(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00362R000300030001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 14, 1992
• Content Type: LETTER

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IAC -D -2 / 1
IAC-D-3
IAC -I),-4
IAC-D-5
IAC-D-5/ 1
IAC-D-5/2
IAC-D-5/3
A recommended US Policy Toward Soviet
and Soviet Orbit Official Representatives
on Duty in the US (7 November 1950)
Regulation of Travel of Soviet Officials
in the United States (1 February 1952)
Draft Terms of Reference - Yugoslavia
(13 November 1950)
Draft Terms of Reference - Iran
(14 November 1950)
A Proposal for a Discussion of Intelligence
Requirements on Spitzbergen (24 November 1950)
Intelligence Requirements - Spitzbergen
(29 November 1950)
Intelligence Requirements - Spitzbergen
(5 December 1950)
Spitzbergen (16 May 1951)
*Army and State Dept. reviews completed*
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14 February 1992
25X1A
MEMORANDUM FOR: DO/IRO
FROM:
Lniet, Historical Review Section, CRB/IP&CRD
SUBJECT: Follow-Up Coordination of Documents from DCI
Record Files, Box 3, Job 85S00362R [92-1]
1. Attached are two additional documents which O/DCI/IRO
has asked us to coordinate also with you. Our primary
coordination package for DO from this box (eleven documents)
was sent to you on 14 January. O/DCI/IRO agrees with our
determination for these two, subject to your concurrence.
X1A (Please note t name was released in the
I Io pages, an in this specific role--
Secretary, IAC--on, e.g., page 9 of Volume III.)
2. Please indicate your concurrence or disagreement on
the HRP Cover Sheet.
25X1A
Attachments
UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED
FROM ATTACHMENTS
S E C R E T
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SPITZBERGEN
TOP SECRET
IAC-D-5/3
16 May 1951
The attached memorandum has been received from General
Boiling recommending that an Intelligence Estimate be
initiated on "The Prospect of Increased Soviet Activity in
the Spitzbergen Area,"
JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee
TOP SECRE?
TOP SECRET
IAC-D- 5/73
16 May 1951
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CIAp 36013 C% TOP SECRET
TO-D-5/3
16 May 1951
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence
Washington 25, D. C.
G2-I 14 May 1951
MEMORANDUM FOR: CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Spitzbergen
1. It is recommended that an Intelligence Estimate be initiated
on, "The Prospect of Increased Soviet Activity in the Spitzbergen
Area.
2. Reference is made to a memorandum from this office dated
6 November 1950, subject:
12 February 1951) was made available to interested agencies, and
indicated that there was no unusual or widespread Soviet activity in
the area.
3. The following, however, are significant factors bearing on
the possibility of the U.S.S.R. taking action in the Spitzbergen area
in the near future:
a. The strategic location of Spitzbergen, in view of its
possible use, either by the U.S.S.R. or the Western Powers, as
an air base.
b. The establishment of U.S. security detachment in
Iceland.
c. The proposed establishment of other U.S. air bases.
d. The reported Russian activity in the Coles Bay,
Spitzbergen, area to prepare for handling of ocean-going
ships.
e. Increased activity reported at Bohemannesset,
Spitzbergen - a potential Russian airfield site.
f. The possible use of glaciers as landing grounds.
SOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
IAC-D-S 3
16 May 1951
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TOP SECRET 16CMay 5/31951
g. Suspected overland exploration by the Russians between
Coles Bay, Spitzbergen and Billefjiord, Spitzbergen in the
winter of 191+9/50.
h. Russian fishing activity off the coast of Western
Spitzbergen in July 1950.
s/ A. R. BOLLING
TOP SECRET
LAC-D.5/3
16 May 1951
.60P. SECRET
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CIA 36107
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
General Staff, United States Army
Washington 25,.D,C.
G2-PC 904.3
TOP SECRET
IAC -D -5
24 November 1950
MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
6 Nov 1950
Reference is made to your memorandum dated 16 November 1949,
dealing with U.S. strategic and intelligence requirements in
Spitzbergen, and to Tab "A" attached hereto which reviews the
situation in Spitzbergen and the action taken by the State Depart-
ment subsequent to the circulation of reference memorandum. Tab "A
represents all information available to this office on what action
has been taken to date in regard to intelligence on Spitzbergen.
