims.
Paying these particular claims before
they are fully audited is especially
objectionable.
A MANUFACTURED CRISIS
After reviewing the facts and the se-
quence of events in this matter, I am
forced to conclude that the Pentagon is
conspiring with the shipbuilders to
manufacture a crisis designed to cover
up cost overruns and possible false claims
that could cost the taxpayer hundreds of
millions of dollars.
The facts surrounding the $1.4 billion
in claims filed by Newport News and Lit-
ton against the Navy show that they are
based at least in part on vague estimates. -
phony assertions and inflated figures.
The facts also show that the timing of
many of the claims coincide with pres-
sures applied to get them quickly settled
and that the Pentagon is now trying to
exempt the contractors from audits of
their claims and pay them under a na-
tional emergency law.
CLEMENTS PROPOSAL' IS FOR A BAILOUT
The Pentagon's purpose seems to be to
bail out two defense contractors who
hove incurred huge cost overruns be-
cause of-their own inefficiency and fail-
ures to deliver on time.
I am confident that if the claims wer
thoroughly audited, they would be re~
vealed as largely a mixture of hocum and
hot air.
The squeeze play engineered by Clem-
ents and the shipbuilders has already re-
sulted in recent provisional payments of
nearly $20 million to Litton based on an
incomplete analysis of . partial infor-
mation.
Litton asserts that the Navy agreed in
a March 1976 meeting to pay the com-
pany $50 million in provisional pay-
ments. I ain informed that Navy officials
deny making any such agreements.
Part of Litton's and Newport News'
$894
months aft
pleted, and
in the Navy
March.
dumped most of them
ap last February and
of them had even
February Clements
to resolve the
rt News in 30~
fa.iins had still
days. Some of the largest c
not been filed.
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Crimson, that's newsworthy and it
t be. Women who have a potention
continuing pursuit.
Johnson was honored at a
 S7408
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 18, 1976
INVCLEAR CARRIER CLAIM FILED FEBRUARY 1976
Newport News' largest single claim-
$221 million for the aircraft carriers
its, and Eisenhower-was filed on
bruary 19, 1976, together with 16 thick
flumes of documentation. On February
20, Diesel wrote to the Navy threatening
to stop work on other Navy ships unless
there was progress toward settlement
of its claims.
NUCLEAR SUBMARINE CLAIMS FILED MARCH 1978
Newport News' $92 million claim for
the nuclear submarines SSN 686 and
SSN 687 was not filed until March 1976.
I am informed that Newport News com-
pleted its price estimates for this claim
in May 1975.
Another curious fact about the SSN
687 and SSN 687 claims is that General
Dynamics built four submarines of the
same class, in the same time period, in
accordance with the same designs. Yet
General Dynamics has no significant
claims. against the Navy for its sub-
marines.
NEWPORT NEWS CLAIMS FILLED WITH
DISCLAIMERS
Other disturbing facts about the New-
port News claims are:
First, the statements accompanying
the claims are filled with disclaimers in-
dicating the company would not be able
to prove the Navy owes the amounts
alleged.
Second, with regard to its $160 million
claim on the cruisers CON 38, 39, and 40,
documentation "includes the team's anal-
ysis of contemporary documents and
working files which might be lost when
e project goes tinto final completion
ages." The contractor also admits "some
W rors may have been made" in its esti-
mates, and that the specific impact of
what the Navy is alleged to have done
"is difficult to identify."
Third, Newport News also admits
some errors may have been made" in its
nuclear submarine claim, that its con-
clusions cannot be proven with certainty,
and that it may be evaluated differently
by the Government.
Fourth, Newport News refuses to cer-
tify its claims although 'Navy regulations
require that contractors certify that their
claims are "current, complete and accur-
ate" in a sworn affidavit.
LITTON LHA CLAIM STILL NOT FULLY
DOCUMENTED
Litton's claim on the helicopter carrier
program-LHA-was originally $270 mil-
lion in 1972 and was revised upwards
three times until it reached the total of
$505 million in April 1975.
The Navy rejected Litton's original
claim in 1973 on the grounds that it had
failed to substantiate its allegations with
facts. The Navy did agree to pay Litton
$109.7 million for cancellation costs when
riving in March, enabling the Navy for
the first time to begin analyzing the facts
behind the claim. In the latter part of
March, Secretary Clements pulled the
rug out from beneath the Navy by de-
ciding the Government should provide
financial relief to Newport News and Lit-
ton through its national emergency
powers.
EARLIER LITTON CLAIM UNDER INVESTIGATION BY
JUSTICE DEPT.
Among the disturbing facts about Lit-
ton are the following:
First, an earlier Litton claim on a sub-
marine contract was referred by the Navy
to the Justice Department for investiga-
tion of possible fraud. That investigation
is now taking place.
Second, in 1972 Roy Ash, president of
Litton, urged the Navy to ask Congress
for $1 billion to $2 billion to solve LHA
and other shipbuilding problems. Ash
said he discussed such a program with a
Mr. Conally, who was quoted as saying
that it should be positively presented, "on
a grand scale-make it bigger than the
Congress.,,
Third, only a fraction of the support-
ing data to the LHA claim has been sub-
mitted to the Navy.
Fourth, Litton's shipyard facility has
been proven to be inefficient and poorly
managed by a number of Government'in-
vestigations. This is the same company
that ordered a ship cut in ,half so that
when welded back together Litton could
claim that it had been built according to
modern, modular construction techni-
ques.
THE REAL ISSUE-WHO IS TO BLAME FOR DELAYS
AND COST OVERRUNS?
I believe Secretary Clements is a man
of high integrity and that he is dedi-
cated to the public interest. I also feel
certain that the Navy must share some
of the responsibility for the problems in
the shipbuilding program. The real issue
is, who is to blame for the schedule de-
lays and the cost overruns?
THE CLAIMS MUST BE }LILLY AUDITED AND
ANALYZED
There is no way to decide this issue
until the claims are thoroughly audited
and analyzed.
The contractors should have nothing to
fear from a Navy audit if the claims are
legitimate.
The 'taxpayer should not have to pay
anything for unaudited, unanalyzed and
unsubstantiated claims.
Under the law the Senate and the
House each have 60 days of continuous
session to adopt a resolution disapprov=
ing the Pentagon's proposal. Clearly,
there is no national emergency justify-
ing the wholesale bailout of the ship-
building industry proposed by Mr. Clem-
ents. It is also of interest that the ship-
builders themselves have not asked for
the LHA program was cut back from nine
the kind
ships to five ships. Litton appealed the of relief contemplated by the
decision to the Armed Services Board of law that is being invoked.
Contract Appeals instead of providing The senate should reject the Clements
proposal.
the Navy with supporting facts.
In January 1976, the Navy and Litton
agreed that the contractor would with-
begin documenting the
draw its appeal
,
"Na im, and resume negotiations
er the Navy examined the backup The PRESIDING OFFICER. Morning
PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ate will now resume consideration of the
unfinished business, Senate Resolution
400, which will be stated by title.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
A resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish a
standing Committee of the Senate on In-
telligence Activities, and for other purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
The question is on agreeing to the
amendment of the Senator from Ohio.
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, we have be-
fore its amendment No. 1645 to the sub-
stitute.
An aspect of Senate Resolution 400
that disturbs me greatly is the stipula-
tion that the Select Committee on In-
telligence be, in essence, a "B" committee
with members limited to an 8-year term
of service on the committee.
In fact, as every Senator knows, "B"
committees do not always receive the at-
tention from their members which they
might deserve. This is fully understand-
able in terms of the severe constraint on
time faced by every Member of the Sen-
ate. In recognition of this fact, we usually
designate as a "B" committee those com-
mittees responsible for areas' which,
while vital, are perhaps not as vital as
certain other areas.
Extending this logic, by designating the
select committee as a "B" committee,
we state that its area of concern is not
as vital as a number of other areas, and
that it is recognized that members may
not be able to give its committee business
as much attention as they would like to.
Can we do this in regard to the area of
national intelligence? I strongly suggest
we cannot. It is clear to me that national
intelligence is one of the most critical
areas for which the Congress has some
responsibility.
In fact, is it not contradictory that the
increasing awareness of the importance
of ? the intelligence community has
brought us to consider a bill, which im-
plies strongly, by designating the pro-
posed committee as a "B" committee,
that the subject in question is compara-
tively a less important one? I do not think
this aspect of the proposed legislation can
be considered at all satisfactory or
acceptable.
Mr. President, Members,. particularly
those with the greatest abilities, may
tend to seek to avoid such a committee
assignment because it is an uncompen-
sated add-on to their primary commit-
tee responsibilities. Can we afford to have
this committee regarded by the Mem-
bership as one of the "dogs," so to speak
as far as committee assignments are con-
cerned? Given the tremendously impor-
tant nature of the national intelligence
function, I do not believe we can afford
that.
Merely doing the authorized house-
keeping work annually, in itself, In my
opinion, has to be a very considerable
burden upon all Senators who serve on
the committee, regardless of the con-
tinuing oversight functions which that
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May 18, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE
committee would be called upon to exer-
cise continually. Not at any particular
point in the calendar year, I emphasize
to the Senate, but throughout the entire
year this intelligence committee
Id have a responsibility 'for its over-
t function. The experience we have
.ndar
had would indicate that that oversight
should continue on a very active basis at
all times.
Mr. President, what about those dili-
gent Senators who really become in-
volved with the work of the select com-
mittee, as we would hope and expect. Will
we not have a situation where other sen-
atorial committee assignments and other
necessary work will suffer because of the
time and effort devoted to the select com=mittee by such Senators?
Mr. President, this situation is unfair
to Senators who rightfully assume re-
sponsibilities for work on the select com-
mittee as well as to those Senators who
must, by virtue of time limitations, pick
up the slack created on regular commit-
tee assignments.
We want our very best people to serve
on this committee, if such a committee is
established; and we want them to be
motivated to devote their full attention
to it. We must provide for an accommo-
dation between the current requirements
imposed by section 6(a) of rule XXV, and
the realities of our demanding work in
the Senate in all areas. My amendment,
No. 1645, would integrate the select com-
mittee into the normal functional work
structure of the Senate and thereby, rec-
ognize the realities of providing for a
realistic opportunity to do our very best
in this most critical area. _
shall mention one other danger I see
lved here. I see it involved in any
but I think it is multiplied by the
approach we are taking with respect to
permitting this committee to be an
add-on, select, or "B" committee, what-
ever one wishes to call it. That is the
propensity that already exists in. many
of these areas of Senators to rely on their
committee staffs very heavily. That is mittee for more than 8 years. At the
likely to be magnified in this particular end of this period, he will have to start
area. What we have here, very possibly, all over again on another "B" committee.
Is the building up of a staff of so-called The. proposed amendment will affect
intelligence experts in this area who, especially hard those Senators initially
unless the Senators have the time, in appointed to the committee who must
view of their other committee assign- get' off the committee after only 4 years,
ments, to devote a great deal of attention in order to start the rotation process
.
,
ecomes
to the work of the committee, are going These Senators may have to give up all indifferent to the problems and an apolo-
to become the actual, functional working -their seniority on another committee to gist for the intelligence communit
Th
t
y.
a
committee. Instead of having one or more serve just 4 years on the new committee. was the rationale behind limiting the
agencies in the executive branch with the It could very well be hard to find a Sen- term.
final word in the intelligence field, I .ator willing to do that. I say respectfully to the Senator from
think we are very likely to see it cen- The members of the present Select Ohio that I have a degree of sympathy
tralized, as we have it in this committee, Committee on Intelligence were able to for his point of view. It is my feeling that'
in .the staff of this committee-a power conduct their work on this committee this committee is going to, have a lot
in itself within the Senate but not sub- as an add-on committee on top of all of hard work to do. It is my feeling that
ject to as much oversight or control as other committee assignments. Members this committee is going to take a con-
there should be and really becoming the of the new permanent committee could siderable amount of a member's time.
dominant force in the intelligence activi- , do so also. We have before us a Senate resolution
ties of the United States. It would seem to me that even without setting up a group of Senators to look
For all these reasons, my feeling is that the proposed wording, the leadership over the entire committee structure. I
It would be far wiser if we, at the very could certainly take into account the believe they have to report back in the
outset, began by regarding this as a "B" overall problems of a Senator's other next session of Congress. At that time,
committee or a select committee that obligations in trying to find Senators the whole alinement of "A" and "B"
under rule XXV would have the same re- to serve on the new select committee. committee will be gone into. At such
.quirements as to a limitation on mem- Consequently, and for these reasons, time, the select committee will be in
bership as the other "B" and select and Mr. President, I oppose the amendment place.
Jqj" committees of the Senate have offered by the distinguished Senator I say frankly, I do not seek a place on
UNP the second sentence of rule XXV. from Ohio. this committee. If I were a member of
S 7409
For that reason, I recommend the Mr. TAFT. I wonder if the distin-
adoption of this amendment. guished Senator_ would yield for a
I reserve the remainder of my time. moment for a question?
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, the Mr. RIBICOFF. I am pleased to yield.
compromise substitute as presently writ- Mr. TAFT. I should like to know the
ten allows a Senator to serve on the new rationale by which the committee ar-
intelligence committee in addition to any rived at the decision or the framework
other committee on which he already for the compromise which subsequently
serves. arrived at the decision to have an 8-year
The amendment offered by Senator limitation on the term. I have not offered
TAFT would change this. It would bar a an amendment to strike that, but it does-
member of the select committee from also seem to me it raises exactly the same
serving on any other "B" committee. point. The Senator, indeed, has made
Paragraph 6(a) of rule 25 places in the the same point himself. That is that
category of "B" committees the following having a committee of this limited length
committees: seems to me to militate against mem-
District of Columbia, Post Office and bers choosing it as a committee on which
Civil Service, Rules and Administration,
Veterans' Affairs, any permanent select
or special committee, any joint commit-
tee of the Congress except the Joint Com-
mittees on the Library and Printing.
If the amendment offered by Senator
TAFTwas adopted, any Member going on
the new intelligence committee would
have to give up his present membership
on any of these "B" committees.
The problem with the amendment of-
fered by Senator TAFT is that it will make
it more difficult to find a suitable cross-
section of the Senate to serve on the
committee.
Only 23 Members of the Senate are not
now members of a B committee. Of the
40 Senators from whom the 7 at-large
Members must be drawn, only 7 are not
already on a "B" committee. Thus, it is
clear that to get a true cross-section of
the Senate, and meet the other member-
ship requirements of the resolution, the
leadership will have to find Senators now
on other "B" committees willing to give
up their present committee assignments. -
This may be difficult if the proposed
wording were approved in light of the
provision in the resolution for rotating
membership.
It will be difficult to get a Senator to
"B" committee to go on the new com- When we started to think about the
they want to serve and, thereby, down-
grading the committee. If you know
you are only going to be on it for 8 years,
you cannot build up seniority on it as
you might on another committee, and
it seems to me you would think a long
time before you would agree to go on
this committee.
Is the Senator firm and are the com-
promisers firm in feeling that they want
to keep the 8-year limitation of member-
ship?
Mr. RIBICOFF. The Committee on
Government Operations at first sug-
gested only a 6-year term. It was our
feeling that we wanted to make sure
that the Senators on this committee
would not get a vested interest in the
intelligence community and find them-,
selves apologists for the intelligence
apparatus instead of:doing their over-
sight job. When we sat in Senator
MANSFIELD'S office to try to work out a
compromise between the ,proposals of
the Committee on Rules and the Com-
mittee on Government Operations, the
point was raised by Senator CANNON that
he felt that it should 'be a longer term
of years in order to give the members
of this committee the necessary special
knowledge and insights. Consequently, it
9-year term, it became obvious that cer-
tain members would have to get off in
the middle of a term, and, consequently,
an amendment was offered on the floor
changing it to 8 years. I think there is
a basic wisdom in making sure that no
member stays on this committee too long,
and- thereby loses his interest
b
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 18, 1976
this committee, I would give up a "B" mittee ample time and attention. If he to me this might be a fair way, a work-
committee on which I serve, because I finds that a Member wants to get on this manlike way, to go about resolving this
uestion
ned with
b
d
d i
.
q
ur
s so over
e
do not think I could really give the committee an
necessary time to the new committee other committee assignments that he Mr. RIBICOFF. Again, this will be a
.~ _
the atten- permanent rotating rnmmittee
and t
... t h i
0tt
t
,
s com
ee
e
k
ao ++c c++~==
~~---
will taKe a naru loo
mittee structure at the beginning of the Senator MANSFIELD could very well talk years resolves the basic difficulty of ap-
next Congress, it was felt that, because to such a Member of the Senate and find plying your proposal to a committee with
of all these reasons, at this time, we out if he would be willing to give it up. rotating membership.
should not insist that any member serv- But I do not want to tie the hands of As I indicated, this provision was
ing on the select committee would have either Senator MANSFIELD or Senator worked out in close cooperation between
to give up another committee assign- SCOTT in the makeup of this 15-member the Rules Committee and the Govern-
ment. committee. If it is going to work, it is . men Operations Committee..At this time
and I do not feel I could depart in this in-
t
f th
'
up
e se
s going to work because o
Mr. TAFT. I appreciate the Senator
comments, particularly with regard to the makeup of this first 15-man com- stance and change the basic compromise
the ongoing review of the entire com= mittee. I should like to give the majority that was worked out between the Com-
mittee structure in the Senate. I am and minority leaders the freedom to mittee on Rules and the Committee on
extremely hopeful that something affir- make that choice without writing in re- Government Operations.
mative will come out of that at the next strictions in this resolution. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the
session. The experience of the House Mr. TAFT. I am not sure that the Sen- Senator yield?
today; unfortunately, does not seem to ator understands my suggestion, because Mr. RIBICOFF. Yes,
be too sanguine a one as to what is likely I do not think it relates to writing in re- Mr. PERCY. I think what the Senator
to come out of it. I still feel that we strictions. I have no restrictions. I think from Ohio is attempting to accomplish is
badly do need such a study and we badly the makeup of the committee at present comparable to the original thoughts that
need some realinem t of legislative is probably as good as we can get, al- the Senator from Illinois had. I felt there
responsibilities within 'The various legis- though I think, frankly, it ought only to should be some sacrifice.
lative committees. That is one reason why come from the four committees involved As I interpret this'amendment, it would
I, frankly, have trouble with the sub- and not be a legislative committee. But require a Member to decide between all
stitute at this point. I thought that the in view of the direction that.the substi- of the select committees that he has-
resolution of the matter, in view of that tute has already gone, I concur rather these permanent assignments they have
pending study that the Committee on strongly with the drafters of the substi- on those committees-and he would have
Rules came out with in setting up an tute to the effect that the selecion ought to give up those permanent assignments,
oversight committee at this point, really to be made by the majority and minority all of them, for a temporary assignment
deferring any question of transferring leaders, I think that is a move in the on this-committee.
basic authority for legislative purposes right direction and one that I would not Taking into account the very difficult
to such a committee until we got the re- want to upset if this legislation is going compromise position that we finally re-
port of that study of committee juris- to become law. - solved and worked out, where every single
ther was that we say Member receded in that compromise
ti
on ra
diction overall, was a sound approach to My sugges
the problem. . that, for the purposes of the second sen- group on some points, I finally receded on
le V-V V this point. I think the Senator from JjLi-
_ _
-%
f
what
ru
o
of
t
not be
lli
e
gence -_
haps some kind of resolution of the may,- Committee on in
However, 'I do commend the Senator
ter might not be arrived at better by at taken into account until a date occurring from Ohio for grappling with a problem
least putting a 2-year limitation or a during the first session of the 96th Con-
next-session limitation, a 21/2-year lim- gress, upon which the appointment of that we wrestled with ourselves in com-
itation, upon the ability of anyone to the majority and minority members of mittee and in the conferences that we
serve on the Select Committee on Intelli- the standing committee of the Senate had. It is not an open-and-shut case
gence and not count it, under rule XXV, would be initially completed. - either way.
as a select committee or a "B" commit- In other words, you would have a delay What I am impressed with is that the
tee. until after the next Cdngress before the floor manager of the bill is attempting to
I have given some thought to that limitation upon holding membership on provide as much leeway as possible, to
consideration and perhaps should want this committee would be included under have as many Senators from whom we
to consider modifying the amendment in the rules as they currently stand, and can draw as possible, and then leave it to
that direction if the committee were dis- that is a consideration I would await, and their conscience and their own judgment
posed to think along those lines. Is there I think it is particularly appropriate in as to whether they can handle the load.
any feeling of the committee on that? view of one of the matters the Senator I am sure the leadership will impose
Has that been discussed? has already mentioned, which is the fact the requirement that once this respon-
Mr. RIBICOFF. I do not think that that we have an ongoing study of the sibility is accepted.that it be accepted as
at this time, as manager of the resolu- lineup of our committee structure. a major responsibility.
tion, that I could accept that modifica- But, it seems to me, if you do not do The old saying is that if you want a
tion. that, in a way you sort of make a prom- job done, give it to a. busy man. Now, that
I think it is important to have the ise which later I feel we are going to be would only be altered by saying to give it
majority and minority leader, if the Sen- called upon to "grandfather" in of keep- to a busy person. We know the capacity
ate agrees to Senate Resolution 400, set tag people on this committee for the full of some people to handle a tremendous
up this committee as soon as possible. I 9-year period even though it is an add- workload, and certainly I think everyone
have the utmost confidence in Senators on committee, and even though they may in the Senate will be impressed by the
MANSFIELD and Scorr, to structure this already be on their full quota of com- fact that this is a heavy load. Members
committee in a way that takes into ac- mittees insofar as paragraph 6 of rule. of the Select Intelligence Committee, the
count the composition of the Senate and XXV is concerned. Church committee, recognized the
the question of seniority, and makes sure So my proposal really was to put this amount that it took out of their lives and
that this committee represents a cross limitation on so that anybody who goes , the time and the effort that they put in,
section of the thinking of the U.S. Sen- on this committee knows that at the end and we have that as a guideline to go by.
ate. I should like to give Senator MANS- 'of the 95th Congress he is going to have But I still would come down on the side
FIELD and Senator SCOTT a free hand. to make a choice. of giving the leadership the maximum
I cannot talk for Senator MANSFIELD, We have done this once before. There leeway, and standing by the compromise.
but I have heard his testimony that he is an obvious precedent for it insofar as So I would regretfully oppose the amend-
meet
erned
.
.
is going to make sure -that whoever he the Budget Committee was conc
appoints will be able to give this com- We have -tried that before. It would seem Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I
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May 18, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
modify the amendment, and I send the
modification to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
modification will be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
f h ows:
e Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) modi-
is amendment to read as follows:
On page 4, line 18, strike lines 18-21 and
substitute in lieu thereof:
"(d) Paragraph 6 of rule XXV of the
Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by
adding at the end thereof the following new
subparagraph:
(i) For purposes of the second sentence of
subparagraph,(a) membership on the Select
Committee on Intelligence shall not be taken
into account until that date occurring dur-
ing the first session of the Ninety-Sixth
Congress, upon which the appointment of
the majority and minority party members of
the standing Committee of the Senate Is
initially completed."
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment is so modified.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I will
have to oppose the modified amendment
for the same reasons previously stated.
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, it is my in-
tention to call for the yeas and nays on
the amendment, as modified, and I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I ask for the
yeas and nays on the amendment.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I yield back
the remainder of my-time.
Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield back the re-
mainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time
has been yielded back. The question is
on agreeing to the amendment of the
Senator from Ohio, as modified. The yeas
and nays have been ordered and the
clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr President on
this vote 1: have a pair with the distin-
guished Senator from Iowa (Mr CUL-
vER). If he were present and voting, he
would vote "nay." If I were permitted
to vote, I would vote "aye." Therefore, I
withhold my vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will suspend. Let us have order In the
Chamber; Will Senators please clear the
well? Senators will please take their
seats or return to the cloakroom.
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, there Is
still not order in the Chamber. '
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
point of the Senator from Wisconsin is
well made. The well is not clear. Will
Senators please take their seats? Let us
have order in the Chamber. The clerk
will suspend until we have order.
The assistant legislative' clerk resumed
that the Senator from Virginia (Mr.
HARRY F. BYRD, JR.), the Senator from
Iowa (Mr. CULVER), the Senator from
Michigan (Mr. HART), the Senator from
Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE), the Senator from
Wyoming (Mr. McGEE), and the Senator
from California (Mr. TUNNEY) are nec-
essarily absent.
I also announce that the Senator from
Indiana (Mr. BAYH) is absent because
of illness.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the
Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER),
the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr.
BROOKE), the Senator from Arizona (Mr.
GOLDWATER), and the Senator from
North Carolina. (Mr. HELMS) are neces-
sarily absent.
I further announce that, if present and
voting, the Senator from North Caro-
lina (Mr. HELMS) would vote "yea."
The result was announced-yeas 38,
nays 50, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 178 Leg.]
YEAS-38
Allen
Haskell
Randolph
Bartlett
Hruska
Roth
Beilmon
Kennedy
Schweiker
Bentsen
Laxalt
Scott, Hugh
Biden
Leahy
Scott,
Brock
McClure
William L.
Curtis
Metcalf
Stafford
Dole
Moss
Stevens
Eastland
Nelson
Stone
Fannin
Packwood
Taft
Garn
Pastore
Thurmond
Griffin
Pell
Tower
Hansen
Proxmire
Young
NAYS-SO
Abourezk
Glenn
McIntyre
Beall
Gravel
Mondale
Buckley
Hart, Gary
Montoya
Bumpers
Hartke
Morgan
Burdick
Hatfield
Muskie
Byrd, Robert C. Hathaway
Nunn
Cannon
Hollings
Pearson
Case
Huddleston
Percy
Chiles
Humphrey
Ribicoff
Church
Jackson
Sparkman
Clark
Javits
Stennis
Cranston
Johnston
Stevenson
Domenici
Long
Symington
Durkin
Magnuson
Talmadge
Eagleton
Mathias
Weicker
Fong
McClellan
Williams
Ford
McGovern
PRESENT AND GIVING A LIVE PAIR, AS
PREVIOUSLY RECORDED-1
Mansfield, for
NOT VOTING-11
Baker Culver McGee
Bayh Goldwater Tunney
Brooke Hart, Philip A.
Byrd. Helms
Harry F., Jr. Inouye
So Mr. TAFT'S amendment, as modified,
was rejected.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was rejected.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
LEAHY). The question is on agreeing to
the motion of the Senator from Montana.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. May we
have order in the Chamber so the Sen-
ator from West Virginia may be heard?
ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT TO 10
A.M. TOMORROW
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that when the
Senate completes its business today it
S 7411
stand in adjournment, until the hour of
10 a.m. tomorrow.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER FOR RESUMPTION OF CON-
SIDERATION OF SENATE RESOLU-
TION 400
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that at the
hour of 11 a.m. tomorrow the Senate re-
sume consideration of the unfinished
business, Senate Resolution 400.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
TIME LIMITATION AGREEMENT ON
AMENDMENTS TO AND VOTE ON
SENATE RESOLUTION 400
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that at 11 a.m.
tomorrow morning there be a time limit
for debate on the amendment by Mr.
STENNIS and Mr. TOWER, the time to be
limited to 3 hours to be equally divided
between Mr. RIEICOFF and Mr. STENNis,
that a vote occur on the amendment by
Mr. STENNIS and Mr. TOWER at the hour
of 2 p.m. tomorrow afternoon, that im-
mediately upon the disposition of that
Vote the Senate proceed to vote on the
Cannon substitute, as amended, if
amended, and that upon the disposition
of that vote the Senate proceed imme-
diately to the vote on Senate Resolution
400, as amended if amended.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The text of the unanimous-consent
agreement is as follows:
Ordered, That on Wednesday, May 19, 1976,
at the hour of 11:00 a.m., the Senate proceed
to consider. the amendment offered by the
Senator from Texas (Mr: TowER) and the
Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), with
a time limitation thereon of 3 hours, to be
equally divided and controlled by the pro-
ponents of the amendment and the manager
of the resolution.
Ordered further, That at the hour of 2:00
p.m., the Senate proceed to vote on the
Tower-Stennis amendment, and that imme-
diately following that vote, there occur a vote
on the substitute amendment of the Senator
from Nevada (Mr. CANNON). and that if
adopted, the committee substitute amend-
ment, as amended, be considered as having
been adopted, and that in any case, the
Senate immediately proceed to vote on S. Res.
400 as amended, if amended.
ECIITIVE SESSION
Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate go
into executive session to consider nom-
inations.
There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to the consideration of execu-
tive business.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, on May
4, 1976, the Senate passed by a vote of
62 to 29 the Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1976 (S. 3065) pro-
viding for the administration of the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act of 1971, as
amended, by a Federal Election Com-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 18, 1976
mission to be appointed by the Presi-
dent, by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate. S. 3065 had passed
the House on May 3, 1976, by a vote of
291 to 81. On May 11, 1976, the President
signed S. 3065 into law.
Yesterday, May 17, the President sub-
mitted to the Senate the nomination of
six individuals as members of the Fed-
eral Election Commission, five of whom
were previously confirmed by the Sen-
ate as members of the Commission prior
to the Supreme Court's decision in Buck-
ley against Valeo. The nominations have
been made pursuant to section 101 of
the Federal Election Campaign , Act
Amendments of 1976.
On March 14, 1975, the Subcommittee
on Privileges and Elections of the Com-
mittee on Rules and Administration held
hearings on the nominations of Thomas
A. Harris of Arkansas, Joan D. Aikens of
Pennsylvania, Robert O. Tiernan of
Rhode Island, Vernon W. Thomson of
Wisconsin, and Neil Staebler of Michi-
gan, to be Commissioners of the Federal
Election Commission. These nomination
were reported favorably by the Com-
mittee on Rules and Administration on
March 24, 1975, 'and approved by the
Senate on April 10, 1975.
The pending nominations of these five
Individuals have been cleared by the
members of the Committee on Rules and
Administration for approval by the Sen-
ate. In view of the Senate's recent ap-
proval, after full hearings, of these five
individuals, I ask unanimous consent
that the Senate consider their nomina-
tions as in executive session at this time
without referral to that committee.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
Mr. HATFIELD was recognized.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, re-
serving the right to object, I wonder if
the Senator will yield for a question or
two.
Mr. CANNON. I yield.
Mr. HATFIELD. I ask the chairman
of the committee what his time schedule
is on the sixth member who has been
nominated by the President and whose
name has been sent to the Senate along
with the five names that are now before
us at this time? I refer to former Con-
gressman, Mr. Springer, who is also a
former member of the ? Federal Power
Commission.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, the Com-
mittee on Commerce of which I am a
member held hearings on the nomination
of William L. Springer, a former Con-
gressman from the State of Illinois and
the sixth nominee to the Federal Elec-
tion Commission on March 19 and 20,
1973, when he was nominated to the
Federal Power Commission. His nomina-
tion to the Federal Power Commission
was approved by the Senate on May.21,
1973, by a rollcall vote of 65 to 12.
Since Mr. Springer's present nomina-
tion is to the Federal Election Commis-
sion, it is necessary, however, to have the
matter referred to the Committee on
Rules and Administration, and I intend
to call for a hearing on this nomination
on Thursday or Friday of this week.
Should the Senate confirm five of the
pending Presidential appointments,
being more than a majority of the mem-
hers, it is hoped that the Federal Elec-
tion Commission will then be able to
perform its duties and carry out all of
the vital functions delegated to it under
the law, as recently amended by this
Congress, pending Committee hearings
and subsequent consideration by the
Senate of the President's sixth appoint-
ment to the Commission.
I say, in further response to our col-
league, that I said on Thursday or Fri-
day for the reason that we have been
holding hearings for a number of days. in
the joint conference committee on the
airport-airways bill. We did not conclude
this morning and went. over until tomor-
row morning. I am hopeful we will con-
clude tomorrow. If we do, I will set the
hearing on the Springer nomination.for
Thursday. If we do not conclude tomor-
row morning with the airport-airways
bill, then I will set the hearings for Fri-
day morning on Mr. Springer.
Mr. HATFIELD. I thank the Senator,
and I am glad the Senator brought out
the point that he, as the chairman of
the Committee on Rules and Administra-
tion and also as a member of the Com-
mittee on Commerce, has already sat in
a hearing on Congressman Springer,
which I am sure was a very intensive,
compresensive, and complete hearing.
Will the Senator not agree that in all
likelihood this would be a relatively brief
hearing in the Committee on Rules and
Administration and then we could ex-
pect the .nominee's name reported out,
barring unforeseen circumstances, by
Monday, at least to the Chamber?
Mr. CANNON. I could not make a
commitment as far as Monday is con-
cerned, but based on my past knowledge
of having heard this witness, the nomi-
nee, before, I myself would be willing to
report his nomination immediately at
the conclusion of the hearings, assuming
that nothing else comes up that was not
brought out in our hearings before in the
Committee on Commerce.
So if the committee agrees with me on
that and we do not receive any adverse
comments on the nominee, I would hope
that we could report him out forthwith.
Mr. HATFIELD. That is precisely the
point I wished to ask the senator. The
Senator has agreed to a hearing on
Thursday and Friday. But I was wonder-
ing what the Senator felt about report-
ing the nomination after the hearing, if
there would be any delay that he could
foresee at this time, not precluding, of
course, any possible question raised in
the hearing.
Mr. CANNON. I do not see any need
for delay or any reason for delay. So. far
I have not had any requests from anyone
to appear and testify in opposition to the
nominee. ~
Mr. HATFIELD. I have one last ques-
tion, if the Senator will yield further.
Regardless of the time schedule we may
have on Mr. Springer, is it not true that
until the nominees are formally sworn
in by the President none of the members
whom we confirm can function as a com-
mission?
Mr. CANNON. The Senator is correct.
After the notice of confirmation, it is my
understanding that they-would have to
be sworn In by the President,
Mr. HATFIELD. If the White House
decided they wanted to wait until all six
were confirmed before swearing any of
them in that would mean, then again,
that the function of this Commission
would still be nonexistent.
Mr. CANNON. The Senator is corb
as I understand the law.
Mr. HATFIELD. I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, reserving
the right to object, and I shall not ob-
ject, I welcome the assurances that the
chairman of the Committee on Rules and
Administration has provided to the Sen-
ate. I shall not object because I think it
is important that the campaign funds
which have been held up be released and
made available as early as possible.
It also is important that the Senate
move to confirm the nomination of the
sixth FEC Commissioner as quickly as
possible. A new chairman of the Com-
mission must be selected, and it will be
difficult, . if not lawfully impossible, to
choose a new chairman without all the
members being on board.
There also are legal questions that
could arise about the powers of the Com-
mission. I will not go through them at
the present time. It may be that they are
legal questions without substance. Yet
questions could arise, it seems to me, if
certain actions were attempted by the
Commission without its full membership
because the FEC is contemplated as a
bipartisan Commission.
I do welcome the assurances of the
chairman. I hope that we will be able,
by the early part of next week at the
latest, to have the nomination ofw
sixth member confirmed.
Mr. CANNON. I thank the Senato .
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there
is no objection, the nominations will be
stated. The legislative clerk read the
nomination of Neil Staebler, of Michi-
gan; Veronon W. Thomson, of Wiscon-
sin; Thomas E. Harris, of Virginia; Joan
D. Aikens, of Pennsylvania; and Robert
0. Tiernan, of Rhode Island to be mem-
bers of the Federal Election Commission.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the nominations are confirmed.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the President
be notified of the confirmation of the
nominations.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
LEGISLATIVE SESSION
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I move
that the Senate resume the considera-
tion of legislative business.
The motion was agreed to, and the
Senate resumed the consideration of
legislative business.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, on
April 5 the Senate defeated a motion to
table a motion to reconsider the vote- by
which the amendment of the Senator
from Oklahoma (Mr. BARTLETT) to -
ate Concurrent Resolution 98, the a
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May 18, 1976
CONGRESSIONAL
Carta resolution, was agreed to. The roll-
call, No. 118 legislative, appears at page
S4957 of the RECORD for that day, and
reflects that I voted "nay." The vote is
rded'as 30 yeas, 43 nays, and.27 not
r. President, I voted "yea" on this
rollcall. I supported the Bartlett amend-
ment when it was originally agreed to by
the Senate, and I voted against the mo-
tion to reconsider, believing that for rea-
sons of economy it would be better to
send nine members of Congress to Bri-
tain to pick up the Magna Carta rather
than 25.
Mr. President, I ask.unanimous con-
sent that when the permanent RECORD
is printed I be shown as voting "yea"
on rollcall vote No. 118 legislative. This
change would not-alter the result of that
vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR-
SENATE RESOLUTION 400
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
on behalf of Mr. Leahy, I ask unanimous
consent that Doug Racine and Herbert
Jolovitz be permitted the privilege of the
floor during the further consideration of
Senate Resolution 400 and during all
rollcall votes in relation thereto.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that a member of
my staff, Mr. Walker Nolan, be per-
mitted the privilege of. the floor during
the consideration of and voting on Sen-
esolution 400.
e PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
o tion, it is so ordered.
JOINT MEETING OF THE HOUSES-
ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT OF
FRANCE
that at that time the- Senate stand in
recess, pending the conclusion of the
address to be delivered by the President
mous consent that the Senate resume
consideration of its business not later
of the Senate, Francis R. Valeo; the Ser-
geant at Arms,. F. Nordy Hoffman; the
Vice President of the United States; and
the President pro tempore (JAMES O.
EA' LAND), proceeded to the hall of the
RECORD - SENATE S 7413
(The address delivered by the Presi-
dent of France to the joint meeting of
the two Houses of Congress is printed
in the proceedings of the House, of Rep-
resentatives in today's-RECORD.)
At 1:21 p.m., the Senate having re-
turned to its Chamber, reassembled, and
was called to order by the Presiding Of-
ficer (Mr. HATHAWAY).
ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SEN-
ATOR GOLDWATER TOMORROW
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that on to-
morrow, after Mr. PROXMIRE is recognized
under the order previously entered, Mr.
GOLDWATER be recognized for not to ex-
ceed 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400)
to establish a standing committee of the
Senate on intelligence activities, and for
other purposes.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that after the
Senate votes tomorrow on the Cannon
substitute for the committee substitute,
if the amendment is agreed to, the com-
mittee amendment as amended be con-
sidered as adopted, since, in effect, the
Senate would be voting on the same ques-
tion again.
The. PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the order
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
TINE MORNING BUSINESS TO-
PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400)
to establish a Standing Committee of
the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and
for other purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
pending business is the amendment in
the nature of a substitute by the Senator
from Nevada (Mr. CANNON).
Who yields time?
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered. .
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I have
a matter that I have discussed with the
Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIDI=
coFF) and the Senator from Illinois (Mr.
PERCY), the ranking Republican mem-
ber handling this bill, and now with
Senator WEICR:ER.
On page 12, in line 7, I suggest that
where we are discussing information
being made public-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the
Senator from California discussing, a
possible amendment to the amendment
in the nature of a substitute of. the Sen-
ator from Nevada?
Mr. CRANSTON. Beg pardon?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the
amendment to the amendment offered as
a substitute by the Senator from Ne-
vada? Is the Chair correct in that as-
sumption?
Mr. CRANSTON. No; I am just going
to discuss with the floor manager adding
three words, which could be done by
their accepting those words, I believe,
at this point.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Chair wishes to know whether or not it
is to the amendment in the nature of
a substitute.
Mr. CRANSTON. Yes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Or to the
original resolution.
Mr. CRANSTON. It is to the amend-
ment in the nature of a substitute.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The one
offered by the Senator from Nevada?
Mr. CRANSTON. Right.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator may proceed.
Mr. CRANSTON. On line 7, where we
are discussing information and the re-
lease of that information, the present
language is that the President-
Certifies that the threat to the national in-
terest of the United States posed by such dis-
closure is vital and outweighs any public in-
terest in the disclosure. -
I suggest that the word "security" be
inserted after the word "national" and
before the word "interest" In line 7, just
to stress that national security is in-
volved. I understand that language is ac-
ceptable to the Senators from Connect-
RECESS UNTIL 2 P.M.
Mt. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE May 18, 1976
guage is satisfactory to the manager of
the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment of
the Senator from California.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On whose
time?
Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I yield
time for.the quorum call.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
EXECUTIVE SESSION
Mr. HUGH SCOTT: Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the Senate
go into executive session to consider a
nomination reported earlier today.
There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to the consideration of execu-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The nom-
ination will be stated.
THE JUDICIARY
The second assistant legislative clerk
read the nomination of Maurice B. Co-
hill, Jr., of Pennsylvania, to be U.S. dis-
trict judge for the western district of
Pennsylvania.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the nomination is considered
and confirmed.
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the Presi-
dent be notified of the confirmation of
the nomination.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
LEGISLATIVE SESSION
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the Senate
return to the consideration of legislative
business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered..
