CIA LONG-RANGE PLANNING FOR 1985-1990 PHASE 2 - COVERT ACTION GOALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040020-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: May 12, 1982
• Content Type: PAPER

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S E C R E T
CIA LONG-RANGE PLANNING FOR 1985-1990
PHASE 2 - COVERT ACTION GOALS
I. Covert Action in Perspective
Covert action consists of actions which are not attrib-
utable to the United States and which are designed to influence
foreign governments, organizations, persons, or events in support
of US foreign policy. Covert action as a tool of foreign policy
has been well established in the US political firmament since
1947, when the National Security Act, which chartered the Central
Intelligence Agency, authorized CIA to: "Perform such other
functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the
national security as the National Security Council may from time
to time direct." Driven by growing concern in the late 1940s
about the threat to Western interests posed by the Soviet. Union
and its communist allies, US policymakers set the Agency on a
course that saw the rapid development and use of a wide variety
of action capabilities.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, these capabilities were
employed on a broad scale. Whether offensive or defensive,
programs of that period almost invariably had as their ulti-
mate objective the countering-of communist activities. Inter-
national organizations with mass participation were established,
worldwide media capabilities were created, political action and
paramilitary skills and mechanisms were developed and kept at the
ready, and major attention was devoted to the recruitment. and
training of staff personnel and field agents needed to implement
the programs. During this period, the Agency intervened covertly
in numerous countries around the globe in response to policy
direction to shape elections, support the democratic center,
oppose extremism (especially from the left), and counter the
efforts of countries and forces perceived to be inimical to US
and Western security interests. Not until later, in the 1970s,
would issues such as international terrorism, narcotics, nuclear
proliferation, and technology transfer, among others, emerge as
problems requiring covert action attention.
By the early 1970s, public attitudes about the appro-
priate role for the US in world affairs had begun to shift as
a result of the adverse turn of events in Vietnam. Compounding
the problem, the national trauma of Watergate led to a period of
introspection and caution in foreign affairs, which found de-
clining use for covert action as an instrument of policy. With
this decline, the Agency's covert action capabilities atrophied.
S E C R E T
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Not until the late 1970s did US pol icymakers , faced with the
collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran, the Sandinista victory in
Nicaragua, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, among other
problems, begin turning once again to the Agency.for covert
support to policy initiatives. Since then, the rapid increase in
tasking has stretched the Agency's action capabilities to the
limit and made necessary the development of a program to rebuild
certain capabilities.
As we assess its future role, covert action should play
a narrower, more selective role throughout the 1980s than
was the case in the 1950s and 1960s. In contrast with the
international organizations, political party operations, and
large-scale paramilitary programs of that era, we foresee
program actions that are more tightly focused, more bi-
lateral than multilateral in scope and with an increased
capability for unilateral action. it will be important for
Agency management to ensure that CA programs are designed to
support clearly defined policy objectives, and not employed
as a substitute for policy. Nor, except in rare circum-
stances, should CA programs be allowed to become more than
subordinate elements in the overall policy mechanisms for
dealing with foreign problems. Keeping CA within such a re-
stricted framework will be difficult at times, but the
Agency's central responsibility for program design and
.implementation will require that policymakers be sensitized
to and respectful of the limits of covert action.
To prepare for tasking in the latter half of this
decade, the Agency will require the capability to mount and
sustain propaganda, political action, and special opera-
tions/paramilitary programs. The recruitment and training
of staff personnel to manage the programs will be among our
highest priorities of the next two fiscal years as we seek
to recreate a cadre of "triple-threat" case officers who can
handle CA as well as FI and CI responsibilities. Attention will
also be needed to ensure that a cadre of CA specialists is
maintained. Our parallel objective is to have on-line by 1985 a
variety of infrastructural capabilities for program support into
the 1990s.
II. Setting the Stage: Infrastructure Development 1981-1985
In the summer of 1981, the Agency decided on the nature
of CA infrastructural.capabilities needed for the 1980's.
Supplementing the primary need for improved human resources,
both staff and agent, a multi-point development program was
initiated to provide by 1985 a skeletal capability to respond
to a variety of covert action requirements. This development
effort is guided by several principles:
-- The CA mechanisms must be secret and show no
affiliation with the US.
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-- The mechanisms should be small and easily
disposable. The large counter-front organizations
appropriate to the 50s and 60s will not be appro-
priate to the 80s and 90s.
-- The new infrastructure should allow the
Agency to carry out its CA mission entirely
unilaterally if desired. The leak problem will
not go away. The new capability must accept this
reality and be built in such a way that leak damage
can be minimized.
-- The infrastructure must be "on shelf", ready for
rapid use. Because of time required to build, we
cannot wait for the need to be clearly defined. The
skeleton capability will allow the Agency to surge
resources to meet specific demands.
-- The Agency must once again aggressively ex-
plore new ways to use state-of-art developments in
covert action.
With these principles, the reestablished infrastructure will
enable the Agency to:
-- respond to-two insurgency/counterinsurgency
situations simultaneously--at least one entirely
unilaterally;
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A list of specific projects is provided as attachment
This then is the mechanism we hope to see in place as
we enter the second half of this decade. The major resource
commitment should be completed by FY-86. After that, we will
face primarily maintenance expenses both with our human and
equipment resources. If maintained, the Agency should have a
covert action capability able to meet the demands of the 1980s
and beyond.
III. The World Environment: 1985-1990
The latter half of the 1980s will find the US continuing
to confront risks to its national security interests. The
Soviet Union will remain the principal adversary. Although
anticipated leadership changes in Moscow will probably result
in some policy shifts, the Soviet Union will continue its
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efforts to undermine the US position wherever possible. Some
ercent of our total covert action effort will be devoted
p
directly or indirectly to dealing with the Soviet threat. Issues
Provided at Tab B are the key findings of the DDI as-
sessment of probable international problems of the late
1980s which will require policy attention. The DO shares
these perceptions. What are the implications for covert
action?
IV. implications for Covert Action
A. Geographic Issues
Given the outlook for US national security interests in
the 1985-1990 time frame, US administrations will continue
to consider covert action a valuable foreign policy
instrument. We cannot estimate the overall program size by
the latter half of the decade.
Our .planning assumption, however, is that covert action
should not continue on a course of open-ended growth.
Resource requirements should begin to level off by FY-86.
To guide the process of rebuilding capabilities, we
should focus on countries or regions of relatively permanent
US foreign policy ` interest, and on issues that seem destined
to require policy attention throughout the decade.
Because the Soviet Union will represent the greatest
threat to US interests for the foreseeable future, special
effort will be required to counter Soviet initiatives
inimical to US interests worldwide. This will require,
inter alia, strengthening and some redirection of current CA
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET +_- ...,,..
EXTENSION
D/OP
FORWARDED I
Attached is the final version
of the CA long-range planning
___,.. paper.
FORM 61 fl USE PREVIOUS
1-79 EDITIONS
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7055 HQS
TO: (Officer -designation, room numher,ond
b.esdding)
DICER'S
NI IAl5
12 May 1982
COMMENTS (Number each comment Jo show he rn whom
to whom. Dra~ a line acres*__s column aftor eoeh coTerent.(