CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A025100110001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 28, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Department review completed
Top Secret
C 204
28 August 1973
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28 August 1973
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
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CHINA: Strength of moderates reflected in rehabil-
it to ion of senior party officials. (Page 2)
ROMANIA-CSCE: Moscow not likely to favor Bucharest's
proposals on European security. (Page 4)
MALAYSIA-CHINA: Talks on establishing diplomatic
relations dea locked. (Page 5)
SOUTH AFRICA - RHODESIA: Pretoria helps Rhodesia
to combat insurgents. (Page 6)
CHILE: The shifting scene (Page 7)
FOR. THE RECORD: (Page 10)
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CHINA: The rehabilitation of two former top-
ranking party officials is a sign that moderates are
in a strong position in the policy debates that ap-
parently are preceding the Tenth Party Congress.
NCNA announced that Ulanfu and Tan Chen-lin,
who were purged during the Cultural Revolution, at-
tended a table-tennis tournament that began in Peking
on 26 August. Ulanfu was an alternate member of the
Politburo and the party boss of Inner Mongolia until
1966. Tan Chen-lin was a full member of the Politburo
and the party's agricultural specialist. They are
the two most important officials to be rehabilitated
since the reappearance last April of the party's
former secretary general, Teng Hsiao-ping.
The announcement did not indicate what positions
the two men now hold, but presumably their party
status will be clarified at the congress, Tan's re-
turn is particularly significant, in light of Peking's
current concern with agricultural problems.
In recent weeks there have been signs in Chi-
nese propaganda that debates over policy have inten-
sified with the approach of the party congress.
People's Dail v, the party's official newspaper with
a nationwide circulation, has seemed to question
several pragmatic policies implemented in recent
years. In July the newspaper criticized the strin-
gent birth-control regulations introduced earlier
this year. On 19 August the newspaper attacked
policies such as having "experts" run factories and
using material incentives, noting that these "mis-
takes" have already been criticized in the past.
In this regard, a factory in central China has re-
portedly discontinued the practice of awarding
bonuses. Earlier there had been hints in the prop-
aganda of opposition to the rehabilitation of party
cadre disgraced in the Cultural Revolution. This
may have been in response to the reinstatement of
former leaders such as Tan Chen-lin.
(continued)
28 Aug 73 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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These propaganda themes do not indicate that
post - Cultural Revolution policies are now in retreat,
but they do symbolize the kind of resistance that
Chou En-lai and other moderate leaders have con-
tinually encountered from the more radical elements
among the leadership. The recent rehabilitation of
additional party leaders is an indication that the
moderates are having some success in overcoming this
resistance.
28 Aug 73
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ROMANIA-CSCE: A strong Romanian delegation
will present proposals for a non-use of force agree-
ment and the establishment of a permanent European
security organ at the next round of CSCE talks
slated to start in Geneva on 18 September. The
Soviets can be expected to oppose a number of Ro-
manian ideas.
In setting forth his government's views to a
group of NATO chiefs of mission in Bucharest, a
senior Foreign Ministry official claimed that the
Romanian position calls for both disarmament and
disengagement; the latter includes an agreement on
the non-use of nuclear weapons. Bucharest intends
to push for an extension to the Balkans of disarma-
ment measures that are adopted for Central Europe.
The Romanians want to include three elements
in the non-use of force document: notification of
maneuvers, notification of large military movements,
and provisions for foreign observers at maneuvers.
None of them is likely to win favor in Moscow, which
wants to keep the military content of CSCE at a
minimum.
Another Romanian official claimed that Romanian-
Soviet differences extend into other aspects of Euro-
pean security talks. Moscow reportedly opposes Ro-
manian phrasing on the inviolability of frontiers
and insists that terminology should make clear "the
unchangeability of frontiers." Bucharest is inter-
ested in avoiding permanent foreclosure of its claim
to northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, now part of the
USSR. The Soviets, however, are opposed to any pre-
cedent that might leave their borders with China or
Eastern Europe open to challenge.
The Romanian proposal on a permanent CSCE organ
appears designed to provide Bucharest with a forum
for voicing its dissent from the Warsaw Pact. Pub-
licly, however, Romania will probably argue that
such a body is necessary to handle such matters as
the dissemination of information on troop movements
and maneuvers.
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MALAYSIA-CHINA: Prime Minister Razak has con-
fided to the US ambassador that talks at the UN on
diplomatic recognition have "ground to a halt," and
the establishment of relations will probably be de-
layed until early 1974. Malaysia had been aiming
for an announcement of recognition on its independence
day--31 August.
The talks, which opened in June, quickly stalled
on the issue of the 200,000 stateless Chinese in
Malaysia. The Malaysians have been unable to ex-
tract from Peking a statement of acceptance of Ma-
laysian sovereignty over this group. Razak explains
that Malaysian preoccupation with this topic stems
from memories of the problems the British faced in
1948 when the Chinese Nationalist consulate aggres-
sively acted as spokesman and protector of the same
group of Chinese. Although the Malaysians have given
an appearance of being adamant, they will--if they
want relations--have to accept Peking's stand that
the question of the stateless Chinese cannot be taken
up until after the opening of relations.
Peking's position regarding the Communist in-
surgency in Malaysia does not appear to be a serious
impediment to the establishment of relations. Al-
though Kuala Lumpur continues to press for a public
"hands off" statement, Razak admits that he realizes
that Peking cannot go much further than it has in
dissociating itself from the insurgency.