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for-
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400)
to establish a standing committee of the
Senate on intelligence activities, and for
other purposes.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I turn
to another suggestion. On the same page
of the Cannon substitute, line 5 on page
12 and line 10 on page 12, I suggest that
after the word "President" the word
"personally" be inserted in both places.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair
informs the Senator that there is a pend-
ing amendment earlier offered by the
Senator from California which has not
been acted upon.
Mr. CRANSTON. I did not actually
offer that as an amendment, so I am not
discussing that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the
Senator move to modify his amendment?
Mr. CRANSTON. I move to modify
that amendment to suggest that the
word "personally" be inserted therein.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair
suggests to the Senator that he withdraw
his earlier amendment.
Mr. CRANSTON. I withdraw my earlier
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment is withdrawn.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. CRANSTON. I yield.
OR15ER AUTHORIZING THE COM-
MITTEE ON COMMERCE TO MEET
THIS AFTERNOON
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Cgnnmittee
on Commerce be allowed to" meet this
afternoon while the Senate is in session.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400)
to establish a standing committee of the
Senate on intelligence activities. and for
other purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Chair asks the Senator from California
if he will repeat his current amendment.
Mr. CRANSTON. Yes.
This amendment has been discussed
with the leadership on both sides of the
aisle just now. The proposal is this: on
line 5, after the word "President" the
word "personally" be inserted, and on
line 10, after the word "President" the
word "personally" be inserted
The purpose of the amendment Is to
insure that this will in all cases be a
Presidential notification and not done
through delegation to some other official
without the Presigient's knowledge of the
request.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a question?
Mr. CRANSTON. I yield.
Mr. TOWER. It is my understanding
that the Senator's intent here is simply
to insure that this is a _ personal com-
munication from the President, that it
does not require that he appear person-
ally.
Mr. CRANSTON. Absolutely.
Mr. TOWER. And that the notifica-
tion come over his signature.
Mr. CRANSTON. That is correct.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, reserving
the right to object, looking at the lan-
guage on line 10. although the legislative
history which has just been made would
help, it seems to me that if we are going
to insert the word "personally," we ought
to add the words "in writing."
Mr. CRANSTON. That is fine.
Mr. GRIFFIN. "Notifies the 8
committee in writing of his objec
Mr. CRANSTON. I so move to mo y
the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment is so modified.
The Chair inquires: Is the modifica-
tion to occur in both places?
Mr. CRANSTON. Yes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is in
both places.
Is time yielded back?
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I
yield back any remaining time on the
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time
is yielded back.
The question is on agreeing, to the
amendment, as modified, of the Senator
from California.
The amendment as modified was
agreed to.
Mr. CRANSTON. I thank all Senators
involved.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I call to
the attention of the managers of the
bill line 8 on page 12, specifically the
words "is vital."
The President here is required to cer-
tify "that the threat to the national in-
terest of the United States posed by such
disclosure is vital and Outweighs any public interest in the disclosure."
? I frankly wonder about the use of the
word "vital." It does not have a very
precise meaning in this context, as far
as I am concerned.
We have just discussed and r d
the insertion of the word "see#'
recognizing that there might be eco-
nomic or diplomatic information, not
national security in character, which
nevertheless should not be disclosed. By
the same token it seems to me that there
might be information, not perhaps
"vital" to the survival of the Nation,
which also should not be disclosed. Per-
haps we should try to determine what
the word "vital" means in this context
since we are setting up a standard with
this language.
I would like to read the definition of
the word "vital" from Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary:
Akin to life, existing as a manifestation of
life, concerned with or necessary to the
maintenance of life, fundamentally con-
cerned with or affecting life, tending to re-
new or refresh the living, destructive to life.
My question is: Is that what we really
mean? Are we goilig to limit it to that
kind of a situation, where the life of the
Nation has to be involved?
So what I am suggesting is that we
strike the words "is vital" In line 8. .
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I shall
respond to the distinguished minority
whip.
This language comes from the original
Church committee bill. I wonder whether
the Senator from Michigan. will be sat-
isfied with these words: "is of such grav-
ity that it outweighs any public est
in disclosure."
Mr. GRIFFIN. I think that is LL ch
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May .18, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
better. In other words, it is a very serious
matter. I think that is what we are
really talking about.
Mr. RIBICOFF. That is acceptable to
if it is satisfactory to the Senator
Michigan.
r. GRIFFIN. It would be. I think that
is a very good suggestion.
Mr. RIBICOFF. My suggestion is this:
On line 8, strike out the words "vital
and" and insert in lieu thereof the words
"of such gravity that it outweighs any
public interest in disclosure".
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the
Senator suggesting that in the form of
a modification of the amendment?
Mr. RIBICOFF. I think it should be
done by the Senator, and I accept it.'
Mr. GRIFFIN. I propose the modifica-
tion.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Michigan so modifies the
amendment.
Mr. GRIFFIN. On page 12, line. 8,
strike the words "vital and" and insert,
as has been suggested, the words "of
such gravity that it".
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is all
time yielded back?
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I
should like the distinguished Senator
from Nevada to have an opportunity to
look at the wording.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the
Senator from Michigan or the Senator
from Connecticut suggest the absence of
a quorum?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum, with
the time to be charged against both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
ii&aall the roll.
second assistant legislative clerk
p eeded to call the roll.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered,
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I yield
back the remainder of my time.
Yr. GRIFFIN. I yield back the re-
mainder of my time. -
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the amend-
ment of the Senator from Michigan, as
modified.
The amendment, as modified, was
agreed to.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, do we-
know precisely how many amendments
remain on Senate Resolution 400?
Mr. -MANSFIELD. Yes. So far as we
know, one.
Mr. CANNON. That is the Tower-
Stennis amendment?
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is right. They
have indicated that their time could be
better spent tomorrow, rather than this
afternoon.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, if the.
Senator will yield, I believe that Senator
NUNN would like an opportunity to en-
gage in a colloquy with the distinguished
Senator from Nevada and me. I have in-
formed Senator NtNN that I am willing,
and I am sure the Senator from Nevada
will be willing to do so, at his conven-
iel
Mr. CANNON. Certainly.
Mr. RIBICOFF. I imagine that we will
use my time, not Senator STENNIS' time,
to oblige the Senator from Georgia.
Mr. STENNIS. We will still have an
hour and a half?
Mr. RIBICOFF. I will take it out of my
time, not out of the time of the Senator
from Mississippi.
Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, throughout
the 1970's we have been shocked by one
revelation after another regarding im-
proper activities of intelligence agencies.
The piecemeal disclosure of abuses, led
us to establish a Select Committee on In-
telligence to give us a full and complete
picture of problems within the intelli-
gence community. The Rockefeller Com-
mission was charged with a similar re-
sponsibility.
Now after a 15 month study by the
select committee, we have more informa-
tion regarding the operation of this
country's intelligence apparatus than
ever before. We have learned that while
the intelligence community for the most
part has carried out its duties well and
performed a vital service, the occasions
on which power was abused were more
numerous and even more shocking than
we had previously imagined. The ques-
tion before us today is whether we will
respond to what we learned and take the
first step in gaining control of intelli-
gence activities by establishing an effec-
tive oversight committee. I sincerely
hope that we will answer that question
in the affirmative.
Mr. President, I think all of us here
recognize the importance of sound in-
telligence to this Nation. No one wants
to do anything ,o jeopardize our ability
to collect intelligence information. We
do have a responsibility, however, to in-
sure that intelligence activities are car-
ried out effectively and in a manner
consistent with our foreign policy and
the fundamental principles of individual
rights on which this Nation was founded.
This has not been the case in the past,
and we cannot assume that it will be so
in the future.
When bureaucracies are capable of
carrying out clandestine activities and
are not properly restrained, there will
always be the temptation to employ those
capabilities in an improper fashion. I do
not wish to imply that individuals in the
intelligence community have evil mo-
tives, Mr. President. To the contrary,
their underlying intentions are usually
most patriotic. But as Justice Brandeis
said many years ago,
Experience should teach us to be most on
our guard to protect liberty when the gov-
ernment's purposes are beneficient. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel in-
vasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers.
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in in-
sidious encroachment by men of zeal, well
meaning but without understanding.
Mr. President, our recent experience
includes Cointelpro operations to disrupt
the activities of groups expressing politi-
cal dissent, the CHAOS program to col-
lect information on thousands of Ameri-
cans who opposed the Vietnam war, FBI
mail cover programs, attempts to dis-
S 7415
credit Martin Luther King, Jr., CIA
paramilitary operations in Chile and
Laos, and assassination attempts against
a number of foreign leaders. It is clear
that we must be more alert and make it
perfectly clear to the' intelligence com-
munity that there are, indeed, limits to
what it can do.
I believe a permanent oversight com-
mittee with legislative authority is an
important first step in gaining control
of intelligence activities. One committee
with responsibility solely for intelligence
oversight and legislation should serve us
far better than maintaining the exclusive
jurisdictions for intelligence matters in
committees which have many other
responsibilities.
The new committee can serve as a
watchdog to keep the intelligence
agencies in check, and, equally as im-
portant, wore- on legislation to insure
protection of human rights and to make
our intelligence efforts as effective as
possible. Recent experience shows there
is much to be done in this last area.
Mr. President, nearly every person or
group which has studied the intelligence
agencies has called for an intelligence
oversight committee, including the Sen-
ate select committee, the Rockefeller
Commission, President Ford, George
Bush, William Colby, and the Murphy
Commission. It is up to us now to act.
Th3 compromise proposal introduced
by the distinguished chairman of the
Rules Committee will provide us with
an effective oversight committee. While I
do not believe it is perfect and there are
many changes I would make, I believe it
merits support and passage.
The new committee will have a broad-
ly drawn membership. It will have exclu-
sive jurisdiction ever the CIA and will
share jurisdiction with existing commit-
tees on other intelligence matters. It will
be involved in the critical budget process
of the intelligence agencies. The com-
promise also provides adequate protec-
tion against unwarranted disclosure of
sensitive information by resting the ulti-
mate authority in these matters with the
full Senate.
Mr. President, if we fail to provide a
mechanism to control the intelligence
agencies now, we will set the worst pos-
sible precedent. Our failure would be
nothing more than a green light for the
overzealous to repeat past abuses.
We cannot turn our backs to the out-
rageous actions which have been re-
vealed. If we care anything about re-
storing confidence in Government, we
must act now to begin to set things right
in the intelligence establishment.
ORDER FOR H.R. 12527 TO BE HELD
AT THE DESK
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that H.R. 12527,
authorizing funds for the Federal Trade
Commission, be held at the desk until
further disposition. It has been cleared
on both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it will be so held, when re-
ceived.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE May 18, 1976
PROGRAM
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
the Senate convenes tomorrow at 10
a.m.
Mr. PROXMIRE will be recognized for
15 minutes. Thereafter Mr. GOLDWATER
will be recognized for 15 minutes. Morn-
ing business will follow until 11 a.m.,
with a limitation on statements therein
of 5 minutes each.
At 11 a.m. the Senate will resume con-
sideration of Senate Resolution 400. The
pending question at that time will be on
adoption of the Stennis-Tower amend-
ment. There is a limitation for debate
thereon if 3 hours equally divided.
At 2 p.m. the Senate will vote by roll-
call on- the Stennis-Tower amendment.
When that amendment is disposed of
the vote will occur immediately, without
intervening motion or debate, on amend-
ment 1643, the Cannon et al. substitute
amendment as amended.
After the Senate votes on the Cannon
substitute to the committee substitute,
if the Cannon substitute is agreed to, the
committee amendment, as amended, will
be considered as adopted since, in effect,
the Senate would be voting on the same
question again.
Without intervening motion, debate,
or amendment the Senate will then pro-
ceed to vote by rollcall on Senate Reso-
lution 400.
it is the intention of the leadership to
call up the antitrust legislation upon
disposition of Senate Resolution 400.
Also coming up in the near future will
be the military procurement and mili-
tary construction authorization bills, but
not necessarily in that order.
S. 3439, foreign military sales, will be
taken up in the near future.
ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M.
TOMORROW
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mt. President, If
there be no further business to come
before the Senate, I move, in accordance
with the previous order, that the Senate
stand in adjournment until 10 a.m. to-
morrow.
The motion was agreed to; and at
2:36 p.m. the Senate adjourned until to-
morrow, Wednesday, May 19, 1976, at
10 a.m.
NOMINATIONS
Executive nominations received by the
Senate May 18, 1976:
DEPARTMENT OF-DEFENSE
John J. Martin, of Maryland, to be an
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, vice
Walter B. LaBarge, resigned.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Joseph Z. Taylor, of Virginia, to be
Inspector General, Foreign Assistance.
John P. Constandy, resigned.
TIC: JuDicrszr
John P. Crowley, of Illinois, to' be U.S. dis-
trict judge for the northern district of Illi-
nois, vice Richard B. Austin, retired.
CONFIRMATIONS
Executive nominations confirmed by
the Senate May 18, 1976:
1 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
The following-named persons to be mem-
bers of the Federal Election Commission for
the terms indicated:
For a term expiring April 30, 1977:
Neil Staebler, of Michigan.
For terms expiring April 30, 1979:
Vernon W. Thomson, of Wisconsin.
Thomas E. Harris, of Virginia.
For terms expiring April 30, 1981:
Joan D. Aiken, of Pennsylvania.
Robert 0. Tiernan, of Rhode Island.
THE JuDICIART
Maurice B. Cohill, Jr., of Pennsylvania, to
be U.S. district judge for the western district
of. Pennsylvania.
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y..19, 1976 - CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE
pensive end of the high-low mix of ships and
aircraft.
An "Efficiency" Defense Budget the same
size of that currently requested, but de-
signed with these principles in mind, would
yield a far more potent and suitable U.S. de-
fense force.
OPTION 3: MATCHING DEFENSE FORCES TO
FOREIGN POLICIES
Adopting the EFFICENCY Defense Budget
outlined in this study will not save money
but will add additional defense muscle where
it is needed most. Adopting the ECONOMY
defense Budget outlined here would save
$8,537.9 million and still provide an adequate
and strong defense force.
Adopting a different foreign policy gen-
erates different kinds of defense forces to
support it. We have examined the different
kinds of TACAIR. seapower, and defense
manpower forces needed for each of four
foreign policy options:
(1) A Pax Americana Foreign Policy
(2) The Present Foreign Policy of the U.S.
(3) A Pacific Pullback/Europe-First For-
Policy
How much should be spent on defense to
implement each of these? What kind of forces
are needed for each?
PAX AMERICANA
This foreign policy would require a very
strong and larger defense force. The US.
N would be built to a level of 650 shfps
ls many as 25 aircraft carriers and
ing escorts. The Navy would. swell to
80 people and the Marines to 250,000.
N orces would be assigned in strength
to y ocean in the world. A Pax Americana
military force would also maintain 30 active
Army divisions, 5 active Marine divisions,
45 tactical Air Force wings, 25 Navy carrier
wings, and 5 Marine aircorps wings. U.S.
strategic force levels need not be changed
significantly to support a foreign policy of
Pax Americana since a massive U.S. strategic
force to deter aggression is already in place.
A Pax America military force would cost as
much as twice what the U.S. now allocates
to the Defense budget, an estimated dollar
cost of roughly $220 billion per year with
nearly 4 million persons in uniform and 2
million defense civilians working full time
for DOD.
PRESENT POLICY: STATUS QUO
Present U.S. foreign policy commitments
could be supported by a budget similar in
dollar size to the U.S. Defense budget sim-
Korea and scaledowns- elsewhere over five
years. Pacific-bases would be withdrawn from
Korea and a naval scaledown in the Far East
would occur. Once completed such a policy
would save $720 million annually in man-
power costs and $7,400 million in Navy-Ma-
rine costs yearly. U.S. Naval forces would be
centered around nine attack carriers at their
core. Scaledowns in naval tactical airforces
and tactical air units in the Western Pacific
region would also allow annual cost savings
of roughly $1,000 million per year once ac-
complished. European forces under this policy
would remain similar to the present deploy-
ments. Overall this policy in fiscal terms
would mean defense expenditures cuts of
$9,120 million based on foreign policy changes
alone. This, of course, could be combined
with the "economy" cuts of $8,537.9 million
described' under the present foreign policy to
produce an annual total savings of $17,657
million dollars in defense expenditures. Con-
versely, these resources could be diverted to
building a stronger European force should
that. be necessary to maintain. the military
balance there under such a policy of "EIi-
rope First."
GENERAL RETRENCHMENT
A policy of general retrenchment would
involve a major pullback of U.S. forces from
both Europe and the Western Pacific. This
policy would require far fewer forces than
Pax Americana, the Status Quo, or Pacific
Pullback Policies and would also require less
of a defense budget investment. Under a gen-
eral retrenchment policy the U.S. Navy would
still retain 400 ships, nine attack aircraft
carriers, and 342,000 Navy people as well as
126,000 Marines. This would represent 82
fewer ships than we now maintain and 40%
fewer people. The Navy budget would thus
be in the neighborhood of $28.5 billion in
current dollars, down $8,900 million from the
current Navy budget. Tactical airforces could
also be confined to the United States or in
token deployments abroad with 20 of the 42
TACAIR wings withdrawn and demobilized
for a savings estimated at $12 billion in cur-
rent dollars each year after such action was
taken. Such a general retrenhement policy
would also permit a return and demobiliza-
tion of 172,000 land-based troops from Eu-
rope and Asia at a cost savings of at least
$2.0 billion per year once the transition costs
have been paid. Strategic forces would re-
main at present levels for the purpose of
deterrence of direct attacks on the United
States.
Changing to a foreign policy of general re-
trenchment would thus require a significant-
ly smaller defense establishment abroad. It
would signal far less dependence on the mili-
tary power and other advantages secured by
tight alliances. The defense expenditures for
such a policy would be $22.9 billion less than
ply by adopting the administration program. policy-this based solely on foreign policy
Or a somewhat smaller defense budget with changes. If the "economies" also identified
the suggested cuts laid out would give an in the present defense budget were taken an
economical but still impressive defense pro- additional $8,537.9 million might be saved.
gram to the country. - Thus, a foreign policy of general retrench-
Present policy could be supported by an ment might lead to savings in excess of 31
"economical" defense program costing $8,- billion. dollars in defense expenditures.
537.9 million less than the original FY 1977 SUMMARY
Defense Department request. Still another
legitimate defense posture used to support Overall, U.S. defense costs would vary in
the present policy might be what would be the following ways depending upon the for-
termed an "efficient", if not economical, de- eign policy option elected and whether one
fense posture. In the efficient posture the adpoted an "Efficiency" or an "Economy"
$8,537.9 million saved from the "soft" pro- budget for the Department of Defense.'
grams would be plowed back into more rea- Fiscal clear 1977 defense expenditures
sonable defense programs such as PGMs, Foreign policy adopted
*,tank weaponry, improved TACAIR pro- 1. Present U.S. Policy.
and greater readiness and malnte- 2. Pax American Policy.
n1~Ce Uroxrams. ??
k .-^^^
st n^,: .,
ac
r
PACIFIC PULLBACK/ EUROPE FIRST
a dense establishment consisting of a 400 Efficiency budget
ship Navy, an overseas force reduced in size 1. $116.4 Billion ($114.2 + 2.2B in payroll
by 72,000 consisting of. withdrawals from added).
S 7533
2. $220:0 Billion (rough estimate) (extra
Bost: $104 Billion).
3. $107.3 Billion (foreign policy cuts alone)
(savings: $9.1 Billion).
4. $93.5 Billion (foreign policy cuts alone)
(savings : $22.9 Billion).
Economy budget
1. $107.86 Billion ($8,537.9 million saved).
2. Not applicable (all kinds of forces pur-
chased with hedges built into budget).
3. $98.8 Billion (foreign policy + economy
cuts) (savings: $17.6 Billion).
4. $85.0 Billion (foreign policy ? economy
cuts) (savings-, $31.4 Billion).
In conclusion, we allow the reader to draw
his own conclusion as to the correct foreign
policy for the United States and whether to
'elect the economy or efficiency versions of the
Defense budget. It is also our firm conclu-
sion that there should be no rubberstamping
of the FY 1977 defense budget or of any auto-
mdtic cost-of-living raise in military and
DOD civilian pay for FY 1977. We conclude
that even if the current U.S, foreign policy
is adopted, either $8,537.9 million should be
reinvested in programs that make more sense
such as those identified in option 2 or
$8,537.9 million should be saved the taxpayer
or invested in other more useful government
programs. Both the economy and the effi-
ciency budget options make more sense than
the proposed FY 1977 budget now before the
Congress.
CONCLUSION OF MORNING
BUSINESS
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there
further morning business? If not, morn-
ing business is closed.
PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under
the previous unanimous-consent agree-
ment, 11 a.m. having arrived, the Senate
will now resume consideration of the un-
finished business, Senate Resolution 400,
which will be stated by title.
The second assistant legislative clerk
read as follows:
A resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish a
Standing Committee of the Senate on In-
telligence Activities, and for other purposes.
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the resolution.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under
the previous order, the Senate will now
proceed to the consideration of the
amendment offered by the Senator from
Texas (Mr. TOWER) and the Senator
from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), with a
time limitation of 3 hours thereon, and
with a vote thereon to occur at 2 p.m.
The amendment will be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
The Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER); for
himself, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. GOLDWATER, and
Mr. THURMOND, proposes an amendment
numbered 1649.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, a parlia-
mentary inquiry.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The
Senator will state it.
Mr. TOWER. Who has control of the
time in favor of the amendment, and who
has control of the time in opposition?
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Sen-
ators RIBICOFF and STENNIS are in con-
trol of the time.
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The amendment is as follows:
On page 5 strike out paragraphs (2) and
(3) of section 3(a) of the amendment and
insert in lieu thereof the following:
"(2) Intelligence activities of all other de-
partments and agencies of the Government
except the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency, and other agen-
cies and subdivisions of the Department of
Defense.
"(3) The organization or reorganization of
any department or agency of the Govern-
ment, other than the Department of Defense,
to the extent that the organization or re-
organization relates to a function or activity
involving intelligence activities.
Strike out clauses (B), (C), and (D) of
paragraph (4) of section 3 (a) of the amend-
ment and redesignate clauses (E) and (F) as
clauses (B) and (C), respectively.
Strike out clause (G) of paragraph (4) of
section 3(a) of the amendment and insert
in lieu thereof the following:
"(D) Any department, agency, or, subdi-
vision which is the successor to the agency
named in clause (A) ; and the activities of
any department, agency, or subdivision
-which is the successor to any department or
bureau named in clause (B) or (C), to the
extent the activities of such successor de-
partment, agency, or subdivision are de-
scribed in clause (B) or (C).".
Strike out the period in section 4(c) and
insert in lieu thereof "as specified in section
3(Strike out clauses (2), (3), and (4) of
section 12 and redesignate clauses (5) and
(6) as clauses (2) and (3), respectively.
Mr. TOWER.. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may have con-
trol of the time, in the absence of Mr.
Stennis.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With-
out objection, it is so ordered. .
Mr. TOWER. I yield myself such time
as I may require.
Mr. President, as a result of the in-
vestigation conducted by the Senate Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence Activi-
ties, there is one inescapable lesson that
we in the Senate should have learned
about the intelligence community-that
is, that the entire community is a com-
plex, fragile, and essential asset to the
security of the United States.
While the committee's investigation
revealed many abuses that occurred over
the years, it also showed that such abuses
were the exception rather than the rule
in our intelligence agencies, and that
more often than not the abuses that did
occur were initiated by politicians who
had authority over the agencies rather
than by the agencies themselves. While
the results of the select committee's in-
vestightion makes it clear that changes
should be made in the manner-in which
Congress monitors the activities of the
intelligence agencies, I feel that creation
of a select committee on intelligence with
legislative and authorization authority is
the wrong way to do this.
Yesterday, my distinguished colleague,
the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY),
stated that he felt that the Department
of Defense and all of the 'Intelligence
agencies should be subjected. to over-
sight by one group of Senators who have
the entire intelligence picture. While I
do not totally agree that unified and cen-
tralized oversight is essential, I am cer-
tain that to give such an oversight com-
mittee the legislative and authorization
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 19, 1976
authority for appropriations would be a
serious mistake. This is true, especially
of the Department of Defense, where in-
telligence and the defense, generally, is
so inextricably bound together.
Also, in the Department of Defense,
tactical and national intelligence are im-
possible of separation; for what, in
peacetime, is apparently purely tactical
information, may certainly, in times of
crisis or high tension, be of great na-
tional importance. In testimony before
the select committee, as well as the Sen-
ate Armed Services Committee, it was
revealed that the DCI, who is responsible
for the national intelligence budget, as
well as Defense officials, found it almost
impossible and inconceivable to separate
these two areas.
For,the Senate to attempt in haste to
separate a major part of the Defense in-
telligence budget from the committee
with principal intelligence responsibility
for the defense generally, will, in my
opinion, create grave risk to the national
'security. This, position is supported by
the recent testimony of Deputy Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence, Ellsworth,
who, before the Armed Services Commit-
tee, on Thursday last, stated:
We operate our intelligence responsibility
sin a somewhat different world from the CIA
or the FBI. We operate in an extremely
highly technological world, which with our
facilities is very sensitive and very delicate.
And that is the basis for our first concern-
from the standpoint of maintaining the over-
all confidentiality of our sensitive and ex-
pensive military and defense intelligence
sources and methods and-you know what I
mean, particularly our most modern collec-
tion systems. The visibility that is created
by separate budget process would entail, as
we see it, grave risk. That is our first con-
cern about the creation of a committee with
the authorization for appropriations Juris-
diction over these matters.
Mr. President, I think that few Mem-
bers of the Senate realize that section 12
of Senate Resolution 400 would, in its
present form, require a separate bill or
joint resolution to authorize appropria-
tions for the various agencies and de-
partments involved in intelligence activ-
ities. I am concerned that this section
would create unworkable problems re-
garding public disclosure of the intelli-
gence budgets of the intelligence agen-
cies and departments. For instance, the
highly classified activities of the National
Security Agency, if revealed in such
fashion to enemy intelligence forces
could be disastrous to one of our most
important national intelligence assets.
For these and other very important
reasons, which will be discussed more
fully by the distinguished chairman of
the Committee on Armed Services and
the distinguished ranking member of
that committee, we urge the Senate to
support this amendment.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, a parlia-
mentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CUL-
VER). The Senator will state it.
Mr. STENNIS. Who has control of
time on the bill?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, 3 hours are allotted
for debate, and the time is to be equally
Mr. STENNIS. Three hours f
so-called Tower-Stennis amendm
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is
correct-equally divided, and the vote
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if I am
in control of the time, I yield 10 minutes
Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, I support
this amendment, but I shall speak in
gence organizations.
My major reason for opposing
tions, I have always felt there no
possible way to prevent leaks of ti' ost
sensitive and top secret inform if
you have a large committee and big
While our Appropriations Subcommit-
tee does not have oversight responsibility,
This Appropriations Subcommittee for
years has been composed of only five
every Senator who has served on this
subcommittee felt that, because of the
with, it should be a small committee.
Most Members would be very reluctant or
new committee, the staff would have ac-
cess to the most sensitive information.
Mr. President, human nature is such
that when too many people have access
it to an ambitious and inquisitive press.
The press people who concentrate on
the business of intelligence are uncanny
in their ability to piece together bits of
The Senate Select Intelligence ' m-
mittee, which has been holding gs
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May 19, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD,$ENATE
Bred some things that need to be
ed. I cannot help but feel, however,
far too much information has been
'ized, especially as to how our in-
te ence agencies such as the CIA oper-
ate in foreign countries.
These disclosures have very adversely
affected the operation of our intelligence
system. They have seriously damaged
our intelligence agencies in foreign coun-
tries. The best example is the disclosure
that Richard Welch was our top CIA
agent in Greece. Shortly after he was
identified as a CIA agent, he was mur-
dered.
Examples such as this cannot help but
demoralize the spirit and dedication of
other CIA agents, especially those operat-
ing. in hostile foreign countries.
If the Soviet Union conducted similar
Investigations into their KGB operations
and made public all the inside operations
of their spy agencies, such information
would be most valuable to us. To acquire
this kind of information, we would have
to spend hundreds of millions of dollars.
Mr. President, intelligence plays a tre-
mendously important role not only in the
security of this Nation, but it makes pos-
sible a very large saving in military ex-
penditures.
The more we know about what the
Soviet Union or any other potential
enemy is doing militarily, especially in
the development of new weapons, the
better we are able to determine what
e termeasures we should take.
stant surveillance by our intelli-
g _e satellites gives us accurate infor-
movements and the deployment of mis-
siles.
The present Senate Select Intelligence
Committee, during its year. and a half of
operation, composed of 11 members, did
its utmost to do a good job and try to
prevent leaks of highly classified infor-
mation.
The very size of this committee, how-
ever, along with its more than 70 staff
members, made it just impossible to pre-
vent very damaging leaks.
Mr. President, let me give one exam-
ple of how important it is to keep some
sensitive information top secret.
During World War II, when we devel-
oped the atonic bomb-as far as I am
able to ascertain-not more than five
Members of Congress were aware of the
nearly $4 billion we secretly diverted into
the development of the atomic bomb.
This was one of the best kept secrets
in our history. Had Hitler's Germany
known early what we were doing, they
might well have produced an atomic
bomb before we did. They had the know-
how.
Thus, world history, as we know it
today, would have been changed.
With a 15-member Intelligence Com-
mittee and a staff of 60 or more having
ss to our top secrets of Government,
MMuch projects involving our national
s ! ity, such as the development of the
Mr. President, I would favor a joint
Senate-House intelligence oversight com-
mittee dealing with all intelligence matte
ters, but I would want it to be a relatively
small committee with a very limited staff.
This Is the kind of legislation I would
support.
Mr. President, I cannot vote for this
bill but I hope and pray that history will
be wrong. '
Mr. WEICKER. Will the distinguished
prove my concern and apprehensions to
Senator from North Dakota yield for a
question, and I shall be glad to have it
on our time.
Mr. STENNIS. Yes.
Mr. YOUNG. Yes, I yield.
Mr. WEICKER. I wonder if the dis-
tinguished Senator would tell me and my
colleagues who divulged the information
on.. Richard Welch? I ask the question
since this has become a focal point as
to whether or not Congress can be trusted
with this type of oversight function. I
would like to have the question an-
swered: Who divulged that information?
Did anybody in the Congress or any con-
gressional committee divulge it?
Mr. YOUNG. I think it was directly
associated with the investigation at that
time.
Mr. WEICKER. No, I am afraid I am
not going to let that point go unan-
swered, because it was used, as I say,
as a focal point to turn around this whole
investigation. It was not as the result of
any information coming from the Con-
gress of the United States. It was di-
vulged by a foreign periodical. That is
the very simple fact of the matter.
Mr. YOUNG. That he was a member
of the CIA was published at the time of
the CIA hearing and I do not think the
Senator would deny that through the in-
vestigations, most people know how these -
intelligence agencies ? operate now.
Mr. MONDALE. Will the Senator yield
just on that one point which the Sen-
ator from Connecticut raises?
Mr. WEICKER. Yes.
Mr. MONDALE. We never had Mr.
Welch's name because we never wanted
it. We never asked for any names of any
foreign operatives, because it was not
necessary to our investigation and we did
not want it. In fact, the record discloses,
as we looked into it later, that the CIA
had urged Welch not to move into that
house, because it had been known in the
community that that house had been the
residence of the previous head of the
CIA in Greece. So when we look into the
record, our committee and the House
committee had absolutely nothing to do
with the tragedy concerning Mr. Welch.
Mr. YOUNG. Did not the members of
that committee and more than 70 staff
members have access to all of this kind
of information?
Mr. MONDALE. No, because we were
very careful never to ask that kind of
information, because we had anticipated
that kind of problem.
For example, we often let CIA officials
come in and testify under pseudonyms.
We did not want to know their names. It
was not important to our work. What we
wanted to know were issues that went
to the question of accountability and
control.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Will the Senator
yield at that point?
S 7535
'Mr. YOUNG. I yield to the Senator
from Mississippi first.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, a parlia-
mentary inquiry, if the Senator will
yield.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator will state it.
Mr. STENNIS. I understand that this
.comes on the time, now, of the other
side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is
correct.
Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield some on our
side.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. As a Member of
the Senate committee that investigated
our intelligence operations, I want to
confirm what the distinguished Senator
from Minnesota and the Senator from'
Connecticut have indicated regarding
the tragic death of Richard Welch. I do
this only because this matter has been
brought up several times and has been
used to try to denigrate the activity of
the committee and the need for the over-
sight committee.
As Senator Mondale said, the investi-
gating committee did not seek and did
not have the identity of Mr. Welch. One
further point that should be made is that
It has never been established that the
revelation of his identity had anything
at all to do with that unfortunate oc-
currence. I think this matter should be
put in proper perspective and that Mem-
bers of the Senate should realize that
that unfortunate occurrence really had
no relationship to what we are discussing
here today. As a matter of fact, proper
oversight may very well help to eliminate
or at least diminish prospects that situ-
ations similar to that of Richard Welch
will occur again.
Mr. YOUNG. I am pleased to know
that the committee feels there was no
such leak. But the point I am trying to
make is that there is no possible way to
have a large intelligence committee with
a staff of 60 or 70 and not have very
damaging leaks such as this.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield
myself 12 minutes. I agree to the alter-
nating of speakers side to side, as far as
that is concerned, but I do want to make
these few remarks now.
Mr. President, I `want to make clear
that I have nothing except compliments
for the select committee, the members of
the special intelligence committee who
have been investigating these- matters. I
not only assume, but I believe they acted
in good faith. There are no charges to
be made, by inference or otherwise.
Mr. President, we are dealing today
with a problem that is not one of indi-
viduals; we are dealing with a major
part of our foreign policy. We can sim-
plify all of this greatly by just with-
drawing and surrendering our position in
international affairs. But if we are go-
ing to continue in the role of a world
power, which I-do not think we can aban-
don, we are going to have to have intel-
ligence and we are going to have to adopt
special rules and make concessions to
handle it. That is what was done with
the passage of the original CIA Act.
It was put into operation by the re-
spective congressional committees on a
kind of general understanding. The
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S 7536
Senator from North Dakota has been a
part of that for some years, as have the
Chairman of the Committees on Appro-
priations, Armed Services, and Foreign
Relations, and others. It has been a spe-
cial setup.
It was not perfect by any means. We
cannot legislate an arrangement here
today, or any day, that is perfect. But
we did, by common consent, realize this
had to be handled in a special way.
Now, this amendment, Mr. President,
which we propose does not touch the CIA.
It does not change the Cannon resolu
tion as to what you are going to do about
the CIA. It does not undertake anything
of that kind to limit the new committee
in its investigative oversight power, in-
cluding power with respect to what I
should call strictly military intelligence.
Having tried to state what it does not
do, I want to refer now to what this
amendment does do. But.-at the very
threshold of this whole problem I want
to say I do not think we can ever have
a system that will work unles it jibes with
and coordinates with the system of the
House of Representatives. We are talk-
ing about legislation, dealing with legis-
latide affairs, authorizations, appropria-
tions, debates and sessions, and reports
and staff work. All of those things we
cannot possibly operate independently of
the other body. Somewhere along the
line this plan, however well motivated,.
will fail, I think, because it lacks that
essential threshold requirement.
I have said before that a joint com-
mittee of the House and the Senate, a
special joint committee, was, I thought,
the route to go if we were going to have
a special committee, and I believe we
will have to come back to that.
What does this amendment do? It
passes up all these matters that I have
mentioned and merely takes out of the
Cannon resolution as written now the
matter of legislation and funds for the
DIA and the NSA and other groups in
the Department of Defense and within
the services. Those items, under this
amendment, would not have to go
through this budget process. They would
not have to be authorized as we use that
term in legislation. I am one who favors
authorizations, gene?ally. But under this
amendment funds for those strictly
military operations would be excepted.
They would not have to go through the
process of authorization where the
amount of money and the amount of
manpower become involved. Now, these
are the key points, gentlemen: An au-
thorization, the amount of money, the
amount of manpower, not only in total-
ity but for some of these major divisions
would have to be set forth and be bind-.
ing on this body once the authorization
process has been met as required by the
resolution. It would be binding on this
body in open or secret session, and then
be binding on the Appropriations Com-
mittee and binding on this body when
the appropriations bill came back for
passage.
I am talking about the Department of
Defense appropriation bill. The author-
ization will not be binding on the House
of Representatives, not binding on their
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE May 19, 1976
committees, not binding on their repre-
sentatives at the conference that it has
always had on the Defense appropria-
tion bill. Now, that is the basic condi-
tion that this resolution, whatever its
virtues may be, does not solve. It cre-
ates this additional fatal defect, I re-
spectfully say, that will keep this sys-
tem, as proposed, from working.
Our amendment merely undertakes to
take out of that process this authoriza-
tion.
Now, just a word on this. By and large
over the years the real foreign intelli-
gence has been highly valuable to our
Nation. The military intelligence has
been highly valuable, and in all the
things the select committee found-and
I am ashamed of a lot of those facts-
there was not much, Mr. President, that
was attributable to the military services.
I do not come here to defend them.
I just say'it is a fact that, according to
your record a very small percent of the
wrongdoing, the evil things that were
uncovered, were attributable to the serv-
ices. There you have that military chain
of command, there you have the military
discipline, and I pray God we will always
have that discipline; there you have
their pride of service and responsibility.
Anyway, the part of this operation this
amendment covers is limited solely to
the armed services, and there are cer-
tainly not a great deal, a great number
of things evil, in all of this proof that
can be-attributed to them. There are no
dirty tricks that they pulled. They just
were not in on these matters, except in
a slight degree, and that was under some
special orders more or less from the
Presidents of the United States during
unrest and turmoil and high uncertainty.
If I may just relate this incident, talk-
ing about uncertainty, I was on my way
to Capitol Hill one morning, driving my
own car. Down there, very near the White
House I was literally stopped, bodily
stopped, and these organized groups
threw a blanket over my windshield so
that it was impossible to move forward.
Well, I had the presence of mind
enough to knov) that I had better stay
in the car rather than get out, but they
had effectively stopped the operation of
the Government so far as one, Member
of this body was concerned, and that is
what their purpose was. I think maybe it
was some of that group, the then Presi-
dent had had some of the military look-
ing in on, trying to find out their motives.
I know the group was successful, and this
body could not have convened that day
had all Senators suffered the fate that I
had suffered.
I was finally released. By whom? By
one of their own, one of their own group,
one of the group which was stopping the
operations of the government, who came
up there and pushed the others out of the
way and said, "This is a damned shame."
He pulled that blanket away and told
me to drive forward. Well, I persuaded
them to let me drive backward. But I got-
out.
That is just a little of the atmosphere
prevailing here when some of these activ-
ities might have been carried on where
some part of the army got a little over
the line. But of the evil about whi
are also concerned, not much of it
tributable to this group.
If we have to make up a budgeWd
any committee has to go through the
process, the ordinary budget process, and
bring an authorization in here and argue
it, debate it, and then another commit-
tee, Appropriations, has to take it and
operate under, it and come back, and.
then if the Appropriations Committee
goes over the line items subject to a
point of order, all the debate back and
forth could be day after day and time
formation will get out. I do not accuse
anyone of intentionally leaking or telling
anything, but it will get out. It is in-
evitable. It has before and it will now.
Then when we would go to the confer-
ence on the proposed authorization bill
the other side is not bound by it any-
way.
What kind of disclosure am I talking
about?
Our friend here has already mentioned
the Manhattan project that brought us
the atomic bomb. I was not here then.
I refer to the U-2 which was the air-
craft which became known as "the spy
in the sky."
I can say on my responsibility that the
activities of that group saved us billions
of dollars by giving us information that
caused us not to make mistakes as to
the kind of weaponry we would build I
suggest that literally saved us bi
of dollars.
I pass on to another. Take the
By the way, I do not want to be a mem-
ber of any new committee, whatever form
it will be. I have been through, I believe,
my share of sleepless hours about these
projects.
For over 4 years we were on the verge
there of getting from that sunken sub-
rnarine a regular mine of information, to
learn about codes and many,. many other
things. If there had ever been suspicion-
no one had to tell it to kill it, if there
had ever been suspicion-that we were
carrying on that activity, that would
have been the end of it because they
would, naturally, have come in, and we
would have had to go away.
It finally fell through for other rea-
sons, as we know.
These are not imaginations, these' are
actual facts of life.
I do not support the resolution as a
whole because of the defect I described in
the beginning. I beg, peg even, because it
is so important, that Senators recon-
sider the matter. Let us put in this
amendment so as to have a special cate-
gory.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
NUNN). The Senator's 3 minutes have
.expired.
Mr. STENNIS. One minute.