It seems that the whole project has been in a state of defer-
ment following the dispatch of a telegram by the State Department
to the United States Ambassador in London (see paragraph 10 of
Tab "A")..
It is my belief that the strategic importance of Spitzbergen
is of sufficient importance to warrant further action. I, there-
fore, recommend that the subject of Spitzbergen be brought up for
discussion by IAC at an early date,
/s/ A. R. Bolling
TOP SECRET
A. R, BOLLING
1 Incl. Major General, GSC
Tab "A" A, C. of S., G-2
TOP SECRET
IAC -D -5-D -5
24 November 1950
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SECRET
IAC-D-3
13 November 1950
DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE
YUGOSLAVIA
1. The attached draft terms of reference for a
National Estimate on Yugoslavia is a revision of the paper
earlier distributed in IAC-D-1/1, as revised by the work-
ing staffs and by the IAC. It is issued in this form
for ready reference.
2. IAC-D-l/l should be destroyed since it was not
properly numbered. A separate paper on terms of reference
for Iran will be distributed at this same time.
JAMES Q. REBER
Acting Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee
SECRET
IAC-D-3
13 November
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SECRET
IAC -D - 3
13 November 1950
DRAFT TEEMS OF REFERENCE
YUGOSLAVIA
The Problem:
To estimate the current situation in Yugoslavia and its
effect on the world balance of power.
Scope:
This estimate is designed to indicate the importance of the
survival of the Tito regime, both from the point of view of the
US and of the USSR; to estimate the stability of Tito regime and
to analyze current Yugoslav economic difficulties in terms of
their effect on this stability, to analyze current Yugoslav
economic difficulties in terms of their internal effects, the
degree to which they increase Cominform capabilities for the over-
throw of Tito, and the extent to which US aid might be success-
ful in maintaining the regime in power.
*10r' Suggested Outline:
I. Importance of non-Stalinist Yugoslavia to the West
A. Degree and Dependability of Yugoslav Western
orientation
1. International
2. Internal
B. Military importance
C. Salient in Soviet ideological front
D. Base for political warfare in Balkans
II. Soviet intentions toward Yugoslavia
III. Military Situation of Yugoslavia
A. Military strength
SECRET
IAC -U -3
13 November 1950
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IAC-D-3
13 November 1950
B. Ability to withstand satellite attack
C. Ability to withstand Soviet attack
IV.. Stability of the Tito regime under the impact of the
current economic crisis.
What are the Tito regime's internal difficulties
(considered without regard to Cominform exploita-
tion or Western aid)?
1, Was disaffection with the Tito government wide-
spread or serious before the drought?
2. To what extent has it increased?
3. Is this discontent generally expressed in terms
of the Communist nature of the regime? Its
oppressive and dictatorial nature? Its policy
of opposition to the Cominform? The desire on
the part of Yugoslav groups for return of a
former regime?
~+. Apart from aid or intervention, would Tito have
the necessary strength to control popular dis-
content during the period of economic stress?
B. What are the prospects for attempts on the part of
the Cominform to exploit the current situation for
changing the alignment of the Tito regime or over-
throwing it?
1. What possibilities are there for an acconunoda-
tion between the Tito regime and the Cominform?
2. To what extent are the Yugoslav people--or any
influential group in Yugoslavia--susceptible to
Cominform propaganda claims? for example, that
economic conditions would be better if Yugoslavia
return to the Soviet fold? that Tito is doomed
in any case and, therefore, prudence would dictate
individual opposition to Tito? that Tito is sel-
ling Yugoslavia out to Western Capitalist-Imperi-
alists?
3. Is Tito so weakened that Cominform-directed
guerrilla activities or other forms of subver-
sive or quasi-military activity would promise
success?
SECRET
IAC-D-3
13 November 1950
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IAC-D-3
13 November 1950
4. Is the current situation in Yugoslavia suf-
ficiently unstable to encourage direct military
action by the USSR? or by the Soviet Satellites
bordering on Yugoslavia?
C. What US aid would be required to maintain the Tito
regime?
1. What is the scope and character of US economic
aid needed to tide the Tito government over
until Yugoslav economic conditions improve?
2. Given relief from drought conditions in 1951,
how long is it likely to be before Yugoslavia
will cease to need US aid?
