THE PURPOSE OF INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00552R000800090003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 96
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE PURPOSE OF INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence's Contribution to Policy Decisions
The Central Intelligence Agency and the Office
of the Director of Central Intelligence were
created by the National Security Act of 1947 in
light of the lessons learned during World War II
and, in particular, to minimize the risk of an-
other Pearl Harbor. The object of that Act was
to establish a structure that would improve the
U.S. Government's ability to collect, analyze,
and assess information on foreign governments and
events or trends abroad. Even more, the drafters
of that Act wanted to establish a structure
capable of ensuring that all information relating
to foreign developments bearing on major U.S. in-
terests known to all components of the U.S. Govern-
ment would be assembled, assessed and presented on
a timely basis to the President and his senior
advisers on foreign affairs and national security
policy.
Intelligence on foreign developments that draws
on the fruits and the collection and analytic re-
sources of all components of the U.S. Government
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is called national intelligence. It can, and does,
cover a broad range of subjects, including mili-
tary, political, and economic matters. The primary
role of the Director of Central Intelligence and
thus the Central Intelligence Agency is to pro-
vide -- with the assistance of all other U.S. in-
telligence organizations -- this kind of national
intelligence on key foreign trends and develop-
ments to those U.S. Government officials who are
responsible for the formulation and implementation
of national security policy.. The principal "con-
sumers" of national intelligence are, consequently,
the President, the members of the National Security
Council and their senior departmental subordinates,
the staff of the National Security Council, the
Council on International Economic Policy, and the
broad range of committees and groups which support
these councils.
Intelligence, of course, does not make policy
decisions. Indeed, intelligence officers of the
U.S. Government -- including the DCI -- carefully
avoid offering policy recommendations. The root
meaning of "intelligence" is "understanding." The
role of the DCI, the CIA, and the whole U.S. Intel-
ligence Community is to ensure that those who do
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make policy decisions have before them the most
comprehensive body of information and analysis
attainable so those decisions may be based on the
best possible understanding of the foreign situa-
tions to which they relate.
In essence, intelligence is distilled, analyzed
and refined information. (Information is what in-
telligence officers collect; intelligence is what
they produce.) The process for producing intel-
ligence involves a series of basic steps:
? the collection and assembly of raw infor-
mation from all sources available, ranging
from the overt news dispatches to the
most secret technical devices (producing
national intelligence requires drawing on
all information available to the U.S.
Government),
? the assessment of the validity of the raw
information,
? the selection of that which is valid and
pertinent to the question under consid-
eration,
? the analysis of the information and de-
velopment of objective'onclusions and
judgments, and
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? the presentation of the intelligence
findings in a clear, succinct, and timely
fashion.
Our consumers need to know how confident we
are about the validity of the facts and judgments.
Especially on complex problems, the evidence may
support more than one assessment of future develop-
ments. National estimates therefore must often
reflect this complexity, setting forth the range
of alternative explanations which available evi-
dence supports and explaining all of the major
factors which may influence actions of a foreign
government, including those that may be affected
by various U.S. policy choices.
The matter of strategic arms limitations is a
good example of the role national intelligence can
play in the formulation and implementation of na-
tional security policy.
Obviously, in order to negotiate about arms
limitations, those who instruct our negotiators
need to know the number and kinds of strategic
weapons the Soviets already have, new weapons
actually under development, and any more advanced
weapons that may be it their minds (and within
their capabilities to produce).
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The President and his advisers also need to
know if the Soviet Union is living up to the terms
of agreements already reached. National intelli-
gence can and does monitor Soviet compliance with
the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement. It is
the duty of the Director of Central Intelligence
to inform the President of any activity or ambig-
uous situation that could be construed by policy-
makers as compliance on the part of the Soviet Union.
National intelligence also has a part to play
during negotiations. The Director of Central In-
telligence advises?the President and the National
Security Council on how well the U.S. Intelligence
Community could monitor various possible agreements.
It is the DCI's responsibility to advise the Presi-
dent as to formulations and provisions that should
be included in such agreements to insure our ability
to monitor it.
The national intelligence effort to keep the
President and his senior advisers informed about
the Soviet Union does not stop with the military
and scientific considerations applicable to SALT.
Soviet willingness even to try to limit strategic
arms must be viewed in the larger context of the
overall outlook and policies of the Soviet leader-
ship. Here the questions that intelligence must
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answer for the policymaker are political and eco-
nomic ones. How firmly committed is the Soviet
leadership to the policy of, detente? What inter-
nal political stresses could lead to a significant
change in the Soviet attitude toward detente, or
possibly even its abandonment? A prime Soviet
motive for detente is the USSR's need to close the
technological gap with the West, but just how
pressing are its economic problems? What steps
is it taking to solve these problems, and what are
the chances of success?
Intelligence must stand ready to answer a
broad range of questions. Some are highly specific
and immediate, such as the question of whether
the Soviets have introduced nuclear weapons into
the Middle East. Others are general and complex,
such as the long-run outlook for Japanese militari-
zation or European integration. Across this range,
the chief difference between intelligence and the
information available to a regular reader of the
commercial and scholarly press is that intelli-
gence rests on all sources of information avail-
able to the U.S. Government. While the final
product may not always be highly classified, the
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intelligence analyst has taken the information
from the most sensitive sources into account in
reaching his conclusions.
Because of their special sources, intelligence
analysts can study and reach conclusions on prob-
lems which outside experts could not begin to ex-
amine. For example, the accuracy of Soviet ICBMs,
or even their total number, are questions which
could not be answered without these special sources.
Thus it is in the military, scientific, and tech-
nical fields that intelligence's contribution is
truly unique, and vital.
The Organization of the Intelligence Community
The National Security Act of 1947 provided the
initial framework for a national intelligence struc-
ture. That Act created the Central Intelligence
Agency, and, the Office of the Director of Central
Intelligence, who -- by Presidential order -- was
made the chief intelligence officer of the Govern-
ment. In this capacity, he is the principal for-
eign intelligence adviser to the President and the
coordinator of all foreign intelligence activities
relating to U.S. national security interests.
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This made him the head of what has come to be
known as the U.S. Intelligence Community -- the
term used in Presidential directives and other
executive communications to embrace all of our
foreign intelligence organizations. Each mem-
ber of the Intelligence Community has his own
department head to whom he must report and whose
needs he must meet ?-- the Secretary of State, the.
Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of the Treasury.
The CIA is unique in that it is not part of any
cabinet-level department. Through the DCI, it re-
ports to the President. The members of the Intel-
ligence Community are:
? the Central Intelligence Agency;
the Defense Intelligence Agency, which is
responsible for providing intelligence
support to the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; and other com-
ponents of the Department of Defense;
? the intelligence units of the Army, Navy,
and Air Force, which support the particular
missions of the services and support the
chiefs of these services.
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? the intelligence units of the Department
of State, which serves the Secretary of
State and the Department's operating
bureaus;
? the Energy Research and Development Admin-
istration, whose intelligence unit has a
specialized charter devoted to the vital
field of intelligence on nuclear energy
departments;
? the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which
is responsible for the internal security
of the United States (the FBI's participa-
tion in USIB is limited to those of its
activities which interrelate with foreign in-
telligence);
? the Treasury Department, whose recent
membership reflects the growing interest
in and importance of intelligence to sup-
port the formulation and implementation of
foreign economic policy;
? the National Security Agency, which is
responsible for signals intelligence --
the intercepting and decoding of elec-
trically transmitted messages -- and whose
head reports to the Secretary of Defense.
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These, then, are the individual members of the
Intelligence Community -- CIA, DIA, the service in-
telligence components, State, ERDA, the FBI,
Treasury, and NSA. Together, they form the United
States Intelligence Board with the primary task of
advising and assisting the Director of Central In-
telligence in the production of national intelli-
gence and in establishing intelligence policy,
objectives, and priorities with respect to collec-
tion, production, and dissemination.
USIB, as the Board is commonly known, passes
on the agreed, coordinated judgments of the entire
Intelligence Community. The Director of Central
Intelligence chairs the USIB at its weekly meetings
and is responsible for the substantial network of
specialized committees --? such as nuclear intelligence
or economic intelligence -- that operates under
USIB auspices.
management steps for improving the effectiveness
of the Intelligence Community.
The first of these steps instructed the Director
of Central Intelligence to draw up a consolidated
intelligence program budget and to fit intelligence
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requirements to budgetary constraints. The Presi-
dential Directive did not give the DCI any increased
command authority over the other members of the
Intelligence Community. He was given, however,
the significant new responsibility of being in-
formed on and expressing views with respect to
the allocation of all intelligence resources in
the Community, particularly those of a national
character.
The second step created the Intelligence Re-
sources Advisory Committee, which is chaired by
the DCI and includes representatives of State,
Defense, the Office of Management and Budget, and
CIA. Its main task is to formalize previous,
looser arrangements among the departments to help
the Director of Central Intelligence coordinate
the use of national intelligence resources --
money, manpower, and equipment.
The third step, creation ofthe National
Security Council Intelligence Committee, was in-
tended to provide systematic feedback of cricitism
and comment from high policy users of finished in-
telligence. It is chaired by the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, and its
members are the Attorney General, the Deputy
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Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of De-
fense, the Under Secretary of the Treasury for
Monetary Affairs, the Chairman of the JCS, and
the DCI. The purpose of this Committee is to give
guidance as to what intelligence products are
needed to reach decisions on U.S. foreign and de-
fense policy. This committee will also evaluate
the intelligence product from the standpoint of
intelligence users on a continuing basis.
Finally, the President revised the role and
composition of the United States Intelligence
Board. Whereas USI:B previously had some authority
of its own, it is now limited to an advisory ca-
pacity to the DCI. The Treasury Department was
added to the membership because'of the increasing
importance of foreign economic intelligence to
national security policy and its implementation.
Intelligence Products
The Intelligence Community must disseminate
its intelligence -- on a timely basis -- to the
President, the National Security Council, and
other top policy advisers. This is done through
various intelligence publications whose scope,
length, and format vary with the nature of the
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intelligence task they undertake and the policy-
making level for which they are intended.
One vehicle is the National Intelligence Esti-
mate, or NIE, which is intended for the highest
policy level. An NIE uses the Community's present
knowledge of a situation and existing data as a
base line and then tries to estimate what is going
to happen in some particular country or on some
particular topic. Many estimates cover fairly
broad topics, such as "The Outlook in Country A
or Area B," and look ahead two or three years to
discuss basic trends and expected lines of policy
in the country or area in question. Others are
more specialized papers on, for example, the Soviet
military establishment. This type of estimate,
built on a solid base of evidence, goes into greater
detail and generally looks ahead for periods of up
to five years. Such estimates focus on the USSR's
strategic attack forces, air defense capabilities,
and general purpose forces. The production of
annual estimates on these topics is timed to assist
in the planning of Defense Department force levels
and budgets. There are also Special National In-
telligence Estimates, or SNIEs, which are ad hoc
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studies on important questions of the moment, such
as the expected foreign reaction to some pro-
posed -- but as yet unadopted -- course of action
by the U.S. Government. As a purely hypothetical
example, an SNIE might assess the likely foreign
response to a U.S. initiative abroad. SNIE's are
usually produced at the request of an NSC member
and often get into highly sensitive matters.
