THE CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND LEGAL BASIS FOR COVERT ACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00552R000800080004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 93
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 24, 1975
• Content Type: REGULATION

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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY .
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Review Staff: 7.6/0139
.23 January 1976
Mr. A. Searle Field
Staff Director
Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Field:
It has occurred to me, even at this late date,
that this material on oversight might be of interest
to your staff and members of the HSC.
Sincerely,
Review Staff
Attachment:
As Stated
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IT AL INTELLIGENCE AGED
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505 .
29 October 1975
Cyrus R, Vance, President
Association of the Bar of the City of New York
42 West 44th Street
New York, New York 10036
Dear Cyl
Earlier this year we received a pamphlet entitled, "The Central
Intelligence Agency; Oversight and Accountability" by the Committee
on Civil Rights and the Committee on International Human Rights of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York. The report subsequently
appeared in the April 1975 issue of The Record, published by the Association.
It is not our custom to comment on publications dealing with CIA,
nor to argue with conclusions which anyone is entitled to draw, no matter
how much we may disagree. However, in examining the report of your
two committees, ,we found numerous factual errors, miscitations of
statutes and texts, misquotations, and material out of context.
Because of the immense prestige of the Bar Association of the City of
New York, we made a careful critique of this report, which is enclosed,
together with a short summary. This paper is not a brief in opposition; it
is designed to question the validity of some of the research and thus raise
legitimate questions as to some of the statements and conclusions. The
critique is paged to the original report which we received and not to the
pagination as it subsequently appeared in. The Record,
After you have read this critique, you may well wish to insert some
statement in an early issue of The Record, in view of its large readership
among members of the Bar and law libraries who rely on these reports for
accuracy and ideas.
My best personal regards to you.
Sincerely,,
X1 A
z:et~eral Counsel
q ~ u prw~ =~
U ~y art
11-1-76 -14311a
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SUMMARY OF CRITIQUE
I . FACTUAL ERRORS AND MISCONCEPTIONS.
As set forth in the attached Critique, the Report's major weakness
lies in its many factual errors, some large, some small, as well as what
can best be described as misconceptions about CIA, its activities and
statutory responsibilities. A few examples are illustrative of the more
detailed explanations. contained in the Critique,
One error which appears in several places in the Report is that
in 1946 President Truman established the National Intelligence Authority
and the Central Intelligence Group by Executive order. There was no
Executive order; these organizations were established under the terms
of a. Presidential Directive issued to the Secretaries of State, War and
the Navy. Nor did the subsequent National Security Act of 1947 remove
CIA from "military control" (Report, p. 3, 1. 1). Neither CIG nor CIA
was ever under "military control. " The National Intelligence Authority,
which gave direction to CIG, was composed of the three Secretaries to whom
the Directive was addressed, and Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff. to the
President. The National Security Council, which directs the activities
of CIA, is composed entirely of civilians and is chaired by the President.
Among other examples of factual errors is the statement that the
National Security. Act of 1947 established the Department of Defense (Report,
p. 2, par. 3). That Act established the National Military Establishment,
headed by. a Secretary of Defense. The Department of Defense was not
established until the National Security Act Amendments of 1949. Nor was
Secretary Forrestal ever the Secretary of War (Report, p. 7, par. 2).
The Report presents a generally misconceived view of the functions
of the National Security Council (NSC), especially vis-a-vis the CIA.
At p. 3.4 of the Report, the NSC is described as an advisory and. coordi--
nating body, while overlooking the NSC's directive authority over CIA as
set forth in section 103(d) of the National Security Act of 1947. From
their misreading --of the statute, the authors of the Report then continue that
"Nowhere is the NSC directly given the power to conduct political opera-
tions" and then conclude that it is difficult. for CIA to. maintain .that .it
conducts its covert action operations as a delegation of power from the NSC.
NSC does not have the power, to delegate, and CIA does not claim such
delegation. CIA bases its authority in this field in. part on its statutory
provisions under the direction of the NSC.
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Another area of misconception in the Report. is its discussion of
congressional intent as. to CIA's role in clandestine collection (espionage).
Footnote 74 of the Report (p. 11 at p. 40) argues that "as originally
.envisioned, the CIA was to be, primarily, a correlator and evaluator of
intelligence gathered by others." This is not correct. From the earliest
.o# the. concepts for a.peaceti.me .intelligence.:.,ervice- in 1944 and. .945,
drafts
it was envisioned. that clandestine collection would be centralized in such
a service-. The members of the congressional committees which established
CIA were well aware of what the CIA role. was to be in this field. It was
thoroughly considered in executive sessions by the committees involved,
and CIA's primacy in that field was understood. It was also mentioned
in the floor debate in the House (see Critique, III.B . h) .
In order not to prolong this summary unduly, one can merely mentiori
that we have detailed in the Critique other misconceptions regarding covert
action activities, budgetary matters,. and the Director's responsibilities to
protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. It
should be emphasized, however, that the latter responsibility runs only
..to the field of intelligence and not to "all government documents and sources"
as claimed on p. 11. of the Report. .
II. MISCITATIONS OF STATUTES AND TEXTS.
. There are sever .l miscitations of statutes and texts in the Report.
The statute most often miscited is the Foreign Assistance Act of 1.974. In
quoting the provision of" that Act which deals with CIA, the Report cites
(p. 15, par. 1, and elsewhere) section 663 of the Act. Actually, the section
which should he cited is section 32 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974
which enacts an. amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, to be
numbered section 662 of the latter Act. The Report then continues to mis-
quote subsection (b) of the misnumbered section.
Other citations which seem to cause difficulty to the authors of the
Report are to the National Security Act of 1947. For instance, at p. 14,
par. 2 of the Report, the text cites a provision attributed to the National
.Security Act of 1.947 which is actually section 7 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949.
A further rniscitation appears in connection with footnote 103 (p. 15
at p. 42). There the cited House Report is correctly quoted but adds
"as quoted in Wise & Rose," [The Invisible Government] at p. 10. First,
one must note that the name of the second author of that book is Ross, not :
Rose. Secondly, there is no reference, nor any quotation, from the House:
Report at the cited p. 10 of their book. That page is about the Bay of
Pigs.
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III . MISQUOTATIONS AND MISLEADII" G STATEMENTS.
In the Report (p. 1, par. 2) there is a statement which is misleading,
at least by implication, when it states that CIA's "activities may be any
that the National Security Council directs, as long as they concern in some
fashion 'the national security.' " The Report omits the important modifier
in they National Security Act of 1947 which provides that the Agency shall
perform such other functions and duties "related to intelligence affecting
the national security" (emphasis supplied) a~ Elie NSC; m.ay from time to
time direct.