Put in a special category on
life that they cannot go through thi-
nary process. We will find anothe wa,y
to be effective, because the budget
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May 19, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
12 ss, the authorization, the debates,
he point of order just cannot apply.
President, how much time is there
is amendment?
e PRESIDING OFFICER. Fifty-
r(ine minutes.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I yield
myself 10 minutes.
Mr._ President, this amendment would
deny the new committee any legislative,
authorization, or oversight jurisdiction
over the intelligence activities of the De-
partment of Defense.
It would fundamentally alter the com-
promise language offered by Senator
CANNON last Wednesday.
I must strongly oppose this proposed
amendmelt.
The new committee must have con-
current legislative and authorization
jurisdiction over the national intelligence
activities of the Department of Defense
for the following reasons:
The Department of Defense is the Na-
tion's primary collector of intelligence
information. It controls 80-90 percent of
the Nation's spending on national intel-
ligence programs, and most technical
collection systems are developed, tar-
geted, or operated by Department of De-
fense personnel. The Department also
supplies a great deal of information to
nonmilitary intelligence agencies. It pro-
vides critical information of national se-
ty policymakers on a multitude of is-
including strategic arms limitations
peace in the Middle East.
dingly, the executive branch
the DOD intelligence activities as
al ntegral part of the entire national
intelligence community. For example, in
February, the President charged a new
committee on Foreign Intelligence,
chaired by the Director of Central Intel-
ligence, with responsibility for overseeing
and coordinating the Government's en-
tire national foreign intelligence pro-
gram, including DOD's intelligence pro-
gram.
If the new committee did not have
jurisdiction over the defense intelligence
agencies, it would be denied jurisdiction
over most of the intelligence community.
It is very important to achieve the
proper relationship between the civilian
intelligence agencies and the military in-
telligence agencies. The two different
types of agencies must work closely to-
gether to assure as accurate and unbiased
intelligence as possible for use by all mili-
tary and civilian decisionmakers. It
would be difficult to achieve this goal if
responsibility in Congress for the intelli-
gence community was split up so that one
committee was responsible for the civil-
ian intelligence agencies and one the
military intelligence agencies.
The Department of Defense has an
enormous technological capability that
could be used to violate the rights of
American citizens. Past disclosures of
as the FBI, CIA, and other agencies.
example, the select committee has
curity Agency from 1947 to 1975 under a
secret arrangement with three U.S. tele-
graph companies.
Second. An estimated 100,000 Ameri-
cans were the subjects of U.S. Army in-
telligence files created between the mid-
1960's and 1971.
Third. Army intelligence maintained
files on Congressmen because of their
participation in peaceful political meet-
ings under surveillance by army agents.
Fourth. As part of their effort to col-
lect information which related even re-
motely to people or groups in communi-
ties which had the potential for civil dis-
order, army intelligence agencies took
such steps as: sending agents to a Hal-
loween party for elementary school chil-
dren in Washington, D.C. because they
suspected a local dissident might be pres-
ent; monitoring protest of welfare moth-
ers' organizations in Milwaukee; infil-
trating a coalition of church youth
groups in Colorado, and sending agents
to a priests' conference in Washington,
D.C. held to discuss birth control meas-
ures.
Fifth. Army intelligence officers opened
the private mail of American civilians in
West Berlin and West Germany.
Sixth. The military joined other in-
telligence agencies in drafting the so-
called Huston plan in 1970, and later
participated in the Intelligence Evalu-
ation_ Committee, an interdepartmental
comittee established by the Justice De-
partment to analyze domestic intelligence
information.
Just this past weekend the select com-
mittee released a 49-page report describ-
ing in detail abuses by the Defense De-
partment intelligence activities. It de-
scribes how the DOD collected informa-
tion about the political activities of pri-
vate citizens and private organizations,
monitored radio transmissions in the
United States, investigated civilian
groups considered threats to the military,
and assisted law enforcement agencies in
surveillance of private citizens and orga-
nizations.
The same expertise gained by the new
committee through oversight of the CIA
and FBI could and should be used to
oversee the DOD's intelligence activities
so that civil liberties are protected.
A committee with the necessary re-
sources must closely examine the DOD
intelligence agencies to avoid duplication
and inefficiency and assure the best in-
telligence possible. The Defense Depart-
ment spends billions on intelligence. Yet
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr.
Ellsworth, testified before the Govern-
ment Operations Committee in January-
that-
The problem that we have had with the
Defense `Intelligence Agency, as I see, is the
same problem that we have generally with
all intelligence in this Nation. That is, there
are weaknesses in the quality of analysis and
estimates that our intelligence community
provides to us.
I do not think that there is anyone in the
intelligence community that would take issue
with that.
Our objective is, as far as the DIA is con-
cerned, to very substantially improve the
quality of the analysis and estimates that the
DIA produces for the Secretary of Defense
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
S 7537
If we cannot achieve that objective, then
we have got to think of some other; way of
structuring defense intelligence activity so
that we can improve the quality of the fin-
ished intelligence product.
Problems with DIA exist despite the
fact that DIA's problems have been rec-
ognized for a number of years. In 1970,
the Fitzhugh report, containing the con-
clusions of a blue ribbon defense panel
organized by the executive branch, crit-
icized DIA's performance, concluding
that "the principal problems of the DIA
can be summarized as too many jobs and
too many masters."
In order to avoid waste and duplica-
tion, and improve the quality of intelli-
gence generally, the intelligence commit-
.tee must have an overview of all national
intelligence activities. It must be able to
make choices 'between programs within
and outside of DOD and to make changes
in the way all the agencies-operate and
are organized. Without authority over
DOD's national intelligence activities, the
new intelligence committee's jurisdiction
would be incomplete in a crucial respect.
The pending substitute to Senate Res-
olution 400 recognizes that, to be effec-
tive, the new committee must have leg-
islative and authorization authority over
the intelligence activities of the Defense
Department. At the same time, it is writ-
ten in such a way to protect fully the
interest of the Armed Services Commit-
tee in intelligence matters.
Under section 3 (b) the Armed Services
Committee will share with the new com-
mittee legislative and authorization au-
thority over bills involving DOD intelli-
gence. Any legislation, including authori-
zations, reported by the new committee
and involving DOD intelligence activities
will be sequentially referred to the Armed
Services Committee upon request of its
chairman.
Section 3(c) of the resolution assures
the Armed Services Committee the right
to continue to investigate the national
intelligence functions of DOD in order
to make sure that the intelligence agen-
cies are providing DOD the intelligence
it must have to operate effectively.
Section 3(d) provides that the Armed
Services Committee will continue to re-
ceive directly from all intelligence agen-
cies the intelligence it must have to con-
tinue to carry out its other responsibili-
ties. One of the responsibilities of the
new committee will be in fact to make
sure that the intelligence agencies are
promptly providing the other committees
of Congress the information they should
have.
Section 4(a) requires the new commit-
tee to promptly call to the attention of
other committees, such as the Armed
Services committee, any matters deemed
by the select committee to require the
immediate attention of such other com-
mittees. Section 8(c) provides the new
select committee with the authority and
responsibility to adopt regulations that
will permit it to share sensitive infor-
mation with other committees in a way
that will protect the confidentiality of
the information.
To assure that there is close coopera-
tion between the new committee and the
Armed Services Committee, the substi-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE May 19, 1976
tute reserves two seats on the committee
for members of the Armed Services Com-
mittee.
The substitute does not give the new
committee any legislative, authorization,
or oversight responsibility for tactical in-
telligence. Responsibility for this type of
intelligence will remain solely within the
jurisdiction of the Armed Services Com-
mittee.
The new committee will only have
jurisdiction over that portion of DOD's
intelligence activities which provides na-
tional intelligence that DOD, the State
Department, the President; and others in
the executive branch need to make broad
national policy decisions. The definition
of intelligence in section 14(a) of the
substitute to Senate Resolution 400 spe-
cifically excludes from-the- committee's
jurisdiction tactical foreign military in-
telligence. The new committee will not
have jurisdiction over tactical intelli-
gence which seeks to meet the more spe-,
cific technical interests of the weapons
developers and field commanders.
As a practical matter, the national in-
telligence portion of the DOD budget
may be authorized by the new commit-
tee, in conjunction with the Armed
Services' Committee, apart from the rest
of the DOD budget.
The distinction between national and
tactical intelligence is an accepted one
in the executive branch.
The Defense Department already pre-
pares a consolidated defense intelligence
program which includes expenditures for
intelligence of the type covered by this
resolution, but excludes "intelligence re-
lated activities which belong in the com-
bat ..force and other major programs
which they are designed to support." The
Director of Central Intelligence already
prepares a national intelligence budget.
Indeed, President Ford's recent executive
order gives the executive branch's Com-
mittee on Foreign Intelligence-CFI-
headed by the Director of Central Intel-
ligence, responsibility to control "budget
preparation and resource allocation" for
the national foreign intelligence pro-
gram. The President's directive provides,
however, that the Committee on Foreign
Intelligence will not have responsibility
for tactical intelligence.
The final report-of the Church Com-
mittee on Foreign Military Intelligence
similarly indicates that it also was able
to separate national from tactical intel-
ligence and to arrive at separate figures
for each.
Distinction between the different types
of intelligence are in fact already being
made for Congress by the Department of
Defense as part of the budgetary process.
In September 1975 the chairman of
the House Appropriations Committee
wrote the Secretary of Defense as fol-
lows:
The committee is concerned about appar-
ent attempts to lessen the visibility of in-
telligence funding. Therefore, the committee
directs that the 1977 budget presentations
include manpower and dollar amounts for in-
telligence, direct support, and intelligence-
related activities.
The committee insists that the total cost
of intelligence be presented to the Congress,
and by requiring submission of justifications
for these programs the committee hopes to
assure the accomplishment of this goal.
Mr. Ellsworth testified before the
Government Operations Committee con-
cerning this letter that,
The Defense Department and agencies are
following this directive and are supplying to
the committee a thorough justification of
intelligence and intelligence-related activ-
ities in the fiscal year 1977 budget.
Mr. Ellsworth indicated that in the
material being prepared for the House
Appropriations Committee, the Defense
Department was in fact attempting to
distinguished between tactical and na-
tional intelligence despite, his testimony
that the distinctions were difficult to
make precisely.
In discussing Senate Resolution 400
before the Armed Services Committee
last Thursday, Mr. Ellsworth did not
argue that it was impossible to author-
ize separately the type of national in-
telligence activities covered by Senate
Resolution 400.
There may be gray areas where it is
difficult to decide whether a particular
activity belongs to tactical or national
intelligence. It may take the -new com-
mittee several years to finally settle, in
consultation with other interested com-
mittees and the executive branch, the
precise dimensions of the budget.
But these technical budgetary issues
can be removed. The Comptroller Gen-
eral wrote the House select committee
November 10, that-
Once the Congress has outlined the ac-
tivities which it wants identified and re-
ported in the intelligence budget, it will be
possible to establish guidelines for the ex-
ecutive branch to follow in developing and
submitting the budget.
The responsible committees of Con-
gress have every right to know as exact-
ly as possible how much DOD spends on
intelligence. To the extent that this in-
formation is riot available now, it should
be one of the first jobs of the new com-
mittee to work with the executive branch
to make sure it is available in the future.
The fact that it may take some study
and work to settle all the questions is no
reason to deny the new committee the
crucial authorization power itmust have
to exercise effective oversight.
In summary, the proposed substitute
to Senate Resolution 400 will assure the
Armed Services the ability to have access
to intelligence information, and the abil-
ity to consider legislation; including au-
thorization legislation, involving DOD
intelligence. The resolution creates a
new committee that can work with the
Armed Services Committee in this area
so that the time-consuming and diffi-
cult work necessary to oversee the in-
telligence committee will not have to fall
on the Armed Services Committee alone.
Mr. TOWER. Will the Senator yield
for a question?
Mr. RIBICOFF. I am pleased to yield.
Mr. TOWER. I would like to suggest to.
the Senator from Connecticut that the
Stennis-Tower amendment does not
touch the question of oversight, only the
question of legislation. It is addressed
only to the legislative section of the
resolution and not on the question of
oversight.
It does not take away the authority for
oversight on the part of the new select
committee.
Mr. TOWER. The power to s
or what have you.
Mr. RIBICOFF. But in order to
job, and do it properly, we do beve
that it is important that the new com-
mittee share with the Armed Services
Committee the legislative functions in-
substitute that 8 members of this com-
mittee will be taken frouti Armed Serv-
ices, Foreign Relations, Appropriations,
What we are doing is adding seven
more members to the committee, four
from the majority and three from the
Senate, who have just as much of a
stake, and whose integrity I havediMt
I have high respect for tl`ici'
and higher regard. I think the Sena-
tor from Mississippi appreciates that
from the past experiences we both have
ator from Mississippi and the Senator
from Texas should realize that there are
body.
Consequently, I think it is absolutely
necessary, in order to have the complete
support and complete confidence of the
Senate in basic decisions that - will be
made in the future, that the committee
tions, and Armed Services.
Mr. President, at this time, on my
time, I would like to accord the distin-
guished Senator from Georgia a colloquy
on some problems that are bothering
Committee. I think the colloquy will
mittee do have.
Senator from Illinois, on the. Govern-
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or all the diligent work which
into this.
questioning, but I will start with the
question of whether or not there is any-
thing in the pending substitute to Sen-
ate Resolution 400 which would require
public disclosure in any form of the
amount spent on intelligence.
Mr. RIBICOFF. No. Senate, Resolu-
iton 400 creates a new committee and
defines its jurisdiction. It does not try
to decide the important issue whether
the intelligence budget should be dis-
closed publicly, and, if so, in what form.
The new committee is encouraged by
section 13(a) (8) to study this issue. I
would expect the full Senate to give this
difficult issue full consideration after
the new committee submits any recom-
mendations it may have on the matter
no later than next July 1.
Section 12 establishes a procedure
which assures that, for the first time,
the intelligence activities subject to the
select committee's jurisdiction will be
authorized on an annual basis. The sec-
tion constitutes a commitment, on behalf
of the Senate, that funds will not be
appropriated for these agencies before
such an authorization. Approval of an
authorization, however, may be given
in a way that keeps the figures secret,
just as now the Senate appropriates
f s for intelligence in a way that
tains the secrecy of the figures:
r. NUNN. I thank the Senator from
.
Acticut
her question along that line:
:
hen the select committee reports an
authorization bill for intelligence funds,
how will the full Senate then consider
the matter, assuming that the Senate
has decided to continue to keep these
figures secret?
Mr. RIBICOFF. If the Senate decided
to continue to keep the overall figures
secret, the process could work this way :
In the case of authorizations for de-
fense-related intelligence activities, any
bill reported by the new committee would
be sequentially referred to the Armed
Services Committee. As in the case of
sequential referral of other legislation,
there would be no need for full Senate
debate prior to this sequential referral.
The authorization figure would then be
disguised in the DOD authorization bill
approved by the Armed Services Com-
mittee, as is the case now.
In the case of an annual authorization
for the CIA, after the. select committee
approves an authorization, I would ex-
pect that the figure would be disguised
in some other authorization measure.
Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator. I
think that is extremely important, and
clarifies a point that has been of con-
siderable concern to the Senator from
Georgia and I think many other Sena-
tors.
nother question along the same line:
would the new committee bring a
wAhjLpr involving the intelligence au-
ction figure to the attention of the
f Senate, assuming the figures are
still secret?
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
Mr. RIBICOFF. In that event, the
Senate could invoke the same procedure
for a secret session now available to the
Senate. Under rule XXXV, the Senate
could go into closed session and debate
the matter in secrecy, just as they could
debate the intelligence budget now in
secret session.
Mr. UNN. A further question: Will
the requirement in section 12 for an
annual authorization of the intelligence
budget interfere with the ability of the
Appropriations Committee to appro-
priate funds for intelligence in a timely
fashion?
Mr. RIBICOFF. The committee au-
thorizing expenditures for intelligence
activities would be subject, like other
committees, to the requirements of the
Budget Act. The committees will have
until May 15 to complete action on au-
thorizations for intelligence. At the same
time, the Budget Act contemplates that
the Senate will not act on approriation
measures until after May 15. This would
apply to appropriations for the intelli-
gence community. Assuming that all the
committees adhere to the Budget Act,
the requirements in section 12 will not
affect the schedule the Appropriations
Committee would follow for the appro-
priation of intelligence funds.
Mr. NUNN. One clarifying question
on that latter point: I understand the
timetable and that we may have to re-
vise that timetable as the budgeting
process is reviewed; but suppose, for in-
stance, in terms of the overall intelli-
gence activities, that there is a sequen-
tial referral of the annual authorization
from the Intelligence Committee to the
Armed Services Committee. I understand
that under the provisions of Senate Res-
oltuion 400, in the case of such a referral
the Armed Services Committee would be
allowed to have that bill for 30 days!
Suppose the Intelligence Committee
gives them the bill on, say, May 14. Then
the Armed Service Committee would be
right up against the May 15 deadline. I
suppose the committees would just have
to work together under those circum-
stances.
Mr. RIBICOFF. I would say so. I would
assume that the Intelligence Committee
would, on a basis of comity, adopt a
schedule that would assure that the
Armed Services Committee had'the full
30 days to do its job.
It should be remembered that on the
Intelligence Committee there will be two
members of the Armed Services Commit-
tee, and I personally would be very dis-
appointed in the Intelligence Committee
if they did not make sure that any com-
mittee entitled sequentially to 30 days
would have the full 30 days before May 15
to comply with the Budget Act.
Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator. I have
another line of questioning on this point:
Under present law, the Committee on
Armed Services has authorizing jurisdic-
tion over all of the military personnel
and all of the civilian personnel in the
Department of Defense. The manpower
requirements report indicates that there
are 42,000 military personnel, 9,500 civil-
ians, and 5,300 reservists in the overall
manpower authorization for fiscal year
S 7539
1976 for the intelligence and security
category.
My question is, With the new Intelli-
gence Committee having authorizing
jurisdiction over Defense Department in-
telligence, how would the two commit-
tees handle the manpower authorization
which relates to Defense Department
personnel in general, but also includes
intelligence personnel?
Mr. RIBICOFF. Let me respond to the
distinguished Senator from Georgia and
the distinguished Senators from Missis-
sippi and North Dakota, who are so deep-
ly involved in such matters: This is the
type of situation where, in my opinion,
it would first go to the Armed Services
Committee and then, sequentially, to the
Intelligence Committee. You would come
first, in my opinion, where the bill is a
general Defense Department manpower
bill.
The Armed Services Committee would
continue to have exclusive jurisdiction
over all aspects of the legislation except
for the portion affecting national intel-
ligence. The portion of the legislation af-
fecting national intelligence would be re-
viewed by both the Committee on Armed
Services and the new committee, under
section 3. It would be up to the new com-
mittee and the Armed Services Commit-
tee to work out the details on the pro-
cedure for actual consideration by both
committees of the intelligence portion of
this bill.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield to me and let me inter-
vene on that same point?
If the Senator will yield, I appreciate
the suggestion of the Senator from
Connecticut, but the bill, as I under-
stand it, provides to the contrary, that
it would go to the Intelligence Commit-
tee first. Senators will understand that
our hearings on manpower start in the
fall of the year, before-the budget even
comes in.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Well, basically it is
up to the Parliamentarian, in a sequen-
tial referral, on the basis of what is in
the bill. If it is basically armed services,
it goes to the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices first. If-it is basically intelligence, it
goes to Intelligence first. It is my per-
sonal interpretation that if it provided
for overall manpower, covering the en-
tire Department of Defense, common-
sense would dictate-and, of course, the
Parliamentarian is the final judge-that
that would go to armed services first.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
ALLEN). The allotted time has expired.
Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield myself 2 more
minutes.
It would go to Armed Services first,
because intelligence would be only a part
of the overall Department of Defense
manpower authorization.
Then out of that would be carved out
only the intelligence portion, which
would then be referred sequentially to
the Intelligence Committee.
May I say for the benefit of the Senate
that it is my feeling that there are a lot
of gray areas in this legislation. It is
impossible to answer all the questions.
We are going to have to work it out
between all the committees and the In-
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. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 19, 1976
telligence Committee. All the interested
committees will have to exercise a great
deal of commonsense.
I would say much will depend upon the
quality of that 15-member committee.
Also, I think it should be pointed out
that the reason why we have a resolu-
tion, and the advantage of the resolu-
tion, is that a resolution does not bind
the executive branch. If this is to work,
we will have to have comity between the
executive branch and the Senate of the
United States. I personally believe that
the greatest problem America has today
in the matter of foreign policy is not our
problem with foreign governments or
our prospective opponents, but the di-
visions between the executive branch
and the legislative branch. I think the
greatest problem we suffer as a nation in
the field of foreign policy is the conflict,
we have gone through in the last few
years between the executive and legis-
lative branches of the Government in
the whole field of foreign policy.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's additional time has expired.
Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield myself 2 more
minutes.
Here is an opportunity for the Senate
and the executive branch to work closely
together with the Intelligence Commit-
tee, to work out the problems of broad
policy, for the executive branch to gain
a sense of what the Senate is going to
do, and what the sentiment of the Senate
is. I can think of no greater blow to the
executive branch in our foreign policy
than to find our Nation - embarrassed
over a matter like Angola: If the execu-
tive branch had gone before a commit-
tee like the Intelligence Committee and
had obtained the sense of this 15-mem-
b-er committee that it just would not fly,
it would never have developed into such
a matter of conflict, to the embarrass-
ment of our Nation.
I have confidence in the majority and
minority leaders, that the men they will
choose will make this committee work
in a way that benefits the Senate and
the United States.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, may I ask
one further, question on that manpower
matter?
Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield.
Mr. NUNN. It is my interpretation,
from what the Senator from Connecticut
has said, that the overall manpower au-
thorization, as it is now, would be sub-
mitted to the Armed Services Commit-
tee, the Armed Services Committee would
act on that manpower request, just as it
acts on other requests, and then the por-
tion -of the manpower proposal dealing
with intelligence would be referred to
the intelligence committee for their re-
view. Is that correct?
Mr. RIBICOFF. That is the way I
interpret it,
Mr. NUNN. 'If there were a difference
between, say, what the Committee on
Armed Services authorized in terms of
manpower and what the intelligence
community authorized in terms of man-
power how would that difference be
brought to the Chamber?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's time has expired.
Mr. NUNN. I know the Senate would
resolve it. But how would it be brought
to the Chamber?
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I yield
myself 1 additional minute.
I suppose the Senate would have to
resolve this as they resolve all other con-
flicts. There is no difference. The Senate
eventually is going to decide, and they
will have to make that decision. But
again, looking at the makeup of the
committee, with eight members coming
from basic committees and seven from
the remainder, of the Senate, and the
Committee on Armed Services being well
represented by two members, personally
I do not think we are going to have any
problems. I do not think we are going to
ble that jealous or that shortsighted in
this body.
Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator from
Connecticut.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield to the distin-
guished Senator from Nevada, after
which I yield to the Senator from Illinois.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. How
much time is yielded?
Mr. CANNON. Will the Senator yield
me 1 minute?
Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield the Senator 1
minute.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, on
May 17, 1976, the hearings on Senate
Resolution 400, having been concluded,
the director of the National Legislative
Commission of the American Legion, de-
siring to express its attitude toward Sen-
ate Resolution 400, sent me a letter set-
ting forth a resolution adopted by the
National Executive Committee of the
American Legion-on reaffirming "the
American Legion support for a viable
intelligence community." In light of the
colloquy, just preceded, between Senator
NUNN and Senator RISICOFF, I think it
appropriate at this point, and I, there-
fore, ask unanimous -consent that the
letter and resolution be printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the letter
and resolution were ordered to be printed
in the RECORD, as follows:
THE AMERICAN LEGION,
Washington, D.C., May 17, 1976.
Hon. HOWARD W. CANNON,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration, Russell Senate Office
Building, Washington, D.C. '
DEAR CHAIRMAN CANNON: It is my under-
standing that a floor vote to invoke cloture
on S. Res. 400, to establish a Standing Com-
mittee of the Senate Intelligence Activities,
will occur later this week.
The National Executive Committee-of The
American Legion recently met in Indian-
apolis, Irldiana and adopted the enclosed res-
olution (Foreign Relations Res. No. 23) re-
affirming our strong support for a viable in-
telligence community.
Mr. Chairman, the Legion hopes that you
will keep our views and recommendations
in mind when the measure is considered by
the full Senate.
Your attention to this request is ap-
preciated.
Sincerely,
MYLIO S. KRAJA,
Director, National Legislative Commission.
Resolution No. 23.
Committee: Foreign Relations.
Subject: Reaffirm American Leglo
are indispensible to any nation's security
and deterrence; and
Whereas, there is presently a massive and
sustained attack on-- the 'American intelli-
gence community which has the effect of dis-
crediting all intelligence operations; and
Whereas, these continuing attacks have
already seriously impaired the functioning of
the CIA, Hampering the collection of worth-
while intelligence by the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the CIA is- also experiencing
great difficulty in gaining cooperation from
some foreign intelligence agencies; and
Whereas, without credible intelligence op-
erations, the United States becomes a blinded
warrior. incapable of insuring even its own
survival; and
Whereas, at a time when America's intelli-
gence community has been seriously im-
paired, the KGB has expanded to an esti-
mated 300,000 agents, domestic and abroad,
with close cooperation from intelligence serv-
ices which it has trained in Romania, Hun-
gary, -Cuba and other nations; and
Whereas, leaks of legitimately classified
information with profound impact on our
national security have become commonplace;
and
Whereas, no Congressional oversight of the
intelligence community will be effective in
the absence of specific statutes concerning
the leakage of classified Information which
effects our national security; and
Whereas, the British- Official Secrets Act
of 1911, as amended by the Official Secrets
Act of 1920, has effectively safeguarded
classified information without infrinaiftnt
Whereas, the U.S. Supreme Cour g-
nized the need for safeguarding ed
information in the New York Times pu lica-
tion case when Justices Stewart and White
concurred that "it is clear . . . that it is
the constitutional duty of the executive-as
a matter of sovereign prerogative and not as
a matter of law as the courts know law-
through the promulgation and enforcement
of executive regulations to protect the con-
fidentiality necessary to carry out its re-
sponsibilities in the fields of international
relations and national defense;" and
Whereas, it is obvious that executive orders
and regulations alone can no longer con-
trol the unauthorized release of classified
information; and
Whereas, the U.S. Congress faced and re-
sponded to similar situations, namely the
enactment of 50 U.S.C. 783(b), 18 U.S.C. 798
and the Atomic Energy Act; and
Whereas, in the Scarbeck case, the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia point-
ed out that the Congress fully intended to
permit a prosecution without violating the
same national security that 50 U.S.C. 783(b)
was designed to protect; now, therefore, be
it
Resolved, by the National Executive Com-
mittee of The American Legion in regular
meeting assembled in Indianapolis, Indiana,
on May 5-6, 1976, that we reaffirm our sup-
port for a viable intelligence community
which adequately advises the U.S. Congress
of its major activities and one which operates
within the current statutes and safeguards;
and, be it further
Resolved, that we support enactme
penalties for violation of its provisio
be it further
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May 19, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
it further
Resolved, that this legislation should clear-
ly prohibit the classification of infromation
which does not effect the national security,
of the United States.
Mr.,LEAHY. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a unanimous-co sent-
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I am-happy
to yield.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unan-
imous consent that Douglas Racine and
Herbert Jolovitz of my office staff be ac-
corded privilege of the floor during con-
sideration and votes on Senate Resolu-
tion 400.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the Sen-
ator from Connecticut wishes to have a
3-minute colloquy and ask a few ques-
tions at this point. The Senator from
Illinois wishes about 10 minutes some-
time before 1 p.m. I think we have held
the floor, and the proponents of the
amendment may wish to have time now.
I am happy to defer my comments
until afterwards, depending on the
wishes-of the Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I yield
4 the distinguished 'ranking minority
tuber as much time as he wishes.
the Senator from Maine.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I have a
more complete statement covering my
support of the compromise resolution,
but in light of the colloquy which has
taken place between the distinguished
Senator from Georgia (Mr. NUNN) and
the distinguished floor manager of the
bill, part of which related to the budget
process, I shall. make some brief observa-
tions on it from that point of view.
Mr. President, I rise and support the
establishment of a new Senate committee
with legislative jurisdiction over the na-
tional intelligence community.
Senate Resolution 400, as favorably re-
ported by the Committee on Government
Operations, would have created such a
permanent committee. The substitute re-
ported by the Committee on Rules and
'Administration would' not have estab-
lished the kind of committee that the
times demand. The compromise amend-
ment (No. 1643),, proposed by the two
committees, would set up a new select
committee with sufficient authority to
exercise those responsible uses of power
that are required.
As the American people now know so
well, Congress' 40-year informal method
of overseeing the activities of the Cen-
ral Intelligence Agency, the National
curity Agency, the Federal Bureau of
'RKnvestigation, and other agencies in-
'ved in domestic and foreign intelli-
ce has been careless and ineffective.
err host of intelligence agency abuses,
violations of the law, covert operations,
and infringements on civil liberties-
without the knowledge of Congress-has
been revealed by the Rockefeller Com-
mission and the Senate Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence Activities.
The Senate myst take the lead to
start anew in fulfilling the constitutional
role of controlling the Nation's purse
strings and formulating national policy.
Vigilant legislative oversight over the in-
telligence activities of the United States
is very much in order to assure that such
activities are in conformity with the Con-
stitution and the laws of the land.
die Budget Committee's view-
point, a new select committee with juris-
diction jk*er the national intelligence
budget annual basis fits right into
the co ional process of analyzing
and co ling the budget.
The regate outlay of the various
intellig&ri a agencies is significant. At this
time, Senate committees deal with parts
rather than the whole. Intelligence
spending-is not looked at in terms of na-
tional priorities or priorities within our
foreign-defense policies. "Neither the
Armed Services Committee nor any other
committee has the time, because of its
other duties, or the necessary overall
jurisdiction to attend to the Nation's in-
telligence system," Senator CHURCH tes-
tified before the Committee on Rules and
Administration. He added that-
The executive budgets for, and organizes
and directs the national intelligence effort in
a way that draws together the various com-
ponents, and unless the Congress establishes
a committee that can do the same, it will
continue to fail in its oversight responsibili-
ties.
Section 3 of Senate Resolution 400, as
amended, would provide for periodic au-
thorization of appropriations for the CIA
and other intelligence agencies. Each
March 15 that committee would submit
a report on intelligence spending for the
forthcoming fiscal year to the Senate
Budget Committee. This is what every
authorizing committee does now, in ac-
cordance with section 301(c) of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974. Sec-
tion 4(c) of the compromise resolution
reads:
On or before March 15 of each year, the
elect committee shall submit to the Com-
mittee on the Budget the Senate views and
stimates described in section 301(c) of the
ongressional Budget Act of 1974 regarding
matters within the jurisdiction of the select
ommittee.
Reports to the Committee on the Budg-
t would be received and handled in a
manner consistent with the protection
of national security.
It-seems to me that the colloquy be-
tween Senator RISICOFF- and Senator
uNN covers this point very well, from
oint.of view.
AnQther aspect of the legislative
process involved here is helping to re-
store Congress role as a coequal branch
of Government. I agree with the "Minor-
ity Views" statement set forth by Sena-
tors PELL, WILLIAMS, CLARK, and HAT-
FIELD in the Rules Committee report:
In failing to adequately control the activ-
ities of the intelligence agencies abroad, Con-
gress, in effect, has appropriated funds with-
out knowing how they would be spent by
the.executive to carry out foreign policy ob-
jectives. Without the knowledge or approval
S 7541
of the full Congress, the CIA has received
funds to carry out paramilitary operations
in Chile and Laos and assassination attempts
against a number of foreign leaders. At the
same time, Congress has refrained from de-
manding access to vital intelligence informa-
tion concerning matters of foreign policy
upon which it is called to act.
By establishing an effective oversight
mechanism, Congress can assert its right
to essential information and begin to define
the proper limits of secrecy in a democratic
society.
A Select Intelligence Committee in the
Senate with authorizing powers is essen-
tial. This committee must have primary
authority to consider and act on the an-
nual budgets for the intelligence agencies
within its jurisdiction. By controlling the
purse strings, the select committee and
Congress will have restored its rightful
role in directing America's future intel-
ligence activities-and America'ss future.
I thank my good friend from Connecti-
cut for yielding me this time to support
him in his' efforts and to compliment
him on the effective way in which he has
handled this issue and. the problems
connected with it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
LEAHY). Who yields time?
Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I have
a question which I intend to direct to
the amendment.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I yield
2 minutes to the Senator from Connecti-
cut.
Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I ad-
dress myself to the amendment of the
distinguished Senators from -Texas and
Mississippi.
In the "Dear Colleague" letter they
sent out, they said:
The amendment would provide:
1. It would remove from the proposed new
select committee legislative jurisdiction over
Department of Defense intelligence. The ra-
tionale is twofold. First, it would minimize
the possible disclosure through the long and
debated process of authorization of sensitive
intelligence figures. Rather than being sep-
arately "authorized by a bill or joint resolu-
tion passed by the Senate", as required by
the Substitute, Defense intelligence figures
would continue to be included in various
parts of the Military Authorization and Ap-
propriation Acts. I cannot overstress the
damage to defense intelligence that could
flow from budget clues which would enable
foreign powers to determine information and
trends on our highly sophisticated electronic
and satellite activities.
The difference I have with the Sten-
is absolutely unconstitutional.
I bring to the attention of the dis-
and that clause which reads:
No money shall be drawn from the Treas-
ury, but in consequence of Appropriations
made by Law; and a regular Statement of
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of
all public Money shall be published from
time to time,,
What seems rather unsettling to me
is that as men sworn to uphold the Con-
stitution of the United States apparently
we have some system or some procedure
that de facto supersedes the very specific
requirements of the Constitution. It does
not say in the Constitution an account
of the receipts and expenditures of all
public money except those allotted to
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 19, 1976
Intelligence activities. It says all public
money, all money.
And as much as I appreciate the thrust
of the comments in the Chamber, which
is to try to keep these moneys from pub-
lic view, it seems to me that, if that is
what they desire to have accomplished,
then I suggest a constitutional amend-
ment. But to me the duty placed on us
in this body, in the legislative branch,
and the executive branch, is very clear,
as mandated by the Constitution of the
United States, regardless, of what the
process has been in the past, and the
process has been a direct violation of
the Constitution of the United States.
I ask either the Senator from Texas or
the Senator from Mississippi as to
whether or not they feel that the way
matters have been handled in the past,
in fact, is an exception to this require-
ment of article I, section 9?
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I shall re-
spond to the Senator from Connecticut.
Can he cite any decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States that has held
that our previous procedures in the mat-
ter of budgeting our intelligence activi-
ties are unconstitutional?
Mr. WEICKER. No, for the simple
reason that everyone is perfectly willing
to go along with the old system, -and
that is exactly what is under attack to-
day and has been for many weeks. The
old system did not work, it broke down.
And that is exactly why the legislation
is before the Senate now, and to go back
to the old system-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of the Senator has expired. -
Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield me 2 additional minutes?
Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield the Senator 2
additional minutes.
Mr. WEICKER. To go back to the old
system invites the disasters that have
been revealed during the course of the
past year.
But I repeat, I do not care what was
done; I am insisting, as I think others
are, that the Constitution be explicitly-
followed, and to me it is not whether we
want to obey it or do not want to obey it,
the language is very specific:
. a regular Statement of Account of the
Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money....
Is the Senator from Texas telling me:
Yes; there should be an exception insofar
as this public money is concerned? That
is all I ask.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield 3 minutes to the
Senator from Texas. -
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, as I read
this provision of the Constitution, I see
nothing that requires a line item disclo-
sure of every expenditure of the Govern-
ment of the United States. It is not done
in other departments. In fact, we do
publish these figures by generic category.
We do not publish everything in a line
item way. If we did, we would have to list
the salaries of every individual hired by
the Government of the United States
and the Congress of the United States.
- Mr. President, I think it is significant
that there never has-been a court case on
this. Apparently, the people of the United
States are prepared. to accept the fact
that if this country is going to have an
intelligence-gathering capability, some
things must be kept secret.
The fact is that there is no, public out-
cry for this oversight committee. There
is not such an outcry outside of a 50-mile
radius of Washington, D.C. We become
so inundated when we read the Washing-
ton Post and the New York Times, and
by what we hear from the network com-
mentators, that we must have the im-
pression that the American people are
out there shivering in fear of the vast
abuses of the intelligence-gathering com-
munity of the United States. $ k.
There is an- anti-Wash senti-
ment abroad in this land, is not
focused on the FBI, the CIA, ' DIA, or
the NSA. It is focused on thd-fact that
we have failed to exercise pii er over-
sight ,over all agencies, departments, bu-
reaus, boards, and what have you, that
intrude themselves on the daily lives of
our citizens. If there is a fear of a police
state in this country, it is generated by
the fact that every American's life is
touched by the arbitrary acts of some bu-
reaucrat operating under what he con-
ceives to be or perhaps does not con-
ceive to be a mandate from the Congress
of the United States, which has delegated
away its legislative authority.
Mr. WEICKER. If that is the response
to the question I asked the Senator from
Texas, it is a very effective presentation
of his case, but it does not respond to the
constitutional issues that I raise.
Nobody has asked for a line item budg-
et, but I think the Senator from Texas is
well aware that the total intelligence
figure never has been released to the
American people until the latest hear-
ings came along; and even then, there is
a tremendous disparity. The House
thinks $9.7 billion; the Senate commit-
tee thinks $10 billion. But nobody in the
Armed Services Committee has given t4T
the American people the total-never
mind line item-of moneys spent on in-
telligence. Have they or not?
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, to begin
with, there would be great difficulty in
separating that which is purely intelli-
gence and that which is not, because
there are many agencies of Government
that gather intelligence just as an ancil-
lary.function to what their line respon-
sibility is. It cannot be separated. You
cannot say that this Government em-
ployee has spent 1% hours in a 40-hour
week on gathering intelligence; there-
fore, we must figure out what percentage
of his salary goes into the intelligence
budget.
The fact is that there never has been
a test of the constitutionality of this. The
fact that there, is no precedent for hold-
ing this to be unconstitutional, in my
view, means that what we have done in
the past is constitutional, until there is
such a test. Again, I think it is significant
that there never has been such a test, be-
cause no citizen has ever questioned what
we have done.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Texas yield?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield
myself 1 minute.
I know that the Senator from Con-
necticut is a mighty good lawyer; but
under a strict interpretation of the
stitution as he has advocated, we -t
lution, I say respectfully. All the un-
broken custom is to the contrary. There
are records of every appropriation. It is
accounted for. But the law does not re-
quire it for the CIA.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. - President, will the
Senator yield me 1 minute?
M ? STENNIS. I yield to the Senator
fromreorgia. The Senator from Con-
necti t, has the floor. I yield to- the Sen-
ator from Georgia.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield me 30 seconds?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield 1 minute.
Mr. NUNN. We just went through a
colloquy, a minute, ago, on the question
of revealing the overall budget. It is very
plain in the committe bill and in the col-
loquy I just had with the Senator from
Connecticut (Mr. RIBIcorp) that nothing
in this bill requires the overall budget to
be revealed.
One of the mandates for study by the
new committee is to determine how to
handle that very question. So under
either the Tower amendment or the Can-
non substitute, the same question, the
constitutional question, that the Senator
from Connecticut has raised applies, and
it has no bearing, as I see it, on whether
the Tower amendment should 6r -should
it is agreed to.
very clear that under the Cannon suo-
stitute, the question can be studied, and
all our options are available to us; but
under the Stennis-Tower amendment,
that automatically, by virtue of what we
are doing here, cuts us off from ever
being able to get those figures and pub-
lishing V.-em. So there is a definite dif-
ference between the two.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield me 30 seconds?
Mr. WEICKER. I yield.
Mr. CANNON. I think we have to read
article 1, section 9, clause 7, together
with article 1, section 5, clause 3, which
reads: -
Each House shall keep a Journal of its
Proceedings, and from time to time publish
the same, excepting such Parts as may In
their Judgment require Secrecy ...
So the two have to be read together.
It is obvious that either House can re-
quire secrecy as to this part of the
budget or other items that may require
secrecy. We have to read both those pro-
visions of the Constitution together, I
believe.
I thank the Senator for yielding.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the
floor manager of the bill yield me 10
minutes?
Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield.
Mr.. PERCY. Mr. President, first,
(Mr. RIBICOFF) had with the Sen
from Georgia. I found that colloquy
traordinarily reassuring.
The Senator from Illinois has been
deeply concerned about- unauthorized
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE -
uncTertaken to be revealed publicly sim-
ply by someone being able to trace au-
thorized amounts that have been made
public.