NIEs reflect the considered judgment of the In-
telligence Community, all working from the same
data base and with access to the same information,
and reflect, accurately and fully, any major dif-
ferences of opinion or judgments within the Com-
munity. This is insured through the participation
of all appropriate elements of the Community,
through contribution of facts and judgments, in
the preparation of the estimate, and by its review
by the U.S. Intelligence Board. Each national
estimate is produced under the auspices of a Na-
tional Intelligence Officer. These officers are
the direct representatives of the DCI for specific
areas of the world, such as Latin America, or sig-
nificant functional areas such as strategic forces.
They assist the DCI by assuring that all the re-
sources of the entire Intelligence Community are
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brought to bear on problems within their area of
responsibility. The final product is presented
to the President and the NSC as the DCI's estimate.
A second type of intelligence product is the
National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum. These
are similar to Estimates, but are intended for
policy officials below the National Security Coun-
cil level. Their subjects tend to be a notch be-
low the highest and most immediate policy concerns.
They are often longer than National Intelligence
Estimates and usually present their analysis and
supporting evidence in greater detail.
National intelligence is also relayed to senior
policy levels through a variety of somewhat less
formal vehicles, such as interagency memoranda --
which are less elaborate than NIEs, SNIEs or NIAMs,
are usually more specific in focus and often pro-
duced against very short deadlines. They are, as
the name suggests, coordinated products -- reflect-
ing differences of opinion or judgment where these
are relevant -- but sometimes draw only on the In-
telligence. Community components primarily concerned
with a concrete issue rather than the Community as
a whole.
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Apart from general reporting and analysis,
there is a special vehicle developed to alert
senior policy levels to an. incipient crisis --
known as Alert Memoranda. These are brief papers
(usually not more than two to three pages in
length) designed to flag some developing situation
to top level attention before it erupts into news-
paper headlines. Alert Memoranda can be produced
on very short notice (i.e., in an hour or so) and
are produced by the Intelligence Community, under
the auspices of the appropriate National Intelligence
Officer. The ideal (which has been realized on one
or two occasions) is for an Alert Memorandum to flag
a potential crisis in time for counteraction to be
taken which keeps the crisis from developing or
occurring. (The best Alert Memoranda, consequently,
will be proven "wrong" by subsequent events.)
Another type of intelligence is current in-
telligence. It is designed to insure that the
decisionmaker is well informed, on the basis
of the latest available information from all
sources, on significant world developments which
may affect the interests of the United States.
CIA maintains an Operations Center; functioning
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around the clock, it produces spot current intel-
ligence and relays and routes information to re-
cipients on a 24-hour basis in critical situations.
The CIA Operations Center is also connected by
rapid and secure communications to the White House
Situation Room, and operations centers at the
Pentagon, the State Department, and NSA.
Current intelligence has often been compared
to a newspaper -- and in fact CIA's principal
vehicle for the dissemination of current intelli-
gence, the National Intelligence Daily, is printed
in newspaper format. It differs from a conventional
newspaper in that it is produced by a group of
analysts who are experts in their fields and who
have all sources of information available to them
and that its content is limited to foreign activi-
ties of concern to the U.S. policymaker. The news-
paper format provides the readers with a wide var-
iety of intelligence items, from which they can
pick and choose according to their interests or
responsibilities. The Daily goes to the President
and Vice President, members of the Cabinet and
heads of the principal offices, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other top members
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of the government -- including the Chairmen of
some key Congressional committees. A much shorter
and more sensitive selection of such material is
prepared for the President himself. Other types
of current intelligence are disseminated in daily
and weekly publications, special memoranda, and
situation reports on crisis topics.
Still another type of intelligence production
is the research study, published as Intelligence
Memoranda or Intelligence Reports. These studies
cover a wide variety of topics -- for example,
an analysis of the various sectors of the Soviet
economy, the oil industry in Iran, or the develop-
ment of lasers in France. The studies are often
produced in response to specific requests from
the White House or from the Secretaries of State,
Defense, or Treasury, or their senior officers.
There are other ways in which intelligence
judgments are fed into the decisionmaking process.
One is through the National Security Council
apparatus and the studies of policy questions
called for in National Security Study Memoranda --
commonly called NSSMs. More than 200 of these
NSSMs have been commissioned. They have set in
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motion studies ranging from highly specific projects
such as US Ocean Policy or US Policy Toward Greece,
to lengthy and wide-ranging studies of alternative
choices for the U.S. strategic postures. The func-
tion of the Intelligence Community is to supply
the facts and the intelligence judgments which bear
on the array of policy options which a NSSM is de-
signed to present to the President. This process
enables the Community to carry out its advisory
and policy support role in a very direct fashion,
and at a high level.
The Director of Central Intelligence also par-
ticipates in the meetings of the National Security
Council and its subordinate organizations. The
Senior Review Group, for instance, reviews NSSM
studies, and in crisis situations the Washington
Special Action Group -- a sort of crisis management
team -- meets to coordinate timely actions. These
meetings and those of the National Security Coun-
cil itself usually begin with a briefing by the
Director on the current situation and the intelli-
gence background of the subject under consideration.
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The Sources and Collection of Intelligence
Finally, something should be said about how
national intelligence is acquired. The most impor-
tant element in governing this process is the Key
Intelligence Question. Each year the DCI, in con-
sultation with the USIB, establishes a series of
these questions on which he believes the Intelli-
gence Community should focus its efforts during
the year in order to meet the needs of its con-
sumers.
This year there are 69 Key Intelligence Ques-
tions, many in turn broken down into more specific
sub-questions. For instance,
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"Collection strategies" are developed for all
such questions. The various collection systems
and organizations available to the Community are
assigned specific responsibilities for collecting
information. These responsibilities are of course
tailored to the capabilities of the collectors and
the cost and risk of using them. If information
on Soviet research in biology can be had from
freely available scholarly journals, it makes no
sense to try to penetrate the laboratories by clan-
destine means.
The major categories of sources are:
? Signals Intelligence: interception, analy-
sis, and decryption of communications or
other electronic emissions.
? Photography: collection and interpreta-
tion of overhead photography.
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? "Open Sources": foreign public broadcasts,
foreign press and journals, U.S. press
reporting on foreign activities, and
interviews with U.S. nationals who pro-
vide foreign information voluntarily.
? Foreign Service and attache material:
official reporting by US Missions abroad.
(An Ambassador reports his talk with
the Foreign Minister; a Defense Attache
reports his visit to a military installa-
tion.)
? Clandestine collection: material derived
from espionage. This involves primarily
the reporting of CIA's Directorate of
Operations.
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Here we come to an important point which is
often imperfectly understood outside the Intelli-
gence Community. Techniques such as those just de-
scribed help us frame our estimate of other nations'
capabilities -- in this case
capabili-
ties. Our estimate, however, may be significantly
We may be right and they wrong; but it is their
estimate -- not ours -- which will influence their
decisions. Learning their estimate, what their
leaders think, is a difficult problem which com-
munications intelligence and reconnaissance
will often not be able to answer. Here, collec-
tion achieved or directed by human beings comes
very much into play. It also comes into play when
you get into the critical area of assessing inten-
tions. Here, even more, it is necessary to get
into the minds of other, foreign human beings --
framing assessments which are less dependent on
the observable and countable than on judgment,
perception and a careful weighing of political,
emotional or cultural intangibles. The chief
sources for political intelligence are those which
reflect the interplay of human beings. In the
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intentions problem, we look to infor-
mation produced by a variety of sources ranging
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The assignment of tasks is done, with as much
specificity as possible, on each of the KIQs. The
sum constitutes the marching orders for the managers
of the individual collection systems.
The largest of these collection systems is
managed by the National Security Agency. This
Agency is responsible for cryptologic intellili-
gence -- intercepting and decoding electrically
transmitted messages. Its product is disseminated
with admirable speed throughout the Intelligence
Community and has played a vital role in many of
our most crucial intelligence judgments over the
years.
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The National Security Council has desig-
nated selected reconnaissance programs to be treated
as national programs to be funded and operated by the Secre-
tary of Defense. Guidance and tasking priorities
for these programs are established by the Director
of Central Intelligence in consultation with the
members of USIB. The National Photographic Inter-
pretation Center, which is run by CIA for the en-
tire Community interprets the photography from these
programs. This work feeds into and supports intel-
ligence production throughout the Community. Its
importance was long ago proved, for example, by
the detection of the Soviet medium range ballistic
missiles in Cuba.
an overt collection pro-
gram for the monitoring of open foreign radio broad-
casts, newspapers, and magazines. In addition to
monitoring Radio Moscow, Radio Peking, and the
foreign 25X1
broadcasts in 68 languages, selecting the most sig-
nificant for immediate translation and dissemination
to the entire Intelligence Community. It also se-
lects and translates material from foreign news-
papers and magazines. A large part of the
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. product is available to the academic community and
the American public by subscription.
In the normal course of their duties all US
officials abroad acquire information. Their obser-
vations and their conversations with officials of
the government to which they are posted, as well
as with their colleagues from friendly countries,
are a principal source of political intelligence.
They also, of course, read the local press and re-
port significant items from it. Defense and mili-
tary attaches, likewise, gather much military in-
telligence from their normal contacts with leaders
of the local armed forces. Sometimes they are
invited to inspect equipment or watch maneuvers,
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and they, too, scan the local press and magazines
for information on military equipment, movements,
or personnel.
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) is established to
advise and assist the DCI with respect to: a) the establishment of
appropriate intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities; b) the
production of national intelligence; c) the supervision of the dissemination
and security of intelligence material; d) the protection of intelligence
sources and methods; and e) as appropriate, policies with respect to
arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters.
Under the chairmanship of the DCI, the USIB membership
consists of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Vice Chairman);
Director of Intelligence and Research, State; Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency; Director, National Security Agency; and representatives from
Treasury, Energy Research and Development Administration. and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Military Department Intelligence
Chiefs attend USIB meetings as observers.
There are thirteen committees which report directly to the USIB.
Principal membership is derived from member agencies represented at
the USIB. In the case of the committees, the service intelligence organizations
have full membership rather than observer status. There are some
committees which have participation from other agencies, which are
indicated below where appropriate. Full membership in the committees are
drawn from the following organizations: CIA, State, Defense Intelligence
Agency, National Security Agency, Treasury, Energy Research and
Development Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Army,
Navy and Air Force. Not all are active in all committees. Each of the
committees are supported by appropriate subcommittees and working groups.