Also misleading is the handling of the quotation in the }report (p. 3)
par. 2) of the Director's authorities in the field of unvouchered funds. The
Report at this point places in quotation marks what. would appear to be the.
text of a part of section 8(h) of the CIA Act of 1949. As pointed out in the
Critique (par. 1.1) this is not an accurate quotation of the statute. The
Report (p. 3, par. 2) is also at best misleading in its discussion of section
7 of the CIA Act of 1949 concerning CIA authorities to bring certain aliens
into the United States for permanent residence (see Critique, Sec. I.m).
The Report (p. 10, #18) also speaks of the Agency supplying equipment
and safe houses "to other government officials," sourcing the statement
to Mr. Colby's confirmation hearings. In those hearings at the cited page,
Mr. Colby testified that such facilities had been provided to White I-louse
employees, a much narrower term than "other government officials."
IV. MATERIAL OUT OF CONTEXT.
In the very first paragraph of the Report, Director Colby is quoted
as stating that CIA domestic activities have included the insertion of agents
into "American dissident circles." It would have presented a fairer picture
if Mr. Colby's entire sentence at this point had been used. It reads:
In order to obtain access to foreign circles, the
Agency also recruited. or inserted about a dozen
individuals into American dissident circles in
order to establish their c r e d e n t i a l s for operations
abroad. [Emphasis supplied.]
Similarly, it would -have been more even-handed if the Report in its 'fu st
paragraph had included exactly what Director Colby did say about CIA's
dossiers on American citizens. (See Critique, Introduction, par. b) .
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.Under. the general heading, "Domestic Activities Viewed as Permissible
by the CIA," the Report (pp. 9-10) lists 18 items. Several are taken froixt
the Senate Hearing on the Noinination. oi: Mr. Colby to be DCI. Ac:tualli,
the cited items are ' taken' frorn writteii repli.e:i to questions 'submitted by
Senator Symington for inclusion in the Hearing record. It would have
placed My. Colby's answers in. P. better context if the Report had i scluded
his preamble sentence to his answers. In that sentence, Mr. Colby stated:
Provided that CIA's activities within the U. S. are in
the prosecution of foreign intelligence and do not
contraveric U. S. law, I believe they do not conflict
with the statutory restriction against CIA involve:----_
went in domes ti.c affair s .
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CRITIQtJJ: ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,,
OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITYt` A Report by the. Committees
on Civil Rights-and International Human Rights of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York
1C~dTRC)1 UC TION
a, In citing 1)CI Colby's Statement to the Senate Appropriations Committee
on 3.5 January 1975, the Repol t (p. 1, par. 1) quotes him as stating that CIA
domestic activities have included the insertion of agents into "American dissi-
dent circles." ':l his is taken out of context. The full quote from the DCI:'s
Statement readsi`
In order to obtain access to foreign circles, the Agency
also recruited or inserted about a dozen individuals into American
dissident circles in order to establish their credentials for
c11~eration ?abroad [!Emphasis supplied.]
b. In +1~ 'dn citing the DCPs Statement of 15 January 1975, the Rcpo,?t
sty,:,-=s (p. 1: Par. 1) that CIA had cc;mpilecl dossiers "on about 10,000 American
c;i.ti.d c "as, " by implication American dissidents. The DCI's explanation would
have, been appropriate here. It reads 9 '
In the course of this program, files were established on
about 10,000 citizens in the counterintelligence unit, About two-
thirds of these were originated because of specific requests from the
FBI for information on the activities of Americans abroad, or by
the. filing of reports received from the FBI for possible later use
in connection with our work abroad.
C. The Report states (p. 1, par. 2) that CIA's "budget is exempt from
legislative review," This is untrue. Subcommittees of both the Senate and
House Appropriations Committees over the years have given the CIA budget
close scrutiny. liurtliermore, the special. House Approlriations Subcomrnit-
tee which has oversight of the CIA budget has recently been enlarged to
include all the members of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.
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tl;: The Report (p. 1, par. 2) also. cotltains a misleading statement, at least
by implication, when it states that CIA's "activities may be any fl-hat the
National Security Council directs, as long as they concern in, some fashion.
'the national. security. "' The Report. omits the important modifier in the National
Security Act of 1947 in this connection; the statute reads:
IT) o perform such other functions and duties related to zntolli-
ppen(`e affecting the national security as the National Security
Council may from time to time direct. [3 r:3 ;basis st pplied.).
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CREATION AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF TIII? CENTRAL INTFLLtGENCI
AGENCY
a. Footnote 2 (p. 1 at p. 36) omits a word in citing the Ransom book. The
footnote reads "extensive and covert activity." It should read " extensive
espionage and covert activity.
I . The Report states (p. 2, 11. l--?,) that the plan for a post -war intelli-
gence service was "sicletraicl:.eel" by the Joint Chief of Staff. The Report does
not point out that the sidetrac?icing occurred as a result of the leak of the top
secret plan to Walter Trohan of the Chicago Tribune, where the article appeared
on 9 February 1945 (as well as in the Washinf;ton Times-Herald), resulting in
discussions being temporarily suspended by tb.e JGS on. orders from Gen.
Marshall. They were resumed in September 1945.
c. The Report states (p. 2, 1. 2) that the OSS was disbanded on
September 20, 1945. While this is the correct date for the issuance of the
executive order, the effective date of the dissolution of OSS was 1 October 1945.
ti. The Report states (p. 2, par. 1) that President Truman established the
National Intelligence Authority by "executive order. " Actually, it was estab-
lished by a Presidential Directive to the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy.
Nor did the Directive designate Admiral Leahy as a member of the NIA, as stat;o:d
in this paragraph. It merely designated "another person to be named by me as
my personal representative; " and Admiral Leahy was subsequently so designated.
e. The Report states (p. 2, par. 2) that one of GIG's roles is "coordinating
the activities of the intelligence agencies throughout the government." Actually,
the Presidential Directive limited the coordination to the intelligence elements of
State, War, and the Navy. The Report is only partially correct here in stating
that one of CIG's first tasks was to furnish the President "with a daily report of
intelligence information, a functiozi which its successor continues to perform.""
It is true that CIG furnished the President with a daily intelligence report, but
the CIA. daily.report now contains comments and evaluations of such information.
