THE USE OF POLYGRAPHS AND SIMILAR DEVICES BY FEDERAL AGENCIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 66
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 28, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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392
94th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - _ TT 'a k- "w,
I
---
9
THE USE OF POLYGRAPHS AND SIMILAR
DEVICES BY FEDERAL AGENCIES
THIRTEENTH REPORT
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS
together with -
SEPARATE AND DISSENTING VIEWS
JANUARY 28, 1976.-Committeed to the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
JACK BROOKS, Texas, Chairman
L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina FRANK HORTON, New York
JOHN E. MOSS, California JOHN N. ERLENBORN, Illinois
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida JOHN W. WYDLER, New York
TORBERT H. MACDONALD, Massachusetts CLARENCE J. BROWN, Ohio
WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD, Pennsylvania GILBERT GUDE, Maryland
WM. J. RANDALL, Missouri PAUL N. McCLOSREY, JR., California
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York SAM STEIGER, Arizona
JIM WRIGHT, Texas GARRY BROWN, Michigan
FERNAND J. ST GERMAIN, Rhode Island CHARLES THONE, Nebraska
FLOYD V. HICKS, Washington ALAN STEELMAN, Texas
DON FUQUA, Florida JOEL PRITCHARD, Washington
JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan EDWIN B. FORSYTi-IE, New Jersey
BELLA S. ABZUG, New York ROBERT W. KASTE.N, JR., Wisconsin
JAMES V. STANTON, Ohio WILLIS D. GRADISON, JR., Ohio
LEO J. RYAN, California
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
JOHN L. BURTON, California
RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts
ROBERT F. DRINAN, Massachusetts
EDWARD MEZVINSKY, Iowa
BARBARA JORDAN, Texas
GLENN ENGLISH, Oklahoma
ELLIOTT H. LEVITAS, Georgia
DAVID W. EVANS, Indiana
ANTHONY MOFFETT, Connecticut
ANDREW MAGUIRE, New Jersey
WILLIAM H. COPENHAVER, Associate Counsel
LYNNE HIGGINBOTHAM, Clerk
J. P. CARLSON, Minority Counsel
WILLIAM M. JONES, General Counsel
JOHN E. MOORE, Staff Administrator
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, SUBCOMMITTEE
BELLA S. ABZUG, New York, Chairwoman
LEO J. RYAN, California SAM STEIGER, Arizona
JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan CLARENCE J. BROWN, Ohio
TORBERT H. MACDONALD, Massachusetts PAUL N. MCCLOSKEY, JR., California
JOHN E. MOSS, California
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts
ANDREW MAGUIRE, New Jersey
ANTHONY MOFFETT, Connecticut
TIMOTHY H. INGRAM, Staff Director
ERIC L. HIRSCHHORN, Counsel
ROBERT FINK, Professional Staff Member
TIIE()DORE J. JACOBS, Professional Staff Member
WILLTA.II G. FLORENCE, Professional Staff Member
RUTH MATTHEWS, Professional Staff Member
ANITA WIESMAN, Clerk
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES,
Hon. Washington, D.C., January 28,1976,
CARL ALBERT,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SPEAKER : By direction of the Committee on Government.
Ope:rtations, I submit herewith the committ,ee's thirteenth report to
the 94th Congress. The committee's report is based on a study made
by its Government Information and Individual Rights Subcommittee.
JACK BRooKs, Chairman.
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CONTENTS
Rage
1. Introduction ---------------------------------------------------
1
II. Background ---------------------------------------------------
4
Polygraph -------------------------------------------------
4
Psychological stress evaluator_______________________________
5
Voice analyzer---------------------------------------------
6
Other devices and techniques--------------------------------
6
III. Research and the fallibility of "lie detector" devices---------------
8
Federally funded research-polygraphs -----------------------
8
Federally funded research-voice analyzers------------------
10
Proposed federally funded research-polygraphs--------------
11
American Polygraph Association research____________________
12
Continued need for definitive research_______________________
12
IV. Legal and moral considerations__________________________________
15
"Lie detectors" and constitutional safeguards-----------------
15
The "right to prove one's innocence"_________________________
16
Admissibility in evidence___________________________________
17
Justice Department position on admissibility -----------------
17
V. Policy and standards established by the Civil Service Commission__
20
Current Civil Service Commission regulations-----------------
20
Commission's assessment of agency polygraph use ------------
22
VI. Ownership and use of "lie detectors" by Federal agencies--------__
25
Financial and statistical data.-----------------------
Use of psychological stress evaluator________________________
27
Use of voice analyzers--------------------------------------
29o
Intelligence agency practices differ--------------------------
29w
Does the intelligence community rely too heavily on polygraph
testing? ------------------------------------------------
361
VII. Polygraph operators and the quest for professionalism--------_---
3`l
Current criteria for selection of examiners-------------------
32
Polygraph examiner training--------------------------------
33
Department of Defense training------------------------
33
Other agency training of examiners----------------------
34
Efforts toward professionalism------------------------------
35
VIII. The polygraph test and safeguards for the individual-------------
38
Who authorizes tests?--------------------------------------
39
Consideration of physical and mental condition--------------
40
Weight accorded polygraph tests---------------------------
41
Effect of refusals to be polygraphed--------------------------
42
Availability of results to individuals tested------------------
43
Assurance of confidentiality of test results-------------------
44
Appeals of polygraph test results----------------------------
45
Special test facilities---------------------------------------
45
IX. Recommendations ---------------------------------------------
46
APPENDIXES
Appendix A.-Questionnaire on polygraphs and psychological stress evalu-
ators -------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix B.-Correspondence from former Chairman Moorhead to the
Executive Secretary of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board ------------------------------------
Appendix C.-Correspondence from the Executive Secretary of the Presi-
dent's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to former Chairman Moor-
head --------------------------------------------------------------
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'Separate views of lion. Sam Steiger (concurred in by Ron. Frank Horton,
Hon. John N. Erlenborn, Hon. John W. Wydler, Hon. Clarence J. Brown,
Ron. Garry Brown, Hon. Charles Thone, Hon. Edwin B. Forsythe, and Page
Ron. Elliott II. Levitas) -------------------------------------------- 51
Dissenting views of Hon. Frank Morton, Bon. Clarence J. Brown, Hon.
Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., Hon. Joel Pritchard, Ron. John N. Erlenborn,
Ron. Charles Thone, Don. Garry Brown, lion. Edwin B. Forsythe, Hon.
Alan Steelman, Hon. Robert W. Kasten, Jr., Hon. Sani Steiger, Mon. John
W. Wydler, and Ron. Willis D. Gradison, Jr__________________________
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Union Calendar No. 392
94TH CONGRESS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 5 REPORT
2d Session No. 94-795
THE USE OF POLYGRAPHS AND SIMILAR DEVICES BY
FEDERAL AGENCIES
JANUARY 28, 1976.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
THIRTEENTH REPORT
together with
SEPARATE AND DISSENTING VIEWS
BASED ON A STUDY BY THE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE
On January 22, 1976, the Committee on Government Operations
approved and adopted a report entitled "The Use of Polygraphs and
Similar Devices by Federal Agencies." The chairman was directed to
transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1964, the Foreign Operations and Government Information Sub-
committee made its initial study of the Federal Government's use of
polygraphs as "lie detectors." Over the years, such use of polygraphs
had become an increasingly controversial topic. As a consequence, both
public officials and private citizens were raising serious questions re-
garding the propriety of their use, as well as the validity and reliabil-
ity of such devices. Consultation with the Library of Congress dis-
closed that no study of the Federal Government's use of polygraphs
had ever been made by the Congress, by any agency of the executive
branch, or by private researchers.
On the basis of hearings conducted in 1964, a report entitled "Use of
Polygraphs as `Lie Detectors' by the Federal Government" was issued
by the Committee on Government Operations in March 1965. It con-
cluded that :
There is no "lie detector," neither machine nor human.
People have been deceived by a myth that a metal box in the
hands of an investigator can detect truth or falsehood.'
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The committee expressed its concern that this myth was being en-
couraged by substantial Federal Government expenditures for poly-
graph machines and on salaries for hundreds of Federal investigators
who were conducting thousands of polygraph examinations. To correct
the obvious defects and to protect employees from abuse in connection
with polygraph examinations, the committee recommended that the
Federal Government :
Initiate comprehensive research to determine the validity
and reliability of polygraph examinations.
Prohibit the use of polygraphs in all but the most serious
national security and criminal cases.
Improve the training and qualifications of Federal poly-
graph operators.
Restrict the use of two-way mirrors and recording de-
vices during polygraph examinations.
Guarantee that polygraph examinations be, in fact, volun-
tary.
Insure that refusal to take a polygraph examination will
not constitute prejudice or be made a part of an individual's
records except in the most serious national security cases.'
The committee also recommended that the President immediately
establish an interagency committee to study problems posed by the
Federal Government's use of polygraphs and to work out solutions
to those problems.
Four months after that report by the committee, the Department of
Defense issued a comprehensive directive to regulate the conduct of
polygraph examinations and to improve the selection, training, and
supervision of its polygraph operators.
A subsequent report by the committee dated September 26, 1966,'
commented both on the directive issued by the Department of Defense
and on the establishment of an Interagency Polygraph Committee by
President Lyndon B. Johnson in November 1965. The directive was
recognized in the report as the first step taken by any Federal agency
to curtail the widespread use of so-called "lie detectors." Its provi-
sions for stricter controls and for research were considered to be in
harmony with most of the recommendations previously made by the
committee. The Department of Defense directive, however, did not
respond fully to the recommendation that the Federal Government
prohibit the use of polygraphs in all but the most serious national
security and criminal cases.
The interagency group's detailed study of the overall utilization
of polygraph machines throughout the executive branch was then still
in process, and the final report was not available to the committee for
evaluation. This committee did, however, include the following rec-
ommendations in its own September 1966, report :
1. The Department of Defense polygraph directive is a
good first step forward. But now a second should be taken.
The Department should immediately reconsider the permis-
sive use of the device for pre-employment screening with the
Ibid., p. 2.
8 "Use of Polygraphs as 'Lie Detectors' by the Federal Government" (pt. 2), H. Rept.
89-2081.
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view of fulfilling the committee's recommendation to prohibit
the use of polygraphs in all cases but those clearly involving
the Nation's security.
2. Qualified physicialis and psychiatrists should be in-
cluded among the appropriate supervisory officials designated
to review polygraph examination records.
3. All Government agencies should be placed under a uni-
form administrative system which will enforce maximum con-
trols on the use of polygraphs, and which will establish regu-
lations to prevent their proliferation and misuse.4
In June of 1974, the Foreign Operations and Government Informa-
tion Subcommittee held hearings to update its information on this
subject.5 Not only had nearly a decade passed since the previous hear-
ings but new technology and techniques have been developed.
The subcommittee used a questionnaire 6 in addition to public hear-
ings, as it did in its earlier inquiry, to develop the data and views in-
cluded in this report.
* Ibid., p 4.
c "The Use of Polygraphs and Similar Devices by Federal Agencies." Hearings before a
subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives. June
4 and 5, 1974.
Appendix A, p. 47.
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II. BACKGROUND
History is full of instances where different cultures and societies
have attempted to detect lies and verify truth. Some of the ancient
tests reflected a primitive understanding of psychology or physiology,
but they were hardly reliable or scientific. They had in common a sig-
nificant dependence on brutality, deception, or chance as the deter-
minant of guilt or innocence.
At various times, and in different places, there evolved such tests as
the ordeal of boiling water, the ordeal of the red hot iron, and the
ordeal of the red hot stones. In one such ordeal, a suspected wrongdoer
was required to thrust his hand into a fire. If the ]land was unsinged
when removed, the individual was declared innocent; if the hand was
burned, that was positive proof of guilt. In other circumstances, truth
or lack of truth might be determined by the pattern assumed by a
handful of tossed pebbles. A test used by the early Chinese required
suspects to chew rice powder while being questioned. If the rice pow-
der was dry when spit out, the man was condemned, on the premise
that the tension of guilt supposedly dried up his salivary glands.
Modern criminology is more sophisticated, and utilizes a wide vari-
ety of devices and methods which have been developed to assist in ap-
prehending suspected criminals and establishing their guilt or inno-
cence. Among those generally acceptable to the courts 7 as admissible
evidence are the results of tests relating to fingerprinting, ballistics,
and handwriting. Others, such as the results of polygraph tests, have-
not yet merited that "general acceptance."
POLYGRAPH
The polygraph concept presumes that an identifiable physical reac-
tion can be attributed to a specific emotional stimulus. Erasistratus, a.
Greek physician and anatomist of the. third century B.C., reported
that emotion caused a quickening of the pulse, but the first attempt to
use a scientific instrument as an aid in detecting lies dates back to 1895
when Cesare Lombroso, an Italian criminologist, claimed success in
determining the guilt or innocence of suspected criminals by noting
whether their blood pressure or pulse changed during interrogation.
In a book entitled "On the Witness Stand" published in 1908, Har-
vard psychology professor Hugo Munsterberg discussed possibilities
of detecting lies by recording physiological changes. Changes in
breathing rates were linked to attempts at deception by another Italian
7 In Frye v. United States (293 F. 1013 [D.C. Cir. 1923]) the court made the following
observation relative to the general acceptance test of admissibility: "Just when a scientific
principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages
is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony de-
duced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs."
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5
criminologist, Vittorio Benussi, in 1914. The following year William
Moulton Marston, a criminal lawyer and student of Munsterberg,
began systematic research at the Harvard Psychological Laboratory
into the correlation between lying and changes in blood pressure.
During World War I, Marston headed a committee of psychologists
formed by the National Research Council to look into the known
deception tests and report on their possible usefulness in counter-
intelligence activities. Using a sphygmomanometer, the device physi-
cians use to measure a patient's blood pressure, Marston conducted
experiments by taking intermittent readings of blood pressure during
interrogation periods. After performing a number of experiments, the
committee of psychologists concluded that the Marston blood pressure
test was 97 percent reliable. It recommended that Marston be ap-
pointed Special Assistant to the Secretary of War with authority to
use his method in spy cases. War Secretary Newton D. Baker took no
action on the recommendation, but the committee's work aroused the
interest of a young psychologist, John A. Larson, who was connected
with the Berkeley, Calif., police force.
In 1921 Larson devised an instrument capable of simultaneously
recording blood pressure, pulse rates, and respiratory changes, the
forerunner of today's polygraph. Working under Berkeley Police
Chief August Vollmer, sometimes called the father of scientific police
work in this country, Larson used his device with reported success on
hundreds of criminal suspects. Presently he was joined on the Berkeley
force by a young man named Leonardo Keeler.
Keeler, a Stanford University psychology major, was destined to
become the best known expert in the field. In 1926, he developed an im-
provement of Larson's apparatus. Keeler continued refining his device,
which he named the Keeler polygraph, and incorporated into it the
feature of measuring changes in the skin's resistance, commonly known
as "galvanic skin respone." He also developed polygraph interrogation
techniques while at the scientific crime detection laboratory at North-
western University from 1930 until 1938, when he entered private
business.
The term polygraph refers, most precisely, to the multiple-pen sub-
system which records the instrumental responses on a roll of paper;
through usage, it has come to represent the entire lie detection equip-
ment. Contemporary polygraph equipment measures simultaneously
three physiological responses :
Breathing pattern_________________ Pneumograph------ _____---- Corrugated rubber tube around chest.
Blood pressure and pulse__________ Cardin-sphygmomanometer-.- Pneumatic pressure cuff around upper arm (or
around wrist and forearm to minimize discomfort)
Skin resistance to external current-- Psycho-galvanometer -------- Finger or palmar surface electrodes.
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS EVALUATOR
The psychological stress evaluator (PSE-1) was developed by two
retired Army intelligence personnel and has been marketed by them
through Dektor Counterintelligence & Security, Inc., of Springfield,
Va., since 1970. The instrument capitailzes on the principle of in-
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voluntary physiological changes that are related to psychological
stress. It is designed to measure and to graphically display certain
stress-related components of the human voice's two modulations-the
audible and the inaudible.
According to the developers of the PSE-1, there are inaudible fre-
quency modulations in speech that are superimposed on those audible
-modulations of the voice that are heard. They further represent that
the internal stresses which are reflected in those inaudible variations of
the voice are not totally controlled by the brain or thought processes,
and that those variations can be detected and recorded by their PSE-1
device.
Two significant advantages are claimed for the PSE-1 over other
types of `lie detector" devices. First is its simplicity, in that it has
relatively few moving parts and it is relatively easy to learn to operate.
