PRIVACY RIGHTS AND GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: June 16, 1975
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2001/08/AO ? C.1ArEe8RUMOMI6R00800110060-9 11 5543
June 16, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL ith
the Veterans' Disability Compensation
Survivor Benefit Act (H.R. '7767) . I was
conferring with some other Members
and missed the vote.
Had I voted, I would have voted for
passage of the act.
PERSONAL EXPLANATION
(Mr. KEMP asked and was given per-
mission to address the House for 1 min-
ute) .
Mr. KEMP. Mr. Speaker, on the Arm-
strong amendment I was temporarily de-
layed in my office with constituents. Had
I been present I would have voted "aye."
GENERAL LEAVE
Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr.
Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that
all Members may have 5 legislative days
in which to revise and extend their re-
marks and to include therein extraneous
material on the subject of the special
order today by the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. EILBERG) .
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Mc-
FALL) Is there objection to the request
of the gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
PRIVACY RIGHTS AND GOVERMENT
SURVEILLANCE
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
a previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from Ohio (Mr. MOSHER) is recog-
nized for 60 minutes.
(Mr. MOSHER asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. MOSHER. Mr. Speaker, in re-
cent years we have become increasingly
aware of the dangers that are posed to
the rights to privacy of American citi-
zens. In particular, we have become
aware of the dangers of warrantless
Government surveillance activities.
It is the purpose of this special order
to publicly express the concern felt by
many Members of Congress over the dual
Issues of rights-to-privacy and Govern-
ment surveillance activities. ,
Joining me today as cosponsor of this
special order is the gentleman from
Wisconsin (Mr. KASTENMEIER). We be-
lieve a bipartisan group of Members will
join us in this dialog.
When we requested the time for this
order we could not know that it would
come just a few days after the release of
the Rockefeller Commission's report to
the President. Certainly that report
makes this special order especially time-
ly and topical today.
MT. KASTENMEIER and his Subcommit-
tee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Ad-
ministration of Justice have done a com-
mendable job of disclosing and docu-
menting questionable surveillance activ-
ities, and other congressional panels also
are bringing to light various abuses of
the Government's surveillance authority.
Other Members participating in this
special order may be discussing those
specific abuses or usurpations of rights-
to-Privacy, and these will be helpful in
Illustrating the nature of the problem.
But I think it also is important for us
to look beyond the actual events to their
implications.
Mr. Speaker, I am especially con-
cerned by the "chilling effect" of war-
rantless Government surveillance. The
number of persons who are actually sub-
ject to surveillance is relatively small,
but a far larger number of people do be-
gin to fear that they are being secretly
monitored by the Government.
;t is net uncommon for met or for any
Member of Congress. to recTve a letter
from a constituent that begins or ends,
know I'll probably end up in some FBI
or CIA file for making this complaint
*" Of course, such fears are essen-
tially needless, but they are real and
widespread nonetheless. I suggest we
should examine here why law-abiding
' ' -.r ? 1)e.in s ied u on
by their own Goveinmen
We have no way of measuring how
many citizens fear to petition their
elected representatives for a "redress of
grievances" simply a right assured by the
Constitution, fear because they believe
their names will be placed in some omi-
nous Government file. We cannot count
how many citizens have been kept away
from political gatherings for fear that
they would be photographed and in-
dexed into someone's file. No one knows
how many individuals decline to con-
tribute to political organizations for fear
of being identified as "subversives" by
their Government.
We have no way of telling how many
people are afraid to talk freely on their
telephones, because they suspect that a
click or a buzz on the line may be a
telltale sign of a wiretap installed by
Big Brother.
The point of all this is that many
Individuals are living in fear that their
private activities may be monitored by
the Government. The chilling effect of
this is that many citizens consequently
refrain from writing to their representa-
tives, refrain from writing letters to
newspaper editors, stay away from po-
litical meetings, and otherwise shy away
from the lawful exercise of their consti-
tutional rights. It is a shame that any
American citizen would live in fear of
our own Government?the Goverment
which is supposed to protect and pre-
serve our rights.
To remedy this situation, Senator
MATHIAS and I have introduced the Bill
of Rights Procedures Act (H.R. 214) . I
am pleased to note that we are joined
by more than 70 cosponsors in the
House; and I see that many of them are
here to participate in this evening's
special order.
Essentially, the Bill of Rights Proce-
dures Act provides that iao agent of the
Federal Government can conduct any
form of surveillance on an American
citizen?for any reason?unless a court
order is obtained upon a showing of prob-
able cause. Any person who participates
in a warrantless wiretap or any other
warrantless surveillance activity would
be personally liable to criminal penalties.
Mr. Speaker, I think we must recog-
nize that surveillance, or any other in-
fringement of a person's basic right-to-
privacy, is an infringement of the citi-
zen's constitutional rights. In my view,
only the courts should have the authority
to permit abridgments of the individ-
ual's constitutional rights.
Presently. we have yielded to the ex-
ecutive branch frightening amounts of
discretionary authority in the area of
surveillance. I think it is now time that
we in the Congress move to restore the
proper safeguards for citizens' rights.
The Bill of Rights Procedures Act is
not the only rights-to-privacy bill now
pending in the Congress. There are many
other bills as well. Regardless of which
bill or bills finally are accepted, the ob-
ject remains clear. We must act quickly
to assure private citizens that they shall
not be subject to capricious surveillance
by the Government.
We must remove the Executive's dis-
cretionary authority to invade citizen's
privacy. We must restore the courts to
their proper role as arbitrator between
the citizens' rights to privacy and the
State's need to protect society.
It is our hope that this special order
will help to illustrate the intensity of con-
gressional feeling on rights-to-privacy
and the dangers posed by our present
state of virtually unlimited authority for
Government surveillance activities.
Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. MOSHER. I yield to the gentleman
from Wisconsin.
(Mr. KASTENMEIER asked and was
given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, as
chairman of the House subcommittee
now considering a number of legislative
proposals designed to limit ,the scope of
Government surveillance of Americans
I am pleased to join with my colleague
from Ohio, Congressman MOSHER, in
sponsoring today's special order.
The scope of surveillance practices and
resulting invasions of personal privacy is
so vast that it is difficult to define nar-
rowly the subiects requiring close con-
to. e
reform.
For example, the eavesdropper may be
a e 91 er al investigator or an intelligence
agent, a local policeman, or a private in-
vestigator, a soldier or a civilian. He may
use a wiretap or a bug. Be may choose a
method totally unrelated to electronic
technology, such as examining our credit,
bank, medical, or business records. He
may open mail or he may cover mail?
examine outside of envelopes sent to us.
He may engage in eavesdropping pursu-
ant to a court order or he may simply
claim that the national security re-
quires it. His surveillance may be legal or
illegal.
My Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Administration of
Justice has already held a number of days
of hearings both this session and in the
93d Congress each dealing with a differ-
ent aspect of the problem, and we intend
to continue our work with the twin goals
of providing the Congress with sound leg-
islation and assuring the enforcement of
existing laws through vigorous oversight.
These hearings have, without a doubt,
established that the fundamental right
to privacy in America is today in a state
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
H 5544
Approved FceirR6kna9M3IVRODPUNI00144R000800110060-9
?nut SE June 16, 1975
of siege. Consider for a moment these ex-
amples from the testimony presented to
our subcommittee.
national securi wiretapping: Despite
-
the plethora of revela ng
down upon us almWsraBW uring the
laat....year about the abuses of the so-
...calladnaLion
erment surveillance the Department of
Justice continuitppriT
=
matelv, 1QQ.warrantless wiretaps each
?var. These wiretaps are not supervised
by in court; they_ar_e_noirm. camteI to
the Qongress;_ the subject of the wire-
pever notified that he has been
surveil' ? he has no protection except
the goodwill of the intelligence gather-
in bureaucracy. These nation ST securi-
ty wiretaps may go on indefinitely. In-
deed, we heard testimony about one tap
directed against a domestic organization
which lasted for 25 years.
Telephone company monitoring: In
addition to indefinite warrentless wire-
tapping by Government intelligence
agencies we have also received extensive
evidence of the highly questionable
eavesdropping practices of the Nation's
largest telephone system?American
Telephone and Telegraph Co. Between
1965 and 1970, according to testimony of
Bell executives, the company secretly
monitored over 30,000,000 telephone calls
made by its customers. The subjects of
these surveillances were never notified
even though the purpose of the moni-
toring was to gain information which
might lead to criminal charges against
them. I should note that this practice
Is justified under a, questionable excep-
tion to Federal wiretap laws which allows
the phone company even greater freedom
in conducting wiretapping than law en-
forcement agencies enjoy.
Police wiretapping: The subcommittee
heard testimony from the chief of police
of a major U.S. city describing systematic
use of illegal wiretapping by police offi-
cers. In some cases this wiretapping was
conducted with the knowledge of the
very Federal law enforcement agents
charged with enforcing existing anti-
eavesdropping laws. What is particularly
shocking is that evidence from these
wiretaps was often disguished as having
come from unidentified informants and
used as the basis for search and arrest
warrants which ultimately led to con-
victions and prison terms for the unwit-
ting subjects of the surveillances. This is
completely repulsive to our centuries old
concept of due process of law.
Illegal private political wiretapping:
The same police chief who revealed ex-
tensive police wiretapping also made the
shocking observation that any person in
his city in a "controversial position
which possibly includes everyone in po-
litical life" is probably wiretapped "on a
fairly regular basis," in many cases by
private wiretappers operating wholly
outside the law.
Other forms of surveillance: We have
also learned that the pervasive use of
surveillance does not stop at wiretapping.