This was not true of the original GIG reports, as State blocked the inclusion Of
any evaluation. This precipitated a long and continuing battle between the
agencies concerned. This whole paragraph is taken with very little change from
-a law review article by Prof. .Walden; error included.
f. The Report discusses (p. 2, par. 3) the "Report on the System Currently
Employed in the Collection, Evaluation, and Dissemination of Intelligence ..."
released by the House Military Affairs Committee in December 1946. In taking
note of the Committee's call for permanent legislation for GIG, the authors of the
Report are apparently unaware of the fact that Admiral Souers had made such a
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reconiineixdati.on. to the NIA i' his final report to that body in Tune 1940; .and that
such l.ega.sla,tion had already been drafted in. the spring of 1.946 by SSU/C G's
Office of General Counsel, The impact of the House Military A.ffa.irs Committee
Report on the subsequent hearings and debate on the National Security Act of
1947 .was minimal, and not the cause and effect implied here. GIG had little or
nothing to do with the Military Affairs Committee,-'s work a3.-id Report. The Bar
A ssociationa Report also continues its error by designating President Truman's
Presidential Directive as an "executive order. " A further error in this paragraph
is the stater-rent that the National Security Act of 1947 established the Department
of Defense. That Act established the Natror,.ni Military Establishment, headed. by
a. Secretary o.f Defense. '1,he Department of: Defense teas riot. establi: hed until the
National Stc.u.rii:y Act Amendments of 1949.
g. At the 1-.bottom of p. 2, the Report digests the duties of CIA as set forth in
the National Security Act of 1947. Conspicuously absent from duty 3 as set forth
in the Report is the statutory requirement that the Director of Central Intelligence
shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthor-
izcd disclosure.
h. The Report states (p. 3, 1. 1) that, by the National Security Act of 1947,
"the CIA was removed from military control .... " Neii`lr.er CIG nor CIA was ever
under "military control. " The members of the NIA were all civilians, except for
Admiral Leahy. The meiLabers of the NSC are all civilians.
i... T ooinot:c 10 of the Report (p. 3 at 1). 37) states tlh.at Rear Admiral
Hil.lenkoetter became the first Director (of CIA) on September 15, 1947. This
date is incorrect. Section 310 of the National Security Act of 1947 provided, with
certain exceptions not pertinent here, that the Act: would become effective on the
day after the day on which the first Secretary of Defense takes office. Secretary
Forrestal was sworn in as Secretary of Defense on 17 September, which brought
the CIA provisions into effect the next day. Actually, Admiral Hi.l.l.enkoetter did
not take the oath until 26 September.
j. The Report states (p . 3, par. 1) that the DCI was empowered "to inspect
all intelligence relating to national security gathered by any agency of the
government ...." This is not accurate. A sharp distinction was drawn with regard
to information from the FBI. A special proviso was written into sec. 102(e) of the
Act which states that:
[U] pon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available
to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation,
evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security.
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The right of inspection which is given to the DCI vis-a-vis ihra other intelligence
~~gencii.s of the governaricnt is not authorized vvis--a--vis the .F I,
k. The Report (p. 3, par. 1) purports to quote the text of sec. 102 (c) of
the ?National Security Act of 1947. When quoted correctly, the word "interest:"
in the. last line of the paragraph should read "interests." This error is doubt--
Jess caused by the use of Walden's text, cited in footnote 12, ,k,hich contains this
. ea:-ror,, rather than checking the actual statutory k ciguage. 1. ootnote 12, Which
follows this quotation, also cites in. support, Jnt'7 ilia, Core-, Ford's book,
Donovan However, there arc,. no ref( 1`E nc;es to the l~GPs termination
authority in the Ford book at the rages cited,
1. Tb Report (p. 3, par. 2) discusses the CIA Act of 1919. It quotes two
provisions of that Act. '_0.'h.en it quotes (par. 2, ii. 8-10) what would appear to
bo a third quotation from the Act, as follows:
[S] uch expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate
of the Director without a y further accounting therefor. [Emphasis
The correct statutory quotation from the Act reads:
T .l] rich expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate
of the Director and c vexlsuch r -e? tifi.cate lA _71 be deernted a suffic l r,.t
vo c ,ti i for the p cou It thercdrl. cc rtifiecl [Emphasis
It is misleadin , to say the least, to have included this erroneous quotation in the
text of the Report as if it were taken from the Act, even though it is preceeded in
the text of the Report by the phrase: "and granted him the extraordinary right
to spend money simply by signing his name.
m. The Report (p. 3, par. 2) is certainly misleading to the general public
When it :state::. that the CIA. Act of 1949 allows the Director:
[IJ~ n collaboration with the Attorney General and the Commissioner
of Immigration, to admit up to 100 persons into the United States each
year secretly
without regard to immigration quotas, The word "collaboration" has the cornnota-
tion of plot or something sinister, and the quote furthermore implies that CIA
can. bring in any 100 aliens that it might choose. The statute is certainly more
explicit and reads:
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Whenever the Director, the Attorney General, and the Commissioner
of Immigration shall cleterahine that the entry of a particular alien into the
United States for permanent residence is in the interest of national secant.
2K-essential to the furtherance of the national intel.h erxce mission .
[Emphasis supplied.) A correct: prescritation of the text of the statute, together with a rea.di.ng of the
Repo`Lrts on this let,islat:ion , as well s:. s the extensive debate which accon-r-
l,-aaniied its Via;'.. sage, would have presented a 'tmmooh fairer 1")iL1:Y'?i E to the public
in; tend of t e zr,.i~le~ cling implication of the Re nor:t.
n.. The Report (p. 3, par. 3) the quoted provision from the
National Security Act of 1.947. The last word in. 1. 4 should read "related" rather
than "relating."
o. Footnote 19 to the Report states (p. 3 at 1). 37), in discussing CIA's
covert action. role, that: The CIA's real role is therefore spelled out in a series
of top secret DISC directives (NSCID:s) ." This is inaccurate. Covert ad on
directives, such as the originating 10/2, are NSC Directives -:nd not NSCIDs, the
latter being a different series. The Report is led astray here by its reliance on
poor or ill--i,iforrned sources. The last sentence of the footnote, based on a state-
went in Raai.;om's book, states that the DCI's participi:Jo i. in NSC arac:etings "suggests
that the scope of Agency operations may be largely self --determi.ried." The fact that
t -yc- President presides over the NSC, whose a-r?.c?:rihcrship includes the Vice
President a.esrl the Secretaries of State and Defense., among others, wouldl seem to
negate this sua.ggestion.
p . The second half of p. 3, par. 3 in the Report is somewhat connfused. The
operations authorized by NSC 10/2 were originally handled (commencing in June
1948) by a component of the Office of Special Operations. Mr. Wisner came in to
take over these operations in the newly created Office of Policy Coordination on.
1 September 1948. The statement in par. 3 that "A section. was thereupon created
by President. Truman within the CIA." is placing too much administrative detail.. on.
the President. He merely assigned the functions to CIA. by his approval. of DISC
10/2. Nor, as this parzvS raph implies, was the Office of Specia.l. Oper d-lon.s created
at the same time as OPC. The former Office was established (originally in GIG) on
11 July 1946, The Report is also incorrect in stating that the control of bath Offices--
O SO and OPC--was shared with the State Department and the Pentagon.. This was
true of OPC, which received policy guidance from State and the Pentagon, but was
never true of OSO which was completely controlled by CIG/CIA..from its inception.
