CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A026000110001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 18, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Department review completed
Top Secret
C 289
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January 18, 1974
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January 18, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
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MIDDLE EAST: Syria has threatened to break rela
tions with Egypt because of Cairo's agreement to 25X1
disengage forces. (Page 1)
CHINA - SOUTH VIETNAM: Saigon claims clash with
Chinese occurred on one of the disputed Paracel
Islands. (Page 6)
INDONESIA: Government decides to clamp down on
dissent in wake of urban violence. (Page 10)
EC: Prospects have improved for agreement on re-
gional fund. (Page 11)
USSR-MBFR: Soviets not likely to introduce new pro-
posals at start of current round. (Page 12)
UK: Government makes new proposal to miners. (Page 13)
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C MIDDLE EAST: Syria threatened to sever rela-
tions with Cairo yesterday following the announcement
of the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, ac-
cording to a press report from Damascus. If the
report is accurate, President Asad may have been
forced to make the threat by those in the military
and Baath Party who strongly oppose negotiations
with Israel.
"Authoritative sources" were quoted by the
press report as stating that Damascus viewed the
disengagement agreement as an act of treachery that
would lead to the ":Liquidation" of the Palestinian
question and of Arab interests as a whole.
Asad's position could be seriously weakened by
this turn of events., Only a few days ago he seemed
ready to enter negotiations. Asad was said to have
called a meeting of political leaders to announce
that Syria would attend the Geneva conference. To
underscore the decision, he reportedly named the
Syrian delegation and said he intended to reshuffle
the cabinet, presumably to replace those opposing
such a move. Most prominent among those rumored to
be replaced was Foreign Minister Khaddam, who is
said to have threatened to resign rather than repre-
sent Syria at the peace talks.
Syria's reaction could pose particular problems
for Egyptian President Sadat. He can point to suc-
cess in the disengagement talks as a counter to mil-
itant Arabs who contend that only war can bring
progress toward a complete Israeli withdrawal, but
without Asad's support Sadat has less of a counter
to charges that Egypt is negotiating unilaterally,
disregarding Arab interests.
Sadat had already been planning a trip to Da-
mascus, as well as other Arab capitals, presumably
to coordinate positions in the aftermath of the ne-
gotiations. The trip now takes on added urgency.
Egypt clearly regards Syrian-Israeli disengagement
as a necessary next step, and views Syrian partici-
pation in the broader Geneva negotiations as a key
factor in the talks. 3
Jan 18 , 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
(continued)
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CSadat probably hopes he can convince the Syrians
that Cairo does not intend to abandon the Arab cause
for the sake of a comprehensive bilateral settlement
with Tel Aviv, and that Syrian participation in the
coming talks could benefit Damascus.
As yet, there has been no reaction to the disen-
gagement announcement from Saudi Arabia or other
Arab oil-producing states. Neither has there been
any indication whether it will lead to a lifting of
the oil embargo and an increase in production. The
evidence suggests that King Faysal may not have made
up his mind whether to declare an end to the embargo
in conjunction with disengagement on the Egyptian
front. The terms and timetable of the accord may be
a telling factor in his decision.
Israel views its approval of the accord as a
major concession to the Arabs. Tel Aviv will likely
regard Cairo's adherence to the agreement as the
prerequisite for further steps toward a comprehensive
settlement. Although the Meir government conceded
that it had to make the first move, it is likely to
proceed cautiously in withdrawing its forces from
the Suez Canal into the Sinai, constantly alert for
any sign that Cairo is not keeping its end of the
bargain.
The government has already come under sharp
criticism for making the agreement with Cairo. The
right-wing Likud--the country's second largest po-
litical grouping--is calling for street demonstra-
tions on Sunday to protest the alleged "surrender
and one-sided withdrawal." Mrs. Meir's efforts to
form a new coalition government will probably not
be affected by the agreement. Likud, her major do-
mestic political opponent, is not in the running
for coalition membership, and the parties that are
do not share Likud's opposition to territorial con-
cessions in the Sinai. 3
(continued)
Jan 18 , 1, 9 7 4 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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C Moscow quickly issued the text of President
Nixon's statement, including the phrase that the
disengagement agreement had been reached "with the
help of the Government of the United States of Amer-
ica." The Soviets did not, however, report any of
the related remarks made by the President. Moscow
obviously is not pleased with the fact that it
played little or no role in bringing about disengage-
ment. The Soviets, nevertheless, have little choice
but to support the agreement as a step toward a
Middle East settlement.
