THE THIRD AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLE'S SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R001400380004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 1, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01400380004-1
Scope
The third biennial conference of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity
Organization took place in Moshi, Tanganyika, from 4-11 February 1963.
Attached is a working paper which describe the events and results
of the conference emphasizing the position of the AAPSO in the
international Communist movement and particularly the effect of the
Sino-Soviet conflict on its policies and organization. It should be
noted that the scope of c AAPSO interests and activities now extends to
Latin America as well as Africa, the Near East and the Far East.
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01400380004-1
 Sanitized - Approved For ReIeaseL.,Q~-RDP78-00915 R001400380004-1
The Third Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference
I. Introduction
Delegations representing 54 anti-imperialist nationalist movements
and revolutionary parties from the countries of Asia and Africa,along
with 72 observers including European and Latin American members of
international Communist fronts, met at Moshi, Tanganyika, from 4-11
February 1963. This was the third biennial conference of the Afro-Asian
Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO). The Organization's first
conference,held in Cairo (December 1957-January 1958),legitimized the
E'cZ Y'
Sino-Soviet presence in the Jdiftft. East and Africa. The second conference
which met in Conakr in April 1960/ assured Communist control
of the organization. This third conference at Moshi brought a confrontation
between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets in their respective efforts
to dominate the AAPSO. This confrontation, however, was effected within
the framework of a common mutual determination to hold the organization
together and to a shared desire to maintain solidarity - at least in the
short run - on the basis of a least common denominator - the struggle against
colonialism, neo-colonialism, and Western imperialism led by the United
'~sz f~ ci~~, loo v
States. But,ultimate determination of each to controlAwas equally evident.
,t CL-i
emcee-a of Sino-Soviet conflict were most obvious in those issues
which bore on the relative importance of peaceful coexistence and militant
liberation, anti-colonial struggle in the war against the imperialists, particularly
regarding the World Peace Council's relation to the AAPSO. Th conflict
a Iso
was - if much less obvious - in proposals for organizational
changes by which both the Chinese and Soviets attempted to add to their supporters
on the two major policy-making bodies of the organizationai. e. the Executive
Committee and the Permanent Secretariat. On these issues both the Chinese
flee
and Soviet delegations initially took strong positions from which they retreated
80004-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Releesea RDP78-00915R001400380004-1
to isr. compromise stand&'whenever it became apparent that an open
breach and. organizational might develop. In general the
final resolutions and organizational changes reflected a substantial net gain
for the Chinese inAAAPSO leadership and program lines.
"reoAk
that were being dzawxtfor a Sino-Soviet ca 'en
were apparent from the earliest preparat Sor the jfrtoming conference.
Not only was it important to find a suitable locale but also to convene the
conference at a time acceptable to both of the major Communist participants.
During the 13 months taken up in preparing for the conference both the
Chinese and the Soviets were actively working to bring about conditions
which would prove advantageous to their respective positions and add
strength to their respective support among the. delegations.
I.I. Preparations for the Conference
Preparations for the conference had been under way since the
Gaza meeting of the AAPSO Executive Committee in December 1961. First,
difficulties were encountered in finding a suitable locale for the meeting.
Casablanca was initially suggested because of the importance of the Algerian
situation. However, this posal was_atthe request of Mehdi Ben Barka who
felt that the presence of the King, "an ally of imperialism" would be
embarrassing not only to the UNFP and the UMT but to the conference.
Ben Barka was undoubtedly aware at this time (June 1962) that a confrontation
between the UNFP and the King was inevitable. Moreover, increasing
Communist interest in the liberation movements of East Africa made
desirable ikowwtd the third AAPSO conference in that area. Serious
consideration was given to Addis Ababa, Mogadiscio, and Dar es-Salaam
as possible locations, and missions from the AAPSO Secretariat were
dispatched in early 1962 to all three cities. In Addis Ababa the AAPSO
emissaries were at first given encouragement by Mekasha Getachew,
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Ethiopian government, who had
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001400380004-1
 -
been aSa t tiz pttOVIed(forrfe ele es:tffilAsIR ZB-06945R1Q1ADA38GQ@4el-,
higher authorities of the Ethiopian government turned down the proposition
to hold the conference in Ethiopia, and Addis was eliminated. The governments
of Somalia and Tanganyika both approved the holding of the conference in
their countries. The final choice of Tanganyika, however, was apparently
based primarily on the active support given to the AAPSO planners by
Oscar Kambona, Secretary General of TANU and Home Minister of, the
Tanganyika government. Other factors which probably influenced the decision
were the strategic location of Tanganyika adjacent to the most important
colonial territories left in East Africa and recognition of the difficulties
that might easily arise if the conference were forced to take a stand on the
controversial "greater Somalia issue", a virtually inescapable problem if
the conference were held in Mogadiscio.