Second, the PSE-1 does not have to be used at the time of the inter-
view or interrogation. A tape recorder is used to snake a permanent
record of the interview, and the tape is later fed into the PSE-1 and
the voice reactions recorded on a chart. Users of the device frequently
make tape recordings for clients over the telephone, run the tape on
the PSI:-1, and report the test results to their clients.
VOICE ANALYZER
Research on the capability of a speech parameter to differentiate
truthful from deceitful responses, by measurement of the energy
changes in the lower and mid-range speech frequencies, begun in 1963
by Mr. Fred Fuller, culminated in 1970 in the development of the
voice stress analyzer. The acknowledged shortcomings of that instru-
ment by its developer led to further research of thoi e rapid variations
in the tremolo or vibrato amplitude of speech. In 1972, a second device
kno-,vii as the Mark II voice analyzer was introduced by this same
individual. That device electronically extracts a numerical value of
those rapid variations in the tremolo or vibrato amplitude of speech,
which the developer represents varies with changes in emotional stress.
The Mark II voice analyzer and the Dektor psychological stress
evaluator both use the analysis of speech as a basis for inferring truth
or deception. They are, however, two completely different instruments
and the features extracted from speech for measurement by these in-
struments are entirely different. The developer of the Mark II voice
analyzer claims that because it shows an instantaneous numerical
value reading, it provides the most rapid means of detecting deception
and the most precise indication of emotional reaction of any
instrument.
OTHER DEVICES AND TECHNIQUES
A 1962 report by the Institute for Defense Analysis, cited in the
subcommittee's earlier hearings," notes that suggestions have been made
that other physiological responses, such as face temperature, electro-
cardiograph and electro-encephalograph should be included in lie de-
8 Hearings, subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Repre-
sentatives, 88th Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 29 and 30, 1964. "Use of Polygraphs as 'Lie Detec-
tors' by the Federal Government-Panel Discussion with Scientists," (pt. 3), pp. 425-463.
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tection work but virtually no research had been done to learn whether
the addition of these indicators would increase the accuracy of lie
detection.
Dr. Frederick Davidson, a professor at Kent State University in
Ohio, claims to have discovered a lie detection technique that works ont
a subject who never opens his mouth.9 Dr. Davidson reports that he
merely examines change in retina color, plus change in pupil size andi
in eye focus, to determine emotional response to stimuli-like question-
ing. Thus, he says, the conventional retinoscope can become a lie de-
tector. It allegedly works, too, on an intoxicated or drugged individual.
because it measures responses in the eye's retina to questions or com-
ments. The method was used temporarily to screen applicants for
campus police jobs at Kent State University.
The Weizmann Institute of Rehovot, Israel, recently reported de-
velopment of a "microwave respiration monitor" to determine truth-
fullness remotely and without the knowledge of the subject.10 This
device, presently being used in addition to the polygraph by the Israeli
police, measures the palpitations of the stomach by use of a microwave.
The theory is that lying produces an increased rate of respiration
which can be detected by increased movement of the stomach. The
device offers the possibility of widespread, random, remote and sur-
reptitious "truth verification" at border crossings, airports, and police
lineups. The developers hope to market the device in the United
States shortly.
Hearings, pp. 113-120. See footnote 5 on p. 3.
to Hearings, pp. 121-140. See footnote 5 on p. 3.
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III. RESE APCII AND TIIE FALLIBILITY OF "LIE
DETECTOR" DEVICES
No body of empirical scientific data existed 10 years ago to demon-
strate that the polygraph was either valid or reliable, or both, when
used as an instrument for lie detection. The subcommittee found that
Federal investigators had given thousands upon thousands of poly-
graph tests, but that there had been no attempt to determine the
validity of the procedure and no attempt to find out whether the
polygraph operator really could detect falsehoods. No statistical proof
had been compiled, despite thousands of cases; no scientific proof had
been produced, despite thousands of opportunities.
The need for and importance of research were highlighted to the
subcommittee by the views expressed by many expert witnesses that
lie detection tests could be rendered nearly or completely invalid.
This could occur if the physical or mental makeup of the individuals
being tested involved extreme nervousness, physiological abnormali-
ties, mental abnormalities; if there was a lack of or managed emo-
tional response; and if bodily movements were undetected. These and
other factors make it possible for an individual to mislead examiners.
Moreover, in the view of those experts, polygraph examiners had
neither the training nor ability to recognize obscure mental or emo-
tional abnormalities.
For that reason, the committee's first recommendation in its earlier
report was that :
The Federal Government initiate comprehensive research
to determine the validity of polygraph examinations.
FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH-POLYGI{APIIS
.1 DOD joint services group on polygraph research, established
shortly thereafter to act on that recommendation, developed a re-
search program which contemplated six studies :
a. Evaluation of basic instrumentation now employed in poly-
graph examinations for the assessment of the reliability and ade-
quacy of measurement of the physiological changes assumed to
be significant. The test standards and methods for this purpose
will be established by an unbiased agency, the National Bureau
of Standards.
b. An extensive field test of the reliability of polygraph field
instrumentation in use.
c. A study of the reliability of examiners in. polygraph chart
interpretation.
d. An attempt to establish external criteria in criminal cases
which will make it possible to perform studies of the validity of
each aspect of the polygraph examination.
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e. An examination of the possibilities inherent in modern in-
strumentation and computer data processing in the assessment of
ph siological changes.
/.. Collection and analysis of descriptive statistics on polygraph
operations.
The Air Force provided $200,000 in October 1966 to support this
program, designated as Project 4356, at Rome Air Development Cen-
ter. Earlier, the Air Force transferred $16,500 to the Navy for a con-
tract to the National Bureau of Standards to evaluate the response
characteristics of two standard polygraph instruments. A total of
$111,516 'ryas actually spent, with $104,984 reserved for studies await-
ing approval. Although a continuing program of research was con-
templated, no funds were provided in fiscal year 1968.
The major reason for research planned and undertaken on the poly-
graph was to determine its validity, more commonly called accuracy.
Validity is defined as a measure of the agreement between the results
of a polygraph examination in the absence of any other information
and some independent and acceptable way of establishing a person's
true guilt or innocence. Validity should be distinguished from reli-
ability. Reliability is simply a measure of agreement between two or
more examiners on the same case (or between two tests by the same
examiner) ; i.e., it is a measure of consistency.
Unfortunately, it is possible to be both consistent and wrong. On the
other hand, high accuracy is not possible if reliability is low. Validity,
i.e., agreement of a polygraph examination with "the truth" (as meas-
ured in a test program) is, obviously, the central issue concerning the
value of the polygraph as a test of deception in routine use.
The joint services group recognized that it is relatively easy to meas-
ure the validity of the polygraph in a laboratory because steps can be
taken to insure precise knowledge of the subject's "guilt" or "inno-
cence" and to insure independent judgments by the polygraph ex-
aminers. As an example, a subject is told to select a particular card
from a deck and to respond with the word "No" to all questions about
it or any other card. The experimenter can keep the card while the
polygraph examiner's task is to determine the subject's choice solely on
the basis of the polygraph test.
A more complicated laboratory test of validity is to contrive the
subject's participation in some simulated crime, like acting as if he
stole a book from a college bookstore, or perhaps even to steal a book
(while arrangements have been made for the bookstore manager to
look the other way). Experiments of this sort are not regarded as con-
clusive because, it can be said, the subject does not have a real motive
to deceive the examiner, or does not exhibit the same emotions as that
of a guilty person in an actual crime. Thus, even though the "labora-
tory" experiment offers precise control and knowledge of events, some
observers do not accept the results of such experiments.
The joint services group was able to accomplish only part of its
assignment. It developed a research and development program which,
if carried out, was believed capable of establishing the reliability and
validity of the polygraph as a means of judging deception. However,
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10
that group was not able to undertake its proposed validation studies
because of concern with the possibility of severe adverse reaction on
the part of Congress, the press, and the public to that program.11 More-
over, its proposed TV study of the complete polygraph interrogation
could not be undertaken because too few polygraph examinations were
being conducted at the time to permit the collection of the required re-
search data in a reasonable amount of time.
The joint services group summarized the results of its curtailed
research efforts in an internal report dated August 28, 1968, entitled,
"Present Status of 1)OD Research on the Polygraph." 12 That report
states that the joint services group was able to formulate but not to
carry out a research program to determine the reliability and validity
of a polygraph examination, observing that the conceptual problems
of devising a research strategy were less formidable than the prac-
tical ones.
Notwithstanding the problems encountered, and the fact that
its research program was not completed, the joint services group did
reach some conclusions. Paramount was its conclusion that the poly-
graph remains in use although no steps were being taken to establish
its validity. In addition, it concluded that the standard polygraph
device is not a precision instrument, and that the response characteris-
tics of the two standard polygraph instruments--Keeler and Stoel-
ting-differ. Moreover, it found that some polygraphs in routine use
in the Department of Defense did not perform in accordance with
pertinent specifications. The joint services group also noted that, al-
though rather easy to carry out, surprisingly few studies had been
accomplished on the reliability of an entire polygraph examination
or of any of its parts such as the pre-interrogation interview, type and
sequence of questions used in the examination, and chart reading.
The Department of Justice witness, commenting on the matter of the
fallibility of polygraph test results, enumerated many reasons 13 for
that Department's decision to view such examinations with caution
and to oppose their introduction into evidence at trial. Among them
was the statement that :
* * * the results of polygraph examinations cannot be
viewed with the same equanimity as the results of forensic
tests such as fingerprints, ballistics, and blood tests because
***
followed by an enumeration of nine reasons for that view. (See pages
17 through 19 for additional detail.)
FEDERALLY F4 UNDEl) RESE nc t-VorCE A,_~r.rzrrs
With the passage. of time, polygraph proponents appear to have
accepted without serious question the validity of their device as an
instrument for differentiating between truth and deception. Theare
now increasingly addressing their efforts to demonstrating the-reli-
ability of polyygraph test results (i.e., consistency in reaching an iden-
tical conclusion). Moreover, they no longer give as much emphasis to
the term "lie detection." as they used to; instead, they speak of their
11 Hearings, pp. 630-631. See footnote 5 on p. 3.
19 Retained in subcommittee files.
18 Hearings, p. 414. See footnote 5 on p. 3.
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testing processes as a means of. identifying and measuring changes in
stress which are indications of the truth or deception of the answers
being given.
The primary strategy and efforts of the proponents of the psycho-
logical stress evaluator and the voice analyzers are devoted to dem-
onstrating that, in similar circumstances, their devices are at least as,
if not more, reliable than are polygraphs.
In the most recently reported pertinent research, "Comparison of
Voice Analysis and Polygraph as Lie Detection Procedures," 14 the
researcher's finding was that there existed a clear inferiority of voice
analysis, in its present state of development, not only to the poly-
graph, but also to judgments made on the basis of simply observing
subjects' behavior. In view of this, the study concluded that neither
of the presently existing voice analysis instruments (i.e., psychological
stress evaluator or the voice stress analyzer) warranted acceptance as
valid "lie detectors" within the constraint of an experimental para-
digm. The CIA, which has been interested in voice analysis for sev-
eral years does not believe that research to date has been either ex-
haustive or conclusive, and has plans for research of its own.
PRorosED FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH-POLYGRAPi16
The subcommittee was advised in May 1974,15 that the Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration (LEAA), of the Department of
Justice, had under consideration funding an 18-month study, for ap-
proximately $100,000, entitled "Validity and Reliability of Detection
of Deception," to consider the followingufive areas :
1. The basic validity and reliability of polygraph examinations
in detecting truth and deception with criminal suspects ;
2. The relative effectiveness of various physiological measures,
including the currently used standard measures (respiration, skin
resistance, cardiovascular activity) and other promising measures
which require additional laboratory research;
3. A general evaluation of present practices among field ex-
aminers in private practice and in law enforcement settings;
4. The extent to which subject variables such as psychopath,
and personality factors influence the effectiveness of the poly-
graph technique ; and
5. The sources of errors in polygraph examinations.
The study is expected to result in reports written for two different
audiences. First, a comprehensive and detailed report. of the overall
research, methodology, results, and conclusions will be prepared, along
with individual reports covering each of the five research areas stated
above, for those with a scientific and professional interest in the poly-
graph technique. Secondly, a summary report will be prepared that
will give the basic findings and interpret them in terms designed for
the criminal justice practitioner who is interested in the problems of
application of the polygraph technique.
1, Technical Report No. LWL-CR-03B70, by Joseph F. pubis, Fordham University. to
U.S. Army Land Warfare Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., 20015--(Final Re-
port Contract No. DAAD05-72-C-0217).
15 Letter dated May 29, 1974, retained in subcommittee files.
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AMERICAN POLYGRAPH AssOCI ATION RESEARCH
The level of research directly funded or sponsored by the American
Polygraph Association can best be described by that organization's
own language-"minimal." 16 Only nominal funds have been allotted
to the APA Research and Instrumentation Committee for in-house
volunteer efforts concerned mostly with instrumentation and refine-
ment of techniques. These projects receive advance approval by the
APA president.
The APA spokesmen were queried, also, concerning the degree to
which the organization had itself conducted tests comparing the ac-
curacy and validity of polygraphs and those newer- devices which de-
pend primarily on voice analysis. Such a test was reported to have
been underway for about a year, conducted by the APA Research and
Instrumentation Committee, but no report thereon was expected be-
fore August 1974. On March 19, 1975, the subcommittee was advised
that this test was suspended, without preparation and issuance of a
final report, because of indicated unreliabilities of the PSE equipment
being used in the research project.17
CONTINUED NEED FOr, DEFINITIVE RESEARCH
When the committee earlier identified the need for and recom-
mended research, it was hopeful that with the passage of some reason-
able period of time, some of its doubts and reservations about the
validity and reliability of polygrap]s might be allayed by the result of
that research. However, the nature of research undertaken, both feder-
ally and privately funded, and the results therefrom have done little
to persuade the committee that polygraphs, psychological stress evalu-
ators, or voice stress analyzers have demonstrated either their validity
or reliability in differentiating between truth and deception, other
than possibly in a laboratory situation. It is not alone in this view.
The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the Depart-
ment of Justice responded to the subcommittee's request for evahu-
ative information relating to past and recent research on the validity
and reliability of polygraphs as follows :
It has been established that psycho-physiological record-
ings can be effective in differentiating between truth and
deception in mock crime situations in the laboratory, and
that the accuracy rate of detection can be manipulated by
controlling such variables as age, relevance of the question,
degree of motivation of the subject the number and type of
physiological measures being monitored, the number of times
the questions are asked, etc.
however, the effectiveness of the lie detection technique
when it is used on criminal suspects outside of the laboratory
has never been adequately resolved; there is, therefore, a
conspicuous lack of reliable data on this point. Polygraph
examiners have consistently claimed all error rate of less
than one or two percent. Unfortunately, their claims are
unsubstantiated, and their statistics were based upon total
1 Hearings, p. 160. See footnote 5 on p. 3.
11 Memorandum retained in subcommittee files.
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13
cases rather than confirmed cases. Several scientists have ex-
amined criminal suspects, and they have unanimously re-
ported accuracies of essentially 100%. However, they did not
publish many details to support their claims."'
The Department of Justice was also queried about the justification
for underwriting, at a cost of $100,000, the unsolicited research pro-
posal from Dr. David C. Raskin of the University of Utah, in light
of the earlier substantial Federal funding of several Department of
Defense research projects.
The response to that question again emphasized the significant dif-
ference between test results obtained in a laboratory situation and those
obtained in a "real life" situation :
During the last 50 years there have been over 75 laboratory
experiments which have indicated that psycho-physiological
measurements can greatly increase the probability of deter-
mining whether a subject is lying or not. Unfortunately,
there are numerous differences between the detection of de-
ception in a laboratory environment and lie detection with
criminal suspects. Some of these differences, such as the degree
of emotional involvement which the subject has in the out-
come of the examination, are obvious and compelling ; other
differences are more subtle. Some of these differences favor
accuracy with criminal suspects. The qualifications, experi-
ence and testing techniques of the scientists were not at all
representative of lie detection as it is being practiced today.
Perhaps the major reason for this is that very few scientists
have been trained in current lie detection practices.