Jan 18 , 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Paracel Islands
NORTH'
VIETNAM
'Nar i-3
CHINA
'nhan-chiang
HAI'-NAN
TAD
MACAO -7"
f" HONG KONG
Robert Patt/e
Crescent Group
SOUTH
VIETNAM'
PHILIPPINES
0 MILES 200
MALAYSIA
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CHINA - SOUTH VIETNAM: Chinese and South Viet-
namese nationals may have clashed on January 16 over
Chinese occupation of Robert Island in the disputed
Paracel Islands. Saigon reports that South Vietnam-
ese soldiers fired on the Chinese when the latter
set up tents and raised their flag over the island.
The South Vietnamese also claim that Chinese person-
nel have landed on two other islands in the Crescent
Group of the Paracels.
Both Peking and Saigon have claimed the Paracels
and have maintained a military presence on some of
them since the mid--1950s. The Chinese occupy the
northern Amphitrite Group, and the South Vietnamese
the southern Crescent Group.
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The Paracels have strategic and economic im-
portance for the Chinese. The islands are used as
radar and weather sites, and their proximity to the
main shipping lines of the South China Sea permits
surveillance of ocean traffic. Chinese naval units
periodically visit the islands
In recent years, the Chinese have expanded
their naval forces in the South Sea Fleet area and
have extended the operating area of fleet units.
Despite conflicting claims to the islands, the
Jan 18, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin 6
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Chinese evidently are intent on maintaining their
presence there, possibly with a view to developing
a forward operating base for South Sea Fleet units.
For its part, South Vietnam has moved in recent,
years to reinforce the number of troops manning its
outposts, particularly on Pattle Island.
Prior to the current incidents, the only tension
between Peking and Saigon over this issue occurred
in 1959 when the South Vietnamese seized a number of
Chinese fishermen in the Crescent Group. They were
released several days later.
The renewal of interest in the ownership of the
islands may have been prompted by the prospect of
finding oil on the islands or under the surrounding
waters. As Saigpn continues to award concessions to
Western oil companies and technology permits explora-
tion of ever-deeper waters, China is being forced to
decide how to play its claim to the islands. While
the facts of the situation are still obscure, Peking
may be interested in testing South Vietnamese atti-
ed territory.
Jan 18, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin 7
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INDONESIA: The government has decided to clamp
down on dissent in the wake of urban violence in
Jakarta this week. The government statement issued
after a three-hour cabinet meeting yesterday morning
took note of the need for social and economic reform,
but at the same time it outlined a new tough stance
on dissent:
--demonstrations that can lead to disorder will
be prohibited,
--universities will be "protected" from political
activities,
--newspaper reporting will be "regulated," and
--those responsible for the recent disorders
will be punished.
CThis morning, troops occupied the University of
Indonesia, and the government shut down three radio
stations and a newspaper.)
Although security officials now admit that most
of the violence was caused by nonstudent street
toughs, they are arresting student leaders as an
object lesson. They are publicly blaming the stu-
dents for starting something they could not control.
For their part, the students are appalled at the
outcome of the anti-Japanese protests, and many are
working closely with the authorities to restore
order.
The rapidity with which the protest escalated
proves that student criticism of Japanese business
practices and of the ostentatious life styles of
the Jakarta elite struck a sympathetic chord within
the population at large. The subsequent violence,
however, may well have canceled out any gains the
student movement might have made. The government's
new hard line suggests that the violence has also
given pause to those few within the ruling group
who were beginning to champion the students' cause.