It includes inspection of personal, sup-
posedly private records as well. For ex-
example, the way the famous White
House plumbers found out that Daniel
Ellsberg was using the services of Dr.
Henry Fielding, a psychiatrist whose of-
fice they burgled, was by examining rec-
ords of his checking account, supplied
by a friendly bank teller.
Not only are our telephones and pri-
vate records subject to outside scrutiny,
but our mail as well. The Chief Post In-
spector of the United States told our sub-
committee that for 20 years the Central
Intelligence Agency opened and read the
mail of American citizens, knowing that
this practice was a violation of existing
Federal law.
Not only has mail been opened and
read, but every year the correspondence
of thousands of Americans is monitored
regularly by the process known as a mail
cover?the systematic recording of in-
formation contained on the outside of
envelopes. By this means any State, lo-
cal, or Federal body claiming to be an
investigative agency can find out how
many letters you send or receive and with
whom you are corresponding. There are
presently no statutory safeguards
against abuses-of this practice. The Pos-
tal Service admits that it regularly con-
ducts mail covers for agencies with such
questionable connections with normal
police work as a local real estate com-
mission, a welfare department, and a
State fish and game commission.
Fortunately, the abuses of Government
power and of modern technology which
I have just described have not gone un-
noticed by Members of the House. At the
present time 24 bills directed to the prob-
lem, sponsored by over 100 Members,
are pending in my subcommittee.
It is my hope that after further analy-
sis by the subcommittee and the full
Judiciary Committee, this House as a
whole, will have an opportunity to de-
bate and vote on one or more of these
proposals.
I am taking the liberty of inserting
Into the RECORD a short description of
these pending bills.
Mr. Speaker, at this time I would re-
quest unanimous consent that the record
remain open for 5 business days so that
Members not present may submit their
views on this important subject.
SURVEILLANCE BILLS PENDING ni Scrscommrr-
TEE ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
H.R. 141 by Mr. Kastenmeier (Surveillance
Practices and Procedures Act of 1975). Re-
quires a court order for national security
wiretaps. Also mandates regular reports to
House and Senate Judiciary and Foreign Af-
fairs Committees on national security wire-
tapping and electronic surveillance.
HR. 142 by Mr. Kastenmeier (Freedom
from Military Surveillance Act of 1975).
Makes investigation, surveillance, and rec-
ord keeping regarding the beliefs, associa-
tions, political activities or private lives of
civilian citizens by the military a crime pun-
ishable by up to two years imprisonment or
$10,000 fine. Also provides for civil cause
of action, including class action, for actual
and punitive damages in the case of such
surveillance.
(Identical bills are: H.R. 266, Boland. H.R.
2753, 2754, 2862 and 3284, 4339 Steelman and
49 others.
H.R. 539 by Holtzman and HR. 2556 by
Abzug are the same bill with slightly differ-
ent language) .
H.R. 171 by Ms. Abzug. Makes wiretapping
and electronic surveillance conducted with
the consent of one party to the conversation
illegal, unless pursuant to a court order.
(Same effect as HR. 620 by Long.)
H.R. 214 by Mr. Mosher (Bill of Rights Pro-
cedures Act of 1975). Prohibits interception
of any communication by electronic or other
devices, surreptitious entry, mall opening, or
the inspection or procuring of bank, tele-
phone, credit, medical, or other business or
private records without a court order based
on probable cause a crime has been or is
about to be committed. Because robable
ce,...,L,Iss_l?_jmuired, this bil e ec ve W-
ishes national security surveillance for in-
telligence purposes.
(Identical bills are: H.R. 414, Fish and H.R.
2330, 2603, 2604, 3113, 3467, 3855, 3874, Mosher
And 71 cosposors.)
HR. 620 by Mr. Long of Maryland. Same
effect as HR. 171 by Ms. Abzug. Makes wire-
'apping, recording, and electronic surveil-
'ance conducted with the consent of one or
fore parties to a conversation, but without
,he consent of all parties, illegal unless au-
,horized by a court order.
(HR. 620 has 13 co-sponsors; HR. 2453, an
dentical bill, has 1 cosponsor for a total of
' 1 co-sponsors.)
H.R. 1603 by Mr. Drinan. Makes all wire-
- apping and electronic surveillance illegal by
gieleting those sections of the law currently
authorizing such activity when authorized by
o court order.
H.R. 1864 by Mr. Kastenmeier (Freedom
from Surveillance Act of 1975). Makes in-
- estigation, surveillance, and record keeping
egarding the beliefs, associations, political
ectivity or private affairs of American citi-
zens punishable by one year imprisonment,
8,10,000 fine or both, unless such activity is
conducted upon reasonable grounds to be-
1 eve that the subject of the surveillance has
c unmitted a felony or is an applicant for
f :deral employment.
BILLS WITH MULTIPLE COSPONSORS
HR. 214 (Bill of Rights Procedures Act, Mr.
1Vosher, chief sponsor) total-72 Sponsors.
H.R. 414 (H.R. 2330, Mosher and 25 co-
s ionsors) : Fish, Abzug, Anderson (Calif.) ,
}lading:), Conte, Conyers, Coughlin, Duncan,
Forsythe, Harrington, Helstoski, Holtzman,
1)/ cCormack, McKinney, Moorhead (Calif.).
Pettis, Quie, Regula, Roe, Ruppe, Sarasin,
SAberling, Stark, Talcott, Charles Wilson
( "ex.) , Won Pat.
H.R. 2603, Mosher and 14 co-sponsors)
A oderson (Ill.), Andrews (N.D.), Ashley, Bell,
B-own (Calif.) , Esch, Frenzel, Heinz, O'Brien,
P-itchard, Richmond, Solarz, Symington,
halen.
(HR. 2604, Mosher and 7 co-sponsors) :
G adwater, Conlon, Heckler, HinShaw, Hor-
ten, Lagomarsino, Thone.
(H.R. 3113, Mosher and 13 co-sponsors) :
B:ester, Boggs, Cohen, Fenwick, Hechler
(W. Va.), Jeffords, McCloskey, Melcher,
M tchell (Md.), Patterson (Calif.), Rangel,
hroeder, Studds.
(H.R. 3467, Mosher and 8 co-sponsors) :
Bcdclus, Fauntroy, Howe, Jeffords, Matsunaga,
ellman, Steelman, Stokes.
`H.R. 3855) : Hammerschmidt.
HR. 3874, Mosher, Hammerschmidt and
2 c thers) : Keys, Long (Md.).
I.R. 142. (Freedom from Military Surveil-
Ce Act of 1975, Mr. Kastenmeier, chief
sp, ,nsor, and Mr. Steelman, total 72 spon-
scalri..R)
. 266: Boland.
H.R. 3753: Steelman, Goldwater, Horton,
Koh, Vigorito, Martin, Melcher, Regula, For-
sr. Solarz, Spence, Pritchard, Mathis,
Th ,ne, Keys, Charles Wilson (Tex.), Brown
(Celli.), Symington, Charles Wilson (Calif.),
He ner, Edgar, Ryan, Anderson (Ill.), Mosher,
Ta:eott.
( TR. 2754 Steelman, Goldwater, Horton
an 6 co-sponsors) : McKinney, Edwards
(a :if.), Mitchell (Md.), Studds, Anderson
(CI if.),: Heckler (Mass.).
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
June 16, #9,p5oved For ReletyRKIM/kbli&A.M30001fieden800110060-9 5545
H.R. 2862: Charles H. Wilson (Calif.).
H.R. 3284 (Steelman, Goldwater, Horton
and 15 co-sponsors) : Gude, Tsongas, Har-
rington, Pattison, Obey, Coughlin, Qui%
Riegle, Lent, Leggett, Hannaford, Blaster,
Matsunaga, Chisholm, Buchanan.
(H.R. 4339 Steelman, Goldwater, Horton
and 3 co-sponsors) : Hammerschmidt, Mc-
Cormack, Hawkins.
H.R. 620 (Abolishing One Party Consent
Eavesdropping, by Mr. Long (Md.) chief
sponsor) : Hechler (W. Va.), Riegle, Brown
(Calif.), Chisholm, Moss, Charles Wilson
(Tex.), Mitchell (Md.), Diggs, Rangel, Hel-
stoski, Collins, Harrington, Mink.
H.R. 2463 (Long and one cosponsor) : Leg-
gett.
Mr. DRINAN. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MOSHER. Yes, I will yield to the
gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. DRINAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the
gentleman for yielding.
(Mr. DRINAN asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. DRINAN. Mr. Speaker, when the
newspapers and the committees of Con-
gress only a few years ago began to un-
cover the surveillance activities of the
executive branch into the lives of our cit-
izens and elected officials, few persons
ever expected such revelations to reach
the magnitude they have. The initial dis-
closures, such as the wiretaps of the 17
public officials and newspaper reporters
in connection with alleged national secu-
rity materials, were considered by many
to be abberations by an overzealous Ex-
ecutive seeking, in good faith, to protect
the Nation against subversion.
THE WIDENING SCOPE OF SURVEILLANCE
What followed, however, was a series
of disclosures which widened the circle
of persons who were considered proper
subjects of surveillance by the investiga-
tory units of the executive branch. We
soon learned, for example, that during
the sixties and the seventies, the U.S.
Army, in cooperation with the FBI and
other agencies, engaged in an extensive
program of surveillance over the lawful
activities of American citizens who were
merely exercising their constitutional
rights in protesting a terrible war in
Southeast Asia and other social and po-
litical injustices. -
Civil rights groups, dissident organi-
zations, splinter political parties, and
others became the targets of extensive
surveillance by Federal and State in-
vestigators into permissible and pro-
tected conduct.