Formal approval from the Tanganyikan Republic for the holding of
the, conference was received in Cairo in July. Although the conference was
originally scheduled for the summer of 1962 in order to comply with stipulations
of the AAPSO by-laws directing a conference to be held "every two years,"
further delays occurred. Long-drawn-out negotiations ensued between the
host party, TANU, and AAPSO officials over technical arrangements. These
delays were welcomed if not encouraged by the Soviet contingent within the
AAPSO, who had been vigorously attempting to forestall Chinese and Japanese
demands for an early June-July conference date. In retrospect it seems
likely that the Soviet reluctance for an immediate confrontation with the
Chinese in the framework of the AAPSO was inspired in part by their hopes
of outflanking the Chinese by enhancing the influence of the WPC in the national
liberation groups of Africa and Asia through the Moscow Disarmament Conference
in July. A number of new peace committees in Africa were in fact formed; the
WPC claimed nine in October. Furthermore, Soviet preparations for the Cuban
venture were certainly under way at this time. It is therefore likely, particularly
in view of their previous experience with the Chinese and Albanians on the Berlin
issue, that the Soviets were concerned that the Chinese might exploit the projected
Russian maneuvers over Cuba in the infighting within the Communist movement
and its fronts.
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001400380004-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001400380004-1
Although a mid-November date for the AAPSO conference had tentatively
TAT
been set, the Russian withdrawal from Cuba and the Sino-Indian border war
fwd further p stponements, and it was not until 4 February 1963 that the
conference actually convened.
During the summer months the invitation list for the Tanganyika
conference was the source of repeated dissension within the AAPSO Secretariat.
The bone of contention was the question whether or not to include observers
from the World Peace Council and Eastern European groups. The Tanganyikan
government had stipulated that observers not be invited from European countries.
This policy was in complete agreement with the Chinese positio Aof eliminating
observers from both the Soviet-backed World Peace Council and European
bloc countries. The issue was hotly argued in the Secretariat,where sides
were taken,with the Chinese supported by Japan and Indonesia lined up
against the USSR, UAR,and India. The latter group was given some support
by the secretaries from Cameroun, Uganda, Algeria, and Iraq. The aas=aant
re.ce44n an uneasy compromise whereby 12 WPC observers were invited
but all Eastern European representatives were banned. (An East German
group eventually turned up at Moshi where they had no official status but
occupied themselves busily making contacts with African leaders),
In contrast to the dissension over the question of Eastern European
representation at the conference, propos^L,atin American observer
representation caused little trouble. Invitations were dispatched to Cheddi
Jagan's Peoples Progressive Party of British Guiana, and to Cuba via the
Cuban Ambassador in Cairo. Other Latin American observers from Argentina,
Chile, and Brazil were included in the WPC delegation.
There was little disagreement concerning invitations to delegates who had
attended previous AAPSO conferences. In fact,the only major problemnconcerned
Osende Afana, Cameroun Secretary at the AAPSO Secretariat, who had recently
Sanitized - Approved For Release CIA-RDP78-00915R001400380004-1
 Sanitized -Approved
1. 1 -RDP78-00915R001400380004-1
been denied a re-entry visa by the UARI seat in Cairo was being filled
on a temporary basis by Aloys-Marie Ndjog. Inasmuch as Ndjog represented
the Accr apro-Soviet wing of the UPC and Osende Afana the Conakry..based
pro-Chinese UPC faction, the Chinese supported Osende's accreditation to
the Tanganyika conference while the Soviets sponsored Ndjog. A compromise-
t au
suggested by the UARwas finally reached 3decision to invite both.
Invitations to new applicants for AAPSO membership were separated into two
categories; those who represented countries not heretofore represented at
AAPSO meetings and those who applied from countries already represented
at AAPSO meetings by other organizations. &The first group roused little
friction; concerning the second group Wp deferred for -afr
the credentials committee at the conference.
III. Conference Management
With the conference actually under way the Chinese and Soviet leadership
immediately started jockeying for position. It was apparent to each group
that the mechanics of the conference, i.e. the make-up and responsibilities
of committees, the methods of reaching decisions, and the accreditation of
delegations and observers, would have a substantial bearing on the relative
success of their respective positions on major issues. It is not surprising
therefore that conflicts arose from the first day.