3. To what extent can US aid be exploited for:
a. procuring intelligence?
b. developing a base for covert anti-Soviet
operations?
c. weakening any Yugoslav tendencies toward
accommodation with the Cominform?
d. improving long-term US relations with
Yugoslavia?
SECRET
IAC -D - 3
13 November 1950
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SECRET
IAC-D-1
14 November 1950
DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE
1. The attached draft terms of reference for a
National Estimate on Iran is a revision of the paper
earlier distributed in IAC-D-1/1, as revised by the
working staffs and by the IAC. It is issued in this
form for ready reference.
2. IAC-D-1/1 should be destroyed since it was not
properly numbered. A separate paper on terms of reference
for Yugoslavia will be distributed at this same time.
`4I
JAMES Q. REBER
Acting Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee
SECRET
IAC -D-4
l4 November 1950
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SECRET
Zo
DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE
IAC -D -J+
14 November 1950
The Problem:
To estimate the current position of Iran in the world balance
of power.
Scope:
This estimate is designed to answer the following broad
questions relating to the current position of Iran --
What is the strategic importance of IRAN to the US
and its allies? to the USSR?
What are the scope and character of possible Soviet
measures designed to gain influence or control over Iran?
What are the prospects for Iranian resistance to those
Soviet measures?
'irk
What deficiencies essential to the maintenance of the
stability and security of Iran must be met by the US and its U,Yt-
allies?
Suggested Outline:
I. The Basic Factors Underlying Iran's Position.-
1. Open political, economic, and military pressure.
2. Subversive activities and covert penetration.
1. Internal reforms.
2. Aid from the West,
C. US Program in Iran.
1. Character and purpose.
ZCRET
SECRET
IAC-D-1+
14 November 1950
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2. Results to date.
3. Prospects.
II. Current Situation in Iran.
A. Internal.
B. Foreign Relations.
III. Effect oi- US Security Interests gf:
A. On the Assumption of a continuation of "Cold War":
1. Current Alignment of Iran. -
2. Alignment with the USSR as result of political Eryu -*~
or subversive pressures.
B. On the Assumption of an Outbreak of Hostilities:
1. Allied or aligned with US.
2. Neutral.
3. Allied or aligned with USSR.:.
IV. Probable Position and International Alignment of Iran
through 1951-
A. On the Assumption of a Continuation of "Cold War":
1. In event legitimate Iranian government retains
control of country, US continues programmed aid,
and USSR takes no direct military action against
Iran.
2, In event Soviet-supported elements gain control
of:
a. Limited areas in Iran.
b. Central government.
B. On the Assumption of an Outbreak of Hostilities:
1. Direct Soviet military action against Iran,
presumably under Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921,
SECRET
IAC-D-4
14 November 1950
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14 November 1950
without general war --
a. In event of Western direct military aid
to Iran.
b. In absence of Western military aid to
Iran.
2. Direct Soviet military action against Iran as
part of general war --
a. In event of Western direct military aid
to Iran.
b. In event Western military aid to Iran
limited to air operations.
c. In absence of Western direct military
aid to Iran.
SECRET
TAC 1) 4
14 November 1950
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SE(REI
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CONFIDENTIAL
Security Informatiofl
IAC-D-2/1
1 February 195'2
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTi
1 February 1952
REGULATION OF TRaVEL CF SOVIET OFFICIALS
IN 'IM UN TED STATES
At the request of the Department of State the
attached proposal for regulation of travel of Soviet
officials in the United States is circulated for the
consideration and concurrence of the IAC. It vill be
considered at the meeting on February 7.
J MES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee
CONFIDENTL`L
IAC-D-2 1
1 February 1952
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security Information
IAC-D-2/1
1 February 1952
R1IGULATION OF TitAVEL OF SOVIET OFFICIALS
IN HE UNITED STATES
1. On January 15 the Soviet Government greatly increased its pre-
vious travel restrictions on American officials in the USSR. The
history an,,.'k nature of these restrictions, which have existed since 1941,
are described in TAB A.
2. The Department of State considers that the time has now come
to regulate the travel of Soviet officials in the United States not on
a security basis but solely on the basis of reciprocity in the treatment
accorceu to official representatives of each government by the receiving
state. The suggested method. of application of this regulation is set
forth in a draft note to the Soviet Auibassador at t-ashington, which
forms TAB B of this me-moranuum. Our regulation will apply only to Soviet
official, personnel assigned to the Embassy in Washington, to Soviet news-
paper corr:spondents whose place of work is Washington and to Soviet
personnel of Amtorg in New York.