The thirteen committees are:
Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX)
The COMIREX provides staff support to, and acts for, the USIB in
development and implementation of national-level guidance for overhead
imagery collection and exploitation. The National Photographic Interpretation
Center and operational elements serve as consultants.
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Critical Collection Problems Committee CCPC)
The CCPC is a permanent study group responsive to requests
submitted to it by the DCI. It has been relatively inactive since the
establishment of the National Intelligence Officers mechanism and its
future is presently under review.
Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC)
The primary mission of the Economic Intelligence Committee is to
provide coordinated guidance to the collectors of foreign economic
intelligence. In addition to the membership indicated above, the following
representatives from other Government agencies and departments concerned
with US foreign economic relations participate in the work of the committee
as associate members or observers: Agency for International Development,
Agriculture, Commerce, Export-Import Bank, Federal Reserve, Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, Overseas Private Investment Corporation,
Transportation, Office of Management and Budget, Interior, Labor,
US Tariff Commission, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations,
Council of Economic Advisors, Council of International Economic Policy,
and Federal Energy Administration.
Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC)
The GMAIC is responsible for the coordination of foreign missile and
space intelligence within the U. S. community. Current plans for this
committee call for expansion of its functions to include other weapon systems.
Human Sources Committee (HSC)
The Human Sources Committee advises and assists the DCI in the
discharge of his responsibilities for the efficient allocation and effective use
of community resources for the collection of positive foreign intelligence
information through human sources.
Intelligence Information Handling Committee IHC )
The IHC is responsible for facilitating the timely and coordinated
handling of intelligence and intelligence information within the intelligence
community and promoting the continuous improvement, integration and
effective use of community information handling resources.
-2-
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SECRE'T'
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Interagency Defector Committee (IDC)
The Interagency Defector Committee advises USIB on policy matters
which affect the defector program. The Coast Guard and USIA are
represented as observers.
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC)
JAEIC recommends national collection requirements, fosters inter-
agency exchanges of information, coordinates. national-level intelligence
production, contributes to national intelligence estimates and provides a
mechanism for community evaluations of collection programs and intelligence
assessments in the field of atomic energy intelligence. The JAEIC also has
the responsibility for monitoring implementation of the provisions of
Safeguard (d) of the Limited Test Ban Treaty on behalf of the USIB.
Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC)
The Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee is to provide
early warning of foreign scientific or technical advances, whether indigenous
or imported which could affect significantly the national security or national
welfare of the U. S. The STIC will advise USIB on S&T matters within the
committee, 's areas of concern. This committee replaces the Scientific
Intelligence Committee which had certain weapon systems responsibilities
which are being transferred to an enlarged GMAIC.
Security Committee
The mission of the Security Committee is to provide recommendations
regarding security policies and procedures for the protection from
unauthorized disclosure of foreign intelligence sources and methods.
The SIGINT Committee advises, assists and generally acts for the USIB
in matters involving SIGINT.
Watch Committee
The Watch Committee is about to go out of business and be replaced by
a Special Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning; his Deputy would be from
CIA with a small analysis staff supported by the National Military Intelligence
Center.
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SALT Monitoring Group
The SALT Monitoring Group is responsible to the DCI for guidance
to and supervision of all intelligence monitoring activities required under
the strategic arms limitations agreements with the USSR. Membership
consists of DDCI, Chairman; CIA; Director, DIA; and Director, INR/State.
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Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC)
The Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee was created by the
November 1971 Presidential Directive. It is chaired by the Director of
Central Intelligence and has as members senior representatives from
the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Office of
Management and Budget, and the Central Intelligence Agency. In order
to maintain currency as to the allocation and employment of intelligence.
resources, the NSC Staff is represented as an observer at meetings of
the IRAC. Mr. Colby has also extended invitations to the Director,
National Security Agency and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
to attend meetings as observers for those items of particular interest
to their agencies in their capacity as national intelligence program
managers.
This Committee was established to advise the DCI on the preparation
of the intelligence budget and the allocation of resources among programs
and to ensure that they are employed in accordance with approved require-
ments with no unwarranted duplication. It assists in the development and
review of the annual national foreign intelligence program, which is a
composite of all the separate national and departmental programs contributing
to the national intelligence effort. Based on the IRAC review of these pro-
grams, the DCI submits to the President each year his recommendations on
the level of effort and the mixture of activities which, in his judgment, need
to be funded for the attainment of the national intelligence objectives. These
recommendations, once approved by the President, constitute the basis for
the intelligence portion of the President's budget as it is sent to Congress.
Pursuant to the objectives and provisions of the Presidential Directive
of 5 November 1971, three permanent subcommittees of the Intelligence
Resources Advisory Committee were established:
Intelligence Research and Development Council
The Intelligence Research and Development Council is chaired by the
Director, Defense Research and Engineering, and consists of senior
representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the National Security
Agency, and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director,
Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Under Secretary of the Air Force,
the Under Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant- Secretary of the Air Force (R&D),
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (R&D), and the Assistant Secretary of the
Army (R&D). The Intelligence Research and Development Council explores
new directions and techniques in both the hard and soft sciences which hold
promise for intelligence and which should receive program resource support
and application.
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IRAC Working Group
The IRAC Working Group is chaired by the Director, Management,
Planning and Resources Review Group, Intelligence Community Staff
and consists of representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), Office of
Management and Budget, Department of State, National Security Agency,
Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Council Staff, Office
of the Secretary of the Air Force and the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy. The IRAC Working Group has no formal terms of
reference or charter but derives its authority from the parent Intelligence
Resources Advisory Committee. However, the following are some of the
functions which may be inferred from the IRAC charter:
a. review planning guidance as it relates to national
intelligence programs;
b. review or develop fiscal guidance for the intelligence
community;
c. advise the DCI on the contents of national intelligence
programs, as stated in the NIPM;
d. review and recommend priorities for reflecting the
impact of presidential budget reductions and congressional
appropriation reductions;
e. review and assess the impact of major repro-
gramrnings of intelligence resources;
f. receive regular reporting (both fiscal and substantive)
on intelligence activities of the National Intelligence Program,
IRAC Information Working Group
The IRAC Information Working Group is chaired by the Director,
Systems Evaluation, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence), and consists of representatives of the Central Intelligence
Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, State Department, Office of
Management and Budget, National Security Agency, Office of the
Secretary of the Air Force, and the Office of the Deputy to the Director
of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community. The IRAC
Information Working Group reviews the Consolidated Intelligence Resources
Information System (CIRTS) and related intelligence management information
systems with the objective of developing recommendations for the imple-
mentation next year and beyond of CIRIS or some other follow-on system.
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COMMITTEES OF THE
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD AND
INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES ADVISORY COMMITTEE
DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Committee on Imagery
Intelligence
Information
SIGINT C
ommittee
Requirements and Exploitation
Handling Committee (IHC)
(COMIREX)
Watch Committee
'Interagency Defector
(Special Assistant to the
Critical Collection Problems
DCI far Strategic Warning)
Committee (IDC)
Committee (CCPC)
'I
Joint Atomic Energy
`Economic Intelligence
Intelligence Committee
Committee (EIC)
(JAEIC)
Guided Missile and Scientific and Technicaii
A tronatitics intelligence intelligence Committee (STIC)
Committee (GMAIC)
Human Sources Committee
(HSC)
USE Cormittee Membership,
~,t,A, DIA, State, NSA, Treasury. ERDA, FBI,
Army, Navy. and Air Force
In a dit?on to abeve membership, these committees have associate
members or observers representing non-USIB member agencies.
-SAL-1 Monitoring Group membership- DDCI, CIA, DIA and STATE.
Intelligence Research Et
Development Council
IRAC Working Group
D/DCVIC
ASDI
C
A
OMB
State
Intelligence Research and Development Council
I
DIA
NSA
NSC staff
Detense Research & Engineering
Air Force
Navy
Information Working Group
Adv need Research Pro' is ANa
U/S
AF U
ec
ee
vy
ASDI
Navy (RED)
D/DCI/IC
ASO!
Army (R&D)
Air Force (RED)
OMB
NSA
NSA
CIA
CIA
DIA
DtA
D/DCIIIC
State
Air Force
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SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MISSION AND FUNCTIONS
OF COMPONENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
1. Presented herein are brief summary statements of the
mission and functions of the various organizational components of
the Intelligence Community.
2. The sequence is as follows: PAGE
The Central Intelligence Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research ? . . . . . . . . . 6
Department of Defense
National Security Agency/Central Security
Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Defense Intelligence Agency ? . . . . . . . . . . ? ? 12
Intelligence Activities of the Military
Departments and Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Department of the Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Department of the Navy . . . . . . . . . . 19
Department of the Air Force ? ? ? ? . . . ? . . ? 21
Department of the Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation. . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Energy Research and Development Administration . . . . . 26
February 18,, 1975
Copy No.
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THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION/AUTHORITIES
1. The Central Intelligence Agency was established
under the National Security Council by the National Security
Act of 1947 (61 Stat 495, 50 U.S.C.A. 403). The Director
and Deputy Director are appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
The National Security Act of 1947 provides that,
"for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities
of the several Government departments and agencies in the
interest of national security," the Central Intelligence
Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council,
has the following duties:
a. "To advise the National Security Council in
matters concerning such intelligence activities of the
Government departments and agencies as relate to national
security;
b. "To make recommendations to the National Security
Council for the coordination of such intelligence
activities of the departments and agencies of the
Government as relate to the national security;
c. "To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating
to the national security and provide for the appropriate
dissemination of such intelligence within the Government
using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities:
Provided, That the Agency shall have no police,
subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal
security functions:
Provided further, That the departments and other
agencies of the Government shall continue to
collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate
departmental intelligence:
And provided further, That the Director of Central
Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure;
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d. "To perform for the benefit of the existing
intelligence agencies, such additional services of
common concern as the National Security Council determines
can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
e. "To perform such other functions and duties
related to intelligence affecting the national security
as the National Security Council may from time to time
direct."
3. Specific functions of the Central Intelligence
Agency, particularly with respect to services of common
concern, are delineated in a number of National Security
Council Intelligence Directives.
MISSION
4. It is the mission of the CIA to support the Director
of Central Intelligence in his responsibilities as principal
advisor to the President and the National Security Council
on all matters of foreign intelligence related to the national
security, and to perform intelligence services of common
concern as directed by the National Security Council.
INTERNAL ORGANIZATION
5. The Central Intelligence Agency is organized into
four principal directorates, each headed by a deputy director,
and four offices (General Counsel, Legislative Counsel,
Inspector General, and Comptroller).
Intelligence--which is responsible for the production
of current intelligence, political,
economic and strategic (military)
intelligence, and basic and geographic
intelligence, and for the collection
of information from foreign broadcast
and press media.