On the basis of the colloquy that has
been carried on, I have come to the con-
clusion that it is possible to authorize
intelligence activities without public dis-
closure; that you can authorize such
sums and explain it in a classified report;
that differences can be debated in a
closed Senate session and notes taken on
a sense of the Senate resolution which
can remain secret. The specifics will not
have the force of law but will have the
same impact as the Senate will be mak-
ing its decision.
The Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER)
has indicated in his previous comments
this morning-if my notes are correct-
that the new committee still would have
oversight authority even if stripped of
legislative authority under the amend-
ment. The point of the Senator from
Illinois, in response to that, is simply
this: A committee without legislative au-
thority but only with oversight respon-
sibility means that a committee's only
recourse is public disclosure. It really
has no legislative remedy.
In response to the comment of the dis-
tin fished Senator from 'Texas (Mr.
T ) that no one outside a 50-mile
ra of Washington cares about this
ma ` -that no one cares about it other
th, ,ose who read the New York Times
ana Washington Post, I respond by
saying that is not true in the State of
Illinois. It is not true in the State of In-
diana, where the Senator from Illinois
has been recently. It is not true in a
number of areas that can be testified to
by the editorials that are available. The
entire country is looking to Congress now
to find a way to have effective oversight.
They are counting on us.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent
to have printed in the RECORD, as quickly
as I can obtain it, an editorial from the
Chicago Tribune, and the San Francisco
Chronicle that evidences that deep con-
cern with respect to the practices of the
past and the expectation that the U.S.
Senate is going to deal with this issue.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
HARNESSING THE CIA
The essence of President Ford's reorganiza-
tion of the foreign intelligence services lies
in the focusing of responsibility on the Pres-
ident and on a three-member oversight
board which will receive continuing reports
on all intelligence activities and will report
directly to the President.
The other changes and restrictions, sound
though they may be, will be only an effec-
tive as the President and the oversight board
make them. It is impossible, after all, to fore-
seef the methods an intelligence agency
. Mr. Ford's restrictions cover only
mWe
a the more common or shocking tricks
of tY pyy trade that surfaced during last
year yngs; planned assassination of for-
eign rs, illegal opening of the U.S. mail,
,infiltration of domestic groups, and so on.
Next time it could be something entirely
unforeseen.
The past time of the CIA were committed
under a system of supervision so loose as to
be nonexistent. Vague suggestions from the
White House were translated into sinister
plans and activities which, in many ins-
tances, the President didn't want to know
about and would never have specifically ap-
proved. The new system will work only if the
President and the oversight board use their
judgment as well as the rules in determining,
what activities are justified and what are not.
The highly controversial question that re-
mains is how deeply Congress will become in-
volved. It is quite proper and indeed essen-
tial that Congress be repersented in the
mechanism for overseeing intelligence op-
erations. It always has been, through the
agency of certain committee chairmen. That
things got out of hand under the old system
was as much the fault of these congressmen
as it was of the executive branch.
Mr. Ford's proposal is that Congress create
a joint intelligence committee to be kept
fully informed of all intelligence activities.
This would be better than the old system
in that it would provide a more formal and
systematic means of supervision. The ques-
tion is whether the committee members
would have the necessary maturity and
proved discretion, and whether the commit-
tee's activities could be kept totally free of
politics, which would be essential if the hag-
gling and leaks of the recent House Intelli-
gence Committee are to be avoided.
These are big questions. Already some
Democrats are referring to Mr. Ford's changes
and proposals as a "first step" in the "re-
form" of our intelligence operations. What
are the next steps? When some of them say
"reform," were afraid they really mean
"emasculation" by indiscriminately publiciz-
ing every activity that they happen to dis-
approve.
A good illustration is the decision of the
House to consider holding CBS correspon-
dent Daniel Schorr in contempt for the re-
cent publication of the intelligence com-
mittee's report. We don't defend Mr. Schorr's
behavior for a minute, as we've already made
clear. But the duty to protect the secret
information was not Mr. Schorr's; it belonged
to the members and staff ' of the intelli-
gence committee. It was they who violated
their trust. It is they who should be iden-
tified and punished. Yet, so far, the House
seems more interested in looking elsewhere
for its villains.
Obviously Mr. Ford Is right In wanting
Congress to patch up its own leaks before
it is made privy to any more secrets.
Most members and employes of Congress,
we're sure, can be trusted. The trouble is that
it takes only one leak to do the damage. So
before scrambling for a place in the line to
receive further CIA secrets, we suggest that
congressmen move slowly-first by demon-
strating a willingness to impose the same
restraints on themselves that they want' im-
posed on the CIA and that the President
wants imposed on employes of the executive
branch, and then by setting up a committee
like the one Mr. Ford has proposed and
making certain that its members and staff
are of the highest caliber available.
NEW OVERSIGHT FOR THE CIA
A PERMANENT NEW committee with au-
thority to oversee U.S. intelligence activities
seems likely to come into being thanks to a
compromise worked out in the U.S. Senate.
The committee will have 17 members with
a nine-year limit on length of tenure. Most
importantly, it will have purse-string con-
trol over the CIA.
The whole question of placing a legislative
rein on intelligence work is a touchy and
debatable one due to the nature of covert
activities. Spreading authority too widely
S7543
and allowing too many persons to be "in on
the know" removes the essential element of
secrecy, as has been shown by widespread
leaks from congressional panels investigating
our intelligence structure.
This power to limit the CIA's budget. and
thus its activities Wm a.. ey element of the
compromise worked out between the Sen-
atVs old guard and more reform-minded
members. At one point Nevada Senator How-
ard W. Cannon's rules committee had voted
to give the new committee no law-making
or budgetary authority. Its present posture,
however, gives it most of the policing powers
originally recommended by the now-defunct
Church committee that looked into illegal
activities by our spies.
Everything will depend, of course, on the
selection of Senators for the committee who
can keep their eyes open for intelligence
abuses but their mouths shut while they're
being dealt with.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the ques-
tion comes up as to whether or not a
consolidated committee is desirable and
whether or not defense intelligence
should be included. My point simply is
that because of the interlocking char-
acter of intelligence, the President's
Executive order puts the DCI over all
intelligence, including national intelli-
gence, but excluding tactical intelligence.
- The compromise substitute offered by
the distinguished Senator from Nevada
(Mr. CANNON) 'does exactly the same
thing. The administration, as I under-
stand the testimony that witnesses gave,
supports the concept of placing all intel-
ligence in one committee. The adminis-
tration made it clear that to avoid the
proliferation of testimony which Mr.
Colby said consumed, in 3 years, 60 per-
cent of his time, leaving him only 40 per-
cent of his time to administer the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, it would prefer
a joint committee. But they have made
it clear that if it is the wisdom of the '
Senate and the House to decide on sepa-
rate committees, that is our decision.
And it is the decision of the Committee
on Government Operations, the Com-
mittee on Rules, and the compromise
group that have worked together that
the Senate of the United States should
establish its own committee.
I wish to read to my distinguished
-colleagues the words of Mr. George
Bush, Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. Mr. Bush said:
The Central Intelligence Agency welcomes
strong and effective congressional oversight.
We have a great deal to gain from it. We gain
the advice and counsel of knowledgeable
Members. Through it, we can maintain the
trust and support of the American people.
We will retain the support only so long as
the people remain confident that the poli-
tical structure provides clear accountability
of our intelligence services, through effective
executive and congressional oversight.
Good oversight will insure that the intel-
ligence agencies operate as the government-
and the Nation-wish them to. But in es-
tablishing this accountability; I believe the "
Congress must also Insure that oversight en-
hances, rather than hinders, the vital opera-
tions of our intelligence agencies.
Certainly, the Senator from Illinois has
been deeply concerned about this. I have
been satisfied that the compromise reso-
lution takes that into account.
I close the quotation from Mr. George
Bush by quoting this sentence:
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S 7544 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
And so I urge concentrated oversight.
What he does not want is fractional-
ized oversight. The Director of Central
Intelligence would like to have effective,
meaningful oversight, but concentrated
oversight.
turn to the testimony given before
the Committee on Government Opera-
tions. I wish to point out several prom-
inent people who have testified, first
from the Senate itself. Senator MANS-
FIELD emphatically believes in the crea-
tion of a new committee that would pro-
vide consolidated oversight. Senator
CHURCH said:
We need a new committee. The work can-
not be done on a piecemeal basis or by a sub-
committee of another standing committee
which is primarily engaged in a different pre-
occupation. It will require a well-staffed
committee directing all of its attention to
the intelligence community.
Senator BAKER favors a new commit-
tee. He said:
The greater good would be the prompt
creation of a new standing Senate commit-
tee on intelligence oversight, even if this
leaves to another day resolving the questions
of prior notification of sensitive operations
and the authority of the Senate to disclose
classified information.
In all fairness, I would like to point out
that our distinguished colleague from
Texas (Mr. TOWER) did come in and tes-
tify. He opposed the creation of a new
committee. Senator TOWER made it clear
that he wants to leave reforms to the ex-
isting standing committees. But cer-
tainly, the Committee on Rules and Ad-
ministration and the Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations overwhelmingly de-
cided that that course was not one that
we would recommend that the Senate
follow.
Secretary Rusk testified. He testified
that he was shocked to find, as Secretary
of State, how many things were being
done by intelligence agencies, not under'
his direct, day-by-day jurisdiction, but
that involved foreign policy. He was
shocked later, when he left office, to find
how much had been carried on. He also
stated very clearly to us that he would
like to. see a committee as quickly as pos-
sible.
Former Attorney General Katzenbabh
favors a new committee.
David Phillips, the president of the As-
sociation of Retired Intelligence Officers,
stated that 98 percent of his membership
favors some form of a new committee.
Mr. Colby, the past Director of CIA,
said that he is in favor of "`a new com-
mittee with exclusive jurisdiction for the
oversight of foreign intelligence."
McGeorge Bundy, former Assistant to
the President for National Security,
favors a new committee.
Mr. John McCone strongly urged a new
committee.
Mr. Clark Clifford, former Secretary of
Defense, favored a new committee.
Mr. Richard Helms said, "It is up to
the Congress whether or not to have a
new comimttee," but he thinks a commit-
tee would be an improvement.
So, overwhelmingly, it seemed to the
Senator from Illinois, and unanimously
to the members of the Committee on
Government Operations, a new commit-
tee was needed and is necessary. On
whether defense intelligence should be
included or not, we came to-the unani-
mous judgment in the Committee on
Government Operations, on a vote of 16
to 0, that is should be included. DIA
plays a role in covert actions-for ex-
ample, the Schneider killing during the
Chile Track II operation. Army counter-.
intelligence was found spying on inno
cent Americans, bugging, taping, and
opening mail.
As I pointed out before, the 5th Army
was discovered performing intelligence
operations-following the activities and
keeping dossiers on such distinguished
Illinois citizens as my distinguished col-
league, Mr. ADLAI STEVENSON, who I pre-
sume was just as shocked as anybody
else to learn that he and many promi-
nent people were being followed by the
5th Army and dossiers were being kept
on them. Obviously, it has been revealed
by our own intelligence committee how
much spying on innocent Americans was
engaged in without proper oversight.
Military clandestine intelligence activ-
ities were supervised by the CIA. When
we consider that only half of what the
CIA spends comes from its own appro-
priations-the other half comes out of
Defense appropriations through transfers
or advances-certainly, it is desirable
and necessary, I think mandatory, to
include defense intelligence.
The question can be raised, what would
the compromise substitute do to the ju-
risdiction of the Committee on Armed
Services? The compromise would give the
new select committee concurrent juris-
diction over major intelligence agencies
of national importance, NSA and DIA.
It would also have concurrent jurisdic-
tion over joint defense-CIA programs
and over clandestine military intelligence
activities now supervised by the 91A.
The Committee on Armed Services
would continue to have jurisdiction in
this area and would continue exclusive
jurisdiction over the bulk of tactical mili-
tary intelligence. It is not impossible, as
has been pointed out, to sort out these
national Intelligence elements from the
defense budget. We have identified the
relevant program elements.
The new Committee on Foreign Intel-
ligence is charged with this task and
with the responsibility for a national
intelligence budget.
Certainly, the members of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services have a perfect
right to ask this question: Will they, in
the grave responsibilities that they have
assumed and undertaken and have so
ably carried out for so many years for
the defense and security of the United
-States of America, be able to fulfill that
function if they do not have the legisla-
tive authority over defense intelligence?
Certainly, the bill that is before us, the
compromise version before us, in every
conceivable way guarantees and insures
that the end product of intelligence shall
always be available to the Committee on
Armed Services. There are not any ifs,
ands, or buts about that assertion. Every-
body in this body will know and recog-
nize that they must have that, and the
concurrent responsibility that they have
over the defense budget seems to have
such a way that I hope the maj
our colleagues today would def
pending amendment.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President,
Mr. PERCY. Would it be possible for
this Senator to yield the floor to the dis-
tinguished Senator from Mississippi so
he can speak on his own time?
Mr. STENNIS. I want to ask a question
on my own time, if I may have 1 minute,
Mr. President, on my time.
The Senator from Illinois used the
term, "concurrent jurisdiction," and re-
ferred to the Armed Services Committee
having concurrent jurisdiction. I do not
believe the language will support saying
that this resolution gives the Committee
on Armed Services concurrent jurisdic-
tion.
That means concurrent as to time, ref-
erence, and so forth. It permits the
Armed Services Committee, as I see it,
to obtain this matter, whatever the
pending matter would be.
Mr. PERCY. I would like to have my
distinguished colleague from. Connecti-
cut answer it, and then I would like to
follow it with my own interpretation.
Mr. RIBICOFF. May I say to my dis-
tinguished colleague the word used is not
entirely correct. It is not the intention
by this resolution to put concurrent
jurisdiction in the Intelligence Commit-
tee and the Armed Services Committee.
We specifically call it sequential Jul dic-
tion, not concurrent.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the
Senator define sequential as comnd to
concurrent.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Well, co rrent
means both committees have jurisdiction
at the same time. My understanding is
depending on where the thrust is that
one committee handles the matter first,
as I discussed in my colloquy with the
after the first committee completes ac-
tion, it then goes to the other committee
sequentially for a period of 30 days, to
give them an opportunity to act on the
matter that cuts across the jurisdiction
of both committees.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the
Senator will yield 1 minute further on
my time, the Senator's interpretation
though would' be to say. the Parliamen-
tarian would refer this matter first to
the intelligence committee-
Mr. RIBICOFF. No, it depends-not
necessarily.
Mr. STENNIS. No sequential reference.
Mr. RIBICOFF. If the matter is purely
an intelligence matter it would go to the
intelligence committee first. But if the
matter is not predominantly an intelli-
gence matter it would go to the Armed
Services Committee, the Judiciary Com-
mittee or the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, and it then, would be sequentially be
referred to the intelligence oversight
committee to consider only that portion
that involved intelligence.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the
Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes, I yield to en-
ator from Illinois. The. Sena .. , from
Connecticut thinks concurrent jurisdic-
tion is not the term that applies.
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melers of the Armed Services Commit-
tee are among the most overworked
Senators in the Senate.
What the Senator from Illinois would
hope would happen is that a tremendous
burden of responsibility for a lot of fol-
low-through on details in intelligence
would now be taken over and assumed
by the Select Committee on Intelligence
Activities, providing to the members of
the Armed Services Committee an as-
surance that the details of those pro-
grams have been looked to.
Thirty days would be available for an-
other sequential look at it by the Armed
Services Committee. But they have the
was: What are you going to do about
it? What are you going to do about it?
Are you going to put it under civilian
control or are you going to leave this
destructive weapon under the sole con-
trol of the military?
The Congress of the United States went
on record creating a joint committee.
It is regrettable that we cannot create
a joint committee in this area, but maybe
in time that will be accomplished. For
the .time being, something needs to be
done, and there is not the concurrence
at the moment between the Senate and
the House that could bring about a joint
committee, although ultimately that is
the prime and the ultimate answer to
this problem.
here? Under the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy it is written in the law
that that committee must be fully and
concurrently informed of all activities.
If the decision of what the actions of the
CIA should be will be left up to the Con-
gress I would be against it. I would ab-
solutely be against it because CIA comes
under the. jurisdiction of the National
Security Council. But if all this amounts
to .is the fact that, like the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy, where we have
not had one single leak from the time it
was created, where we have been con-
tinuously, completely and currently in-
formed by the military, by the civilians
and by everybody else, if you are accom-
plishing this, I am all for it in this legis-
lation, and that is the question I am go-
ing to direct to the chairman of the
committee. If this legislation means that
before the CIA can do anything they
have to come up here and get permission
of 5, 6, 10 or 15 Members of the Senate,
I will be against it. But if it means that
whatever they do from the moment they
begin to do it they have to come up here
and tell the committee, then I am all for
it, and that is the question I would like
to ask at this moment.
Is this putting the approval of the ac-
tivities of the CIA in the control of Con-
gress or is it merely giving Congress the
authority, and mandatory upon the
agency, to report everything that they
do the minute they do it? '
Mr. RIBICOFF. May I say that in de-
vising this legislation we relied exten-
sively and heavily on the experience of
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
Under no circumstances is it the inten-
tion that this committee is going to tell
the CIA or any other intelligence agency
how to conduct its business on a day-by-
day basis.
Section 11 says:
It is the sense of the Senate that the head
of each department and agency of the United
States should keep the Select Committee
fully and currently informed. with respect to
intelligence activities, including any sig-
nificant anticipated activities which are the
responsibility of or engaged in by such de-
partment or agency; provided, that this does
not constitute a condition precedent to the
implementation of any such anticipated in-
telligence activities.
assurance that 15 of their colleagues
have spent months looking at these pro- i
grams, and they can concentrate on their
main job, which is providing for the na-
tional security of the United States, hav-
ing available to them all the product of
intelligence but not the necessity of over-
seeing all details of these programs, the
ramifications of which are now apparent
for all of us to see.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, if the
Senator will yield 5 minutes to me on
this bill-
Mr. RIBICOFF. I would be pleased to.
Mr. President, how much time re-
mains on each side?
PRESIDING OFFICER. There are
3iiutes remaining on the side of the
Se k r from Connecticut, and 52 min-
u aining on the side of the Senator
frog Mississippi.
Mr. RIBICOFF. I would hope that
after the time taken by my distinguished
colleague from Rhode Island, the Sena-
tor from Mississippi will use some time. I
am very anxious to give some time to
the Senator from Kentucky, but my time
is running out fast.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, first of
all, I congratulate the chairman and the
members of the committee for the ex-
peditious way in which 'they have
handled this very important legislation.
My regret at the moment is that appar-
ently we have drifted into the sensitive
question of committee jurisdiction.
We must remember, Mr. President,
that what we are dealing with here now
is not the composition of the commit-
tees today or the sensitivities of the vari-
ous Members. What we are dealing with
here today is the matter of how do we
resolve this very important question that
now confronts the Congress of the
United States in a way that is for the
public benefit.
I realize that in an open society it is
always difficult to justify secrecy, living
in the kind of a world we live in today.
Realizing that we do have strong adver
saries who would take us over in a mo-
ment if they have a chance, who conduct
thgMelves in a secret way that goes far
thIMbountry, we had better beware of
wh do.
Mr. President, this question came
up in` 1945 when the first atomic weapon
was exploded, and the serious question
Mr. PASTORE. That is taken out of
section 211 of the Atomic Energy Act.
Mr. RIBICOFF. That is right. May I
say we relied completely on the joint
committee's 'experience.
S 7545
Mr. PASTORE. Under that provision I
cannot see how anybody can object to it
because even in atomic energy or atomic
matters the Armed Services Committee
has a right to inquire. Actually they have
a right to inquire and they do inquire.
But, after all, there has to be a commit-
tee constituted by Congress to which
these people are responsible, that the
minute they undertake something they
have to come up and tell the Congress.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Rhode Island yield for a
comment on his remarks?
Mr. PASTORE. I do. not know how
much time I have. I wish they had given
me time to yield.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator has 1 more minute.
Mr. PERCY. One minute, if the Sena-
tor from Rhode Island will yield. The
question he put was an extraordinarily
good one, and one that perplexed the
members of the Government Operations
Committee throughout the course of the
hearings. There was a body of feeling
that this committee, if it were to be effec-
tive, should have prior approval, author-
ity, and responsibility.
The Senator from Illinois from the
outset was adamant that the Senator
from Illinois wdull work against the cre-
ation of a new committee, and would
fight it right down the line, if we started
to move in and take over the responsi-
bility of the executive branch of Gov-
ernment.
Mr. PASTORE. I am glad to hear that.
Mr. PERCY. We lose our oversight
then.
Certainly, in discussing this with the
President of the United States, he has
agreed that the options, the problem and
the various approaches would be com-
mitted to writing. It would be signed by
a top officer. The President said, "by my-
self in extraordinary cases."
It would be available for oversight and
for a study by the oversight committee,
but we cannot become a part and parcel
of the day-to-day decisions.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
has expired.
Mr. PERCY. And the judgment and
experience of the Joint- Atomic Energy
Committee has been extraordinarily
helpful.
Mr. PASTORE. I am glad to hear it.
Mr.- STENNIS.. Mr. President, I am
glad to yield 15 minutes to the Senator
from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise
in support of amendment 1649, authored
by the distinguished Senator from
Texas, Mr. TOWER, and cosponsored by
the chairman of the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee, Mr. STENNIS, and my-
self, the ranking minority member of
Armed Services.
This amendment would, in effect, re-
move from the proposed Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence the joint jurisdiction
over the Department of Defense Intelli-
gence Agencies. These would include the
intelligence programs of the three sep-
arate services and the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency and the National Security
Agency.
It might be well to offer an initial and
brief explanation of the activities of the
agencies addressed in this amendment.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 19, 1976
1. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
The Defense Intelligence Agency is
directly responsible to the Secretary of
Defense and is the focal point of the
military intelligence community. It
maintains a balance in assimilating and
analyzing the intelligence gathered by
the separate military departments as
well as its own efforts, all designed to
enables the Secretary of Defense to act
wisely on requests and programs of the
military intelligence community.
2. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
The National Security Agency deals
with national or strategic intelligence
and its collection and production appar-
atus serves not only the military, but
other agencies of the Government such
as the State Department and Treasury
Department. The NSA is also the prin-
cipal source for the National Security
Council and ultimately the President be-
cause its work goes beyond strictly mili-
tary applications. It is charged primarily
with much of the electronic apparatus
used in intelligence gathering.
3. SERVICE INTELLIGENCE
In addition, each of the three military
departments has a limited intelligence
apparatus which is directed primarily In
those areas of concern to the particular
department.
For instance, the intelligence service
of the Air Force is targeted on foreign
military aircraft and foreign activities
related to the air power while the Navy's
intelligence apparatus is concerned with
intelligence gathering submarines and
estimates of capability of the Soviet and
other foreign navies.
Mr. President, the definition of the
work of these military agencies shows this
amendment is not a capricious effort to
dilute the strength of the proposed se-
lect committee. It represents a well
thought out proposal upon which I feel
there is a solid basis for support. This
amendment deals strictly with military
intelligence by military or DOD agencies.
It does not involve the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. Therefore, I would like to
list some points which I feel in support
of adoption of amendment 1649.
1. OVERLAP WITH SERVICE BUDGETS
It will be extremely difficult to separate
the expenses of the separate military de-
partments from the defense budget and
present it as a separate request to the
select committee. It is now more an esti-
mate, but if dealt with exclusively by- a
single committee, the problem of cost
identification becomes most complex.
Practically all of the intelligence ac-
tivities of the military departments are
performed by military personnel. In any
one fiscal year, an individual may be on
an intelligence assignment for only a por-
tion of that year. He may be in a school
in which only a portion of that period of
training involves his intelligence duties.
How does one decide how much of his sal-
ary should go in the intelligence budget?
How much of his training should be
charged to the intelligence budget? How
much of the support he receives in the
way of vehicle use, air transportation,
secretarial support would go into the in-
telligence budget?
These examples illustrate the difficulty
in separating military intelligence activ-
ities from the defense budget.
Furthermore, there are certain intelli-
gence support activities which do not
require authorization, but are dealt with
only as to appropriations. Here again
we have the problem of separating these
activities and in so doing, we come back
to the often-stated problem of more dis-
closure and ultimately more danger to
our intelligence people and the effective-
ness of their missions. Before closing on
that point, I would like to cite a few
examples.
NAVY EXAMPLE
For instance, when a submarine goes
out on a mission, a part of its work may
involve intelligence gathering. However,
it will have other missions and how DOD
can separate the costs and expenses in
such a situation is beyond my compre-
hension.
AIR FORCE EXAMPLE
As another example, one might take
the case of a pilot flying an intelligence
mission in a military aircraft. How much
of the cost of the aircraft; his salary, or
support costs would be charged to intelli-
gence? This plane may be used once or
twice a year on intelligence missions.
Also, our committee will still have au-
thorization over research and develop-
ment programs involving intelligence. Do
we have to clear our actions with the
select committee? The bill language is
not clear on this point.
These are but some of the problems in
separating such budgets. Others will re-
veal themselves if this separation is re-
quired by the Senate.
2. DISCLOSURE
Mr. President, there is no doubt in
my mind that to support this new com-
mittee of 15 members and a staff whose
size is not defined in this bill, will re-
quire much more disclosure on the simple
basis the information is being spread
among a greater number of people.
Here again we are putting another
layer on top of the four responsible De-
fense committees and the very separa-
tion of the intelligence operations from
defense operations is going to lead to
much, much greater disclosure.
3. IMPROVING MILITARY. INTELLIGENCE
Mr, President, this step, in my judg-
ment, in no way improves military in-
telligence. It may well have just the op-
posite effect by making intelligence work
less attractive for our more qualified peo-
ple because of the threat of disclosure
which results by proliferation of data.
There is nothing apparent to me in
this bill which improves military intel-
ligence. It merely inserts another layer
of authority. The Senate must realize
that those abuses in the past would be
better corrected by passage of new laws
rather than new layers of legislative
oversight and authorization. I certainly
favor strengthening the oversight of the
past, but when a President tells the Army
to augment the Secret Service at a politi-
cal convention, the Army can hardly be
blamed for obeying that order. Oddly
enough, these orders were never revealed,
even to the Joint Chiefs nor to the Con-
to control the Chief Executiv uld
answer this issue if such is the of
lem arises in Government the solution is
to reorganize, insert another layer of
supervision, add 50 more GS-18's in the
executive branch, set up a new commit-
tee in Congress with a large staff, and in
general, throw money at the "problem.
The fact is that allowing the select
committee authorization and legislative
jurisdiction over the Defense intelligence
activities will mean that these agencies
will have to add to their personnel
strength in order to respond to "the re-
quests for information and data which
will be forthcoming from these new lay-
ers of supervision.
The Senate appears to ignore the point
that the abuses and problems of the past
few years in military intelligence agen-
cies represent only possibly 2 or 3 percent
of the entire intelligence effort. Yet we
are restructuring the entire authoriza-
tion program in an attempt to deal with
a problem representing only 2 or 3 per-
cent of the total effort. These problems
could be dealt with by laws to prevent
such abuses rather than an attempt to
manage military defense intelligence
agencies. Military intelligence will no
longer be an arm of the executive branch,
but rather an arm of the Congress.
5. COORDINATION WITH HOUSE
tion available to me indicates t use
of Representatives plans to dem -om
the Executive that the intelligence udg-
et be submitted as in the past. This raises
another problem in establishing a select
committee in the Senate, especially when
DIA, NSA and other military intelligence
activities are involved. The CIA, being a
civilian agency not answerable to DOD,
could possibly be separated from the de-
fense budget, but I fail to "see how the
military agencies could be realistically
separated.
In summary, Mr. President, this
amendment should be approved by the
Senate for any one of the reasons I have
mentioned: First, there is the overlap of
service budgets in the Defense request.
Second, the problem of disclosure
through proliferation. Third, the fact
that this offers-no improvement of mili-
tary intelligence, but rather weakens it.
Fourth, additional expenses will result
with little promise of improved intelli-
gence production. Fifth, the problem of
coordination with the House is highly
aggravated.
Mr. President, these are but a few of
the reasons I am cosponsoring the pro-
posed amendment. This amendment
makes a great deal of sense and I urge
my colleagues to give it their most care-
ful consideration before casting their
vote.
Mr. President, I yield back e-
mainder of my time.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the uator
very much for his very timely rks
and very convincing argument. "
Mr. President, the Senator dri yield
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 7547
bar uch time as he did- not use,- as I
un nd.
ator orrect. Who yields time?
I ther side is yielding time, the
time runs equally. -
Mr. RIBICOFF. How much time re-
mains on both sides?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Connecticut has 27 minutes
and the Senator from Mississippi has 39
minutes.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Sen-
ator from Arkansas (Mr. MCCLELLAN) is
to arrive later.There is such a. slight at-
tendance present, Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that we have a quo-
rum call for not over 4 minutes, to be
equall; divided, or 3 minutes:
Mr. RIBICOFF. I alrir also reluctant to
have Senator HUDDLESTON or Senator
Church talk to an empty Chamber. Sen-
ator CRANSTON has a colloquy. I would
rather use 2 minutes in that fashion.
Mr. STENNIS. I withdraw my request.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I am
speaking primarily for purposes of legis-
lative history, so I will be concise on this
particular point.
Yesterday I suggested that certain
language be added on page 12, line 7, of
the pending substitute to clarify the
standard which the President must apply
in objecting to a committee determina-
tion to publicly disclose appropriately
classified national security information
submitted to the committee by the exec-
ut' anch. Prior to raising this issue,
I discussed this clarification with
the ' inguished floor managers of the
bill the Senator from Connecticut
(Mr. EICKER). They were prepared to
accept the clarifying language that I
was prepared to offer. However, when it
developed that my clarification raised
some questions with other Senators, I de-
cided not to pursue the matter.
Yesterday, the Senator from Michi-
gan (Mr. GRIFFIN) stated on page S 7414.
that the Senate had "rejected" that clar-
ification. I think the record will show
that this was not the case at all. Indeed,
the record will show that I did not form-
ally offer an, amendment but only raised
a suggested clarification. There was no
action of any sort taken by the Senate.
Mr. RIBICOFF. If,the Senator will al-
low me to respond, that is correct. There
was no formal amendment offered. There
was a general discussion, and the Sena-
tor from California, if I recall, talked
about his language. But, after consider-
able discussion, the language was not
adopted. Changes were made after a
discussion between the Senator from
Michigan, Senator WEICKER, and my-
self, and I believe the Senator from Cali-
fornia was in on that discussion.
Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator.
As the Senator knows, and as all Sena-
tors know, one reason that some of us
are reluctant to offer amendments when
there is not an agreement is that we have
be working together in the spirit of
c omise on a compromise proposal
in uced by the Senator from Nevada.
I
ra e who has worked on this com-
e and, , therefore, I have restrained
not had general agreement. I know other
Senators have done the same thing.
In regard to the matter that I brought
up yesterday, it must be understood that
neither this resolution nor rule XXXV
nor XXXVI in any way establish the
standard which the committee or the full
Senate is to use in deciding in a vote if
particular classified national security in-
formation should be publicly disclosed.
That is a determination which each Sen-
ator must make for himself in deciding
how he would vote in such a matter,
using the standard and balance of com-
peting considerations which he deems
appropriate.
I would like to ask the Senator from
Connecticut, the. distinguished floor
manager of this bill, who has'performed
so magnificently in this effort,,for his
understanding of the restraints that
would be upon a President in the light
of all this in deciding when to seek to
persuade the Senate not to release in-
formation publicly.
Mr. RIBICOFF. The Senator may re-
call that the distinguished minority whip,
the Senator from Michigan, had raised
a question on page 12, line 8, concern-
ing the use of the word "vital."
After discussion with the Senator from
Michigan, I suggested alternative lan-
guage so it would read:
* * * and personally certifies that the
threat to the national interest of the United
States posed by such disclosure is of such
gravity that it outweighs any public inter-
est in the disclosure.
So it is obviously our intention that
the President would not act capriciously,
but only act if it were a matter of
gravity. Of course, none of us could tell
the President of the United States what
he, considers to be a grave matter. I
would assume, on the basis of comity,
that the President certainly is not going
to abuse his discretion. It is my feeling
that the President will act responsibly,
as I would expect the intelligent over-
sight committee would act responsibly, in
determining whether a matter should be
publicly disclosed.
I would imagine that the President
would seldom issue a certification under
this procedure, so as not to wear out
his standing with the Senate. Yet I
would not want to put into the defini-
tion what the President must consider
a matter of gravity. I am confident the
President will not act capriciously and
that he will only act to certify that the
matter should not be disclosed if he
thinks that the threat to the national
interest posed by such disclosure is of
such gravity that it outweighs any pub-
lie interest in disclosure.
Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator.
That clarifies this matter fully and ade-
quately. Obviously, the Senate will al-
ways be able to make its own decision
in its own way as to whether a matter
is of such gravity or not.
I would like to ask the Senator just
one other question.
Let us assume that the new commit-
tee on Intelligence receives information
which is not classified under established
security procedures. Let us also assume
that the committee additionally has de-
termined that the release of such classi-
fied information would not damage the
national security of the United States.
Js it the intent of this compromise ver-
sion that the new -committee would be
able to release such information with-
out referring it to the full Senate for
review?
Mr. RIBICOFF. Well, if it is the type
of information the Senator mentions,
yes, the committee could release such
information without referring it to the
full Senate, since the compromise ver-
sion anticipates that the process of
Presidential certification will only be
operative when the information is the
kind described by section 8(b) (1) of this
resolution.
The eompromise version permits this
new committee to hold hearings and
otherwise function like any other Sen-
ate committee, if the information is un-
classified, and the committee has con-
cluded its release would not damage na-
tional security.
Mr. CRANSTON. L thank the Senator
very much.
Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, will the
distinguished Senator yield me 3 min-
utes for a unanimous-consent request
and explanation?
Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield.
AMENDMENT OF TH34 ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURES ACT-RE-
REFERRAL OF S. 2715
Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I ask unan-
imous consent, with respect to Calendar
Order No. 820, S. 2715, that that bill be
rereferred to the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations for a period of 30 days.
This bill was originally introduced and
assigned to the Committee on the
Judiciary and the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations. The Judiciary Com-
mittee approved the bill, and while it was
still before the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, the distinguished
chairman of that committee (Mr. RIBI-
CoFF) and the distinguished minority
member of the committee, in order to
permit the bill to come in before the
May 15 budget deadline, waived the jur-
isdiction of the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations in order that the bill
might be reported prior to May 15.
I now request-and this has been
cleared with the distinguished chairman
of the committee (Mr. RIBICOFF) and the
distinguished ranking minority member
of the committee-that the bill be re-
referred to the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations for a period of 30 days.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? Without objection, it is so
ordered.
PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The Senate continued with the consid-
eration of the resolution (S. Res. 400) to
establish a Standing Committee of the
Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for
other purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
STONE). Who yields time?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield
myself 3 minutes.
I ask unanimous consent .that Mr.
Braswell, Mr. McFadden, Mr. Sullivan,
and Mr. Kenney of the staff of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services be permitted
to be in the Chamber during the debate
on this measure.
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S 7548'
u
Senator wo go 0
of consequence. No one charges that, and grams, what they find and what they Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I yield
never has. This matter is related to try- transmit, but all kinds of activities with the Senator 1 minute.
'ing to reduce to a minimum the oppor- reference to codes and working on codes, The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
tunities for exposure in one way or an- our own as well as others, as an illustra- ator from Connecticut is recognized for
other, with reference to some of these tion. It includes electronics of all kinds; 1 minute.
item which are so sensitive and so ma- some of it is very sensitive, some not. Mr. WEICKER. If the amendment of
terial. Some of it stays in the research and de- the distinguished Senator from Missis-
I have been hounded for years-in a velopment area for years and years, and sippi is agreed to, what will- it do to this
good way,, and I do not blame anyone- maybe never does emerge into an instru- committee? The Senator has stated, in
because I just would not say how much, ment of some kind. Then some of it does other words, what it will not do.. What
so far as I knew, was included in what break through in the most valuable kind will it do?
TENNIS - I ed that when
er
M
S
reference here to any Senator not being In this subject matter that we are try- sip p-.
trustworthy, or any suggestion that any Ing to protect in this amendment, there The PRESIDING OFFICER. Wh
ld ut and leak a matter are included not only the satellite pro- yields time?
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 19, 1976
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without together as they study our processes I-yield the floor.
objection, it is so ordered. from year to year and from time to time,; Mr. WEICKER. M. Presiden the
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I want and that increases or decreases in budg- time of the distinguished!. Senat rom
to make clear, since some other Senators etary items can put them- on the right Connecticut, I wish to ask a q of
have come in, that there has been no track. the distinguished Senator fron ssis-
we have called the budget for intelli-
gence. As I say, I do not blame anyone.
Mr. President, may we have order?
I can hear people talking there at the
desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ate will be in order.
Mr. STENNIS. So this is an effort not
dealing with individuals, not a matter of
who has what to do. - We are talking
about a system here.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's 3 minu es have expired.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield myself 3 addi-
tional minutes.
We are dealing with a system here
that will afford the most protection.
I notice, according to the press re-
ports-and the committee has done a lot
of fine work-that when the motion was
made that the Intelligence Committee
publish the total amount of the intelli-
gence budget this year, there was dis-
agreement, and the committee voted 5
to 4 not to make that discloure, but
rather to refer it to the Senate.
I do not think there could possibly be
a better illustration of the sensitiveness
of this matter, and also of the differences
of opinion about it. We all recognize
there must be some protection, some-
thing less than total disclosure, and it
shows that the more you get into it, the
more you realize that that disclosure
ought to be reduced to the very minimum.
Every time that the Senate has ever
voted on this budget matter directly, it
has refused to make this disclosure,
whether in open session or in closed ses-
sion. This conclusively proves- to my
which are not allied with us, our adver- it, nas always ucuii iii iaY V'r -
saries, have the most adept and most closure as to these total amounts. There eluded and the power to mak ecom-
penetrating intelligence agents, and that must be some basis for that position or mendations also. We would s' give
pri-
from a mere morsel of information, or the Senate would not have maintained the ore ptteeb 1 ty med dealinSerm with
just an inference, they can piece things that position all these years. mry
e
from which inferences can be drawn. ber what we are trying to pro ec e jurisdict
on, as I That is what Mr. Ellsworth says in his are the verymattars tl~athahp divided Ittleaves with ithe othenccomm escribed.
more opportunities for things to get out; activities. Mr. STENNIS. This would retain in
not the substance, maybe, but matters I repeat for emphasis. Let us re bor
the Committee on Armed Services legis-
uilliu, Ulu pvuru vrra.. ...,.. .. '_- '_ ..._.
make-the- point that is reflected in the and power for investigations of all kinds sary powers to go ahead and act on its
effort of the Senator from Texas, the and over all kinds of intelligence. oversight. We have had unfortunately
Senator from South Carolina, and my- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- an ineffective system. This is not laying
self as the third author-of this proposed ator's time has expired. this fault at the door of the Senator
amendment. It is just to make it more Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield from Mississippi. The system itself ob-
certain that we give these sensitive mat- myself 1 additional minute. viously has not adequately handled the
ters the maximum security. The select committee will have access, intelligence community.
When we kick a. matter around as I repeat for emphasis, to all intelli- Why should this committee have any
through this Chamber and the various gence it makes and full investigatory and less power than any other committee of
committees with more staff, there are subpena power over all intelligence the U.S. Senate?
cov
r.
of instrument, weapons system, or part
of a system. someone had distracted the attention of
Many of those projects prove to be the Senator in some way. There are
worthless, it is true; but at the same time positive things, and I spelled them out
some of them have proven to be of im- in a brief memorandum, but I have it
measurable value and of far-reaching written out in more formal language.
consequences; and should some inference It would remove from the proposed
get out or some basis for discovery get new select committee legislative juris-
in the middle, or diction over the Department of Defense.
out in the beginning
,
at the end of all this long laborious ef- The rationale is, first, it would minimize
fort, the entire venture would be killed. the possible disclosures through the long
Mr. President, so it is as to matters of and debated process of authorization of
that nature. sensitive intelligence figures. Rather
Another point has been mentioned. No than being simply authorized by a bill
one has charged anything. This does not or a joint resolution, passed by the Sen-
raise the issue about civilian control and ate alone, as, required by this substitute,
military control. Not one iota of that defense intelligence figures would con-
issue is here. tinue to be included in various parts of
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- the military authorization andro-
ator's 3 minutes have expired. priations acts. I cannot overstr at.
myself 2-additional minutes. But that is the point the SefW very
I persona,..,,
top officers- of CIA, for instance, being Mr. WEICKER. It takes the power of
-
nonmilitary so far as that point goes. the purse away from the committee, does
s
e
t an
w
is
u
Out this is no
control or military control. This is in the Mr. STENNIS. Not entirely, but it
field of intelligence that we regularly gives defense intelligence matters back
charge to the military. It is those funds - to the Committee on Armed Services
to which we are trying to give the highest rather than stripping the committee of
degree of protection and subject to the that.
least amount of chance for exposure. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 2
Mr. President, I say with emphasis minutes have expired.
that our amendment does not alter in Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, will the
any way, the existing language of the Senator yield me 2 additional minutes?