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SOUTH AFRICA - RHODESIA: A transfer of 800
South African police to Rhodesia in July substan-
tially increases the forces that Pretoria has com-
ITnitted Rhodesia's counterinsurgency efforts.
some 1,400 South
African special paramilitary police are now serving
in Rhodesia.
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The transfer of the reinforcements apparently
is intended to back up Rhodesia's counterinsurgency
efforts while avoiding open military aid to the
breakaway Smith regime that would intensify inter-
national pressures against South Africa as well as
Rhodesia. Pretoria has long acknowledged that some
250 South African police have been stationed in
Rhodesia since 1967 to-prevent South African mili-
tants who go abroad for subversive training from
infiltrating back home via Rhodesia.
A quiet build-up of South African police in
Rhodesia could go far to offset the shortage of
white reservists available for extended duty in the
Rhodesian security forces. The. presence of addi-
tional South African police probably has enabled
the Rhodesians to search out insurgents across the
border in Mozambique. There have been indications
-
that Rhodesian units have been operating there reg
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CHILE: The Shifting Scene
Tensions are again at fever pitch, and Presi-
dent Allende again must handle a delicate situation.
A concerted move by the armed forces to overthrow
the government does not yet appear to be firmly or-
ganized. Instead, it would seem that the various
military services will attempt to bring unified mil-
itary pressure on the President to restore public
order and moderate his policies.
General Prats' resignation as defense minister
and army chief last week marks a major change in the
situation in Chile. In the past, elements that fa-
vored action against the Allende administration had
been restrained by Prats' support of the constitu-
tional government--whatever its character--and by
the deep divisions within and among the services.
Now, more and more officers have concluded, almost
against their will, that the Allende administration
is bent on destroying the military institution and,
indeed, constitutional government itself. Without
Prats' restraining hand, they are trying to pull to-
gether to thwart Allende's manipulation and exploi-
tation of military loyalty.
Concern over the growing boldness of paramili-
tary workers' groups has been a major factor in con-
vincing the military officers that they must assert
opposition to government policies. Many officers
also were shocked by recent evidence that the far
left had penetrated the most disciplined service,
the navy. Further impelled by Allende's ouster of
the dissident air force chief and b civilian op-
Po I sition demonstration last week
ome in uen is
army cers are veering om defense of Al-
lende, a shift from the army's previous reluctance
to back air force and navy hopes of exerting influ-
ence on the administration.
(continued)
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The long tradition of military isolation from
politics has not kept officers from adopting polit-
ical views, but neither has it trained them in po-
litical maneuvering. Their unity and resolve will
be severely tested by actions by Allende to bluff
or confuse them.
The President's own preference would be to pro-
tect his flank by appearing to go along with the
military demand for more power and by reaching a
modus vivendi with the opposition Christian Democrats.
Allende, however, is increasingly pressed by the
demands of his own Socialist Party and other extre-
mists--and now even by the usually moderate Commu-
nists--to adopt a hard line to advance the Chilean
revolution and destroy its political opposition.
One government response to the developing mili-
tary pressure is an implicit threat of reaction by
leftist-led workers. The real size and the armed
capability of these paramilitary groups is unknown
even to their rival sponsors--Communists, Socialists,
and members of the Revolutionary Leftist Movement.
Many government leaders doubt that the workers could
face down a military challenge.
On the other hand, the factories and other areas
controlled by the paramilitary and workers' groups
straddle vital sections of major roads in and out
of Santiago. The Chilean Army is inexperienced and
ill equipped for riot control, and half its enlisted
manpower consists of short-term, largely untrained
recruits. In addition, its relationship with the
national police, the carabineros, has traditionally
been one of rivalry rather than cooperation. The
carabineros, a career force as large as the army,
have extensive experience in civil disorders. Their
cooperation would be essential for an effective mili-
tary effort in any armed confrontation. Information
is conflicting on the attitude of the carabineros
toward the Allende government.
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The key to developments is Santiago, where army
and carabinero units are now on alert and being re-
inforced from other provinces. Any confrontation
that occurs is most likely to begin there. More-
over, it is likely to fluctuate and drag on. In
that event, other cities, most notably the port of
Valparaiso and the industrial center of Concepcion,
would become more important. Leftist extremists are
particularly powerful in Concepcion, while the mili-
tary commanders in both areas dislike the government.
Most Chileans are strongly for or strongly against
this administration, and real violence in Santiago
would be reflected throughout the country.
The principal actors, military and civilian,
appear to be still counting on political maneuver--
bluffs, threats, and propositions. To a degree rare
in Latin America, the bulk of the Chilean population
abhors violence, and few leaders feel confident that
they have the backing to impose their will without
touching off a civil war. Yet the prolonged tension
has led to despair that any maneuvering can alleviate
Chile's problems. Leftist and rightist extremists,
meanwhile are doing their best to provoke confron-
tation. i7 I
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FOR THE RECORD*
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SOUTH VIETNAM: Unofficial returns indicate
that the Thieu government scored its anticipated
landslide victory in the Senate election, capturing
all 31 seats at stake. President Thieu will now
control more than two thirds of the votes in the
60-seat Senate.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA-USSR: Czechoslovak Premier
Strougal arrived in Moscow yesterday for economic
talks with Soviet Premier Kosygin. Strougal is
the last East European government leader to have
made this trip during the past two weeks. As was
the case with his predecessors, the talks will al-
most certainly center on strengthening cooperation
within CEMA.
*These items were prepared by CIA without consulta-
tion with the Departments of State and Defense.
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