Science and Technology--which is involved with
collection utilizing technical sensors,
research and development in support of
collection activities, and the
production of intelligence on foreign
weapons systems and other S&T topics.
The National Photographic Interpretation
Center is a part of this directorate.
SECRET
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Operations--which is the clandestine arm of CIA.
25X1
Administration--which embraces such services as
communications, finance, medical
services, logistics, personnel,
security, training, and joint computer
support.
COLLECTION ACTIVITIES
6. The Central Intelligence Agency has primary respons-
ibility for U.S. clandestine intelligence activities abroad.
As services of common concern, it is responsible for the
conduct of clandestine collection activities outside the
United States and its possessions to meet the needs of all
departments and agencies; for the conduct of clandestine
counterintelligence outside the United States and its possessions;
and the conduct of liaison with foreign clandestine services,
or, concerning clandestine activities, with foreign intelli-
gence or security services. The CIA also conducts clandestine
and special technical collection operations abroad.
7. Supplementary clandestine collection by other
Government organizations with installations or commands
located outside the United States and its possessions to
satisfy departmental or tactical needs, and clandestine
counterintelligence activities required for the security of
personnel, installations and activities, are subject to
coordination with the CIA as prescribed by the Director of
Central Intelligence.
8. As services of common concern, the Central Intelligene-FATSPEC
Agency:
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d. Provides to the departments and agencies of the
United States Intelligence Board required support for
foreign intelligence purposes in the field of clandestine
equipment and related matters.
e. Maintains for the benefit of the Intelligence
Community central indices and records of foreign counter-
intelligence information.
PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES
9. The CIA is charged to produce such finished substantive
foreign intelligence as may be necessary to discharge the
responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence.
10. The Agency makes a major contribution to the writing
and review of National Intelligence Estimates and other
national products. It also prepares a large number of CIA
memoranda and studies on political, economic, military and
scientific and technical subjects for use by the Director of
Central Intelligence.
COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES
11. The Director of Central Intelligence serves as
chairman of the United States Intelligence Board and the
Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee. The Deputy
Director of CIA serves as the CIA member of each of these
advisory groups and functions as chairman in the absence of
the DCI.
12. Nearly all of the chairmen of USIB committees are
CIA officers, and eight of the 11 National Intelligence
Officers came from CIA. The Agency also provides a consider-
able portion of the personnel in the Intelligence Community
Staff.
13. The CIA is actively involved in the drafting and
development of national intelligence estimates and other
national intelligence products and has major responsibility
for the publication of the National Intelligence Bulletin.
5
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External Reviews of the Intelligence Community
Summary
This compilation of 28 surveys, investigations and
studies concerning the intelligence community includes only
those directed and carried out by authorities external to
the intelligence community. They range in time from 1948
to the present, in magnitude of effort from one-man studies
to major Government commissions, and in scope from single
agencies or departments to the entire intelligence community.
Not included in this listing are an equal or greater
number of studies and surveys carried out wholly within the
intelligence community or within individual agencies. These
generally were intended to be self-examinations of major
systems, functions or organizations for purposes of making
improvements.
The principal observation enabled by a review of the
actions reported is that the intelligence community, in
whole or in part, has been the subject of almost continuous
study, review and oversight by elements of Congress and the
Executive Branch ever since the current community structure
started evolving after World War II.
Added to these efforts are other audits, hearings,
and testimonies far too numerous to mention over the same
time span, and involving at one time or another all elements
and organizations within the intelligence community.
The entry in parentheses at the end of each item rep-
resents the custodian of the report.
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Report of the U. S. Commission
on the Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government - 1947-49
(The Hoover Commission Report)
Prepared by a Presidential-Congressional Commission
created by the Congress in July 1947. The Report ranged across
the entire Executive Branch. What little space was specifically
devoted to intelligence is under "The National Security Organization"
chapter. It calls for more effective relations between the JCS, on
the one hand, and the NSC, CIA, R&D-Board, Munitions Board and
National Security Resources Board on the other. It also called for
vigorous steps to improve the CIA and its work (the CIA was barely
established then) by more flexible use of military personnel.
(Open literature)
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The Administration of Intelligence
in the Department of State - 15 May 1952
(The Cresap-McCormick-Paget Report)
Prepared by the management engineering firm of Cresap,
McCormick and Paget under a State Department contract with the
Center for International Studies of MIT. The Report found that
intelligence in the State Department was vigorous and had been
strengthened over the past seven years since 1945. It recommended
improvements in consumer relations, the use of research analysts,
planning for simplification of operations, and some refinements in
organizational structure -- all in all a total of 35 specific changes.
Considerable emphasis was given to consumer relations with a
recommendation to designate a Consumer Relations Coordinator to
perform "market research" and evaluate the adequacy of INR's
responses to the "market. " (State)
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Survey on Commu.unications Intelligence Activities
of the U. S. Government - 13 June 1952
(The Brownell Report)
Prepared by the Brownell Committee appointed by the
Secretaries of State and Defense on 28 December 1-951 to survey
departmental and national needs for communications intelligence.
The Committee also surveyed the allocation of responsibility and
authority for the conduct of communications intelligence as a
service of common concern. It recommended a true unification
of the separate communications intelligence activities of the Military
Services into a national agency under the Secretary of Defense. The
National Security Agency was established as a result of this study.
(NSA)
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ri9T
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The Clark Task Force Report
of the Hoover Commission on Intelligence Activities - June 1955
(The Second Hoover Commission Report)
(The Clark Report)
Prepared by a group under General Mark Clark as one of a
number of task forces of the Second Hoover Commission. The
major recommendations of the Report dealt with internal reorganization
of CIA; establishment of a Presidential watchdog committee on
intelligence with prominent citizens and members of Congress and
a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence; greater
use of military personnel by CIA; more frequent security checks on
personnel; transfer of foreign publications procurement and
scientific intelligence reporting from State to CIA; construction of
a new CIA building; and expansion of foreign language training.
(This report and the Joint Study Group Report of 1960 seem to have
had the greatest impacts on the community prior to the Schlesinger
Report of 1971.) (State)
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S EPJ T
Scientific Judgments on Foreign Communications
Intelligence by the Special Intelligence Parcel
of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee -
23 January 1958
(The Baker Report)
Undertaken by a group headed by Dr. William 0. Baker
of Bell Laboratories to look into technical aspects of the
NSA cryptanalytic effort. Due to the highly classified
nature of this report, further details are not included but
can be made available separately,. (NSA)
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eau
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The Joint Study Group Report
on Foreign Intelligence Activities
of the U. S. Governr,ent - 15 December 1960
(The Joint Study Group Report)
An across the board review of the entire intelligence community
of the time, with particular emphasis on Defense intelligence activities.
It recommended strengthening the JCS, recently elevated by the
Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, as a way to reduce the frag-
mentation of intelligence among the three Military Services, and
this suggestion is considered to have been the origin of the Defense
Intelligence Agency. It also called for a stronger coordinating role
for the Director of Central Intelligence, backed by a truly inter-agency
community staff. (CIA)
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Report of the President's Committee
on Information Activities Abroad - December 1960
(The Sprague Report)
Dealt only peripherally with intelligence activities, concentrating
instead on the "battle for men's minds. " The Committee was set up
by President Eisenhower in December 1959 to review the 1953 report
of the Committee on International Information Activities and
recommend revisions of U. S. information programs to meet the
current cold war situation. Among other things, it called for
stepping up broadcasts by Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and the
Radio in the American Sector (of Berlin) and for increased operations
in Japan, Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa. (NSC Staff)
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Report of the President's Commission
on the Assassination of President Kennedy - 1964
(The Warren Commission Report)
Inter alia, a strong criticism that the liaison between the
Secret Service and intelligence-gathering agencies was too casual,
particularly with the FBI and CIA which carried a major responsibility
for information about potential threats arising from organized groups
within their special jurisdictions. As a result, the Secret Service
reorganized its intelligence handling, formulated standards for the
collection of information and set up agreements with each Federal
agency that might be able to supply information bearing on Secret
Service responsibilities. The volume of information resulting has
required the Secret Service to automate its information handling and
to secure help from the scientific community in defining violent
behavior that might be aimed at those the Secret Service protects.
(Secret Service)
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A Review of Selected NSA
Cryptanalytic Efforts - 18 February 1965
(The Bissell Report)
A virtually one-man study conducted by Richard M.
Bissell after leaving CIA. He examined certain aspects of
the NSA cryptanalytic effort seven years after the Baker
Report. Due to the highly classified nature of this report,
further details are not included but can be made available
separately. (NSA)
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Investigation of the Defense Intelligence Agency - 27 February 1965
(The HACIT Report of 1965)
The result of the Committee Staff investigation of DIA
between May 1961 and February 1965 to: examine the extent to
which the establishment of DIA had eliminated redundancy in Defense
intelligence activities; review the military and civilian grade
structure of DIA; and identify management and operational improve-
ments resulting from DIA's establishment. The report was forwarded
to the Secretary of Defense in June and his reply went to the Committee
in October 1965. (House Appropriations Committee)
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The Forei Yn Affairs Information
Management Effort - 10 May 1965
(The FAIME Report)
Prepared by Dunlap and Associates for the Bureau of the
Budget in exam ining the information handling practices of State,
AID, USIA, and ACDA. The Report found no program. for the
development of an integrated reporting system for all foreign affairs
information and no common classification system for that infor-
mation. As to the State Department, the Report called for greater
readiness to use modern information handling methods, greater
feedback from top management as to its information needs and a
centrally managed information system including both development
and day-to-day use. (State)
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Report on Strategic Warning - Z7 February 1967
(The Shute Report)
This study was commissioned by President Kennedy in 1963
to review all activities of the intelligence community bearing on
strategic warning with a view to bringing the warning process up to
date, taking advantage of new collection and processing systems,
and planning for still newer systems then under development,
especially in the area of overhead reconnaissance. The study was
headed by Benjamin R. Shute, a New Fork lawyer, who was assisted
by representatives of the major intelligence agencies. (CIA)
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^ ,
VL. 'r~
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Rehort of the Guidance
and Evaluation Panel - February 1967
(The Knox Panel Report)
A year-long study of information handling within the
intelligence community in response to a Presidential directive
recommended by PFIAB and the Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology. The study was inspired by the
"information explosion" of the period and the difficulties encountered
by the community in dealing with the volumes of information
generated by new collection technology. The Panel found that the
community had failed to exploit modern information technology and
recommended that the President direct the establishment of a
unified intelligence information system under the guidance of the
DCI, supported by a new staff separate from CIA. (PFIAB)
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The Katzenbach Report - 24 March 1967
Occasioned by the Ramparts revelations of the relations
between CIA and the National Students Administration and conducted
by Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Richard Helms, and John W. Gardner.