Cannon substitute, so far as oversight of Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield the Senator 2
U.S. intelligence activities, including de- additional minutes.
fense intelligence is concerned. This new Mr. WEICKER. I suggest to the Sen-
committee, if the amended resolution is ator from Mississippi that the whole
agreed to. will have full, unlimited over- n,,rnnse of the committee is to give it
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 7549
kind of matters only, and they of this information, the information
recommend what they wished. would not then be released until the full
ank the Senator from Connecticut Senate was consulted and gave approval.
Chair please inform us concerning the
amount of time remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Connecticut' has 17 minutes
remaining, and the Senator from Missis-
sippi has 28 minutes remaining.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, because
of the disparity of time remaining, I hope
the Senator from Mississippi would use
some more of his time.
-Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I think
the point is well taken. I will ascertain
if I can.
Let us have a 2-minute quorum call
on the time, of the Senator from Mis-
sissippi.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence
of a quorum, and I ask unanimous con-
sent that the quorum call for 2 minutes
be charged to our side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll. --
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, the quorum call is
rescinded.
Who yields time?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Chair indulge me for a minute?
mimes. He has a relevant matter to
PAN. It is not on this amendment.
for from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF) in
the Chamber? I see that he is present.
He and I discussed this amendment. -
Mr. President, section 8 of Senate Res-
olution 400, in the nature of a substitute,
deals with a very important subject, and
that is the right of Congress, in this case
more particularly the Senate, to declas-
sify information that the executive
branch has classified.
Section 8, subsection (a) is very clear
in its wording. Subsection (b) is also
clear.
Section 2 of subsection (b) beginning
on page 12, is also clear, and then we
get down to section 3 of subsection 3 un-
der (b) of section 8. This section reads:
If the President notifies the select com-
mittee of his objections to the disclosure
of such information as provided in paragraph
(2), such committee may, by majority vote
refer the question of the disclosure of such
information to the Senate for consideration.
Such information shall not thereafter be
publicly disclosed without leave of the
Senate.
I have discussed this section with both
Senator BYRD and Senator RIBICOFF, as
well as Senator CANNON, and it is clear
from my conversations with them that
the last sentence makes reference to and
is premised on the President notifying
th nce the President notified the
co ttee that he objected to the release
position which follows number 2 on line
12, page 12, which says that "such com-
mittee may, by majority vote, refer the
question of the disclosure of such infor-
mation to the Senate for consideration,"
and then that clause is followed by the
word "thereafter" in the last sentence.
One could interpret this section as mean-
ing that after the committee, by majority
vote, referred it to the Senate, there
would be no disclosure without consulta-
tion with the full Senate.
The structure of this section could lead
to an interpretation that I do not think
the committee intends. The unintended
interpretation would be, in effect, that
the select committee could declassify in-
telligence information over the Presi-
dent's objections, if it did not, by major-
ity-vote refer the question of disclosure
to the Senate. I do not think that is what
the committee intends, and I am going
to submit an amendment, which I will
call to the attention of the Senator from
Connecticut. I believe my amendment
will clarify and make very clear that
once the President objects, the commit-
tee, if they recommend the release of
classified information, in effect declassi-
fying that information, would have to
refer it to the full Senate, and the full
Senate would have to give leave.
The Senator from Connecticut may
wish to respond.
Mr. RIBICOFF. I think the Senator
should present his amendment.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send the
amendment to the desk. I do not know
whether it is in order. I ask unanimous
consent that it may be in order to take
up this amendment at this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, reserv-
ing the right to object-and I shall not
object on the merits of it-but the agree-
ment is to vote at 2 p.m.; so we will be
cut off in our debate if the amendment
is not adopted in a short period of time.
Mr. NUNN. It is my understanding
that the minority and the majority have
agreed to this amendment.
Mr. STENNIS. All right. I have no
objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
On page 12, beginning with the word
"such" on line 14 strike all through the
word "Senate" on line 15 and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
"The committee shall not publicly dis-
close such information without leave of the
U.S. Senate.".
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, as the
manager of the bill, I am pleased to
accept the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 5
minutes allotted to the Senator have
expired.
The question is on agreeing to the
amendment of the Senator from
Georgia.
The amendment was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICE1. Who
yields time?
Mr. RIBICOFF; I yield 5 minutes to
the distinguished Senator from Ken-
tucky.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. I thank the dis-
tinguished floor manager of the bill.
Mr. President, first, I want to reiter-
ate my very strong support for the sub-
stitute version of Senate Resolution 400,
creating a permanent oversight commit-
tee on the intelligence activities of - this
country. That support is predicated
upon my experience during the past -15
months as a member of the Senate se-
lect committee investigating our intel-
ligence activities.
It is based upon my firm belief that
it is absolutely essential that this Na-
tion have the strongest most effective,
and most efficient intelligence organiza-
tions, both from the standpoint of col-
lecting intelligence and the standpoint
of processing and using that intelligence
once it has been collected.
Second, it is based on my strong be-,
lief that it is essential that certain in-
formation be kept secret; that there is
a necessity for this Nation to have
secrets.
It is also my firm belief that the ap-
proach taken by the suggested compro-
mise is the best way to insure that we
have adequate intelligence, and ade-
quate oversight.
I will have a further statement to
make, or to place 'in the RECORD, as we
approach final passage, regarding my
support of the substitute amendment to
Senate Resolution 400.
At this time, however, I offer my op-
position to the amendment now pend-
ing. I oppose the amendment because it
is contrary to the concept of national
intelligence, a concept that has-been em-
braced by the President of the United
States in his own directive which estab-
lishes the Director of the Central In-
telligence Agency as the supervisor and
coordinator of all our intelligence opera-
tions: It is contrary to the recommenda-
tions of the select committee of the Sen-
ate that investigated intelligence, which
makes a similar recommendation. More
important, in fact, it is contrary to the
facts of life as they apply to the in-
telligence community.
The amendment would take from the
new oversight committee the legislative
and authorization jurisdiction over De-
fense Department intelligence. That
means that some 80 to 90 percent of both
the collection and production of intelli-
gence and the consumption of that in-
telligence would be outside the effective
oversight responsibility of the new com-
mittee. I use the word "effective" be-
cause it already has been pointed out that
to take legislative authority from an
oversight committee would diminish tre-
mendously its effectiveness so far 'as
exercising the proper oversight responsi-
bility is concerned. Oversight without
legislative participation is toothless
oversight, as all of us in this body know.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's 5 minutes have expired.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr: President, will
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE May 19, 1976
the Senator yield me. 2 additional min-
utes?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. But, not only do
the defense Intelligence operations com-
prise some 80 to 90 percent of our col-
lection, production, and use of intelli-
gence, they are also entities which have
had their share of the abuses that have
occurred, and for that reason alone
should be within the effective oversight
and responsibility of the new committee.
Mr. President, I think that the com-
promise as written-although, as has
been pointed out, there are areas in
which accommodations will have to be
made among various committees-can be
put into effect, can provide the effective
kind of oversight for which there has
been a crying need for a long time in
the operation of the intelligence orga-
nizations of this Nation.
The pending amendment should be
rejected, so that this new committee can
have the full authority, together with
the full responsibility, to provide the
kind of oversight that is necessary
throughout the intelligence community.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield
5 minutes to the Senator from Arizona.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I
support the amendment.
I believe we have to divide intelligence,
as we are discussing It here today, into
many, many facets. The resolution that
established the select committee, in my
opinion, was a wise one. Our job, sup-
posedly, was that of ferreting out wrong-
doings so far as intelligence gathering
was concerned with respect to the
American citizen. That is one form of
intelligence. We have intelligence
gathered from embassies by tapping. We
have intelligence gathered by mail.
Mr. President, I am anxious to sup-
port this amendment, and I call atten-
tion to the fact that the amendment
would remove from the proposed new
select committee legislative jurisdiction
over the Department of Defense intelli-
gence. Why is this important?
Last week, I read several books, with
.which hindsight always can provide us,
as to what we actually knew about the
Intent of the Japanese before Pearl
Harbor. It was amazing. Had we had a
properly working intelligence agency at
that time, with the information we had
gathered from a number of sources, none
related to the other, we almost could
have predicted the attack on Pearl Har-
bor to the hour. We could have resisted
it and defeated the Japanese without
any trouble at all. But because we did
not have an intelligence agency such as
the CIA at that time, we depended upon
the warring factions in the services and
the civilians in the War Department and
the President, himself. We got ourselves
into a very costly war.
That is why I support this amend-
ment-not to prevent the establishment
of a committee to have so-called over-
sight, but. to allow the Committee on
Armed Services to have that sole juris-
diction because, Mr. President, I do not
care if you have a committee of one, it
is almost impossible to stop leaks. As
hard as our special committee tried, we
could not bottle them all up, and, of
course, the House was a sieve. It leaked,
leaked, and leaked.
Under the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices, we would handle just that intellf-
gence that applies to the military, npth-
Ing else-no interest in the FBI; no in-
terest in anything except the Intelligence
that the military has to gather.
Mr. President, I remind my colleagues
in this body who have had experience in
war or experience With the military that
the estimate of the situation is a little
formula that we are taught almost be-
fore we know what the rest of the serv-
ice is about. The primary part of the esti-
mate of the situation is intelligence:
What does the 'enemy have, what does
the enemy intend to do with what he has,
what does he know about what we have,
and what does he know about what we
intend to do with out intelligence? Then,
by working the two against each other,
we come up with some possible lines of
action. But if this Information is made
public, as we watched it be made public
from the other body and from leaks
downtown, then the estimate of the sit-
uation gets to be pretty much of a joke.
I know Members of this body are con-
cerned about covert action. I know that
Members feel that we should disclose,
among the oversight function, any covert
action. Well, Mr. President, this is dan-
gerous. Those of us on the Committee on
Armed Services, in spite of what our col-
leagues might think, know of many,
many covert actions that were practiced
during the years, many of which pre-
vented wars between other countries,
many of which prevented ourselves from
getting into trouble. So, military intelli-
gence, to me, is a most sacred item and
we should look on it as such; create a
full committee to take care of the abuses
upon the American people, but allow
military intelligence to go as it has in
the past. We have developed a very fine
intelligence-gathering system. In fact, I
just, read on the ticker tape this morn-
ing that our old friend, Averell Harri-
man, has recommended to the Demo-
cratic Platform Committee that covert
action not be stopped, that it be en-
couraged because, by covert action,
properly done, we prevent wars; we do,
not get into them.
I am afraid if a 15-member commit-
tee is ever created and given the handle
on, military intelligence, covert action
will become something that will be very
overt and we will be fighting the battles
on the floor of the Senate instead of do-
ing it in a round-about, backward,
sneaky way. Call it what you want, but
by doing it that way, we will prevent
American men and, now, American
women from being called into battle.
I hope my colleagues will support this
amendment. It is not an Earth-shaking
amendment. It is not going to destroy the
concept of the substitute Senate Resolu-
tion 400. It will, in my opinion, protect
the best interests of our country.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I yield
1 minute to the distinguished Senator
from North Carolina.
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. President, as I un-
derstand the amendment offered by Sen-
ators STENNIs and TOWER, it eliminates
from the jurisdiction- of the new select
committee any jurisdiction over defense
intelligence, which would iricludee
Bence activities of the three
' departments.
Under the Cannon substitute,, the new
select committee would have jurisdiction
over defense intelligence, except for "tac-
'tical foreign military intelligence serving
no national policymaking function."
Those Senators supporting the Sten-
nis/Tower amendment argue that it is
impossible, as a practical matter, to sep-
arate, for purposes of oversight, tactical
intelligence activities from national in-
telligence activities. They therefore
would opt for the Armed Services Com-
mittee to retain sole jurisdiction over all
defense intelligence activities.
While I have great respect and admi-
ration for, the distinguished chairman
of the Armed Services Committee, the
findings of the Selebt Committee on In-
telligence lead me to disagree with him
on this point. I think that it is possible
to separate those intelligence programs
carried out by the Department of De-
fense which contribute to the national
intelligence picture from those carried
out to support tactical military units.
The Department of Defense already dis-
tinguishes between tactical intelligence
programs and national intelligence pro-
grams for purposes of its annual budget
submissions .to the Congress. '
Furthermore, we have seen that The
ment of Defense. We have here; 'Chen,
the executive branch distinguishing be-
tween "tactical" and "national" intelli-
gence activities carried out by the De-
partment of Defense, for purposes of
managing the intelligence community.
Should Congress not do the same?
I know this is a cloudy issue for a lot
of Senators who are unfamiliar with
how DOD conducts its intelligence ac-
tivities, but I think that insofar as over-
sight is concerned, the dividing line
would be quite clear. The new select
committee, as I see it, would have con-
current jurisdiction over all DOD agen-
cies and programs which were' created
primarily to collect and produce intelli-
gence for our national intelligence esti-
mates. The Armed Services Committee
would retain sole jurisdiction over those
agencies and programs of the Depart-
ment of Defense designed primarily to
produce intelligence .for use by military
commanders in the field. To be sure,
there may be national intelligence ac-
tivities which produce information use-
ful to the military commander in the
field, and, by the same token, tactical
intelligence activities may produce in-
formation useful to the national intelli-
gen ,e picture. But insofar as oversight
of these activities is concerned, the
t
select committee would have co;d,
jurisdiction over those activities d
to provide national intelligence, e
Armed Services Committee won e
sole jurisdiction over those activ-
signed to produce tactical irate e.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 7551
Mr. RIBICOFF. I wonder if the Sena-
tor from Mississippi would take 4 minutes
and give 10 minutes to the distinguished
senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) from
the last 10 minutes of the distinguished
Senator from Mississippi?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I do not
care just to repeat things that I have al-
ready said. I want to refer to what the
Senator from Arizona said.
The major part of military intelligence
is so sensitive, so far-reaching, that,
should error be made, in my humble
opinion, we could hardly do a worse thing
than to subject all of it to the ordinary
legislative process of this congressional
body. That is just a matter of common-
sense when we consider the subject mat-
ter with reasonable caution and not over-
caution. I speak with great deference to
all these men who have worked on it so
much. This resolution is a unilateral
thing. No one in the House is going to be
bound by it, in the legislative circle even
if this process is adopted. Where we
would have a budget, it would finally be
debated here and finally agreed on and
then carried to the Committee on Appro-
priations to let them do the best they
could to live with it. The Lord only knows
how they would be able to live with it.
But we will say they will do their best,
which I believe they will, and bring it
back here on the floor, where it is subject
to a point of order under the terms here
and can be knocked out, debated and re-
debated, and finally a bill is passed.
Then what happens to the appropria-
tions bill? It goes over to the House of
Representatives, and there is no one at
home, no special subcommittee over
there, no special Select Committee on
Intelligence over there-I am talking
about legislation now-no one to deal
with. If you have ever been- on a real ap-
propriations conference committee with
those gentlemen from the House, you
know they are experts and they are not
going to be compelled or bound by any-
thing in the way of. a ceiling that they
had no part in fixing.
They are not going to be bound by
anything that does not pertain to them,
or at least that they had a part in mak-
ing and legislating on-I mean in the
House. It would be, I say with great def-
erence, a great mistake. This unilateral
committee will have to be redone and
abandoned, or something happen to it
before it has a chance to be effective In a
legislative way. Unless the House comes
to something in the neighborhood of the
same pattern. I just can not see where it
would have a chance.
Maybe I am not fair to the House.
Maybe they should have gone on and
gone into this thing. But they did not;
they did not. All we are asking in this
amendment-we are not touching the
CIA, we are not touching all the others.
All we are asking is just for the military
intelligence to be given this routing
through the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices, which has the jurisdiction over all
the rest of the military program, for
their analysis, for their.recommendation
at the same time, so that the select com-
mittee can pass it, taking all the testi-
mony they want in the whole Intelli-
gence field, subpena power undiminished
and everything else.
So I hope, Mr. President, that on sec-
ond thought the majority of this body
will say we must call a halt, we must take
another look, at least we will carve this
out for the time being until we see what
can be done with the House of Repre-
sentatives.
I yield back the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ten min-
utes remain per side.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I yield
10 minutes to the distinguished Senator
from Idaho.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I am
happy to yield 2 minutes to the distin-
guished senior Senator from Missouri.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Missouri is recognized.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, as
everyone knows, I have great respect for
the distinguished chairman of the
Armed Services Committee, but I just
cannot agree with this proposed amend-
ment. In my opinion, it will drown the
CIA,-the only civilian agency which in
itself is a brake against the Defense De-
partment having the exclusive right to
describe the threat.
I am already worried about the execu-
tive branch reorganization of the Agency
and I have so told Director Bush for
whom I have the greatest respect.
I believe if this intelligence is assigned,
the way it is planned under this amend-
ment, to the Pentagon Building it would
end any true civilian supervision of in-
telligence activities, 90 percent of which
is a matter for the Foreign Relations
Committee even though it is called mili-
tary intelligence, unless we are at war
with the country in question.
I thank my friend for yielding the
time to me.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I thank
the'Senator very much for his remarks.
Mr. President, the Stennis amendment
would strip the oversight committee of
all legislative authority over strategic
intelligence agencies which operate un-
der the aegis of the Pentagon.
The resolution, the substitute resolu-
tion, does not take anything away from
the Armed Services Committee. It does
not in any way intrude upon the legis-
lative authority that that committee
possesses.
All this resolution does is to establish
concurrent legislative authority so that
the oversight committee might have ade-
quate powdr to do its job.
But the Armed Services Committee,
speaking through its distinguished chair-
man, opposed sharing any legislative au-
thority with respect to those agencies
that operate under the Defense Depart-
ment.
It ought to be made clear, Mr. Presi-
dent, that we are speaking here only of
those agencies within the Defense De-
partment that are primarily concerned
with strategic or sometimes what is
called national intelligence. We are not
at all concerned with, and we are not
even reaching for, the Army intelligence,
the Air Force intelligence, or the Naval
Intelligence, which Is purely military
and purely technical.
. Unless the proposed intelligence com-
mittee does share jurisdiction over the
national intelligence activities of the De-
tment of Defense, I think its effec-
ness will be seriously jeopardized. I
his for several reasons.
First, as several Senators have pointed
out already, between 80 and 90 percent
of the intelligence budget goes to the
Department of Defense. To eliminate
such a sizable amount of intelligence ex-
penditures from the scrutiny of the new
intelligence committee would be to make
a mockery of it.
Second, I think it will be impossible for
the new committee to study the perform-
ance of the intelligence community as a
whole without looking at DOD. How, for
instance, can we make a judgment about
the performance of the intelligence com-
munity during a Mideast war or an
Angolan crisis, unless we have military
intelligence in to explain its role? And
how will we have their cooperation in
these studies unless we have some type
of oversight authority? .
Third, I fear that if, in the future, the
Committee on Armed Services proves to
be more favorable than the proposed
select committee to intelligence activi-
ties or intelligence expenditures, we will
see the intelligence community decide to
have military undertake more and more
of its activities in order to avoid facing
the tougher committee. In sohrt, I think
that the Stennis/Tower amendment will
not result in even-handed oversight of
the intelligence community.
Finally, I am concerned that leaving
military intelligence in the exclusive
privacy of our citizens. I remind my col-
leagues of the.Church committee findings
which showed that numerous activities
of the Department of Defense resulted in
violations of individual rights, none of
which were ever investigated by the Com-
mittee on Armed Services. I point to the
existence of the NSA's Watch List and
Project Shamrock, and the domestic
surveillance activities of the Army dur-
ing the late 1960's. In this latter case, the
investigation of Army surveillance was
undertaken not by the Committee on
Armed Services but by a Judiciary sub-
committee.
The Church committee report also
found that there are approximately 5,000
military investigators still in the United
States. Can we be satisfied that these
5,000 investigators are staying within
legitimate bounds by depending on the
Committee on Armed- Services?
In short, Mr. President, I do not think
we will have an effective committee or
effective oversight if Defense intelligence
is left out of the committee's jurisdiction.
I urge my colleagues to vote against the
amendment offered by Senators STENNIS
and TOWER.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Will the Presiding
Officer please inform us concerning the
remainder of the time?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Connecticut has 10 minutes;
Senator from Mississippi has 14
utes.
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S 7552
We are talking about those agencies
within the Defense Department that deal
with the collection, the dissemination,
and the assessment of political and eco-
nomic intelligence under the direction of
the DCI, strategic intelligence, and that
we must have if the oversight committee
is to do its job. '
Mr. President, I suggest that If this
amendment is adopted it will deny the
oversight committee the leverage it needs
to deal effectively with those intelligence
agencies which account for the great
bulk of the spending. It has already been
mentioned if this amendment is adopted
what it means is that between 80 and 90
percent of the spending for intelligence
is excluded from the legislative reach
of the oversight committee, and I think
that is no minor matter. In fact, instead
of a club, the adoption of this amend-
ment would leave the oversight commit-
tee with nothing more than a small stick,
and would gut the committee.
Now, the substitute resolution, on the
other hand, gives the oversight commit-
tee sufficient legislative reach to em-
brace the whole intelligence community.
Thus, the oversight committee would be
the congressional counterpart to the way
the executive branch itself organizes and
administers national intelligence.
This is a seamless web, Mr. President.
If you look at the way the executive
branch pulls it all together, you will see
the so-called military agencies actually
operate under the direction of the DCI;
they operate under the direction of an
overall intelligence board. This is all of
a piece, and it has to be left of a piece,
and if you do not give the oversight com-
mittee jurisdiction to handle as a piece
then you, of course, deny the committee
effective oversight authority.
Everyone who has served in the Sen-
ate knows that the power of the purse is
the ultimate test. -To deny the oversight
committee the power of the purse where
the intelligence community is concerned
would be to effectively undermine its
role. I
Furthermore, Mr. President, if this
amendment is adopted it gets us right
back to the problem we are trying to
solve. For years the problem has been
there has been no committee in Congress
that could reach out and embrace the
entire intelligence community. Now we
have one if this substitute resolution is
adopted. But if the Stennis amendment
is approved, we are right back to where
we started from. The net, that seemless
web, has been broken, and we are back
to piecemeal jurisdiction distributed
among several committees of Congress
no one of which can do the job.
So, Mr. President, I do hope that in
consideration of the need that has been
demonstrated during the past 15 months
of investigation, and the abuse we found,
some of which occurred within the De-
fense Department-the National Secu-
rity Agency was one of those that, con-
trary to the laws of the land, intercepted
hundreds of thousands of cables and
read them in a massive fishing expedi-
tion for intelligence information, all
contrary to the statutes of this country.
So these agencies need to be super-
vised, and the oversight committee needs
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 19, 1976
to have such reach so it may deal with
the overall national strategic intelli-
gence community the same way that the
executive branch deals with it. Only then
will you have effective senatorial over-
sight. Only then will you be assured that
the abuses that we found in the course
of this investigation can be prevented
from reoccurring in the future.
So I do hope that the Senate, in its
wisdom, will reject the amendment.
Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. CHURCH. Yes.
Mr. MONDALE. The argument was
made today that not much of the scope
of the abuses that were uncovered oc-
curred in this area of defense intelli-
gence. So I asked the staff to bring over
-just the copies of the reports that deal
in detail with abuses occurring exclu-
sively in the defense intelligence areas:
One dealing with surveillance of private
citizens, one dealing with the National
Security Agency, and each of these going
into detail showing over many years in a
broad and deep scope-the abuse of human
rights and legal rights by these agencies.
If we proceed as this amendment pro-
poses, to exempt these agencies, not only
do we exempt 80 percent of the intelli-
gence budget but we will be creating a
situation where if they wanted to repeat
what has happened in the past they
would simply shift these activities over
into the defense intelligence agencies be-
cause these agencies can do and have
done, as this record shows, precisely the
things that we seek to prevent.
Mr. CHURCH. I agree wholeheartedly
with the Senator. He is correct in every-
thing he said.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of the Senator from Connecticut has ex-
pired. The time the Senator from Missis-
sippi has left is 10 minutes.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield
6 minutes to the Senator from Texas.
W. TOWER. Mr. President, the issue
here is not whether or not we should
have oversight. I think everybody agrees
that we should have oversight. The ques-
tion is whether or not we are proceeding
on the presumption that a committee set
up specifically for that purpose can do a
more perfect job than the other commit-
tees having jurisdiction over various ele-
ments of the intelligence-gathering com-
munities.
I submit that it cannot.
Now, inherent in the proposal of this
resolution is the suggestion that the
Armed Services Committee has been de-
relict in its duties for lo these 25-plus
years since the Central Intelligence
Agency has been in existence.
I reject that notion. If there has been
any dereliction,, then the entire U.S.
Senate and the House of Representatives
must bear the responsibility because this
was the accepted way of doing business
for so many years. Then when abuses
were brought to our attention, we re-
acted, and quite properly, in mandating
a special investigation.
That brings up a point, the Senator
from Idaho says that without legislative
jurisdiction the oversight committee
would not have sufficient authority and
power to deal with the business of over-
sight.
I reject that notion because the select
committee which he so ably chaired ac
ally got everything it wanted and it
absolutely no legislative authority.
it could do was make recommendations.
I submit that a better way to main-
tain oversight would be to allow the juris-
idiction in terms of oversight of our
various intelligence-gathering activities
to continue to lodge in the committees
that now exercise that jurisdiction.
I think that the process could be per-
fected by the creation of, in the case of
the Armed Services Committee, a per-
manent subcommittee with a permanent
professional staff required to report to
the Senate on a regular basis.
The thing I fear about this oversight
committee that is supposed to resolve
all of our problems regarding the in-
telligence community is that it is going
to create more problems than it solves.
Certainly, it is going to create problems
in terms of the effectiveness of our
clandestine activities.
Now, already, the debate on this resolu-
tion preceding that investigation, the
Senate-House committee, has under-
mined foreign confidence in the ability
of the United States to carry on intel-
ligence-related activities in a confidential
way.
We have damaged our credibility with
the intelligence services of allied nations
and they feel less disposed to cooperate
with us now, feeling that much might be
disclosed about their own operations if
they do cooperate with us.
So what we are doing here is en
ing in an exercise that, in my view,
the potential for seriously undermi g
the intelligence-gathering capability of
the United States.
I cannot see that the need for the crea-
tion of such a committee, whatever the
merits in the proposal are, outweigh the
potential dangers to the security of the
United States in terms of the prolifera-
tion of disclosure of confidential, classi-
fied and sensitive information.
The fact. of the matter is that in the
creation of this new committee we do not
solve the problem of the proliferation, we
exacerbate that problem..
Now, we have a brand new committee
of 15 members, we also have a staff, for
every member plus the regular perma-
nent staff, and this is an enormous un-
dertaking, particularly when we consider
all the security precautions this commit-
tee will have to take.
This means that the potential for dis-
closure of sensitive information increases
geometrically rather than arithmetically
and the potential is very much there.
Yes, the select committee had a pretty
good record of not leaking that which it
chose not to disclose. I think. the com-
mittee chose to disclose more than it
should have.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's time has expired.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield the Senator a
minute.
Mr. TOWER. But we can always ex
this to be the case.
The experience in the House is thaffhe
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May 19, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
House committee, investigating intelli-
gence committee, did not leak; it poured.
There is a vast potential for mischief
re. This is not a committee that is
' ng established on the basis of popular
and. The popular fear in, this coun-
try, by citizens generally, is not that- the
CIA and the FBI are going to invade their
rights, because most people being law-
abiding, have no such fears. Their con-
cern is that other agencies of the gov-
ernment have intruded much too much
in their lives.
The preponderance of the American
people believe, I feel, that we have dis-
closed too much, not too little, and the
dangerous potential is here, that we shall
we are not trying to keep the informa-
tion away from the Senators or from the
American people. This means disclosures
art of the intelligence program will be
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that it be in or-
der, with one show of hands, to order the
yeas and nays on the pending Stennis-
Tower amendment, the Cannon substi-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a
sufficient second? There is a sufficient
Tower-Stennis-Thurmond amendment?
amendment.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I intend
to speak in supiiort of the amendment by
enator TOWER, myself, and others to
he e pending substitute proposed by Sen-
ator CANNoN. Before discussing the
amendment in detail, I shall address the
substitute as a whole.
PRINCIPAL EFFECT OF THE PENDING SUBSTITUTE
I realize the pending substitute, which
reverses the version reported by the
Rules Committee, represents a good faith
effort and hard-bargaining on the part
of all those involved. For a number of
basic reasons, however, I cannot support
the substitute.
Although there are many provisions in
the substitute on which I have reserva-
tions, I will limit my_ comments to the
principal thrusts of the substitute:
The substitute would create a separate
intelligence committee with legislative,
oversight jurisdiction over all intelligence
activities in the Federal Government.
Defense intelligence activities would be
broken out from the Defense budget. At
the same time, any cognizant standing
committee could request on a secondary
and limited basis the referral of intel-
ligence legislation except as to the CIA.
Of equal significance is the provision
that no funds will be appropriated for
U.S. intelligence activities after Septem-
ber 30, 1976 "unless such funds have been
previously authorized by a bill or joint
resolution passed by the Senate during
the same or preceding fiscal year to carry
out such activities for such fiscal year".
If intelligence funds have not been spe-
cifically authorized, appropriations for
intelligence activities could be subject to
a point of order.
OBJECTIONS TO THE PENDING SUBSTITUTE
Mr. President, any Senate arrange-
ment for legislation and budget author-
ity such as the pending substitute that
does not include the House of Represent-
atives is bound to fail in the Congress.
Moreover, by creating a new and second
budgetary process for intelligence, the
substitute would increase the potential
for disclosures. Whatever reform that is
needed to improve U.S. intelligence
should be undertaken through a unified
approach between the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate.
The pending substitute would also re-
sult in a proliferation of involvement by
Senate committees in intelligence mat-
ters and would inevitably lead to greater
disclosures on the nature and scope of
U.S. intelligence activities.
Finally, the pending substitute would
do nothing to improve U.S. intelligence;
on the contrary, its effect could well be
to weaken present U.S. intelligence-
gathering capabilities.
ADVANTAGES OF THE TOWER AMENDMENT
I have joined Senator TOWER in spon-
soring an amendment which would pro-
tect military intelligence from these two
main hazards of the pending substitute-
the requirement for a separate authoriza-
tion and the breakout of military intelli-
gence from the defense budget. The
Tower amendment would do three
things:
Keep the legislative jurisdiction over
military intelligence with the Armed
Services Committee while leaving the
select committee with oversight juris-
diction for all military intelligence.
Avoid a report by the select committee
of its views and estimates on military in-
telligence to the Budget Committee.
S 7553
Eliminate the requirement for a sepa-
rate authorization for military intelli-
gence funds.
The effect of this amendment would be
to reduce the risk of serious intelligence
disclosures and preserve the integration
and strength of military intelligence
within the overall U.S. defense posture;
I fully support a strengthening of con-
gressional oversight for intelligence and
have endorsed the concept of a new
"watchdog" committee for intelligence.
The Tower amendment would in no way
reduce the power of a select committee
created by the pending substitute to
guard against possible abuses in the U.S.
intelligence community. The select com-,,
mittee would have undiminished over-
sight authority over all intelligence ac-
tivities including CIA and military intelli-
gence. It would have access to all mili-
tary intelligence information, budgetary
and otherwise. It would also have full
investigatory powers, including subpena
power. Thus, the Tower amendment has
neither the aim nor effect of restricting
congressional vigilance over any U.S. in-
telligence activities.
Rather, the Tower amendment would
preserve the regular authorization proc-
ess for defense intelligence resources. In
other words, the Armed Services Com-
mittee would continue to examine the
merits of complex research and develop-
ent, procurement, and construction asso-
ciated with high technology intelligence
equipment. The Armed Services Commit-
tee would continue to scrutinize military
intelligence manpower through the au-
thorization of overall military end
strengths. These authorizations are
studied initially by the various subcom-
mittees of the Armed Services Committee
such as the Research and Development
Subcomittee, headed by Senator McIN-
TYRE, the Military Construction Subcom-
mittee, headed by Senator SYMINGTON,
and the Manpower and Personnel Sub-
committee, headed by Senator NUNN, and
so forth. Military intelligence matters
would then be passed on by. the full
Armed Services Committee in conjunc-
tion with annual authorization for the
budget of the Defense Department. It is
this process that has served this Nation
well over the years and has been respon-
sible in large part for creating the most
effective intelligence service in the world.
WHAT. THE TOWER AMENDMENT WOULD NOT
DO
There have been abuses of activities
in the intelligence community, some
quite serious and inexcusable. They have
been spread out over the 30-year period
which has recently been under review,
but they cannot be justified, and I have
been ashamed of the abuses which have
been reported.
For the purposes of the amendment,
I want to point out that most of the
abuses have noj been associated with de-
fense intelligence. The uniformed mili-
tary by and large has not engaged in cov-
ert operations and the so-called "dirty
tricks." While certain survelliance opera-
tions, ordered by higher authority, have
provoked criticism, the military agencies
have engaged,-for the most part, in col-
lecting and analyzing intelligence Infor-
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S 7554 CONGRESSIONAL
mation. I believe they have done so skill-
fully and in the Nation's best interest.
In the exuberance to prevent abuses
within the intelligence community, the
Congress must not fail in its responsi-
bility to give intelligence itts proper em-
phasis and security for the defense of
this country. -
HOW THE PRESENT SYSTEM WORKS
At the present time there are no laws
requiring that intelligence funds in the
Federal Government be authorized an-
nually as a condition for the appropria-
tions of intelligence activities. There is
a sound reason for not requiring a sep-
arate annual authorization law. The rea-
son is to prevent disclosure of the
amounts of these funds and the annual
changes which would surely be revealed
if a separate law were utilized.
Let me also emphasize that the appro-
priations for the various defense intelli-
gence funds are now contained in 23 dif-
ferent defense accounts and are author-
ized in part by the annual military au-
thorization bill. In addition, there pres-
ently is no separate budget for defense
intelligence activties in the sense that
there are separate accounts that can be
audited for the Congress by the General
Accounting Office. In other words, the
military intelligence budget is composed
of merely estimates of intelligence spend-
ing rather than strict budget accounts.
For, example, an Air Force mechanic may
work part-time on fighter aircraft and
part-time on intelligence-gathering air-
craft. He is paid out of a general defense
operation and maintenance account
rather than any account for defense in-
telligence.
Thus, this substitute would force the
creation of a completely new and un-
wieldy budget system for intelligence in
the Senate while the Houseof Represent-
atives would continue under the, existing
budget system.
SEPARATE AUTHORIZATION REQUIREMENT WOULD
LEAD TO GREATER INTELLIGENCE DISCLOSURES
A requirement for separate authoriza-
tion of military intelligence funds will
inevitably result in serious disclosures on
the nature and scope of U.S. intelligence
activities. To meet the separate author-
ization, as contemplated by the pending
substitute, would-,result in identifying
crucial aggregates and components of
military intelligence.
Such disclosures would not have to
come from outright leaks. Instead, sepa-
rate authorizing legislation and,debate
in the Senate would provide the basis for
drawing inferences and reaching conclu-
sions. These inferences could be enor-
mously valuable to our adversaries. They
could also shatter the confidence of allied
nations and friendly individuals who
might otherwise cooperate with U.S.
intelligence efforts.
SEPARATE AUTHORIZATION WOULD PRECLUDE THE
CONDUCT OF CERTAIN SENSITIVE. PROJECTS
A brief historical review will show that
several projects_ crucial to the national
security could not have been accom-
plished under a congressional require-
ment for separate authorization. It would
have been impossible for example to de-
velop the atomic bomb in secrecy if the
funds for the Manhattan project had to
RECORD -SENATE May 19, 1976
y authorized by the production of defense intelligence. All of
the various elements of the defense pro-
gram-such as intelligence, tactical _Air
power, and strategic submarine force:
ites would have been must be evaluated and balanced togeti
een necessary to an-in order to provide the most ;effect
nds for this purpose. overall national defense. Valuable
,xample was the so- fense resources must go to the ar(
plorer project. This - where they will make the maximum c(
t effort to recover a 'tribution to national defense. This
tear submarine with -quires that all of these elements be
hnology and weap-viewed together in one place by a sin
timillion-dollar prof- committee.
3everal years. if the Given its responsibility for the "coi
ad the separate au- mon defense generally" tha Armed Sel
ires for intelligence
ices Committee should be the one
in the pending com-
d have been sufficient spectrum of defense activities so as
ation made public best channel resources into intelligei
riferences could have activities. Only the Armed Services Co:
he United States was mittee can review research and devel(
ordinary intelligence ment, procurement, and manpower'
suspicions-and all suspicions-the So-intelligence activities in relation in a lift capabilities, command-and-cont
en right on the re-facilities, and so forth.
Pacific Ocean, there- Defense intelligence must not beco
.-e project. an end in itself. It must be designed
other examples in- support and enhance U.S. defense
ecoding systems, and forts. Separating it from the Arry.
technology, which Services Committee will facilitate I
separate authofiza-
or intelligence funds.
A SEPARATE AUTHORTLA-tional defense efforts.
SE INTELLIGENCE Giving the select committee jurisd
requirement for de- tion over defense intelligence would
activities would pose like giving the Commerce Committee 2
. There is no mean-thority over military airlift or the SP.
tween tactical or lo-Committee authority over strategic m
strategic or national
ce collector such as national defenseatellite can provide CONCLUSION
rmation that will be
ners, weapons devel-For the reasons I have stated the To
)nal command head. er-Stennis amendment should
adopted. In that way we can avoid i
aintenance, logistics,
long and cumbersome process of prepf ing, debating, and passing an authort
ociated with an in-tion measure to cover military Intel
system cannot be gence.
Iget sense from the Mr. President, I ask unanimous cc
maintenance, logistics, sent to have printed in the RECORD a 11
the Defense Depart-ter I sent to Senators on this mat
, a KC-135 intelli-dated today.
a military airport, There being no objection, the let
rom. military stocks, was ordered to be printed in the RECO
%intenance personnel as follows:
U.S. SENATE,
ense intelligence ac- CO~JMITTEE oisi ARMED SERVICES,
rle budget would be Washington, D.C., May 19,1976
stly, requiring addi- DEAR COLLEAGUE: AS YOU know, AMel
aff, and automation ment No. 1649 (the Tower-Stennis Amel
m e, the mere
com-
a new intelligence
antially increase the
iisclosures. 1. The amendment will not alter. in i
,t defense intelligence respect the Substitute as it relates to
eparately authorized, Central Intelligence Agency.
ent would lose the 2. The amendment in no way alters
quickly the level and
Iligence activity. This
damaging in a crisis ties including defense intelligence. The
lect committee will have access to all int
ligence information as wen as full inve,
SHOULD NOT BE ISO-gatory, and subpoena powers over all inl
ERALL U.S. DEFENSE PRO-ligence activities.
The amendment would provide:
mg-the product of the 1. It would remove from the proposed n~
Ce community, the select committee legislative jurisdiction o
damental role in the Department of Defense intelligence. 7' e
CIA-RDP90,00735R000200180001-5
impossible had it b
dually authorize fu
called Glomar Ex
was a highly secret
all its advanced tee
onry. It was a mul
promise, there would
budgetary inform
been drawn that t
engaged in an extra
project. From their
they needed were
viets could have be
volving satellites, d
other electronic
tion requirement f
OTHER DRAWBACKS TO
TION FOR DEFENSE
fense intelligence
additional problems
ingful distinction be
s info A single intelligence
an aircraft or s
simultaneously info
useful to force plan
ass The facilities, m
and operations ass
general facilities,
and operations of
ment. For example
and military pilots.
subst pilation of such
budget would subst
s activities must be s
the Defense Departm
flexibility to adjust
situation.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
LATED FROM THE OVERALL
GRAM
In addition to us'
defense intelligence
to
weigh needs and priorities across the
rate activity operating independently of
the Defense Department and U.S. na-
1
sile development. The result must
evitably be to fractionate and dilute
efforte
went) to the pending Substitute to S. Res.
400 will be considered at 11:00 this morning.