1 ven with the merger of the two Offices into the Directorate of Plans, CIA did not
have "sole control over secret operations of all types ." Policy guidance for covert
action still continued to be given through a succession of mechanisms, starting
with the Psychological Strategy Board, succeeded by the Operations Coordinating
Board, down through the current Forty Committee.
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.q. As is customary, no comment will he made on the accuracy or inaccuracy
of the, CIA personnel and budgetary figures in the Report (top of p. 4), The use
of the word "trade" in this paragraph (1, 9) is puzzling, However, a check of the
source in footnote 24 (p. 4 at P. 37), the hook by Marchetti and.Marks , reveals
"
that the word "tr-adc." in the Report should be "training.
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P?.
II. DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES ANT) THEIR LEGAL BASIS
A, Domestic Surveillance and Infiltration
a. Footnote 25 (p. 4 at pp. 37-38) cites a New York Time article of
29 1~. ct Ya b x 1974 as stating that a former CIA agent. said he was one of
severa.1 assigned to spy on aan.ti--war groups in New York between 1.968 and.
IV?- 1"l:xe Report does not tike note of DCI Colby's Statement before: the
S1j,,.)co)-11,Mittee of the House
1975 . In that Statement, the Director said, r ega.rdin.g, the allegations in the
Cited Now `limes article, thatt
Another alle=gation given prominence was apparently based
on the statements of an anonymous source .... As I told the journalist
involved before the story was printed, it does not bear any
relation to CIA's actual activities in that area. Nor can we identify
any former employee who answers to the journalist's description of
his source. I fear that the journalist has been the victim of what we
in the intelligence trade call a fabricator.
1'c~otnote 25, in its second paragraph also cites a New York Titre,: article of
8 Santa a:ry 1.17)75 to the effect that CIA's mail opening operations tiT e: c '1a11egeci
to have :tart rl in the summer of 19531} Actually, the" Times zirtielc gives the
date L1"the summer of 1958.11
b. 'l."he Report (p. 4, par. 3) states that in 1967, CIA and other g;overn-
ment agencies adopted a statement of principles which provided that "the
fact of government research support should always be acknowledged by
sponsor, university and researcher. It The footnote sources this quote to
a law journal article by Prof. Walden, who in turn sources it to the New
York Times of 12 August 1967. A review of our copy of the 'limes at the
cited page discloses no such quotation,
c The Report discusses (p. 5, 11, 1-6 and par. 1) the subject of CIA
support to the National Student Association (NSA), The CIA aim was to
preserve the freedom ands integrity of NSA in whatever.- positions it chose
to take, The Report distorts the NSA connection, which in part allowed
the members to gain parliamentary expertise face to face with communist
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front groups abroad. Similar distortion appears in the lengthy quotation from
Prof. Walden (p. 5, par. .1.). He quotes one officer of NSA. Others could have
been quoted per contra. It is also noted that footnote 32 (p. .5 at p. 38), which
is, citation to the Walden article, gives the wrong; page for the quote. It
-boold be p. ]. C , not p.
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P. ?10
B. Statutory Limitations Upon CIA Activities in the United States
a. There are several. references in this section to President Truman's
"executive order" of 22 January 1946. As noted above, (id.), this docu-
ment is not an executive order; it is a Presidential Directive.
1:.). The opening sentence in section B (p. 5) states that "The only
express statutory limitations upon the activities of the CIA are those found
in ;c. ction 102(d.)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 ... which provides
that it shall be the duty of the Agency ...." The text then continues by quot-
ing parts of sec. 102 (d) (3). The only part of sec. 102 (d) (3) quoted in the
text here which contains a limitation upon Agency activities is the proviso
against police subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal-security
functions. The earlier part of the quoted text sets forth duties and responsi-
bilities and is not a limitation. The second quoted proviso regarding the
protection of sources and methods is also not a limitation, and in any event it
is a responsibility placed on the Director of Central Intelligence and not on
the Agency.
c. The Report states (p. 6, par. 2) that, as finally passed, the National
Security Act of 194 7 "expo essly adopted, generally verbatim, the powers
and duties of the Agency and limitations thereon contained in the Order [sic] ."
One omission was paragraph 9 of the Executive Directive of 22 January 1946,
quoted (p. 6, par. 1) in the Report. This limitation had originally been
included in the Presidential Directive as a "late starter" at the request, or can
behalf, of the FBI. Subsequently, GIG found that this proviso might make it
impossible to talk to American travellers who had been abroad or American
businessmen who could have information of value to contribute about matters
overseas. After. consultation with FBI Director Hoover, the latter stated that
it was not the intent of the Bureau to block such activities; as a result, and
because it was redundant, paragraph 9 of the Directive was omitted from the
National Security Act as finally adopted.
0- The Report states (p. 6, par. 3) that:
. [T] here was no doubt in the minds of the supporters of the
National Security Act.of 1947 that the Agency's ... activities in this
country were to be strictly limited to those directly related to the
correlation and evaluation of such [foreign] intelligence:
''t'his is not strictly correct. GIG had commenced collecting foreign intelligence
from knowledgeable sources in the U.S. as a service of common concern, as
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p. 11
noted in paragraph c. above. General Vandenberg, the DCI, had alluded
to this in a passi.n.g remark in his Statement to the Senate Armed Services
Committee in support of S. 758. In that Statement he referred to the "great
open sources of information" available, including "general information from
people with a knowledge of affairs abroad."
r. 1.e; Report (P. 0, in the first of two quotations from G(- .. r d
Vandenberg': Statement at the bottom of the page) omits the wo) `to"
between the Nvords "arid" and "avoid" in the second line of the.
Footnote i8 (p. 0, at p. 38) misspell. General V~1Y:tra.enl~er 's n,. s?"ti `''1~c3l1~r;.11Ca'_f,rg,tt
i. The Report (p. 7, par. 2) cites Secretary ltorrestal as "Secretary of
War." Mr. Forrestal was never Secretary of War; he was, at that time,
Secretary of the Navy.
g. The Report (p. 8, pars. 2, 3) discusses the "Keith" case in paragraph
2 and then tries to link it up, in a negative way, with the discussion in Para-
graph 3. The result is a non sequitw7. The discussion in. paragraph 2 of the
Report involves the definition and alleged interchangeable usage of the terms
"domestic security" and "internal security" by the Court in "Keith." Mention
is then made of the examples that Court used for what is, and what is not,
"domestic etc .xity . " Paragraph 3 of the Report then starts off with the -tate-
merct that:
The Keith cai. ;e notwi.thsta.n iz.~f , however,-, Messrs. Helms
and Colhy appear to have adopted a different definition of the term
"internal security" ....