3. Although the proposed regulation of the travel of Soviet per-
sonnel in the United States is less onerous than the restrictions applied
to American officials in the USSR, the Department has drafted the pro-
posed note with the purpose of ii,aintaining a flexible position which
would enable us to forbid a proposed journey by a Soviet official, if
such were thought expedient in the light of Soviet restrictive practices
on our official personnel in Moscow. Ambassador-designate Kennan has
approved this proposes. procedure and has expressed the desire to be
given the authority, if the occasion arises after his arrival in the
Soviet 'Union, to inform Soviet authorities that a relaxation in Soviet
travel restrictions will be met by a relaxation in the regulation of
travel placed by this Government on Soviet official personnel in
Washington.
4. The Department has informed the United States Deputy on the
NATO Council of Deputies in London of this proposed action and has
instructed him to inform his colleagues of the measure being contemplated.
He has been instructed to say that while a final United States Government
position has not yet been reached, we would like to obtain from the other
Deputies an expression of the views of their governments whether they
intend to regulate the travel of Soviet official personnel in their re-
pective countries. However, our final action will not be dependent upon
any discussion or aecision by the NATO Council of Deputies.
CONFIDENTIAL
hACC-D-271
1 February 1952
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CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information
IAC-D-2/l
1 February 1952
5. Secretary Acheson has approved of the procedure for regulating
the travel of Soviet official personnel in the United States as outlined
above. It is desired, however, to have the comments of other interested
government agencies and their concurrence in the action finally taken.
CONFIDENTIAL
IAC-D-2 1
1 February 1952
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CONFIDEN `: I ~L
Security Information
LX-D-2/1
1 February 1952
r fVMZL RESTRICTIONS PLACED BY THE SOVIET GOVE i &.-ENT
ON Ai ;RICAN OY ICL'.LS IV THE USSR
1. Travel restrictions were first placed upon American officials
as well as other foreign representatives in the USSNN by a circular note
from the Soviet Foreign Office to foreign missions in Moscow dated
i4ay 16, 1941. The Soviet note declared travel to certain points and
localities prohibited and established a procedure under which travel on
the territory of the USSd by members of foreign embassies, legations
and consulates may take place "only on condition that such persons
previously inform appropriate organs of the Peoples Commissariat for
Foreign Affairs, Peoples Commissariat for Defense and Peoples Commissariat
for Navy with regard to trips planned, indicating itinerary, points of
stopover and length of travel so that such trips may be registered by
above-mentioned organs."
2. On June 7, 11041 the United States unposed retaliatory restric-
tions which required Soviet officials in this country to secure permits
for travel more than 100 tiles outside of Washington, (any: 50 wiles
outside of New York and San Francisco). These retaliatory restrictions
were withdrawn shortly after the German attack on the USSR.
3. The Soviet regulations were not officially withdrawn although
application of the provisions was relaxed for a short time at the end
of the war. By 1947 it had becocae evident that the Soviet authorities
were actively hindering the movements of official American personnel
outside of Moscow. In the summer of 198 the hindrances were extended
to automobile travel only a short distance from Moscow.
4. On September 30, 1948, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
notified the t merican hmbassy and other foreign ,aissions at Moscow that
the 1941 restrictions were still in effect and added a new and Greatly
e:.panaed list of localities closed to travel by members of the staffs
of foreign missions. Under the 1943 procedure, however, foreign offi-
cials were required to give the Soviet Foreign Office (cailitary personnel -
the Foreign Liaison Section of the &Miinistry of Armed Forces) 48 hours
advance notice of their intention to travel more than 50 Kilometers
outside of Moscow. Beyond this 50 kilometer zone travel was permitted
only by public carrier except to three points of historic interest near
the city. Even within this 50 kilometer perimeter certain areas were
forbidden for travel, with the result that automobile travel to the 50
kilometer limit was possible on only four highways.