This report strongly recommended against Government association
with educational and private organizations operating abroad and
urged establishing an American adaptation of the quasi-public
British Council. The report also contains an excellent history of
the evolution of mechanisms to review and control covert action
operations. (NSC Staff)
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The House Appropriations Committee
Investigative Team Report...- March 1968
(The HACIT Report)
This investigation was focused entirely on DIA and was
strongly critical of that organization's failure to accomplish what
was expected when it was established in 1961. The investigation
found that Defense intelligence activities continued to be fragmented
among the Military Service intelligence agencies, which had nearly
doubled in personnel since 1964, and which appeared to be acting as
subcontractors for DIA-directed production. No recommendations
were made, however, as to ways to strengthen DIA vis-a-vis the
Services. (House Appropriations Committee Staff)
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The DCI Special Study Group Report - 16 August 1968
(The Eaton Report)
Prepared by a panel composed of Frederick M. Eaton of
Sherman and Sterling, General Norstad, Ambassador Merchant, and
Dr. Fubini of IBM pursuant to a Presidential order to review SIGINT
activities of the U. S. Government which had reached unprecedented
size and expense by Fiscal Year 1968. The group also examined
the wide differences between JCS and NSA over control of certain
tactical or quasi-tactical SIGINT resources and recommended that
those used for tactical support be budget outside the intelligence
budgets and be controlled by the tactical commander as another force
element. It also called for a strong control at the Secretary of
Defense level over Defense intelligence and for a true community
staff for the DCI. (CIA)
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Report on Defense Intelligence - 29 July 1968
(The Froehlke Report)
Prepared for the Secretary of Defense by Robert F'. Froehlke,
Assistant Secretary of Defense/Administration, in continuation of
recommendations in the Eaton Report: for stronger, more
authoritative management of Defense intelligence resources and
activities. It recommended establishing a Special Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense as the focal point of intelligence control, a
position which Mr. Froehlke filled for a time as an additional
responsibility. (ASD/I)
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Costs and Benefits of the NSA Cryptanalytic Effort -
14 November 1968
(The Eachus Report)
Undertaken by a Defense study group, headed by
Joseph J. Eachus, at the request of Secretary of Defense
Clifford to examine the costs, possible success, intelli-
gence value and proper size of certain NSA cryptanalytic
efforts. Due to the highly classified nature of this re-
port, further details are not included but can be made
available separately. (NSA)
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Covert Operations
of the U. S. Government -- 1 December 1968
(The Lindsay Report
Prepared by a distinguished private and Government group
headed by Frank A. Lindsay of ITEK to brief the incoming President
on covert operations on the Clandestine Services. The report argued
persuasively against proposals to separate Clandestine Services
intelligence collection from covert action and to remove the
Clandestine Services from CIA. It called instead for increased
clandestinity by the Agency, noting that CIA was often obliged in
assisting other departments to undertake risks of disclosure greater
than prudent. (Frank Lindsay)
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Report on National Command
and Control Capability and Defense Intelligence - 1 July 1970
(The Fitzhugh Report)
Prepared as one of the studies by a Blue Ribbon Panel on
the Defense Department, headed by Gilbert W. Fitzhugh. The
report echoed the Froehlke Report on the fragmented state of
Defense intelligence and called for a strong central authority in
Defense, greater consumer feedback for more efficient direction
of intelligence collection and production and the consolidation of
several functions, such as counterintelligence being conducted
separately by the Military Services. It effectively established the
authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Intelligence, now
Dr. Hall, and foreshadowed a number of the recommendations of the
Schlesinger Report. (ASD/I)
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A Review of the Intelligence Community - 10 March 1971
(The Schlesinger Report)
Prepared by Dr. Schlesinger of OMB for the President, this
report formed the basis of President Nixon's directive of
5 :November 1971. The report recommended establishment of the
DCI as the leader of the community in resource matters as well as
in substance, urged stronger central. management of Defense intelli-
gence resources, called for establishment of the NSC Intelligence
Committee and the Intelligence Resouces Advisory Committee, called
for a true Intelligence Community Staff, recommended that improve-
ment of the intelligence product should be a matter of the highest
priority. (OMB)
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President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Report to the President - 15 December 1971
(The PFIAB Economic Intelligence Report)
Prepared by PFIAB in response to President Nixon's directive
of 4 June 1971 to make recommendations on the collection and
dissemination of economic intelligence. The report was the first
major survey of the U. S. economic intelligence effort, at least
since 1960. It found that responsibility for fiscal, monetary and
trade matters was fragmented among Government agencies and that
the supporting intelligence effort had suffered disproportionately
large reductions in recent years. It recommended that economic
intelligence be considered an essential element in national security
policy and urged the DCI to take the lead in formulating a broad
concept of economic intelligence and resources devoted to it. (PFIAB)
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(The Lehan Study)
Requested by Dr. Foster, DOD/DDR&E, on behalf of the
Defense Science Board, as an analysis of technical intelligence
systems and their contribution to tactical operations. The study
group was chaired by Mr. Frank Lehan and gave particular attention
to systenis found to be receiving insufficient support. A result of
the study was that certain systems had their funding increased four-
fold. Most of the systems studied were ELINT systems operated
by NSA and the Military Services. (DDR&E)
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SECRET
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Report of the Ervin Subcommitt..,e
on Con, i_itutional Rights, Senate Judiciary Committee - 1973
(The Ervin Committee Report)
Prepared by the Ervin Committee which was formed in 1970
to inquire into allegations of U. S. Army intelligence investigations
of U. S. citizens. Based on hearings held during 1971 and 1972,
at which the Assistant Secretary of Defense /Admin'.stration
(Mr. Froehlke) testified for the Department of Defense, a report,
"Military Surveillance of Civilian Politics, " was issued in 1973.
This report led Senator Ervin to introduce legislation to prohibit
such activities by military intelligence. Although this bill was never
reported out of committee, identical legislation, the "Freedom from
Military Surveillance Act of 1975, " has been introduced in the Senate
(Senator Matthias) and in the House (Mr. Kastenmeier).
Judiciary Committee)
(Senate
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A Report on Economic Intelligence - 7 December 1973
(The Cherne Report)
Submitted by Leo Cherne under PFIAB auspices as an update
to the 15 December 1971 PFIAB report on economic intelligence.
The report contained numerous substantive observations on inter-
national economic affairs of the time and commented on the lack of
effort in economic intelligence forecasts, the over-classification
of much of economic intelligence production and little user feedback
for guidance.
A supplement to this report exists as a statement by Mr. Cherne
to PFIAB on 4 October 1974?
25X1
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The Commission on the Organization of the Government
for the Conduct of Foreign Policy -- report due 1 July 1975
(The Murphy Commission)
A joint Presidential-Congressional study commission
established by the Foreign Relations Act of 1972. It is to submit to
the President and the Congress findings and recommendations "to
provide a more effective system for the formulation and implementation
of the nation's foreign policy." The Commission may make recommen-
dations with respect to the reorganization of the departments and
agencies, more effective arrangements between the Executive Branch
and Congress, improved procedures among departments and agencies,
the abolition of unnecessary services and functions, and other measures
to promote economy, efficiency, and improved administration of
foreign policy. The Commission is divided into four Committees:
Congressional (Senator Mansfield, Chairman), National Security/
Intelligence (Ambassador Murphy, Chairman), International Economics
(Senator Pearson, Chiairman), and Public Diplomacy and Support
(Congressman Zablocki, Chairman). The Commission's mandate
expires on 30 June 1975. Among the subjects under study by the
Commission are the relationship between intelligence and the policy-
maker, resource allocation in the Intelligence Community, the
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authorities for the conduct of intelligence, and the desirability of
maintaining a capacity for the conduct of covert action.
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The Role of Counterintelligence*
Counterintelligence is an integral part of our
national defense. By definition and by its very
nature, counterintelligence is a defensive posture
to the extent that it reacts. primarily to intel-
ligence initiatives of hostile intelligence services.
Like any good defense, however, it cannot be static
or passive. It is based upon knowledge of this
country's adversaries; it seeks out and engages
hostile agents and the intelligence services that
employ them. The national counterintelligence de-
fense, in other words, requires both sound preventive
measures and an energetic and sustained counterattack.
The purpose of defensive and aggressive counter-
intelligence is to insure that adversaries who do
not want to risk open confrontation cannot attain
the same objectives through stealth. In more con-
crete terms, the purpose of counterintelligence is
to identify and neutralize spies and their masters
who serve our opponents.
Spycatching, by itself, is not enough, because
spies are replaceable. American counterintelligence
must also know who sent the spies and who supported
and directed their work in this country and in
friendly nations. And beyond identifying these
agent handlers -- the officers of the KGB and other
such clandestine communist organizations -- our
counterintelligence must know how these people are
motivated, recruited, trained, structured, rewarded,
and punished. We need to know how they communicate
with each other -- from New York or Washington, for
example, to Moscow or Prague. In short, we need to
know everything we can find out about them, as indi-
viduals and as organizations. And finally, what we
know must be shared appropriately with other services
equally concerned.
This need is even more acute today than in the
1950s and 1960s. We know from hard experience that
the clandestine communist services always increase
the range and the intensity of their operations during
periods of Western relaxation, when the openness and
multiplicity of exchanges provide favorable condi-
tions and opportunities for launching intelligence
operations against our country.
* This Annex does not address the role of counter
intelligence within the Department of Defense.
February.18, 1975
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It must also prevent leakage of sensitive U.S.
information from foreign services to whom American
secrets are necessarily confided as a matter of
common concern but which in turn have been penetrated
by enemy agents. 1/
The value of what might :be called an anticipatory
defense is not always evident, because when it succeeds,
nothing happens. It is like preventive medicine.
Its value becomes dramatically clear only when it fails.
The second value of counterintelligence is that
it provides information about hostile clandestine in-
tentions and capabilities. This information is the
more valuable if our adversaries do not know that we
have it.
Finally, the third value of counterintelligence
is the large amount of straight intelligence obtained
as a by-product of counterintelligence agents in the
normal course of their business.
All U.S. Government components have some indi-
vidual internal responsibility for the security of
personnel, records, and physical facilities. Aside
from these basic security functions, the overall
counterintelligence role in the U.S. Government is
shared by several specific intelligence agencies.
The conduct of counterintelligence overseas is one
of CIA's original functions flowing from the National
Security Act of 1947, as amended, and specifically
spelled out and developed in a series of National
Security Council Intelligence Directives. The FBI
has the general responsibility for conduct of counter-
intelligence operations within the United States
based on statutory responsibilities (enforcement of
espionage, sabotage, neutrality, and registration
acts and related matters) as well as a series of
Presidential Directives and Attorney General orders.