Since polygraphs are being used more frequently in the
judicial process and are used by the Federal Government, as
well as most major law enforcement agencies at State and
local levels, it is extremely important that adequate informa-
tion be available regarding the basic reliability and validity
of the techniques. In addition, information is needed about
the ways in which the techniques can be improved and the
extent t.o which available techniques are properly employed
in present practice. It is the basic purpose of the proposed
research by the University of Utah to fill. some of the gaps in
knowledge concerning those fundamental problems.'9
The Central Intelligence Agency made similar observations in its
testimony before the subcommittee:
Reliability, defined as consistency of interpretation of poly-
graph charts, has been looked at by means of examiner agree-
ment studies. Agreement figures from our studies are com-
parable to figures from similar studies of other groups
interpreting data germane to their specialties.
On the other hand, validity-or the degree to which
polygraph charts measure what they purport to measure-
has.been a more diMlicult issue to evaluate. Satisfactory inde-
pendent criteria for validating real life conditions are scarce,
1e Hearings, pp. 638-639. See footnote 5 on p. 3.
It Hearings, p. 639. See footnote 5 on p. 3.
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and the differences in polygraph subject attitudes between
real life and laboratory conditions have prevented much
headway through laboratory experiments. The data so far
available have not been disappointing, but they are lim-
ited, and we still lack an appropriate scientific base for any
conclusions.20
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IV. LEGAL AND MORAL CONSIDERATIONS
The subcommittee heard considerable testimony that the examina-
iton of individuals by polygraph or other "lie-detection" instruments
infringes on essential individual liberties and protections guaranteed
by the Constitution.
"LIE DETECTORS" AND CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS
The American Civil Liberties Union witness stated that no individ-
ual should be required, by moral or legal compulsion, to submit to a
"lie detector" test and argued that a number of the Bill of Rights
amendments to the Constitution are violated by such a testing proce-
dure. He called further attention to the fact that some European coun-
tries have long rejected the polygraph as an impermissible police tech-
nique, not so much because of its possibilities for error, but because
it was deemed to violate the essential dignity of the human personality
and the individuality of a citizen.21
The spokesman for the American Federation of Government Em-
ployees (AFGE), an organization representing 650,000 Federal em-
ployees in exclusive recognition units, expressed similar strong ob-
ections for much the same reasons. The AFGE recognized with only
limited satisfaction the inclusion in the Federal Personnel Manual of
the partial bars to the use of polygraphs in screening applicants and
appointees to competitive service positions, following subcommittee
hearings of a decade ago. It expressed particular concern about that
significant part of the Federal work force which is in the excepted
service and which does not enjoy the same protection afforded com-
petitive service employees.22
The AFGE proposed, therefore, that the use of polygraphs be con-
trolled by legislation and that such legislation contain an absolute
bar against the conduct of polygraph examinations of Federal employ-
ees, except in narrowly defined national security cases. The pressures
placed upon certain elements of the intelligence and security appara-
tus of the Government were conceded to warrant the limited and se-
lected use of polygraphs and other technological devices, in the public
interest. However, it is the stated belief of the AFGE that the outer
limits of that use and very strict procedural safeguards should be
established under congressional standards, if proliferation of use and
abuse in application is to be avoided.
The conditions which call forth the use of polygraphs on Federal
employees are often highly charged investigations involving security
breaches or leaks of classified information which initially at least are
conducted under partial or total secrecy, according to the AFGE. In
such circumstances, the compulsion upon the employee to consent is
31 Hearings, pp. 88-49. See footnote 5 on p. S.
=Hearings, pp. 384-385. See footnote 5 on p. 3.
(15)
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believect to be almost overpowering. There is the assumption present
which the AFGE finds unwarranted-that the polygraph will some-
how sort out the innocent from the guilty and that if an employee
refuses to submit, he is hiding his guilt.
While the polygraph examination is not a surreptitious surveil-
lance of the individual, like bugging or wiretapping or the use of two-
way mirrors, the union believes that the use to which the results may
be put can have the same deleterious effect, unless strictly controlled.
Accordingly, assuming that polygraph examinations are warranted in
narrowly justified circumstances, the AFGE proposed that they be
conditioned unequivocally by law to require consent of the individual
examined and to guarantee to him the right to have an attorney, a
doctor, or both, or another representative of his choice present at all
times during the examination.
The AFGE further proposed that absolutely no inference adverse
to the employee should be drawn from the refusal to submit to the
polygraph examination, that the use of the result of a polygraph
examination be restricted to the specified purpose for which it was
taken and to which the employee has consented, and that the use or
distribution of such test results for any other purpose be prohibited.
Tim "RIGHT To PROVE ONE'S INNOCPNCE"
Supporters of the use of the polygraph, psychological stress evalu-
ator, and voice analyzer as "lie-detectors," who appeared before the
subcommittee as witnesses, uniformly represented that their exam-
ination results were valid and reliable when their instruments were
operated by competent examiners who adhered to proper examining
techniques. They rejected the charge that use of these instruments
violates an individual's constitutional rights and protections, support-
ing that view with the statement that the job applicant or employee
has the option to refuse to take such an examination. Again, uniformly,
they offered the view that the opportunity to take the polygraph or
similar test should be welcomed by an individual, because, to quote
the American Poly graph Association, "* * * all intelligent people en-
dorse the right of the innocent to prove their innocence * * *."23
This latter view is a, novel restatement of a major tenet of our system
of jurisprudence that an individual is presumed to be innocent of
charges brought against him and that his guilt must be proven.
A number of witnesses disagreed with this restatement of law. Mr.
Henry S. Dogin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Divi-
sion, Department of Justice, for example, was queried as follows :
Mr. CORNISH. One of the concerns that I raised here yester-
day was sort of a theme running throughout the testimony
of the polygraph proponents. And the theme was that there
was a way a person can prove himself to be innocent of
things. I just wondered, Mr. Dogin, do you know of any
court in the United States where a defendant is required to
prove his innocence?
Mr. DOGIN. No. The State, the people or the Government
has to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
* * * *
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Mr. CORNISH. Also one of the witnesses yesterday said he
thought it was a bizarre twist of the Constitution if some-
one were to regard the first amendment as giving the right to
remain silent. Mr. Dogin, do you find that bizarre?
Mr. DOGIN. Not at all.24
Proponents of the polygraph instrument stated during their testi-
mony that, increasingly, courts have begun to admit test results as
evidence. In response to the subcommittee's request, a summary of in-
formation bearing on that point was prepared and furnished by the
American Polygraph Association (APA).25
In substance, that submission discloses that a number of State courts
have been considering more closely the subject of admissibility of
polygraph test results as evidence. Examination by the subcommittee
staff of the cases identified by the APA shows that the strongest of the
cases have been in support of the defense; have dealt with situations
where test results, although admitted through stipulation by both
parties, were not admitted as prime evidentiary material; and none of
the cited cases appears to have addressed those primary issues involv-
ing the violation of individuals' constitutional guarantees against self-
incrimination.
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT POSITION ON ADMISSIBILITY
The responsibility of the Criminal Division at the Department of
Justice is to enforce all Federal criminal laws except, those specifically
assigned to that Department's Antitrust, Civil Rights, and Tax Divi-
sions. U.S. attorneys are concerned with criminal matters and liti,ga-
tion arising under approximately 900 Federal statutes, including
statutes relating to bank robbers, kidnapping, extortion, labor rack-
eteering, fraud against the Government, conflict of interest, bribery of
public officials, perjury, corruption of justice, and theft and larceny of
public property. In light of these major responsibilities, the position
of the Justice Department with respect to the use of results of poly-
graph examinations is deemed particularly noteworthy.
Because it views the results of those examinations with caution, it
opposes their introduction into evidence at trial. To this end, U.S. at-
torneys are instructed not to seek the admission in evidence of poly-
graph examinations and to oppose all attempts by defense counsel to
seek the admission of such examinations. This position of the Depart-
ment of Justice is concurred in both by the eight U.S. courts of appeals
which have considered the question of the advisability of polygraph
results as evidence, and by the vast majority of State courts.
The Department of Justice witnesses, who appeared before this sub-
committee, marshaled the following list of reasons supporting this
policy :
First, while proponents of the polygraph claim 80 to 90
percent or even higher accuracy for the technique, their sta-
tistics are open to challenge because of the great difficulty in
Hearings, pp. 631-632. See footnote 5 on p, 3.
25 Hearings, pp. 147-153. See footnote 5 on p. S.
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obtaining independent corroboration of the results of the vast
majority of examinations-especially those examinations in-
dicating-the subject was not trying to deceive the examiner.
Second, the results of polygraph examinations cannot be
viewed with the same equanimity as the results of forensic
tests such as fingerprints, ballistics, and blood tests because :
(1) There is no specific physiological reaction indicative of
deception, and even the same person may have inconsistent
physiological reactions associated with deceptive responses;
(2) apparent indicationsof deception may be caused by other
psychological factors; (3) the moral attitude toward lying
by the subject may affect his reactivity; (4) the subject may
be able to "manrnfactiire" physiological responses, such as in-
tensifying his reactions to control questions, thereby effec-
tively masking his reactions to relevant questir>ns; (5) mental
instability or aberration may affect the reactivity of a subject;
(6) the taking of depressant drugs may affect, a subject's re-
activity; (7) the physical circumstances incident to an ex-
amination may affect a subject's physiological reactions; (8)
the complexity and nature of the matters being inquired into
may affect a subject's reactions (for example, a-subject may be
able to rationalize his answers in matters involving his state
of mind, such as questions relating to intent or knowledge,
but would be less likely to be able to rationalize his answers
to simple direct questions such as "Did you shoot John
Jones?") ; and (9) other objective factors such as a subject's
involvement in other similar acts, excessive interrogation
prior to the polygraph examination, and excessive test length
may also affect the accuracy of polygraph results.
In addition to these objective factors affecting the validity
and reliability of polygraph results, subjective factors, such as
the polygraph examiner's observation of the subject's be-
havior during the test procedure, the effect of the interaction
of the polygraph examiner and the subject, and the subjective
bias of the polygraph examiner, may all affect the validity
and reliability of any examination.
Third, and possibly most important, because- of the undue
reliance juries are likely to place on the apparent mechanistic
accuracy of polygraph results, we believe that the introduc-
tion in evidence of polygraph results would virtually vitiate
juries' historical fact-finding responsibilities. As Judge
Irving Kaufman eloquently stated fifteen years ago :
The most important function served by a jury is in
bringing its accumulated experience to bc~ar upon
witnesses testifying before it, in order to distinguish
truth from falsity. Such a process is of enormous
complexity, and involves an almost infinite number
of variable factors. It is the basic premise of the jury
system that twelve men and women can harmonize
those variables and decide, with the aid of examina-
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Lion and cross-examination, the truthfulness of a wit-
ness. * * * I am not prepared to rule that the jury
system is outmoded. * * * I still prefer the collec-
tive judgment of twelve men and women who have
sat through a trial and heard all the evidence
on the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Indeed, unless there is a constitutional amendment which
substitutes trial by polygraph for trial by jury, the Crim-
inal Division will oppose the introduction in evidence of poly-
graph results.
Fourth, under the common law rules of evidence and pro-
posed Rule 704 of the Rules of Evidence for United States
Courts and Magistrates, polygraph results, which one Court
of Appeals has perceptively referred to as little more than
"electrical oath-helpers," would not be the proper subject of
expert testimony.
Fifth, the admission of polygraph results would greatly at-
tenuate the length of trials and lead to a potentially serious
confusion of the issues. Our experience with hearings on de-
fense attempts to introduce polygraph results in evidence is
that these hearings take more of the courts' time than 75 per-
cent of all criminal trials. It readily can be seen that such
hearings not only would more than double the length of most
trials, but also would lead to serious confusion of the issues
involved in a case because at least as much of the court's time
would be spent "trying" the polygraph examination as the
issues involved in the case. Moreover, if courts admit poly-
graph results of defendants, should they not also admit poly-
graph results for key witnesses or even all witnesses?
Additionally, if the use of the polygraph becomes preva-
lent, jurors may come to believe that any defendant who does
not submit polygraph results indicating his innocence is pre-
sumably guilty.
Sixth, it is our belief that there is no proper evidentiary
purpose served by polygraph results which would justify
their admissibility in evidence under either common law rules
of evidence or the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.
Polygraph results are not properly classifiable as substantive
evidence, evidence of character trait or credibility, or re-
habilitative evidence as an exception to the prior consistent
statement rule.
Finally, if the Government were to seek the introduction of
polygraph results of defendants in cases in which defend-
ants failed to testify, serious Fifth Amendment problems
would arise. If defendants were to successfully introduce
polygraph. results in cases in which they did not intend to
testify, serious questions would arise as to whether they did
not thereby waive their Fifth Amendment rights and could
be required to take the stand.-'
20 Hearings, pp. 413-417. See footnote 5 on p. 3.
H. Rept. 795, 94-2-4
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V. POLICY AND STANDARDS ESTABLISHED BY THE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
The current provisions of the Federal Personnel Manual relating
to the use of polygraphs are an outgrowth of the interagency study
made following the issuance by this committee o,f its reports in 1965
and 1966.
The first report recommended that the President establish an Inter-
agency Committee To Study Problems Posed by the Federal Govern-
ment's Use of Polygraphs and to work out solutions. The second report
recommended that all Federal Government agencies be placed under
a uniform administrative system which would en force maximum con-
trols on the use of polygraphs and would establish regulations to
prevent their proliferation and misuse.
The study, under the direction of John W. Macy, Jr., then Chairman
of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), developed a set of guide-
lines and instructions which, in substance, were incorporated by the
Commission into a Federal Personnel Manual system letter issued
October 25, 1968, and, subsequently, into the Federal Personnel Man-
ual, chapter 736, appendix D.
The current regulations, which include minor modifications made
in 1973,21 contain the following essential provisions:
(1) An executive agency which has a highly sensitive in-
telligence or counterintelligence mission directly affecting the
national security may use the polygraph for employment
screening and personnel investigations of applicants for and
appointees to competitive service positions only after receiv-
ing written approval from the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission.
(2) The executive agency must submit to the Chairman of
the Civil Service Commission a statement of the nature of its
mission and a copy of its regulations and directives governing
the use of the polygraph.
(3) The Chairman determines whether the agency has an
intelligence or counterintelligence mission directly affecting
the national security and whether the regulations and direc-
tives meet the approval requirements.
Approval to use the polygraph is granted only for 1 year, and an
agency given approval by the CSC to use the polygraph for competi-
tive service positions is required to recertify annually that the condi-
tions which led to the original certification still exist in the agency.
27 Inst. 196. dated July 9. 1973, to Federal Personnel manual, retained in subcommittee
files.
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All other uses of a polygraph to screen applicants for and appointees
to competitive service positions are forbidden. This prohibition applies
to the use of the results of polygraph examinations given previously
by that agency, by another Federal agency, or by a private source.
The head of each department and agency of the Federal Govern-
ment is responsible for establishing and maintaining an effective pro-
gram to insure that the employment and retention in employment of
any civilian officer or employee is clearly consistent with the inter-
ests of national security. The employment of each such civilian officer-
or employee is subject to investigation. The investigation of persons
entering or employed in the competitive service is primarily the re-
sponsibility of the Civil Service Commission. Exceptions to that rule
may be made where agency heads assume that responsibility pursuant
to law or by agreement with the Commission. The investigation of
persons other than those in the competitive service is primarily the
responsibility of the employing department or agency.
Of the 2.6 million Federal civilian employees, 85 to 90 percent are
estimated by the Civil Service Commission to be competitive service
employees. The remaining 10 to 15 percent-or between 250,000 to
375,000 individuals-are excepted service employees. The use of poly-
graphs in personnel investigations of such excepted service employees,
either for pre-employment screening or as a condition of continued
employment, is not prohibited by the provisions of the Federal Per-
sonnel Manual.
Included in the category of excepted service employment are em-
ployees of the Tennessee Valley Authority, the employees of the
Foreign Service in the Department of State, all-some 70,000-attor-
neys in the Federal Government (schedule A) ; cooks, chaplains and
other persons for whom the Commission lacks either the capacity or
opportunity to examine as to qualifications (schedule B) ; and those
noncareer executive assignments frequently referred to as "political
jobs" (schedule Q.
The Civil Service Commission itself does not possess any devices
such as the polygraph or a psychological stress evaluator, nor does it
make use of those so-called lie detectors in its own internal operations
or in discharging its responsibilities relating to Government-wide in-
vestigative activities. Its Bureau of Personnel Investigations, through
the Office of Security Appraisal, conducts continuing studies of per-
sonnel security programs of 'Federal departments and agencies for
the purpose of determining :
(1) Deficiencies in security programs established under the
order which are inconsistent with the interests of, or directly or
indirectly weaken, the national security.