First, I would like to call your attention to
existing language of the Substitute as it re-
lates to oversight of U.S. intelligence activi-
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May 19, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
rationale is two-fold. First, it would mini-
mize the possible disclosure through the
long and debated process of authorization
sensitive intelligence figures. Rather than
Afting separately "authorized by a bill or
nt resolution passed by the Senate", as
equired by the Substitute, Defense intelli-
gence figures would continue to be included
in various parts of the Military Authoriza-
tion and Appropriation Acts. I cannot over-
stress the damage to defense intelligence
that could flow from budget clues which
would enable foreign powers to determine
information and trends on our highly sophis-
ticated electronic and satellite activities.
2. Intelligence activities, as carried on
within the Department of Defense, are as
much a part of national defense as the Stra-
tegic Air Command, Polaris submarine fleet,
or any other vital defense element. The Sen-
ate should not fractionalize national defense
by having a separate authorization for in-
telligence manpower, intelligence research
and development, and intelligence procure-
ment involving such matters as cryptology,
satellites and other electronics. Intelligence
is an inseparable element of national
defense.
The new select committee, by retaining
complete oversight, would be empowered to
investigate and prevent any abuses. At the
same time the necessary secrecy and
strength of defense intelligence would be
preserved.
One final comment. With the Senate act-
ing alone, the entire proposal will ultimately
fail. With the House continuing under the
present system, with the basic differences in
Congressional management of the intelli-
gence program, legislative reconciliation be-
comes unmanagable and impossible -to at-
tain. The fate of national intelligence should
not be left to chance.
I hope you will see fit to vote for the pro-
posed Amendment No. 1649.
? Most sincerely,
JOHN C. STENNIS.
Ing process for the intelligence function
from the process of authorizing and ap-
propriating funds for our national de-
fense. It is clear to me from my work on
the Armed Services Committee that in-
telligence is an integral part of the na-
tional defense. It can be analogized to a
complex network that could not be un-
raveled without destroying its entire
structure. For example, Navy ships and
military bases carry intelligence gather-
ing equipment, for both tactical and na-
tional defense purposes. My question is,
how can these funds for these systems be
separately authorized and appropriated?
In practice, it is impossible to draw a dis-
tinction between national and tactical
intelligence, much less say that one sys-
tem gathers only national, and another
only tactical intelligence. These differ-
ences exist only on paper, in Senate Reso-
lution 400, and not in point of fact. More-
over, I believe Senator STENNis has made
a good point here when he said that Con-
gress has a vital role in the production
of defense intelligence. He stressed that
all of the elements of our defense pro-
gram, such as sealift capability, defense
intelligence, air power, must be evaluated
together in order to provide the most ef-
fective overall national defense capabil-
ity. He urged that valuable defense re-
sources must go to those areas where
they will have a maximum contribution
to national defense. I could not agree
more. It is my conclusion that this re-
quires all of the component elements to
be reviewed together in one place by a
single committee having the expertise to
make such evaluations. I submit that this
is properly an Armed Services Committee
function.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask unan-
imous consent to have printed in the
RECORD a'statement by the Senator from
Delaware (Mr. ROTH) in connection with
this matter.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
STATEMENT BY SENATOR ROTH
I regret that due to a long-standing speak-
ing engagement in Delaware, I am unable to
be present for the final votes on S. Res. 400,
including the vote on the Tower amendment
and on the Cannon substitute.
If present, I would vote against the Tower
amendment and for the Cannon substitute.
The Tower amendment would exclude from
the jurisdiction of the new Intelligence Com-
mittee all Defense Department intelligence
programs, including the National Security
Agency (NSA) and the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA). Since these agencies are in-
volved in preparing national intelligence in-
formation that is the basis for general foreign
policy and defense policy decisions, I believe
that it is essential that the new Intelligence
Committee have jurisdiction over these pro-
grams along with the Armed Services Com-
mittee. This is necessary for the new com-
mittee to have a coherent anal complete
understanding of our national intelligence
effort, to review the various programs to
eliminate any unnecessary duplication and
maximize efficiency as required by one of
my amendments to S. Res. 400, and to per-
form basic oversight responsibilities. Under
the Cannon substitute, the Armed Services
Committee will have sequential jurisdiction,
and, of course, that committee will also prop-
erly retain exclusive jurisdiction over.tacti-
cal military intelligence, the kind of intelli-
gence commanders in the field need in a
battlefield situation.
S 7555
The Cannon substitute to-S. Res. 400 is the
compromise worked out by. members of the
Government Operations and Rules Commit-
tees to establish a new permanent Intelli-
gence Committee. I joined in introducing
this substitute because I believe a new com-
mittee with legislative jurisdiction is needed
to help restore public confidence in our in-
telligence services while providing effective
oversight. Finally, the substitute incorpo-
rates the essential provisions of the amend-
ments I introduced to protect national in-
telligence secrets and examine a number of
problems, including the morale of intelli-
gence personnel, the analytical quality of our
foreign intelligence information, and the de-
sirability of charters for each intelligence
agency, which I believe have not yet been
adequately addressed.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield back the remain-
der of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time
has been yielded back. The question is on
agreeing to the amendment. The yeas
and nays have been ordered and the
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce
that the Senator from Michigan (Mr.
HART), the Senator from Indiana (Mr.
HARTKE), and, the Senator from Wyo-
ming (Mr. McGEE), aie necessarily
absent.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce, that the
Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER),
the Senator from North Carolina (Mr.
HELMS), and the Senator from Delaware
(Mr. ROTH), are necessarily absent.
On this vote, the Senator from North
Carolina (Mr. HELMS) is paired with the
Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER). If
present and voting, the Senator from
North Carolina would vote "yea" and the
Senator from Tennessee would vote
"nay."
The result was announced-yeas 31,
ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS ON TOWER-STENNIS
AMENDMENT `
Mr. TA.FT. Mr. President, I rise in sup-
port of the amendment offered by. Sen-
ator TOWER and others which would avoid
a very serious problem created by the
substitute-the requirement for a sepa-
rate authorization and the breakout of
military intelligence from the defense
budget. This is one of the points I ad-
dressed in my testimony before the Rules
Committee which unfortunately has not
been resolved in the final compromise
version of the resolution.
Furthermore, as I understand it, the
Tower amendment would add construc-
tively to the resolution by establishing
the following things:
First, it-would maintain the legislative
jurisdiction over military intelligence
within the Armed Services Committee,
while preserving the select committee's
oversight jurisdiction over military in-
telligence.
Second, it would obviate the require-
ment that the select committee report its
estimates on military intelligence to the
Senate Budget Committee.
Third, it would avoid the requirement
that a separate authorization for mili-
tary intelligence funding be employed.
The intendment of the amendment is
to alleviate the risk of disclosure of mili-
tary intelligence and to provide for the
continued coordination of military intel-
gence with our entire U.S. defense posi-
ion.
Mr. President, in my opinion it is vir-
tually impossible to separate the budget-
nays 63, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 179 Leg.]
YEAS-31
Allen
Fong
Scott, Hugh
Bartlett
Garn
Scott,
Belimon
Goldwater
William L.
Brock
Hansen
Sparkman
Buckley
Hruska
Stennis
Byrd,
Johnston .
Stevens
Harry F., Jr.
Laxalt
Taft
Cannon
Long
Talmadge
Curtis
McClellan
Thurmond
Eastland
McClure
Tower
Fannin
Nunn
Young
NAYS-63
Abourezk
Gravel
Montoya
Bayh
Griffin
Morgan
Beall
Hart, Gary
Moss
Bentsen
Haskell
Muskie
Biden
Hatfield
Nelson
Brooke
Hathaway
Packwood
Bumpers
Hollings
Pastore
Burdick
Huddleston
Pearson
Byrd, Robert C. Humphrey
Pell
Case
Inouye
Percy
Chiles
Jackson
Proxmire
Church
Javits
Randolph
Clark
Kennedy
Ribicoff
Cranston
Leahy
Schweiker
Culver
Magnuson
Stafford
Dole
Mansfield
Stevenson
Domenici
Mathias
Stone
Durkin
McGovern
Symington
Eagleton
McIntyre
Tunney
Ford
Metcalf
Weicker
Glenn
Mondale
Williams
NOT VOTING-6
Baker
Hartke
McGee
Hart, Philip A.
Helms
Roth
So the Tower-Stennis amendment (No.
1649) was rejected.
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 S 7556
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 19, 1976.
Mr, RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I move Mr. President, it is a most difficult I have additional problems with the
to rarnnsider the vote by which the task to shift jurisdiction in the Senate compromise resolution as it 'presently
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I move to lay the national interest demands. It is not ments during the debate on this Ineasu
h
e
agreed to. intelligence community-the fact is that dealing with the Senators' committee
ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS ON THE CANNON the intelligence activities of our Govern- assignments was defeated yesterday and
SUBSTITUTE- AMENDMENT ment have grown so large and so com- I believe that this was a crushing blow
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi- plex that the substantive committees, to the establishment of a new Select
dent, as a member of the Committee on with all of their other heavy responsi- Committee on Intelligence. Without go-
Rules, I have worked closely with other ?bilities, could not hope to give the neces- ing into detail into this issue, which is
Senators in writing the substitute sary time and develop the specialized a matter of record, I believe! that we
amendment offered by Mr. CANNON to expertise needed to constantly monitor have not given this committee a realistic
Senate Resolution 400. I am keenly aware and effectively control. the intelligence chance to succeed because there is no
of the compelling need for effective over- community. accommodation made for a Senators'
sight of the intelligence community, and Recognizing the reality that an ef- work on this select committee with his
I also recognize that the best interests of fective intelligence community is an ab- normal activities in the conduct of other.
the United States demand that the in- solute necessity for our country's secu- senatorial committee assignments.
telligence community must be able to ' rity, but also realizing that past abuses I am also concerned that the pending
function effectively and that there are by some segments of the intelligence substitute will cause a proliferation of
matters which, in the national interest, community require the Senate to act to committee involvement in intelligence
the Government must be able to keep restructure itself in such a. way as to be matters and will unavoidably lead to
from public disclosure. -able to exert the necessary legislative greater disclosures of our intelligence ac-
Ibelieve that the compromise substi- oversight to prevent future abuses, I urge tivities. While I recognize that the bill
tute offered by Senator CANNON and my- the Senate to adopt the Cannon substi- does provide for controls over unauthor- -
self and other Senators to Senate Reso- tute proposal and pass Senate Resolu- ized disclosure of classified information
lution 400 will provide the best legislative tion 400 as so amended. and while there is a provision for the
response to these legitimate competing Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, after a Senate to investigate unauthorized dis-
interests. -thorough study of the issues involved, closures, I am still not satisfied that we
The membership of the new commit- and after actively participating in the have tightened. this area sufficiently so
tee would be drawn from the entire Sen- debate on Senate Resolution 40,0 as well as to fully protect our intelligence se-
ate, while at the same time drawing from as offering several amendments thereto, crets. I will continue to monitor this area
the substantive committees which have I am constrained to vote against the so- assuming the select committee conies
expertise in intelligence-gathering mat- called Cannon compromise. This is not into being and if there are violations and
ters-recognizing that members from to say that I do not favor a central com- abuses, I am prepared to offer legisia-
these committees not only must con- mittee of the Senate which would have tion to impose criminal sanctions on the
tinue to work closely with intelligence legislative and even perhaps appropria- violators in addition to the disciplinary
matters to enable their committees to tions jurisdiction over our intelligence rLles contained in the Standing Rules of
fulfill their responsibilities properly; but, activities. I believe we all agree on the the Senate.
also that these members bring a special objectives for creating such a body- For all of these reasons, I would pr
understanding and knowledge of intelli- more adequate and continuing control the approach taken by the Rules C
gence activity matters to the new select on the part of the Congress over our mittee which would establish a Sena
committee. various intelligence functions. But I dif- Select Committee on Intelligence with
The new committee, in exercising ex- fer with the Cannon compromise with oversight jurisdiction over the intel-
elusive jurisdiction over the CIA, will be respect to the means employed to achieve ligence community, but would leave
able to deal with the complexities of in- these objectives. within the various standing committees
telligence activities, without the burden I believe that the compromise in sev- the. legislative jurisdiction in respect to
of responsibility over other large areas eral ways is premature and hastily intelligence activities.
of legislation which the substantive com- drawn. The compromise calls for the I believe that a separate oversight
mittees now shoulder. Centralization of creation of a select committee of the committee, fully and currently informed
responsibility for the CIA in one com- Senate which in effect has the powers and having a subpena power, can pro-
mittee, while providing for closer over- and authority of a standing committee of vide effective oversight for the intelli-
sight, also decreases the risks of inad- the Senate. The substitute establishes gence community without a grant of leg-
vertent publication of highly sensitive a wholly new intelligence committee with islative jurisdiction. This statement is
material on the part of the Senate. Con- legislative, budgetary, and oversight ju- borne out by virtue of the experience of
versely, responsibility to only one Senate risdiction wrapped up in one committee. the Select Senate and House Intelligence
committee demands and will allow full It is my view that this is extremely seri- Committees which have very successful-
cooperation and candor with that com- ous undertaking and should not be ap- ly exposed the abuses while not having
mittee on the part of the CIA. proved until all of the implications of legislative authority.
At the same time, the compromise pro- creating a committee like this have been Mr. President, it seems to me that in
posal offered as a substitute for Senate thoroughly developed over an extended order for the Senate to succeed in this
Resolution 400, recognizes that in other period of time. area, it must work with the House of
areas of the intelligence community, the - I believe it is also proper to have an Representatives in fashioning. a joint
working relationship of the intelligence informed input from the select commit- committee of Congress acceptable to both
arm of the respective departments and tee to study the Senate committee sys- bodies. Legislative activity as broad as
agencies are so closely intertwined with tem prior to our adoption of the com what we are providing for in this select
the other activities of the departments promise resolution. It would certainly committee has got to be done in con-
that isolated oversight of these intelli- seem logical that any proposal to estab- junction with the House of Representa-
gence activities by one Senate committee lish in effect a standing committee of tives if we are to gain control over our
would be detrimental to the proper func- the Senate should receive study by the intelligence area. The beauty of adopt-
tioning- of both the affected department committee which the Senate has au- ing the Rules Committee approach is
and the Senate in carrying out its con- thorized for that purpose in conjunction that it would furnish us with sufficient
stitutional oversight responsibilities, with its overall study of committee ju- time to further study this prospect while
The compromise also provides ade- risdictions. I believe we are depriving our at the same time not diminish our in-
quate protection against unwarranted Select Study Committee of jurisdiction quiry into the status of our intelligence
disclosure of sensitive material, I believe, over a matter which the Senate has functions. I note that Congressm 0
thus correcting a serious deficiency he jurisdictin oeed f this body entiy within nCEDERBERG has for himself ority leader of the House, and oduc
the original bill.
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May 19, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
joint resolution to provide for the estab-
lishment of a Joint Committee on Intel-
ligence which I believe shows a willing-
I on the part of the House to engage
i a constructive dialog on creating a
mmittee of this kind.
I would like to have the opportunity
and time to develop this aspect further
and it appears to me that we are going.
to foreclose this possibility by approving
this Senate Select Intelligence Commit-
tee today.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I
strongly support the compromise amend-
ment to Senate Resolution 400, offered
by Senator CANNON and others, which I
am pleased to cosponsor. This proposed
substitute, as amended, would establish a
permanent Select Committee on Intelli-
gence Activities composed of 15 Members
of the Senate, appointed on a rotating
basis. -
The committee will have full oversight,
legislative, and budgetary authority over
the 'Government's national intelligence
activities. Its jurisdiction will not only
cover the Central Intelligence Agency,
but also the Defense Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Agency, and the in-
telligence activities of other agencies-
including the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation.
Although we are considering this reso-
lution in the wake of the reports re-
-cently issued by the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence Activities and the
President's Commission on CIA activities,
the need for such a permanent intelli-
gence oversight committee was recog-
nized by the Hoover Commission over 20
te~aars ago. In 1956 the Senate Rules Com-
ttee recommended the creation of a
ew congressional unit "to gather infor-
mation and make independent checks
and appraisals of CIA activities." Nu-
merous other studies and reports since
that time have reemphasized the need for
closer more continuous, and more sophis-
ticated oversight of intelligence activities
of the Federal Government.
Under the able leadership of Senator
CHURCH, the Select Committee on Intel-
ligence Activities explored for over a year
the various intelligence programs, agen-
cies, expenditures, and activities of the
Federal Government. Whatever doubts
may have existed before, the over 1,000
pages of final report recently issued by
that committee make it imperative that
we proceed with dispatch to set up a per-
manent committee with broad jurisdic-
tion and adequate powers to keep a watch
over and maintain a check on the ac-
tivities of all the agencies of the Federal
Government dealing with intelligence.
It has taken the Intelligence Commit-
tee seven volumes of hearings and two
volumes of reports to uncover, document,
and analyze the intelligence activities of
various Federal agencies. It would be im-
possible to describe In any brief floor re-
protection of our national security. And
all were carried out secretly, without
public or congressional knowledge, with-
out adequate controls or checks from
within or without.
The establishment of a permanent
Senate committee to keep tabs on the
Governments' intelligence community is
only the first step. Congress must proceed
to develop comprehensive charters for
the intelligence agencies, and guidelines
for their activities. We must reorganize
portions of those agencies, establish firm
chains of command within and constant
reporting and approval mechanisms
without.
We must establish a statutory classifi-
cation system and enact laws governing
national security electronic surveillance.
The list goes on and on. But at its head is
the need to put in place a committee to
oversee and study the intelligence activi-
ties and programs of our Government, to
develop and review legislation concerning
them, and to insure that they are in con-
formity with the Constitution and laws of
our land.
Senate Resolution 400 has been before
various committees of the Senate for
over 2 months. It has been studied and
debated, revised and revised again. But
until the introduction of the Cannon sub-
stitute last week. What had emerged from
these studies and debates and revisions
was a division of this body into two basic
groups-those who would put in place a
permanent strong committee, equipped
with the authority and jurisdiction to do
the immense and difficult job of oversee-
ing Government intelligence operations,
and those who would construct a com-
mittee of paper mache, having the ap-
pearance of solidity but remaining thin
on the outside and hollow on the inside.
The Stennis amendment, which would
strip the new committee of its jurisdic-
tion over Defense Department " intelli-
gence functions-including DIA and
NSA-reflects this second choice.
If we choose the latter course, then we
are saying that the Senate tradition of
ignoring the use and abuse of immense
power and perhaps billions of dollars in
the intelligence field is to be continued.
We are choosing to put our heads back
in the sand, knowing nonetheless that
what we do not know and will not know
could hurt us, thousands of other Ameri-
cans, and our democratic society.
The evidence we have makes the for-
mer course the only responsible one. The
proposed substitute to Senate Resolution
400, as it stands now, would arm the Sen-
ate with the tools to fulfill our constitu-
tional duty to provide the controls and
guidance over executive branch intelli-
gence activities. In taking this road we
are not acting as if intelligence Is unim-
portant to our Nation. We are not saying
that we should drop our guard against
contained in that record. tional security. But we are asserting that
it is replete with descriptions of bug- Congress intends to play a direct role, a
gang, wiretapping, mail opening, surrep- firm role, in guiding the conduct of ih-
titious entry, infiltration, assassination telligence activities and in protecting the
plots, drug experimentation, clandestine rights and liberties of all American citi-
ilitary operations, character assassina- zens.
ons, and more, all carried out under the I would like to turn my attention for a
anner of intelligence gathering and the moment to the matter of the jurisdiction
57557
of the new committee proposed to be
established by the substitute to Senate
Resolution 400, which I am joining, in
proposing. As a member of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, I had the
occasion to hear testimony and join de-
bate over whether any new permanent
Senate Intelligence Oversight Commit-
tee should have jurisdiction to oversee
the intelligence activities of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. I came away
convinced that while the Judiciary Com-
mittee must maintain its historic juris-
diction over every aspect of the Bureau's
operations, the new committee should -
nonetheless be vested with authority over
the FBI's intelligence activities.
There are two reasons for this conclu-
sion: First, there have been a myriad of
abuses by the FBI, under the guise of
domestic intelligence and counterintelli-
gence, which have basically gone un-
checked and undisclosed, despite the
Judiciary Committee's interest in and in-
volvement with the Bureau. And second,
setting aside the issue of abuses, there is
a legitimate role which the FBI has-as
a full member of the intelligence com-
munity-which takes it into realms that
can often best be understood and guided
by a committee with broader jurisdiction
over foreign intelligence activities of
other agencies of Government as well.
The abuses of authority by the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation in the intel-
ligence area are by now all too well
known. They are not limited to narrow
timeframes or circumscribed geographic
areas. Nor, more importantly, do they
reflect the isolated acts of zealous agents
out on a frolic of their own. Instead,
those abuses were embodied in on-going
bureaucratic programs, ordered and ap-
proved atrthe highest levels, spanning the
country and continuing for years.
The Bureau's counterintelligence pro-
grams were, in its own words, designed
to "expose, disrupt and otherwise neu-
tralize" political groups in the United
States. The Cointelpro program,
targeted against five groups, extended
over 15 years and was found by the
Department of Justice itself to have in-
volved practices "abhorrent to a free so-
ciety." Attorney General Levi stated that
many of the Bureau's activities in this
field were not only "foolish," but were
also "illegal."
The' FBI's bag of intelligence tricks
included wiretapping, burglaries, sur-
veillance, and abusive disruptive prac-
tices. And it also included efforts to dis-
credit and harass American citizens
whose only offense was to provide leader-
ship in the antiwar and civil rights
movements.
But I do not want to dwell solely on
the misuse and abuse of FBI power so
thoroughly documented by the Church
committee. Because, Mr. President, it is
clear that even without straying from its
lawful and legitimate course, the FBI
retains responsibilities that are not di-
rected primarily toward law enforce-
ment, but which are aimed at collecting
intelligence information for our Govern-
ment and at blocking attempts by for-
eign governments from collecting infor-
mation from us.
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S 7558 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 191 1976
On February 18 of this year President mittee with jurisdiction over FBI intel- The Judiciary Committee had not un-
Ford issued an Executive order govern= ligence activities, that case is even ?covered, much less put a stop to, the wide
ing U.S. foreign intelligence activities. stronger regarding the Defense Intelli- range of FBI activities which violated
In that order, the FBI was listed along- gence Agency, the National security the law but which have only recent
side the Central Intelligence Agency, Agency, and other units of the Depart- come to light. Likewise, the Armed Se
the National Security Agency, and the ment of Defense. The Defense Depart- ices Committee has hardly done bettffl
Department of Defense as a full-fledged ment must be kept in check as to its ac- in keeping an eye on the CIA and other
member of the "foreign intelligence tivities both at home and abroad. intelligence agencies. We must establish
community." The Subcommittee on Constitutional a committee whose full-time job it is to
In fact, while the CIA was charged Rights of the Judiciary Committee has look at Federal intelligence activities.
with carrying out "foreign counterintel- documented the extensive nature of mili- And we must give that committee full
ligence activities," the FBI was charged tary surveillance of American citizens in authority over each and every Federal
With conductin
i"" ........4....:...4-ii. the TT-it. .St
t
"for
g
a
es
e
gauge activities within the united
States." I stress, Mr. President, that the
only difference in the characterization
of the responsibilities between the CIA
and the FBI is the use of the geographic
limitation which sets the CIA's duties
outside our country, the FBI's inside. In-
cidentally, the Executive order spells out
the Bureau's responsibilities in some de-
tail, but not once in that order is law
enforcement or prosecution for violat-
ing Federal laws mentioned.
In short, the FBI, while fundamen-
tally a law-enforcement agency, is also an
intelligence-gathering agency. In its re-
port on Senate Resolution 400, the Rules
Committee observed that "the intelli-
gence activity of the FBI is a means by
which it detects and investigates viola-
tions of Federal criminal laws." In fact,
as the President's Executive order, the
Bureau's own guidelines and organization
chart, and testimony- before the Judi-
ciary Committee make clear, this is
simply not the case. The Intelligence Di-
vision of the Bureau performs activi-
ties in the United States similar in na-
ture to what the CIA does abroad. No
direct law-enforcement nexus is neces-
sary in the conduct of the Bureau's intel-
ligence and counterintelligence pro-
grams.
Finally, it is difficult, and often impos-
sible, to draw clear lines between the
law enforcement and the intelligence
functions of the FBI. Nor is there any
clear line dividing domestic-oriented
from foreign-oriented activities.
Mr. President, I would also like to point
out for the record that while the Rules
Committee report on Senate Resolution
400 contains what are called "recom-
mendations of the Committee on the
Judiciary," 7 of the 15 members of that
committee dissented from those recom-
mendations. Those 7 members joined in
a letter to the Rules Committee, which
was not reflected in its report, urging
that the new Intelligence Committee
retain concurrent legislative jurisdiction
over FBI intelligence activities.
It seems plain to me, Mr. President,
that if there are two committees in the
Senate-one predominately concerned
with law enforcement and the protection
of constitutional rights, as is the Judici-
ary Committee, and the other predomi-
nately concerned with foreign intelli-
gence, as will be the new Intelligence
Committee-then both must have con-
tinuing, full, and active oversight and
legislative jurisdiction over the intelli-
gence activities of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
As strong as I believe the case is for
providing the Select Intelligence Corn-
Staff in 1967 approved a recommendation ""L144 "?" a111wI, We e111r,uw-
in- ered to obtain all relevant information
for "continuous counterintelligence
it needs to do its job.
vestigations" to obtain information on Further, by vesting in this new com-
"subversive personalities, groups or orga- mittee the shared jurisdiction over au-
nizations." As later revised, the Army ex- thorizing appropriations for all those
tended its intelli
gence gathering pro-
gram beyond "subversion" and "dissi-
dent groups" to prominent persons who
were friendly with or sympathetic to
leaders of domestic civil disturbances.
And even in the face of a Defense De-
partment directive prohibiting military
spying on civilians in the United States-
as narrow as that directive is-that is
evidence that the military has continued
domestic surveillance.
One notable example of the Army's
domestic activities was the pervasive
Army presence in 1973 at Wounded Knee,
S. Dak., where the Directorate of Military
Support in the Pentagon coordinated the
Army's participation in what was clearly
a domestic disturbance. And my own
subcommittees turned up widespread
military drug testing programs which
were geared to intelligence gathering and
frankly showed little respect for the hu-
man subjects of the tests.
DOD's domestic intelligence-related
activities, however, are but the tiniest tip
of the iceberg. In fact, it has been esti-
mated that of the total national intelli-
gence budget, the Defense Department
controls or is allocated upward of 80 per-
cent. Much of what goes on with that
money is still not in the public domain.
And if the Stennis amendment is adopted
by this body, much of what goes on with
it will never be brought under any co-
intelligence activities, we will be giving
that committee the clout and the con-
trol it will need.
I believe that one of the first tasks of
this new committee should be to develop
comprehensive charters for the carrying
out of intelligence activities by the intel-
ligence agencies. This will surely take an
extraordinary investment of time and
energy-one which is hardly likely to be
undertaken by any of the present stand-
ing committees of the Senate. But if we
are going to learn any lessons from the
disclosures of the past, we cannot afford
to lose any time in first making the hard
decisions necessary and then installing
firm limitations and guidelines to govern
intelligence activities in the future.
As I stated earlier in these remarks,
Mr. President, the Senate is confronted
tion of ignoring what our intelligence
agencies are doing-above the real needs
of this Nation for legislative leadership
in the intelligence field. Or we can dis-
pense with petty institutional jealousies
and put in place a committee which em-
bodies -our best eff orts to fashion the
broadest jurisdiction, the most sophisti-
cated safeguards, and the strongest au-
ihorit v
ti
la
ve oversight. We cannot fool ourselves, and we
To Place the CIA under the jurisdic- should not try to fool the public: Any
tion of the new intelligence committee, committee equipped with less jurisdiction
and at the same time to leave the De- or authority than provided in this sub-
fense Department outside its purview, is stitute will not be capable of obtaining
worse than telling a boxer that he can- information from- and exercising checks
not hit below his opponent's waist with over those agencies which exercise such
his left fist only. Because as much as we extreme power themselves and which
scrutinize the CIA, we cannot adequately have for so long eluded control by either
control, chart, guide, or check abuses in the Congress or the Executive. And any
Federal intelligence programs if the Se- committee without full jurisdiction
lect .Intelligence Committee is not given across the range of all Federal agencies
authority over Defense Department in- would stand as a monument to this
telligence activities. We may well wake up body's willingness to cave in and cop
one day to find that many CIA activities out in the face of real challenge.
have in fact been transferred over to That is why I oppose the Stennis
Defense to escape congressional control. amendment and urge my colleagues to
We cannot delude ourselves. We know adopt the Cannon substitute as it now
full well that the standing committees stands.
have not always performed their over- The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
sight tasks with vigilance or vigor. That SCHWEI,KER). Under the previous order,
is why we set up the Church committee the Senate will now proceed to vote on
to begin with. And that is why we are the amendment in the nature of a sub-
going to set up a permanent Select Com- stitute, as amended, of the Sena
mittee on Intelligence Activities. from Nevada. (Mr. CANNON). On th
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S-7559
question, the yeas and nays have been
ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
?31e second -assistant legislative clerk
rthe-roll.
`ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce
that the Senator from Michigan (Mr.
PHILIP A. HART), the Senator from
Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), and the Senator
from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE) are neces-
sarily absent.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the
Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER),
the Senator from North Carolina (Mr.
HELMS), and the Senator from Dela-
ware (Mr. ROTH) are necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present
and voting, the Senator from Tennessee
(Mr. BAKER), and the Senator from
North Carolina (Mr. HELMS) would each
vote "yea."
The result was announced-yeas 87,
nays 7, as follows:
[Roncall Vote No. 180 Leg.]
YEAS-87
Abourezk
Glenn
Moss
Bartlett
Goldwater
Muskie
Bayh
Gravel
Nelson
Beall
Griffin
Nunn
Bellmon
Hansen
Packwood
Bentsen
Hart, Gary
Pastore
Biden
Haskell
Pearson
Brock
Hatfield
Pell
Brooke
Hathaway
Percy
Buckley
Hollings
Proxmire
Bumpers
Huddleston
Randolph
Burdick
Humphrey
Ribicoff
Byrd,
Inouye
Schweiker
Harry F., Jr.
Jackson
Scott, Hugh
Byrd, Robert C. Javits
Scott,
Cannon
Johnston
William L.
Case
Kennedy
Sparkman
Chiles
Laxalt
Stafford
Church
Leahy
Stennis
C
Long -
Stevens
ton
Magnuson
Stevenson
r
Mansfield
Stone
Do 8
Mathias
Symington
Domenici
McClellan
Talmadge
Durkin
McGovern
Tower
Eagleton
McIntyre
Tunney
Eastland
Metcalf
Weicker
Fong
Mondale
Williams
Ford
Montoya
Young
Garn
Morgan
NAYS-7
Allen
Hruska
Thurmond
Curtis
McClure
Fannin
Taft
NOT VOTING-6
Baker
Hartke
McGee
Hart, Philip A.
Helms
Roth
So Mr. CANNON'S amendment (No.
1643), as amended, was agreed to.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I move to lay
that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS ON SENATE RESOLUTION
400, AS AMENDED
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, in the
zeal to organize, we sometimes disor-
ganize, and there is clear and present
danger that we are heading down that
road with these particular intelligence
oversight proposals. The fact of the mat-
ter is that the measure before us
creates confusion where there should be
authority, and dilutes the kind of respon-
sibility which could provide for adequate
Adkountability and oversight. Before we
W sw it, we could be right back to the
e slipshod oversight, the same dimi-
nution of public credibility, and right
back 3 or 4 or 5 years from now to an-
other round of spectacular hearings and
revelations, simply becausewe failed to
do a better job. The public would not
stand for that. The Senate should not
have- to endure it. And our intelligence
agencies will not be able to survive it.
My objection is that here we are creat-
ing this large supercommittee, yet it
lacks jurisdiction over the majority of in-
telligence activities and instead focuses
on the Central Intelligence Agency. Its
jurisdiction over the FBI would not be
exclusive, and the same applies to the
intelligence operations of the military
branches. In these instances, we bring
in other standing committees. The limi-
tations here should be obvious: First,
there is no focal point of responsibility;
and second, by including these other
committees, we will not have 15 Senators
involved, but closer to 40. And if the
House follows our example, it can add
another 175 or 200, and we will have one
big, happy family to oversee the vital
operations of our intelligence commu-
nity. The inadequate oversight guaran-
teed to result from that kind of arrange-
ment should be obvious.
Mr. President, I had the opportunity
of testifying before the Government Op-
erations Committee during its delibera-
tions on this matter. I made some sug-
estions at that time. They were not acted
upon, and I do not wish to belabor them
or to repeat my testimony today. But,
briefly put, I proposed the establishment
of a watchdog commission small enough
to get the job done, tight enough
to provide the necessary responsibility
and authority, wide enough in diversity
of membership to insure public credi-
bility, and efficient enough to do its job
without impairing the work of the agen-
cies it is supposed to be helping.
The genesis of my proposal is in the
Task Force on Intelligence Activities of
the Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government-
the Hoover Commission. It was my privi-
lege to serve on this task force 21 years
ago. At that time we looked Into every
facet of our intelligence operations, and
I believe the basic thrust of our report
has withstood the test of time.
We recommended a small, permanent,
bipartisan commission-not a commit-
tee-composed of Members of both
Houses of Congress, to make periodic
and ongoing surveys of every segment of
our intelligence operations. Its findings
and recommendations, with adequate se-
curity safeguards, would go 'to both the
Congress and the President.
I suggested before the Government
Operations Committee that such a com-
mmission would have just five leaders
from each House, and five prominent
citizens not involved in Federal Govern-
ment, appointed by the President and
approved by the Congress. That sum
total of 15 must be compared with the
40 some Senators who will be involved
under the present proposals, plus what-
ever number the House establishes, plus
the executive branch personnel. The spe-
cific five Members from the Senate I
-would like to see on a commission are
the majority and minority leaders, and
the chairmen of the Senate Committees
on Appropriations, Armed Services, and
Foreign Relations. I include the leader-
ship and the chairmen for the main and
simple reason that they are the ones who
have to know and who, in any event, will
know. Let us also face the fact that this
is an unglamorous job. I do not look for
much enthusiasm to get on such a com-
mittee, when other assignments offer so
much more visibility and excitement.
This is not to say that we junior Mem-
bers should be cut off from information.
But"there is a lot of water over the dam,
and we can now get the briefings we
need, whether it be Angola, Diego Gar-
cia, Israel, or any other such matter,
and we are not ruled out by lack of
seniority. That is not the problem here.
The problem is the effectiveness and
the necessary secrecy of an intelligence-
agency being maintained while at the
same time those responsible for oversight
get the facts and the knowledge they
need. The leadership and these particu-
lar chairmen are the logical choices here.
I would envision such a commission
meeting three or four times a year for
comprehensive reviews of the entire in-
telligence community, in order to deter-
mine if the various intelligence activities
were-in the national interest, whether
there was duplication of effort and/or
cost, whether appropriations were being
adequately accounted for, and in general
to insure that the various agencies and
offices were focusing rather than prolif-
erating their efforts. The commission
would have all the authority it needed
to acquire the information and to carry
out its mandate.
Mr. President, within the context of
maintaining some secrecy about our in-
telligence operations, we must establish
confidenoe--confidence both within the
intelligence agencies, and confidence in
the public mind. I think the establish-
ment of this kind of ommission would
do just that. The kind of proposal being
considered today is without the essential
focus, responsibility, and authority to get
the job done as well as it should be done.
The commission proposal that I pre-
sented to the Government Operations
Committee received no committee sup-
port. Consequently, I am not going to
pursue them further today. I will vote
for the proposal before us, because ob-
viously we need " to put something in
place, and this seems to be the solution
the Senate is going to agree to. But I
want the record to show the objections
I have and the proposals I favored.
Mr. BEALL. Mr. President, I support
the passage of Senate Resolution 400
which will establish a committee of the
Senate on intelligence activities. Crea-
tion of this committee is an important
step in- our efforts to establish a positive
congressional oversight role in the oper-
ation of our Nation's intelligence agen-
cies. Even though the final reports of the
Select Committee To Study Govern-
mental Operations With Respect to In-
telligence Activities found the extent
and magnitude of CIA abuses to be,some-
what less serious than earlier reported,
the existence of such abuses simply can
not be allowed to continue.
I am the last person who would defend
the abuses -and illegal conduct of our
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 19, 1976
overseas intelligence community. Philo-
sophically I deeply believe in the concept
of limited government. Our Nation must
always be governed within the con-
straints of our Constitution and our laws.
We are a nation of laws, not of men and
our freedoms are only safe as long as we
adhere to that principle.
Thus I do not condone the misconduct
of the Central Intelligence Agency, nor
do I believe that it should be allowed to
operate beyond the limits of its legal
mandate. Part of the problem stems
from the dangerous international envi-
ronment of the cold war. Part of the
problem stems from the failure of the
Central Intelligence Agency Oversight
Committees in both the House and the
Senate to play their watchdog roles in a
diligent and consistent manner.
Mr. President, I would note that, even
before the Select Intelligence Commit-
tee was established to investigate the
ramifications of,the current controversy,
I was actively supporting legislation to
correct this si'tuation. I joined with our
distinguished colleagues from Connecti-
cut (Mr. WEICKER) and Tennessee (Mr.
BAKER) in sponsoring S. 317 which would
have established a single joint commit-
tee with oversight responsibilities for
both domestic and foreign intelligence.
During the past 16 months since S. 317
was introduced, I have come to the con-
clusion that a separate Senate committee
Is a better approach to meeting this need.
Perhaps at some future date a subsequent
Congress may consider the possibility of
broadening the Senate committee into a
joint committee.
Mr. President, as we prepare to vote
on Senate Resolution 400, the Senate is
taking upon itself greater authority over
the conduct of intelligence operations.
With this enhanced power comes grave
responsibilities. In the conduct of foreign
intelligence operations, there is a very
great need for confidentiality. Disclosing
confidential information about foreign
intelligence operations and agents can
place in jeopardy the security of our Na-
tion and its 215 million people. The over-
riding interests of all Americans demands
protection under these circumstances.
This new committee, which we are about
to form, and its staff must be able to con-
duct its business in a manner consistent
with our overall national security needs.
We live in a far too dangerous era for
us to dismantle or cripple our foreign
intelligence apparatus. We must instead
correct its faults as quickly as possible
so that it can once again devote all of
its attention to gathering the type of
Information our decisionmakers need to
shape our foreign and military policies.
Mr. President, on April 5, 1976, I in-
troduced S. 3242, a bill to provide for the
personal safety of our foreign intelli-
gence Personnel. This legislation wot{ld
make it unlawful to disclose classified
information that would identify or tend
to identify any individual or entity who
is or has been associated with U.S. for-
eign intelligence operations. Violations
would carry a maximum penalty of $15,-
000 or 15 years imprisonment or both.
S. 3242 is currently pending before the
Senate Judiciary committee and it has
now been cosponsored by the distin-
guished senior Senator from North Da-
kota (Mr. YOUNG) and the distinguished
senior Senator from Arizona (Mr. FAN-
NIN). I would hope that the Judiciary
Committee will bring this vital legisla-
tion before the full Senate before the
conclusion of the 94th Congress.
Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, I wish
to commend the managers of Senate
Resolution 400 and all of my colleagues
who have worked so intensively to create
the new Intelligence Oversight Commit-
tee. Their labor has produced a com-
promise that I believe represents a re-
sponsible combination of increased over-
sight and legislative restraint that re-
flects well on this body. I hope that it
also represents a reversal of a long his-
tory of congressional inactivity in the
intelligence field.
-It has become, over the past 2 years,
painfully clear that some new oversight
panel was essential. The Rockefeller
Commission and investigations con-
ducted by select committees in both
Houses of Congress have disclosed do-
mestic, abuses and foreign debacles per-
petrated by our intelligence community.
During the nearly 30 years in which
these abuses were all too frequent, Con-
gress neglected its constitutional respon-
sibility to keep a vigilant watch over its
administrative creations. Congress abys-
mally failed to assure that legislative ap-
propriations were properly expended.
To the extent that this neglect and
failure was institutionalized by frag-
mented committee responsibility this
resolution begins to eliminate the in-
adequacy. Effective oversight of the CIA,
NSA, DIA, the national intelligence
components of the Department of De-
fense, and the intelligence activities of
the FBI will hopefully become a reality
under the new panel.
Congressional overseers have, in the
pant, tended to identify their interests
with those of the agencies under their
jurisdictions. This can be predicted as
a natural result of years of contact.
While familiarity is necessary to under-
standing, it sometimes blinds those who
oversee. Rotation of the members who
serve on the new panel should serve to
prevent this occurrence in the future.