CONFIDENTIAL
IAC-D-2
I February 1952
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CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information
I AC-D-2/1
1 February 1952
5. In general, the border areas, the Central Asian Republics, the
Caucasus region with the exception of Tiflis, the Baltic States, and
the Western areas of the Ukraine and Belorussia, including the capital
cities of Kiev and Minsk were placed within the zones prohibited to
foreign officials. Although most of the Siberian area was left techni-
cally "free", in practice it was greatly restricted owing to the fact
that the important cities are forbidden areas and therefore there are
no facilities available for foreign visitors.
6. On January 15, 1052, the Soviet ministry of Foreign Affairs
prohibited 22 a?..ditional cities of the USSR to foreigners any reduced
the zone around :Moscow from 50 to 40 kilometers from the center of the
city. In addition, several more districts within the 4+0 kilometer limit
were placec.L on the prohibited list, thus reducing to a great extent the
number of places to which foreign officials may travel in the USSR or
in the Moscow area. It is noteworthy that the great majority of the new
prohibited localities are those which American and other foreign offi-
cials have visited most frequently since 19I3.
7. At present about 00 percent of Soviet territory is closed to
American officials. In audition to the forbidden zones, the Soviet
Government denies acess to other technically "free" areas by exercising
administrative control over the limited facilities for travelers ands
by prohibiting access to large urban centers which are necessary transit
points to reach surrounding areas. Thus by its latest move of adding
22 cities to the prohibited list, the Soviet Government has been able
to close to American and foreign officials a large proportion of the
localitieN to which they have traveled in recent years. In practice,
all of the USSR is now closed to foreign officials except a small por-
tion of European Russia and of the Caucasus region, including Tiflis.
CONFIDENTIAL.
IAC-D-2 1
1 February 1952
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TAB B
CONFIDENT OIL
Security Information
IAC-D-2/1
1 February 1952
.1. The Secretary of State presents his compliuients to Isis
Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and has the honor to invite the Ambassador's attention to note No. 46/PR
of January 15, 1952, note No. 1130/PR of September 30,.194S, and the note
verbale dated Hay 16 1941, addressed to the United States Esibassy at~-~
,IoscOW by the Ministry of Foreign affairs, the effect of which has been
to restrict the travel in the Soviet Union of American diplomatic and
consular officers, as well as of the other ineui,.~ers of the staff of the
American Embassy at Moscow.
2. Ia view of tote restrictions whica have been placed upon the
travel of American diplomatic and consular representatives and er ployees
in the Soviet Union, the Governciex t of the United? States, on the basis
of reciprocity; is constrained to regulate the travel of Soviet personnel
assigned to the Embassy in Washington, Soviet representatives of the
official Soviet news agency, Tass, or Soviet representatives of other
publicity media who are assigned for Cuty in ashington and Soviet offi-
cial personnel assigned to Amtorg in New York. Effective inmeaiately
Soviet official personnel of the Embassy in ;Washington, l'ass representa-
tives ana others who are Soviet citizens as:3iGned for newspaper work in
t:aahineton are required not to travel to any point wore than 25 miles
distant from the center of Washington without previous official notifi-
cation at least 46 hours in a_tivance. Soviet official personnel assigned
to Amtorg shall nut travel to any point wore than 25 ciiles nistant from
the center of hew York City without previous official notification at
least 43 hours in advance.
;. In the case of Soviet civilian officials, the notification
should_ be addressed to the Department of State; and in the case of Soviet
military personnel to the Department of Defense. Kotification should
contain the nauue of each traveler, cor.rplete and detailed information con-
cerning his projected travel, including itinerary, points of stopover,
and duration of journey.
4. The Unite? States Government observes that by reason of the
action of the Soviet Government in restricting the travel of United
States official personnel in the USSR, it is cotipelled on the basis of
reciprocity in the treat.iient of official representatives sihiilarly to
regulate Soviet official personnel. At the satae tine the United States
Government states it is prepared to re-e:.amine the question of travel
regulations in the li,,;ht of the treatment accorded. United States official
representatives in the Soviet Union.