Jan 18, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin 10
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EC: The EC Council meeting early this week
improved prospects for an early decision on the size
and allocation of the fund to aid the poor areas of
the community. Agreement on the regional fund would
permit the EC to deal with other pressing problems,
including energy policy, that have been deferred
pending resolution of this issue,
The nine foreign ministers discussed various
compromises on the regional fund and finally agreed
to meet again on January 30 for a session devoted
exclusively to the issue. Almost all the compromises
involve concentrating part of the regional develop-
ment funds in the poorest areas of the community--
the UK, Italy, Ireland, and Greenland. The remainder
of the fund would be distributed more widely, thus
satisfying the commission's desire to have all mem-
bers participate.
Agreement on the precise division of the fund
has not yet been reached. Paris suggested allocat-
ing only 10 percent exclusively to the poor areas,
Luxembourg suggested 100 percent, and other govern-
ments suggested intermediate figures,
Resolution of the dispute over the regional
fund, which had ended in a stalemate at the meeting
on December 18, would "restart the community clock"
that was stopped to permit technical compliance with
a deadline of January 1, 1974, for implementation
of the community's decision to move to a modest
second stage of economic and monetary union.
The Nine also discussed the energy problem, but
Britain has held up formal moves toward organizing
the community's energy market and developing an in-
ventory of community oil stocks until a satisfactory
settlement of the regional issue is reached,
Jan 18 , 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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USSR-MBFR: The Soviets are not likely to in-
troduce any major new proposals at the start of the
current round of MBFR talks in Vienna, although
their tactics may prove flexible.
In their contacts with Western counterparts,
Soviet delegates have indicated that Moscow will
place particular emphasis on the inclusion of na-
tional as well as foreign forces in all stages of
reductions. NATO is proposing that there be two
stages, the first to cover the reduction of US and
Soviet forces, and the second to cover the armies
of the European states covered by the agreement.
Moscow, worried that this formula would leave the
West German Army disproportionately strong, wants
a firm understanding that the Bundeswehr would be
reduced in a second phase.
Moscow?s concern has been heightened by increas-
ing talk in Western Europe about defense cooperation.
For the Soviets, this raises the specter of a third
force in Europe that includes a West Germany
independent of the US and NATO.
The Soviets do not accept the Western concept
of asymmetric reductions to reach a "common ceiling"
with NATO, They have emphasized the idea that
Western inferiority in areas such as ground forces
and armor is compensated by superiority in air forces
and nuclear weapons. In their comments, the Soviets
have reiterated that air and nuclear forces must
be included in the reductions.
Jan 18 , 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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C UK: The government put the ball in the miners'
court by announcing that if the miners agree to end
their overtime ban, it may relax fuel controls suf-
ficiently to allow industry to go on a four-day work-
week.
Prime Minister Heath did not announce any deci-
sion yesterday on calling an early election, but gov-
ernment officials are quoted as saying that if Heath's
move fails he will call for general elections, possi-
bly for February 14. The latest government move in
its confrontation with the miners should strengthen
the ruling Tory Party's hand if Heath should call for
an election, which then clearly would be fought on
the question of who rules the country. On the other
hand, if the miners should agree to return to their
normal work schedule, the government could decide
that no election was necessary now.
During yesterday's parliamentary session, Heath
said that he and his colleagues were still consider-
ing whether to meet again with the leaders of the
Trades Union Congress (TUC) and that they would
decide "in due course" whether another meeting was
now appropriate. Informal talks between the union
leaders and the government, however, were held yes-
terday. At any rate, a meeting could not be held
until next week because the TUC general secretary,
who would lead any discussions with the government,
will not return to London until Sunday.
Earlier this week, the TUC proposed that the
government make the miners a "special case," thereby
freeing them from. wage guidelines, in return for TUC
guarantees of restrained demands by other unions.
Heath rejected this proposal, but the Labor Party
leader appealed to him to meet again with the union
leaders.
If Heath does not call for an election next
week, no election will occur until spring because
of the technical problems involved in setting up
Jan 18, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Ca new voter register, scheduled for mid-February.
If the election is held in early February, 18-year-
olds who are likely to favor Labor or the Liberal
Party could not vote and Heath would minimize the
risk that a worsening economic situation would
spell his defeat.
Jan 18 , 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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