Each member of the new panel should
be on guard against inadvertent coop-
tion to avoid succumbing to the friendly
"cult of intelligence." John Stewart
Mills contended, in his papers on repre-
sentative government, that legislation
control of administration is essential to
liberty. Effective legislative oversight is
wholly consistent with American legal
traditions and precedents. While there
is no need for Congress to put its fingers
in the day to day operation of adminis-
trative agencies, there is "a real need to
interpose a continuing congressional
presence into intelligence activities.
But I hope that no Member of this
body considers our actions today any-
thing more than the beginning. Intelli-
gence oversight has been long in com-
ing, but it is merely one step on the road
to correcting-'abuses. The new committee
will have to work quickly and will need
all of our support to formulate and en-
act additional legislation: Legislation to
prefect the FBI's intelligence charter,
legislation to assure that analytical in-
telligence is legitimately used in policy
way to go before we have compreh n-
sively addressed the various problems
and to bring the intelligence function
within the bounds of our Constitution
and moral commitment.
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, in con-
nection with today's passage of intelli-
gence oversight legislation, 1: would like
to make several observations.
I have long felt that effective over-
sight over the intelligence agencies of
our Government is absolutely essential:
Essential not only to curb possible abuses
but also to provide clear-cut guidance
to the intelligence community, so that
the absolutely vital and necessary intelli-
gence function could be performed with-
in well-established and workable guide-
lines.
In 1956 I joined with the distinguished
majority leader, Senator MANSFIELD, in
cosponsoring the first intelligence over-
sight legislation presented to the U.S.
Senate. Certain features of that legisla-
tion I found attractive at the time-and
I still do. That proposal provided for the
creation of a joint House-Senate com-
mittee for intelligence oversight. I be-
lieve a joint committee of the Congress
is the best and wisest approach to ful-
filling the responsibility of Congress for
intelligence oversight. It would reduce
the hazards of working at cross-pur-
poses, and it would deter the Possible
closures damaging to our nation
curity.
I recognize sincere and vigorous ef-
forts have been made by leaders of this
body to create such a structure, without
success. I sincerely hope in the future
this type of arrangement will become
possible.
I also believe the Congress is neither
constitutionally nor philosophically
equippqd to duplicate the day-to-day op-
eration of the executive branch of Gov-
ernment. I, therefore, hope the authority
provided this committee will be used ju-
diciously and constructively in perform-
ing the constitutionally mandated re-
sponsibility for oversight. Its members
and staff will bear a heavy burden of re-
sponsibility because of the broad scope
of intelligence information they will ob-
tain.
The real requirement for successful
congressional oversight is full knowledge
of what is going on in the intelligence
community; not to substitute a different
set of daily decisionmakers for those in
the Executive already chargedwith this
responsibility.
Experience with the arrangements we
are voting on today should provide us
,the lessons needed for future construc-
tive development in this ,vital area.
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President, I
am pleased to support Senate Resolution
400-to create a permanent Intelligence
Oversight Committee.
The legislation before us repr
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May 19, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE S 7561
fleets what I believe to be one of the or controls. The nature of intelligence ercised as an adjunct to other more
greatest strengths of our democratic sys- requires that many of its activities be pressing and demanding functions. It has
tem and the legislative process-the abil- closely held. Detailed discussions of failed to recognize and understand the
.to mediate among various interests sources and methods not only set the realities and scope of an intelligence com-
views and to develop a common un- stage for rendering those sources and munity which, especially in theyears
tanding as to what will best serve methods ineffective but in some cases after World War II, was forced to oper-
our Nation and each of us as its citizens. impose dangers upon persons involved ate in clandestine and secret ways or to
Certainly there have been differences with them. confront the issue of massive technologi-
among us in this Chamber as to what There can be no question that greater cal developments which offer us greater
Senate Resolution 400 should include, direction and oversight is needed in the protection and security but also hold the
but'I believe we have proceeded to de- intelligence sphere. Many of the abuses potential for greater abuse.
bate and consider those differences in a which our investigating committee dis- I believe the investigation which we
most appropriate manner and that we covered, many of the inefficiencies which in the Senate have conducted over the-
have come to reasonable and realistic the- select committee's report discussed, past 15 months has demonstrated that
conclusions. might have been ,avoidedywith tighter we cannot again stick our heads in the
,.a?+;.,o aand and hone things will all work out.
have contributed to this legislation but
those who deserve particular commenda-
tion would certainly include the able
floor managers, Senators RIBICOFF, CAN-
NON, and PERCY, and Senators MANSFIELD,
ROBERT C. BYRD, MONDALE, JAVITS, and
CRANSTON. Senators BAKER, SCHWEIKER,
MORGAN, GARY HART, MATHIAS, and
CHURCH-all-members of the select com-
mittee which investigated the intelligence
operations of the Government-Played
important roles in developing the origi-
nal proposal that has now gone through
the legislative process and is ready for
a final vote.
There can be no question as to the
need for a strong, effective intelligence
community. As we on the Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence Activities noted in
our final report on foreign and military
intelligence:
We must have an early warning system to
monitor potential military threats by coun-
ties hostile to United States interests. We
a strong intelligence system to verify
treaties concerning arms limitation are
intelligence agencies is a necessary ingredient Furthermore, as McGeorge Bundy, frig of that data. AS I uriderstana aenaae
and
in making national defense and foreign pol-
icy decisions. Such information is also noses- former special assistant to the President Resolution ability is 400fully, protected, hat access and I avail-
would,
sary in countering the efforts of hostile in- for National Security Affairs noted in support the legislation if I thought
telligence services, and in halting terrorists, testimony before the Senate Government not bi otherwise.
international drug traffickers and other in- Operations Committee- Furthermore, in an effort to insure
ternational criminal activities. It really is true that in the nature of
But that need can never justify illegal, things, the achievements of the intelligence that there is coordination between the
unprincipled, or unacceptable actions- community are less known than its failures: new committee and the committees with
Its general good discipline is less noticed jurisdiction over matters demanding in-
and it does not have to. We are corn- than its occasional irresponsibility and its telligence information, Senate Resolution
pletely capable of conducting intelligence usually cool and careful estimates of inter- 400 provides that there will be a certain
operations within acceptable bounds, and national reality are less noticed than the wild amount of membership overlap between
we should do so. To follow any other opinions of its occasional zealots. the committees most affected and the
practices not only undermines the sup These are some of the paradoxes; these ne?r select committee.
port which such agencies must have e are some of the conflicting interests I know that there has been concern
among the American people, but also which must be balanced-and they are over the possibility that an authorization
undermines the morale and effectiveness the aspects which will, I believe, be process will lead to harmful disclosures
of the agencies themselves. balanced through the creation of the regarding our intelligence spending. I
There can be no question that there proposed permanent oversight commit- . understand these fears, but I would point
has been too much secrecy in our Gov- tee. out that Senate Resolution 400 does not
ernment, not just in the intelligence As I noted in remarks earlier in this require public disclosure of budget figures
agencies, but throughout. It is well known debate, three principal reasons mandate and I am confident that the new commit-
that the classification system is abused. the creation of an oversight committee: tee can manage thebudgetary authority
As former Attorney General Nicholas the need to prevent any recurrence of without undermining our intelligence
Katzenbach noted in a 1973 Foreign Af- illegal and unwise activities which have activities.
fairs article: brought disfavor upon the agencies and - Finally, I would like to focus briefly on
Classifiers have mixed the desire to keep ourselves; the fact that a number of two provisions with which I have been
information confidential and "closely held"
activities, including covert operations, particularly involved. One relates to the
for whatever reason, good or bad, with in-
the
formation actually affecting the "national de- must be kept secret and controlled grin- reporting requirements. Section 4 ofreports to
fense". Perhaps worse, it is a perversion of cipally through an increased system of resolution requires periodic - regarding intelligence
the processes of government, because it does accountability; and the fact that the in- the Congress
not force officials to consider honesty the vestigating committee's report indicated activities. As a member of the Select
reasons for confidentiality or the relevant improvements could be made in the man- Committee to Study Government Opera-
time frame. agement and administration of the tions With Respect to Intelligence Activ-
osed this section when our
ro
I
hi
p
p
es,
But an exaggerated emphasis on agencies.
Crecy, either past or present, cannot be For almost 30 years, Congress has al- committee was drafting legislation to
used to justify the abolition of all secrecy lowed the oversight function to be ex- create a permanent oversight committee.
branch and in the Congress. _ ? ~~
But, the need for such controls does not forced upon us new duties, new responsi-
mean that we can either abolish our in- bilities. The world -does not stand still.
telligence activities or overly restrict Changed times, changed conditions,
them. changed factors require that we have '
There can be no question that public changed priorities, changed structures.
emphasis is on the dramatic, the unusual, The creation of a new committee will
the cloak and dagger, James Bond-type offer us the opportunity to deal with this.
operations. Perhaps that is how' both But, that will not alter the fact that
romantics and opponents of intelligence we have a number of committees in the
activities like to view them. Senate which must rely heavily upon the
But, we must constantly be aware that information which the intelligence com-
there is much more to intelligence than munity develops. I do not believe anyone
that. Covert operations which receive so would argue that the Armed Services or
much attention-or notoriety as the case Foreign Relations Committees, for exam-
may be-are a miniscule portion of U.S. ple, could adequately pursue their re-
intelligence operations. The Central In- sponsibilities without easy and constant
they agencies
telligence Agency, which perhaps too access to tInformation which he various intelligence
possess.
often bears the brunt of attacks, is only and th
one of a number of entities engaged in I do not believe that any of us in this
intelligence work. The spy, the counter- body would want those committees to
sny, the mercenary is the exception, not make recommendations -to us on issues
the rule. In truth, a large portion of the of war and peace, security and survival
intelligence community consists of re- without fully considering all the per-
searchers, analysts, and technicians, who tinent data which our intelligence
have
athered and the hest
g
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S 7562 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 19, 1976
I testified before the-Government Opera- material which informs, evaluates and Study Government Operations With Re-
tions and Rules Committees regarding assesses-can be made available to Mem- spent to Intelligence Activities. The new
this provision and was pleased that it was bers of Congress and to the public. select committee which this legislation
included both in Senate Resolution 400 Rut- it Also seems obviou
th
t
s
a
d
at, an
power to resolve the multna(
tions Committee and in the compromise to release information which could en- problems which have plagued our
version which was developed. danger the lives of those who collect and tion's int
lli
e
gence operations.
I believe this provision is important assemble our intelligence information, By combining the authority for legisla-
for three reasons: First, the secrecy sur- which could alert unfriendly nations to tive oversight and budget authorization
rounding intelligence operations has bred our methods of collecting information so and placing that authority with the new
much suspicion. If more information can that they could render those methods in- select committee, the pending resolution
be made available, perhaps some of the effective, which could reveal certain gives the committee the capability to re-
cloud can be driven away. Second, as I technological capabilities which we have, view and correct the inappropriate and
have noted before, there is a widespread or which could seriously harm our so- illegal activities which have recently
misunderstanding as to the nature of a ciety. To determine when such informa- come to the attention of Congress and
large portion of our intelligence activi- tion would have these results is not an the American people. The committee will
ties. If more can be understood about the easy task. A cursory reading of material have full subpena and investigative
routine but important functions, perhaps may not reveal the implications which powers and the authority to disclose
there can be greater understanding and one with expertise in the field could abuses where disclosure is in the public
support for such activities. Third, I think glean. The way material is presented or interest. Of course, serving the interests
Members of the Senate are entitled to the perspective can often give hints as to of Americans by both preserving privacy
have more general knowldege about the where the information was obtained. The and protecting the national interest
activities of the intelligence agencies. proposed committee will have to deal sometimes creates conflicts and problems.
It is, I believe, important to note that with this matter. Indeed, along with I trust that this legislation will make
the reports required by the section are to oversight, the distinguishing between for improved handling of these impor-
be made in a manner consistent with na- what information should be rele d tant, although sometimes conflicting,
tional security and that any report will and what should be closely held will cer- interests.
be subject to the requirements 'in the re- tainly be one of its prime concerns. In addition; the select committee will
solution regarding disclosure of sensitive Thus, if we, in Congress are to prove greatly assist Congress in performing
information. Finally, as the Government that we are capable of handling this in- its legislative duties in areas where
Operations report indicates, a minimum formation in a responsible manner, if Congress must rely on intelligence in-
of at least one report per year would be we are to demonstrate that we can re- formation. The select committee is spe-
expected from the new committee. lease that which should be released and cifically instructed, under the pending
A second matter which I would like to protect that which must be protected, we resolution, to make every effort to assure
discuss briefly; is the so-called Roth- must have viable and effective processes. that the appropriate departments and
Hud'dleston amendment regarding sanc- The Roth-Huddleston amendment agencies of the United States provide the
tions. Senator RoTH and I presented our seeks to provide such a process with re- informed and timely intelligence neces-
proposal to the Government Operations gard to sanctions. sary for the executive and legislative
Committee on which he serves; we have Our amendment is based on the con- branches to make sound decisions affect-
discussed this provision with numerous stitutional right of each body of Con- ing the security and vital interests of
Senators; and we both t
s
tifi
t
d b
f
di
r
es
e
s
e
e
ore g
o
scipline its own Members. It our Nation.
the Rules Committee regarding it. does nothing to infringe upon the speech
I am also confident that the
Basically, the Roth-Huddlesto_ n and debate clause of the Constitution committee will effectively streng Mn
amendment is designed to provide a- which specifies that Members shall not our intelligence position within the inter-
practical, workable system of sanctions be held accountable for their speeches, national community. The widely pub-
L which could be utilized should we have debates or deliberations "in any other licized leaks and abuses of the last. 5
the unfortunate experience of an unau- place" than the Chamber in which they years have shackled and disrupted our
thorized disclosure of intelligence infor- serve. This provision of the Constitution intelligence effort to a point where its ef-
mation which either the new Intelligence was designed to protect against intimi- fectiveness has been greatly diminished.
Committee or the full Senate has deter- dation by the executive branch or a hos- The activities of the select committee
mined should be kept secret pvrsuant to tile judiciary, not to prohibit Congress can restore public confidence in our in-
procedures recognized in Senate Resolu- from disciplining its own membership. telligence techniques and programs, halt
tion 400. Under our amendment, any sen- It, has its precedence in the long-stand- the publication of confidential informa-
sitive information which the committee ing rule 36 which provides similar sane- tion, and restore the strength of our in-
or the Senate had determined should be tions for the disclosure of "the secret telligence effort. This is of vital impor-
kept secret would have to be kept secret. or confidential business of the Senate." tance and should be a primary concern
It could not be publicly disclosed. Should In summary, Mr. President, our re- of the new select committee. -
there be an unauthorized disclosure, sponsibility during consideration of this In this regard, I wish to express my
either by a Member or by a staff aide, legislation has, at its most basic, been strong support for sections 7 and 8 of
that person would be subject to sanc- to balance the legitimate and unques- the resolution and the process it estab-
tions. The responsibility to investigate tioned need to secure and protect that lishes for the disclosure of classified in-
alleged unauthorized disclosures and rec- intelligence information upon which our formation. By distributing the responsi-
ommend sanctions would be placed in the Nation's well-being depends against the bility for the disclosure of such informa-
Senate Select Committee on Standards need of legislators for informatipn nec- tion between the President and the Sen-
and Conduct. The Committee on Stand- essary to perform their tasks and the ate, I feel we have established safe
ards and Conduct would, of course,- be need of the people in a free and open
which disclosure guabut
free to recommend a range of sanctions- society to know and understand the poli- also assure the ra security proper m but
or even no sanctions-depending upon ties which their government takes in needed ed to to main .
what its investigation indicated was ap- their name. Section top 7 of the rate intelligence operation. In order for sanctions to be Mr. President, I think Senate Resolu- quire the
Sec committee resolution so to er would re-
imposed, they would have to be approved tion 400 does that in such a way as to carry out rules les no procedures t e and
pre-
by the full Senate. provide us with an effective oversight vent the disclosure re information which
Certainly our jobs as legislators and committee and a strong intelligence co m- unnecessarily ly infringes any which
upon upon indi-
policymakers in a number of areas would munity. I urge its adoption. vidual's privacy. As the ranking member
be easier if we had access to thetremen- Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I wish to in- of the Senate Finance Subcommittee on
dons amount of information which our dicate my support for Senate Resolution the Administration of the Internal Reve-
intelligence agencies collect from a vaxt- 400 which will establish a Select Com- nue Code, I intend to work for proety of sources about a wide scope of sub- mittee on Intelligence. This legislation is passage of legislation to provide s
Sects. There is no doubt in my mind that responsive to the findings and recom- 'rotection for information filed o
more of the information-more of the mendations of the Select Committee To individual's tax return.
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May 19, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
I look with great hope toward the
operation of the new select committee
acid trust that it will operate as an effec-
brake on the abuses which prompted
nvestigation by the Select Commit-
To Study Government Operations
With Respect to- Intelligence Activities.
Mr. ROBERT C, BYRD. Mr. Presi-
dent, I ask unanimous consent that time
on the next rollcall vote be limited to
10 minutes, with the warning bells to
be sounded after the first 21/2 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Under the previous order, the com-
mittee substitute, as amended, is con-
sidered as having been adopted, and the
Senate will now proceed to vote on the
question of agreeing to Senate Resolu-
tion 400, as amended.
On this question the yeas and nays
have been ordered, and the clerk will
call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce
that the Senator from Michigan (Mr.
PHILIP A. HART), the Senator from In-
diana (Mr. HARTKE), and the Senator
from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE) are neces-
sarily absent.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the
Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER),
the Senator from North Carolina (Mr.
HELMS), and the Senator from Dela-
ware (Mr. ROTH) are necessarily ab-
sent.
On this vote, the Senator from Ten-
nessee (Mr. BAKER) is paired with the
Senator from North Carolina (Mr.
HELMS). If present and voting, the Sen-
from Tennessee would vote "yea"
the Senator from North Carolina
w id d vote "nay."
The result was announced-yeas _72,
nays 22, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 181 Leg.]
YEAS-72
Abourezk
Garn
Morgan
Bayh
Glenn
Moss
Beall
Gravel
Muskie
Bellmon
Griffin
Nelson
Bentsen
Hart, Gary
Nunn
Biden
Haskell
Packwood
Brooke
Hatfield
Pastore
Bumpers
Hathaway
Pearson
Burdick
Hollings
Pell
Byrd,
Huddleston
Percy
Harry F., Jr.
Humphrey
Proxmire
Byrd, Robert C. Inouye
Randolph
Cannon
Jackson
Ribicoff
Case
Javits
Schweiker
Chiles
Kennedy
Scott, Hugh,
Church
Leahy
Stafford
Clark
Magnuson
Stevens
Cranston
Mansfield
Stevenson
Culver
Mathias
Stone
Dole
McClellan
Symington
Domenici
McGovern
Tunney
Durkin
McIntyre
Weicker
Eagleton
Metcalf
Williams
Fong
Mondale
Ford
Montoya
NAYS-22
Allen
Hansen
Sparkman
Bartlett
Hruska
Stennis
Brock
Johnston
Taft
Buckley
Laxalt
Talmadge
Curtis
Long
Thurmond
Eastland
McClure
Tower
Fannin
Scott,
Young
Goldwater
William L.
NOT VOTING-6
Baker Hartke McGee
t, Philip A. Helms Roth
o the resolution (S. Res. 400) was
agreed to, as follows:
S. REs. 400
Resolved, That it is the purpose of this
resolution to establish a new select commit-
tee of the Senate, to be known as the Select
Committee on Intelligence, to oversee and
make continuing studies of the intelligence
activities and programs of the United States
Government, and to submit to the Senate ap-
propriate proposals for legislation and re-
port to the Senate concerning such intelli-
gence activities and programs. In carrying
out this purpose, the Select Committee on
Intelligence shall make every effort to assure
that the appropriate departments and agen-
cies of the United States provide informed
and timely intelligence necessary for the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches to make
sound decisions affecting the security and
vital interests of the Nation. It is further
the purpose of this resolution to provide vig-
ilant legislative oversight over the intelli-
gence activities of the United States to as-
sure that such activities are in conformity
with the Constitution and laws of the United
States. ",
SEC. 2. (a) (1) There is hereby established a
select committee to be known as the Select
Committee on Intelligence (hereinafter in
this resolution referred to as the "select
committee"). The select committee shall be
composed of fifteen members appointed as
follows:
(A) two members from the Committee on
Appropriations;
(B) two members from the Committee on
Armed Services;
(C) two members from the Committee on
Foreign Relations;
(D) two members from the Committee on
the Judiciary; and
(E) seven members to be appointed from
the Senate at large.
(2) Members appointed from each com-
mittee named, in clauses (A) through (D) of
paragraph (1) shall be evenly divided be-
tween the two major political parties and
shall be appointed by the President pro tem-
pore of the Senate upon the recommenda-
tions of the majority and minority leaders
-of the Senate. Four of the members appointed
under clause (E) of paragraph (1) shall be
appointed by the President pro tempore of
the Senate upon the recommendation of the
majority leader of the Senate and three shall
be appointed by the President pro tempore
of the Senate upon the recommendation of
the minority leader of the Senate.
(3) The majority leader of the Senate and
the minority leader of the Senate shall be
ex officio members of the select committee
but shall have no vote in the committee and
shall not be counted for purposes of deter-
mining a quorum.
(b) No Senator may serve on the select
committee for more than eight years of con-
tinuous service, exclusive of service by any
Senator on such committee during the
Ninety-fourth Congress. To the greatest ex-
tent practicable, one-third of the Members
of the Senate appointed to the select com-
mittee at the beginning of the Ninety-seventh
Congress and each Congress thereafter shall
be Members of the Senate who did not serve
on such committee during the preceding
Congress.
(c) At the beginning of each Congress, the
Members of the Senate who are members of
the majority party of the Senate shall elect
a chairman for the select committee, and the
Members of the Senate who are from the
minority party of the Senate shall elect a
vice chairman for such committee. The vice
chairman shall act in the place and stead of
the chairman in the absence of the chair-
man. Neither the chairman nor the vice
chairman of the select committee shall at
the same time serve as chairman or ranking
minority member of any other committee re-
ferred to in paragraph 6(f) of rule XXV of
the Standing Rules of the Senate.
S7563
(d) For the purposes of paragraph 6(a) of
rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Sen-
ate, service of a Senator as a member of the
select committee shall not be taken into
account.
SEC. 3. (a) There shall be referred to the
select committee all proposed legislation,
messages, petitions, memorials, and other
matters relating to the following:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency and
the Director of Central- Intelligence.
(2) Intelligence activities of all other de-
partments and agencies of the Government,
including, but not limited to, the intelli-
gence activities of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, and
other agencies of the Department of De-
fense; the Department of State; the Depart-
ment of Justice; and the Department of the
Treasury.
(3) The organization or reorganization of
any department or agency of the Govern-
ment to the extent that the organization or
reorganization relates to a function or ac-
tivity involving intelligence activities.
(4) Authorizations for appropriations,
both direct and indirect, for the following:
(A) The Central Intelligence Agency and
Director of Central Intelligence.
(B) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(C) The National Security Agency.
(D) The intelligence activities of other
agencies and subdivisions of the Department
of Defense.
(E) The intelligence activities of the De-
partment of State.
(F) The intelligence activities of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, including all
activities of the Intelligence Division.
(G) Any department, agency, or subdi-
vision which is the successor to any agency
named in clause (A), (B), or (C); and the
activities of any department, agency, or sub-
division which is the successor to any de-
partment, agency, bureau, or subdivision
named in clause (D), (E), or (F) to the
extent that the activities of such successor
department, agency, or subdivision are ac-
tivities described in clause (D), (E), or (F).
(b) Any proposed legislation reported by
the select committee, except any legislation
involving matters specified in clause (1) or
(4) (A) of subsection (a), containing any
matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of
any standing committee shall, at the re-
quest of the chairman of such standing com-
mittee, be referred to such standing commit-
tee for its consideration of such matter and
be reported to the Senate by such standing
committee within thirty days after the day
on which such proposed legislation is re-
ferred to such standing committee; and any
proposed legislation reported by any com-
mittee, other than the select committee,
which contains any matter ,within the juris-
diction of the select committee shall, at the
request of the chairman of he select com-
mittee, be referred to the select committee
for its consideration of such matter and be
reported to the Senate by the select com-
mittee within thirty days after the day on
which such proposed legislation is referred
to such committee. In any Case in which a
committee fails to report any proposed legis-
lation referred to it within the time limit
prescribed herein, such committee shall be
automatically discharged from further con-
sideration of such proposed legislation on
the thirtieth day following the day on which
such proposed legislation is referred to such
committee unless the Senate provides other-
wise. In computing any thirty-day period
under this paragraph there shall be excluded
from such computation any days on which
the Senate is not in session.
(c) Nothing in this resolution shall be con-
strued as prohibiting or otherwise restricting
the authority of any other committee to
study and review any intelligence activity to
the extent that such activity directly affects
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S7564
a matter otherwise Within- the jurisdiction
of such committee.
(d) Nothing in this resolution shall be'
construed as amending, limiting, or other-
wise changing the authority of any stand-
ing committee of the Senate to obtain full
and prompt access to the product of the in-
telligence activities of any department or
agency of the Government relevant to a mat-
ter otherwise within the jurisdiction of such
committee.
SEC. 4. (a) The' select committee, for the
purposes of accountability to the Senate,
shall make regular and periodic reports to
the Senate on the nature and extent of the
intelligence activities of the various dpart-
ments and agencies of the United States.
Such commitee shall promptly call to the
attention of the Senate or to any other ap-
propriate committee or committees of the
Senate any matters requiring the attention
of the Senate or such other committee or
committees. In making such, reports, the se-
lect committee shall proceed in a manner
consistent with section 8(c) (2) to protect
national security.
(b) The select committee shall obtain an
annual report from the Director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Di-
rector of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion. Such reports shall review the intelli-
gence activities of the agency or department
concerned and the intelligence activities of
foreign countries directed at the United
States or its interests. An unclassified version
of each report may be made available to the
public at the discretion of the select com-
mittee. Nothing herein shall be construed as
requiring the public disclosure in such re-
ports of the names of individuals engaged in
intelligence activities for the United States
or the divulging of inteligence methods em-
ployed c: the sources of information on
which such reports are based or the amount
of funds authorized td be appropriated for
intelligence activities.
(c) On or before March 15 of each year,
the select committee shall submit to the
Committee on the Budget of the Senate the
views and estimates described in section 301
(c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974
regarding matters within the jurisdiction of
the select committee.
SEC. 5. (a) For the purposes of this res-
olution, the select committee is authorized
in its discretion (1) to make investigations
into any matter within its jurisdiction, (2)
to make expenditures from the contingent
fund of the Senate, (3) to employ personnel,
(4) to hold hearings, (5) to sit and act at
any time or place during the sessions, re-
cesses, and adjourned periods of the Sen-
ate, (6) to require, by subpena or other-
wise, the attendance of witnesses and the
production of correspondence, books, papers,
and documents, (7) to take depositions and
other testimony, (8) to procure the service
of consultants or organizations thereof, in
accordance with the provisions of section
202(1) of the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1946, and (9) with the prior consent of
the Government department or agency con-
cerned and the Committee on Rules and Ad-
ministration, to use on a reimbursable basis
the services of personnel of any such de-
partment or agency.
(b) The chairman of the select commit-
tee or any member thereof may administer
oaths to witnesses.
(c) Subpenas authorized ,by the select
committee may be issued over the signature
of the chairman, the vice chairman, or
any member of the select committee desig-
nated by the chairman, and may be served
by any person designated by the chairman or
any member signing the subpena.
SEC. 6. No employee of the select commit-
tee or any person engaged by contract or
otherwise to perform services for or at the
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE May '19, 1976
request of such committee shall be given ac-
cess to any classified information by such
committee unless such employee or person
has (1) agreed in writing and under oath
to be bound by the rules of the 'Senate (in-
cluding the jurisdiction of the Select Com-
mittee on Standards and Conduct) and of
such committee as to the security of such
information during and after the period of
his employment or contractual agreement
with such committee; and (2) received an
appropriate security clearance as determined
by such committee in consultation with the
Director of Central Intelligence. The type of
security clearance to be required in the case
of any such employee or person shall, within
the 'determination of such committee in con-
sultation with the Director of Central In-
telligence, be commensurate with the sen-
sitivity of the classified information to which
such employee or person will be given access
by such committee.
SEC. 7. The select committee shall for-
mulate and carry out such rules and pro-
cedures as it deems necessary to prevent the
disclosure, without the consent of the per-
son or persons concerned, of information in
the possession of such committee which un-
duly infringes upon the privacy or which
violates the constitutional rights of such
person or persons. Nothing herein shall be
construed to prevent such committee from
publicly disclosing any such information in
any case in which such committee deter-
mines the national interest'in the disclosure
of such information clearly outweighs any
infringement on the privacy of any person
or persons.
SEC. 8. (a) The select committee may, sub-
ject. to the provisions of this section, dis-
close publicly any information in the pos-
session of such committee after a determi-
nation by such committee that the public
interest would be served by such disclosure.
Whenever committee action is required to
disclose any information under this section,
the committee shall meet to vote on the
matter within five days after any member of
the committee requests such a vote. No mem.
' ber of the select committee shall disclose
any information, the disclosure of which re-
quires a committee vote, prior to a vote by
the committee on the question of the dis-
closure of such information or after such
vote except in accordance with this section.
(b) (1) In any case in which the select
commtitee votes to disclose publicly any in-
formation which has been classified under
established securtiy procedures, which has
been submitted to it by the executive branch,
and which the executive branch requests be
kept secret, such committee shall notify the
President of such vote.
(2) The select committee may disclose
publicly such information after the expira-
tion of a five-day period following the day on
which notice of such vote is transmitted to
the President, unless, prior to the expiration
of such five-day period, the President, per-
sonally in writing, notifies the committee
that he objects to the disclosure of such
information, provides his reasons therefor,
and certifies that the threat to the national
interest of the United States posed by such
disclosure is of such gravity that it outweighs
any public interest in the disclosure.
(3) If the President, personally in writing,
notifies the select committee of his objec-
tions to the disclosure of such information
as provided in paragraph (2), such commit-
tee may, by majority vote, refer the question
of the disclosure of such information to the
Senate for consideration. The committee
shall not publicly disclose such information
without leave of the Senate. -
(4) Whenever the select committee votes
to refer the question of disclosure of any
information to the Senate under paragraph
(3), the chairman shall, not later than the
first day on which the Senate is in session
following the day on which the vote occurs,
report the matter to the Senate for its con-
sideration.
(5) One hour after the Senate conve
on the fourth day on which the Senate
session following the day on which any
matter is reported to the Senate, or at s
earlier time as the majority leader and the
minority leader of the Senate jointly agree
upon in accordance with section 133(f) of
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,
the Senate shall go into closed session and
the matter shall be the pending; business.
In considering the matter in closed session
the Senate may-
(A) approve the public disclosure of all or
any portion of the information in question,
in which case the committee shall publicly
disclose the information ordered to be dis-
closed,
(B) disapprove the public disclosure of all
or any portion of the information in ques-
tion, in which case the committee shall not
publicly disclose the information ordered
not to be disclosed, or
(C) refer all or any portion of the matter
back to the committee, in which case the
committee shall make the final determina-
tion with respect to the public disclosure of
the information in question.
Upon conclusion of the consideration of
such matter in closed session, which may not
extend beyond the close of the ninth day
on which the Senate is in session following
the day on which such matter was reported
to the Senate, or the close of the fifth day
following the day agreed upon jointly by
the majority and minority leaders in ac-
cordance with section 133(f) of the Legisla-
tive Reorganization Act of 1946 (whichever
the case may be), the Senate shall immedi-
ately vote on the disposition of such matter
in open session, without debate, and with-
out divulging the information with respect
to which the vote is being taken. The Sen-
ate shall vote to dispose of such mattellft,
one or more of the means specifie
clauses (A), (B), and (C) of the sect,
sentence of this paragraph. Any vote of the
Senate to disclose any information pursuant
to this paragraph shall be subject to the
right of a Member of the Senate to move for
reconsideration of'the vote within the time
and pursuant to the procedures specified in
rule XIII of the Standing Rules of the Sen-
ate. and the disclosure of such information
shall be made consistent with that right.
(c) (1) No information in the possession
of the select committee relating to the law-
ful intelligence activities of any department
or agency of the United States which has
been classified under established security
procedures and which the select committee,
pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this sec-
tion, has determined should not be disclosed
shall be made available to any person by a
Member, officer, or employee of the Senate
except in a closed session of the Senate or
as provided in paragraph (2).
(2) The select committee may, under such
regulations as the committee shall prescribe
to protect the confidentiality of such in-
formation, make any information described
in paragraph (1) available to any other com-
mittee or any other Member of the Senate.
Whenever the select committee makes such
information available, the committee shall
keep a written record showing. in the case
of any particular information, which com-
mittee or which Members of the Senate re-
ceived such information. No Member of the
Senate who, and no committee which, re-
ceives any information under this subsec-
tion, shall disclose such information except
in a closed session of the Senate.
(d) it shall be the duty of the Select Com-
mittee on Standards and Conduct to roves
gate any unauthorized disclosure of int
gence information by a Member, officer
employee of the Senate in violation of s
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May 19, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
section (c) and to report to the Senate con-
cerning any allegation which it finds to be
substantiated.
Upon the request of any person who
ct to any such investigation, the Be-
bje
Committee on Standards and Conduct
'release to 'such individual at the con-
clusion of its investigation a summary of
its investigation together with its findings.
If, at the conclusion of its investigation, the
Select Committee on Standards and Conduct
determines that there has been a significant
breach of confidentiality or unauthorized
disclosure by a Member, officer, or employee
of the Senate, it shall report its findings to
the Senate and recommend appropriate ac-
tion such as censure, removal from commit-
tee membership, or expulsion from the Sen-
ate, in the case of Member, or removal from
office or employment or punishment for con-
tempt, in the case of an officer or employee.
SEC. 9. The select committee is authorized
to permit any personal representative of the
President, designated by the President to
serve as a liaison to such committee, to
attend any closd meeting of such committee.
SEC. 10. Upon expiration of the Select Com-
mittee on Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities, established
by Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth Con-
gress, all records, files, documents, and other
materials in the possession, custody, or con-
trol of such committee, under appropriate
conditions established by it, shall be.trans-
ferred to the select committee.
SEC. 11. (a) It is the sense of the Senate
that the head of each department and agency
of the United States should keep the select
committee fully and currently informed with
respect to intelligence activities, including
any significant anticipated activities, which
are the responsibility of or engaged in by
such department or agency: Provided, That
this does not constitute a condition preced-
ent to the implementation of any such an-
ated intelligence activity.
It is the sense of the Senate that the
10d' of any department or agency of the
United States involved in any intelligence
activities should furnish any information or
document in the possession, custody, or con-
trol of the department or agency, or person
paid by such department or agency, whenever
requested by the select committee with re-
spect to any matter within such committee's
jurisdiction.
(c) It. is the sense of the Senate that each
department and agency of the United States
should report immediately upon discovery
to the select committee any and all intelli-
gence activities which constitute violations
of the constitutional rights of any person,
violations of law, or violations of Executive
orders, Presidential directives, or departmen-
tal or agency rules or regulations; each de-
partment and agency should further report
to such committee what actions have been
taken or are expected to be taken by the
departments or agencies with respect to such
violations.
SEC. 12. Subject to the Standing Rules of
the Senate, no funds shall be appropriated
for any fiscal year beginning after Septem-
ber 30, 1976, with the exception of a continu-
ing bill or resolution, or amendment thereto,
or conference report thereon, to, or for use of,
any department or agency of the United
States to carry out any of the following ac-
tivities, unless such funds shall have been
previously authorized by a bill or joint reso-
lution passed by the Senate during the same
or preceding fiscal year to carry out such
activity for such fiscal year:
(1) The activities of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and the Director of Central
Intelligence.
(2) The activities of the Defense Intelli-
nce Agency.
(3) The activities of the National Security
ency.
(4) The intelligence activities of other
agencies and subdivisions of the Department
of Defense.
(5) The intelligence activities of the De-
partment of State.
(6) The intelligence activities of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, including all
activities of the Intelligence Division.
SEC. 13. (a) The select committee shall
make a study with respect to the following
matters, taking into consideration with re-
spect to each such matter, all relevant as-
pects of the effectiveness of planning,
gathering, use, security, and dissemination
of intelligence:
(1) the quality of the analytical capabil-
ities of United States foreign intelligence
agencies and means for integrating more
closely analytical intelligence and policy
formulation;
(2) the extent and nature of the author-
ity of the departments and agencies of the
executive branch to engage in intelligence
activities and the desirability of developing
charters for each intelligence agency or
department;
(3) the organization of intelligence activi-
ties in the executive branch to maximize
the effectiveness of the conduct, oversight,
and accountability of intelligence activities;
to reduce duplication or overlap; and to im-
prove the morale of the personnel of the
foreign intelligence agencies;
(4) the conduct of covert and clandestine
activities and the procedures by which Con-
gress is informed of such activities;
(5) the desirability of changing any law,
Senate rule or procedure, or any Executive
order, rule, or regulation to improve the pro-
tection of intelligence secrets and provide for
disclosure of information for which there
is no compelling reason for secrecy;
(6) the desirability of establishing a stand-
ing committee of the Senate on intelligence
activities;
(7) the desirability of establishing a joint
committee of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on intelligence activities in
lieu of having separate committees in each
House of Congress, or of establishing pro-
cedures under which separate committees on
intelligence activities of the two Houses of
Congress would receive joint briefings from
the intelligence agencies and coordinate their
policies with respect to the safeguarding of
sensitive intelligence information;
(8) the authorization of funds for the
intelligence activities of the Government and
whether disclosure of any of the amounts of
such funds is in the public interest; and
(9) the development of a uniform set of
definitions for terms to be used in policies or
guidelines which may be~ adopted by the
executive or legislative branches to govern,
clarify, and strengthen the operation of in-
telligence activities.
(b) The select committee may, in its dis-
cretion, omit from the special study required
by this section any matter it determines has
been adequately studied by the Select Com-
mittee To Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities, es-
tablished by Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-
fourth Congress.
(c) The select committee shall report the
results of the study provided. for by this
section to the Senate, together with any rec-
ommendations for legislative or other actions
it deems appropriate, no later than July 1,
1977, and from time to time thereafter as it
deems appropriate.
SEC. 14. (a) As used in this resolution,
the term "intelligence activities" includes
(1) the collection, analysis, production, dis-
semination, or use of information which
relates to any foreign country, or any gov-
ernment, political group, party, military
force, movement, or other association in such
foreign country, and which relates to the
defense, foreign policy, national security, or
S 7565
related policies of the United States, and
other activity which is in support of such
activities; (2) activities taken to counter
similar activities directed against the United
States; (3) covert or clandestine activities
affecting the relations of the United States'
with any foreign government, political group,
party, military force, movement or other as-
sociation; (4), the collection, analysis, pro-
duction, dissemination, or use of information
about activities of persons within the United
States, its territories and possessions, or na-
tionals of the United States abroad whose
political and related activities pose, or may
be considered by any department, agency,
bureau, office, division, instrumentality, or
employee of the United States to pose, a
threat to the internal security of .the United
States, and covert or clandestine activities
directed against such persons. Such term
does not include tactical foreign military
intelligence serving no national policymaking
function.
(b) As used in this resolution, the term .
"department or agency" includes any orga-
nization, committee, council, establishment,
or office within the Federal Government.
(c) For purposes of this resolution, refer-
ence to any department, agency, bureau, or
subdivision shall include a reference to any
successor department, agency, bureau, or
subdivision to the extent that such succes-
sor engages in intelligence activities now
conducted by the department, agency, bu-
reau, or subdivision referred to in this reso-
lution.
SEC. 15. For the period from the date this
resolution is agreed to through February 28,
1977, the expenses of the select committee
under this resolution shall not exceed
$275,000, of, which amount not to exceed
$30,000 shall be available for the procurement
of the services of individual consultants, or
organizations thereof, as authorized by sec-
tion 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization
Act.of 1946. Expenses of the select commit-
tee under this resolution shall be paid from
the contingent fund of the Senate upon
vouchers approved by the chairman of the
select committee, except that vouchers shall
not be required for the disbursement of
salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.
SEC. 16. Nothing in this resolution shall
be construed as constituting acquiescence
by the Senate in any practice, or in the con-
duct of any activity, not otherwise author-
ized by law.
The title was amended so as to read:
"A resolution establishing it Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence."
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the reso-
lution was agreed to.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield for a unanimous-
consent agreement?
Mr. RIBICOFF. May I take just 2-
min-utes to finish?
Mr. SPARKMAN. Surely.
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I thank
the Senate as a whole for its overwhelm-
ing vote. The Senate saw its duty and it
did it. But there are some people in this
body who should be singled out for spe-
cial appreciation.