1. There may be cited here some of the completed
counterintelligence cases which resulted in the iden-
tification and suppression of high-level Soviet
penetrations of Western intelligence services and
which were directly attributable to CIA counterin-
telligence work: George Blake (UK - 1961), Heinz
Felfe (West Germany - 1961), Harold Adrian Russel
("Kim") Philby (UK - '1963), George Paques (France -
1964), Giorgio Rinald:i Ghisl.ieri (Italy, Spain -
1967), Yuriy Loginov (South Africa - 1967), Nahit
Imre (Turkey - 1968), and Francis Roussilhe (France -
1969).
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Success of U.S. counterintelligence is propor-
tionate to the extent to which it exists as an
integrated, unified concept with fullest coordi-
nation among the separate agencies. It did not exist
as such until World War II; and only small progress
was made after that war, despite the National Secur-
ity Act of 1947. An integrated system first began
to take shape in 1958, when the National Security
Council moved directly into the problem. Intelli-
gence and counterintellgience directives which estab-
lished the basic ground rules were formulated and
placed in effect. As a result the United States has
a set of counterintelligence concepts and precepts
that organize our experience and hold us together.
Throughout the recent years, interagency coordination
and cooperation have become a working reality, be-
coming more and more effective as the level of co-
ordination continues to rise.
The effectiveness of counterintelligence also
requires recognition of its separateness as a func-
tion. In CIA and elsewhere, before the mid-1950s,
counterintelligence was often identified only with
security and the ad hoc exchange of limited amounts
of information in liaison. It was sometimes regarded
as an adjunct to other specialities, usually espionage.
This subordination degraded the function to its
lowest level, to such necessary but elementary work
as nametracing and operational bookkeeping. But
these are only the elementary building blocks of
the masonry of counterintelligence. If it is re-
stricted to nothing more than that, American counter-
intelligence will inevitably degenerate to paro-
chialism and departmentalism. It will not be respon-
sive to a central and vital philosophy. It will tend
to yield the initiative to the adversary and to the
writing of damage reports after we have been hurt
instead of seeking the adversary out and engaging
him before he can hurt us.
In summary, the value of counterintelligence
as an integral part of national defense requires a
continuity of doctrine and an organization of ex-
perience, and must be sustained by a full-time,
experienced cadre of specialists with continuing
emphasis on interagency understanding and coordination.
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Origin and Disposition
of the Huston Plan
Background
By letter dated June 20, 1969, Tom Charles
Huston, Staff Assistant to the President, addressed
a letter to the Director, Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, stating that the President had directed
that a report on foreign communist support of revo-
lutionary protest movements in the United States
be prepared for his study. According to the Huston
letter, the President specifically requested that
the report draw upon all the sources available to
the Intelligence Community, that it be as detailed
as possible, and that the word "support" should be
liberally construed to include all activities by
foreign communists designed to encourage or assist
revolutionary protest movements in the United States.
The letter stated that on the basis of earlier re-
ports submitted to the President on a more limited
aspect of the problem, it was apparent that "present"
intelligence collection capabilities in the area
were inadequate. Huston stated that the President
wanted to know what resources were currently tar-
geted toward monitoring foreign communist support
of revolutionary youth activities in the United
States, how effective they were, what gaps existed
in our (U.S.) intelligence because of either inade-
quate resources or low priority of attention, and
what steps could be taken, if the President directed,
to provide the maximum possible coverage of these
activities.
The request was also sent to the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, National Security Agency, and the
Defense Intelligence Agency seeking contributions
relating to this same problem. Pursuant to the
request, the FBI and CIA submitted available infor-
mation on the matter. These responses were handled
unilaterally and without coordination between CIA
and FBI.
On June 5, 1970, Director Hoover met with President
Nixon, at which meeting the President appointed him
as chairman of a special intelligence committee to
February 18, 1975
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coordinate a more effective intelligence-gathering
function. 1/ He also instructed that the FBI, CIA,
NSA, and DIA were to coordinate their efforts to
insure that comprehensive information would be ob-
tained for the President's use which would provide
him with a worldwide picture of the efforts of new
left and subversive groups in directing dissident
activities in the United States. Present at this
meeting were CIA Director Richard Helms; Vice
Admiral Noel Gayler, NSA; General Donald V. Bennett,
DIA; Mr. Tom Charles Huston, White House Staff
Assistant; Assistant to the President H.R. Haldeman;
Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs
John D. Ehrlichman; and Robert H. Finch, Secretary
of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
An initial meeting of the Interagency Committee
on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) was held in Mr. Hoover's
office on June 8, 1970. This meeting was attended
by Mr. Helms, Vice Admiral Gayler, General Bennett,
and Mr. Huston. Mr. Hoover emphasized the President's
keen interest in the problem of intelligence collec-
tion and outlined the general objectives to which
the Committee was to address itself. He instructed
that a working subcommittee composed of representa-
tives of all the member agencies be established and
be headed by FBI Assistant Director William C.
Sullivan.
The first meeting of the working subcommittee
was held on June 9, 1970. At this meeting, Mr. Huston
presented the subcommittee with an outline which
he stated the President desired the subcommittee
to follow in preparing its report. The outline
addressed itself mainly to the purpose, procedures,
and objectives of the subcommittee's review. The
following is quoted from the outline:
1. Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Ninety-third Congress,
Second Session Pursuant to H. Res. 803Resolu-
tion Authorizing and Directing the Committee on the
Judiciary to Investigate Whether Sufficient Grounds
Exist for the House of Representatives to Exercise
Its Constitutional Power to Impeach Richard M.
Nixon, President of the United States of America,"
Book VII, Part 1, pg. 375.
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"Purpose:
(A) To define and assess the existing in-
ternal security threat.
(B) To evaluate the collection procedures
and techniques presently employed and
to assess their effectiveness.
(C) To identify gaps in our present col-
lection efforts and recommend steps
to close these gaps.
(D) To review current procedures for inter-
community coordination and cooperation
and to recommend steps to improve these
procedures.
(E) To evaluate the timeliness of current
intelligence data and to recommend
procedures to increase both its time-
liness and usefulness.
(F) To access the priorities presently
attached to domestic intelligence col-
lection efforts and to recommend new
priorities where appropriate.
(A) Although the sub-committee will be of-
ficially constituted within the frame-
work of USIB, it will in fact be an
independent, ad hoc, interagency working
group with a limited mandate.
(B) Operational details will, be the respon-
sibility of the chairman. However, the
scope and direction of the review will
be determined by the White House member.
(C) The sub-committee will submit its re-
ports to the White House and not to
USIB. Report will be due by July 1,
1970.
(D) To insure that the President has all
the options available for considera-
tion, the WH member may direct detailed
3
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interrogatories to individual agencies
in order to ascertain facts relevant
to policy evaluation by the President.
Information resulting from such inter-
rogatories will, if the contributing
agency requests, be treated on a con-
fidential basis and not be considered
by the sub-committee as a whole.
"Objectives:
(A) Maximum coordination and cooperation
within the intelligence community.
The sub-committee may wish to consider
the creation of a permanent Domestic
Intelligence Operations Board, or some
other appropriate mechanism to insure
community-wide evaluation of intelli-
gence data.
(B) Higher priority by all intelligence
agencies on internal security collec-
tion efforts.
(C) Maximum use of all special investiga-
tive techniques, including increased
agent and informant penetration by
both the FBI and CIA.
(D) Clarification of NSA's role in tar-
geting against: communicaton traffic
involving U.S. revolutionary leaders
and organizations.
(E) Maximum coverage of the overseas activi-
ties of revolutionary leaders and of
foreign support of U.S. revolutionary
activities.
(F) Maximum coverage of campus and student-
related activities of revolutionary
leaders and groups.
(G) More detailed information about the
sources and extent of financial sup-
port of revolutionary organizations.
4
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(H) Clarification of the proper domestic
intelligence role of the Armed Services.
(I) Development of procedures for trans-
lating analyzed intelligence informa-
tion into a format useful for policy
formulation."
At a meeting of-the working subcommittee held
on June 23, 1970, a consensus was reached on a
final draft of the report to be issued by the Inter-
agency Committee. This report, which was captioned
"Special Report Interagency Committee on Intelligence
(Ad Hoc)," 1/ dated June, 1970, and numbering g
43 pages, was signed and approved by the heads of
each member agency at a final meeting of the Com-
mittee held in Mr. Hoover's office on June 25,
1970. 2/ The report footnoted several objections
by the FBI to certain options contained in the Com-
mittee's report. 3/ These objections are enum-
erated in a later portion of this paper. A copy of
the "Special Report" was delivered to Mr. Huston
at the White House on June 26, 1970. The "Special
Report" was divided into three main sections: Part
One, a summarized estimate of the internal security
threat; Part Two, a summary of various operational
limitations on certain intelligence collection tech-
niques with cited advantages of maintaining such
restrictions as well as the advantages of relaxing
them; and Part Three, an evaluation of interagency
cooperation with suggested measures to improve the
coordination of domestic intelligence collection.
During the first week of July, 1970, Huston sent
the "Special Report" to H.R. Haldeman with a memo-
randum entitled "Operational Restraints on Intelli-
gence Collection." In his memorandum, Huston recom-
mended that the President, from among the options
discussed by the "Special Report," select, in most
areas discussed, the options relaxing the restraints
on intelligence collection. 4/
On July 14, 1970, Haldeman sent a memorandum to
Huston stating that the President had approved
Huston's recommendations for relaxing restraints on
1.
Ibid.,
pp.
384-431.
2.
Ibid.,
pg.
383.
3.
Ibid.,
pg.
433.
4.
Ibid.,
pg.
437.
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intelligence collection and requested that a formal
decision memorandum be prepared. l/
In a memorandum dated July 23, 1970, addressed
to the Ad Hoc Committee agencies with copies for
the President and Mr. Haldeman, 2/ Mr. Huston ad-
vised that the President had carefully studied the
"Special Report" and had made certain decisions
with respect to issues raised therein. The Presi-
dent's decisions called for a relaxation of certain
existing restraints on, intelligence coverage, in-
cluding the following: NSCID-6 was to be inter-
preted to permit NSA to program for coverage of
the communications of US citizens, using interna-
tional facilities; the Intelligence Community was
directed to intensify electronic surveillance
coverage of individuals and groups in the United
States who posed a threat to the internal security;
restrictions on legal mail coverage were to be re-
moved and restrictions on covert mail coverage
relaxed to permit its use on select targets of
priority intelligence; restraints on the use of
surreptitious entry were to be removed on certain
high-priority targets; the coverage of violence-
prone campus and student-related groups was to be
increased; CIA coverage of American students
traveling or living abroad was to be increased;
the restrictions on the use of military undercover
agents were to be retained; each member agency was
to submit a detailed estimate of manpower and mone-
tary needs required to implement the decisions;
and a committee consisting of the directors of rep-
resentative agencies or appropriate alternates was
to be constituted effective August 1, 1970, to
provide evaluation of domestic intelligence, pre-
pare periodic domestic: intelligence estimates,
carry out other objectives specified in the report,
and perform such other duties as the President
should from time to time assign. The Director of
the FBI was appointed to serve as chairman of this
committee. An attachment to the memorandum from
Mr. Huston captioned "Organization and Operations
of the Interagency Group on Domestic Intelligence
and Internal Security (IAG)" set forth specific
composition, operations, and duties of this new
committee. 3/
1. Ibid., pg. 445.
2. Ibid., pp. 450, 454.
3. Ibid., pg. 456.
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On receipt of the letter from Mr. Huston, the
Director, FBI, addressed a letter to the Attorney
General dated July 27, 1970, pointing out FBI objec-
tions to certain of the decisions reported in the
Huston letter. Mr. Hoover objected to relaxation
of electronic surveillance policy, the implementa-
tion of covert mail coverage, the removal of re-
strictions on the use of surreptitious entry of
embassies to obtain cryptographic materials, the
removal of controls and restrictions relating to
the coverage of violence-prone campus and student-
related groups, and the establishment of a perma-
nent Interagency Committee on Domestic Intelligence.