CONFIDENTI 'LL
1 February 1952
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Security Information
L,C--D-2/1
1 February 1952
TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS PLACED BY THE SOVIET GOVERN_:; XT
1. Travel restrictions were first placed upon American officials
as well as other foreign representatives in the USSR by a circular note
from the Soviet Foreign Office to foreign missions in Moscow dated
May 16, 1941. The Soviet note declared travel to certain points and
localities prohibited and established a procedure under which travel on
the territory of the USSR by members of foreign embassies, legations
and consulates may take place "only on condition that such persons
previously inform appropriate organs of the Peoples Commissariat for
Foreign Affairs, Peoples Commissariat for Defense and Peoples Commissariat
for Navy with regard to trips planned, indicating itinerary, points of
stopover and length of travel so that such trips may be registered by
above-mentioned organs."
2. On June 7, 1941 the United States imposed retaliatory restric-
tions which required Soviet officials in this country to secure permits
for travel more than 100 miles outside of Washington, (and 50 miles
outside of New York and San Francisco). These retaliatory restrictions
were withdrawn shortly after the German attack on the USSR.
3. The Soviet regulations were riot officially withdrawn although
application of the provisions was relaxed for a short time at the end
of the war. By 1947 it had become evident that the Soviet authorities
were actively hindering the movements of official American personnel
outside of Moscow. In the summer of 1948; the hindrances were extended
to automobile travel only a short distance from Moscow.
4. On Septecuber 30, 1948, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
notified the American Embassy and other foreign missions at Moscow that
the 1941 restrictions were still in effect and added a new and greatly
expanded list of localities closed to travel by members of the staffs
of foreign missions. Under the 1943 procedure, however, foreign offi-
cials were required to give the Soviet Foreign Office (military personnel -
the Foreign Liaison Section of the Ministry of Armed, Forces) 43 hours
advance notice of their intention to travel more than 50 kilometers
outside of Moscow. Beyond this 50 kilometer zone travel was permitted
only by public carrier except to three points of historic interest near
the city. Even within this 50 kilometer perimeter certain areas were
forbidden for travel, with the result that automobile travel to the 50
kilometer limit was possible on only four highways.
CONFIDENTIAL
IAC-D. 2 1
1 February 1952
ON AMERICAN OFFICL.LS IN TH' USSR
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5. Secretary Acheson has approved of the procedure for regulating
the travel of Soviet official personnel,in the United States as outlined
above. It is desired, however, to have the comments of other interested
government agencies and their concurrence in the action finally taken.
CONFIDENTIAL
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1 February 1952
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5. In general, the border areas, the Central Asian Republics, the
Caucasus region with the exception of Tiflis, the Baltic States, and
the Western areas of the Ukraine and Belorussia, including the capital
cities of Kiev and AAiinik were placed within the zones prohibited to
foreign officials. Although cost of the Siberian area was left techni-
cally "free'", in practice it was greatly restricted owing to the fact
that the important cities are forbidden areas and therefore there are
no facilities available for foreign visitors.
6. On January 15, 1052, the Soviet hinistry of Foreign :affairs
prohibited 22 additional cities of the USSR to foreigners and reduced
the zone around Moscow from 50 to 40 kilometers from the center of the
city. In addition, several more districts within the 4+0 kilometer limit
were placeu on the prohibited list, thus reducing to a great extent the
number of places to which foreign officials may travel in the USSR or
in the Moscow area. It is noteworthy that the great majority of the new
prohibited localities are those which American and other foreign offi-
cials have visited most frequently since 1943.
7. At present about Co percent of Soviet territory is closed to
i~merican officials. In a:'?dition to the forbidden zones, the Soviet
err' Government denies areas to other technically "free" areas by exercising
administrative control over the limited facilities for travelers anu
by prohibiting access to large urban centers which are necessary transit
points to reach surrounding areas. Thus by its latest move of adding
22 cities to the prohibited list, the Soviet Government has been able
to close to American and foreign officials a large proportion of the
localities to which they have traveled in recent years. In practice,
all of the USSR is now closed to foreign officials except a small por-
tion of European Russia and of the Caucasus region, including Tiflis.
CONFIDENTIAL
IA -D-2 1
1 February 1952
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.1. The Secretary of State presents his cowpliuients to His
Excellency the i\mbassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and has the honor to invite the Arabassardor's attention to note No. 46/PR
of January 15, 1952, note No. 1130/PR of September 30, 1913, and. the note-
verbale dated may 16 191+1, addressed to the United States Embassy at
iioscow by the Ministry of Foreign affairs, thy: effect of which has-ueen
to restrict the travel in the Soviet Union of American diplomatic and
consular officers, as well as of the other iaeu.:ers of the staff of the
!-.merican E massy at Moscow.