Our majority leader (Mn MANSFIELD),
some 20 years ago, suggested to Congress
that there should be an oversight com-
mittee on intelligence. As Is usual with
the majority leader, he was foresighted
and farsighted. If we had accepted his
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S 7566 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
recommendation, the problems that have
developed over the years would have
been eliminated and the intelligence
agency and this body would have been
better off for it.
Special appreciation should be given
to the distinguished Senator from Idaho.
He was given an unwelcome task. It was
his obligation to try to straighten out a
mess that we had been confronted with.
It was a great responsibility to conduct
the hearings of the select committee in
a way that would not do harm to the
intelligence community and, at the same
time, lay the foundation to correct the
abuses of the past, to assure that the in-
telligence community would survive and
would be able to do its job in the future,
while preserving the personal and civil
liberties of our peonle.
Senator CANNON of Nevada, chairman
of the Committee on Rules, was faced
with the responsibility of reviewing the
resolution after the Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations. The Committee on
Rules came up with a different proposal,
but I want to pay great tribute to Sen-
ator Cannon for working out the Cannon
substitute, which formed the basis for
the resolution adopted today.
Senator PERCY, the ranking minority
member of the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, has been and is a joy
for me to work with. Looking back at my
chairmanship of this committee and the
role of the ranking minority Member
from Illinois, practically every proposal
coming out of the Government Opera-
tions Committee has been treated on a
bipartisan basis. We were able to work
out carefully and closely constructive
`legislation which has the support of the
Senate as a whole.
Senator CRANSTON, Senator WEICKER,
Senator MONDALE, Senator CLARK, Sena-
tor HATFIELD, Senator HUDDLESTON, Sen-
ator MORGAN, and Senator JAVITS made
significant contributions.
Above all, Mr. President, I pay special
tribute to the majority whip (Mr. ROBERT
C. BYRD). During the markup in the
Committee on Rules, he insisted on, first,
perfecting Senate Resolution 400. I felt,
and the committee felt, that we had re-
ported out a good resolution, but Senator
Byrd, with his sharp eye and his knowl-
edge of the Senate and Its rules and
procedures, did spot a number of weak-
nesses. He went to work, carefully and
thoughtfully, perfecting Senate Resolu-
tion 400.
When the Committee on Rules voted
out its own substitute, the Senate was
headed for a real battle. There were
strong feelings on both sides, and it was
my conclusion that if we reached this
confrontation, the Senate as a whole
would have been the loser. This bill would
have taken weeks instead of days. Then
Senator BYRD was a strong force behind
Senator CANNON and myself and other
representatives of the - Committee on
Government Operations, the Church
Committee, and the Committee on Rules
getting together with Senator BYRD to
work out the compromise known as the
Cannon substitute. My personal feeling
is that, were it not for Senator BYRD's
intervention and his wise counsel in how
to perfect the Cannon resolution, we
would not have been able to pass this
outstanding and intelligent bill that is
now the law of the Senate, Senate Re-
solution 400.
Finally, high praise to Mr. Dick Weg-
man, Paul Hoff, Paul Rosenthal, John
Childers, Claudia Ingram, Jim Davidson,
Brian Conboy, Andrew Loewi and other
members of our staff who backed us up
so ably and completely. Without an able
staff such as represented by these ladies
and gentlemen, we would not have been
able to bring forth the type of legisla-
tion that we have today passed.
I take this opportunity to pay tribute
to all these gentlemen.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I shall be
very brief, and I appreciate the courtesy
of my colleague from Utah.
Mr. President, I should like to respond
to the chairman of the Government Op-
erations Committee, Senator RIBICOFF, in
first expressing to him my very deep ap-
preciation for the very thoughtful com-
ments that he made about the Senator
from Illinois.
It is with a great sense of respect and
affection that the Senator from Illinois
has worked on any number of matters
involving the Government Operations
Committee with the Senator from Con-
necticut. He has found him one of the
fairest, most competent, determined and
dedicated men with whom the Senator
from Illinois has ever worked in industry
or in Government.
It is a tremendous pleasure to work
with him, and I pay great tribute to him
for not only this piece of legislation but
many, many other landmark pieces of
legislation we have been privileged to
work on together.
I join with him in expressing our deep
appreciation to Senator MANSFIELD, the
majority leader, for the inspiration that
he provided 20 years ago for the resolu-
tion that has just been adopted by the
Senate.
I also join in paying great tribute to
our assistant majority leader, Senator
ROBERT C. BYRD, without whose brilliance
in this matter we would not have been
able to have moved ahead as rapidly and
as effectively. And certainly to Senator
CANNON, who has also been a major force
in moving us ahead.
I pay great tribute to Senator WEICKER
particularly who, on a number of occa-
sions, took over the minority side of floor
management of this bill when the Sen-
ator from Illinois was unable to be on the
floor. I express my deep appreciation not
only for that work that he did here but
also for the work that he did on the res-
olution as it was guided through the Gov-
ernment Operations Committee, and for
the work that he did previously on the
Watergate Committee that prepared him
so well for this.
I would like to pay tribute to Senators
BROCK, ROTH, JAVITS, MATHIAS and
SCHWEIKER; to Senators CHURCH, BAKER,
CRANSTON, and MONDALE, and to all mem-
bers of their staffs and the staff of the
Government Operations Committee, and
the staff of the Committee on Rules and
Administration, with my deep apprecia-
tion for the fine work that has resulted
in this virtually unanimous vote that we
had on a very, very complex mattter.
May 19, 19.76
Particularly I pay tribute to the staff
of the Government Operations Commit-
tee-Dick Wegman, Paul Hoff, Paul
whose help was invaluable and without
whom passage of Senate Resolution 400
would not have been possible.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, this
is an historic occasion, and I want to
pay tribute to the many Members of the
Senate whose tireless and dedicated work
has made possible the establishment of
the new Select Committee.
The passage of Senate Resolution 400
marks the beginning of a new era of
responsibility and accountability in the
conduct of intelligence activities by the
Federal Government.
Many Members of this body have
served responsibly and with distinction
to achieve that result. They deserve the
gratitude of all of us and the American
people.
The adoption of Senate Resolution 400
is the culmination of more than a year's
exacting work by the members of the
Select Committee on Intelligence Activi-
ties. The Senator from Idaho Mr.
CHURCH was given a difficult assignment,
and he has led his committee in a sensi-
tive and responsible manner. He and the
11 members of that committee have de-
voted countless hours to the exposure of
unlawful and unethical practices by the
CIA, the FBI and the military intel-
ligence agencies. They have published
exhaustive and detailed findings and
the Congress and the Nation.
Senate-Resolution 400 was referreTq!"o
two Senate committees, the Committee
on Government Operations and the Com-
mittee on Rules and Administration.
Under the able leadership of the Sena-
tor from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF),
the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY),
the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON),
and the Senator from-Oregon (Mr. HAT-
FIELD), those committees handled dif-
ficult, sensitive, and controversial ques-
tions of commit-tee jurisdiction. While
they took different approaches to
these questions, under their leader-
ship and under the leadership of
the able assistant majority leader
the Senator from West Virginia
(Mr. BYRD), the Senator from Minnesota
(Mr. MONDALE), the Senator from Con-
necticut (Mr. WEICKER), and the Senator
from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) the resolution
we have just passed is a compromise
measure in the best traditions of the
Senate.
I want to pay special tribute to these
Senators and to all others who have
worked so long and responsibly to
achieve that compromise.
Mr., KENNEDY. Mr. President, I rise
as a Member of the Senate who was
neither a member of the Rules Commit-
tee nor the Intelligence Committee to
commend those Members who have per-
formed such a noble service for the Sen-
ate in bringing about the new action w
have taken in establishing the Intell4
Bence Committee.
Their names are well known to the
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May 19, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE .
Members of the Senate, but they are not
as well known, perhaps, to the American
p opie: But any review of the history of
achievement would have to recognize
ery special work that was done by
t chairman of the Select Committee,
the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH),
the chairman of the Government Opera-
tions Committee (Mr. RIBICOFF), the
chairman of the Rules Committee (Mr.
CANNON), majority whip (Mr. ROBERT C.
BYRD), Senator PERCY, and Senator
CRANSTON.
I acknowledge the very extraordinary
accomplishment they achieved. I want to
mention just a special commendation for
them. But I also, Mr. President, want to
join my colleagues in singling out what
I consider to be the most important force
in the Senate over the period of recent
weeks, months, and, yes, years: the spirit
and energy of our majority leader. He
has played really the central role in
fashioning this particular resolution
which has recently been passed over-
whelmingly by this body.
Mr. President, if we think back over
the period of years, the majority leader
was the first Member of Congress to
offer to the Senate of the United States
the suggestion that a separate intelli-
gence committee be established, we can
see his foresightedness in this particular
matter.
I think many of us remember the
caucuses which took place over a year
ago where this issue was debated, and
with a great deal of heat and with a
great deal of passion, and not without
n stakes on many sides. But nonetheless,
nk the persistence of the majority
er in forming the Intelligence Com-
mittee, the Church committee, and giv-
ing that the kind of support without
which I do not think that committee
could have performed the great public
service that it did perform. And finally,
in fashioning this compromise, the
majority leader was showing us the ex-
ercise leadership at its best in the Senate.
This will stand as one more monument
to his firm and effective guiding hand.
As a Member who observed and
watched and supported this particular
proposal, I mention what I think has
been an additional signal leadership of
the leader in this important area, and
any evaluation of the history of this pro-
posal has to put the contribution of the
leader right at the top.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I would
like to offer a few comments concerning
the intelligence oversight legislation we
have passed today.
During the course of our deliberations
I have had foremost in my mind one
overriding consideration. That is the ab-
solute necessity of maintaining a viable
and effective intelligence service for the
protection of our country. In today's un-
certain world there is no substitute for
accurate, timely intelligence. I have
fought hard to resist actions which I felt
would damage our capability, to provide
our country's leadership with the infor-
mation they need.
I have also recognized that the Con-
J~ss has a clear cut responsibility to ex-
"r vise its constitutional mandate for
oversight in this senstive area, not only
S 7567
to insure that intelligence operations are new Intelligence Committee to come into
conducted in accordance with our Con- 'being. So I salute Senator MANSFIELD
stitution, but also to assist our Intelli- for leading us the whole mile.
gence services by providing clear guide- I would also, once again, draw atten-
lines for their activities. tion to the work of the principal archi-
The need for improved intelligence tects of the compromise. In addition to
oversight has been recognized by virtu- Senator MANSFIELD, they were the Ma-
ally every witness who has appeared be- jority Whip, Senator BYRD of West Vir-
fore the concerned committees. However, ginia,the chairman of the Government
a wide range of views have been pre- Operations Committee, Senator RIBI-
sented as to how to best accomplish that corn-who floor managed the bill so
goal. magnificently, with his infinite concern
Our deliberations on this legislation for detail as well as for the broad policy,
have clearly shown us it is impossible to matters involved-and the chairman of
develop a perfect mechanism for intel- the Rules Committee, Senator CANNON,
ligence oversight without an opportu- who also was involved in steering this bill
nity to observe it in action. I, therefore, through so effectively. The work of Sen-
view this legislation as a first step in ator CHURCH was also invaluable and in-
dealing with this complicated problem. dispensible, as was the work of so many
Experience will provide us valuable in- members of his committee: On the other
formation for future actions to improve side of the aisle, special mention should
on what we have created. be made of' the fine work of Senator
I have expressed my reservations con- PERCY and Senator WEICKER.
cerning some aspects of the proposals EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE:
presented to us. I believe a joint commit- LONG OVERDUE
tee of the Congress for intelligence over- Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, our action
sight would be a far more workable today in creating a mechanism for effec-
structure than a separate Senate com- tive senatorial oversight of U.S. intelli-
mittee. I am concerned that the orga- gence is a tribute to Senator MANSFIELD'S
nization we have created might involve vision in having seen the need for such
itself in the operation of our intelligence a step, two decades ago, and having
services beyond the proper constitutional campaigned for it since that time. It is
role of the Congress. only a pity that it has taken us 20 years
I am also concerned about the unau- to accomplish this.
thorized disclosure of classified informa- There is no question but that existing
tion. Any reasonable person must recog- congressional oversight'procedures have
nize that some information must be kept .been inadequate. For all these years we
secret for our own protection. I believe have been voting intelligence appropri-
great care must be exercised by the com- ations pretty much in the dark: un-
mittee to insure no unauthorized dis- known sums for unknown services. And
closures emanate from its operations. in addition to the legitimate services
I share the view of many that it is rendered, we now know that there have
virtually impossible to separate military been numerous transgressions of the law
intelligence from the total military pic- and numerous infringements of our con-
ture. Military intelligence is integral to stitutional rights. Republican -and
the responsibilities of our Armed Forces Democratic administrations, alike, have
as an essential element of military plan- been infatuated with covert operations
ning and operations. I believe we would abroad, even though the results of many
be in a far sounder position to leave au- of them have been self-defeating to
thorization authority for that function America's interest; the Congress has
within the committee of the Senate meanwhile acquiesced in these opera-
charged with overall responsibility for tions even though they undercut Con-
our Armed Forces. gress constitutional prerogatives con-
However, in the interest of taking this cerning the conduct of foreign relations.
vital first step for congressional over- More than one President has used U.S.
sight of intelligence activities we have intelligence as a political instrument,
developed what appears to be the most and has politicized objective intelligence
workable approach. Lessons we learn in analysis. Year by year, there has been
the future will help us refine it. more and more intelligence bureaucracy,
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, now more and more intelligence overkill, and
that we have finally established a perma- more and more bureaucratic feudalism.
nent committee of the Senate to oversee We now have the realistic opportu-
the intelligence agencies, to be fully and nity to help the executive to reform
currently informed as to their activities, these practices and to give the American
and to authorize budgets for them, I taxpayer a better political and economic
want to pay a special tribute to the accounting concerning our vast intelli-
decades-long effort by our leader toward gence community. Our thanks are due
this end. to the splendid and responsible job
One of the most important goals of which the Senate Select Committee on
Senator MANSFIELD'S public life has been Intelligence has done in examining these
to make these agencies-a dark corner questions-and in demonstrating in the
of government to the public and to most process that senatorial security can be
Members of the Senate-accountable to kept, and leaks discouraged.
Congress for their activities and their We should nonetheless recognize as
expenditures. Most recently, he was inti- well that our country's many problems
mately involved in establishing the with intelligence have not resulted just
Church committee and supporting its from past CIA, FBI, or NSA overenthusi-
work. Now, in these final days, he has asms, or from the unaccountability-in
given his energy and good spirit to work- real terms-of present and past adminis-
-ing out the compromise that enabled the trations, but from our own, congres-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 19, 1976
sional, derelictions. We have collectively
been too casual and inattentive, and at
times too easily gulled, in not demanding
genuine executive accountability. We
have too easily settled instead for a
buddy system which in practice has often
assured the last possible communication
of intelligence reality to the Congress.
Thus we should congratulate not only
the select committee, but the Govern-
ment Operations and Rules Committees
for the imaginative and responsible way
in which they formed a constructive
compromise solution for the new Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence which
I sincerely hope we will vote into being.
Now our real challenge and work be-
gin: to insure that the Senate continues
to monitor U.S. intelligence alertly, so
that the country's legitimate intelligence
processes may be maintained and
strengthened, the appropriate offices of
the executive branch be kept meaning-
fully accountable, and the tax moneys
of the American people wisely spent.
The Senate has done a fine and needed
piece of business. Let us hope that it will
continue to show the vigilance necessary
to help give the country the finest and
most responsible intelligence establish-
ment possible, and to help restore the
country's confidence in those processes.
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, by its
action today, the Senate can take an
important step toward insuring that the
abuses committed by the intelligence
agencies will not recur. The Senate's
willingness to alter its institutional ar-
rangements to create a new committee
with' legislative jurisdiction would re-
flect some recognition that the present
system of overseeing the intelligence
agencies has been a dismal failure; that
the extraordinary revelations of the
Church committee require an extraor-
dinary , response; that "business as
usual" cannot be the order of the day
when constitutional rights have been im-
periled on a large scale.
Action in this area is long overdue.
The tip of the iceberg uncovered by
Watergate and the Church and Pike
committees has been evident for years.
In 1971, a year before the Watergate
breakin, I introduced legislation to
create a commission composed of both
public and congressional members
charged with the responsibility to "in-
vestigate the entire range of domestic
surveillance" and recommend oversight
legislation. Three times since June 1973,
I have introduced legislation calling for
a committee to conduct oversight of
domestic surveillance. No action was
taken on these bills. As the disclosures in
the aftermath of Watergate illuminated-
more clearly the need for such a com-
mittee, I Introduced Senate Resolution
231 last summer, which the Senate
adopted, committing itself to a time-
table requiring action on oversight legis-
lation by June 1, 1976.
Although the deliberateness of the
Senate's response to the disclosed abuses
of the intelligence agencies has been
frustrating, it may have served a useful
purpose. Perhaps in this area, it was not
enough to glimpse the tip of the iceberg.
We needed to know that the abuses were
not simply the excesses of one man or
one administration. We needed to see
that the techniques of a police state were
employed, not sporadically, but systema-
tically. We needed to realize that the
covert actions conceived and imple-
mented in secrecy by a handful of men
in the executive branch have become a
major thread of our foreign policy, and
that the consequences have often been
disastrous. Certainly after learning all
this the Senate must take action signal-
ling our awareness that intelligence acti-
vities can no longer be the sole province
of the President; that they must be car-
ried on in conformity with the Constitu-
tion-that indeed, in our society, "na-
tional security" can ultimately be safe-
guarded only by deep respect for law and
democratic principles.
At least it is my sincere hope that our
action today reflects an understanding
of these fundamental lessons, for there is
no magic to creating a new committee,
and without this understanding, this
committee can fail in its oversight as
surely as its predecessors did.
The debate on this measure has not
been altogether reassuring. Obviously,
the version of Senate Resolution 400 on
which we are voting is very much a com-
promise between the resolutions reported
by the Government Operations Commit-
tee and the Rules Committee. In large
part, it is a successful compromise which
manages to grant the new committee
necessary legislative jurisdiction while
protecting the legitimate interests of the
standing committees by providing for
concurrent jurisdiction and sequential
referral of legislative proposals.
However, during the compromise, the
controversial section governing the pro-
cedure for disclosing classified informa-
tion was changed. In the Government
Operations version, if the Intelligence
Committee voted to disclose classified
information, and the President, after be-
ing notified, interposed an objection, the
committee's decision would stand unless
one-third of the committee voted to
bring the matter to the full Senate for a
decision. Under the compromise version,
once the President objects, the informa-
tion could be disclosed only by a vote of
the full Senate, even if the committee
was unanimously in favor of disclosure.
When Senator ABOUREZK offered an
amendment last week to return to the
approach of the Government Operations
draft, it was tabled by a vote of 77 to 13.
In reaching this decision, the Senate
undercuts its new committee. We set the
stage for a possible replay of the contro-
versy in the House over release of the
Pike committee report. In that case, the
committee decided to publicly release its
report containing some classified in-
formation. The committee members were
fully familiar with the information and
made the judgment that its release would
not jeopardize national security. The
committee was overridden by the full
House, responding to public and Presi-
dential pressure, despite the fact that few
of the members were in the position to
seriously consider whether any of the ma-
terial would injure national security.
If the Senate had left the responsibility
for deciding whether classified informa-
tion should be released with the commit-
tee, it would have provided the maximum
guarantee that the decision would be
based on whether the release of the-ma-
decisions on classified information will
reflect undue deference to the executive's
classification system. This system has no
basis in law or reason. Senator MUSKIE'S
Subcommittee on Integovernmental Rer
lations has made it clear that, overclassi-
fication is routine, and that perhaps as
much as 75 percent of material classified
should not be.
The classification system has been a
major pillar in the edifice which has be-
come known as the "imperial presi-
dency." By accepting the presumptive
validity of a classification system which
is obviously flawed and which the Con-
gress had no part in creating, we under-
mine our claim to be a coequal branch of
the Government, the premise on which
this resolution is based. To the extent
that this decision was prompted by the
change in public opinion following the
"leaking" of the Pike report, it is most
unfortunate. Despite what the executive
branch would have us believe, the para-
mount issue before us is how to curb the
abuses of the intelligence agencies and
the executive branch, and not how to
maintain secrecy.
Only time will tell how effective this
committee will be. At present, we can
safely say that while the creation of this
committee is a necessary step, it will not
be.sufcient. The reform of the intelli-
gence agencies to prevent the conti
Lion and recurrence of abuses ca
seen as at least a three-stage pro .
After the abuses are exposed and the
committee is created, significant legisla-
tion must be considered and enacted.
The Church committee has transmitted
a formidable legislative agenda. Its rec-
ommendations included the tasks of re-
writing the 1947 National Security Act,
and setting forth charters for the vari-
ous intelligence agencies. Without at-
tempting to explore the merits of any
specific proposals, the basic need for leg-
islative action seems clear.
Although the failure of Congress to
perform its oversight responsibilities has
been discussed at length, the failure to
write legislation telling the intelligence
community and the public what surveil-
lance techniques are legal and which are
not and defining the jurisdictional limits
of each agency represents an equally
serious abdication of congressional re-
sponsibility. If practices like warrant-
less wiretapping, politically motivated
tax audits, or attempted assassinations
of foreign leaders abroad are as repug-
nant to the majority of Americans as
they are to me, they should be outlawed
as a matter of Federal law. It is danger-
ous to leave various intelligence practices
in a gray area where they are generally
disapproved by public opinion but not
clearly outlawed.
Judicial decisions in cases brought by
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May 19, 1976 'CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-- SENATE
cases can take years, vary from court to
court and case to case or ultimately turn
on some'technical point rather than the
its. In The interest of public confi-
ei3tl`for the benefit of the intelli-
~agencies themselves, there is no
substitute for carefully drawn legislative
guidelines and statutory prohibitions on
certain practices. N
The tasks remaining for the new com-
mittee, then, and the Congress as a
whole, are formidable. It is my hope that
the committee will discharge its respon-
sibilities as effectively as the Church
committee did. In its 15-month tenure,
the committee -conducted the first ex-
haustive study of our intelligence ap-
paratus since 1947. The committee de-
liberations were conducted in a biparti-
san, thorough, deliberate manner in
which the foremost commitment was to
obtaining the truth. Despite the delicate
nature of the task and the constant pos-
sibility of clashes with the Executive over
sensitive materials, the committee
avoided confrontation on the one hand
and "leaks" on the other, while manag-
ing to present a comprehensive report,,
documenting a stunning array of abuses.
The committee's efforts were a credit to
its members, its staff and the Senate, and
its legislative recommendations 'deserve
careful study by the new select
committee.
TRADE COMMISSION ACT
message from the House of Repre-
atives on H.R. 12527, and I ask that
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, this matter
Commerce Committee, with tl* leader-
ship of the minority side as well as the
needs in order to make it through until
June 30, 1976.
Earlier this year, the Senate passed an
nisters. The House committee on in-
state and Foreign Commerce has held
rings on these substantive amend-
ments, but by the time of the May 15
deadline was only able to report the au-
thorizations and the extension of time
for the required reports. It is my under-
standing that the House committee -will
continue with its consideration of the
substantive amendments, but at this
time, we believe that it is imperative that
the Commission be authorized the in-
creased funds which it needs through
June 30, 1976, and the extension of time
that is needed for submission of the re-
port required under the Magnuson-Moss
Act.
Therefore, I send to the desk an
amendment which has been cleared on
both sides. This amendment would de-
lete the fiscal 1977 authorization from
the bill, and amend the title to reflect
this'deletion. By moving ahead now with
the needed fiscal 1976 supplemental au-
thorization, we will not delay the Com-
mission from its important work while
we consider the fiscal 1977 authorization
and substantive amendments to the FTC
Act.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will state the amendment.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
On page 1, beginning on line 5 strike out
and by striking out '$50,000,000' and in-
serting in lieu thereof '$57,233,000"1.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment of
the Senator from Utah.
The amendment was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
is open to further amendment. If there
be no further amendment to be proposed,
the question is on the engrossment of
the amendment and the third reading of
the bill.
The amendment was ordered to be en-
grossed and the bill to be read the third
time.
The bill was read the third time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
having been read a third time, the ques-
tion is; Shall it pass?
So the bill (H.R. 12527) was passed.
The title was amended so as to read:
"An Act to amend the Federal Trade
Commission Act to increase the authori-
zation of appropriations for fiscal year
1976, and for other purposes."
EDWARD GORIN AND FAMILY RE-
UNITED IN BALTIMORE
Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, all of us
in America can rejoice that Edward
Gorin and his family, formerly unwilling
residents of the Soviet Union, were re-
united in Baltimore last week after a sep-
aration of almost 4 years.
For Edward Gorin, a violinist with the
Baltimore Symphony Orchestra, those 4
years were marked by delays and disap-
pointments, and by discouragement verg-
ing often on despair.
For his wife, Sophia Belotserkovskaya
left in Moscow with their two little
daughters, it was far worse. There were
repeated visa applications and repeated
refusals. There were threats, harrass-
ments and hostile interrogation. There
was isolation. But there was tremendous
courage as well. Sophia never gave up.
S 7569
The Gorins' problems with Soviet au-
thoritiesbegan in July 1972 when Mr.
Gorin, then first violinist with the Sym-
phony Orchestra of All Union Radio and
Television of the U.S.S.R., refused to join
in denunciations of fellow musicians who
had emigrated to Israel. For this honor-
able conduct, he was dismissed from the
orchestra and barred from further em-
ployment in the U.S.S.R.
The Gorins then decided to emigrate
themselves, but their effort was frus-
trated when they received sponsorship
for three people to resettle in Israel sev-
eral weeks after Julia's birth had made
them a family of four. Reluctantly, the
family decided that Gorin should leave by
himself-that his chances for arranging
for them to follow him would be better
from the outside than from within the
Soviet Union. This hope proved bitterly
disappointing.
Gorin left Moscow on November -5,
1972. He did not see his wife and children
again until last Tuesday night-May 11,
1976-when they arrived at LaGuardia
Airport en route to Baltimore. His daugh-
ter, Inna, is now 6 years old. Julia, the
newbornbaby he left in Moscow is 4.
The tireless . struggle of the interven-
ing years followed the pattern which has
become all too tragically familiar. Soviet
authorities refused to issue an emigra-
tion visa to Mrs. Gorin, a mathematician,
claiming she had had access to state
secrets. Her denials and protests were
unavailing.
Finally, pushed to desperation, Mrs.
Gorin staged a public demonstration in
Moscow in June 1975 and went on a hun-
gerstrike to dramatize her plight. She
was almost immediately picked up+and
interrogated by the KGB.
Meanwhile, Mr. Gorin, working. with
Sol - Goldstein, Chairman of the Balti-
more Committee on Soviet Jewry and
with various city and state officials, was
exploring every avenue to secure his fam-
ily's release from the Soviet Union. As
part of this effort, I met with Russian
"Refusniks" when I was in Moscow last
summer and the Senate Delegation of
which I was a member also raised the
question of her emigration with Secre-
tary Brezhnev when we met with him
then.
Last week all those efforts finally paid
off. And today I am happy to be welcom-
ing the Gorin family to Washington: I
am proud to show them the capital of a
country that believes people have a right
to freedom. I am proud to show them
the capital of their new homeland.
At this time, in addition to paying trib-
ute to the faith and courage of Edward
Gorin, his wife and children, I would like
to salute the tireless humanitarianism of
the Baltimore Committee for Soviet
Jewry in the person of Sol Goldstein,
and Eileen Yaffee, and Rabbi David
Goldstein, all of whom are here today
with the Gorins.
Together, we have overcome in what
often seemed a hopeless situation. And
once again, the Soviet Union has been
obliged by the intensity of international
protest to do something that in common
decency they should have done 4 years
ago.
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S 7570
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 19, 1976
LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
hope that the schedule which has been
distributed on the Democratic side has
also been distributed on the Republican
side, and if not, I will request the pages
to do so. I understand it has been dis-
tributed on the Republican side.
The schedule illustrates what con-
fronts the Senate in the remaining
weeks of this session.
It is the intention of the leadership at
an appropriate time to ask the Senate
to turn to the consideration of the anti-
trust bill, Calendar No. 781, H.R. 8532,
which I understand will be in some dif-
ficulty, but I shall not do that at the mo-
ment so, I can enunciate to the Senate
what the program may well be for the
period between now and the Memorial
Day recess.
First, it is my intention to ask unan-
imous consent and then if that is ob-
jected to, to move to take up Calendar
No. 781, H.R. 8532, an act to amend the
Clayton Act to permit State attorneys
general to bring certain antitrust ac-
tions, and for other purposes.
The bill from the Judiciary Commit-
tee has been on the calendar since May 6
and I am calling it up at this time at the
special request of the chairman of the
subcommittee, the distinguished Senator
from Michigan (Mr. PHILIP A. HART),
who is unable to be here today for rea-
sons well understood by his colleagues in
this body.
Then I would like to turn to the con-
sideration of Calendar No. 814, S. 3434,
the military construction authorization
bill, which was reported on the 13th of
this month and placed on the calendar
that day.
No. 3, Calendar 832, S. 3439, Foreign
Military Arms Sales Act, which was re-
ported and.placed on the calendar on
May 14. This is a somewhat toned-down
version of the bill which the President
vetoed.
Then, following that, Calendar 834,
H.R. 12438, the Defense Authorization
Act which, likewise, was reported and
placed on the calendar on the 14th.
Whether or not we can finish with
these measures before we go out, and
others in addition to that, such as con-
ference reports and bills which have lit-
tle in the way of opposition, remains to
be seen.
It is hoped that after we return from
the Memorial Day recess, which is only,
I believe, for 2 days, that the Senate at
that time will be able to take up Calen-
dar No. 685, S. 3219-the Clean Air Act,
which was reported out of committee and
placed on the calendar on March 29 of
this year.
GENERAL
explanation of what confronts us and
what my intentions are, I ask unani-
mous consent, Mr. President, that the
Senate at this time turn to the considera-
tion of Calendar No. 781, H.R. 8532. This
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
will be stated by title.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
A bill (H.R. 8532) to amend the Clayton
Act to permit State attorneys general to
bring certain antitrust actions, and for other
purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the immediate considera-
tion of the bill?
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, reserv-
ing the right to object--
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Nebraska is recognized.
Mr. HRUSKA. May I ask the majority
leader is that the House-approved bill,
what we know as the parens.patriae bill?
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct,
H.R. 8532, which was placed on the
Calendar on the 13th of this month, but
which I have been asked to take up in
place of S. 1284, which was reported out
of the Judiciary Committee, on which
the distinguished Senator from Nebraska
is a member, on May 6, 1976.
Mr. HRUSKA. Further reserving the
right to object, Mr. President, may I ask,
the majortiy leader if he is aware, as I
am sure he is, that the substance and
content of that bill have been considered
for an extended period of time in the
Judiciary Committee of the Senate; that
there is in process now the preparation,
printing, delivery, and laying before the
Senate of a report on one -part of that
bill, which is the bill for which there is
a unanimous-consent request to be taken
up? Is the Senator aware of that?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. If the Senator
would allow me, I would like to read a
brief statement in connection therewith.
Mr. HRUSKA. Very well, without my
losing the right to the floor.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, let
me recount the facts as to the processing
of S. 1284 so my colleagues can reach
their own conclusion.
On March 21, 1975-March 21, 1975-
Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee
Chairman PHILIP A. HART and Minority
Leader HUGH SCOTT introduced S. 1284.
The legislation' was referred to the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary. The Antitrust
and Monopoly Subcommittee held hear-
ings on May 7 and 8, and June 3, 4, and
12, 1975, at which more than 30 witnesses
testified. All persons suggested as wit-
nesses by opponents of the bill and every
person requesting to testify were granted
that right, with two exceptions. The, two
who did not testify requested to testify
after the witness list for the last day of
hearings was' released. Senator HRUSKA
requested and agreed to chair an addi-
tional day of hearings for those wit-
nesses, which was scheduled. At Senator
HRUSKA's request, that hearing was twice
postponed. Thereafter, at Senator HRUs-
KA's request and with the concurrence
of the two witnesses, the hearing record
was closed and their statements were
received for the record.
On July 28, 1975-July 28, 1975-the
Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee
met in open executive session at which
time the bill was reported without rec-
ommendation to the full Committee on
the Judiciary with amendments.
At the direction of the Committee on
the Judiciary, additional hearings on S.
1284, as reported by the Antitrust and
mony from persons opposing the bill. Of
the nine witnesses heard, all were desig-
nated by Senators ROMAN HRUSKA and
heard during 8 days of hearings; and
scores of additional statements were ac-
the Judiciary met in open executive ses-
sion and marked up the bill; and on
April 6, 1976, S. 1284 was ordered favor-
BURDICK, ROBERT C. BYRD, TUNNEY,
ABOUREZK, FONG, HUGH SCOTT, MATHIAS.
The majority report was circulated to
the minority on April 23-April 23-
and an agreement was reached that the
jority to file the report without their
views although a typed draft of minority
views was circulated to the majority on
May 4. The committee reviewed the gal-
leys of the minority report on May 11. It
was not until May 18 that the minority
distinguished minority. ,
haustive review process.
from Nebraska for allowing me to make
this statement at this time.
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I thank
the majority leader for his narrative on
the timetable on the legislative doing on
this bill.. I think the very fact of the
time make. That is that this is slte,t"
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 accept 10 minutes on my amendment.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent there be a 10-minute
limitation on the amendment to be of-
fered by the Senator from Nebraska (Mr.
CURTIS) and that there be 20 minutes on
the bill.
Mr. ALLEN. Reserving the right to ob-
ject, and I shall not object, before we
leave the military procurement bill, I
wonder if the majority leader would in-
dulge me to the extent of allowing me not
to exceed 10 minutes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I would be delighted
to, if we could get the agreement.before
that.
Mr. ALLEN. I have no objection to the
agreement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
Mr. ABOUREZK. Reserving the right
to object.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, a parlia-
mentary inquiry. - -
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator will state it.
Mr. STENNIS. If the Senator will yield
to me.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.
Mr. STENNIS. I did not understand.
The military procurement bill was laid
aside?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Until Monday.
APPOINTMENTS TO SELECT COM-
MITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in
accordance with Senate Resolution 400,
94th Congress, I submit recommenda-
tions for appointment to the Select
Committee on Intelligence.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Chair, on behalf of the President pro
tempore, makes the following appoint-
ments, which the clerk will state.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
Daniel Inouye (Appropriations) -for term
expiring at the end of the 98th Congress
Birch Bayh (Judiciary for term ex-
piring at the end of the th Congress
Adlal Stevenson (At-large)-for term ex-
piring at the end of the 97th Congress
William Hathaway (At-large)-for term
expiring at the end of the 97th Congress
Walter Huddleston (At-large)-for term
expiring at the end of the 96th Congress
Joseph Biden (Foreign Relations)-for
tem expiring at the end of the 96th Con-
gress
Robert Morgan (At-large)-for term ex-
piring at the end of the 95th Congress
Gary Hart (Armed Services)-for term
expiring at the end of the 95th Congress
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. -Mr. President, in
accordance with Senate Resolution 400,
mendations to the
t
recom
I hereby submi
Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. STENNIS. I did not understand
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The that. The Senator from South Dakota
Chair, on behalf of the President pro has been waiting here patiently for an
tempore, makes the following appoint- amendment. I feel we ought to give him
ments, which the clerk will state. a chance.
The assistant legislative clerk read as Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
follows: withdraw my request and I ask there be
Senator CLIFFORD P. CASE, Senator STROM a time limitation of 5 minutes on the
THURMOND, Senator HOWARD H. BAKER, in., Abourezk amendment, not to exceed 5
Senator MARK O. HATFIELD, Senator BARRY minutes, equally divided, in the usual
GOLDWATER, Senator ROBERT T. STAFFORD, and form; and then I would ask unanimous
Senator JAKE GARN. consent that the distinguished Senator
ORDER OF PROCEDURE-UNANI-
MOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if I
may have the attention of the Senate,
there will be no further votes on the
pending business, the Defense Procure-
ment Act. That will go over until Monday.
Between now and Saturday, we will
from Alabama be recognized for-after
disposition of the amendment-not to
exceed 10 minutes, the distinguished
Senator from New York not to exceed 5
minutes, and then the unanimous-con-
sent request would go into effect.
Mr. FONG. Reserving the right to ob-
ject. Mr. President, I have an amend-
ment, the manager of the bill will be
willing to accept it, I ask that I be given
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May 20, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE S 7727
the specific mandate for the Navy td
make better use bff their Reserves.
This is refiectest"t ,committee
f
has been yielded back. The question is
on agreeing to' the amendment.
Mr. STENNIS. Will the Chair state
he amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
ion before the Senate is the amendment
Metcalf
Mondale
Muskie
Nelson
Nunn
Packwood Stennis
Proxmire Stevenson
Randolph Talmadge
Ribicoff
Schweiker
ANSWERED "PRESENT"-1
Durkin
NOT VOTING-24
Baker Hatfield RPercy
oth
Bentsen Hathaway
Brock Johnston Sparkman
Buckley
Burdick McIntyre Symington
Church Montoya Taft
Culver Moss
Hart, Philip A. Pastore Young
So Mr. DOLE'S amendment' was re-
jected.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The , PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Montana.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President--
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will
the Senator suspend?
Give the Senator from Montana at-
tention. Senators take their seats.
The Senator may proceed.
try and clear up eligible bits of legisla-
tion on the calendar which have been
cleared by the Budget committee, which
is in accord with the law.
I would like at this time to lay the
pending business aside temporarily and
turn to the consideration of Calendar
No. 815, H.R. 12455, and in that respect
I would like to make a unanimous-con-
sent request that there be-
Mr. CURTIS. Reserving the right to
object, what bill is the Senator calling
up?
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Child Care Act
which we have -discussed before.
Mr. CURTIS. Very well.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator
have a suggestion which he might make
as to how much time he would want on
his amendment?
Mr. CURTIS. The junior Senator from -
Nebraska has an amendment. If we can
arrive at a limitation on consideration
of the bill that would get us out of here
in a little while, I would be willing to
he yeas and nays have been ordered.'
'he clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called
he roll.
Mr. DURKIN (when his name was
palled). Present.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce
that the Senator from Texas (Mr. BENT-
SEN), the Senator from North Dakota
(Mr. BURDICK), the Senator from Idaho
(Mr. CHURCH), the Senator from Michi-
gan (Mr. HART), the Senator from Maine
(Mr. HATHAWAY), the senator from
rom Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE), the Sena-
,ampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), and the
necessarily absent.
further announce that, if resent
Senator from New York (Mr. BUCK-
), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HAT-
TH), the Senator from Alaska (Mr.
e result was announced--yeas 36,
[Rollcall Vote No. 186 Leg.]
YEAS-36
artlett Hansen Pell
eall Hartke Scott, Hugh
Chiles Hruska Stafford
Curtis Inouye Stone
Dole Jackson Thurmond
Domenici Long Tower
Fannin Magnuson Weicker
Fong Mathias Williams
Ford McClure
NAYS-39
Abourezk Clark Huddleston
Bayh Cranston Humphrey
Bellmon Eagleton Javits
Biden Eastland Kennedy
Brooke Glenn Laxalt
Byrd, _ Gravel Leahy
 S 7728
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 20, 1976
sufficient time to present that amend-
ment.
Mr. MANSFIELD. How much time?
Mr. FONG. Two minutes.
Mr. STENNIS. One minute.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Not to
minutes.
- Mr. KENNEDY. Reserving
Mr. President, I horc as part of the
unanimous-consent request that we can
lay down my amendment.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Absolutely.
Mr. KENNEDY. So it would be defend-
ing the measure.
Mr. MANSFIELD. That was
stood.
Mr. KENNEDY. For Monday?
Mr. MANSFIELD. That the Kennedy
amendment would be laid down and be
the pending business on Monday.
Mr. STENNIS. No agreement on time?
Mr. MANSFIELD. No.
Mr. KENNEDY. Could I just submit it
then?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that on the disposi-
tion of the Fong and Abourezk amend-
ment, the Kennedy amendment be con-
sidered as the pending business, it will
not be taken up until Monday.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Everything else?
The PRESIDING O FICER. Every-
thing else is agreed to.
The Senator from South?Dakota.
fuel, quarters, or transportation, which how- dsrlendment, the committee- had done its
ever, shall not exceed the necessities of the work and
current year"; agreed to the amendment. Un-
(2) striking out the subsection designs- fortunately,'wl;en the issue got to con-
tion "(a)" at the beginning of such subsec- ference, the House Armed services Com-
" b The first la
( ) proviso contained in the L; e ruary, rote to the !
paragraph entitled "Medical and Hospital
Department under-t.1- guished chairman of the House. Armed
headin