Use is then made of two quotations, one from Mr. Helms and one from Mr. Colby,
to illustrate the attempted point. The. only problem is that the quotes have nothing
to do with a definition of "internal security," but rather relate to he respective
responsibilities of the FBI and CIA for counterintelligence activi`.; . within the
United States and abroad.. (It should be noted in the second pair rr'a.ph of the
quotation from Mr. Colby's Statement (p . 8), that the text does have the
word "the" before "C.I.A.") The Report then continues (pp. 8-11) to discuss
the case of Heine v. Rau-s. While the Court, in the "Keith" case did not define
what internal security is, at least the Court, in the Raus case, gave one instance
of what it is not.
h. Under the general heading "Domestic Activities Viewed as Permissible
by the CIA," the Report lists (pp. 9-10) 18 iterris. Several are taken from the
Hearing on the Nomination of Mr. Colby to be DCI. (Although included in
the published record of the confirmation hearing, the cited items are actually
taken. from written replies to questions submitted by Senator Symington.)
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It would have been useful if the Report: had included Mr. Colby's preamble
sentence in answering Senator Syrni.iai;tori.'s questions regarding CIA
domestic activities. That sentence reads:
Provided that CIA's activities within the U.S. arc in the
prosecution of foreign intelligence and do not contravene U.S.
late, I hel.ioove they do not conflict: with the statutory restriction
against CIA involvement in domestic a4fa.irs. (Colby, Ilear"On
at p. 157)
the List in the Report Q-). 9) is 'r ect uit?.rrt :. screening, t:x atti.
}:ab v s ti.jaating e'onployees, " This is sourced (fn. 46, p. 9 at p.. 38) to oh :'
Cc]7i,,,r nominati n. hearing, In the cited portion (which is the Colby written
answer to the Symington question on domestic activities), Mr. Colby do s
not mention "investigating e-e.ployees . "
i' 6--"!:.'he Report (p. 9) lists CIA contracting with U . S . industrial firms or
research institutes for "research and development of technical intelligence
devices. " This is sourced (.11 1. 51, 1.3. 9 at p. 39) to the Colby Report to the
Senate Appropriation's Committee, 15 January 1975. In that Report th.c IDS,
in the context of 6, refers to "technical intelligence capabilities" a much
broader term than "devices," although earlier in his text the DCI did use
the phrase "technical intellig;crate devices. " (However, that 1_}Iira se appears
or,. 1,-). 30, col. 3 in. the New 'York J amts text, whereas fn . 51 cites eel . 4, 5,)
#i3-This item, is stated in the Report (p. 10) as "Protecting intelligence
sources and methods within the Agency." This is sourced (fn. 58, p. 10 at
p. 39) to the Colby confirmation hearing (at p. 25). That citation is a general
discussion of the subject-between Mr. Colby and Senator Symington, and
does not include specifically the strange phrasing of #13 regarding such pro-
tection "within the Agency." In fact, Mr. Colby states in his answer that:
My interpretation. of that particular provision, Mr. Ch rrr wi.,
is that it gives me a charge but doe.; not give mv authority..
arty the job of identifying G.r.Yy pr?c)b'ieetri of protecting sotu ce:
mr rethods , but in the event I identify one it gives me the responsi-
bility to go to the appropriate authorities with that information and
it does not give me any authority to act on my own.
4.18--This item regards the supplying of equipment and safe houses to "other
government officials" if used for a legitimate purpose: (p. 10'.11. It is sourced
(frt. 63, p. 10 at p. 39) to Colby's confirmation hearing. In those hearings
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It vaoulel have been useful if the Report had included Mr. Colby', preamble
sente-nice in answering S orator Symington's questions regarding CIA
domestic activities. That sentence reads:
Provided that CIA's activities within the U.S. are in the
prosecution of foreign intelligence and do not contravene U.S.
law, I believe, they do riot conflict with the statutory restrici:ion
A
against CIA involvement in Cl.ome itic affairs. (Colby, Hearing
at P. lr'()
the :L tfl_i:.rioi.l).ng,
l t e l,i jr
investiga : ng employee ," This is sourced (fn. 46, 1?. 9 at p. "8) to the
Colby nomination hear is ;.g . In the cited portion (which is the Colby written
answer to the Symington question on domestic activities), Mr. Colby does
1'zr: i. me" ntion "a:.:z~~ estig t ire ; employees."
#6---".the Report (p . 9) lists CIA contr. actin , with U . S . industrial firms or
research institutes for "research and development of technical intelligence
11C
devi.ces." This is sourced (fn. 51, P. 9 at p. 39) to the Colby Report to t'
Senate Appropriations Committee, 15 January 1975. In that Report the DCI,
in the context of f6, refers to "technical intelligence capabilities" a much
broader term than "de--ices," although earlier in his text the DCI did use
the phrase "technical intelligence devices, " (However, that phrase appears
on 1). 30, col. 3 in the NedTr York. I. imes text, whereas fra. 51 cites cols. 4, 5 . )
"13 ._Thi s it"e,nn is stated in the Repo ?t Q). 10) a ; "Protec.tti.ng intelligence
c s and. met.hod.s within the Agency. " This is sourced (in. 58, p. 10 at
p. 39) to the Colby confirmation hearing (at p. 25). That citation is a general
discussion of the subject between Mr. Colby and Senator Symington, and
does not include specifically the strange phrasing of #13 regarding such pro-
tection "within the Agency. " In fact, Mr. Colby states in his answer that.
My interpretation of that particular provision, Mr. Chairman,
is that it gives me: a charge but does not give 7ne authority. It gives
me the joi:a of ident:i-`J.x3.g any problem of protecting sources and
methods, but in the event I identify one it gives me the responsi-
bility to go to the appropriate author. ities with that information and
it does not give me any authority to act on my own.
#18--This item regards the.supplying of equipment and safe houses to."other
government: officials" if used for a legitimate purpose (p. 10). It is sourced
(fn. 63, p. 10 at p. 39) to Colby's confirmation hearing. In those hearings
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p. 13
(at p. 22) , Mr. Colby only discusses providing such facilities to White
i ouse employees, not "other government officials.
i. In the section of the Report (p. 10) under they heading "Domestic
Activities Viewed. as Prohibited by the CIA," four items are lic # 'E'd, three of
them The sou.-.rce of Item ' 2 i ; not but it is ta'.;cn from the
Uul,by hear`.i4i. g (at p. 24)
j.. The n,->, t secii?ii ?:c i.1.1c Rcpt.,): L Q) P. ].0""21) is devoted to ''1))o mcs t.i
Activi.tires of the CIA in ';ray Area. '" It comprises seven items.