The Director stated that in the "Special Report"
he had pointed out his opposition to these aspects
of the reoort and requested of the Attorney General
a prompt expression of his views concerning the
matter. He noted that no action to implement the
instructions contained in Mr. Huston's letter
would be taken pending a reply from the Attorney
General.
No further action to implement the Huston letter
subsequent to the July 27, 1970, letter to the
Attorney General was instituted by the Intelligence
Community. There is no indication that the Attor-
ney General ever responded to this communication.
On or about July 27, 1970, each agency that had
received the memorandum of July 23, 1970, received
a telephone call from the White House instructing
that the memorandum be returned.
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The Role of Security in CIA
General Statement
The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401-
403) established the Central Intelligence Agency and
the position of the Director of Central Intelligence
and in Section 102(c), (3) specifically charges the
DCI with the responsibility for "protecting sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure ... ." In
addition, the CIA Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403 a-j),
in implementing this provision, exempts the Agency
from "the provisions ... of any ... law which re-
quires the publication or disclosure of the organi-
zation, functions, names, official titles, salaries,
or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency ... ."
With this as basic statutory background, it can be
seen that the role of Director of the Central In-
telliaence Agency, as the Bead. of the Intelligence
Community, is to protect the vital intelligence in-
formation of the United States. Such a role, there-
fore, must be dependent upon the establishment and
implementation of a strong security program, not
only for the Central Intelligence Agency, but also
for overseeing such programs for the general Intelli-
gence Community.
The Agency, in particular, has a special respon-
sibility to ensure the loyalty, security conscious-
ness, integrity, and psychological stability of its
employees. Soviet and other hostile intelligence
services seek to penetrate US intelligence organi-
zations by identifying and exploiting personal vul-
nerabilities and weaknesses of their personnel.
Such penetration can enable the opposition to iden-
tify and neutralize our own intelligence operations;
learn what we know and what we do not know about
opposition capabilities and intentions; gain in-
sights enabling the opposition to confuse and de-
ceive us; and provide vital information regarding
US national policy, military capabilities, tech-
nology, and intentions, with which Agency and other
intelligence personnel often become familiar in the
course of their routine work.
February 18, 1975
Copy No. 87
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Intelligence personnel not only are an attractive
target for the opposition services, but also in many
respects represent a particularly accessible one.
Unlike members of most Government organizations,
intelligence personnel often must carry out their
demanding assignments alone, and sometimes in hos-
tile areas. They are thus subject to severe psycho-
logical pressures. They are often removed from
immediate supervision, or even observation by
friendly colleagues. :[n these circumstances, latent
vulnerabilities and instabilities in their character
or loyalty may come to the surface and be detected
and exploited by an alert opposition. In addition,
in many instances, employees of not only the CIA,
but also other intelligence services, receive little
or no personal or peer recognition for their efforts.
By the nature of their work, they are not allowed
to talk about it to their family or their friends..
Even within an organization, because of the strin-
gent need-to-know requirements, an individual may
accomplish significant tasks which he or she can
never discuss and which may not be recognized or
even known to friends in the Agency. Therefore,
although an intelligence officer may receive great
personal satisfaction for a job well done and may
receive plaudits from a supervisor, he or she may
operate throughout his or her whole career in what
is, in effect, a vocational vacuum, with people "on
the outside" having no knowledge of his or her area
of expertise.
The only protection for the Agency against these
hazards is a careful and thorough assessment of the
individual to ensure the selection of the right
person for the job. This is essential not only in
the interests of the individual agencies and the
Government, but also in that of the individual.
Many people, through no fault of their own, are
subject to latent weaknesses and vulnerabilities of
one sort or another, and we believe it would be a
great disservice to them to impose upon them burdens
for which they are unfit, perhaps leading to unfor-
tunate personal. consequences, as well. as to serious
security damage to the Government of the United
States.
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Hence, we have, over the years, with the best
professional advice available, devised a system of
medical, psychological, and security checks designed
to identify potential problems in these fields be-
fore they can cause serious damage. In a sense,
these tests may be compared with the assessments
employed in the selection of jet pilots and astro-
nauts -- too much is at stake to take chances with
avoidable human error or weakness.
In the past there have been a number of cases
where sensitive agencies of both the US Government
and other Free World governments suffered damage
precisely because latent human weakness of indi-
viduals in key positions was detected and exploited
by an opposition service. Our procedures for en-
suring the security and suitability of its personnel
have been developed over the years on the basis of
the Agency's specialized knowledge of the aims and
methods of our opposition services, the importance
and sensitivity of the Agency's responsibilities,
the best available professional advice, and the
cumulative practical experience of a number of years
of Agency management.
Discussion
It must be stated, however, that Security in the
broader sense includes the overseeing not only of
the attributes of its employees from what we describe
as a Personnel Security standpoint, but also from
Physical and Technical penetration of our installa-
tions. The implantation of an audio device in a
United States Government facility where sensitive
conversations are held can cause extensive damage
from a security standpoint. Similarly, any opposi-
tion service would leap at the chance to have unre-
stricted access to a safe or file cabinet where
classified information is stored.
Therefore, the Director of Central Intelligence
also has the responsibility to effect appropriate
programs guarding against technical or physical
penetration. This is accomplished in the United,
States through the efforts of the Office of Security
of the Agency, which is responsible for the main-
tenance of adequate physical security standards in
terms of safekeeping equipment, alarm systems,
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perimeter protection, and the like. Our Office of
Security also is responsible for maintaining a
counteraudio program for our :installations in the
United States and abroad. In the foreign field,
this is done with the full knowledge and assistance
of appropriate State Department security personnel.
In these days of extensive use of computers, the
Office of Security monitors the operation of Agency
compartmented computer systems to ensure that they
meet the right standards of security.
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Assuming that security approval is recommended,
the next step for the applicant is to undergo the
polygraph examination. Every applicant is poly-
graphed by a professional polygraph examiner working
for the Office of Security. If derogatory informa-
tion is developed during the polygraph, the poly-
graph examiner writes a report of his interview.
The examiner does not make any judgments as to
the contents of the information, other than to
comment whether or not, in his professional opin-
ion, the applicant has displayed reactions on the
polygraph indicative of deception to the questions
asked. The polygraph report is then appraised and
adjudicated in the same manner as that of the field
investigation.
Polyqraph reports, because of their sensitivity,
are kept on file in the polygraph office and are
closely controlled. They are not made a part of
the applicant's security file. At this point, it
might be well to comment that all security files
of the Agency are kept on a closely controlled
basis by the Office of Security and are available
only to Office of Security personnel with a legi-
timate need to know about the information and, in
some rare instances, to very senior officials of
the Agency. Upon the completion of polygraph
interview and after adjudication, the applicant is
then allowed to enter on duty.
As part of the on-going process of security
cognizance over employees of the Agency, when an
employee of the Agency changes his status -- i.e.,
is transferred overseas or is considered for addi-
tional access to information other than Top Secret --
his Security File is reviewed by a Security Officer.
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In addition, employees are reinvestigated at five-
year intervals.
One of the key functions of the Office of Secur-
ity is its role in assisting those employees who
have problems or those employees who get into
trouble. The Office of Security maintains a Secur-
ity Duty Office staffed 24 hours a day and a staff
of Security Officers ready to respond at any hour
of the day to assist employees who either are in
difficulty or need immediate assistance. This
assistance to employees is coordinated as cases
dictate with the Office of Medical Services and/or
the Office of Personnel. This assistance ranges
from helping an employee with a very personal prob-
lem, such as a child of the employee getting into
difficulty with the police, drugs, etc., to assist-
ing employees who have severe problems. Each time,
of course, this is done with a view toward ascer-
taining what is the best course of action for the
employee to take to resolve his problem. Many of
these cases are referred to the Office of Medical
Services for specialized assistance.
Personnel Security, as outlined above, cannot
be dealt with as a separate entity but must be con-
sidered in the total. picture of this Agency.
Personnel Security, employee morale, and the Agency
image are all inseparably bound together. CIA does
not strive for total security as this would impose
impossible limitations on the efficiency of this
Organization. Instead, the Personnel Security Pro-
gram of this Agency attempts to create a sense of
security responsibility in the employees and this
sense of security responsibility, or trust, is the
element which allows the Personnel Security Program
to be as effective as it is.
At this time, it-should be pointed out that, in
addition to the regular staff applicants for the
Agency, investigations are conducted regarding a num-
ber of other people who have a relationship with the
Agency. These include individuals affiliated with
the Agency on a contract basis, persons who are con-
sultants to the Agency, military personnel assigned
to the Agency, and many people who perform services
for the Agency. In this latter category are included
individuals such as: Federal Protective Service
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Officers who guard Agency installations; persons
who work in the cafeteria at Langley; persons who
perform char force and maintenance duties; barbers
who work in the barbershop at Langley; individuals
employed by the C&P Telephone Company who work on
Agency telephones and telephone lines; and individ-
uals who work in the Agency Credit Union. With the
exception of individuals who work in the cafeterias
and who do not have access to the Agency Headquarters
Building proper, most of these individuals are fully
investigated and polygraphed. All of their cases
are handled and adjudicated in exactly the same
manner and with the same check and balance system
as those of staff employees of the Agency.
