EXPLORING THE AVENUES TO PEACE IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01350R000200750016-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: October 23, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

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Jill,
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h~y LI?c,eex 8O Bunt y 1.1 even more y
Secrclary of State' Dean Rusk. Rusk
G 1 f ~~ pointed out that Hanoi had given no
f /r/ 4`- 71, U ff ; iT)7 sign of interest in a reasonable settle-
Li!I .. v ~, / l ~~ ~;: yr ~iIliAb .tent. and lie was convinced that a
'fotmier President Johnson's boot, the that leaders in Hanoi might try to
- o nt nv ;- nt ? t r,. . make it hard. for us to resume bombing
Vantano "
::?DE>' Ell TING .
ftCGllE3SlON AN1
SEARCUING 1'O I'FA.CE
(VIETNAIi ].9Sd.1967)=
In the summer of. 1905 I. caitie to: the
:painful conclusion that 'an ' indepen-
dent South Vietnam could survive
!only if the United : fates and other na
Lions went to its -aid with their own
fighting forces, From then until Il.eft
the Presidency, we had three principal
goals: to in sure that aggression (lid not
succeed; to make it possible for the
South Vietnamese to build their coun-
,try and their future in their own way;
ii nd to convince Hanoi that working
;out a peaceful, settlement, was to the
advantage of all concerned. Those
`three main strands of action--defeat-
.xnr aggression, building a nation, and
,slant
i4 ([nige
making ilrt6 serious negotiations. Ito
felt that a. bombing halt would have a
bad effect if it led only to prolonged
talks while the enemy continued the
,.war full force. Rusk felt strongly, how-
ever, that we should continue to try to
probe Hanoi's outlook through.diplo-
matic contacts. If the North Vietnam-
ese gave some firm sign that they
would lower the level of fighting or
enter into serious negotiations, he said,
we then should end the bombing.
At lunch one (lay late in November,
Soviet Ambassador Ana.toly Dobrynin
told McGeorge Bundy that if there
could be a pause of "twelve to twenty
clays," we could be assured that there
would be "intense diplomatic activity."
A Hungarian diplomat advised Secre-
tary Rusk that, in his opinion, "a few
weeks would be enough." No one was
offering any ironclad guarantees, but
their over. all tone was hopeful.
I
id
'
t
th
ht
i
ns
ovcrntnen
e our i
,
e we
g
braided together in all that s, e, the completed, t~ e considermaking an- of opinion increased gradually in
favor,
ttlmer allies, and the Vietnams c tried of a pause. McNamara was a strong ad-
to accox,iplish over the next three and other intensive effort to find a way to vocate. Mac Bundy moved to up}told'
fa half years. - pease negotiations. He thought that
1J.S. forces,. which had numbered our effort should i ON } his position, Geor e.l,al.l was an out-?
n
""-75,000 in
e uc e a Ming spoken supporter of the idea. Secx?e- ;.`
pause of coiaicc
abl
l
th
m
t
i
e
eng
,184,000 by the
end of
the Year. We felt
lrerhaps Lary husk finally decided that, all
six to eight weeks
certain th
by November 1
965
t th
S
.
a
.
e
outh Vietnamese
forces, 'with our cooperation, could' AieNamara decided that we had
begin to. take the .offensive in 7.966. , reached the point he had -anticipated.
-
;Clearly, . however,' the
Communist He w,?rote me a long axld detailed
f
things considered, it Haight be worth
the risk. The top civilian echelons bf
the State and Defense d."partments.
orces were far fl?ont defeated, memo on November 7 setting forth his were solidly in favor of the proposal,.
We had to do what was necessary to, views, He described the situation in Eosista.rvc centered mainly }.n the. nWi-
,resist them. In the meantime, mny ad tar?y services and in our 1?.ntonssy in
visors and I kept searching for some Vietnam as he saw it and listed the
lse to bring the kept r
an gnd bydip- various options open to us. Ile pointed Saigor:. I, had grave doubts about a
to --
tomato means ranter than on Me.bat out that the large U.S, troop deploy- pause, but I was reluctantly moving to
tlefielcl. Pew Americans xeali,th }lots ments of the previous months had pre- ward acceptance of the risks I believed
intensive--?-alum extensive- that effort vented the Communists from inflicting v; ere Involved.
the serious military defeat" that had
was over the years. Only a handful of been. threatened. McNamara was con- Rusk, McNamara, and Deely came
my elosmt advisers knew of all the winced, however,. that we would never to my ranch in Texas on December 7,
many attempts we made to get into a achieve our desired goals in Vietnam 1.065, to argue their case.
dialogue with Hanoi. the force we had there at that On. December 18 1 met in the Cabi
. The fact is that time (1.60,000 Americans in Vietnam net Roomn with some of my chief advis-
froin 1965 until Januay; 1.969 we were and about 50,000 more scheduled to
in virtually continuous contact, either go), and that more inen would be er?'?
di I had asl;eci two old and trusted.
rectly or throbgh intermediaries, needed. He believed that we, would friends from. outside the I?xecut}ve
dire leaders in Ilanoi or their repro- also have to step up the campaign of branch to join. us for discussion. They
military pressure against the North, -were Clark Clifford and Associate Jus-
sentatives: Hardly a month passed McNamnara felt strongly that before
throughout that period in which we we tool, either of these actions---send-: and intelligence Abe w valluueeed hi1 h, I ~ . e::i kue
, L
did not make sonic effort to open the ing more men and exerting more pies- .w,anted to review all the argu n;nn ls, all
gateway to peace. Until Marc], 31., 1968, sure ou the North-we should try to 'the pros and cons. I began the discus-
-every attempt we made was ignored or find a way to peace, using a bombing si.on by saying: "The military says a
rejected by the North Vietnamese, halt to reinforce Our diplomacy. month's pause would undo all we've
A2y first reaction to J.4TcNaniara's clone." IcNalnara reacted quickly:
In July Secretary McNamara sug- incmno was one of dee
ske
ti
i
Th
??
'
p
p
c
sm-
e
,Phat
s baloney."
vested that, once the tr.cApp F 5e1'(~Wf~, icl: IAQ- i)p88-01350R00020075001G5
lnents he \vas rernrnmenriinr had 1,nnn to nom wOlm Lt OH BA 311Vlewxa AT
cessation in the bonrbin as a 41gn of
V131 O My skepticism was shared
VON?
ti, 1 1 11
fLOT'li tilleO