#2--Place i in the "gray area" the 1-:r;:roviding of Covert assistance to American
cdu.cationpl o voluntary organizations. However, .footnote 68 Q). 1.0 at p . 39)
states:
Such assistance has been banned by the CIA by internal
regulations, but this may have occurred not because the activity
was thought to be unlawful but as a matter of policy.
The banning of such assistance was a result of the Report of the Katzenbach
Committee on 29 March 1967. It placed this ban in its Statement of Policy,
and the Pre ;id.ent, in a White. House release on 29 1* arch, stated: "I accept
ills" Coimil`(, ('.ee's prop proposed statement of policy and am-!) directing all agencies
of the to iri:,?' ement it fully'." The Pr'esident's St< J: xrlent and
t1:r.a;
l:te]lor#: vi~~~,e, printed vei?3aatiin in the NeYoh 'f iy .7Y e on 30 March. J hus ,
New
,_..
while footnote 68 is cori`c ct. in that the legality of these acts was not at issue,
the banning of them was not so much a matter of policy, but rather the result
of a Presidential order to implement the ban as government-wide policy.
Therefore, it would appear that the Report is incorrect in placing #2 in the
"gray area." It is an activity viewed as prohibited by the CIA. -
T3--Places in the "gray a!.r ea" "Inserting agents 'into American dissident circles
in order to establish their credentials for operations abroad. "i It might present
a fairer picture, if the Report had included the beginning of the sentence it
quotes, which comes from the Colby Statement of 15 January 1975, and reads
"In order to obtain access to foreign circles, the Agency also recruited or,
inserted about a dozen individuals into .. " Similarly, in footnote. 69 (p. 10.
at pp.. 39 40) , which sources #3 to the Colby Statement, it would have left
a much less sweeping and more accurate picture if the entire Colby sentence
had been quoted. The footnote says: "In 1973, such information [on American
dissidents] was limited to that collected abroad. " The full Colby sentence reads:
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In,1973 this program was reviewed and specific direction
given linli.titx,g it to collection abroad, emphasizing that its targets
were the foreign links to American dissidents rather than the
dissidents themselves ....
47-This item (p. 13) places in the "gray area" various CIA activites (all
domes-;tic) such a surreptitious entry, physical surveillance, wiretapping,
ol_>{ . ji.::ag mail, and. maintaining files on congressme..en. Footnote 73 (p. 11. at
. 40), cites 't:1 l.f.'. C o l bi C fak.;:.r~?' ';e~nf of l5 _7 January 1975 r ~ and a i~leiv ~ rox1 ~ .
l? t
(p. 14, par . 1), which states -chat the powers ? which Congress gave the NSC
"were either of an advisory nature or were related to the coordination of
the policies and functions of the other agencies in the national secu~-ity
area," of course t e NSC powr rs quoted lac- c are advisory; no ag :c :cy of
the Fa? -, ecutive br. au-r;h can direc.t the President, The latter power is often with-
in the jurisdiction of the legislative and judicial, branches. The Report does
not poi gat out here that the President is a member of the NSC--its presiding
officer, However, as President, he can accept or reject its recommeendati.ons;
an NSC Directive is the President speaking through his advisors in council.
Furthe.ru)ore, in describing the. NSCIs powers as "of an advisory nature or
were related to the coordination The Report overlooks section 103(d) of
the National Security Act of 1947, the preamble of which states that it
shall he the duty of the Agency, pnder thecl3r cction of flee Ti atiol Security
Council , ..." [Ezraphasis :,tt.}sp(i:;:r5 The Acs . then lists five duties oil.' L'Fle
Agency, including thc, one cited ?:a the Repo:rl: as the source of ClA.'s t< ittesry
claim to perform covert action operation ---1'toa perform such other fi.l?: cLions
and duties related to intelligence. affecting national security as _ he
Nationzd Security Council may from time to time direct," [Emphasis supplied.]
Here again, the NSC has directive authority. The Report concludes (p. 14,.
par. 1) from its reasoning that "Nowhere is the NSC directly given the power
to.con.duct political operations ." This is correct in that the NSC is not an
operational agency of the Government, Its statutory authority is to advise,
coordinate and to direct the activities of CIA, The Report then. continues that
it is difricult for CIA to maintain that it conducts its covert action oprc-r-ations as
a dcl< i *a.tion of po,,v r from the l'NNSC, as the. .NSC has no stitch power to delegate.
CIA does not claim such a delegation, but rather bases its authority in this
field on its statutory provisions under the direction of the NSC,
f, The Report states (p. 14, par. 2) "in the provision of the National
Security Act of 1947" and proceeds to quote portions of 50 U.S.C. 403g
(fn. 98, p. 14 at p. 42), The quoted provisions are not a part of the National
Security Act of 1947, They are taken from sec. 7 of the Central In.telligehce
Agency Act of 1949.' It is interesting to note that, at the end of the text of
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50 U. -.C. 403g (which is the codification of aec. 7 of the CIA Act of 1949),
there is an explanatory sentence which reads: "Section was not enacted
as t.r 'the s unti.er appropriate sa 'guards as to bsciosu.r'e. 1-11o;'/ever,
l :irking C ?: (..'IA. materiel.. ca,.]-s. be costly tie^i the vex j'y i.i'tF as of CTA per ennel or its
sources aibrr)ad, and can have serious effects on. the Agency's liaison ax ran3.g 'e_
3J-Lents With i:or'C:ea.gn governments. To describe CIA personnel, as the Repot!.:
apparently implies, as "a small. number of unaccountable bureaucrats" is
completely untrue and an unwarranted and undeserving slur on a very dedi-
cated group of public servants totally accountable to the designated committees
in the Congress.
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p.
IV. BUDGETARY PROCEDURE AND ITS S T A f ',J ['CORY BASIS
A. lL,ridin r A.rran,eme:nts; The Present: Process of Appro rri~ct'ior.
a. 'J.'1ic Report queries (p. 21, par. 1) why Congress has not acted sooner
to prevent CIA from '' carrying out foreign policy abuses. " While it may be
that CIA i:: , s conducted activit:ie abroad with which some members of ti e
t ong ~.;_; i 1'i alt d7.i='.1 E e as a m t r of policy, CIA. has c~?rrk.(-!
"foreign 1pp,-Aicy abuses.
'b. Footnote 135 (p. 21 at p. 4:3) states that the description of CIA
budgetary proce& res is "ada.pt:er.I" from an a rt cle by Robin Schwartzn, P occss
a. ' "I,.e Report states. (p. 22 , par, 1) that section 6 of the CIA Act of
1949 "provides," and then quotes the Act. Footnote 144 (p. 22 at p. 44)
correctly cites the section as quoted as 50 U . S . C . ? 403f. It-is therefore
misleading for the text to cite this as section 6 of the Act of -1949, becaur e
the. quoted text reads slightly differently because of he codification refer. --
e::nc:c 'ai 1;ssis ,.r.= e Act of P)l/':) adds sec. 66`,?, on CJI.,
not se"e` 663 as stated in the Report (p. 32, t i ,.-r . 4).
a. The Report state s ().. ?3, par. 4) 1t i T@=.pO~)Zt'ttoi7g
~iil4
and submission of a proposed budget to a ca. efully oreai ized joint
committee representing all segments of Congress, should be a
mii imam." It is noted that even. with a joint committee, itr will be
necessary for the Agency, a.s is true of every government a.gency,
to seek its appropriations from the Approp H -41:ionss Commi .aces of the
House and Senate.
