CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A024600080001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 9, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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9 June 1973
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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No. 0138/73
9 June 1973
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
CHINA - NORTH VIETNAM: Economic and military aid
pact hammered out. 'Page 1)
SOUTH VIETNAM: Thieu's Democracy Party scores vic-
tories in local elections. (Page 2)
SPAIN: Franco relinquishes position as premier.
(Page 3)
CSCE-MBFR: Date set for CSCE, but final approval
still hinges on MBFR. (Page 4)
CHILE: President Allende may again turn to General
Prats to shore up government. (Page 5)
HUNGARY: Drought damage to crops may necessitate
greater imports. (Page 6)
GREECE: New republic will feature strong presidency.
(Page 7)
JAPAN: Domestic opposition to nuclear-powered ship.
(Page 7)
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*CHINA - NORTH VIETNAM: The two sides have
signed an agreement on Chinese economic and mili-
tary assistance to North Vietnam for next year.
The pact apparently was hammered out during the
high-level North Vietnamese visit to Peking this
week.
A Chinese news agency announcement on 8 June
states that the purpose of the agreement, after the
"end of the war," is to "heal the wounds of war,
rehabilitate and develop" Hanoi's economy, and
"strengthen its national defense capability." The
new pact obviously will include some military aid,
but the order of priorities listed in the announce-
ment indicates that the package will be weighted on
the civilian side.
Hanoi almost certainly pressed for a heavy com-
mitment of military aid, possibly arguing that such
assistance would at least be necessary until the
post - cease-fire military situation stabilized.
In his speech, at a Peking rally on 7 June, Le Duan
appeared more concerned than the Chinese speaker,
Yeh Chien-ying, about difficulties still to come.
He said the Vietnamese still have a "complicated
course" to follow in South Vietnam. The Chinese
appeared to view the situation with more equanimity,
hinting that total compliance will take time. In
another divergence, Yeh stressed that "all parties"
should respect the agreements while Le I)uan laid
the blame for difficulties entirely at the allied
side's door.
*Because of the shortage oi'time for preparation ot'this item, the analytic
interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State.
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SOUTH VIETNAM: The government is strengthening
its administrative control at the grass roots level.
President Thieu's Democracy Party has scored impres-
sive victories in village council elections that are
being held throughout the country. In the Mekong
Delta, for example, Democracy Party members have won
about 80 percent of some 200 contests to date.
The party's success is due in large part to the
tight control over the elections exercised by ap-
pointed local officials and to the fact that numer-
ous independent and opposition figures refused to
run. A few elections have been postponed, either
because there were not enough candidates on the
ballot or because officials believed that Viet Cong
influence was too strong.
More local contests are scheduled in the coming
weeks and the Democracy Party's success is likely to-
continue. Many local officials appear determined to
ensure a government sweep, although in at least one
area where non-Communist opposition groups are strong,
they are actively working for a more balanced out-
come.
Opponents of the government have thus far re-
acted mildly to the Democracy Party's successes.
One reason is that many of the party's members were
recruited from opposition or independent parties
and are widely believed to lack any real commitment
to Thieu. There is some bitterness, however, over
alleged heavy-handed election tactics by the govern-
ment. The Communists have charged that the elec-
tions violate the cease-fire agreement, but are
generally ignoring the balloting itself. Thieu pre-
sumably believes that the need to strengthen the
government's position at the local level is worth
any criticism the elections may provoke.
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SPAIN: Franco's relinquishment of his position
as premier to his vice-premier, Admiral Luis Carrero
Blanco, and the cabinet changes scheduled for next
week are apparently designed to reduce internal ten-
sions. Franco's health has been declining in recent
years, but there is no indication that his decision
was prompted by some recent change in his condition.
By naming Carrero now instead of allowing him
to become prime minister upon Franco's death accord-
ing to the law of succession, Franco seems to be
moving to restore greater cohesion in the government.
This tightening-up probably foreshadows a further
turn to the right in domestic policy. Franco retains
his two other top positions as chief of state and
supreme commander of the armed forces. Prince Juan
Carlos remains as king-designate and will take over
as chief of state on Franco's death or incapacitation.
Carrero, an ultraconservative and a close con-
fidant of Franco, is dedicated to the preservation
of the status quo. He is the leading instigator of
the stepped-up security measures of the past several
years against those who seek to protest injustices
in Spain. Some members of the outgoing cabinet, who
are linked to the Catholic lay organization Opus
Dei, have favored mild liberalization of political
controls to facilitate Spain's efforts to join the
European Community. They were the target of right-
ist demonstrators last month who protested the mur-
der of a policeman by a terrorist group, alleging
that the murder was the result of an order forbidding
police to use arms to quell May Day demonstrators.
The rightists also protested the church's recent
criticism of police action in the death of a worker
in a clash in Barcelona. Although Carrero may re-
tain some of the technocrats because of their eco-
nomic expertise, he probably will respond to the
pressures by appointing opponents of Opus Dei sym-
pathetic to his own views.
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CSCE-MBFR: Participants in the multilateral
preparatory talks on CSCE have resolved the remaining
substantive and procedural issues and have agreed ad
referendum to start the actual conference on 3 July.
Final approval still hinges on agreement on the
opening date of the MBFR negotiations.
In Vienna, Eastern and Western representatives
at the MBFR preliminary talks have similarly resolved
almost all outstanding differences in formulating a
communique. Since the participants had already de-
cided not to haggle over an agenda at this time,
the only real issue remaining is the question of the
date for beginning the actual negotiations. NATO
representatives want a date no later than 30 October
to be stated in the communique. Soviet leaders have
recently stated that MBFR should begin only after
all three phases of CSCE have been completed, and
the Soviet negotiators in Vienna have therefore re-
sisted setting a date for MBFR that might conflict
with this.
Some NATO members have been reluctant to agree
to a CSCE date until an MBFR date has been set. if
a satisfactory Soviet response is not forthcoming
soon, they could cause problems later, since all de-
cisions at the CSCE preparatory talks, including the
date of the conference, must still be formally ap-
proved by the respective governments. A majority
of the NATO Council members favor withholding ap-
proval of the CSCE package until those members who
want to link it to a Soviet commitment to MBFR have
had a chance to state their case at the NATO minis-
terial meeting next week in Copenhagen.
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CHILE: President Allende may again be turning
to General Prats to shore up his government in the
present uneasy situation.
Popular Unity (UP)
coalition leaders planned to talk with Prats about
bringing the military back into the cabinet when he
returned this week from a month-long trip abroad.
Allende may already have asked him to reassume the
post of interior minister in the hope that this would
strengthen the administration's ability to deal with
the current strikes and other manifestations of wide-
spread unrest.
Prats, spurred by his own presidential ambitions,
would be likely to accept. If the rest of the army
hierarchy still insists that the military must have
all the cabinet posts or none, he might resign from
the army. Prats is disenchanted with what he con-
siders obstructionist tactics by civilian politicians
and military officers who oppose the government, and
he may believe that he could play an effective role
in restoring order and even in moderating some gov-
ernment policies.
Although UP leaders differ over the value of
reappointing military ministers, a civilian Prats
in the top post would be an excellent solution for
the politicians. His prestige would almost cer-
tainly ensure army loyalty, but not at the price of
more power for the armed forces.
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HUNGARY: Drought conditions are threatening to
cause food shortages that will require the govern-
ment to increase imports significantly in the coming
year. If substantial rains do not occur within the
next week or so, large shortfalls in wheat, barley,
early vegetables, and green forage harvests are
likely. Also threatened. are the more recently planted
important row crops--corn, sugar beets, and sun-
flowers--and this year's goals for livestock produc-
tion.
Soil moisture reserves have been below normal
in the major grain areas for nine consecutive months
and, as of 1 June, were 40 percent below normal.
According to press reports, a hot dry May caused
some wheat to ripen prematurely. At this critical
stage of development, wheat and barley yield pros-
pects will deteriorate very rapidly without good
soil moisture. Output of early vegetables has been
reduced and development of spring barley and oats
has been retarded. Some reseeding of late planted
corn and vegetables that, failed to germinate may
be required.
A shortfall in grain and fodder crops may force
Hungary to import larger than usual quantities of
feed grain and protein supplements to support its
high priority livestock program. Although Hungary
had a record grain harvest last year, strong domes-
tic demand and poor quality of the harvested grain
did not permit a buildup of stocks. Hungarian offi-
cials are already concerned over a setback to hog
production from an outbreak of foot-and-mouth dis-
ease and stagnation in the cattle industry. Re-
strictions on exports of livestock products are
thus likely to be enacted this year.
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GREECE: The new republic apparently will fea-
ture a strong presidency, similar to that of France.
The government announced yesterday that a president
will be elected for a seven-year term without the
right of re-election. The president will choose a
premier and 20 of the 200 members of parliament.
The members appointed by the president will not be
able to vote on policy issues or participate in
votes of confidence on the government. Parliamentary
elections are yet to be scheduled, but are supposed
to come before the end of 1974. Neither yesterday's
statement nor last week's decree establishing the
republic clarifies whether or not the provisional
president, Prime Minister Papadopoulos, will stand
for elections or simply take over. Press reports,
probably government inspired, indicate that the
people will be asked to vote for president as part
of next month's referendum sealing the creation of
a republic. Papadopoulos reportedly will be the
only presidential candidate.
JAPAN: Japanese officials have been unable to
test the country's first nuclear-powered ship be-
cause of domestic opposition. The government-
owned experimental merchant ship--the Mutsu--was
scheduled to conduct a test run shortly after being
completed last October, but opposition from the
local fishing industry, which fears nuclear contam-
ination, has forced it to remain in port. If such
opposition intensifies, the ship may have diffi-
culty finding other ports-of-call in Japan even if
its test runs are successful. The Mutsu's uncer-
tain status, moreover, is likely to delay the con-
struction of additional nuclear ships. Plans for
other such ships, which also would be for commer-
cial use, reportedly are already running into dif-
ficulty. The Japanese have no plans for the de-
velopment of nuclear-powered warships.
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