When the conference opened at Moshi on 4 February, problems of
accreditation caused the first on-the-spot confrontation between the Chinese
and Soviet delegations. In all cases, even when Soviet supporters outnumbered
ti 4AAc -Another latent ,ource of trou l.e remains in the unresolved conflict between
IN.
hinese and the So''ets.M TAlthough the Chinese won co .siderable ground at
these gains were esse " -a-ally tactic diffexces on the-
ortance of_p_eaceful_c_oeistenceand violent struggle aretill unresolved.
-In fact, as pr`bparations for the-three-ca inentcorifer cL--go--forw&rcl- we
isagreements betty n_China and Russia seerlnevitable.,
V+ffWH_Y`, ' though Julius Nyerere's opening address was given little play
at the conference, his warnings against Communist imperialism, now on record in
the AAPSO, could, if brought up and debated at a later date, embarrass either or
both of the ma'o C mmuni t ar .
SanitiY~ec - Approve d for fb18 : C1%'R~Wcb0915R001400380004-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01400380004-1
A basic source of trouble, however, remains in the conflict between the
Chinese and the Soviets. Although the Chinese won considerable ground at Moshi,
these gains were on the tactical level. Sino-Soviet differences on the role of the
African and Asian peoples in the peace and xtimal liberation struggles are still
unresolved. In factsoon after the close of the conference the polemics were resumed.
Characteristically, press comments on the results of the Moshi conference
poured out of Peiping hailing the meeting as an unqualified success for the
solidarity of militant liberation movements throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin
America. On the other hand, Soviet sources gave the conference very little
coverage and this was limited almost entirely to the speeches of Soviet delegates and
to publicity for some excerpts from the final documents that indicated endorsement
of Soviet peace and total-di sarmament formulas.
At the Malmo Peace Conference on 2-3 March, the Soviet-dominated peace
council, evidently ignoring the Chinese opposition at Moshi, approved a resolution
that hailed the "success" of the Moshi conference; but, in accord with Soviet desires,
it declared that "the unanimous approval won by the General Declaration and other
resolutions;, testifies to the hopes and fervent desire of millions of people of those
two continents for national liberation, universal disarmament,and peace."
The Chinese, who had protested at Malmo but to no avail, returned to open
conflict with renewed vigor on 7 March when Liu Ning-i addressed a Peiping
rally celebrating the Third Afro-Asian Conference. "A small minority of delegates
at the conference, " he said, "did not face the reality of the Afro-Asian peoples'
struggle.... In their speeches, they once again distorted the current major tasks
of the Afro-Asian peoples, departed from the anti-imperialist struggle, made
empty talk of peace, and resorted to the terror of nuclear war to threaten the Afro-
Asian peoples." Furthermore, he added to the Chinese bill of particulars another
and serious open charge against the Soviet faction in the international fronts when
he said, "Those who are unwilling or who do not dare to oppose imperialism but
who are accustomed.to manipulating and giving orders to international democratic
organizations and international conferences are not very happy about this resolution.
They are now conspiring to distort the spirit of this resolution in an attempt to
manipulate or undermine the conference. " The Malmo resolutions tend to bear this
out.
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01400380004-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01400380004-1
With-the increasing bitterness of both the Chinese and the Soviet,"
followed in the underdeveloped
ver the 1!+APSO rnd the genera :
world, the best opportunity for the Chinese to win a victory over the
CPSU in the mass-organization field seems to be the projected Three-
Continent Conference. While in Latin America the old-line CP leadership
and the pro-Soviet peace struggle cadre appear strong enough to resist
pro-Chinese tendencies) ,Yie Chinese supporters from Asia and Africa
may be strong enough to tip the scale in China's favor. In any event,
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01400380004-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01400380004-1
The Soviets retorted forcefully to this accusation in the 30 March letter
sent by the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party. The letter statedt'the militant call (Proletarians
of the world, unite advanced by Marx and Engels, means that at the basis of such
a union lies class anti -imperialist solidarity, not nationality, color, or geo-
graphical principles.. Cohesion of the masses for the struggle against
imperialism only on the principle of belonging to this or that continent, whether
it is Africa, Asia, Latin America., or Europe might do harm to the struggling
people. It would not be a unioh but a dispersal of the strength of a single anti-
imperialist front. " Apparently the three -continent project is no longer an
appropriate tactic.
With the incur, a s ii gy bitterne s s of both the hire s e and the viets over th
gy.S kA^{" ;'D Out. TI_.(c N-t- ?f J1 Ctw ,.k4. t