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VI. IU,.COMMENDAT:10NS
a. The Report states (p. 33, reconirnendation I) :hat CIA's "do nestle
activities---viewed as legitimate by the Agency--so pervade our national
life and society as to make such restriction [against internal security
functions] and prohibition almost meaningless." This statement i.: much
overdrawn.
'1.'. The Report c i.tes (p. 33, recomm.:1dat on l) Mir. Colby's report to
the iti_:;''le ..)~trtl, .vy ie.+?'l > C,C. iti:C C_s ~' trx lc 7't'r 19'I rt;SYa C ittg Cis:)C..F'.C
arr enci >> r.'a:s to CIA's 1f,-.-gal authorities, In noting the PCI's suggest:ic?~. to
strenr- h: x. the pr si.l:!'~t:l:on lK.'..? 1s1?C:ge a i".i,e.x i s internal security SLZ.? '.:-.Lit y. , the
Report says:
However, this prohibition would be "supplemented" by an
additional proviso preserving for the CIA the right to carry on within
the United States any activity "in support of its foreign intelligence
responsibilities ...." It is difficult to determine which of the domestic
activities now ref,
arded by the CIA as not prohibited even though they
appear to involve internal security functions, would be curtailed
under such. a, proviso.
In the fix st place, Mr . Colby did riot say "any" activity, but merely ", s u
~.{:ti'U7.tiC',., .
S
econdl.y, I./fr. Colby, in the very newt paragraph of his Report to i;' e Committee
lists six c :am.ples of what these '"activities" would Th.eriL;k()ze, the
proviso does not make it "difficLult to d uterinine" what the Director's meaning
c. The Report (p. 34, recommendation 3) is quite confused on the subject
of the Director's use of his responsibility to protect intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure, and recommends that this authority be
eliminated, They suggest, in. regard to such protection outside the United
States, that the authority to protect intelligence sources and methods is
"implied as part of the Agency's i.ntellig nc +-f tl.iering fu.nction:." `1.7Ihe Report:
is incorrect in this, far there is no other provision in CIA statutes which
such authority is "implied.1 The Report: states that "Any protection of domestic-
sources and methods. other than routine safety measures which may be necessary
must be carried out by the FBI. " There is no indication as to what is meant by
"routine safety measures." Nor does the protection of intelligence sources and
-.methods extend, as the .Report states, to. "all Government documents and
.sources.. " CIA's use of the proviso is strictly for intelligence purposes. The
Report also overlooks the use of this proviso in the case of Heine v. Raus and
the two Marchetti cases, all three of which were upheld by the Circuit Clourts,
with certiorari denied.
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d .: - The Report states (pp . 34?35, recommendation 4) that in effect
neither the National Security Act of 1947 nor the. CJA Act of 1949 c ont li its
"any express authorityr" for CIA to undertake "foreign political operations."
The very next sentencc of the Report, however, speaks of the amendment
contained in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 requiring reports on such
operations. Thus, in effect, Congress continues to recognize aad ratifies
U 'A's authority to conduct such orp.erations, although the Report indicates
2-3) it cites tlie Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 as rei~z e z+# ,,. a.
g
c rlgy c. ~sa.e?31? 1. attempt to increase ClA's "accallyAtabbi_lity to Co
for its
a
ence " ! i"3.C flepo C t t:he cont13 ues (. p a5,, it , }` t) to the effe t
has 'a Cti21, ti.iution.a,lly ?IJC. iee.{ responsibility 3
s a
1` *"t3 er with the 1' mchase of a ra.clic' station and other projects, although a lesser amount: was
actually disbus6t,.u.#8President Lord. subsequently stated that the covert funds
had been spent in Chile to "preserve opposition political parties," but said
that he.would take no position on whether such CIA activities were permitted
by international law.88
B. Statutory Framework for CIA Covert
Political Operations
Serious questions have been raised regarding the legal justification for and.
the political wisdom of the CIA's foreign political opei:ations. Since this re-
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port is concerned solely with the constitutional and statutory issues affecting
the CIA, it will not focus on any of the political issues batt.iathcr will be
litnited to a review of the legal authority upon Which the CIA's .foreign co-
vert operations ate said to be b;tscd.
Prior to the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 which was signed into law on l .tember Sr, forei n covert opetaatioos not directly' linked to the
.fathering of intelligence were justified under rife fifth and last. of the duties
established for the CIA uncl.-r the National Security Act of 1947. Pursuant
to that provision it was die CIA's duty "to perform such other functions and
duties relatc;cl to intelligence affecting the national security as the National
Security Council may from to time direct." ? Richard Helms, while Director
of the CIA, took this approach in a speech delivered on ~t,lra:il 14, 1971-in which he said that the language of this provision
n,'reetor tr,cit-,y also implied as ss'eh in his ;: i.narion hrt.si vi-hen he
referred to tic provision as "the authority mulct winch a lot ey the Agency's
activities are conducted."Q"-
Upon careful analysis of the provision's language, however, the interpreta-
tion forwarded by Messrs. Helms and Colby does riot appear to br warranted.
Not only must the "other functions and duties" be "related to intelligence,"
they must also be performed only upon the direction of the National Security
Council. The authority of the National Security Council is therefore the key
issue and the limitations upon the NSC's authority are clear. 71 he NSC is not
an action agency. Its primary function is
"To advise the President with respect to the integration of dramestie,
foreign, and military policies relating to the rtatio,:al security t o as to
.'1.:'.I'4:ritE;1LS FxI"tta. rtF tvFlC:les Uf
enable file Sa]illC3ry y?.rv,!'CS and, the other
the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the
national scceriry." (Emphasis adtled)m
The NSC was also given certain "additional fvn.t:ioaas, none of ; hick gave
it any more o,),.,.-ational responsibility than its 1 i;nary funcaa :r. These ad-
ditional functions were
"was designed to enable us to conduct such foreign activities as the na-
tional government may fins it convenicut to assign to a sertr-
(a) to perform "such other functions as the. President may direct,
for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and func-
tions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to
the national security ...' ;at
(b) "to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks
of the United States in relation to our actual, and potential military
power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making
recommendations to the President in connection therewith";ate
(c) "to consider policies on matters of cotnn,on interest to the tie-
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)_i!-
Y o~ ^?us a$,. 4Y t1 -t . ; to >i7,1.0 Uk1 that he (.-AA Can dflidlf 7N I covert a OacaviiZ.