(2) Tendencies in these programs to deny to individual em-
ployees fair, impartial, and equitable treatment at the hands of
the Government, or rights under the Constitution and laws of
the United States or Executive Order 10450.
Each study made at a department or agency includes examination
of pertinent files and regulations, and looks into whether it is used
only for approved purposes. An agency is required to take necessary
steps, to correct any material weakness or deficiency disclosed during
the appraisal and to notify the Commission of the changes made. This
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22 '
requirement would be applied to any unapproved use of the poly-
graph, or any similar device.
COMMISSION'S ASSESSMENT OF AGENCY POLYGRAPH USE
The Commission's experience, since the issuance of its instructions
in 1968, leads it to conclude that little use has been made of the poly-
graph, in relation to competitive civil service employment. Only one
agency, the Department of Defense, has submitted a request for ap-
proval of the use of the polygraph. The initial request dated June 20,
1969, was not approved by the Commission. By letter of July 8, 1969,
Commission Chairman Hampton advised the Department of Defense
that DOD Directive 5210.48, issued July 13, 1965, which governed
the use of the polygraph throughout that department, needed to be
updated and clarified so that it more specifically met the criteria set
forth in the Federal Personnel Manual.
A second Department of Defense request, dated March 14, 1973,
resulted in the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission granting
authority to use polygraph examinations for certain limited cate-
gories of employees.2$ A request for renewal of this approval was
under consideration by the Commission at the time of the subcom-
mittee's hearings in June 1974.
The Civil Service Commission advised the subcommittee in March
1975 2s that the Department of Defense had submitted its proposed
regulations and directives on the use of polygraphs for review during
the fall of 1974. The Commission returned that submission to the
DOD, with suggestions for changes. During October 1974 DOD
agreed to make the suggested changes and to have the revised guide-
lines approved by the Secretary of Defense. The Commission also
advised that it was its understanding that after the guidelines had
been approved and signed by the Secretary of Defense, DOD would
apply to the Commission for permission to use the polygraph for a
1-year period under the amended guidelines. However, as of this latest
advice from the Commission, the guidelines have yet to be signed and
approved by the Secretary of Defense.
Security appraisals performed by the Civil Service Commission
have disclosed no misuse of the polygraph by agencies. Its recent ap-
praisal at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) did disclose, however, that that agency had regulations
setting forth a policy regarding polygraph examinations which did
not conform to the provisions of the Federal Personnel Manual. The
Commission's security appraisal of that agency was closed out on
May 17, 1974, at which time NASA agreed to revoke its ppolicy.3? The
Commission also was assured by NASA that the policy had not been
used in violation of the provisions of the Federal Personnel Manual.
The committee notes with satisfaction that the Federal Personnel
Manual now includes a statement of Government-wide policy with re-
spect to the use of polygraphs by Federal agencies, where none existed
at the time of its earlier hearings, 10 years ago. Additional evidence
of concern by the executive branch is the continuing review by the
Hearings, p. 412. See footnote 5 on p. 3.
Letter retained in subcommittee's files.
80 Hearings, p. 412. See footnote 5 on p. 3.
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Civil Service Commission of agencies' security programs, including
consideration of their policies and practices concerning the use of
polygraphs.
The committee is convinced, notwithstanding, that additional oppor-
tunity exists throughout the Federal Government to improve and
strengthen both policy and practices. The Federal Personnel Manual
appears to be overly concerned with what agencies must do to obtain
approval. from the Civil Service Commission to administer polygraph
examinations to their employees. It is the committee's belief that, in an
area of such sensitivity with respect to individuals' rights, the perti-
nent paragraphs of its manual should state clearly those few specific
conditions in which applicants for and appointees to competitive serv-
ice positions may be required to take polygraph examinations. It also
should state what effect the polygraph examination, or the refusal to
take that examination, has on eligibility for employment or continued
employment. Such an introduction would more appropriately preface
the current explanatory material in appendix D of chapter 736 of the
Federal Personnel Manual.
The testimony by the Civil Service Commission witness disclosed
that only the Department of Defense has submitted a request for ap-
proval of its statement of policy and procedures applicable to use
of polygraph tests to examine a few Defense Intelligence Agency em-
ployees in competitive service positions who were detailed to work with
the National Security Agency. The subcommittee, by circularizing a
questionnaire among 53 Federal agencies, learned that not only the De-
partment of Defense but other agencies, including some with employees
in competitive service positions, administered or had administered for
them a number of polygraph tests during 1973.
The Department of Justice letter of November 26, 1973,31 reports
that its Drug Enforcement Administration utilizes the polygraph to
evaluate employee integrity, when allegations concerning the em-
ployee are made, or to judge the credibility of informants who volun-
teer unusual information of an important nature. That letter further
states that the Drug Enforcement Administration contracts with
members of the American Polygraph Association for polygraph ex-
aminations, but that no costs were incurred for this purpose in fiscal
year 1973.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System responded
on November 12,1973 '32 stating that on four specific occasions in fiscal
year 1973 polygraphs were utilized, through the retention of outside
agencies, as aids in the investigations of suspected improper conduct
of duties by reserve bank employees.
The November 14, 1973,33 response from the United States Postal
Service reports that polygraph examinations are used in criminal in-
vestigations of employees' activities and that 485 polygraph examina-
tions were made by the Postal Service during fiscal year 1973.
The Defense Communications Agency responded to the questionnaire
on November 2, 19'3,14 stating that it did not possess any polygraph
machines, but that at the request of the Office of the Special Assistant
3L Letter retained in subcommittee files.
33 Letter retained in subcommittee files.
33 Letter retained in subcommittee files.
U Letter retained in subcommittee files.
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to the Secretary of Defense, it had arranged for the U.S. Army 902d
Military Intelligence Group to conduct one polygraph examination
during fiscal year 1973.
None of the above agencies included in their responses to the ques-
tionnaire any disclaimer that the tests were given to individuals other
than employees in the competitive service category. The committee
was unable to ascertain from the limited information furnished wheth-
er or not the polygraph tests reported to it by these four agencies were
given to competitive service personnel. Information subsequently ob-
tained confirmed that those provisions of the Federal Personnel Man-
ual relating to the use of polygraphs are applicable neither to the
employees of the Federal Reserve System nor the Postal Service,
because those employees do not hold competitive service positions.
No procedure currently exists imposing the requirement that all
agencies which have any competitive service employees and which do
administer polygraph examinations report to a control agency in the
executive branch, certifying that polygraph tests were not adminis-
tered in connection either with pre-employment, appointment, or con-
tinuance of employment of such individuals. The committee is
persuaded that, absent such a reporting requirement, the Civil Service
Commission can only assume that no agency other than the Depart-
ment of Defense is giving polygraph tests or has had polygraph tests
given to its competitive service employees.
The committee is further persuaded that such periodic reporting is
desirable at intervals not less frequent than annually. Such reporting
should provide for the disclosure of the volume of polygraph testing,
Government-wide, for both those agencies having highly sensitive in-
telligence or counterintelligence missions directly affecting the na-
tional security and for those agencies not members of that intelligence
community. Those reports should cite the Civil Service Commission
document containing approval of the agency's pertinent regulations
and directives and should furnish data on the number of polygraph
instruments; the number of tests administered both by and for the
agency, categorized by purpose of the test (as contemplated by para-
graph D-3 (1) of appendix D) ; and the numbers of excepted em-
ployees and competitive service employees tested.
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VI. OWNERSHIP AND USE OF "LIE DETECTORS" BY
FEDERAL AGENCIES
Only a relatively few agencies in the Federal Government currently
own and use polygraphs, and that same condition pertained when the
committee made its report in 1965. The overall pattern of ownership
and usage has changed only slightly in the intervening decade. Gen-
erally, polygraphs are being used in screening applicants for employ-
ment by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National
Security Agency (NSA) ; by these and several other agencies, in con-
nection with security and personnel investigations of employees; and
by two agencies in connection with scientific research not related to
the subject of lie-detection.
FINANCIAL AND STATISTICAL DATA
In 1965, agencies reported to the subcommittee ownership of 512
polygraphs which were acquired at a cost of $428,066, and which were
used for 19,796 tests during fiscal year 1963, The subcommittee's re-
cent canvass of agencies showed a reported ownership of 458 poly-
graph devices with an acquisition cost of $493,368, and that 6,889 tests
were performed during fiscal year 1973. This decline in the volume
of tests performed is particularly noteworthy, because the 19,796 tests
given 10 years ago do not include those tests given by both the CIA
and NSA, whereas the 6,889 total currently reported does include more
than 3,000 tests performed by NSA. It is quite obvious that those other
agencies (primarily the military departments in the Department of
Defense) which own polygraphs also have sharply curtailed their use.
Some of the more significant data furnished to the subcommittee
relating to the number and cost of polygraphs owned, and the fre-
quency with which they were used during fiscal year 1973, follow :
Annual Tests
maintenance performed
Instruments Acquisition and other in fiscal
owned cost expenses, year 1973
Investigation and personnel screening:
Department of Defense:
Army____________________________________ 285
$219,171
$59,289
2,028
Navy------------------------------------ 21
30,500
26,181
665
Marines__________________________________ 12
24,000
500
62
Air Force_________________________________ 58
53,872
47,410
482
Defense Investigative Service_______________ 0
0
0
25
Defense Communications Agency ------------ 0
0
0
21
National Security Agency___________________ 14
24,645
11,866
3,081
Defense Intelligence Agency________________ 0
0
0
21
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff______________ 0
0
0
0
Defense Telephone Service_________________ 0
0
0
0
Total, Defense ______________________ ____ 390
350,189
145,246
6,325
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT-Continued
Annual Tests?
maintenance performed
Instruments Acquisition and other in fiscal
owned cost expenses r year 1973
Investigation and personnel screening-Continued
Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation ------- ------------- ----------____-----
26
$25,847
$500
79
Department of the Treasury:
Secret Service______________________________
10
13,215
0
250
Customs Service____________________________
1
1:368
200
7
Total, Treasury____________________________
U.S. Postal Service: Postal Inspection Service_______
Central Intelligence Agency----------------------
Total, investigation and personnel screening------
437
40`,, 432
168,974
6,946
Scientific and medical research:
Health, Education, and Welfare___________________
19
74.990
0
0
Environmental Protection Agency_____________2
12,58
0
P
Total, scientific and medical research --------
21
87,"38
------------------- _________
r Exclusive of operators' salary costs.
2 Tests administered in connection with, respectively, personnel security, personnel screening, and security clearance.
3 Response stated: "Less than 50 polygraph tests were conducted by the Secret Service in fiscal 1973.
+ Agency states such information is classified and its disclosure restricted under 50 U.S.C. 403(g).
The committee cautions that the data furnished by the Federal agen-
cies reporting ownership and use of polygraphs have not been validated
by audit or any other means, and that some evidence is at hand which
raises questions about the accuracy of some of that reported data. The
single largest user listed above is the Department of Defense, which
furnished statistical data, first during November 1973, and subse-
quently during the public hearings in June 1974. There were some
sharp disparities in those data, particularly as they related to the total
number of polygraphs owned and in use by the Army and in the num-
ber of polygraph examiners in the various components of the Depart-
ment of Defense.
The data reported on those two occasions are shown below :
Polygraphs owned
Polygraph examiners
Operable
Inoperable
Total Certified
Primary
duty
Army:
June 30,1973_______________________________ 141
1 144
285
70
9
Mar. 31, 1974_____________________________276
140
416
61
32
Navy:
June 30,1973------------------------------- 21
------------
21
10
10
Mar. 31,1974------------------------------- 21
------------
21
9
9
Marine Corps:
June 30,1973_______________________________ 12
------------
12
11
0
Mar. 31,1974------------------------------ 12
-----------
12
17
0
Air Force:
June 30,1973_______________________________ 58
------------
58
33
0
Mar. 31, 1974______________________________ 58
____________
58
27
1
NSA:
June 30,1973------------------------------ 14
------------
-=
14
12
7
Mar. 31, 1974------------------------------- 16
-----------
16
20
7
Total:
June 30,1973_______________________________ 246
144
390
136
26
Mar. 31, 1974--------------- --------------- 383
140
523
134
49
7 Shown as inoperable, on basis of DOD statement that many of the 144 units in the Army Materiel Command stock
are obsolete.
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The Department of Defense, at the request of the subcommittee, has
undertaken to resolve those differences. That Department has furnished
responses to the subcommittee's inquiries concerning (1) the need for
the relatively large number of polygraphs (58) owned by the Air
Force, in view of the relatively few tests (482) given by that DOD
component in fiscal year 1973, and (2) the need for so many certified
examiners in the Air Force, with all the attendant costs for qualifying
them, inasmuch as only one person had that function as a primary
duty.
On the first point, the Department of Defense stated that the Air
Force's initial acquisition of the instruments was based on their dis-
tribution to each regional operating location, so that examiners did
not have to carry an instrument with them at all times. In 1970, the
Air Force changed its system to require individuals to carry their own
individually assigned instruments. Excess instruments were main-
tained as backups for repair parts for the ones in use in the field. Plans
to eliminate excess instruments in the Air Force inventory were being
put into effect.
On the second point, the subcommittee was advised that, up until
July 12, 1974, the Air Force had assigned polygraph duties as an ad-
ditional duty, believing that this policy permitted timely administra-
tion of examinations. Due to programed revisions in the DOD Direc-
tive, the Air Force was planning to go strictly to primary duty
polygraph examiners and would assign individuals with primary
duties in that field.
This change was expected to result in a future cut of over 50 per-
cent of the presently certified polygraph examiners in the Air Force's
Office of Special Investigations (OSI), as well as a 50- to 75-percent
cut in equipment requirements. The subcommittee subsequently was
advised that the number of OSI polygraph examiners is being reduced
from 34 to 17. DOD sources have estimated that, at the $20,000 average
annual payroll cost for such individuals, total annual savings of a
recurring nature would approximate one-third of a million dollars.
This would be reduced, in some small measure, by increased travel
costs incurred by the remaining examiners.
Significant additional savings are anticipated by the Department of
Defense as a result of reductions in future years' requirements for
training of examiners and for procurement of polygraph equipment.
USE or PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS EVALUATOR
The psychological stress evaluator (PSE), marketed by Dektor
Counterintelligence & Security, Inc., is a comparatively new entry in
the field of lie detector devices. Relatively few have been acquired by
Federal agencies, with the Department of Defense being the principal
purchaser. The following data on sales to Federal agencies were furn-
ished by Dektor.as
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Number of
Number operators
Date of sale of items Serial No. trained
NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, Calif------------------- June 22, 1974 1 1560 2
Patuxent Air Test Center, Patuxent, Md---------------------------- May 24,1974 1 1572 2
Human Engineering Labs, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Aberdeen, Md_ Nov. 14, 1973 1 1493 1
Sharpe Army Depot,* Lathrop, Calif------------------------------- July 1973 1 326 *2
VA Hospital, Danville, III_____________ __ Apr. 19, 1973 1 233 1
Drug Rehabilitation Center,* U.S. Naval Air Station, Yukon, Fla_______ July 5, 1972 1 63 *2
United States Air Force, Office of Special Investigations,* Washington,
D.C---------------------------------------------------------- May 1972 1 51 *1
United States Army Mobility Equipment Research and Development
Center, Combat Development Command, Fort Belvoir, Va__________ Jan. 24,1972 2 31, 32 1
Fort George G. Meade, Fort Meade, Md___________________________ May 1972 1 10 0
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen, Md------------------ _------------ do ------- 1 6 0
*Dektor also advised that the individuals it trained as PSl?1 operators for the agencies
marked (*) on the above list asked that the purchases by their sponsoring agencies be kept
confidential.
When the agencies responded to questionnaires released at the sub-
committee's request, their information was somewhat at variance with
the above. The Veterans' Administration confirmed the acquisition
of one PSE unit which was being used at a VA hospital in the treat-
ment of psychiatric patients. An initial response from the Department
of Defense reported the purchase of six PSE units through fiscal year
1973 by major DOD components. However, an amended DOD sub-
mission on May 9, 1974, reported that those components owned only
five PSE's and that a voice stress analyzer purchased by one of its
components, the National Security Agency, had previously been re-
ported erroneously as a PSE. These five PSE's were procured at an
average cost of $2,150 each for the purpose of determining their va-
lidity and possible usefulness.
The Department of the Army, which purchased three of the devices,
contracted for a test and evaluation project by Fordham University
at a cost of $27,492. The Fordham tests, summarized in an August
1973 report, found that the PSE produced valid results in less than
one-third of the tests administered and that its reliability was less
than pure chance. As a result, the Army dismantled two of the equip-
ments and transferred the other to the Air Force for tests in an appli-
cation not related to "lie detecting," personnel security, or investiga-
tions.
The Air Force Office of Special Investigations procured one PSE
(in addition to that mentioned above obtained from the Army) for
validation testing. The Air Force evaluation, encompassing approxi-
mately 60 tests during fiscal year 1973, although tentative, resulted
in a conclusion that the device was not useful. This device was to be
transferred to a Research and Development Office of the Air Force
Research Laboratory, at Hanscom Field, Mass.
The National Security Agency obtained one PSE and also a voice
stress analyzer for research purposes. Both devices were found to be
insufficiently reliable. Both were declared surplus and made available
for other research use nn related. to detection of deception.
Some discrepancies still remain between the number of PSE's re-
ported es purchased by DOD, and the number reported by Dektor
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29
as having been sold to DOD. Moreover, preliminary discussions with
DOD personnel indicate that the purchases of at least two additional
PSE instruments in fiscal year 1974 did not conform to prescribed
procurement procedures. The subcommittee is also seeking some ex-
planation from DOD why, on the one hand, PSE's are, being dis-
mantled and disposed of by one of its components because of their
lack of reliability, and, on the other hand, subordinate organizations
in the military components continue to contract for and acquire the
same type of instruments.
USE OF VOICE ANALYZERS
In addition to the voice stress analyzer purchased by the National
Security Agency, the subcommittee was advised that a Mark II voice
analyzer, a conceptually different equipment item marketed by Tech-
nical Development, Inc., was purchased by the Central Intelligence
Agency in May 1974, at a cost of $3,500. The CIA is evaluating that
device, prior to making a firm decision as to whether to engage in
any serious research.
A number of Federal agencies having highly classified security mis-
sions require their civilian employees to be polygraphed as a part of
the pre-employment screening process.
The CIA routinely uses the polygraph as an aid to investigation for
determining the security eligibility of persons for employment by or
assignment to the Agency; security clearance by the Agency; staff-
like access to sensitive Agency installations; utilization in operational
situations; or continued access to certain classified information. All
CIA employees, except the Director and Deputy Director who are
Presidential appointees, are required to take polygraph tests prior to
appointment.
The National Security Agency (NSA), which is a separately or-
ganized agency within the Department of Defense, performs highly
specialized technical functions in support of intelligence activities of
the United States as one of its two primary missions. NSA's policy 36
is to use the polygraph examination as an investigative aid in deter-
mining the eligibility of persons for employment, and/or for access
to sensitive cryptologic information or for access to certain areas. It
also uses the polygraph in the conduct of counterintelligence and
personnel security investigations which cannot be completed through
normal investigative means.
All civilian employees of the National Security Agency, including
Presidential appointees, are required by that Agency's regulations to
be polygraphed as part of the pre-employment screening process. As
a oeneral rule, NSA's military personnel whose clearances are con-
trolled by their parent service are not polygraphed.
II6 National Security Agency Regulation 122-3, dated Tan. 7, 1966, retained in subcom-
mittee files.
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The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory IBoarct, consisting of
12 individuals, advises the President concerning the various activities
making up the overall national intelligence effort. It conducts a con-
tinuing review and assessment of foreign intelligence and related
activities in which the Central Intelligence Agency and other Govern-
ment departments and agencies are engaged and reports its findings,
appraisals and recommendations to the President. The Executive
order 37 establishing the Board provides that :
The Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of all
other departments and agencies shall make available to the
Board all information with respect to foreign intelligence and
related matters which the Board may require for the purpose
of carrying out its responsibilities to the President.
When queried by the subcommittee,3$ the Board stated that neither
appointment as a member of the Board, nor as the Board's Executive
Secretary, nor as an employee on the Executive Secretary's staff was
contingent on taking and passing a polygraph test 36
The State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the
Department of Justice, and several major components of the Depart-
ment of Defense have a considerable degree of involvement with the
intelligence communities and deal in highly classified and very sensi-
tive material, much of it relating to national security matters. These
agencies see no need for routinely polygraphing their employees in
connection with pre-eiployment screening interviews, and do not re-
qui re such testing.
Testimony by the Department of Defense witness included the
statement that in October 1972, the Department barred the use of the
polygraph as a screening or selection device or as a condition of
employment for all civilian employees-competitive service or ex-
cepted service-aside from those few individuals assigned to the
National Security Agency. More recently, the Department assigned that
a proposed revision to its DOD Directive 5210.48 dealing with poly-
graph examination, when approved and issued, will make its provi-
sions applicable to military personnel as well as civilian employees.
This is another commendable action on the part of the Department of
Defense, which earlier was commended for having taken the first step
by any Federal agency to curtail the then-existing widespread use of
these so-called lie detectors.
DOES THE INTELLIGENCE CO-IDTUNITY RELY Too HEAVILY ON
POLYGRAPH TESTING?
Dr. Stefan T. Possony of Stanford University's Hoover Institution
on War, Revolution and Peace, who was not able to appear personally
before the committee as a witness, did furnish a statement. In it he
recognized the potential of the polygraph as a pioneering technological
development which could contribute to achieving a better understand-
in of the interrelationships between psychological states and
31 Executive Order 11460, dated Mar. 20, 1969.
"Appendix B.
'1' Appendix C.
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31
physiological. However, he criticized in strong terms the present uses of
polygraphs as "lie detectors," particularly in the intelligence and mili-
tary communities, which are the principal users in the Federal
Government.
The opening paragraphs of Dr. Possony's statement 411 include the
following :
I am not opposed, on principle, to the use of the polygraph
in security investigations. I have no quarrel with the con-
tention that from time to time, the polygraph has helped to
uncover information which but for the use of the instrument
might have remained hidden. But it is imperative that the
polygraph be used in a manner that is scientifically and
legally appropriate.
Tani not opposed to, or even particularly critical of, the sys-
tem through which the United States Government seeks to
prevent infiltration by hostile agents and, more generally, to
protect its internal security. American investigators and secu-
rity agencies have a difficult and thankless job to perform,
and their freedom of action has been unduly narrowed by
legal and political constraints. They do need all the technical
support they can get, and it is not surprising that they are in-
fatuated with a gadget which promises easy answers.
I should add that the American internal security set-up
differs most significantly from the despotic and inhumane
police systems of the totalitarian states. But it does not live
up to the standards this nation has chosen to observe and
represent.
It is surprising, and disturbing, that the government has
never yet taken a firm stand against the "lie detection" hocus-
pocus. Like any technology which we incorporate in air-
planes, ships or tanks, or any medical technique which we
allow our physicians to use, or any drug which is released to
the drugstore, the polygraph must be approached on the
basis of scientific objectivity, technical excellence, statistical
validation, investigative probity, administrative integrity,
and legal acceptability.
The inadequacies and shortcomings of the polygraph examination
in meeting reasonable criteria in each of the above areas are discussed
in some detail in Dr. Possony's statement. In his judgment, the poly-
graph has been oversold as an instrument of personnel selection and
counterespionage as well as an instrument of intelligence collection.
It has also been oversold as the key to psychodiagnostics. In concluding
his statement, Dr. Possony expressed himself as follows :
To be viable, internal security programs must be kept
within the confines delineated by the U.S. Constitution, in-
cluding the Bill of Rights.
If and when these. basic points are finally grasped-but
not before-psychodia.gnostic research may begin to turn
from fake to fact.
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VII. POLYGRAPH OPERATORS AND THE QUEST FOR
PROFESSIONALISM
The operator of the polygraph is generally conceded to be the most
important component of the "lie detection" technique. He should have
proper training and adequate experience to underAand the theory on
which the polygraph instrument is based, and should be aware of the
device's limitations. Because of this, polygraph operators should be
individuals of high moral character and sound emotional tempera-
ment, be selected carefully, trained properly, and supervised effec-
tively.
On the basis of agency-furnished information showing variances
among agencies on the points of minimum age, educational require-
ments, grade or rank, and investigative experience, the committee con-
cluded in its prior report :
* * * there are no uniform criteria for selecting Govern-
ment polygraph operators, and training procedures are even
more inconsistent. Both are completely inadequate since the
operator is by far the most important factor in the polygraph
technique .41
The consensus of witnesses at that time was that ideal minimum
requirements for a polygraph examiner should include:
1. At least 25 years of age.
2. College graduate from an accredited school.
.3. At least 5 years of investigative experience.
4. A complete background investigation, satisfactory comple-
tion of psychological tests, and a psychiatric review.
5. High moral character and sound emotional temperament.
CURRENT CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF EXAMINERS
Provisions of the Civil Service Commission's Federal Personnel
Manual (FPM) pertinent to the use of polygraphs currently do in-
clude a requirement that agencies subject to the provisions of the FPM
establish adequate standards for the selection and training of exam-
iners, but do not prescribe such standards. Accordingly, an agency
using polygraphs may, and still does, establish its own standards for
qualifying individuals as polygraph examiners. It should come as no
surprise that substantial differences still exist in the specific criteria
that agencies have imposed upon themselves.
There is general acceptance by the components of the Department
of Defense of the 25-year minimum age as one criterion as well as a re-
quirement that the examiner be a citizen. Another agency gives its age
criterion as a preference for "maturity consistent with about 30 years
of age"; still another states that examiners should be between 25 and
ll H. Rept. 89-198, p. 15.
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40 years of age. In neither of these latter two instances is citizenship a
stated requirement. The criteria for polygraph examiners furnished by
two additional agencies are silent on the points of both minimum age
or citizenship.
Various combinations of formal education and experience-involv-
ing type, level, and duration-are acceptable to different agencies to
meet their minimum requirements for selection as polygraph examin-
ers. Some agencies are silent in their statement of requirements on
whether and how an individual will be judged as having high moral
character and sound emotional temperament. At least one prescribes
that polygraph examiner-designees themselves be subjected to a poly-
graph examination and a psychological assessment. Minimum grades
and rank held by polygraph examiners still differ among the agencies.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the standards for selection of
individuals to be trained as polygraph examiners still are not uniform.
However, the committee does discern some little movement by Fed-
eral agencies in that direction, and commends such efforts.
POLYGRAPH EXAMINER TRAINING
A substantial number of the polygraph examiners employed by Fed-
eral agencies have been trained at the Army's special training facility
at the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Gordon, Ga. That
training program, which was established in July 1951, originally was
8 weeks in duration ; however, in July 1965, the course was extended to
12 weeks and then in August 1970, lengthened to 14 weeks. In addition
to the 14-week formal training phase, each examiner-trainee must
serve an internship prior to certification as a polygraph examiner.
The facility at Fort Gordon trains polygraph examiners not only
for the Army, but also for the Air Force, Navy, and Marines, and for
the Department of the Treasury and the U.S. Postal Service. The
Army has also trained polygraph examiners for the U.S. Coast Guard;
the National Security Agency; U.S. civilian police agencies under the
sponsorship of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration;
Canadian Defense Forces; Philippine Army; Republic of Korea
Army; Pakistani Army; Republic of Nationalist China Army; and
the Venezuelan Army.
Since this training program was established in 1951, there have been
1,251 individuals graduated from the basic course; advanced, refresh-
er, or personnel security training has been given to 270 students.
Department of Defense training
The prerequisites for attendance at the Army school by all DOD
personnel include-U.S. citizen, at least 25 years of age, baccalaureate
degree from an accredited college, plus 2 years experience as an inves-
tigator with a recognized government agency; or the equivalent of 2
years of college, plus 5 years of investigative experience. Personnel
attending the course from other Federal agencies must meet prerequi-
sites as determined by their respective agencies.
There are 506 academic hours in the polygraph examiner (basic)
course, which includes 13 hours of polygraph theory and administra-
tion, 19 hours of polygraph maintenance management, 84 hours of
polygraph examination procedures, 34 hours of training regarding
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evaluation of mental and physical fitness of examinee, 331 hours of
comprehensive practical exercises, and 25 hours of examinations. There
are also 54 hours of nonacademic (administrative) time included in
this course, with a total course time of 560 hours or 14 weeks. Based
on fiscal year 1974 funding, the cost per student for this basic course
is approximately $6,300.
The polygraph examiner refresher course, a 3-week or 120-hour
course, affords advanced or refresher training for the practicing poly-
graph examiner and the requalifieation and certifications of previously
trained personnel who have not been active as polygraph examiners.
This course provides refresher training in all facets of polygraph ex-
amination procedures and polygraph instrumentation, as well as-sub-
jects related to the conduct of polygraph examinations.
DOD encourages its polygraph examiners to receive advanced or
refresher training each 2 years at either the U.S. Army Training
Facility or at other training seminars or workshop-,-4.
The internship prior to certification within the military departments
of DOD is 6 months to 1 year in length, following the formal phase of
polygraph training. During this period, each examiner conducts poly-
graph examinations in support of criminal or security investigations
wherein polygraph charts are generated. All examinations conducted
by intern examiners are directly supervised by a certified examiner.
The Department of Defense witness referred specifically, in recent
testimony, to the concern previously expressed about the qualifica-
tions of polygraph examiners of that agency. The committee's prior
report recognized that the DOD Directive 5210.48 established rela-
tively high qualifications but then noted that it contained a grand-
father clause which permitted examiners on the rolls in 1965 to
continue on their jobs even if they did not have the training and educa-
tion required under the agency's revised 1965 standards. The witness
stated that the problem appears to have been resolved by the passage
of time, in that there was only one such ppolygraph examiner remaining
on Defense rolls. Moreover, that one individual had received refresher
training as recently as December 1973. The other 134 examiners re-
portedly met fully the qualification standards of the DOD directive.
Other agency training of examiners
Currently, the National Security Agency examiners receive their
polygraph training at the Keeler Polygraph Institute in Chicago, Ill.
Following this training of 6 weeks duration, National Security Agency
examiners serve an internship of 6 months or conduct 100 polygraph
examinations under the direct supervision of a certified National
Security Agency examiner.
The Central Intelligence Agency, under its centrally controlled-
program, also trains its own polygraph examiners. 'the training
courses average 6 to 7 weeks in duration and include coverage of in-
terviewing and interrogation, test construction, chart interpretation,.
instrument maintenance and repair, physiology, psychology, and pro-
fessional ethics. On completion of this course of instruction, the
trainee serves an internship of from 6 to 8 months, during which he is
assigned. cases of gradually increasing complexity under the guidance
and monitoring of senior examiners.
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The Federal Bureau of Investigation, too, conducts its own training
program for polygraph operators. Agents selected for that training
are provided an intensive 2-week academic program, followed by a 1
year period of on-the-job training, during which all their polygraph
examinations are under supervision of the FBI Laboratory. The FBI
does not send any of its agents to outside agencies or schools, public
or private, for polygraph training.
The scope of training offered by the U.S. Army's school at Fort
Gordon appears to be substantially more comprehensive and pre-
sumably more costly than that adopted by these other agencies for
their own use. If its length and content can be justified as being mini-
mally essential, then the adequacy of the courses developed by the CIA
and FBI, and possibly NSA, is brought into question. If the shorter
term courses of these latter agencies are adequate, then the Army's
course which is twice the length of any of the others, may be unjustifi-
ably lengthy and costly. Certainly, on either the point of effectiveness
or economy, the committee believes that this matter warrants attention.
EFFORTS TOWARD PROFESSIONALISM
The American Polygraph Association was formed in August of 11,966
by a merger of three predecessor organizations-the Academy for
Scientific Interrogation, the American Academy of Polygraph Ex-
aminers, and the National Board of Polygraph Examiners.
The 376 members in good standing of these predecessor organiza-
tions were accepted as charter members of the new organization. Those
individuals then actively serving as polygraph examiners who did not
meet the normal membership requirements prescribed by the APA
constitution were permitted full membership status, by a provision
for waiver of certain requirements. That waiver procedure was in
effect for approximately four years after the APA was established.
Membership in the APA totaled 1,004 by May 1974, and of this num-
ber, 645 were full members with the right to vote.
The APA constitution contains the following statement of objec-
tives :
The objectives of the American Polygraph Association
shall be to advance the use of the polygraph as a profession
as a means of promoting social welfare by the encouragement
of the use of the polygraph in its broadest and most liberal
manner ; by promotion of research into instrumentation and
techniques; by the improvement of the qualifications of poly=
graph examiners through high standards of professional
ethics, conduct, education and achievement; to unify poly-
graph examiners throughout the world and rekindle their
interest in the use of the polygraph and in the APA, by the
increase and diffusion of polygraph technology through meet-
ings, professional contacts, reports, papers, discussions and
publications; thereby to advance scientific, professional and
public acceptance of the contributions of polygraph tech-
niques to the promotion of the public welfare and to keep the
APA informed of member sentiment and urge the member-
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ship's active participation in civic and community affairs
where the polygraph is concerned; and to publicize the name
and prestige of the APA.42
In furtherance of those objectives, the APA has, among other things,
developed for its membership a code of ethics, standards, and prin-
ciples of practice; publishes a quarterly journal and monthly news-
letter; and expends considerable effort supporting licensing or regu-
lation of polygraph examiners by the individual States.
In conjunction with this latter activity, it has drafted a model
licensing bill which would regulate persons who purport to be able
to detect deception or to verify truth of statements through the use
of instrumentation as lie detectors, polygraphs, deceptographs, and/or
similar or related devices and instruments.
The APA's board of directors adopted a resolution in August 1973,
disapproving the use of the Dektor psychological stress evaluator as
the sole source of or a major contribution to a determination of truth
or deception in a meaningful testing situation for determining either
truth or deception.,' It also authorized its officers, directors and mem-
bers to state the following as the official position of the APA, with
reference to the Dektor PSE-1 psychological stress evaluator :
1. That the PSE-1 is not a polygraph and does not meet mini-
mum standards for polygraph instruments; neither does it meet
minimum instrument standards for those States which have estab-
lished such standards by legislation.
2. That the published standards for the selection and training
of PSE-1 examiners do not in any way meet APA requirements.
3. That the published capability of the instrument for surrepti-
tious use constitutes a potential violation of the constitutional
rights of the person being examined.
4. That the PSE-1 should not be used in a meaningful testing
situation without verification by a trained examiner using an,
acceptable polygraph instrument.
There are, according to APA's recent testimony, 17 States which
either license or regulate the activities of polygraph examiners.44 In
the remaining 33 States, any individual who either owns or has access
to a polygraph device may offer his services as a polygraph examiner,.
for a fee, without meeting any prescribed minimum requirements of
education, training, experience, or moral, and financial responsibility.
No States have yet enacted licensing or regulatory statutes for users
of the PSE device, and only the State of Florida has held public
hearings on the proposition.
The APA also has a program for accrediting schools which train
polygraph examiners. Its most recent listing of such schools shows
10 in the United States, including the Army's Military Police School
and Texas A. & M. College, College Station, Tex. ; the Israeli Poly-
graph School in Tel Aviv, Israel; and 2 accreditation actions pending.
Efforts by polygraph examiners to obtain acceptance of their activ-
ities as a profession and of themselves as professionals are wholly
42 43 Hearings, p. 192. See footnote 5 on p. 3.
as Hearings, pp. 218-219. See footnote 5 on p. 3.
Hearings, p. 146. See footnote 5 on p. 3.
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understandable. Raising the requirements for education, training,
work experience and personal qualifications of those individuals whom
the APA certifies as polygraph examiners is a goal that the committee
finds laudable. The committee, however, retains much of its earlier
reservation about whether the broadly stated APA requirement of a
baccalaureate degree, irrespective of the discipline involved, is a rea-
sonable criterion for properly qualifying an individual as a poly-
graph examiner. The committee would deem it more appropriate,
absent special professional-level medical training of individuals, that
polygraph examiners have at the very least a substantial educational
background in psychology, physiology, and human behavior.
The relatively minor role accorded such subjects in those polygraph
training course curriculums furnished to the. subcommittee falls short
of what it feels is acceptable preparation. The committee's position, in
its 1965 report, was that qualified physicians and psychiatrists should
be among the appropriate officials designated to review polygraph ex-
amination records. Little evidence was offered or representations made
by agency spokesmen during the recent hearings that this recommen-
dation has either been adopted or given serious consideration. The
following commentary, offered by Dr. Possony, appears to have par-
ticular relevance :
If we compare the polygraph with a medical specialty, we
can say that the polygraph is a quasi-medical specialty which
was taken over by the nurses. The doctors are not admitted to
practice in this field, the scientific backup is woefully inade-
quate, and the current expectations on performance are too
high. If the general philosophy which the U.S. Government is
applying to public health were adhered to with respect to the
polygraph, this machine would be restricted to specialists
with high rather than low qualifications. Furthermore, the
utilization of polygraphs in private industry would be
forbidden.
To find methods permitting the effective diagnosis of
psychological and mental states has been one of the most
challenging tasks throughout history. This task, which was
not solved even by torture and which remains unsolved, is
continuing but it cannot possibly be entrusted to individuals
with perfunctory preparation. In the United States, to pull
a tooth, one must have a dental degree. To handle a mild
neurosis, one needs a degree in clinical psychology. To per-
form surgical operations, one must be a highly qualified and
certified surgeon. Of course, medical doctors cannot function
without nurses and nurses aides. Similarly, in the polygraph
field, some tasks can be performed by the "operators". But it
is entirely inappropriate to use such operators as diagnos-
ticians and to allow them to work without professional
supervision.-
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VIII. TIIE POLYGRAPH TEST AND SAFEGUARDS FOR
THE INDIVIDUAL
In one of its early studies 46 the Foreign Operations and Govern-
ment Information Subcommittee cataloged the reasons given by Fed-
eral agencies for the use of polygraph examinations in carrying out
Government business. These included the investigations of security
matters, infractions of criminal laws, and emplo-ee misconduct, as
well as pre employment screening , medical measurements, and medical
and scientific research. Regardless of the stated use, those agencies as-
sured the subcommittee that the rights of individu,e,ls who were given
polygraph tests were adequately safeguarded. Presumably those as-
surances relied heavily on the corollary representations that indi-
viduals voluntarily a" reed to submit to such tests.
Another, clearly less defensible reason for using polygraphs re-
cently was disclosed in the record of transcription of Presidential
tapes released by the House Judiciary Committee in 1974. The fol-
lowing statement reportedly was made by President Nixon in an Oval
Office conversation on July 24, 1971, because of his concern and frus-
tration with repeated leaks to the press about his secret foreign policy
,positions :
Listen, I don't know anything about polygraphs and I
don't know how accurate they are but I know they'll scare the
hell out of people.47
The President reportedly proposed giving lie detector tests to as
many as 1,500 people with "top secret" security clearance in the Na-
tional Security Council, State Department, Central Intelligence
Agency, and the Department of Defense, but was persuaded by his
aides not to do so, at least as an initial step.
As previously stated, the circumstances under which many poly-
graph tests are given are potentially if not actually coercive, from the
individual's viewpoint. For that reason, the committee has had and
continues to have considerable concern about the safeguards for the
individuals. Accordingly, agencies were asked for information about
the organizational level at which approval to give a polygraph test
must be obtained, whether an individual's physical and mental condi-
tion are considered, whether the use of polygraphs is subject to review,
what relative weight is accorded polygraph test results or refusals to'
be tested, whether test results are made known to the individual,
whether an avenue of appeal exists, and what controls exist to insure
the confidentiality of those test results.
4? use of Polygraphs by the Federal Government (Preliminary Study)," committee print.
April 1964, 88th Cong., 2d sess.
as Washington Post, July 10, 1974.
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A number of these high-interest areas are matters that must be
covered in the agency regulations and objectives that the Civil Serv-
ice Commission requires to be submitted to it, when agencies elect
to use the polygraph in personnel investigations of competitive serv-
ice employees and applicants to competitive service positions. Exam-
ination of the regulations and directives and questioning of witnesses
during the subcommittee's hearings disclosed a number of significant
differences among agencies in their implementation actions.
Wiio AUTHORIZES TESTS?
In most instances, agencies now are requiring that polygraph tests
not be given until written approval has been obtained from a rela-
tively high level official authorizing the action. Only in a few instances
are such approvals authorized at a field level, without requiring prior
approval at the headquarters level in Washington.
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency has delegated to his
Director of Security authority to conduct the polygraph program for
that Agency. The Director of the National Security Agency has dele-
gated a general authority to that Agency's Director of Security to
polygraph applicants for employment; employees of contractors re-
quiring access to the Agency's spaces, classified information, or classi-
fied operations; and persons assigned to unusually sensitive projects.
Specific written approval of the Director of Security or a higher au-
thority is required in each case when polygraph examinations involv-
ing counterintelligence or personnel security investigations are
proposed.
Requests for polygraph examinations in the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation are referred through channels to supervisory review levels
at the agency's headquarters, and final approval authority is vested
in Assistant Directors. The U.S. Postal Service, which uses polygraph
examinations in those criminal cases which are under investigation
by its Inspection Service, has established two levels at which approval
may be authorized. The Regional Chief Postal Inspector has author-
ity to authorize the use of the polygraph in the field; in certain excep-
tional cases, the Postal Service's Chief Postal Inspector may per-
sonally authorize use of the polygraph.
Two organizational elements in the Department of Treasury use
polygraphs-the Customs Service and Secret Service. Both the Office
of Investigation and Office of Security and Audit in the Customs
Service must obtain prior approval from the Assistant Commissioner
(Security and Audit). In the Secret Service, polygraph testing may
be authorized by the Special Agent in Charge of a Field Office, or,
on request of that Special Agent in Charge, the matter may be referred
for approval by the Assistant Director at headquarters in Washington.
The State Department, although it does not own polygraph devices,.
reports that on rare occasions in the past it has used the polygraph
examination as one of a number of investigative techniques to resolve
discrepant testimony by employees suspected of activities prejudicial
to national security interest. On such occasions, these services were ob-
tained by contracting out. Final approval authorizing a polygraph,
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examination must be made by the Departinent's Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Security, if a case supervisor responsible for a particular
investigation recommends that course of action.
CONSIDERATION OF PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CONDITION
The polygraph is one of many instruments used for measuring the
physiological changes that frequently accompany changes in an indi-
vidua.l's feelings. Gaging an individual's physical or mental condition
and determining whether or not that state of health is "normal," is, in
the committee's opinion, a matter for medical professionals. That
was one of the bases for its earlier recommendation that qualified
physicians and psychiatrists should be included among the appropri-
ate supervisory officials designated to review polygraph examination
records.
Information furnished to the subcommittee shows that the Central
Intelligence Agency, alone, among those agencies frequently using
polygraphs, routinely requires that (a) examinees be interviewed by
representatives of the Office of Personnel and the Office of Medical
Services and (b) those Offices advise the Director of Security of any-
thing known to them that might preclude the advisability of conduct-
ing a polygraph interview.
At the other end of the spectrum, the U.S. Service appears
to depend on the qualifications of its polygraph operators to make
those medical-type determinations. That agency responded to the sub-
committee's inquiry as follows :
The physical and mental condition of the person to be
tested is evaluated by the Postal Inspector who conducts the
polygraph examination. Written instructions regarding such
he sub-
an evaluation are not made; however, evaluation of t&1
ject's mental and physical condition as a prerequisite to the
test is a part of the formal training each Polygraph Exam-
iner receives in polygraph school. Questions regarding the
physical and mental condition of each subject are asked by
the Examiner before the examination is commenced, and a
record is made of the responses to such questions.
The responses of other agencies fall somewhere between these ex-
tremes. Two agencies, stating that the physical and mental condition
of the person to be tested is considered-"carefully considered" by the
Department of Justice and "always considered" by the Department of
State-did not disclose whether that consideration and conclusion was
by polygraph operators or by qualified medical professionals. After
further inquiries, these two agencies advised that an individual for
whom a polygraph test is being contemplated may be referred to a
medical professional for interview or examination, if a question or
doubt about the individual's physical. or mental. state of health arises.
The Department of Justice requires that the request for approval
of polygraph testing that is transmitted to Washington be accom-
panied by an identification of any known physical or mental disabili-
ties, abstracted from the background file on the individual. On the
basis of that data, the approving official may recommend that the
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examinee be advised to consult with his personal physician before the
test. The polygraph examining procedure used by its Federal Bureau
of Investigation in the pretest interview also includes as a further
measure of assurance inquiries by the polygraph examiner concerning
the examinee's state of health.
The Department of State also considers any pertinent health and
medical information available in the employee's personnel file, and
solicits the views of the investigative case supervisor and the poly-
graph examiner in deciding whether an individual should be poly-
graphed or should be referred for a professional medical examination
before being given the polygraph test.
In the case of the National Security Agency, if its polygraph oper-
ators have any question or doubt as to the physical or mental fitness
of any examinee, they may refer the matter to the Director of the
Medical Center for appropriate action. From the information pro-
vided to the subcommittee by the Department of the Treasury, it ap-
pears that investigative personnel in its Bureau of Customs and Secret
Service make the determination of condition of health without any
prior advice or consultation with medical personnel.
WEIGHT ACCORDED POLYGRAPH TESTS
The stated policies of agencies using polygraphs appear relatively
consistent on this point. In substance it is best exemplified by the
Departments of Justice and State, where. the polygraph examination
is held to be a useful adjunct to the normal interview and interrogation
process, and may provide direction for additional investigative effort.
Information developed during such examinations reportedly is given
the same weight as substantive information developed from any other
source.
The CIA and NSA both require applicants for employment to be
polygraphed, as one aspect of their security screening processes. Both
agencies represented to the subcommittee that, while refusal to take
% polygraph test would effectively bar an individual from further
consideration for employment, the result of the test is but one element
of the total investigative record and that security action is not taken
on the basis of the polygraph test results alone.
The U.S. Postal Service uses polygraph tests most frequently where
large numbers of persons have had access to registered mail which has
been lost, and an effort is being made to narrow the number of sus-
pects. The use of the polygraph in such circumstances is justified by
the Postal Service as an expedient means of saving many investigative
hours and of providing definite suspects on whom the' investigative
energy can be concentrated.
In the Treasury Department, the two organizations which use poly-
graphs state their policy somewhat differently. The Secret Service
claims to use polygraph tests only after other factors have been. deter-
mined which indicate that this technique may he of further assistance.
It is not considered to be anything other than an aid in a criminal in-
vestigation. It is not used as a substitute for personnel investigation
or interrogation of a suspected person.
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The Customs Service advised the subcommittee that the polygraph
is used only when tangible and concrete investigative leads have been
exhausted, but also stated that the. results of such examinations are
used as investigative aids rather than as evidence. Most commonly
these tests are used to determine an individual's involvement or non-
involvement in cargo theft cases or cases of personnel dereliction areas.
In a number of cases, polygraph examination results are credited with
having determined involvement and complete confessions and the
identification of coconspirators followed.
EFFECT OF REFUSALS To BE POLYGRAPIHED
Agencies responding; to the subcommittee's current inquiry were con-
sistent on several pertinent points. Polygraphs are given only with the
voluntary consent of the individual to be tested. Refusal of an indi-
vidual to agree to take a polygraph test is not recorded or reflected in
that individual's official personnel file.
A fairly representative statement on this point is the instruction of
the U.S. Postal Service, which reads as follows :
REFUSAL TO TAKE AN EXAMINATION
44.17 The polygraph examination is voluntary in nature and
no person can be forced to take an examination. The exami-
nation requires the full and complete cooperation of the Ex-
aminee. A Postal employee who declines to take an examina-
tion shall not be considered as failing to cooperate in an
investigation. No stigma is attached to such a refusal, and ad-
verse action shall not be taken against a person for unwilling-
ness to volunteer to take a polygraph examination. Informa-
tion concerning a person's refusal to submit to a polygraph
examination shall. not be recorded in any of his personnel
files.48
The very nature of the polygraph equipment and the examining pro-
cedures used in a test is such as to preclude giving the test unless the
individual's "cooperation" is obtained. Whether or not such coopera-
tion is indeed evidence of "voluntary" consent has been noted pre-
viously in this report. The inherently coercive pressures to submit to
an examination, both for those who are asked to do so in connection
with employment screening programs of the CIA and NSA, or for
those other Federal employees who may believe that continuance in
their positions would somehow be compromised if they did not submit,
are relatively self-evident.
The CIA witness offered the following commentary on that Agency's
cyclical reinvestigation program, in connection with which employees
may be asked to take another polygraph examination :
Mr. PHALEN. We have a reinvestigation program which is
cyclical, and it is based as closely as we can make it on a 5-year
cycle. In the course of that 5-year cycle we send out another
questionnaire to the individual and ask him to update his
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data. We also conduct a field investigation updating what we
have in our security files. When all this is put together there is
a determination whether or not this is something that would
require a clarifying interview.
Now, this clarifying interview could be just a straight inter-
NOW, just asking him, or it could be that we might think that
a polygraph would be helpful, and also the individual occa-
sionally thinks that a polygraph might be helpful, particu-
larly where the information comes from an area where we
can't reach by our investigative processes.
For example, some overseas areas where people do spend
much of their lives. polygraph, I would
This is getting to your question. We psay, no more than one to five people a year under that arrange-
ment. So my short answer to your question is, we do not poly-
graph people as part of our reinvestigation program, that is,
periodically. It is only at the time that something comes up in
the course of reinvestigation which we feel requires clari-
fication, or it would be helpful if we could clarify it. The
number is almost minimal.
And second, I think we should stress that it is completely
voluntary. We do have people who have said, I do not wish
to take a reinvestigation polygraph. We have accepted this.
We have asked them why. And they are all still employed,
and there is no record of this in their personnel files or in
their security files.
* * * * *
Mr. PIjALEN. One of the reasons is-and it fits many of
them-is that their career has been outstanding, and their
life is relatively an open book. And, of course, in our rela-
tively closed society of the intelligence community it is quite
a bit of an open book. And on that basis they would prefer
not to go through it. Of course, some of this is a hangover
from questions that, have been asked in the past which were
a little too broad. Frankly, our earlier approaches to screening
might have been a little too broad, and evoked responses in
rather personal areas which we don't go into any more.
And this possibly is a feeling from that earlier time.
We have refined our questions down-and I can go into
some examples there if we wish where we do not do that any
more-this would be an example, that a person says he would
rather not go through it. Occasionally they have touched on
their own personal philosophy, the integrity of themselves.
They would prefer not to subject themselves to this.49
AVAILABILITY OF RESULTS TO INDIVIDUALS TESTED
Individuals who are polygraphed by the CIA and NSA are not told
of the findings and conclusions of the examiners. The State,
reports that only the general nature of the polygraph
+t Hear'.ng . PP. 664-655. See footnote 5 on P. S.
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findings are made known to the individuals undergoing that type
examination. The other four agencies which reported using this testing
procedure in connection with criminal investigations gave answer:3
slightly different, one from the other, and covered a fairly broad
Spectrum of practice.
In the Treasury Department, the Secret Service responded that :
The findings of all such polygraph examinations would
most definitely be made available to the subject:4 of such tests.
Since this is a fundamental procedure in conducting the exam-
ination we can think of no single situation where this would
not be done.
The U.S. Customs Bureau response was a simple "yes" to the same
question. The U.S. Postal Service generally makes the examination's
findings available to the individual being polygraphed. This. is not
required by its regulations, but, this "policy" has, over a period of time,
been communicated verbally to its polygraph examiners. The Justice
Department does not disclose to the individual either the results of the
polygraph tests or the examiner's final opinion based on test finding.
Reassurance that refusal to submit to the polygraph test will not
result in stigma attaching to that individual, and that no record is
made of that refusal in his official personnel file are comforting, in
some degree. However, information provided the subcommittee by the
Department of Treasury's U.S. Secret Service discloses that :
* * * his or her refusal would merely be reflected as a com-
ment in the criminal investigative file and not in any individ-
ual personnel record.-II
Ten years earlier, when queried on this point, all Federal agencies
responding reported that refusals by employees to take polygraph
tests were not noted in their personnel records, although such matters
might be mentioned in investigative reports. The information fur-
nished on the administrative controls over the confidentiality of test
results strongly indicates that the condition still persists.
ASSURANCE OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF TEST RESULTS
As previously indicated, polygraph test results are normally in-
corporated into substantive investigative files which are separate and
apart from an individual's official personnel file. No agency incorpo-
rates the results of the polygraph tests into a computerized data bank
nor is such data normally interchanged among
Where two or more agencies cooperate in a crizninill investigation,
particularly where the U.S. Postal Service and the Treasury Depart-
ment are involved, there can be a sharing of information which in-
chides polygraph test results. In most, other reporter( circumstances,
polygraph test results are not made known to other Federal agencies.
Both the U.S. Postal Service and the National Security Agency
instructions make provision for release of this type of information
60 Letter dated Nov. 2, 1.97,13, retained in subcommittee files.
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45
to outside agencies, with the approval of the Chief Postal Inspector
on the one hand, and the NSA Director or Deputy Director, on the
other.
Policies and practices applicable to the appeal of polygraph test
results have not changed substantially since the committee last re-
ported on this subject. Several agencies reported that no administra-
tive or criminal action is taken predicated solely on the basis of these
examinations and that provision for appeal from adverse polygraph
test results is therefore unnecessary. However, the agencies taking that
position further noted that any adverse administrative action result-
ing from an inquiry or investigation would be subject to appeal under
the agencies' normal adverse action appeals program.
SPECIAL TEST Ii ACILITITS
Three agencies reported that special examining rooms or other fa-
cilities are maintained for administering polygraph tests. The Treas-
ury Department's Secret Service reports that its examining rooms
have two-way mirrors and that some are equipped with recording
devices. Examinees normally are told of the existence of both items.
The special test rooms maintained by the CIA generally are not
equipped with two-way mirrors, but do have a capability to monitor
and record the audible portion of the test. The examinee is told
whether the interview is being monitored or recorded, if he asks about
it. The NSA special facilities for polygraph testing are equipped with
two-way mirrors, and monitoring and/or recording devices. Agency
instructions require that the examinee be told about these special char-
acteristics of the test room prior to the examination.
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS
It is the recommendation of the committee that the use of polygraphs
and similar devices be discontinued by all Government agencies for all
purposes.
While recognizing that there has been substantial compliance with
the committee recommendations of 1965 calling for increased uni-
formity of administration of the polygraph and comprehensive re-
search into their validity and reliability, the clear import of the
hearings upon which this report is based leads to the same conclusion
as was reached in 1965. The conclusion at that time was that :
There is no "lie detector," neither machine nor human.
People have been deceived by a myth that a metal box in the
hands of an investigator can* detect truth or falsehood.
The Department of Justice continues to maintain the position that
the results of polygraph examinations would not be admitted as evi-
dence in the Federal courts. The committee adopts this position and
further affirms that since such examinations are considered invalid
for evidentiary purposes, there is absolutely no reason for continuing
the use of such examinations for investigatory purposes.
Although there is .indication that efforts are being made to upgrade
the training and educational requirements of polygraph operators, the
committee finds that unproven technical validity of the polygraph
devices themselves makes such efforts a meaningless exercise.
Even if the committee adopted the positions of some agencies that
the polygraph is useful solely as a secondary investigative technique
and that the results of a polygraph examination alone are never-consid-
ered conclusive, the committee finds that the inherent chilling affect
upon individuals subjected to such examinations clearly outweighs any
purported benefit to the investigative function of the agency.
The committee additionally recommends that the use and/or acqui-
sition of other so-called "lie detectors" such as the PSE or the voice
analyzer be discontinued. Evidence presented in i be hearings upon
which this report is based demonstrates that such devices have even
less scientific validity than the polygraph. Although no agency of the
Federal Government is using such other devices at this time as a sub-
stitute for polygraph examinations, the committee recommends that
additional federally-funded research into such devices be discontinued.
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APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A.-QUESTIONNAIRE ON POLYGRAPIIS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
STRESS EVALUATORS
1. Does your agency possess or make use of polygraphs or psycho-
logical stress evaluator detection devices? (If major subordinate or-
ganizations within your agency engage in such activity, please list all
those organizations.)
2. How many polygraphs and psychological stress evaluator detec-
tion devices are the property of your agency? Your response should
show separate data for each of these two categories of devices, if
available.
(a) Please list the total acquisition cost of all such devices.
(b) Please estimate the total annual maintenance costs of such
devices and indicate whether maintenance is performed by agency
personnel or by outside sources.
(c) If your agency leases such devices, or contracts with other
public or private agencies to perform such tests, please provide
the total costs for such activity during fiscal 1973.
(d) Please estimate all additional expenses attributable to such
testing, such as travel expenses for examiners to and from loca-
tion of tests, internal and external training programs, and all
other costs for fiscal 1973.
(e) Do you have on loan to or loan from other Federal agencies
or any other sources any polygraphs or psychological stress
evaluator detection devices? If yes, give the number of such de-
vices and identify the agencies or sources involved.
3. Please provide two copies each of all intra-agency directives, ad-
ministrative orders, rules, regulations, and/or instructions governing
the use of such devices within your agency.
4. Briefly explain your agency's general procedures governing the
use of both categories of devices and answer the following specific
questions. (Please explain procedures and indicate if they are cov-
ered by regulation in connection with each question. If more than one
major subordinate organization within the agency is affected, provide
separate responses for each. )
(a) For what specific purposes are these devices used (i.e.,
employment interviews, security clearance processing, suspected
improper conduct of duties, medical measurements, or other pur-
poses. List in order of most frequent use.
(b) Are the devices used in every instance involving those pur-
poses listed in answer to (a) above?
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48
(c) What weight is given to the data resulting from tests by
these devices, or refusals to take such tests in relation to other
types of investigative information?
(d) Who makes the initial determination to use such devices,
and is this initial determination subject to review by higher au-
thority in each case?
(e) Is the physical and mental condition of each person to be
tested considered to determine suitability to take such a test?
(f) What disposition is made of data derived from such tests
given to persons connected with your agency (i.e., retained in af-
fected individuals' personnel files, retained separately, entered
into a computerized information system data bank, made avail-
able to other Government agencies, etc.).
(g) Are the fuidings of such tests made available to the subjects
of such tests?
(h,) Is there a right of appeal in cases of adverse findings?
(i) Is access to such data restricted and, if so, what classification
or other designation is applied to the data?
(j) If a person connected with your agency refuses to take such
11 test, is that refusal reflected in any way whatsoever in the indi-
vidual's personnel records?
(k) Does your agency maintain special facilities, such as spe-
cially designed rooms, for the performance of such tests? Briefly
describe such facilities and how they are equipped, stating par-
ticularly if they have two-way mirrors and recording devices.
Furnish photographs, if available.
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APPENDIX B.-CORRESPONDENCE FROM FORMER CHAIRMAN MOORTIEAD
TO TILE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE, PRESIDJ:NT's FOREIGN INTELLI-
GENCE ADVISORY BOARD
JUNE 7, 1974.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Executive Office
Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SIR: This subcommittee has a long-standing and continuing
concern with the subject of polygraph testing by Federal Government
agencies of individuals being considered for employment. This prac-
tice of polygraph testing, as a prerequisite to employment, is one
reserved to the agencies having highly sensitive intelligence or counter-
intelligence missions directly affecting the national security.
It would appear that the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board would have such a mission. Accordingly, we would be inter-
ested in answers to the following questions :
1. Is appointment as a member of the Board contingent upon the
designee taking and passing a polygraph test?
2. Is employment as the Executive Secretary or as staff to that indi-
vidual contingent, in each case, upon the taking and passing of a poly-
graph test?
3. If the answer to either 1 or 2 above is affirmative, what organiza-
tion gives the tests, and to whom are the test results reported?
4. If the requirement does exist, have all members currently serving
on the Board or administratively supporting the Board passed such a
test in the past five years?
With best regards,
Sincerely,
WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD, Chairman.
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APPENDIX C.-CouRESPONDE\ CE FRO11i THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF
TIIE PRES.D.N-r'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD TO FORMER
CIIAIRMAN i\I()()RIIEAD
Hon. WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD.
TnE WHITE HOUSE,
Wash ngton, D.C., June M, 1974.
Chairman, Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcom-
mittee of the Committee on Government Operations, Rayburn
House Office Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR CONGRESSMAN MOORHEAD : Following are answers to the ques-
tions raised in your letter of June 7:
1. Appointment as a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board (PFIAB) is not contingent upon passing a poly-
graph test.
2. Appointment as the Executive Secretary or employment on the
PFIAB staff is not contingent upon passing a polygraph test.
Should you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to
contact me.
With kindest regards,
WHEATON B. BYTES, E.reoutive Secretary.
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SEPARATE VIEWS OF IION. SAM STEIGER (CONCURRED
IN BY HON, FRANK MORTON, IION. JOHN N. ERLEN-
BORN, ZION. JOHN W. WYDLER, IION. CLARENCE J.
BROWN, IION. GARRY BROWN, HON. CHARLES THONE,
IION. EDWIN B. FORSYTHE, AND LION. ELLIOTT II.
LEVITAS)
The recon-anendations contained in this report for an absolute ban
on the use of polygraphs and similar devices are contrary to the testi-
mony presented at the hearings on which this report is based. It
is our opinion that the testimony and discussions contained in this
report support the original recommendations agreed upon earlier by
the Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual
Rights. We think they should be made a part of this report with
particular reference to recommendation No. 2.
RECOMMENDATIONS
No. 1
The committee has not changed its basic views about the benefits of
and the need for research relative to polygraphs, and it has similar
views relative to psychological stress evaluators, voice analyzers, and
other types of stress-measuring instruments. Testimony developed dur-
ing recent hearings showed that a number of Federal agencies are
either conducting in-house research or are funding such research
through contracts.
The committee recommends, because the applicable technology and
the related scientific, disciplines are so specialized, that insofar as Fed-
eral agencies fund further research in this area, a more formal and
organized approach be developed for any such research, so that the
different projects complement one another. This could preclude or
minimize the possibility of duplicative or concurrent research, provide
an effective mechanism for sharing research findings and conclusions
having common applicability, and better recognize any given agency's
unique requirements.
No. 2
The committee strongly reaffirms its earlier position with respect to
the use of polygraphs, and recommends that the use of polygraphs and
other stress evaluator devices by Federal agencies be prohibited in all
cases but (1) those clearly involving the Nation's security and (2)
those in which agencies can demonstrate in compelling terms their
need for use of such devices for their law enforcement purposes, and
that such uses would not violate the fifth amendment or any other pro-
vision of the Constitution.
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No. 3
The committee recommends that the pertinent sections of the CSC's-
Federal Personnel Manual be revised to give visibility and emphasis
to an individual's rights and alternatives ntinien he is requested to submit
to a polygraph test. The Commission's regulations should address.
themselves specifically not only to the approval. uses of polygraph tests
to pre-employment screening situations but also to those situations in
which the question of the continuance of an individual's employment
in a competitive service position is under consideration or at issue
because questions may have arisen about his honesty or the propriety
of his conduct.
The committee also sees a need .for and recommends to the Civil
Service Commission that it require agencies each year to report the
number of polygraph tests given to competitive service and to ex-
cepted employees, the reasons for those tests, and the uses made of the
results of the tests.
No. 4
The -committee recommends that the Department of Defense give
additional consideration to a cross-service arrangement among its many
components for polygraph testing, so that the overall requirements
for devices and for training polygraph examiners might be reduced,.
with resulting savings to the Government.
The committee hesitates to recommend that some Government-wide
central monitoring and control point be established for the purchase
and test evaluation. of PSE's and voice analyzers solely on the basis
of their acquisition cost. However, the ancillary costs involved in un-
coordinated, multi-organization contracting for or in-house per-
formance of evaluation tests can easily become significant, as is evi-
denced by what is happening in the Department of Defense. For that
reason, the committee does recommend that the Department of De-
fense establish a single point of management for those devices and
other newly developed similar devices represented as being useful as
lie detectors to satisfy that agency's stated needs.
No. 5
Discerning between "truth" and "deception" is the stated objective
of the polygraph operator; therefore, his ability i.o do so should not
be dependent in any way upon the special missioar. responsibilities of
his employing agency. It follows then that all polygraph examiners
should be equally well-trained acid qualified. The committee- accord-
ingly recommends that a common set of {ualifications (educational
trammg, experience and personal) be established for polygraph ex-
aminers of all Federal agencies. Both in educations and training, the
committee recommends that the requirements for a baccalaureate-
level education and special training as a polygraph examiner give
greater emphasis to the fields of psychology, physiology, and behav-
ioral sciences.
The marked variations in the duration of the special formal train-
ing given by different agencies to polygraph examiners needs further
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consideration. The committee particularly recommends that the De-
partment of Defense critically reassess its earlier justifications for ex-
panding its formal training course from the original period of 8 weeks
to the present 14 weeks training course. Such an evaluation should,
at the very least, examine and compare the content of the Arnw
school.'s syllabus with the training syllabuses of those agencies which
give their formal. training in periods of 6 to 7 weeks. If those other
training course curriculums are found to be adequate, then DOD should
take the necessary steps to shorten its polygraph training courses.
The advantages of uniformity and economy that normally would
accrue if all Federal agency polygraph examiners were given their
highly specialized basic training at a single, adequately equipped
facility appear self-evident to, the committee. It therefore recommends
to those other Federal agencies which contract for or operate such in-
house training programs that they begin discussions with DOD about
having their employees trained at the Army's Military Police School,
Fort Gordon, Ga., on a cost-reimbursable basis.