These surveillance activities did not,
to be sure, stop at the organizational
level. Not only did Government agents
consider members of these groups as
fair game for their intrusions into polit-
ical beliefs, but they also spied on per-
sons who had any connection with such
groups or their members. A few years
ago, a high school student in New Jersey
wrote to an organization which was then
the subject of Government surveillance,
apparently because someone in the Jus-
tice Department disagreed with its polit-
ical viewpoint. The student had written
for some information in connection with
a course in political thought. Because
the FBI then had a mail cover on the
group, the student's name was acquired
and an inquiry into her activities was
undertaken. Of course, the investigation
did not uncover any unlawful activity
nor anything resembling illegality. But
the data collected was used to open an
FBI file on the unsuspecting student and
retained by the FBI until the U.S. dis-
trict court ordered it destroyed.
Nor did the surveillance activities stop
at the borders of the United States. Fed-
eral agents kept watch over the activi-
ties of Americans in foreign countries,
Including members of the Armed Forces.
I am sure this body recalls the snoop-
ing by Government agents into the lives
of American citizens residing in Ger-
many. It appears that such surveillance
was directed again at war dissenters and
persons who supported the Democratic
candidate for President in 1972. Such
surveillance must be considered a seri-
ous invasion of the constitutional rights
of citizens.
Federal agents have not allowed the
doctrine of separation of powers to in-
terfere with their information gather-
ing on Members of Congress. We do not
yet have an accurate picture of the ex-
tent to which the FBI and other agen-
cies maintained files on elected Members
of the National Legislature. When At-
torney General Levi appeared before the
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Judiciary
Committee, of which I am a member,
he sketched the scope of the surveillance
activities of the Federal agents into the
lives of legislators. While admitting that
this data collection was totally unwar-
ranted, Mr. Levi declined to give us any-
thing but the most general outline of
these intrusions in the legislative sphere.
Since that time, the Justice Depart-
ment has steadfastly refused to provide
sufficient access to our subcommittee so
that we might make an independent de-
termination of the nature and scope of
these surveillances.
A CASE STUDY OF UNWARRANTED SURVEILLANCE
Only by actually examining one of
these files can one fully appreciate the
unwarranted invasion of privacy and the
wastefulness of the activity engaged in
by the FBI. I recently had occasion to
examine my own file which the FBI has
maintained for many years. After I bad
spent more than 2 months pursuing my
rights under the Freedom of Information
Act, Director Kelly finally, released to me
a copy of most of the material contained
in my file. He refused to provide certain
documents. Director Kelly stated that I
had never been a subject of a criminal
investigation. Nevertheless, the FBI had
assiduously collected 81 pages of mate-
rial concerning public activities of mine
both before and after my election to Con-
gress.
I will reproduce in the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD, in the immediate future, a copy
of the file provided to me by the FBI. I
will also attach an exchange of letters
with Attorney General Levi an this sub-
ject. I am placing this material in the
RECORD so that all of my colleagues can
see for themselves how the FBI is spend-
ing the taxpayers' money. Nowhere in
the statute which establishes the FBI is
contained the authority to amass infor-
mation on civil rights work, antiwar
speeches, or any of the other entirely
lawful activities described in my file. No-
where is the FBI or any other agency
given the power to monitor the political
beliefs and activities of American citi-
zens who are exercising their constitu-
tional rights under the protection of the
law.
Because the Justice Department has
refused to cooperate fully with our sub-
committee, it is impossible to specify the
scope of this type of surveillance and
reeordkeeping by the FBI. If my file is
any indication, however, the total num-
ber of persons and documents involved
Is staggering. Based on the limited infor-
mation available to us, it is fair to say
that the FBI presently has millions of
entries describing perfectly lawful activ-
ities of American citizens. How many
more such files are maintained by dozens
of other Federal and State investigatory
agencies is unknown. We can only spec-
ulate on how many of the FBI's 19,178
employees and huw much of the Bureau's
$444.2 million budget is wasted on this
insidious and unauthorized activity.
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH HAS NOT CURBED
ABUSES
What has been the Government's re-
sponse to these revelations? It has been
a grudging admission of the surveillance
activities, a limited attempt to disclose
publicly their extent, and a total failure
to take adequate remedial measures. The
press and the committees of Congress
have not even been able to get a complete
picture of the matter. For example, only
after many, many months of pitched bat-
tle did the Justice Department give up
documents, highly "sanitized," to the
press and to our subcommittee regarding
the Cointelpro program, the operation to
disrupt lawful activities of private
groups. The Justice Department, includ-
ing the new Attorney General, has been
equally reluctant to provide us complete
Information on other surveillance activi-
ties. Thus the attempts by Congress to
exercise its proper oversight responsibili-
ties have been thwarted by the executive
agencies, which, in my judgment, have
an obligation to disclose such data to the
Congress when requested to do so.
Of course, some of these agencies,
which engaged in surveillance, claim
they have taken corrective steps. After
Senator Ervin's inquiry into the Army
surveillance program, that department
stated that it had destroyed its files re-
lating to the lawful conduct of Ameri-
cans. No one has ever really checked to
confirm that action. Even if the Army
has destroyed the files, it is important to
note that the Army was never the sole
repository of the data collected. Such
Information was freely circulated among
various Federal investigatory agencies,
including the FBI. It was part of the co-
perative effort of these agencies to car-
bon copy every bit of information col-
lected and distribute it to the participat-
ing agencies. We have never received any
assurances from these other units that
the "Army files" were destroyed.
The Justice Department takes the view
that, if any citizen seeks access to his or
her file under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, such data will be disclosed. One
of the problems with this approach is
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
H 5546
ApprovedEalsitektysetaRnabith-13_13A676E0144R0008001109-96, 1975
that many citizens, who may have been
subjected to surveillance, do not know
that information about them is on file
at the FBI or another investigating
agency. For example, in connection with
the Cointelpro operations, the Federal
agents must have collected thousands
of names and indexed them in files which
still exist. When Attorney General Saxbe
and then Levi admitted that much of this
activity was improper, they were asked
if the Justice Department planned to
contact all persons who were affected by
the program. They declined to do so.
If the Department of Justice refuses
to advise citizens that they were sub-
jects of improper Government activity,
such as the insidious Cointelpro program,
and if the Department refuses to dis-
close fully the nature of such activities
to the Congress, what other avenues do
we have to check unbridled executive
behavior in these sensitive areas? The
only answer is continued attempts by
Congress to exercise its oversight respon-
sibilities and to enact legislation which
will control such operations. And if we
have to legislate partly in the dark be-
cause the executive refuses to divulge
sufficient data, I am one Member who
is prepared to do so.
LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES ARE NEEDED
The Congress began last fall to enact
legislation to control the executive
branch in its data collection activities.
First, we passed the Freedom of In-
formation Act amendments over the veto
of President Ford. That any President
should dare to reject a measure which
seeks to secure constitutional freedoms
by opening up files to citizens should
stand as an indication that the present
Chief Executive will not, on his own,
exercise the necessary restraint in
managing the executive bureaucracy.
Second, in December, Congress passed
the Privacy Act of 1974. Although this
law does not take effect until Septem-
ber 27, 1975, it will open additional files
to private citizens wishing to learn what
records their Government is maintaining
on them. While the law has a number of
deficiencies, it should provide a new
remedy for those who wish to look be-
hind the paper curtain which executive
employees have drawn across their file
cabinets.
There are a number of other measures
which Congress must enact if the con-
stitutional rights, including privacy, of
American citizens are to be restored to
their proper place in our scheme of gov-
ernment. At a minimum, we must: First,
press our right to examine clearly the
operations of the executive branch. If
the Justice Department or any other
agency refuses to disclose data which we
consider essential in performing our
overight functions, this House must be
prepared to issue subpenas to obtain the
materials; second, enact laws which will
prohibit executive agencies, particularly
the FBI, from collecting any informa-
tion which is unrelated to investigations
into criminal conduct or into the quali-
fications of a nominee for high office. We
cannot permit the agencies which we
established to have unbridled investi-
gatory authority to look into any ac-
tivities of citizens which they choose to
Investigate.
Additionally, Congress should: Third,
amend existing laws to allow easier ac-
cess by citizen to files maintained about
them. Despite the new amendments to
the Freedom of Information Act, there
are indications that additional changes
may be necessary. A recent article in the
Nation, "You Still Need a Can Opener,"
catalogs some of the difficulties which
have arisen under the new act; and
fourth, at least with respect to investi-
gatory agencies, we should alter our
rules so that the legislative committees
have authority over the appropriations
of those units. It makes little sense for
the subcommittee of one standing com-
mittee to examine the budget of the FBI,
while another subcommittee of another
standing committee conducts oversight
of its activities. If Congress really means
to check excesses of the Executive, it must
be prepared to reform its own legislative
machinery to maximize its ability to re-
strain the other branch. The pending
resolution which would assign appro-
priations authority over the Justice De-
partment to the Judiciary Committee
should be passed at the earliest possible
time.
We must act swiftly to prevent the un-
warranted surveillance and iniCil-MTalon
zathering which has gone on for so long
to continue into the future. Before appro-
priating funds to the Department of Jus-
tice for the upcoming fiscal year, we
should insure that these funds will not
be used to conduct surveillance and
maintain files which are outside the
bounds of the Department's legitimate
law enforcement responsibilities. Conse-
quently, when appropriation bills for the
Departments of State, Justice, Com-
merce, the Judiciary, and Related Agen-
cies come before the House next week, I
intend to offer an amendment to prohibit
any sums appropriated for the activities
of the FBI to be used to gather informa-
tion and maintain investigative files
which are not related to criminal inves-
tigations or other specific responsibilities
of the FBI which are authorized by law.