-
'
Y ,a~a.cti { trlr o l 7a: I::tcla.ll 4+ r:9lrity Confined by C t re':ss, therefw'e,
-C ...,txtwH.W/1 0 ice
?Ntr :t'llil floe ;Tifton: s arerur;t- :t>ttr1Cil, since t "li'
l.zr are-s re.~r.:i fie25;;c.?-1:?-^v,?srw
1~ .:.7 x. 'lt frt2e,'gytdlSl;.?' f~/ toote f.Z.it in tit (7i?ovisiori Of the ('+::"'~tsnrroT Co..,.-._:.._..
"-L (Ulu lxn a( tk Jo"CllctCS I'll trl(' t;Itoo-k;ll S^[iirlCyv, `s `?,
area. or" the prnver to conduct 1}clitical o 7Cr -
'
In Llie foI i .?tlon of fore;- l
I ;, liracs iatrid l,t , ..ewould a
l , af. Jerrold L. A 'ai 1 bn has concluded es theresult oats detaile
of i` r~ r{;T ssiofa it ates estak~Iisl ji1 the CIA t1a 'no anaIdie
ld I-atase (list o place in tzar
orr of it.:,I \. is it apj w.a'eilt that C f, r i.lt_e
S T9s : to cn~,t e it t?,. ndEd
e:-
,, st~clJr..ainal v;alfzi~e tr;: ~;'.Lr1. -s
c t _v, l in intelligence a d Ii5 btriar> c;;_
t.rsort tnatin", y, an i it w c , axFd as st"ch. seo
b Jlclrn points out that What few Yl l o+ r,Iendations t,af;r ? erC'that sur_II
activities be allowed Were not adopted-t^5 Other participants favorable to
s9zcll Operations expli;:fitly acknowledged their exclusion frclni the coveragr.
Of the ltlgislation. !"of- example, Representative Patterson (1t. Conn.) stated
in the debate leading to enactment of the 19-17 law that wanted an independent intelligence agency working without lldilection by
our armed services, With full authority in operation procedures," he recog-
nized that it was "impossible to incorporate such broad authority in the bill
now before us ..."Io2
That the CIA was intended for intelligence gathering; purposes only is also
r(JIeeted in the reIevtant 11ouse and Seraatte conunittet: rc:l'o,' ?;. A.ccordirll, t. >
.nu ate foreagi:i policy. '1'o the extent that the
,+4lil ities cotatfict l~,itla lather th-'rl
Ac '' .
I4.iit,,,~?np tw:;San with instructions as to which ~.ea s are to be {t` as-
3. Statutory Basis and Constifuttioiuiiit.V
01 CAPProl.17-io I. ions Process
'I'lie legal authu,:'ity for these extraordinary proce,htrr a is found it the
C antral intelligence Agency Act: of. tc j{i.1. 3 S_ction C of t.l?: Act provides: ., ig ei'%_ce Agcrcy is
~-ia the perfG'Ti17%a XL-.e of its fir riftk[Y}:,f the CaenCrat sri-.,1 ' li,laieg them from tin to tiro , r+s rni~ fit be foustd
c as}' and convenietrt, they. would be more full and :at.;_isfar.'tory to the
public, and would Iz sufficiently fr: t pent." 1,,
Althou:=h this statute -flows the President or Secretary of c t to to certify
on this statem Richardson argued that lfadis;enl and t>sore '11'ere
i>x wholehearted agrLemctt as to be cl(esi;ability of full disdosure`arad di and r ~t.'.nCic;e rci, the I t~fIC1'7l t v, i','Y:tii7lent.
-1 1 Other b)9 t..!.'['c sought (i) and acgs . s rel.-01 is to cx T ''.,. i a
coniniittt:? (:.x< ,i;tclE3 p rd C.;)i '., sst Secs. is cre< t }.:;, ._-, of
congressio a .l C-_mIn;ttees to e_!; ,iii as a matter of law, :further i4t atir,ri
$=:om the (J?, .. ( , r, cn [ .
.. ?.,,k~.. 13,798, 211d a~t7`~1) "P..,.n7:f;:- I.i:tC'lll-
gence Agency Disclosure Ac_t");11-: -ud (3) further study and coare:9.atirr of
information available to Congress ,elating to intelligence (S. Con. Res. 73,
93rd Cong., ist Sess. 119731.).
It is apparent that congressional oversight has many variations. Regular
reporting and submission of a proposed budget to a carefully organized joint
committee re-presenting all segments of Congress, should be a minimum.
VI. REGOJIrefEN'DA2i"IONS
i. Despite she present restriction of the CIA. to the foreign intelligence I
{field and d t .te the prohibition gainst its exercising any internal security'
functions, it c, om~stic acd it. es--- . ic;wed as legitimate !:y the A.z e n y- -so per-
vade out u ,-,na.i life and society as to make such restriction. rid proiiibi-
tif)n almost ire;,,ningless. A. rcvi;;ion of the National Security Act Ea as to de-
fine more both the ?.i.z*_.d,riLy of, .and cute restrictions on, the I gency
is plainly
).,e'gislatio;' ld:, this pure t c: rc _. rre,.l to in CIA i,i,ccrnrWill -7n h. c==on=y's
report to the f;mate Approp.iatioris C=ommittee as s~cceptabie: to the CIA is
inadequate. 't`his legislation would add the word "foreign" before the word
"intelligence" wherever it appeals in the Act, and would add a prohibition
against "any domestic intelligence operation or activity" to the existing ban
against the exercise of police, law-enforcement or internal security functions.
However, this prohibition would be "supplemented" by an additional pro-
viso preserving for the CIA the right to carry on within the United States
any activity "in support of its foreign intelligence responsibilities ..."175
It is difficult to determine which of the domestic activities now regarded by
the CIA as not prohibited even though they appear to involve internal se-
curity func=tions, would be curtailed under such a proviso.
Approved For Release 2005/02/15 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000800080004-0
 Approved For Release 2005/02/15 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000800080004-0
IC is re;cotal;licncied tci:.i`'~~r~," Ic>;isi.;t-iot: 31e.! fi~rercatF.ct=t#._:4,~as,tr.I.i~Ia?
clearly tit:,tnC the terms ""iittt:I"tialBCiYt.t'[ty al-A "d, mm ".41k 11,;
gence opei?atioil" -in accordance with) 2 awt bvlo ,
(b) permit no exceptions to the bars on zlc'h npl :rmion b .he &1 .
2. In light of recent to tii lot:y abut I t _crrae>tic t?ttd iti::, til:>;: