U.S. V. IBM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 5, 1974
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 :CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
5 November 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: U.S, v. IBM
In my telecon with Dick Irvine of Justice today,
I told him that documents #11 and 14 set out in the
Cravath letter to Justice of September 4, 1974 and
relayed to me by Irvine's letter of October 26 were
definitely not Agency. In this connection, ~~ca119~ his
attention to the fact that the cover sheet made it quite
obvious that Rand had prepared these documents for the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and the
Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP). In
order to obtain the required approvals he sought, I
suggested that he contact those two agencies. I told
him that the office locations of ARPA and CIEP could be
found in the U.S. Government Manual 73/74 at pages 1~6
and ~87 respectfully. I emphasized to him that we would
take no further action with respect to these documents
but that I would move ahead with the other four which
seemed to have been originated by the Agency.
OSD has no objection to declassification and release.
OSD review(s) completed.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 :CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
PREFACE
This Working Note has been prepared as an input to an interagency'.
study of computer export policy which is being undertaken by the Council
on International Economic Policy. The paper is also an integral part
of Rand's work on international technology exchange for the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
THE EXPECTED IMPACT OF COMPUTERS ON SOVIET ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
The driving forces behind the burgeoning Soviet demand for computers
have been the increasing inefficiency of the statewide planning system, the
falling growth rate of the economy, and the near collapse of growth in total
factor productivity. It is analytically convenient, as well as factually
correct, to separate Soviet economic problems into the areas suggested above
--the economic planning process as distinct from the producing sector of
the economy. We shall first concentrate on computers in the planning pro-
cess, and then turn to a discussion of the operating economy.
COMPUTERS AND THE PLANNING SYSTEM
Soviet political leaders establish the broad outlines and strategy
of economic production and development. These directions are given to the
State Planning-Agency (Gosplan) which works.out in detail the amounts going
to private and government consumption, military users, investment, foreign
trade, and other final users. The most difficult part of the. planning pro-
eess,'however, involves the calculation of how the output will be produced
--which ministries and enterprises, with what technologies and mix of mater-
ials, and with what.prioriti.es if the output plans are inconsistent or in-
feasible. This must be done for the nation as a whole, for each geographical
region, for each ministry, down to the,enterprise level. Plans must be pre-
pared for 50,000 industrial enterprises and more than a million enterprises
of all types. Eighteen thousand products are planned in detail. The number
of enterprises and products are growing each year and the problem of inte-
grating the expanding number of details is growing at an even faster rate.
Aleading cyberneticist, V. Glushkov, has claimed that if planning efficiency
did not improve and if present growth rates remained constant, every Soviet
adult would be engaged in planning by 1980. At the time of this statement
(1966), the number of planners had increased by 50 percent in the preceding
five years.
While Glushkov's statement is somewhat self-serving in that his research
institute and field of expertise would benefit from the proposed solution
to the problem, the statement has been widely quoted in the Soviet Union
as being a roughly correct caricature.of the problem. In fact, because of
the immense size of the planning job, most plans are late, inconsistent, and
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
nonoptimal. The plans are published well after the beginning of the pro-
duction period to which they refer, so that enterprises must operate for
part of the year without detailed knowledge as to their goals and the re-
sources available to meet them.. The list of goods designated for end uses
generally cannot be produced with the resources allocated according to the
plan. And it would be possible, theoretically, to produce more final, out-
put with the available resources.
A large and somewhat grandiose scheme was proposed in the mid-1960s
to meet the perceived problems in the planning system. The automated system
of planning calculations (ASPR) is a system for working out the national
economic plans and supervising plan fulfillment through the use of mathe-
matical economics and computer technology. ASPR includes "constructing of
an interrelated system of models of long-, medium-, and short-term national
economic development plans; systematizing of plan indicators; determining
the necessary information flows and the.principles of using the information;
developing -the mathematical models; and determining the necessary equipment." Cosplan and the Central Mathematical Economics Institute (TsEMI) are the
organizations chiefly responsible for the implementation of ASPR. This inte-
grated planning system will require an enormous quantity of computing machin-
ery, information transmission equipment, programming, model building and esti-
mation, and a good deal of basic theoretical work. Despite the fact that
perhaps thousands of individuals and several research institutes are involved
in its creation, very little of actual output has been produced and the scope
of the project has been gradually trimmed back.
Although ASPR is likely to be implemented only in part, computer use,
and more generally economic cybernetics, has been growing on a piecemeal
basis throughout the planning bureaucracy.. 2 Computers may enable the plan-
ning agencies to collect and analyze large amounts of data, to manipulate
1"T"ne Creation of an Automated Planning Calculation System--A Nationwide
Task," Plannovoye Khozyzystvo, No. 8, August 1972; translated in JPRS,
13 November 1972, pp. 1-2.
Economic cybernetics, as narrowly conceived, is simply mathematical
economic models. However, broader and more common usage refers to compre-
hensive systems of economic planning and management based on mathematical
models integrated with computers and large data bases.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100,060005-9
complex economic models and estimate their parameters, and to produce and
transmit planning goals to economic organizations. The use of computers
may provide Soviet planners the ability to produce plans that are somewhat
more efficient and timely than is possible by present procedures. But most
outside observers, as well as quite a few Soviet economists, believe that
the main defects in the economy can be traced to the system of incentives
and to the basic structuring of economic life. For example, the parameters
of a mathematical model of the economy are usually assumed to be determined
by the technology of production processes. However, the observed processes
are the outcomes of many distorting forces -- the measured parameters in-
clude a mix of technology, "quasi" price incentives, inefficiency, perver-
sity, and chicanery. Construction and implementation of a plan based on
.such inputs will include all of the nontechnological elements.. However,
it is unlikel that even this nonoptimal plan could actually be implemented.
The problems run deeper. Typical of many comments are the following quota-
tions:.
It is widely known that the compilation of optimal schemes
of freight shipment can yield a quite tangible Saving. This
.is not a complicated task. Many articles and books have been
written and not a few dissertations defended, but almost no
freight is shipped by the optimal schemes. Why? Simply be-
cause the transport organizations are given plans based on
ton-kilometers. One can establish computer centers, and con-
ceive superb algorithms, but nothing will come of it as long
as the transport organizations reckon plan fulfillment in
ton-kilometers.1
A deputy director of TsEMI has written that:
The real saving from the introduction of the new methods has
been considerably less than'we expected. But this is not the
fault of the officials in transport and it is not the fault
of the models. Because of inadequacies in price formation,
the minimization of costs leads to the worsening of practi-
cally all the indices of the work of motor transport. The
same is observed in other fields.2
Computers and the Management of Enter rp ises
The problems noted by these writers are ones of goals and incentives.
They arise from inherent limitations in the planning process and from the
basic structuring of the Soviet economy. Despite the size and complexity
IIzvesti.ya, December 4, 1964.
2Discussions. on Optimal Plan ninj, Proceedings of a Conference, compiled
by L. Kaz, y 1d FI6l legsel2 /?8h2110t:?A-FEDP7>9Ar0 A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
of the planning. system, it cannot possibly provide timely, detailed instruc-
tions for every product and every enterprise. Although managers operate
within a restrictive web of regulations and constraints. and are subject to
the frequent intervention of Party and Government in the internal management
of the enterprise, there remains much scope for managerial discretion and
autonomy in day to day operations.. This discretionary behavior is condi-
tioned by a pattern of incentives, some of which have been explicitly planned,
while others are unanticipated and, often, counterproductive. Excessive
constraints, frequent intervention, and unanticipated incentives are, to
the Western analyst, the major sources of lagging Soviet productivity.
Given these conditions, the role of computers in revitalizing economic life
is sharply limited.
One author, in an excellent overview of the problems affecting tech-
nological progress in the USSR, notes three main directions in the attempted
solution of these problems: (1) the reorientation of capital investment
to fdster modern and efficient technologies; (2) reduction in the time re-
quired to put modern plant and equipment into operation; and (3) devising
new rules and incentives to encourage enterprises to adopt new technologies
and produce new products.
The simplest use of computers is to replace labor by capital. Book-
keeping, payroll calculations, inventory management, and other such account-
ing chores have been the first use of computers in the Soviet Union, as they
were in the United States. Indeed, some Soviet experts claim that these uses
are about the only productive uses currently being made of the equipment.
But more complex schemes have been planned. Automated management systems
(ASU) are intended to automate the management ofministries and enterprises,
to control production processes, and to both feed information to the auto-
mated planning system (ASPR--described above) and receive planning infor-
mation from that system. ASU, though,. has faced the same fate as ,'SPR.
Little has been done to implement what many have thought to be an exceedingly
grand and complex concept.
lGertrude Schroeder, "The Economic Reform as a Spur to Technological
Progress in the USSR," Jarbuch der WirtschaftOsteuropas, Vol. II, Gunter
Verlag, Munich, 1971, pp. 351-352.;
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21,: CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
-5-
These large-scale'plans (ASPR and ASU), despite their failure of
implementation, exemplify two of the three main thrusts of current develop-
ments. The aim here has been to promote the internal efficiency of plan-
ning and production processes and operating units within the context of
the underlying structure. The leadership though has toyed with some poten-
tially major reforms as represented by the Sovnarkhoz experiment, Lieber-
manism, and the 1965 reforms. But. each of these experiments has failed
to provide any Jong term or meaningful change in economic life. The cur-
rent attack on the problems involves seeking administrative solutions.)
This has led to a burgeoning of the State's administrative apparatus, and
a mass of new rules, regulations, plans, and indices that further constrain
and complicate the life of a manager.
The very problems that computers are intended to ameliorate, however,
have hindered the productive use of the computers themselves. More than
machines are required. Software, programmers, maintenance engineers, and
peripheral equipment are necessary before systems can even begin to oper-
ate. And the flexibility of management to reconfigure their organizations
and processes in order to go beyond automated bookkeeping systems is a
missing cornerstone of the whole endeavor. The Soviet system has not res-
ponded to these requirements for the reasons suggested above: excessive
constraints and misincentives that affect most aspects of Soviet economic
life.,
One can conclude from this brief review that neither through the
planning process nor through improved management will computers and econo-
mic cybernetics bring major (or perhaps even discernible) changes to
Soviet growth and productivity. The retarding forces are structural and
strong and computer usage is inhibited in.the same manner and by the same
forces as other economic processes. However, it must be noted that the
growth of analytical economics, in attempting to cope with the critical
planning and managerial problems facing the Soviet Union, has completely
changed the tone of economic debate.2 Real problems are now being discussed
)Schroeder, op, cit.., p. 352.
2For evidence of these changes, see any recent review of Soviet economics
ar.d planning techniques; for example, see: A. S. Becker and others, in Mathe-
matics and Computers in Soviet I conomic Planning, John P. Ilardt, at al, (eds. ),
Yale University Press, New haven, Connecticut, 1967.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
and controversies over substantive issues. of a Marxist economy are not
being suppressed. A new generation of economists and politicians are
grappling with these problems in a new li.ght.1 In the meantime, thousands
of individuals have been trained in the new techniques and are to be found
throughout the economy. Computers and computer analyses are also more wide-
spread than previously, though not in the numbers or quality desired. And
most importantly, modes of thinking that at one time made one liable to
imprisonment or execution are now the commonplace of institutes, univer-
sities, government agencies, and production ministries.2 Debates sur-
rounding these new ways of thinking are aired in newspapers and magazines
as well as in learned journals.. Whether or not the ideas of economic cyber-
netics will be stymied in the future by Marxist dogma or whether practitioners
of applied theory will. clash with the. primacy of the Party is a question for
speculation.
It must be noted though that the growth of cybernetics has followed
a dialectic observed elsewhere in the Soviet Union. The-proclamation of
large-scale, grandiose plans that are later scaled down, modified, and re-
fined has been a demonstrated technique for mobilizing large amounts of
resources and redirecting them in non-incremental ways when the Party has
decided on a major new thrust.3 An important aspect. of the growth of econo-
mic cybernetics that has been noted with respect to other major Soviet'
1The notion of scarcity prices, for example, originally came out of
the models of mathematical economists, but have now filtered down (in a
very diluted form) to the applied level as intended stimulants of new
technology. Many.acadexni.cs, however, contend that these innovations do not
go nearly far enough to make much of a difference. Schroeder, op. cit.,
p. 357.
2Departments of mathematical economics have been established since
1965 in both the Universities of Moscow and Leningrad, with several hundred
students in each department. Their graduates can now be found throughout
the country, especially in the planning organizations of the republics,
ministries, and in Gosplan. The ma&or research institute, TsEMI, and
several of its newer colleagues now have-professional staffs of about-1000,
people each.
3This is seen, for instance, in avaiation where the Party intervened
in a major way to influence the development of jet-powered aircraft and to
-revamp the structure of civil a1.r transport. See, Arthur J. Alexander,
R&D in Soviet Aviation, R-589-FR, ..-The Rand Corporation, 1970, p. 27.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
decisions is that if the leadership values an end highly enough, or per-
ceives a problem as being critical, they will step into the situation in
a nonbureaucratic way, bringing personal, direct, high-level attention
to the subject. I suspect that the continued high-level effort that
would be required to
Soviet Union, and the
the solution entails
solve the problems of efficiency and growth in the
probable direct clash with traditional' values that
(in the
in little observed change in
the next decade, despite the
form of radical decentralization) will result
Soviet economic behavior or performance for
availability or nonavailability of computer
hardware. But beyond that, I. can only note that so many new concepts
are now at loose that longer term prediction is unwarranted.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
Approv MQUI - 2A000100060005-9
 ..t' a ads .mt .i
ARPA Order No.: 189-1
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000 0fi0,539C 01.81
- 3G10 Tactical Technology
WN-8388-ARPA/ C I EP
August 1973
THE COMPUTER GAP AND NATIONAL S ECURITY :
SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR RELAXING PORT CONTROLS (U)
Rein Turn
A WORKING NOTE
prepared for the
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY/
COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
Classified by -D elector,. AttPF1T 10 and C I Ep
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY `
DECLASSIFY ON Indefinite
In addition to security requirements
which apply to this doc'.ment and
must Be met, it may b1: further dis-
tributed by the holde ONLY with
specific prior approval of ARPA,/T! 0 and C I EP.
This Note is intended only to transmit
preliminary research results to a Rand
sponsor and may not he distributed with-
out the approval of that sponsor. Views
or conclusions expressed herein may he
tentative and do not necessarily represent
the opinion of the sponsor.
?5th
ye
ar
SANTA A, CA. 114140t,
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
r1ft E.. ET r:nwtin ,57
S
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21-: CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
THIS DOCU;EFT CUTAIk]S P tVILECED i CRWATIO1
Docwont Identifying no.
Obtained by Rein Turn 'and
From WN-7410-PR ~Secret) on various
(Source) (Date)
Nature of Privi 1e1;ed Infor ation and location in Qmcuat nt--Inte11igence
informat3.on on Soviet computer technaloQV located hrou t Qpt
the documgnt.
Limitations on use by RAND
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092AO00100060005-9
 Approved For ReYJ2U"Sl$i-92A000100060005-9
-iii-
PREFACE
(U) The export of Western digital computers to Soviet bloc nations
is subject at present to strict controls. The rationale for this policy
is to protect a technological lead which the United States enjoys over
the Soviets, and which provides the United States with a strategic mili-
tary advantage. The strategic value of U.S. computer superiority. derives
from the size of our lead and. the degree to which it is exploited in
military systems--issues addressed in this Note. The same issues were
discussed in another connection by Rein Turn for a Rand study in 1971 [17],
and the present paper draws heavily on the previous one. While the present
version uses revised and updated information, it also makes extensive use
of the earlier work. Where. references are still made to data cited in the
earlier paper, we believe these data to be the best available.
(U) This Working Note is a part of Rand's on-going research for the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.on international technology ex-
'change, and for the Council on International Economic Policy dealing with
computer export problems.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
UNCLASSIFIED
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
v-
SUMMARY
(U) The United States currently possesses?a strong lead over the
Soviet Union in all aspects of computer technology--general-purpose and
aerospace computer hardware, software (programming languages, operating
systems, application programs),.and.large civilian and military systems.
This lead can be expected to continue for the next five to ten'years,
despite Soviet efforts, to increase their domestic computer production
and import equipment, software, and know-how.
(U) Current computer applications in U.S. strategic systems do
not fully utilize available advanced computer technology. Indeed, the
currently most powerful Soviet computer, the BES114-6, appears capable of
performing all the computing tasks needed by the Soviets to match (or
counter) the advantages provided by existing U.S. systems. A cursory
comparison of the weapon systems of the two countries reveals no in-
stances where the United States has a significant advantage denied the
Soviets because of their lack of adequate computer technology.
(S) A number of potential applications of advanced' computer tech-
nology in strategic systems appear to exist, e.g., sensor data processing,
real time ICBM retargeting.in limited strategic operations, R.V. guidance
and control, ABM data processing,'and computer-communications networks.
These applications require computer technology not available to the
Soviets in the next five to ten years. It is not clear which among
these applications will prove cost-effective and will therefore become
operational in the United States. Although some of these applications.
are already being explored, as yet there has been no deliberate, system-
atic effort to fully utilize U.S. computer superiority.
(S) The COCOM export controls apply'to commercially available,
general purpose computers. Among the planned and merely suggested mili-
tary applications for the most advanced computer technology, advanced
general purpose machines would be necessary for only ABM data processing
and computer communications networks. Other advanced technology appli-
cations demand Fpecial purpose computers or could be satisfied with less
than advanced cieneral purpose machines. Advanced general-purpose com-
puters will be necessary for monitoring sensor collected data in ASW,
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
-vi-
automated battlefields and satellite based surveillance systems, but
they would not be sufficient for-deployment of these systems because
the required sensor technology will probably be unavailable to the
Soviets in the next five to ten years. Thus, relaxing controls on ex-
port of general. purpose computers could enable the Soviets to develop
no more than a few of those advanced strategic computer systems presently
unattainable to them.' End-use controls may be able to.prevent these
applications. Whether the Soviets would choose to develop an ABM system
or a computer-communications network, even if. the necessary computing
power were available, are separate and moot questions.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092AO00100060005-9
 U ! C . 1FII
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
-vii-
CONTENTS
Section
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................. 1
II. COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY: U.S. VERSUS SOVIET UNION ........... 2
Assessing the Computer Gap 2
1973 Computer Census ................................. 2
Computing Power ...................................... 3
Military and Aerospace Computers ..................... 8.
Software and Computing Theory ........................ 9
Soviet Efforts to Narrow the U.S. Lead ................. 10
.New Soviet Computers ................................. . 10
Increased Soviet Computer Production .................. 11
Export Controls ............... :...................... 12
Licensing Agreements ..... ........................ 12
III.-.STRATEGIC APPLICATION OF THE COMPUTER GAP ................ 14
General Effects of Computer Superiority ................ 14
Computer Gap and Military Systems to Date .............. 15
Operational Applications (Intelligence,
Command and Control) ............................... 17
Weapon System Development ............................ 18
Nuclear Weapons Design and Testing ................... 18
ABM Defense Applications ............................. 19
Space Applications ........................:.......... 20
Summary .............................................. 20
The Potential for Future Strategic Application
of the Computer Gap ................................ 21
Current Efforts ...................................... 22
Suggested Future Systems ............................. 24
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS ....................................... 28
REFERENCES ....................................................... 31
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2 j ? r)qI" D-01092AO00100060005-9
I. INTRODUCTION
(U) The Council on International Economic Policy, and other agencies,
are currently reviewing the COCOM restrictions covering the export of
general purpose computers to Communist countries. Relaxing these restric-
tions would enable the Soviets to narrow whatever lead.the US currently
possesses in computer technology and capability. To best understand the
repercussions of such relaxation on US national security, it is useful to
assess the magnitude of US computer superiority, and to evaluate the
strategic importance of this lead in the present and projected into the
future.
(U) This Working Note. presents an overview of the magnitude of the
"computer gap," Soviet efforts to close that gap, the extent that superior
computer technology has contributed to present US strategic capabilities;
and the possible future value of the computer gap for US strategic posture
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The aim of the discussion is to uncover the
strategic implications of greatly increased exports of general purpose
computers to Communist countries.
Approved For Releas l00 %$lAR'78-01 .3092A0 00100060005-9
1;
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21: CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
2-
II. COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY: U.S. VERSUS SOVIET UNION (U)
ASSESSING THE COMPUTER GAP (U)
(U) It is usually difficult to compare two countries in a selected
technological area. The problem is further compounded if one of the
countries is a closed society, such as the Soviet Union, and if the
technological area has great military and strategic importance,'such
as computer technology. In this case, the comparisons must be based
on whatever information can be obtained from translations of the Soviet
open literature, estimates by Western computer specialists, and classi-
fied intelligence documents. This Working Note draws on all three
sources. It updates much of the information contained in a 1971 draft [17].
(U) One approach to estimating the state of computer technology
is to consider the number of installed computers, installation growth
rates, computational capabilities of computer systems, application areas
(especially for military purposes), sophistication of the software (pro-
gramming systems), and the apparent magnitude of the current research
effort in computer sciences.
1973 Computer Census (U)
(U) The Soviets have never released official statistics of their
computer population. However, Western observers have occasionally esti-
mated the probable number of installed Soviet computers. The latest
such exercise has a January 1973 cut-off date:
Number of
Digital Computers
United States
107,000 (58,000 general purpose)
Soviet Union
6,500-12,000
Western Europe
and Canada
40,000
Germany
9,200
Britain
8,600
France
Japan
8,300 12,006
Eastern Europe
1,500-1,800
SOURCE: International Data Corporation.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 CIA-RDP78-01092AO00100060005-9
 UN CLASS] FIE-D
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
-3-
(U) Among the 107,000 computers installed in the United States,
the U.S. Government owns or operated (as of June 30, 1972) 6731 machines,
4800 of which were general purpose computers. A breakdown by agency of
U.S. government-operated general-purpose computers (excluding computers
used directly in weapon systems and in classified facilities) is pre-
sented below [11]:
Number of Computers
June 30
June 30
June 30
Agency
1970
1971
1972
Air Force
1210
1271
1419
Army
927
949
968
Navy
894
1021
1137
Other.
168
174
209
Total Department of Defense
3199
,
3415
3733
Atomic Energy Commission
754
954
1148
NASA
692
812
934
Civilian Departments
632
780
916
Total U.S. Government
5277
5961
6731
(U) Figure 1 shows the growth in the total number of computers in
the United States, the U.S. Government, the Defense Department, the Soviet
Union, Western Europe and Japan.
.Computing Power (U)
(U) The Soviet Union lags greatly in the total amount of available
"computer power"--something that could be measured in terms of the number
of operations per second that the country's entire. computer population
could perform working simultaneously.
(U) The most powerful Soviet computer, BESM-6 (announced in 1966),
is capable of .8 Mips (millions of instructions/sec).1 By comparison,
1Based on a single-address equivalent mix of five additions and one
multiplication. References 8 and 16 list the characteristics of BES.i-6
and other U.S. and Soviet computers.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
,~ a
 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974
Year
Fig. 1.--- Estimated number of - digitaI computers
Y.vJ i -iM.it"~..) a ,~d~.W
Approved For Release 2002/Ut121 : CIA-RDP78-0109
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
-5-
the most powerful commercially available U.S. computer in operation,
the CDC 7600 (announced in 1968), is capable of 17 Mips. Furthermore,
the United States has some two dozen other computer types equivalent
to or more capable than the BESM-6.
(U) The RYAD computer development effort of the East Bloc coun-
tries has finally led to operational. systems (the R-10 through R-60,
also called the ES-1010 through ES-1060, in steps of 10). The'R-50,
at nominal .5 Mips, is now the second most powerful Soviet computer.
Also in the RYAD line, but not yet announced, is the R-60 which will
have nominal capability in the 1.5-2 Mips range. This would make it
2-2.5 times the BESM-6capability. Figure 2 depicts the historical
development in speed of U.S. and Soviet computers.
(U) In addition to speed, the size and access time of the main
memory system is an important parameter in determining computing capa-'
bility. In this area, the-Soviets used to lag even more than in
computing speed, but they are now improving. The BESM-6 computer is
equipped with only a magnetic core memory of 65,000 48-bit words; its
access time is 2 psec. By contrast, the CDC 7600 has a memory hierarchy
of 65,000 60-bit words accessible in .0275 usec and 512,000 words acces-
sible in 1.76 usec. The RYAD systems will narrow the high speed internal
memory gap. The internal memories of R-50 and R-60 will be in the same
general area as the U.S. computers of similar size. The planned R-60
will have a maximum of 2,048,000 8-bit bytes with a .5 second access
time. Figure 3 depicts the present state of the memory gap.
(U) In the mass memory area, the Soviets recently achieved. the
capability of producing large capacity magnetic disc units. The RYAD
disks form a family to match the different models. The R-50 has a disk
unit of 290 megabits with a 90 ms. access time and a 1.3 megabits/sec.
transfer rate. For comparison, a large U.S. disc drive, the IBM 3330,
can store 6400 megabits, has a 30 msec. access time and a 6.4 megabit/
sec. data transfer rate. Removable disc pack units are also in existence
and in use with BESI.1-6 computers.
(U) Finally, an equally gI- ;it t,~~cllnoloc,ical gap exists in the area
of computer input/output and mass memory devices. Many present types of
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : EF-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
108
107
a
2
6
10
105
? U.S. Computers
X Soviet Computers
ILLIAC L' (1 QUADR)
Star- 100
AMDAHL system A
?IBM 360/195
BESM-X (?)
IBM 360/9 IBM 360/$5 i
?
lBtl 370/168
CDC 66001 r
60701
H
0/
-
360/75 ?
IBM 360/651 e R - 60
IBM 370/158
TX -2v'" / ""' Vr% M -3000
x R-20
R- 10
I I y i I
1970 1980
Year
Fig. 2 - U . S. and S.U . computer capability*
*Comparing the computational power of computers is a most difficult task: the
manufacturers' announced arithmetic operation times and storage cycle times
are used to compare hardware capabi.lities, but are not very satisfactory. Tke
operating system capabilities will greatly influence a system's performance,
and also the type of problems being solved. Figure 2 is not suited for com-
paring the U.S. computers to each other, but only to show the computational
regime of the. U .S . computers versus the S .U . computers. The purpose is to
underscore the magnitude of the "raw" computing capability gap. The infor-
mation in Figure 2 comes from many sources which tend to present non-comfar-
able data. For example, the estimates of BESM-6 computing capabilities .ary
from 0.5 MIPS to 1 .0 MIPS . Simi lar differences in estimates occur for the
U . SAp 6Wd'Frbrr Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
N
C)
E
U
U.
L
0
E
1)
1.0
.01105
106
107
Fig. 3
M - 3000
(1969)
R-30
(1972)
/ Burroughs B77
? x x BESM -b (1966)
IBM 7094 R-40(1973) (1972).
(1960) x x R - 50 1973
00 .
? U.S. computers
x Soviet computers
CDC 6600
IBM 360/65
x R- 60 (1974)
(1964)
(1966)
H 6070 (1971)
UNIVAC 1110 ?
?
IBM 370/155 -158
(1972)
(1971)
?
siBM 370/165
IBM 360/85
(1971)
0
IBM 360/195
(1969)
(1971)
CDC 7600 0
(1970)
CDC - Star 1971
108
Memory capacity in bits
Comparison of computer memories
109
1010
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
--8-
Soviet computers still use paper tape input and output. Only recently
have reasonably reliable punched card readers, card punches, and line
printers been, developed. The RYAD computers will.-have a printer capable
of 800-900 lines/minute and a card reader capable of 500 cards/minute.
Military and Aerospace Computers .(U)
(u) Not much is-known about S.U. military or space computers. A
model, K-200, has been described as weighing 264 lbs., 9.3 ft3 in size,
and capable of 50,000 operations/sec. [16]. This compares favorably with
the U.S. avionic computers. Incidentally, the space/military use of the
K-200 has not been admitted by the Soviets.
(U) Some references have been made to the use of an onboard com-
puter in the Luna 16 moon probe and in satellite tracking systems [15].
Also, a spaceborne computer was described to B. Boehm of The Rand Cor-
poration during a 1971 trip to the Soviet Union [4]. The system was de-
scribed as containing 4000 words of read-only memory in a unit about .1
cu. ft. in volume, and capable of .1 Mips. This computer compares quite
favorably with advanced U.S. aerospace computers.
(S) U.S. intelligence information on Soviet military computers is
very sparse. Indeed, a 1972 survey of Soviet computers [5] makes no men-
tion of the aerospace computer reported by Boehm in 1971. Conjectures
have also been made about the existence of a "hidden" Soviet military
computer community [9]. Such a community may indeed exist for production
of the various special-purpose computers for the Soviet military. However,
the lack of information may also mean that onboard computers are not re-
quired; it is known that the Soviet approach to ICBM guidance and control
is different from the U.S. approach. Furthermore, the use of simplified
avionics systems in Soviet aircraft may not require onboard digital com-
puters. Also lacking is information on possible large Soviet military
computer systems for ABM defense, early warning, and command-control
applications.
(U) By 1971, the United States had produced about 60 types of aero-
space computers [2]. The situati~r. !_-,s not c'.angcd considerably since
that date. The emphasis has been on performance, reliability, and environ-
mental hardness.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 SEC 3ET
Approved For F2e1e 10 /if:'}A 64e92A000100060005-9
-9-
(U) A new development by the U.S. Navy, the AADC, will provide the
U.S. military with a great leap forward in airborne computers--it is pro-
jected to be capable of providing the computing capability of the 360/195
in 1 cu. ft. of volume and at a cost of $30,000 (vs. the IBM 360/195 cost
of $6,000,000) [7]. The AADC will use advanced large scale integration
techniques as well as advanced semiconductor and magnetic components.
The S.U. cannot be expected to achieve similar capability for at least
?5-6 years.
Software and Computing Theory (U)
(U) In the area of computer programming languages and computer opera-
ting systems, the Soviets have chosen to rely mainly on U.S.-designed or
internationally developed programming languages, such as FORTRAN, ALGOL,
COBOL, and others. These are widely used in the Western world, and it is
only natural for the Soviets to take advantage of these developments to
save Tt great deal of development effort.
(U) The Soviets lag considerably in multiprogramming and time-
sharing uses of computers. Until recently, one problem was the lack of
fast mass memories. It is likely that similar difficulties are encoun-
tered in real-time applications of computers. It is well known that the
.programming task is one of the main difficulties in designing large U.S.
military command and control systems. The Soviets maybe expected to
find this problem at least as difficult.
(U) In the theoretical aspect of computer design the Soviets have
been lagging behind U.S. capabilities. A detailed U.S. survey in 1964
[12] concluded that the technical content of the majority of Soviet pub-
lications in the logic design of digital computers was somewhat behind
U.S. standards. This situation still prevails in 1973. Exceptions have
been 10 to 12 leading Soviet computer scientists who, as can be expected,
have been the leading designers of computing and programming systems.
(The "master designer" approach characteristic of the Soviet aircraft
industry seems also to be emerging in. the Soviet computer industry.)
Theoretical developments from the-Western world are easily transferred
to the Soviets and, given their traditional mathematical-logical strength.,
there is no reason to believe that theoretical questions will signifi-
cantly Sov et c m nit dd ~v m t
y Approved For Reieise ~b0 2y`01i~p G6t) -PDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 S E C T
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
-10-.
SOVIET EFFORTS TO NARROW THE U.S. LEAD (U)
.(U) The Soviets are making considerable efforts to reduce the
computer gap. Their admitted computing need is especially great in the
area of economic planning and control, where a large network of some
2000 regional computer centers is planned to be introduced [19]. Auto-
mation of the manufacturing and processing industries is equally high
on the agenda.
(U) The Soviet effort to overcome the computer shortage is being
pursued on several fronts: ' designing new domestic computers, increasing
domestic computer production, importing Western computers, negotiating
licensing agreements to allow Soviet manufacture of Western equipment,
and monitoring Western technical literature and trade shows. The prob-
able Soviet' capabilities in these areas and the effects on the U.S.
computer superiority are briefly discussed below.
New Soviet Computers (U)
(U) Since the installation of the first BESM-6 in 1966, the Soviets
have not announced any higher-performance computers. Beginning to emerge,
however, are the RYAD computers, the result of a concerted effort by the
Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc countries to produce a series
of third-generation computers. similar to, and compatible with, the IBM
System 360 computers [3, 4, 16]. The largest planned RYAD computer may
achieve the 2-Mips category, twice the speed of the BESM-6. The RYAD
development was first hinted at in 1967, with plans of first installa-
tions in 1969. This deadline was not met and only now are the R-10,
R-20',R-40 and R-50 becoming available.
(U) The designers of the BESM-6 are reported to be engaged in a
different project. BESM-6 was a 50-fold speed increase over BESM-4;
thus, the new "BESM-Y." could be expected to be much more powerful than
the BESM-6, possibly attempting to reach the performance level of the
CDC 7600. The latter was constructed from discrete high-speed transis-
tors. Hence, Soviet lags in integrated circuit technology may not be a
barrier to reacting CDC 7600 speeds.
(S) No si.,nificant information is available in the intelligence
sources to permit confident prediction of the. characteristics and initial
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 S.:
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
? -11-
installation times of new Soviet computer systems. It is instructive
to recall, however, that BESINi-6 was announced in 1965--only a few months
after intelligence sources and experts had predicted that a Soviet com-
puter with BESM-6 characteristics was not likely before 1973 [9].
(U) Even if the Soviets manage to produce BESM-X with an 8-10-Mips
capability in 1974, the coraranding U.S. lead in extremely high-performance
computers is not threatened. In the installation phase are the CDC STAR-
100 with 100 Mips capability and the ILLIAC IV (one quadrant of 64 pro-
cessor units) with 128 Mips capability. The new generation of U.S.
computers is reported to be capable of direct execution of higher order
languages--a great improvement from the user's point of view.
(U) Applications of laser technology permit very large and fast
random access memories: 'a trillion-bit laser memory with 2.0 msec access
time has been announced in the United States [18]. However, the Soviets
are also actively pursuing laser applications to computing and may at-
temptrto by-pass their difficulties in integrated circuit technology by
concentrating on laser methods. Here, indeed, is a potential for the
Soviets to greatly reduce the gap in computer and memory capability.
(U) In the area of aerospace computers, the premium is on size,
power consumption, reliability, and ruggedness. These depend heavily
on integrated circuit technology and high-quality manufacturing tech-
niques. The Soviets can be expected to produce a few high-performance
general-purpose aerospace computers in laboratories, but their serial
production may be years off.
(U) To summarize, the performance gap will continue in favor of
the United States both in very large computers and in aerospace computer
systems. A great qualitative change is required in the Soviet industry
before they can begin to catch up with the U.S. although eventually, of
course, they will produce enough computers for their military and govern-
Increased Soviet Computer Production (U)
(U) The Soviets are plan in; erapha 3is on increasing computer
production. For example, the 1971 state pitir: called for a 20 percent
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 S IRE
T
(Th.is )aoe is TT cl ~f t_ d
Approved For Release 2002108/21 : CIA-RDP78 01092A000100060005-9
-12-
production increase over 1970 levels. A 1971-75 plan expressed the
goal of building 12,000-15,000 RYAD computers by 1975 [13]. The
present Soviet computer production rate appears to be 750 to 1000
systems/year,1 so it is highly unlikely that the 1975 objective can
be reached, in two years.
(U) Furthermore, the Soviet coirputer manufacturing industry is
reportedly beset with serious quality control and management problems
[3]. The United States can be expected to continue holding a large
lead in installed. computer systems for the next five to ten years.
Export Controls (U) _
(U) The Soviets apparently realize that their domestic production
cannot satisfy computer needs, and.they have increased their efforts to
import high-performance computer systems from Western countries. The
principal hindrance to the Soviets here is the U.S. and COCOM (Coor-
dinating Committee of representatives of 14 NATO countries and Japan)
countries' embargo on exporting strategic goods to Communist bloc
countries. All export applications are closely scrutinized by the
U.S. Department of Commerce, DoD, CIA, AEC, and State Department,
according to precise guidelines on computer and peripheral equipment
Capabilities. Were it not for this embargo, the computer gap might be
eroded, if the Russians chose to computerize their economy and military
as extensively as is done in the U.S. Restraining the Soviets would be
their scarce supply of hard currency, and a reluctance to depend on
Western hardware.
Licensing Agreements (U)
(U) Although a large-scale program by the Soviets to import Western
computers could considerably improve their computing capabilities (at the
expense of millions of dollars), it would be more important to the Soviet
domestic computer industry to negotiate licensing agreements with Western
industry. This would give the Soviets access to Western manufacturing
IDerived from Fig. 1.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 S ar av.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
? -13-
techniques, tools, and know-how that are otherwise hard to acquire. If
the Soviets.are unable to negotiate such licensing arrangements, they
can be expected to be constrained by production technology from pro-
ducing large numbers of general purpose computers in the next few years.
The 1971-75 plan for production of RYAD computers called for installa-
tion of 12,000 to 15,000 third generation computers by 1975. Now half-
way through that period, the Soviets are far behind schedule, evidencing
their difficulties.
(U) France and Japan have already licensed Communist bloc countries
to produce transistors and computer system components [8]. The results
of these actions are being reflected in the RYAD machines. The Soviet
decision to copy IBM System 360 features in RYAD also shows their interest
.in taking advantage of U.S. experience and achieving a great advantage in-
importing any System 360 peripheral equipment that passes, the embargo limits.
Finally, the ability to utilize System 360 software and application programs
is allowing the Soviets to pull off a really colossal coup in RYAD soft-
ware development.
(U) In summary,'importing computer systems, obtaining licensing
agreements for domestic manufacture of Western equipment and components,
and having free access to a great volume of Western computer literature
will greatly help the development of Soviet computer capabilities. All
this would not permit the Soviets to catch up with total U.S. computer
capability even in the complete absence of export and licensing controls.
But, lifting the controls would certainly improve Soviet computer designs
and manufacturing methods.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Uil~ NL.I .SIFTED
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-010992A000100060005-9
-14-
III. STRATEGIC APPLICATION OF THE COMPUTER GAP (U).
(U) It is apparent from the. statistics that the United States has
enjoyed a commanding lead in computer technology ever since the beginning
of the computer era. Much pf the credit for this, especially in the 1950s
and early 1960s, is due to U.S. Government sponsorship (the AEC and DoD, in
particular. For example, in 1965 the government provided more than $300
million of the total computer R&D effort of some $600 [14]. In 1972 all
government agencies spent $120 million for computer-R&D, 60 percent of
which was spent by the Department of Defense, whereas private industry
sponsored an additional $1 billion of R&D. This section discusses the mili-
tary and strategic advantage the United States has gained from this invest-
ment. Also surveyed are the future directions in which the military is
already planning or only suggesting to use advanced computers. If national
security is at issue, then the computer gap is only relevant insofar as it
.is or could be employed to strategic use. Although unrestricted exports may
threaten U.S. computer superiority, it is the strategic advantage rather than
the computer gap itself, whose loss could influence national security.
GENERAL EFFECTS OF COMPUTER SUPERIORITY (U)
(U) In general terms, the availability of more computer power
.permits the performance of a fixed amount of computations in less time
or more computations in fixed time. The computing costs may be expected
to be reduced and, as a result, effective application of computing power
will permit more rapid achievement of'specific goals, increased efficiency,
reduced costs, and more efficient utilization of resources.
(U) However, there may also exist certain pitfalls and negative
aspects to easy availability of computer power: a tendency in R&D to
substitute careful thinking with computer-based trial and error methods,
flooding the management with computer-generated reports and statistics,,
and regarding computerization as a-cure for poor management.
(U) Whether or not a computer gap actually results in a strategically
superior position for the country with superior computer technology is not
a clear issue. An attempt is made below to assess U.S. military uses of com-
puters and to determine whether there is any evidence that the United States
has gained significant advantages over the Soviet Union through the use of
compute rA etk. gr. Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 ECIR 11
Approved For Rele P1b0'2 '$'/2111 6 kbF -b Y 2A000100060005-9
-15
COMPUTER GAP AND MILITARY SYSTEMS TO DATE (U)
. (U) As of July 1972, the U.S. Government operated over 6800 general
purpose computers for military, space, and nuclear research and weapons
development use [11]. Of these, some 240 are equal to or more powerful
than the BESM-6. The breakdown of these is as follows (a list by com-
puter types is given in Reference [11]):
Number of
Large
Computers
Total
BESM-6
Equivalents
July
July
July
July
Agency
1970
1.972
1970
1972
Department of Defense
75
158
106
190
Air Force
37
66
Army
? 18
42
Navy
20
27
Atomic Energy Commission
34
37
145
153
37
36
62
56
Total
146
241
313
399
(U) "BESM-6 equivalence" is the ratio of U.S. computer speed to
BESM-6 speed, both in Mips. The term is introduced to give an indication
of the number of BESM-6s needed to get the same computational capability
~n terms of total instructions executed per second. This assumes that
computers can be netted together without a penalty, which is not true.
Indeed, it is likely that BESM-6 computers cannot be netted at all; they
have-not been built for this purpose. They would need to be extensively
modified, and are'.then certain to suffer a great degradation in perfor-
mance (perhaps 50 percent). The problem of coordinating will take more
and more time as the number of parallel computers increases, and there
will be an upper bound to computer capabilities that cannot be exceeded
no matter how many computers are connected. Further, it is not always
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Q~i ? 'iU r'-v '? trs 6
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
-16-
possible to get the computing power of a large computer by using a net-
work of smaller computers--often the problem is strictly serial (can be
computed only on a single processor at a time).
(U) Since 1970 the U.S. computer power to be "matched" by BESM-6s
has increased by 86--no doubt larger than the BESM-6 production. The
other S.U. computers are not even candidates for matching these capa-
bilities. The RYAD R-50 and R-60, however, will have a chance,, but if
they are designed along IBM 360 lines, then they are not designed for
multiprocessing systems use and would suffer considerable performance
degradation if hooked up.
(U) In addition to the general purpose computers described in the
above table, special-purpose digital computers for guidance and naviga-
tion are part of the Minuteman and the Navy's Polaris/Poseidon weapon
systems; such computers also support the avionics systems*of most types
of U.S. military aircraft.
,.(U) The following table describing U.S. Air Force computers as of
July,'1970 exemplifies how Defense Department computers are allocated
among various military uses.
Number
Number
Larger
BESM-6 Equiva-
lents for the
of
Than
Large
Application
Computers
Percent
BESM-6
Computers
_.__.
Base and Hq. Management,
445
37 .
. 3
3.9
Finance, Training
Logistics
329
27
4
9.2
Research and Development
183
15
25
32.5
Communications
167
14
2
2.3
Intelligence
51
4
1
10.0
Operational Warning,
35
3
2
2.1
Command and Control
100
37
60.0
(S) For camparison with the above table, intelligence sources de-
scribe installations of 33 BESM-6s, but this figure must be interpreted
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
-17-
only as a lower bound to the number actually in existence. The above
information, illuminates the-fact that, despite the overwhelming U.S.
superiority in number of computers and computer power, its exploitation
in strategic and nonstrategic military systems is relatively modest.
Specific application areas are considered below.
Operational Applications (Intelligence, Command and Control) (U)
(U) At present, the principal operational applications of computers
in the Air Force are:
o NOP.AD 425L Combat Operations Center (two Philco 2000
systems, about .1 BESM-6 equivalents each); will be
replaced by Honeywell H-6070s (2. BESM-6 equivalents
each).
o SAC Automated Command and Control System (SACCS),-
formerly 465L (3 AN/FSQ-31s, about .2 BESM-6
equivalents each); will be replaced by H-6070s.
o SAGE Air Defense System (11 AN/FSQ-7s, about .1
BESM-6 equivalents each); will remain as is.
o SAC Planning and Operations (IBM 7090, IBM 360/44,
IBM 360/50, UNIVAC 1108, 2.2 BESM-6 equivalents
total); will be replaced by H-6070s.
o Military Airlift management (4 IBM 360/65 computers,
4 BESM-6 equivalents); will be replaced by 3 H-6070s.
Other services, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, also employ command and
control systems for their forces. The World Wide Military Command and,
Control (WWMCC) system, being, developed, will integrate the various
command and control systems.
,(U) The above applications do not at present use numbers of com-
puters or computer power that are out of reach for the Soviet military..
But U.S. systems are being upgraded. For ICBM force targeting, the
Soviets could use smaller computers and perform the task over a longer
period of time. For early warning and.air defense applications, the'
BESM-6.computers (or smaller computers used in multiprocessing configu-
ration) may be adequate.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
-18-
Weapon System Development (U)
(U) In R&D applications, the United States has a much greater pool
of government and private computer power available than does the Soviet
Union. However, it is not evident that Soviet weapon system development
has greatly suffered from lack of computers or that the level of general
Soviet R&D in weapon development-related fields is inferior.
(S) One comparison showed that as of 1969 the Soviets had'developed
more weapon system types than the United States [14]:
Weapon System Types
Ballistic missile systems
12 developed
18 developed
(since 1957)
10 deployed
15 deployed
Fighter aircraft
2 developed
-9 developed
(since 1960)
Tactical missiles
I developed
5 developed
(since 1960).
Aerodynamic missiles
8 developed
15 developed
(since 1960)
Submarines (since 1960)
6 developed
11 developed
(U) Considerable use of computers is made in the design of modern
aircraft. For example, the design of the Lockheed C5-A, during the period
January 1965 to June 1968, required about 31,800 hrs. of computer time
[5]. The machines used, however, were two IBM 7094s (.5 BESM-6 equiv-
alents each) for the first 2.5 years, and then also a UNIVAC 1108 (1.1
BESM-6 equivalent). Hence, currently available Soviet computing equip-
ment would not preclude performing computations for designing advanced
aircraft.
Nuclear Weapons Design and Testing (U)
(S) Nuclear weapons design and processing of test data require
large amounts of computation. On the average, the computations asso-
ciated with a single underground nuclear test consume more than 1000
hrs. of computation on the CDC 6600 computers (2.5 BESM-6 equivalents).
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
-19-
This could be converted to 2500 hrs. of computation on a BESM-6 (which,
-actually, is rather generous. in view of the limited storage capacity of
BESM-6 systems). On the other'hand, it is difficult to say how much of the
1000 hours of CDC 6600 time was really essential to the major test objec-
tives. Since 1964, the United States performed an average of 45 under-
ground tests per year, while the Soviet testing rate was 16 tests per
year--perhaps reflecting their lack of computing support.
ABM Defense Applications (U)
(U) The ABM defense applications of computers--managing netted phased
array radar beam; discriminating decoys, chaff, and booster fragments from
warheads; and controlling interceptors--are among the most taxing tasks
for digital computers. In addition, very large and complex computer pro-'
grams are required.
(U) Deployment of ABM systems is constrained by the recent SALT
agreepents, but development of fixed site ABM systems is not so proscribed.
Thus ABM development is still active and still represents a strategically
important application"of advanced computer technology.
(S) The United States does not have an operational ABM system, but
prototypes of the required radars, interceptors, and computer system have
been produced and successfully tested. An early version of the computer
system--the Nike-X computer--is capable of 3 Mips (4 BESM-6 equivalents).
More-advanced (40-50 Mips) computers are being designed. The Soviets,
however, have already deployed an ABM system around Moscow. Since the
capabilities of this system are not known, it is difficult to speculate
whether or not the Soviets have adequate computing support for this sys-
tem. However, the system may be able to handle a relatively small U.S.
threat with a netted BESM-6 configuration augmented by special-purpose
processors.
(S) The intelligence community has generally attributed to the Soviets
the computer capability to perform ABM computations [5]. This is usually
done on the basis of taking the most powerful Soviet computer and postu-
lating a suffici?_ntly large niulticomputer system. Whether this approach
really produces valid estimates is questionable considering theU.S. multi-
processing experience; this may bean appropriate topic for further studies.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 mow; f ~- r
Approved For Release 2002/08/21: CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
-20-
Some additional material appears below in connection with the discussion
of current weapons development issues..
Space Applications (U)
(U) In space exploration and utilization the United States has been
confronted with several challenges from the Soviets: Sputnik in 1957,
the first manned orbital flight in 1961, the FOBS in the late 1960s, and
the remotely controlled exploration of the moon in 1971. This is the
technology area in which the United. States (NASA) employs large amounts
of computer power--934 computers 36 of which constitute 56 BESM-6 equiva-
lents. In this area the Soviets, indeed, do not seen constrained by the
computer gap.
(U) On the other hand,-.U.S. computer power has supported manned
lunar' landings, design of large boosters, and development of geostationary
satellites for weather forecasting, navigation, communications, and sur-
veillance. The success of the planned Grand Tour interplanetary probe de-
pends heavily on the development of an extremely reliable spaceborne computer.
Summary (U)'
(U) Although it seems that the Soviets have been able to acquire
weapon systems to give them capabilities similar to ours in strategic offen-
sive weapon systems and even more, this is not to say that the Soviets don't
need more computers and advanced computer technology in their military forces.
(U) They would need advanced computers--beyond their present capabil-
ities--for almost-any strategic defensive system: ABM, ASW, space surveil-
lance, satellite inspection, etc. These systems.are not only characterized
by advanced hardware, but also by very complex software. This is the over-
whelming problem with similar U.S. systems and is likely to be equally great
with the Soviets. The computers for these systems must have real-time
operation capabilities and have facilities for accepting data from external
sources over communication lines. For reliability, such computer systems
must be operated as multiprocessor systems. Tha MWMCCS computers, Honey-
well H6070/6080s, are of this class.' On the ether hand, the Soviet Union
may get by without these systems if they ass?!me that the U.S. ill not be
aggressively inclined in.the future.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Releatsl} :209tfl4Sdi 9ibIs?~f( 962A00010Q060005-9
-21-
(U) The Soviet Union maintains far more men under arms than the
U.S., and they are'distributed over a larger geographic area. The
Soviets have-large stocks of military equipment, so supply and mainte-
nance problems must be great. The same must be true for their. tactical
air units. For example, in 1970 the U.S. Air Force used 27 percent of
its computers in logistics activities. The Soviets could use many com-
puters and data communication systems here.
(U) Greatly increased exports of general purpose computers could
enable the Soviets. to manage and supply their military forces more effi-
ciently, though such improvements would probably not have a substantial
strategic impact. Most general purpose computers currently available
in the West would not be directly suitable for strategic defensive
systems because they lack the necessary real time capabilities and
facilities for accepting data from remote sources over communications
lines. In any case, on-site inspection would provide reasonable assur-
ances,.that such computers were not connected into multiprocessor networks.
The Potential for Future Strategic Application
of the Computer Gap (U)
(U) The United States has acquired technology for the develop-
ment of computationally powerful, nuclear-effects hardened aerospace
computers, as well. as extremely high-performance ground-based or air-
borne computers. These provide a potential for developing military
systems where these characteristics are essential and cannot be rapidly
matched by the Soviets through the use of other technologies or approaches.
Also, the United States has learned to use computer technology in complex
weapon and command-control systems, and has developed techniques for
successfully managing and bringing. to completion large, complex develop-
ment programs--Minuteman, Polaris/Poseidon, Apollo, and the L-systems.
Especially valuable has been the experience in managing the production
of the large computer programs required for the operation of these systems.
As a result, the U.S. has the computer capacity to react to new strategic
threats by the S.U. (or other countries for that matter). The S.U. is
unlikely to have acquired similar computational capability to mount large
scale crash efforts in advanced technology.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21: CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
-22"
. (U) The strategic systems that can provide more than a transient
strategic advantage through their use of computer technology can be
expected to utilize some of the extremes in computer hardware charac-
teristics (computers with average characteristics are now or soon will
be available for Soviet military systems) as well as very complex soft-
ware. The hardware characteristics include:
o Small physical size, weight, and power consumption, yet large
computing power: e.g., research to produce a 2 million oper-
ations/sec computer on a 3-in. diameter silicon wafer is being
pursued by the U.S. Navy [7].
o Fast: general-purpose computers capable of 800-1000 Mips are
predicted for the 1980s (see Fig. 2).
o Large and fast memories: trillion-bit memories accessible in
2.0 cosec are in production.
o Reliable: redundant circuitry, automatic diagnosing arid self-
repair providing a 10-year unattended operating capability is
being developed for the NASA Grand Tour computer [1].
Environmental hardness: research to harden computers-against
nuclear effects is being pursued vigorously. Ruggedizing of
computers is being pursued.
o High-speed data comnunication: laser data communication sys-
tems capable of 1000 megabits/sec are feasible.
(U) In all the above areas the United States now has a four- to
five-year lead and is continuing vigorous research that promises to
maintain, if not increase, the lead over the Soviet Union.
Current Efforts (U)
(U) A number of strategic systems currently in the study, development,
or acquisition phase utilize advanced computer technology. The objectives
of some of these programs are discussed below.
'(S) Improving Existing Command-Control Systems. The Air Force is
currently modernizing its fairly old command and control computer systems.
The-following list summarizes some of'the improvements presently underway:
o The SAC command-control system will be enlarged (projects
SATIN and SEED CUPS) to considerably increase the computing
power to about 3 BESM-6 egt;ivalents;
o The NORAD Combat Opera-Lion,; C,2aLer i ill be updated (project
427M) to about 1.0 t:iracs it:; former computing capability
(about 2 BESM-6 equivalents);
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 C Y"'fir '~?'1
Approved For Release 2002/08/ 23:CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
o The Military Airlift Command is obtaining a large network of
computers, MACINS, for mission control and general management;
o The Logistics Command is designing a large management system,
ALS;
o The Tactical Air Command is in the process of improving its
command and control system (project SEEK FLEX);
o Computer-based tactical systems under study include UCNI
(Unified Command, 'Navigation, and Identification), and
PLRACTA (Position Location Reporting and Control of Tactical
Aircraft).
Even though these innovations utilize advanced technology, the Russians
could conceivably build adequately capable systems by nesting BESM-6
computers.
(S) Increasing Command-Control Survivability. The present approach
to survivability of cormnand-control systems is to provide airborne mobil-
ity. The AWACS system for air defense requires high-performance airborne
computer capability in at least the .5-Mips range. The airborne command
posts for SAC (the AABNCP) and the NCA (the NEACP) will require very
high-performance onboard data processors if their functions also include
sensor data processing and dynamic control of the forces--these require-
ments are a. challenge to the current state-of-the-art airborne data
processors (e.g., the IBM 4Pi-CC, with its .75-Mips speed, is equivalent
to the BESM-6).
(S) Survivability of command-control systems appears to be equally
important to the Soviets. Although it has been reported that they have
already flown an AWdACS-type aircraft, it is unlikely that they can match
U.S. airborne computing capability. General purpose Western computers are
poorly suited to airborne installation. Hence, their unrestricted export would
not afford the Russians with airborne command and control capabilities.
(S) ABM Systems. The Safeguard and other Minuteman defense systems
now being studied and/or designed require data-processing rates that can
be met with existing highest-speed U.S. computers (CDC 7600, IBM 360/195).
For possible future threats, the data-processing requirements may be in
hundreds of Mips. However, even these could be met with the current
trend in the development of U.S. computer technology. The Soviets, how-
ever, cannot be expected to achieve these computer speeds and, thus, to
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 S E C R.a .
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
field a general area defense ABM system in-the same time frame. Limited
systems, such as the present Moscow ABM system, which may be designed to
counter relatively small threats, may be able to-operate with the postu-
lated advanced Soviet computers in the 2- to 8-Mips class_(R-60 and BESM
X).
(U) Indeed, ABM systems seem to represent the unique example among
all the presently being pursued application areas mentioned above, that
absolutely requires the'advanced technological features embodied in the
most advanced general purpose computers currently available. If CDC
7600s and IBM 360/195s are necessary and sufficient for ABM use, then a
strong argument can be made for prohibiting their export to. Soviet bloc
countries. This is not to say that export of these computers is tanta-
mount to furnishing the Russians with ABM capabilities. The Soviets
probably have other critical technological deficiencies as well. This'
argument against export of these computers is weakened 1) to the degree
that-the SALT agreements effectively prohibit ABM development, and 2)
to the degree that end-use guarantees can assure that these computers
will not be wired to support an ABM system.
Suggested Future Systems (U)
(U) In a number of ways, computer technology could achieve a
strategic advantage for the United States in the sense of increased
survivability, effectiveness, and flexibility of offensive, defensive,
surveillance, and command-control systems. Most of the suggestions
below have been thought of previously and appear to be technically
feasible for U.S. computer technology. However, they tend to be very
costly, may not be cost effective in terms of strategic advantages,
and therefore might never become operational.
(U) Onboard Ccmputer in the Reentry Vehicle (RV). Such a computer
must be extremely small in volume, weight, and power consumption. It
must be extremely rugged, nuclear-effects hardened, and reliable, but
not very costly. In association with appropriate sensors and flight
control, it covid be used for mid-course and terminal guidance to im-
prove accuracy and for active electronic counter measures and maneuvering
to improve penetration of enemy defenses.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 SEC::w7_.,.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
(U) Present trends in U.S. computer, technology could produce such
computers within the next few years. The associated sensors may present
a more difficult problem. To counter U.S. RVs of this type, the Soviets
would have to develop much more capable ABM systems requiring computers
at least two orders of magnitude faster than the BESM-6. Production of
onboard RV computers by the Soviets.seems unlikely during the 1970s.
(S) Spaceborne Surveillance Computer Systeirs. Satellite-based
surveillance systems that can resolve and filter out from the background
clutter moving objects the size of ships, aircraft, mobile ICBMs, or
IRBMs--or even tanks and trucks--could provide reconnaissance and in-
telligence information about Soviet activities. Such information could
be used for strategic and/or tactical warning, to obtain enemy order-
of-battle information, and for ASW purposes. The latter could be greatly
improved by systems that could, for example, detect the wake of a sub-
marine.
(U) The. tremendous amount of data generated by such systems would
make processing on board the satellite desirable. It might be necessary
to do almost all clutter removal operations, and perhaps even maintain
target files, on board. The speed and storage size requirements of such
a spaceborne computer may greatly exceed those of currently planned sur-
veillance systems. U.S. computer hardware technology should be able to
meet these requirements, but development of the necessary algorithms and
programs can be expected to be an extremely difficult task.
(U) The Soviets could use similar capability for monitoring U.S.
strategic bombers, ships, submarines, airborne command posts, and-possible
future mobile ICBMs. However, they are not likely to develop reliable
spaceborne computers in this decade.
(S) Sensor-Contained Computers. The United States has already used
fields of emplaced sensors in Southeast Asia to detect moving enemy vehicles
and troops (Project IGLOO 1,THITE). The advanced miniaturization techniques'
in computers would allow production of sufficien.:.ly rugged, capable, and
inexpensive computers to permit their large-scale use in nonretrievable
(as well as retrievable) sensors. ''.'.u: sensors could be used (1) to detect
targets in tactical warfare situations, (2) ';o detect intrusion to military
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092AO00100060005-9
sites, (3) in ASW sensors in oceans, or (4) in Remotely Piloted Vehicles
(RPV). In the latter applications some of the sensor-related character-
istics, such-as extremely small size and low power consumption, may not
be critical. Such sensor-contained computers could be used to. perform
signature analysis and discrimination functions, as well as applying
counter-ECM transformations to the data communications. The United States
should be capable of building these systems in a few years. Soviet tech-
nology cannot be expected to provide sophisticated sensor-contained com-
puters in the nea:c future.
(U) Antisubmarine Warfare. Both airborne and earthbound computers
are used for processing sensor collected data in ASW. Advanced general
purpose computers might be required for this purpose but ASW capability
is constrained by sensor technology. Sensor technology is still in the
development stage in the U.S. and the Soviets cannot be expected to have
operational ASW sensors in the next five to ten years [20].
(S) High-Perf_ormanceAirborne Computers. Airborne computer tech-
nology in the United States has mainly been concerned with avionics and
fire control. However, much higher-performance airborne computers than
currently required could be produced for use in large aircraft to increase
the capabilities of currently planned U.S. systems, such as AWACS, air-
borne control posts, airborne surveillance data-processing facilities,
airborne RPV control facilities, and airborne ABM launchers. For ex-
ample, with appropriate weapons and more capable airborne computers,'
the AWACS-type systems may be capable of intercepting standoff cruise
missiles andIRBMs in the NATO area.
(U) Although the Soviets can also build airborne computers, their
lag in integrated circuit technology will result in larger and heavier
equipment, which will reduce the payload, range, and flight endurance
of their airborne systems.
(U) All the above suggested future applications of computers re-
quire special purpose machines. In no case would general purpose computers
be suitable for adaptation. Their export would not directly provide the
Soviets with computer capabilities in these areas.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 ys na
UNCLAS
Approved For Release 2002/08/21: el -l 78-01092A000100060005-9
(U) Computer-Communication Networks. The first attempts to connect
computers into networks are already under way in the United States. The
ARPA network and the MACIMS system are examples. These use commercially
available Honeywell H-6070 computers. Networks of computers--redundant,
digital, secure communications and data bases--and large numbers of on-
line terminals can provide systems for peacetime, crisis, and post-attack
.management of forces, resources, and intelligence data. A large-scale
capacity for secure military communications is a. particular need. With
redundancy in connectivity, the system may be made survivable.
(U) Computer networks are priority items in the Soviet plan for
developing and applying computer technology and would greatly contribute
to the flexibility and survivability of their-command-control system.
The Soviets are planning to overcome the telecommunications problems
associated with this network by using imported equipment [3]. However,
given the reported lack of reliability in their communication. plant,
error' rates can be expected to greatly degrade the performance of any
such network.
(U) Computer. communications networks thus represent a second mili-
tary application area (in addition to ABM support) for which advanced
Western computers might be directly adapted. Most general purpose com-
puters are not, however, designed for redundant parallel operation in a
network of computers and external data sources. Modification would be-
required to install most imported computers in such a fashion, and in
any case rudimentary end=use guarantees should be able to assure they
are not so installed.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
(U) It is clear that the United States leads the Soviet Union in
number of installed computers (at least ten to one), speed of high-
performance computers (at least one hundred to one), memories, periph-
erals, software, and all other components of computer technology. Despite
Soviet efforts to improve domestic computers and to import equipment,
-software, and manufacturing technology, the U.S. lead will continue
indefinitely. It may be expected, however, that by 1978 or. 1979 Soviet
computer technology will be at the current (1973) U.S. level and
that.they will have the capability to field systems similar to
those currently in operational use by the U.S. military. If one goal of
the U.S.' military is to maintain a strategic advantage in the sense that
the U.S. always manages to invent and deploy a new, more powerful weapon
system, which provides deterrence for a while (say 5 years), then we
certainly need a computer advantage. That is, we must be able. to produce
systems which will require the Soviets a number of years to counter or
match. But this game gets more expensive all the time, and the Soviet
computer capability is increasing steadily so that the time interval that
the U.S. enjoys a superiority due to a new system is likely to decrease
,steadily. Application of export restrictions to U.S. and Western computing
equipment and software will delay and increase the costs, but not prevent,
the Soviet advances.
(U) The strategic advantage afforded the U.S. by its computer superi-
ority is relatively modest. As a result, the risk of greatly increased
exports of general purpose computers to East bloc nations is also only
modest. Of the strategic application areas surveyed in this study, only
ABM data processing and computer communications networks could greatly
benefit from the technology of advanced general-purpose computers. Advanced
general-purpose computers will be necessary for monitoring sensor-collected
data in ASW, automated battlefields and satellice based surveillance systems,
but they would not be sufficient for deployment of these systems because
the required sensor technology .._1 1 p.obably be unavailable to the Soviets
in the next five to ten years [20]. Sensor technology is still in the
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
Li_L
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
development stage in the U.S. All other application areas either require
special purpose computers or, if they use general purpose computers, do
not absolutely require the speed and memory size of the advanced machines.
SALT aside, it is not at all clear that the Soviets would be able to
develop an effective ABM system-or would try to for that matter, even if
advanced computers were made available. The Soviets are pursuing their
own program to develop a computer network for command and control opera-.
tions, though it is experiencing difficulties.' Rudimentary end-use
guarantees should be able to assure that exported Western computers are..
not directly wired into either a computer, network or an ABM system.
(U) A separate and important question not considered in this
study is whether or not Western manufacturers should be allowed to license
the Soviets to produce general purpose computers. Whether or not produc-
tion technology gleaned from licensing arrangements would be valuable and
transferable to production of special, purpose computers of more strategic
value, requires further study.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 N CL ,Approved For Release 2002/08/21 S ED
CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
-30-
REFERENCES
1. Avizienis, A., F. P. Mathur, and D. A. Rennels, "Automatic Main-
tenance of Aerospace Computers and Spacecraft Information and
Control Systems," AIAA Paper No. 69-966, presented at AIAA
Aerospace Computer Systems Conference, Los Angeles, California,
September 8-10, 1969.
2. Baechler, Donald 0., "Aerospace Computer Characteristics and Design
Trends," Computer, January/February 1971, pp. 46-56.
3. Bereney, Ivan, "Computers in Eastern Europe.;" Scientific Amei,ican,
Vol. 223, No. 4, October 1970, pp. 102-108.
4. Boehm, B. W., "Extensive Tour Yields Report on Current Soviet
Computing,'% Soviet Cybernetics Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, The Rand
Corporation, R-700/1-PR, February 1971.
5. Eichler, F. E., and C. S. Moritz, Computer Handbook-Summary--
Eurasian Communist Countries and Cuba (U) , AF Foreign Technology
Division, ST-HB-05-15-72, 15 February.1972 (Secret, Noforn.).
6. Eichler, F. E., and C. S. Moritz, Computer TechnoZo!Tg and Appli-
cations--Eurasian Communist Countries and Cuba (U), AF Foreign
Technology Division, ST-CS-05-39-70, 3 April 1970 (Secret, Noforn).
7. Entner, Ronald S., "The Advanced Avionic Digital Computer System,"
Computer Design, September 1970, pp. 73-76.
8. Finkler, R. A., Export Control of Data Processing Equipments to
Bloc Countries, Summary Report (U), Institute for Defense
Analyses, March 1969 (Secret, Restricted Data).
9. Finkler, R., and N. Turoff, Soviet Data Processing (U), Institute
for Defense Analyses, May 1965 (Secret).
10. Holland, W. B., and W. H.-Ware, "K-200: Space Computer or Engineering
Oddity?" Soviet Cybernetics Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, The Rand Corpo-
ration, R-960/3-PR, May 1972.
11. Inventory of Automatic Data Processing Equipment in the United States
Government, Fiscal Year 1972, General Services Administration, 1972.
12. Kautz, W. H., "A Survey and Assessment of Progress in Switching Theory
and Logical Design in the Soviet Union," IEEE Transactions on Elec-
tronic Computers, Vol. EC-15, No. 2, April 1966, pp. 164-204.
13. Kozlov, S., "Summary of 5-Year Plan Automation Goals," Soviet Cyber-
netics Review., Vol. 2, No. 1, The Rand Corporation, R-960/l-PR,
'January 1972.
14. Massel, G. A., et al., Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Military Wid
Space RDTE (U), Institute for Defense Analyses, Research Paper
P-615, December. 1969 (Secret).
15. "Notes on T.ecent Soviet Space Activities," Soviet Cybernettico Rt'ie.,
Vol. 1, fro. 4, The Rand Corporation, R-700/1-PR, February 1971.,
p. 37.
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
 Approved For Release 2002/08/21 CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9
-31-.
16. Rudins, George, "Soviet Computers: An Historical Survey," Soviet
Cybernetics Review, Vol.. 4, No. l,'The Rand Corporation,
RM-6200/1-PR, January 1970.
17. Turn, Rein, "On the Strategic Exploitation of U.S. Computer Superi-
ority," The Rand Corporation, WN-7410-PR, (Secret).
18. UNICON-690 Laser Mass Memory System, Precision Instruments Company,
Palo Alto, California, 1969.
" .
19. Zhi..erin, T ~., B ~,~ua ~..prznt for Computerization of the Industrial. Economy,"
Soviet Cybernetics Review, Vol. 2, No. 6, The Rand Corporation,
R-960/6-PR, November 1972.
20. Dole, S. H., et al.,'"Key Technologies for Soviet and U.S.'Near Term
Military Capabilities (U)," The Rand Corporation, WN-7887-DDRE,
July 1972 (Secret).
Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-01092A000100060005-9