Up to this-point, we have discussed individuals
having some sort of actual relationship with the
Agency in terms of being assigned to Agency instal-
lations or being employees of the Agency. There
is another large category of individuals who are
investigated and cleared by the Agency who have
access to sensitive Agency and Intelligence Community
information, but who, except in a few cases, do not
work in Agency installations. These individuals are
in the private sector and are employed by companies
having access to Agency information and Agency
classified contracts. For the most part, these in-
dividuals accomplish their tasks, working in their
own company area. For example, individuals working
for such companies as F_ I 25X1A
and many other companies have access
to sensitive information. In many cases, these in-
dividuals have access to information which individual
staff employees of the Agency do not receive. This
is particularly true of individuals working for com-
panies having sensitive classified contracts in the
overhead reconnaissance field. Security requirements
in this field stem from DCID 1/14, the Director of
Central Intelligence Directive which established
uniform personnel security standards for individuals
having access to compartmented information. This
Directive clearly established the personnel security
standards and minimum investigative criteria to be
met by all US Government civilian and military per-
sonnel, Government consultants, and employees of
Government contractors who require access to sensi-
tive compartmented information or to information
which reveals the manner, methods, and operational
details by which sensitive compartmented informa-
tion is collected.
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Therefore, it is the'responsibility of the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, also
as the Head of the Intelligence Community, to en-
sure that sensitive compartmented information is
adequately protected. The investigations of indi-
viduals in the private sector who are to have access
to compartmented information, and who will be in-
volved in Agency classified contracts, are conducted
in a similar manner to those done on applicants for
Agency employment. 25X1A
The case, with the exception of the polygraph, is
processed similarly to that of an applicant. There
are some substantial differences because we do not
place great emphasis upon certain suitability fac-
tors in an investigation of this kind. By that we
do not wish to imply that we are any less concerned
about the individual's suitability. Minor things
such as the fact that he is a poor supervisor in
the company, is given to temper tantrums, does not
get along well with his fellow workers, and the
like are reported by the investigator, but during
evaluation of the case they are not stressed as to
the individual's "clearability." The great stress
in the case of an Industrial Contractor is upon his
loyalty and upon "pure" security factors.
A few employees in the private sector are also
polygraphed. These are employees of a given company
who work full time in our Headquarters Building at
Langley. Since these individuals have full access
to the building and in almost all cases have access
to sensitive compartmented information, it is our
belief that they should meet the same standards as
staff employees of the Agency. The polygraph inter-
views of these individuals are voluntary and are
closely controlled. Before the individual is selected
to work in the building, company management has
been briefed and made aware of the polygraph re-
quirement, as has the individual. Prior to the
polygraph test itself, the individual is interviewed
by an Agency Security Officer who again points out
that the polygraph interview is voluntary and fur-
nishes the individual a general idea of the areas
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that will be covered. The areas that are covered
are loyalty to the United States, contact with for-
eign nationals or a foreign intelligence service,
and use of drugs. Under no circumstances is the
individual questioned regarding company secrets or
industrial espionage and no inquiries are made into
his private sex life. After the actual polygraph
interview, the individual is again interviewed by
a Security Officer and, if the examiner finds that
the interview was favorable, a badge to enter the
Headquarters Building is issued. If a problem does
exist, the individual is told that it will have to
be adjudicated by higher authority. All companies
who participate in this program are aware that the
employment of an individual does not rest upon his
being cleared or not cleared by the Agency, and it
has been agreed that the turn down of an individual
has no bearing upon his continued employment with
a given company.
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The question may well be asked why is it neces-
sary for the Agency to maintain its own investiga-
tive staff when investigations would just as well
be conducted by some other investigative arm of
the Government. From the middle 1940s until Decem-
ber 1947, the FBI conducted investigations for the
Agency and its predecessor, CIG, on staff employee
applicants. They discontinued these investigations
because
of additional responsibilities placed
upon
them.
They resumed conducting our applicant
investi-
gations
in December 1948 and continued until
December
1950.
However, it should be noted that as a
result
of the unique requirements for covert investiga-
tions it was necessary for the Agency to maintain
its own investigative capability even during the
period the FBI conducted our overt investigations.
Since 1951, we have been conducting all overt and
covert investigations for the Agency without any
major compromise of our cover. It is, of course,
more cost effective for us to do the entire inves-
tigative task since we must be staffed to conduct
the covert investigations which no other Federal
investigative service can do for us. Additionally,
since investigations are controlled by desk offi-
cers in our office of Security from beginning to
end, this, we feel, gives us a more viable end
product.
It should be noted that it is not only the
Agency involved in the sensitive overhead recon-
naissance programs, but that all members of the
Intelligence Community are also involved.
CIA is not the only Agency that is involved in
the sensitive overhead reconnaissance program; all
members of the Intelligence Community are also in-
volved. The investigations conducted by the Agency
and by the Defense Investigative Service (DIS), the
investigative arm of the Defense Department, are
used by other members of the Intelligence Community
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in adjudicating clearances for individuals working
on these sensitive projects.
The field of contract security is an extensive
one in itself, and in terms of security, several
types of contracts exist:. The contract itself may
be classified and the work unclassified. The con-
tract may be unclassified and the work classified,
or both the contract and the work may be classified.
Moreover, within the compartmented systems field,
there are several levels at which an individual
may be cleared. The individual may be aware only
that the project on which he is working is US Govern-
ment sponsored, or he may be made aware of CIA
sponsorship in the contract. In the overhead recon-
naissance area, individuals working on contracts
may have access only to a small part of the contract
and may be working on only, for example, one elec-
tronic system of a space vehicle, or he or she may
have access to the complete idea and the completed
vehicle. In addition, we delineaty between an in-
dividual's access to the security system controlling
knowledge of the craft and access to the informa-
tion derived from use of the craft, or take. It
can be seen, therefore, that the overhead recon-
naissance program is a highly complex, highly sen-
sitive area in which we attempt to maintain maximum
compartmentation, maximum security, and maximum,
for want of a better word, covertness.
Despite our efforts to maintain security, we
have historically been plagued with leaks. The
Office of Security's role in the area of unauthorized
leaks of classified intelligence through the news
media stems from the Director's responsibility under
the National Security Act of 1947 to protect intel-
ligence sources and methods from unauthorized dis-
closure. In addressing a particular leak, he may
turn either to the mechanism of the United States
Intelligence Board or to internal CIA assets. The
purpose of the action taken can be either to ascer-
tain the source of the leak or to prepare a damage
assessment in order to ascertain its effect upon
the continuing viability of the sources or methods
compromised as a result of the news leak. The
mechanism used by the United States Intelligence
Board was established through its Security Com-
mittee by DCID 1/11 on 24 March 1959, as a result
of a memorandum in September '1958 from Mr. Gordon
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Gray, then Special Assistant to the President.
This memorandum concerned procedures to.be followed
in reporting unauthorized intelligence disclosures.
Mr. Gray drew the attention of the then DCI to para-
graph 5, 1, f, of NSCID No. 1, dated 15 September
1958, which stated that the DCI shall "call upon
the departments and agencies, as appropriate, to
investigate within their department or agency any
unauthorized disclosures of intelligence sources
or methods ... . A report of these investigations,
including corrective measures taken or recommended
within the departments and agencies involved, shall
be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelli-
gence for review and such further action as may be
appropriate, including reports to the National
Security Council or the President."
Since its establishment, the Security Committee
has been tasked by various Directors of the Agency
to address leaks of intelligence into the news media.
Most of these actions dealt with the preparation of
damage assessments; a few attempted to identify the
source of the leaks through such devises as ques-
tionnaires submitted to all recipients of the basic
intelligence document(s) to develop further inves-
tigative leads. Other investigative tactics may
have been employed by the Security Committee Member
departments and agencies, however, these are not
reflected in Committee records. revised
23 August 1974, established a standing Security Com-
mittee of the USIB to support the DCI's statutory
responsibilities by providing for effective and
consistent community security policies for the pro-
tection of intelligence and of intelligence sources
and methods and ensuring the timeliness and economy
in the handling of compartmented information. The
Committee is charged with the responsibility of
ensuring that appropriate investigations are .,made of
any unauthorized disclosure or compromise of intel-
ligence or of intelligence sources and methods and
that the results of such investigations, along with
appropriate recommendations, are provided to the
Director of Central Intelligence. However, the
leakage of classified intelligence through the news
media has continued, unabated, despite the efforts
of the Security Committee.
It might, be of value and interest to look at
some of these leaks as to type and damage. In Sep-
tember 1971, at the request of the White House, the
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DDI and the Office of Security of the Agency con-
ducted a comprehensive survey of intelligence leaks
during the 1953-71 period. This study was taken
from files of the Intelligence Community available
at CIA which reflected official. concern about spe-
cific leaks and which recorded the initiation, con-
duct, and outcome of security investigations and
other actions triggered by disclosures in the public
press. The files and the study reflect only those
leaks believed to be serious enough at the time to
be formally considered by the Intelligence Community.
The data base was small in a number of items, but
was highly selective and thoroughly analyzed. All
investigations undertaken were of serious disclosures
and were conducted only when it. had been determined
that a unique and major leak had occurred. It was
usually possible at the time of the disclosure to
determine whether a leak was a deliberate Adminis-
tration disclosure. In such cases, no investiga-
tion was undertaken, and all "official" or "autho-
rized" leaks were excluded. However, the study did
show that almost all of the leaks originated with
US Government officials in Washington, D.C.
Furthermore, it was evident: that the primary
intelligence sources behind information being leaked
were overhead reconnaissance and signal intelligence.
Because these sources can be hampered or frustrated
by passive countermeasures, all, items based on them
created a serious risk to our intelligence data base
for the future.
An examination of appropriate files showed a
total of 104 suspected unauthorized disclosures of
classified intelligence matters officially considered
from 1953 to mid-1971. There may have been two or
three times as many newspaper and magazine articles
which covered or included the material in these leaks,
but these 104 items were determined to be the initial
appearance of specific classified intelligence in-
formation in the public domain. The "peak" years
during this period were 1959 when 15 leaks appeared,
1963 with 13, 1964 with 11, 1969 with 10, and 1971,
when 11 leaks had appeared by mid-year. During
this period, the Washington Post printed 28 leaks;
the New York Times, 23; the Northern Virginia Sun,
13; and the Washington Star, 11. The others were
divided among 18 other publications ranging from 6
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in Newsweek and 1 in Time to such publications as
1 in Aerospace Daiy and 1 in Stag Magazine.
Other serious leaks have occurred since 1971,
with an extremely serious one occurring in an article
in the Washington Post in February 1972 describing
much of the capability and operational details of
a program approved for development by the President
during the summer of 1971. In a letter to the
President, Mr. Richard Helms, then DCI, commented
that he was relatively certain that such a reporter
could not have come up with so sophisticated an
article simply by putting together bits and pieces
of information accumulated from various inadvertent
disclosures. Mr. Helms expressed his belief that
the complete substance had to be provided by some-
one with a good understanding of the whole system.
Since 1960, various memoranda have been issued
by Presidents Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon ex-
pressing concern over the passage of classified in-
formation to individuals not authorized or entitled
to receive it. The United States Intelligence
Board has continued to express deep concern over
unauthorized disclosures, but, as previously men-
tioned, unauthorized disclosures continue to occur.
As an example, some of the types of disclosures
occurring over the past 10 years include the follow-
ing:
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