2. In view if t,.e restrictions which have been placed upon the
travel of American diplomatic and consular representatives and employees
in the Soviet Unf.on, the Government of the United States, on the basis
of reciprocity; is constrained. to regulate the travel of Soviet personnel
assigned to the Embassy in Washington, Soviet representatives of the
official Soviet news agency, Tass, or Soviet representatives of other
publicity u.edia who are assigned for duty in Washington and Soviet offi-
cial personnel assigned to Amtorg in New York. Effective it.ane?.iately
Soviet official personnel of the Embassy in ;jashin ton, Tass representa-
tives an(.L others who are Soviet citizens assigned for newspaper work in
Washington are required not to travel to any point wore than 25 riles
distant from the center of Washington without previous official notifi-
cation at least 1+6 hours in advance. Soviet official personnel assigned
.to Amtorg shall not travel to any point more than 25 miles listant from
the center of Lew York City.without previous official notification at
learn hours in advance.
In the case of Soviet civilian officials, the notification
shoulc:be addressed to the Department of State; and in the case of Soviet
military personnel to the Department of Defense. Notification should.
contain the name of each traveler, cotplete and detailed information con-
cerning his projected travel, including itinerary, points of stopover,
and duration of journey.
1+. The United States Government observes that by reason of the
action of the Soviet Government in restricting the travel of United
States official personnel in the USSR, it is compelled on the basis of
reciprocity in the. treaiuient of official representatives siu,ilarly to
regulate Soviet official personnel. At the same tii:,e the United States
Government states it is prepared to re-e-.awine the question of travel
regulations in the light of the treatment accorded United States official
representatives in the Soviet Union.
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IAC.-L' -2/1
1 February 1952
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1 February 1952
REGULATION OF TRAVEL CF SOVIET OFFICIALS
IN THE UNITED STATES
At the request of the Department of State the
attached proposal for regulation of travel of Soviet
officials in the United States is circulated for the
consideration and concurrence of the IAC. It will be
considered at the weeting on February 7.
JAP..ES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee
CONFIDENTIAL
AC-D-2 1
1 February 1952
3,6,00 740
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1 February 1952
Ri GULAT'ION OF TRAVEL OF SOVIET OFFICIALS
IN THE UNITED S. A.TE3
1. On January 15 the Soviet Government greatly increased its pre-
vious travel restrictions on American officials in the USSR. The
history anu. nature of these restrictions, which have existed since 1941,
are described in
2. The Department of State considers that the time has now come
to regulate the travel of Soviet officials in the United. States not on
a security basis but solely on the basis of reciprocity in the treatment
accorded to official representatives of each government by the receiving;
state. The suggested method. of application of this regulation is set
forth in a draft note to the Soviet Ambassador at Lashington, which
forms TiM B. of this memorandum. Our regulation will apply only to Soviet
official personnel assigned to the Embassy in Washington, to Soviet news-
paper corr.spondents whose place of work is Washington and to Soviet
personnel of Amtorg in New York.
3. although the proposed regulation of the travel of Soviet per-
*%w sonnel in the United States is less onerous than the restrictions applied
to American officials in the USSR, the Department has drafted the pro-
posed note with the purpose of maintaining a flexible position which
would enable us to forbid a proposed journey by a Soviet official, if
such were thought expedient in the light of Soviet restrictive practices
on our official personnel in Moscow. Ambassador-designate Kennan has
approved this propose& procedure and has expressed the desire to be
given the authority, if the occasion arises after his arrival in the
Soviet Union, to inform Soviet authorities that a relaxation in Soviet
travel restrictionu will be met by a relaxation in the regulation of
travel placed by this Government on Soviet official personnel in
Washington.
4. The Department has informed the United States Deputy on the
NATO Council of Deputies in London of this proposed action and has
instructed him to inform his colleagues of the measure being contemplated.
He has been instructed to say that while a final United States Government
position has not yet been reached, we would like to obtain from the other
Deputies an expression of the views of their governments whether they
intend to regulate the travel of Soviet official personnel in their re-
pective countries. However, our final action will not be dependent upon
any discussion or decision by the NATO Council of Deputies.
CONFIDENTIAL
IAC-D- l
1 February 1952
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