It is the belief of the committee that attitudinal changes in recent
years are evidenced in the greater concern shown by Federal agencies
about the manner and conditions under which polygraph tests are
given and about the confidentiality accorded and the uses being made
of the polygraph test results.
The organizational levels at which requests for polygraph testing
must be approved, on a case-by-case basis, are gratifyingly high. As-
surances that the test results, by themselves, are only another matter
for consideration, rather than the sine qua non upon which personnel
decisions are made by agencies, also are gratifying. On the other hand,
the fact that refusal to submit to polygraph testing remains a bar to
initial employment by CIA and NSA is hardly justifiable, in the com-
mittee's view, merely because of the "national security" claim advanced
by these two agencies. A number of other agencies also have sensitive
missions but do not require pre-employment polygraphin m.
There still are a number of marked differences in the Federal agen-
cies' practices that relate to equipping special. test rooms and disclosing
to the examinee the. results of the polygraph tests.
The committee remains persuaded that determining whether or not
an individual's state of mental. and physical health is aeceintable, before
he undergoes a polygraph test, is a, decision that should be made by
properly trained medical professionals rather than by polygraph
examiners.
The committee's recommendation of a decade ago, that all Govern-
ment agencies be placed under a uniform administrative system which
would enforce maximum controls on the use of polygraphs and which
would establish regulations to prevent their proliferation and misuse,
appears to have been accepted and acted. upon, to a considerable de
gree. There is. however, substantial opportunity to make more uniform
a number of the agency practices referred to above. To accomplish this,
the committee recommends that the President reestablish an inter-
agency committee, to consider these. matters, to act as a clearinghouse
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54
of agencies' research activities involving polygraph and other stress
analysis devices, and to coordinate the periodic reporting recom-
mended earlier in this report.
SA 31 STEIGER.
We concur in the foregoing views:
FRANK gORTON.
el UTHN N. ERLENBORN.
JO FIN W. ` YDLFR.
CL,ARENCE:.T. BROWN.
G-IRRY BROWN.
CrlARrvs TiTONE.
Ei,wiN B. FORSYTU[E.
Er,r.roT,r II. LEVITAS.
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DISSENTING VIEWS OF IION. FRANK MORTON, IION.
CLARENCE J. BROWN, IION. PAUL N. MoCLOSKEY, JR.,
IION. JOEL PRITCIIARD, HON. JOHN N. ERLENBORN,
HON. CHARLES THONE, PION. GARRY BROWN, I-ION, ED-
WIN B. FORSYTIIE, IION. ALAN STEELMAN, HON. ROB-
ERT W. KASTEN, JR., IION. SAM STEIGER, HON. JOHN W.
WYDLER, AND HON. WILLIS D. GRADISON, JR.
We disagree strongly with the recommendation made at the con-
clusion of this Report, that the use of polygraphs and similar devices
be discontinued by all government agencies for all purposes.
The factual information and opinions referred to in the Report re-
late solely to hearings held in June, 1974, during an entirely different
Congress, and participated in by an entirely different group of Mem-
bers. There were two days of hearings in 1974. On June 4, the Hearing
Record discloses that five Members were present: then-Chairman
William Moorhead, Bill Alexander and James Stanton, Democrats,
and John Erlenborn and Ralph Regula, Re publicans. The following
day, June 5th, only Mr. Moorhead and Mr. Erlenhorn were in attend-
ance. None of these members serve on the Subcommittee in this, the
94th Congress, which proposed this Report. None who do serve at the
present time on the Subcommittee were present or participated in the
1974 hearings.
The testimony and subsequent statements received for inclusion in
the 1974 record take up 790 pages and represent a wide diversion of
views and suggestions. No witness, however, urged prohibition of the
polygraph for all purposes as the Committee majority now recom-
mends.
Even the ACLU and the American Federation of Government Em-
ployees did not go this far. Former Senator Sam Ervin submitted
perhaps the most persuasive argument, that no American be compelled
to submit to polygraph testing as a condition of obtaining or retaining
federal employment.
A majority of us who join in these dissenting views agree with Sen-
ator Ervin. But this is a far cry from recommending that the govern-
ment be prohibited from use of the polygraph for all purposes. What
of the individual under investigation in a doubtful case who asks that
he be tested in order to try to prove his innocence? Is this privilege. one
which our government should deny him? We think not.
While we have grave reservations about the use of the polygraph in
1973 by DOD and the CIA as disclosed in the 1974 testimony, there is
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absolutely nothing in the hearing record to justify the recommendation
made by the Committee majority.
How'; then, did the, Committee reach such recommendation?
The answer provides an interesting commentary on congressional
procedures. First, it should be noted that an earlier draft report was
prepared in March, 1975, to reflect the record of the 1974 hearings.
That report, prepared for submission to the full Committee at its
April meeting, included at page 20, the specific recommendation that
polygraph tests should be .. .
prohibited in all cases, but (1) those clearly involving the
National Security and (2) those in which agencies can dem-
onstrate in compelling terms their need for use of such de-
vices for their law enforcement purposes and that such uses
would not violate the fifth amendment or any other provision
of the Constitution.
There were five other specific recommendations as to the use of
polygraphs, but none which suggested that they be. prohibited
absolutely.
The recommendations of the draft report were approved by the
Subcommittee in March 1975, (with four Members, Chairwoman
Abzug, Ranking Minority Member, Sam Steiger, Andrew Maguire,
and Paul McCloskey participating in the meeting) and ordered re-
ported to the full Committee on Government Operations on March 25,
1975.
Six recommendations were thus approved. They were based on a
careful review of the testimony at the 1974 hearings, and both the
Chairwoman and two of the three Republicans on the Subcommittee
concurred in these recommendations.
Thereafter, however, the two Subcommittee staff members who pre-
pared the report, James Kronfeld and Nancy Wenzel, were replaced
by the Chairwoman with five new staff members, none of whom had
participated in the 1974 hearings or in the preparation of the March
draft report.
The Chairwoman thereafter did not comply with the March 25 vote
of her Subcommittee and did not submit the draft report to the full
Committee. Instead. she waited until September 25, six months later,
at which time she circulated a memorandum to the Subcommittee on
another subject, (the National Women's Conference bill) and adding
a single sentence to the end that there would also be consideration of
a revised recommendation on the polygraph Report.
No arguments were submitted in support of this change of recom-
mendations and at a hurried meeting, on September 30, 1975, attended
by six Members of the Majority,'but with no Minority Members
present and witlhout either discussion or debate, the new recommenda-
tion was adopted in a 6 to 0 vote by Subcommittee Members, none of
whom had participated in the 1974 hearings or the preparation of
the earlier draft Report approved by the Subcommittee in March,
1975.
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57
It seems to its that this procedure is both demeaning to the
House as well as indicative of a certain lack of validity in the
recommendation.
Our own recommendations remain the original recommendations of
the March 25, 1975 draft Report which follows :
1. The committee has not changed its basic view about the
benefits of and the need for research relative to polygraphs,
and it has similar views relative to psychological stress eval-
uators, voice analyzers, and other types of stress-measuring
instruments. Testimony developed during recent hearings
showed that a number of Federal agencies are either con-
ducting in-house, research or are funding such research
through contracts.
The committee recommends, because the applicable tech-
nology and the related scientific disciplines are so specialized,
that insofar as Federal agencies fund further research in this
area, a more formal and organized approach be developed
for any such research, so that the different projects comple-
ment one another. This could preclude or minimize the pos-
sibility of duplicative or concurrent research, provide an
effective mechanism for sharing research findings and con-
clusions having common applicability, and better recognize
any given agency's unique requirements.
2. The committee strongly reaffirms its earlier position with
respect to the use of polygraphs, and recommends that the use
of polygraphs and other stress evaluator devices by Federal
agencies be prohibited in all cases but (1) those clearly involv-
ing the Nation's security and (2) those in which agencies can
demonstrate in compelling terms their need for use of such
devices for their law enforcement purposes, and that such
uses would not violate the fifth amendment or any other pro-
vision of the Constitution.
3. The committee recommends that the pertinent sections
of the CSC's Federal Personnel Manual be revised to give
visibility and emphasis to an individual's rights and alterna-
tives when he is requested to submit to a polygraph test. The
Commission's regulations should address themselves specifi-
cally not only to the approved uses of polygraph tests to pre-
employment screening situations but also to those situations
in which the question of the continuance of an individual's
employment in a competitive service position is under consid-
eration or at issue because questions may have arisen about
his honesty or the propriety of his conduct.
The committee also sees a need for and recommends to the
Civil Service Commission that it require agencies each year
to report the number of polygraph tests given to competitive
service and to excepted employees, the reasons for those tests,
and the uses made of the results of the tests.
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4. The committee recommends that the Department of De-
fense give additional consideration to a cross-service arrange-
ment among its many components for polygraph testing, so
that the overall requirements for devices and for training
polygraph examiners might be reduced, with resultant sav
ins to the Government.
The committee hesitates to recommend that some Govern-
ment-wide central monitoring and control point be established
for the purchase and test evaluation of PSE's and voice ana-
lyzers solely on the basis of their acquisition cost. However,
the ancillary costs involved in uncoordinated, multi-organi-
zational contracting for or in-house performance of evalua-
tion tests can easily become significant, as is evidenced by
what is happening in the Department of I)efense. For that
reason, the eointnittee does recommend that the Department
of Defense establish it single point of management for those
devices and other newly developed similar devices represented
as being useful as lie detectors to satisfy that agency's stated
needs.
5. Discerning between "truth" and "deception" is the stated
objective of the polygraph operator; therefore, his ability
to do so should not be dependent in any way upon the special
mission responsibility of his employing agency. It follows
then that all polygraph examiners should "be equally well-
trained and qualified. The committee accordingly recoin-
mends that a. common set of qualifications (educational train-
ing, experience and personal) be established for polygraph
examiners of all Federal agencies. Both In education and
training, the committee recommends that the requirement for
a baccalaureate-level education and special training as a poly-
graph examiner give greater emphasis to the fields of psy-
chology, physiology, and behavioral sciences.
The marked variations in the duration of the special formal
training given by different agencies to polygraph examiners
needs further consideration. The committee particularly rec-
ommends that the Department of Defense critically reassess
its earlier justifications for expanding its formal training
course from the original period of 8 weeks to the present 17
weeks training course. Such an evaluation should, at the very
least, examine and compare the content of the Army school's
syllabus with the training syllabuses of those agencies which
give their formal training in periods of 6 to 7 weeks. If those
other training course curriculums are found to be adequate,
then DOD should take the necessary steps to shorten its poly-
graph training course.
The advantages of uniformity and economy that normally
would accrue if all Federal agency polygraph examiners were
given their highly specialized basic training at a single, ade-
quately equipped facility appear self-evident to the com-
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mittee. It therefore recommends to those other Federal agen-
cies which contract for or operate such in-house training
programs that they begin discussions with DOD about hav-
ing their employees trained at the Army's Military Police
School, Fort Gordon, Ga., on a cost-reimbursable basis.
6. It is the belief of the committee that attitudinal changes
in recent years are evidenced in the greater concern shown by
Federal agencies about the manner and conditions under
which polygraph tests are given and about the confidential-
ity accorded and the uses being made of the polygraph test
results.
The organizational levels at which requests for polygraph
testing must be approved, on a case-by-case basis, are gratify-
ingly high. Assurances that the test results, by themselves, are
only another matter for consideration, rather than the sine
qua non upon which personnel decisions are made by agen-
cies, also are gratifying. On the other hand, the fact that re-
fusal to submit to polygraph testing remains a bar to initial
employment by CIA and NSA is hardly justifiable, in the
committee's view, merely because of the "national security"
claim advanced by these two agencies. A number of other
agencies also have sensitive missions but do not require pre-
employment polygraphing.
There still are a number of marked differences in the Fed-
eral agencies' practices that relate to equipping special test
rooms and disclosing to the examinee the results of the poly-
graph tests.
The committee remains persuaded that determining wheth-
er or not an individual's state of mental and physical health
is acceptable, before he undergoes a polygraph test, is a de-
cision that should be made by properly trained medical pro-
fessionals rather than by polygraph examiners.
The committee's recommendation of a decade ago, that all
Government agencies be placed under a uniform adminis-
trative system which would enforce maximum controls on
the use of polygraphs and which would establish regulations
to prevent their proliferation and misuse, appears to have
been accepted and acted upon, to a considerable degree. There
is, however, substantial opportunity to make more uniform a
number of the agency practices referred to above. To accom-
plish this, the committee recommends that the President rees-
tablish an interagency committee to consider these matters, to
act as a clearinghouse of agencies' research activities involv-
ing polygraph and other stress analysis devices, and to coor-
dinate the periodic reporting recommended earlier in this
report.
To show how the Committee reached a contrary view, we attach as
Appendix A Chairwoman's memorandum of September 25, 1975.
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Ar1'E:NnIx A
U.S. HOIJSF.OF REarRESEI TATIVLS,
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGIITS
SURC01MATn iEE, COMI,IITTET, ON GOVE?IINIYI ISNT OPEIL&TIONS,
Washington, D.C., September- 25,1975.
To : Members of the Government Information and Individual Rights,
Subcommittee.
From : Bella S. t.Vbzug, Chairwoman.
Subject : Hearin;; on National Women's Conference Bill-Correction
Because of the Democratic Caucus called for 9: 00 a.m. next Tues-
day, September 30, the legislative hearing scheduled to consider II.1.
8903 (a bill to organize and convene a 1976 National Women's Con-
ference) will be moved to 10: 00 a.m., or shortly thereafter, and will
start immediately following the. conclusion of the Democratic Caucus..
The hearing will be held in the same room as scheduled, Room 2247
of the Rayburn House Office Building. Vote and mark-up of the bill
will take place immediately after witness presentations at the hear-
ing. If for any reason a quorum is not present at that time, mark-up
will take place on Wednesday, October 1, at 2: 00 p.m. in Room II-
310, The Capitol.
Also to be voted on at the Tuesday bearing is the enclosed committee
report on the use of polygraphs by federal agencies, and the revised
recommendation.
Enclosures.
POLYGRAPH REPORT : ERRATA S IIEE r
1. Pages 14, 20, 25, 33, 40, 48 and 49: strike out all portions headed.
"RECOMMENDATION" OR "RECOMMENDATIONS".
2. Page 49, after end of all text: insert the following new section::
It is the recommendation of the committee that the use of poly-
graphs and similar devices be discontinued by all government agen
cies for all purposes.
While recognizing that there has been substantial compliance with
the committee recommendations of 1965 calling for increased uniform
ity of administration of the polygraph and comprehensive research
into their validity and reliability, the clear import of the hearings upon
which this report is based leads to the same conclusion as was reached
in 1965. The conclusion at that time was that, :
There is no "lie detector," neither machine nor human. Pco-
pie have been deceived by a myth that a metal box in the
hands of an investigator can detect truth or falsehood.
The Department of Justice continues to maintain the position that
the results of polygraph examinations would not be admitted as evi-
dence in the Federal courts. The committee adopts this position and
further affirms that since such examinations are considered invalid for
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evidentiary purposes, there is absolutely no reason for continuing the
use of such examinations for investigatory purposes.
Although there is indication that efforts are being made to upgrade
the training and educational requirements of polygraph operators,.
the committee finds that unproven technical validity of the poly-
graph devises themselves makes such efforts a meaningless exercise.
Even if the committee adopted the position of some agencies that
the polygraph is useful as a secondary investigative technique and
that the results of a polygraph examination alone are never consid-
ered conclusive, the committee finds that the inherent chilling affect,
upon individuals subjected to such examinations clearly outweighs
any purported benefit to the investigative function of the agency.
The committee additionally recommends that the use and/or ac-
quisition of other so-called "lie detectors" such as the PSE or the
Voice Analyzer be discontinued. Evidence presented in the hearings,
upon which this report is based demonstrates that such devices have
even less scientific validity than the polygraph. Although no agency
of the Federal government is using such other devices at this time
as a substitute for polygraph examinations, the committee recom-
mends that additional federally-funded research into such devices:
be. discontinued.
FRANK HORTON.
CLARENCE J. BROWN.
PAUL N. MCCLOSKEY, Jr.
JOEL PRITCIIARD.
JOAN N. ERLENBORN.
CIIARLES TIIONE.
GARRY BROWN.
EDWIN B. FoRsYTIIE.
ALAN STEELMANT.
ROBERT W. KASTEN, Jr..
SAM SIMIGER.
JOHN W. WYDLER.
WILLIS D. GRADISON, Jre.
O
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