The adoption of such an amendment will
save the American taxpayers the money
presently being used to collect the kind
of information reflected in the contents
of my own file.
Mr. Speaker, I extend my gratitude for
arranging this special order to the gen-
tlemen from Ohio (Mr. MOSHER) and
from Wisconsin (Mr. KASTENMEIER) , who
is also the distinguished chairman of the
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice, which
has examined some of these problems in
depth. It provides an opportunity for
each of us. outside the normal course of
our legislative duties, to bring to the col-
lective attention of other Members dif-
ferent thoughts and perspectives on the
whole range of problems created by the
untoward and outrageous surveillance
activities of the Executive.
But speeches alone are not adequate
for the task of eradicating the evils
which flow from the indiscriminate sur-
veillance by government of the lives of
our citizens. The words must be rein-
fcl.ced by action. If the bicentennial an-
niversary of our democracy is to have
significance, we must reaffirm in deeds
the principles upon which our ancestors
found this Nation 200 years ago. Noth-
ing short of that should be our goal.
Mr. MITCHELL of Maryland. Mr.
Sueaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MOSHER. Yes, I will yield to the
ntleman from Maryland.
(Mr. MITCHELL of Maryland asked
and was given permission to revise and
es tend his remarks.)
Mr. MITCHELL of Maryland. Mr.
? ,eaker, for many years I have argued
that the most grave threat to the demo-
cratic form of government does not come
from the Union of Socialist Soviet Re-
pnblics, nor from the People's Republic
of China, but that it comes from within
ti is Nation. That threat is the illegal
trammeling of civil rights and civil lib-
el ties done in the name of national se-
curity. The threat grows out of an over
re action to peaceable protest, an almost
paranoic reaction to the exercise of the
11 flit to dissent, and an all pervasive,
? Lreasoning fear about "the Communist
ta keover."
The recent disclosures about the illegal
and unethical practices of the Central
Ii telligence Agency, the Federal Bureau
oi Investigation, the Internal Revenue
Services, and other agencies of Govern-
msnt reveal how widespread and endemic
h, ve been these practices.
I think we in this Congress have not
dene enough to disclose the extent to
w iich local police departments, acting in
c(,11usion with Federal agencies, have
vi dated the constitutionally guaranteed
ri ;hts of citizens, especially black citizens
a;sel those who protested against the il-
legal war in Vietnam.
On March 4 I testified before the sub-
cc on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Administration of Justice. I testified
is support of H.R. 3113.
In my testimony, I established the ex-
^ nt to which unlawful surveillance of
ci dzens was done by the Baltimore City
P dice Department. This evening I want
te share portions of that testimony with
? u.
On February 14, 1975, 131 persons sent
ti e following statement to the Governor
o; the State of Maryland:
As we approach the bicentennial of the
fc incling of our Nation, we are troubled by
in iunting evidence of police enroachment
m rights guaranteed to citizens in the
Aendments to the Constitution. The pub-
11 list of names of 125 organizations on
w dch the Baltimore Police Department
thered information suggests the frighten-
ir and indiscriminate scope of their activity.
Wien there are real crime problems, why
hs the Police Department wasted half a
in Ilion dollars a year of taxpayers money
it surveillance of such groups as the Na-
ti ,nal Association for the Advancement of
C bred People, the American Friends Serv-
ic Committee, the Baltimore Tutorial Pro-
je t and the Interdenominational Ministerial
A liance?
While we recognize the necessary role of
tl a police to maintain order and to prevent
zme, for the Police Commissioner to, justi-
fi blanket surveillance of these groups listed
tc "prevent disorder, revolution and strife"
is absurd and tragic. The majority of people
ir volved were not remotely connected with
a ty activities that could be considered crim-
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
June 1 6, Adffiroved For ReleCONIDRII9SIGINAIIIAIMIMIS11991443M0800110060-9 H 5547
inal. They were persons who care about
America and were exeroising their Constitu-
tional rights as assemble, to enjoy free
speech, a free press, to seek redress of griev-
ances, hoping to make the nation more free
and more just.
With Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, we
believe our Constitution was made for
people of fundamentally differing views. The
strength of the United States has been in
diversity, in capacity to accept difference
and to profit from dissent. Civil Rights vic-
tories were won in the 1960s because citizens
used their right to protest against inequality
and injustice. The Vietnam war was halted
In large measure because citizens used their
right to dissent.
Although some were aware of the pres-
ence of police photographers and infiltra-
tors in the 1960s and early 1970s struggle for
human rights and peace, only now is the
magnitude and threat of police spying in
Baltimore becoming apparent. We are
shocked by reports from the newspapers, the
American Civil Liberties Union and others,
and by the Police Commissioner's own ad-
missions concerning: Infiltration of Peace
and divil Rights groups. Routine photog-
raphy of demonstrators for several years. ?
Collection of information on reporters
writing stories unfavorable to the Police
Commissioner, or on controversial issues.
Surveillance of persons who write letters
to editors of Newspapers.
Surveillance of Congressman Parren
Mitchell; infiltration of a meeting of the
Congressman's campaign staff.
Surveillance of numerous other public
officials, including the Baltimore State's At-
torney and the head of the Community Re-
lations Commission.
Surveillance of Black Clergymen.
ISD collection of reports on recent strik-
ing hospital workers.
ISD collection of reports on individuals
and license numbers of persons entering the
Friends Meeting House and other places in
Charles Village.
As citizens concerned for the well being
and enhancement of Baltimore, Maryland
and the nation, we ask you as head of State
and as the authority to whom the Commis-
sioner of Police is responsible, to bring to
an end the illegal and immoral activity of the
Police Department and to help restore an
atmosphere of respect and trust in this
branch of the government. We urge that you:
(1) End all surveillance of peaceful ac-
tivity by the Police.
(2) Inform the public of the nature and
scope of the activity (methods, not disclo-
sure of individual files), of the "Red Squad."
(3) Inform persons if they have been under
political surveillance and no criminal charges
have been filed against them. Grant them the
right to examine their files, to destroy them
if they wish, and authorize the destruction
of duplicate files.
(4) Develop written standards controlling
Police Department surveillance and infiltra-
tion; restrict Police investigation to areas
where there is evidence of criminal activity.
(5) Develop a system of accountability,
giving an independent civilian body the
power to review Police methods, files, etc.
(6) Place the Office of Police Commissioner
under the Mayor, and encourage leadership
sensitive to individual liberty and sympa-
thetic to the rights of privacy.
Included among the 131 signers of this
statement were the names of over 40
religious leaders including Bishop Joseph
Gossman, the Reverend Hugh Dickin-
son, and the Reverend Vernon Dobson;
from the NAACP, Enolia P. McMillan,
president, and Leonard L. Saunders, vice-
president: also representatives from
Johns Hopkins University and Medical
Institutions; representatives from
Goucher, Townson State, Loyola and
CCB; from the American Civil Liberties
Union, the director, John Roemer, along
with 10 lawyers; included also are repre-
sentatives of the American Friends
Committee.
Based upon information made avail-
able to me to date, I am firmly convinced
that a national domestic espionage ap-
paratus existed in America. I further
firmly believe that this apparatus in-
volved the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion; the Army Intelligence; and local
police departments. In this domestic
espionage apparatus, information gath-
ered, without benefit of court orders, was
exchanged between local police depart-
ments and Federal agencies. The infor-
mation was gathered and exchanged on
persons and organizations that were not
involved in criminal activity.
Obviously had the provisions of H.R.
3113 been in effect, this dreadful
Kafkaesque situation could not have
developed in my city and in other cities
across the Nation.
H.R. 3113 is a good, needed bill. I have
one or two areas of concern that hope-
fully can be cleared up today.
The first is with the language referring
to "private dwelling used and occupied
as a dwelling." I think this language
needs to be broadened and I shall ex-
plain why. During my primary campaign
in 1974, infiltration of my campaign
headquarters took place. Here is the
story as reported by the local press:
Leonard Jenoff, the secret police operative
who worked for dope trafficker John (Liddie)
Jones' lawyer, also infiltrated- the offices of
Rep. Parren Mitchell, it has been learned.
Jenoff volunteered to work "morning,
night, plus weekends" in Rep. Mitchell's last
election campaign. He also took photographs
of Mitchell's campaign workers.
Jenoff is an admitted supplier of informa-
tion to the police department's Inspectional
Services Division (ISD), a clandestine intel-
ligence gathering unit that reports directly?
and only?to Commissioner Pomerleau.
One of Mitchell's aides said Jenoff asked if
he could take pictures of campaign workers
"for a photography course he said he was
taking." He turned over 10 to 15 pictures to
S. I don't know if any were given to the
police.
There is strong evidence to suggest
that in my previous congressional cam-
paigns similar infiltrations by paid or
unpaid police agents took place. These
persons could have, and I believe did, in-
spect records of telephone calls, credit
records, and the like. Therefore, I would
like to see the language broadened to
cover that kind of situation.
My second area of concern deal with
section 2519, "Reports concerning inter-
cepted wire, oral and other communica-
tions." I am aware of the complexity of
legal, bona fide information gathering by
agencies and I am keenly aware of the
need for confidentiality to govern such
operations. However, I do feel that the
person on whom information was gath-
ered ought be advised somewhere down
the line that he was the object of such
activities. Obviously, if the intercepts re-
sult in a specific criminal charge, then
the person would know.
However, if intercepts do not result in
such a charge?or charges?or if indeed
intercepts prove that the individuals con-
duct and behavior has not been inimical
to the best interests of the country, I
think the person has the right to know
that he was under surveillance and why
the surveillance took place.
Hopefully, you can clarify these two
problems for me. I have and will con-
tinue to support H.R. 3113 because it is
legislation needed to protect basic civil
liberties which are guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Ms. ABZUG. Mr. Speaker, will the gen-
tleman yield?
Mr. MOSHER. I yield to the gentle-
woman from New York.
(Ms. ABZUG asked and was given Per-
mission to revise and extend her re-
mar
. ABZUGNr. Speaker, I would like
to extend my appreciation to the gentle-
man from Ohio (Mr. MOSHER) and the
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. KASTEN-
MEIER) for the foresight and insistence
that this issue of surveillance and privacy
be significally aired at this time.
Mr. Speaker, I believe that it is im-
portant because we have yet to complete
the responsibility that is placed upon us
by the Constitution and by the electorate
to make certain that those pacts which
we uncovered at Watergate will not be
covered over by a continuation of those
same activities through various agencies
of the executive branch of Government.
My own committee, the Subcommittee
on Government Information and Indi-
vidual Rights, has jurisdiction, as the
Members know, over the Freedom of In-
formation Act and the Privacy Act, and
In both of those connections we are pur-
suing very extensively the oversight of
various agencies which have been col-
lecting information on the American
people. Our citizens have the right to
know, and under the Privacy Act they
have the right to obtain all of the in-
formation and data which these agencies
have maintained.
In the course of our preliminary hear-
ings to date, we have been shocked to
find that there have been extensive and
deep violations of fundamental rights-
of privacy, as well as first amendment
rights, of many, many untold numbers
of American citizens in this country.
Mr. Speaker, only last week we dis-
covered that instead of the Army's hav-
ing really destroyed all of the files of
civilians whom they have had under sur-
veillance, they discovered by accident
some more files, now numbering at least
9,000. The Secret Service has indicated
It is maintaining surveillance on 47,000
citizens, although they admit only 300
of those persons could actually constitute
a threat to the life and safety of the
President or his family and other per-
sons under, their protection.
The CIA, as we all know, has conducted
massive surveillance over the activities
of American citizens. These facts have
been developed in hearings being con-
ducted loy. the Select Committee of the
.enate. by my committee, by other com-
mittees in Congress, including the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, as well as the
Itockefeller Commission.
We find there have been serious inva-
sions of privacy through surveillance not
only by the CIA but also by the FBI in
an unauthorized manner, including vio-
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
II 5548
Approved EmiteklysevoitratiwyBpfium9144R0008001100-9. 6, 1975
lation of the postal laws, in that first-
class mail was illegally opened. We have
also discovered unauthorized wiretaps,
infiltration of political groups, and out-
right burglary.
Legislative control must be exercised
In this area. The Congress must not only
continue its oversight activities, but must
enact legislation which will stop the kind
of abuse we have recently discovered.
LVf_Pcommittec iyiBcentii_ins_ its
oversight in our jurisdictional area of
Government
We will also_tonsiLlerigglslation designed
to control...the. eaCeSSes of the Govern-
men.Uolice
ready begunstn amendments to the-Fri-
yacy_Act__These...arnendinents will remove
the blanket exemptio_41:rntelco the
,CIA and the Secret Service in the
naLlaill,??Irsi facts that have recently
come to light make it imperafiVF-Thit
an,0Slw Secret Service be heTa
account :1) h A i ri an citizen
whose rights have been abridged by their
activities.
In addition I am considering legisla-
tion which will control the spread of
computers throughout the Govern-
ment?especially the linking of various
computers through advanced communi-
cations networks. I have also introduced
legislation which would prohibit the in-
terception of certain communications
unless all parties to the communication
agree to the monitoring or interception.
Mr. Speaker, I especially want to com-
pliment again the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. MOSHER) , who brought this special
order, because we can do a lot more to
bring this matter to the attention of the
Congress and the public.
(Ms. ABZUG asked and was given
permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Mr. MLKVA. Mr. Speaker, will the gen-
tleman yield?
Mr. MOSHER. I yield to the gentle-
man from Illinois (Mr. MricvA).
Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Speaker, I want to
join my colleagues in commending the
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. MOSHER) for
his concern about this problem and 'for
his focusing the attention of the Con-
gress and of the people on this problem.
It is a problem that has not gone away,
and it will not go away unless all of us
express the kind of concern that he has
shown.
There is a feeling extant in the coun-
try that if one has nothing to hide, if
one has done nothing wrong, what dif-
ference does it make if somebody is fol-
lowing him around or if somebody is lis-
tening in on his telephone conversations?
And indeed there is also a feeling that,
after all, if a few thousand people or even
10,000 people are being watched and
spied upon and their activities are being
reviewed, in a country containing 213
million citizens this somehow is not a
very serious problem.
Mr. Speaker, I think, in addition to
the violations of the rights of people who
are being followed and who are being
Interdicted and their freedom threat-
ened, that there is a much more serious
problem, and that is the deterrent effect
that this kind of activity has on the
whole free society, because there is the
danger that, through surveillance or
even because of the popular belief that
there is the existence of surveillance, we
will discourage the kind of full, free, and
unrestrained exchange of ideas and view-
points on which democracy is based.
When people and citizens and partici-
pants in political debate feel they must
restrain their utterances, that they must
watch their tongues, that they must have
a care about which groups they join or
which candidates they vote for and who
they write letters to or who they receive
letters from because somebody might be
watching them, we are taking that first
step?but it is a very long step?toward
the very totalitarianism that these ac-
tivities are proclaimed to prevent and
deter; then we are in our way in America
reaching toward the kind of closed soci-
ety that the CIA, the FBI, and all the
other intelligence-gathering agencies as-
sure us in the defense of their actions
they are trying to keep from happening.
It has long been the hallmark of to-
talitarian societies that only approved
persons ought to participate in the polit-
ical process.
If we did not have the right ideas, if
we did not vote for the right people, and
if we did not have the right relationships
with other people in the public arena,
then we ought not get involved.
There was and is a deliberate effort
In totalitarian states to keep people from
getting involved in political processes,
and if we do not want that kind of deter-
rent here, then we must finally put a
check on the kind of Government sur-
veillance of activities, particularly in the
political arena, which is going to put a
chill on that kind of thing in the po-
litical arena.
I suppose that one of the problems
about trying to do anything about it is
that most of the time the Government
agencies which are involved end up by
saying, "We did not do it, and we promise
to stop."
It is always a very ephemeral kind of
proof that one has about who is being
wiretapped, and about where the extent
of the surveillance exists. There is always
some kind of justification for it.
Mr. Speaker, I would only say that if
the Congress does not begin to treat with
seriousness of the problem that the gen-
tleman from Ohio (Mr. MOSHER) sug-
gests and my distinguished colleague, the
gentleman from Wisconsin, my former
chairman, suggests, I think we are going
to deserve the kind of trouble we have
because, when all is said and done, if we
cannot abide the very freedom that dis-
tinguishes this society from totalitarian
states, then the Government agencies
which are engaged in that surveillance
are going to be the best justification of
all for engaging it because we will not be
able to exist in any other way.
Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for
yielding.
Mr. MOSHER. Mr. Speaker, I especial-
ly appreciate the emphasis the gentle-
man from Illinois (Mr. M.ncvA) has just
placed on the chilling effect that the
atmosphere of fear has, which I empha-
sized in my earlier remarks. This seems
to me to be a matter of extreme concern.
Mr. Speaker, I now yield to the gentle-
man from New York (Mr. BADILLO).
(Mr. BADILLO asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Speaker, I want to
commend the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.
MosnEa) and the gentleman from Wis-
consin (Mr. KASTENMEIER) , for having
brought up this special order which I
think is particularly appropriate for dis-
cussion at this time in view of the report
of the Rockefeller Commission.
I think that the statements and the
recommendations of the Rockefeller
Commission, which merely call upon the
President to tell the postal authorities
and the CIA not to do it again, that is,
not to violate the law, cannot be ac-
cepted by this Congress. I think in view
of those recommendations, it is urgent
that our subcommittee and the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, of which I am
a member, take action at this session to
pass either the bill advocated by the
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. MOSHER) or
an appropriate bill that will deal with
the question of surveillance.
I just want to cite one example of the
need for urgency. The Rockefeller Com-
mission report points out that there were
a limited number of mail openings that
took place during the 20-year period
where the mail was being opened, but
Mr. Cotter, who testified before our sub-
committee and who is the chief postal
inspector, indicated clearly that the ar-
rangement for the opening of the mail
was such that there really was no way
in which the postal inspectors could
know how many letters, in fact, were
opened by the CIA and the FBI per-
sonnel who were involved.
Therefore, in the light of that, to sug-
gest that it is enough merely for the
President to say to the agencies involved
not to take this action, I think is totally
Inadequate. I think, therefore, we should
take action now.
I think we have to go even further,
frankly, because the report also points
lDenartment
agreed for a period of 20 years not to
prosecute anyone who was violating the
law and who was a memberCIA
'cause they agreed to let the CIAjn.
e?cinvestigate itself,
think, under those circumstances,
the fact that President Ford said last
week that he was referring all of the
materials received from the Rockefeller
Commission to the Justice Department
is an inadequate recommendation be-
cause it is the Justice Department which
itself is violating the law.
I think that not only do we have to
_take action on a bnI this session. jolt I
think we have to establish a special nrsa.-
ernktar to lga_taut_p_asimat 2(19_ jan,
responsible for illegal acts are Prole:
clited, including those people who Are
within the Justice Department right
now.
So I think it is very appropriate that
we begin a dialog on this subject, and
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
June 16, iScarroved For Releet4.129REMCINATURIUMM4301/027510800110060-9 H 5549
that we complete the bill, report out a
bill from our subcommittee, the full
committee, and on the floor of this
House, and from the other body.
Mr. MOSHER. Mr. Speaker, I very
much welcome the expression of sup-
port of the gentleman from New York
(Mr. BADILLo) for the legislation that
is before the gentleman's committee.
Mr. KOCH. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased
to participate in the special order on pri-
vacy called for by our colleagues,
CHARLES MOSHER and ROBERT KASTEN-
MEIER. In the 93d Congress on April 2,
1974, Congressman BARRY GOLDWATER,
Jr. and I sponsored a special order on the
issue of privacy and we were pleased
with the response of the members to our
concerns. The 94th Congress must be
concerned with the preservation of the
Individual's right of privacy and I am
hopeful that today's dialog will elicit
some new thoughts and serious discus-
sion on this issue.
Last December 31, the President signed
into law the Privacy Act of 1974. This
was the culmination of a 6-year effort on
my part and that of many of our col-
leagues to place controls on the Federal
Government's collection, use and dis-
semination of personal information
about citizens.
Earlier this year Congressman GOLD-
WATER and I introduced H.R. 1984 which
provides that controls similar to those
in the Privacy Act be placed on State and
local governments and organizations in
the private sector. The provisions of this
bill are by no means sealed in cement.
We have sent a questionnaire to orga-
nizations affected by this legislation to
ascertain the reactions to it. Approxi-
mately 500 responses have been received
and we will be tabulating the results
shortly. The results will be made avail-
able to our colleague, Dox EDWARDS, who
chairs the Judiciary Subcommittee on
Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights,
and who will be holding hearings during
this Congress on the legislation.
The legislation which BARRY GOLD-
WATER, Jr. and I have introduced and
which we consider the basic draft is for
the purposes of eliciting comments. Un-
doubtedly, there must be additions, de-
letions and changes. That is why the
Privacy Protection Study Commission
came into being so as to provide the
forum for that testimony.
The Privacy Act of 1974 calls for the
establishment of a privacy commission
which will report to the President and
the Congress in 2 years on the results of
its study on data banks in governmental,
regional, and private organizations. The
Commission is to determine what must
be done to protect personal information,
and the privacy of individuals. The Com-
mission members are Minnesota State
Senator Robert Tennessee; William
Dickinson, retired managing editor of
the Philadelphia Bulletin; William 0.
Bailey, executive vice president of Aetna
Life and Casualty; David P. Linowes, a
partner with Laventhol, Krekstein & Hor-
wath; Willis H. Ware, corporate research
staff member of the Rand Corp.; Con-
gressman BARRY GOLDWATER, Jr., and
myself.
The Privacy Commission has had
nearly a 6-month delay in getting started
because all of its members had not been
appointed. But now that the President
has announced his appointments, all
seven members will get together shortly
to begin our work. I am pleased that the
private sector and State governments are
represented on the Commission. I intend,
as I hope the other members do, to pur-
sue hearings regarding the impact of
privacy legislation with an open mind.
We have to be made aware of much in-
formation from the private sector in de-
veloping our report and I encourage or-
ganizations to submit their reactions
to us.
The special order called for today is
devoted to the specific issue of domestic
surveillance activities of the U.S. Gov-
ernment. Last year the Annual Chief
Justice Earl Warren Conference on Ad-
vocacy sponsored by the Roscoe Pound-
American Trial Lawyers Foundation held
a conference on the subject of Privacy in
a Free Society. Three areas were dis-
cussed?data banks and dossiers, elec-
tronic surveillance, and political inform-
ing. I am appending from the report of
the conference, in which I participated,
the recommendations on electronic sur-
veillance.
The material follows:
FINAL REPORT?PRIVACY IN A FREE SOCIETY
PART A?RECOMMENDATIONS : ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE
Summary
(Note: Final Recommendations on Elec-
tronic Surveillance emanating from the Con-
ference together with commentaries follow
this summary.)
The Conference undertook the study of
electronic surveillance in two areas-;,--domestic
intelligence and law enforcement. The Con-
ference expressed strong opposition to elec-
tronic surveillance for domestic intelligence
purposes. It opposed, by a narrow margin, the
use of electronic surveillance for law enforce-
ment purposes.
In discussing two methods of electronic
surveillance, the Conferees were opposed to
both telephone tapping and room bugging.
However, they felt that room bugging was
more insidious than -telephone tapping be-
cause of the much greater and less controll-
able invasion of privacy resulting from room
surveillance.
A broad consensus of the Conferees revealed
general skepticism toward electronic surveil-
lance as a tool and towards methods for con-
trol of its use. It is interesting to note that
this general skepticism was shown among
members of such a diverse group including
many with long experience in law enforce-
ment and in law. The opponents of electronic
surveillance based their conclusions on a
belief that electronic surveillance was of rela-
tively little value to conventional law en-
forcement, was used primarily for minor
offenses, produced very serious invasions of
privacy, and was quite difficult to control. It
should be noted that there was some discus-
sion about the validity of the available sta-
tistics, which indicated that electronic sur-
veillance was invoked most often in cases of
"minor offenses."
There were Conferees supporting some
electronic surveillance for law enforcement
purposes, who believed that the technique
should be used only for crimes of the utmost
gravity and only if controls are strengthened
and, together with those currently in the
statute, are more effectively enforced.
The Conference stressed that, if there were
to be any electronic surveillance, regardless
of its form., of American citizens, it should be
only with prior judicial scrutiny and ap-
proval?with a court order. A substantial
majority recommended that no surveillance
.for intelligence purposes be permitted. How-
ever, if any electronic surveillance were au-
thorized, it should be only for solving spe-
cific crimes and not for obtaining general
intelligence about particular individuals or
groups.
The Conference also overwhelmingly rec-
ommended a series of procedural and other
controls. It suggested a requirement that,
Whatever federal electronic surveillance is
done, it should be conducted only by the
Department of Justice, subject to criteria
and procedures examined at public hearings,
and under close scrutiny by congressional
committees. Also, the Conference urged that
persons subjected to illegal electronic sur-
veillance be permitted to recover damages
from the governmental agencies engaging in
such activity.
RECOMMENDATION 1
There should be no electronic surveillance
for domestic intelligence purposes?
(Adopted by substantial majority)
Commentary: While disagreement re-
mained as to whether electronic surveillance,
with restrictions, is permissible when related
to detection and prosecution of specific
crimes, a majority of the Conferees deter-
mined that electronic surveillance for domes-
tic intelligence should not be permissible.
RECOMMENDATION II
There should be no electronic surveillance
for law enforcement purposes?
(Adopted by narrow margin)
Commentary: This vote represents the
fundamental division among the Conferees.
While there was general skepticism regard-
ing the effectiveness of electronic surveil-
lance, a narrow majority believed that law
enforcement authorities should not be al-
lowed to use electronic surveillance even for
crime detection pUrposes, and a minority
believed that electronic surveillance should
remain available for law enforcement, though
this group insisted that it be used only
for very serious offenses, and under very strict
controls. There was a group of Conferees who,
whatever their individual predilections on
this issue, made the point that our current
knowledge concerning electronic surveil-
lance at all levels of law enforcement (fed-
eral, state and local) is inadequate. Addi-
tional empirical studies are needed to deter-
mine the extent and the effectiveness of its
use.
RECOMMENDATION III
State and local authorities should not be
allowed to engage in electronic surveillance.3
I Mr. Michael Kenney wanted to be on rec-
ord as being opposed to all electronic sur-
veillance. His single Recommendation in this
area would be: "There should be no elec-
tronic surveillance."
Mr. Kenneth Conboy dissents from this
Recommendation and adds the following
statement: "I cannot subscribe to the dubi-
ous logic of the proposition that, because
too many gambling warrants have been is-
sued in the past several years, no authority,
regardless of how circumscribed in execu-
tion, should be vested in the courts to issue
warrants in cases involving, for example, im-
minent bombings, aircraft hijacks, random
killings or barbarous political murders."
Ms. Mary C. Lawton wished it noted that
She abstains on propositions relating to elec-
tronic surveillance. She felt that more pre-
cise definitions of terms used in the dis-
cussions were needed.
s Mr. Conboy did not support the Recom-
mendation because "the data supports the
conclusion that state authorities have been
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
H 5550
Approved FocaNtansNegplegal6rFf9E7j00y4R000800110oyo-9
une 16, 1975
(Vote evenly divided)
Commentary: There was a sharp split over
whether state and local law enforcement of-
ficials (as opposed to federal officials) really
need electronic surveillance, whether they
have used it excessively and indiscrimin-
ately, and whether the judicial and other
controls in the statute do or can function
properly on the state level.
RECOMMENDATION IV
No electronic surveillance should be carried
out without a court order for any purpose
on American citizens on United States soil
or on American citizens in foreign countries.
(Adopted overwhelmingly)
Commentary: The Conferees drew atten-
tion here to the Supreme Court's decision
the United States vs. U.S. District Court, 407
U.S. 297, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752
(1972), which suggested in an 8-0 decision
that, in all cases of electronic surveillance
on American citizens or organizations for
intelligence purposes, that is, for purposes
unrelated to solution of a specific crime, a
court order is required. Also, the Executive
Branch has no inherent power to invade a
citizen's right to privacy without satisfying
an impartial magistrate that a justification
exists for such an intrusion.
ThLs Recommendation expresses the Con-
ference's conviction that there be no war-
rantless electronic surveillance, under any
circumstances on American citizens.
RECOMMENDATION V -
To the extent that electronic surveillance
is permitted for law enforcement purposes,
it should be limited to crimes of the utmost
gravity.
(Adopted by large majority)
Commentary: While there was some dis-
cussion on the meaning of "crimes of utmost
gravity," the Conference reached no final
definition of the concept, except that it
would almost certainly include an imminent
threat to life.
RECOMMENDATION VI
If used at all, electronic surveillance for
law enforcement purposes should be per-
mitted only by court order and on probable
cause subject to the following conditions:
(A) It must be directly related to specific
criminal acts or activities;
(B) There must be a specific limitation of
the time during which the device remains
In place or in use; and the length of time
permitted should be the shortest possible;
(C) There must be a definite demonstra-
tion of the need for installation of the
device;
(D) There must be no other law enforce-
ment technique available for obtaining the
information, and the applicant must demon-
strate this fully;
(E) There must be restraint?responsible
action and accurate reporting by the law
enforcement officials carrying out the order.
(Adopted overwhelmingly)
Commentary: This Recommendation re-
flects specific problems in the present opera-
tion of the electronic surveillance statute,
and is intended to supplement and make
more effective the statutory controls.
RECOMMENDATION VII
Even when electronic surveillance is used
with regard to crimes of utmost gravity, there
should be no electronic surveillance of
rooms?no bugging of a room.
(Adopted by large majority)
Commentary: Bugging should not be
utilized under any circumstances. Bugging
was seen as a more serious invasion of pri-
more discriminating in the use of electronic
surveillance than federal authorites. For ex-
ample, the huge number of gambling war-
rants obtained were predominantly obtained
by the FBI. Also, jurisdiction for the most
serious crime in terms of penalty?murder?
is almost exclusively with state officials."
vacy than wiretapping since, while one can
refrain from using a telephone and thereby
avoid a wiretap, the presence of a room bug
in one's home or office makes it impossible
to be free from surveillance.*
RECOMMENDATION yin
If any federal electronic surveillance is to
be permitted, the authority for all warrants
for wiretapping should be limited to a single
governmental agency?the United States
Justice Department. The Justice Department
should be the only federal agency to install
wiretaps on United States soil and on Ameri-
can citizens abroad.,
(Adopted overwhelmingly)
Commentary: Since electronic surveillance
is difficult to detect in the first place, a pro-
liferation of federal agencies engaged in wire-
tapping would ineluctably result in more
privacy abuses than would result if all legal
wiretapping were the responsibility of only
one agency.
The Conferees were mindful a the diver-
sity of government agencies engaged in elec-
tronic surveillance which were uncovered
during the Watergate investigations come of
them accountable to no one but the Presi-
dent?with the Justice Department and the
courts being entirely by passed.
RECOMMENDATION Ix
The procedures and criteria by which wire-
taps and other forms of eavesdropping are
sought, and warrants for their use issued,
should be clearly and properly prescribed by
the United States Justice Department only
after complete public hearings on these pro-
cedures and criteria, such hearings to be held
in various parts of the country.
(Adopted overwhelmingly)
Commentary: If the Justice Department is
established as the only agency with the re-
sponsibility for federal electronic surveil-
lance, the citizenry should be made aware
of this. Furthermore, the citizenry should
be made aware of the precise processes by
which eavesdropping is permitted by the
courts and carried out by the Justice Depart-
ment. In this way the widespread fear that
government eavesdropping is pervasive can
be countered by a precise vesting of limited
authority?and accountability for any abuse
of that authority?in this one agency.
RECOMMENDATION X
A very strong congressional oversight com-
mittee should be established in both
branches of Congress to review all wiretaps
by federal agencies. This would apply to the
United States Justice Department if it were
established that it were the only govern-
mental agency authorized to wiretap.
Commentary: The unanimous approval of
this Recommendation reflects the strong con-
viction of the Conferees concerning the es-
tablishment of an active monitoring system
by Congress?representatives selected by the
citizenry?to ensure accountability on the
part of those involved in limited, carefully
restricted, use of electronic surveillance.,
Mr. Conboy dissented from this Recom-
mendation and explained how he saw its re-
suit: "the law would simultaneously author-
ize (wiretapping) and condemn troom
bugging) electronic surveillance of the im-
minent criminal, contingent solely upon the
mode (phone conversation or face to face
meeting selected by him.) "
Professor John Elliff suggests that "the
United States Department of Justice should
not be the agency to install wiretaps over-
seas, since its investigative jurisdiction is
primarily within the United States. How-
ever, the Attorney General might properly
be required to approve any wiretaps in-
stalled by another agency on American citi-
zens abroad."
'Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus informed the
Conference, that "not once, in the eighty
days during which I PM Acting Director
of the FBI, was I called on to testify before
RECOMMENDATION X/
A reporting system should be undertaken
by the Justice Department, subject to prop-
er regulations to maintain confidentiality,
so that all information disclosed by taps can
be given to Congress for it to properly exer-
cise its oversight function.
(Adopted unanimously)
Commentary: The information would in-
clude: the duration or the wiretap; the need
for the tap; an affidavit submitted for the
issuance of a warrant for the tap; the author-
ization by the Attorney General of specific
taps; what information the tap revealed and
the consequences of the tap, that is, whether
there was an arrest, conviction or any other
disposition.
RECOMMENDATION xrr
A specific minimum amount of damages.
plus attorney's fees, should be available for
any violation of the wiretapping or other
eavesdropping statutes by federal, state or
local officials. These damages should be re-
coverable in a federal court from the partic-
ular governmental agency engaged in such
eavesdropping.
(Adopted overwhelmingly)
Commentary: The Conferees believed that
effective sanctions must be provided against
all who violate statutes concerning the use of
electronic surveillance.
Mr. BIESTER. Mr. Speaker, I wish to
commend the distingunished gentleman
from Ohio (Mr. MOSHER) , and the dis-
tinguished gentleman from Wisconsin
(Mr. KASTENMEIER) , for their leadership
in further bringing to the attention of
the House and of the American public
the need for legislation in the field of
Government surveillance of private citi-
zens. I know firsthand the dedication to
civil liberties and indiivdual rights which
these two Members of Congress have ex-
hibited in their work in the House.
In March of this year, it was my privi-
lege to appear before the Subcommit-
tee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice, chaired by Mr.
KASTENMEIER. I testified on behalf of leg-
islation known as the Bill of Rights
Procedures Act, introduced by Mr. MOSH-
ER in the House, and by the distinguished
gentleman from Maryland, Mr. MATHIAS,
in the Senate.
The Bill of Rights Procedures Act
would require any Federal agent to ob-
tain a court order before he or she could
conduct any form of surveillance on a
private citizen. The Government would
be required to demonstrate probable
cause that a crime had been or was about
to be committed before any warrant for
surveillance could be issued. The legisla-
tion is intended to be comprehensive in
scope, to cover all forms of surveillance,
including bugging, wiretapping, and? all
other forms of electronic surveillance,
opening of mail, mail covers, entering of
dwellings, and the inspection or procure-
ment of the records of telephone, bank,
credit, medical, or other private transac-
tions.
Mr. Speaker, I believe the need for
new legislation in the field of govern-
mental surveillance of mivate citizens
is clearcut. The fourth amendment to
the Constitution of the United States
proclaims the right of the people to be
"secure in their persons, houses, papers
Congress about the FBI's involvement in
electronic surveillance. It is not in the pub-
lic interest for any such activity to go un-
monitored by the Congress."
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
June 16, /93iRP roved For RelimaTOKINGMACIARDIED14001143M0800110060-9 H 5551
and effects against unreasonable search-
es and seizures." Security, however, must
be more than an abstract legal proposi-
tion. If security is to have any meaning
at all, it must be a sure perception of
one's condition.
I seriously doubt that the American
people today consider themselves secure
against unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures. Twentieth century technology has
given governments and indeed private
institutions the? ability to intrude into
the private realm of an American's life
with staggering efficieincy, sophistica-
tion, and secrecy. The technological ca-
pacity for an unprecedented degree and
scope of governmental intervention into
peoples lives exists today. Without new,
stricter safeguards and more effective
means of oversight and control, there is
little reason to doubt that such tech-
nology will eventually be used, if indeed
aspects of it have not already been
employed.
The American people today are sus-
picious of government. They are skepti-
cal not only of its ability to solve prob-
lems, but they even question govern-
ment's basic motives. That skepticism is
healthy to the degree it results in de-
mands that the Congress of the United
States act forthrightly to end unneces-
sary and illegitimate intrusions into peo-
ple's private lives. Only by responsibly
addressing itself to this very basic but
complex problem can Congress restore
to the American public a firm sense of
security, a justified perception that one
Is indeed safe against unreasonable and
arbitrary or capricious governmental
intrusion.
Clearly the questions at stake in con-
sideration of the whole issue of govern-
mental surveillance go to the very core
of the democratic process. This issue
forces us to contend with perhaps the
most basic question faced by a free so-
ciety: where do we draw the line between
the rights of the individual and the legit-
imate and necessary functions of society
as embodied in the Government?
Stich a question has never been easy
to answer, and it is particularly difficult
In this complex and technically sophis-
ticated age. The introduction of national
security considerations further compli-
cates the issue.
As a member of the Committee on In-
ternational Relations, a member of the
Subcommittee on National Security dur-
ing the 93d Congress, and a former mem-
ber of the Judiciary Committee, I would
particularly like 'to examine the question
of governmental surveillance in matters
pertaining to national security.
Clearly all those in positions of public
responsibility must approach national
security considerations with a weighty
concern for the dangers inherent in the
prevailing international political system,
and the peculiar obligations which our
position within that system imposes on
the Government of the United States.
Few would dispute the need for the Gov-
ernment to deal with some especially
sensitive matters in secrecy. Few would
dispute theneecl for the Government to
preserve international trust in the con-
fidentiality of diplomatic discussions.
But equally clear must be the need to
deal with such legitimate national secu-
rity concerns within our constitutional
framework?to subject governmental
surveillance to proper and reasonable
standards of procedure, and to minimize
the scope for individual caprice or abuse
of power.
With regard to national security, what
balance do we properly strike? Where,
Indeed, do we draw the kind of line which
protects both the individual and society
at large?
I would contend that under existing
procedure, the rights of the individual
under the fourth amendment are inade-
quately protected.
The law presently allows surveillance
to be undertaken on the authority of the
President?with such authority usually
executed by the Attorney General?when
national security is considered to be at
stake.
It seems clear to me that such a pro-
cedure?involving individual interpre-
tation of such a broad and ambiguous
term as "national security" does, indeed,
allow for abuse of power.
The Bill a Rights. Procesiures_ Act
Would rectify that situation by linking
all surveillance?including that under-
taken on grounds of national security?
to a court order based on Probable cause
that a crime had been or was about to be
committed,
In the case of national security, such
an order would have to be linked to sus-
pected sabotage, espionage, Treason or
similar crimes.
Is this an unreasonable restraint on
executive power? Would such a require-
ment hamper the proper stewardship of
our national safety? Would it indeed
swing the judicial pendulum dangerously
In the direction of individual rights at
the expense of societal security?
I think not. Such a requirement is in-
herently reasonable and proper, and
would not have to subject our society to
risk.
I am supported in this belief by the
Honorable William D. Ruckelshaus, for-
mer Deputy Attorney General and for-
mer Acting Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Hardly a man
oblivious to legitimate national security
considerations, Mr. Ruckelshaus last
year stated before joint hearings of the
Senate Committees on the Judiciary and
Foreign Relations that he sees "no rea-
son why all wiretaps should not be sub-
ject to court warrant"
To restrict wiretaps and other forms
of surveillance to instances approved by
a Federal court, simply means the Gov-
ernment must establish to the satisfac-
tion of an independent arbiter that a
reasonable suspicion exists as to the com-
mission of a crime affecting the national
security of the United States. The Bill
of Rights Procedures Act would thus not
bar necessary national security surveil-
lance; it would simply subject the need
for that surveillance to prior assessment
by the judicial branch. Such a prior as-
sessment simply, but significantly re-
moves national security surveillance
from the realm of possibly arbitrary,
capricious action.
Government surveillance--divorced
from suspected criminality and un-
restrained by any check?imperils our
constitutional system, and thus under-
mines the very national security it is
ostensibly designed to protect.
If we are to protect our genuine na-
tional security interests as well as safe-
guard individual rights within our con-
stitutional framework, Congress must
respond to the complex challenge of
enacting new legislation on surveillance.
I feel confident that with dedicated
Members like CHARLES MOSHER and BOB
KASTENMEIER helping to lead the way,
Congress will adequately meet this diffi-
cult challenge.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. Speaker, I am
very pleased that my distinguished col-
league from Ohio, Representative
CHARLES MOSHER, and the chairman of
the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration
of Justice, Representative ROBERT KAS-
TENIVIEIER, have taken this special order
on the subject of surveillance and the
interception of communications by elec-
tronic and other devices of citizens of
the United States. I have had the pleas-
ure of testifying before Mr. KASTEN-
MEIER'S subcommittee on Congressman
Mosim's bill, H.R. 2604, the Bill of
Rights Procedures Act of 1975. I am a
cosponsor of that legislation, as I was in
the preceding Congress. This is impor-
tant legislation and Congressman
MOSHER is to be congratulated for being
its author and chief proponent in the
House of Representatives.
I do not believe that there is anyone
who can question the interest of myself
or my family in the quick and successful
combating of individual and organized
crime in the United States. I agree fully
with former Chief Justice Earl Warren's
statement that the modern law enforce-
ment community must utilize all that is
legitimately available to it, including the
fruits of modern technology, in its battle
to stop crime and end lawlessness. The
quality of our life and the future of our
society are at stake in this battle against
crime.
My support for this bill stems from my
deep and sincere belief that the inalien-
able rights and liberties found in the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights?
especially the 1st, 4th, and 14th amend-
ments relating to freedom of speech and
association, security in one's property
and personal possessions, and the right
to due process?are being erroded by the
increasing use of surveillance as a pri-
mary tool and investigative aid by the
law enforcement community. There is
loose an idea that electronic gadgets and
surveillance are by definition helpful in
the prevention ef crime and in the suc-
cessful prosecution of criminals. This at-
titude is apparently an outgrowth of
American technocracy: that things sci-
entific and technical in their general ap-
plication to daily life are good, healthy,
and desirable. It causes citizens and
members of the law enforcement commu-
nity to assume that the activity is com-
patable with our basic rights and liber-
ties. But, such applications, when left
unquestioned, can clearly lead to abuse
and misuse.
This propensity recently received its
confirmation in the Watergate break-in
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
11 5552
Approved Fot6NtaftEMML3W-16r119.11711ffrgi4R0008001100,0-9
une 16, 1975
Revenue Sharing of the GAO report and
intend to forward such information as
may be gathered in congressional inves-
tigations for them to act upon.
The Office of Revenue Sharing has the
authority to conduct its own investiga-
tion into matters such as this. If they
determine that "improper" use of rev-
enue-sharing funds has occurred, they
may take action on one of several levels,
including demanding that the funds im-
properly used be returned to the Federal
Treasury.
There is no doubt that the responsibil-
ity of the Office of Revenue Sharing is
clear in these cases of policy spying. Il-
legal surveillance certainly constitutes
improper use of Federal funds. If it can
be determined by either the courts or by
a committee of the Congress, that such
surveillance was, indeed, illegal, I would
hope that the -Office of Revenue Sharing
uses its authority in this matter to apply
the most strict penalties against States
and cities that use Federal revenue-
sharing funds in this manner.
The General Accounting Office report
outlined the use of LEAA funds, as well,
by the police intelligence division. Nearly
$4 million of these funds was used by the
city of Chicago to establish a computer
system to which many city agencies, in-
cluding the intelligence division, seem to
have had access. In light of the wide-
spread misuse of such data banks by both
government and private groups, this too
would seem a matter for further study.
The General Accounting Office ob-
tained information on one other aspect
of intelligence activities in the Chicago
area. This concerned the 113th Military
Intelligence Group and its alleged sup-
port of right-wing terrorist activities. Ac-
cording to these reports, this Regular
Army unit provided information and
weapons to militant groups such as the
Legion of Justice and assisted them in
the systematic disruption of various lib-
eral organizations in the Chicago area.
These same reports alleged that the 113th
Military Intelligence Group exchanged
information and received assistance from
the intelligence division of the Chicago
Police Department.
The GAO, in its investigation, could
only determine that most files of the
113th Military Intelligence Group had
been burned in 1972 and those that had
not been destroyed "were not readily
available."
Mr. Speaker, Chicago may be one of
the most blatant examples of such mis-
use of authority by high administrative
officials, but it is certainly not the only
example. Similar cases have been report-
ed in Philadelphia. Baltimore, and Hous-
ton in recent months and this, too, may
only be the tip of the iceberg.
At the time the GAO report on police
ntelligence activities in Chicago was re-
leased, I called the activities it outlined
`an obscene misuse of governmental
authority."
What I said about Chicago is equally
true about other cities where this may
have happened and equally true about
the Federal Government's illegal surveil-
lance activities.
These abuses have infected nearly
and in the illegal surveillance conducted
by the so-called plumbers unit. There,
surveillance was conducted that directly
violated our Constitution. Some of it
was accomplished through the misuse of
legitimate law enforcement operations.
In a few instances, Federal law enforce-
ment personnel unwittingly contributed
to the nroblem because they had no com-
prehensive, commonly identified and
agreed with criterion for judging the
legitimacy of the activity.
I have a sense of urgency about this
area of activity for each of us knows that
recent events do not stand alone. They
are not an abberation. To varying and
often lesser degrees, we know of events
like Watergate and of excesses in the
general law enforcement community
going back over 30 years. And, the
current situation at the Federal level
cries for improvement. Simply put, there
is too much vaguely defined administra-
tive authority within the executive
branch that applies to the area of sur-
veillance. Operational authority is so
widely dispersed as to undermine stand-
ardization of surveillance criterion and
decisions. And, the situation has not been
made any better by the recent conflicting
and contradictory court decisions that
have been added to the "surveillance
mix."
Clearly what is needed is legislation
that defines the term surveillance, re-
stricts and regularizes the authority for
undertaking surveillance, and that estab-
lishes strong penalties for violations of
basic civil rights through illegitimate
surveillance. The Mosher bill, H.R. 2604
does these things. For that reason I com-
mend it to the careful attention of the
House. And, I thank my colleague for
arranging for this special discussion and
giving me the opportunity to participate.
Mr. METCALFE. Mr. Speaker, every-
where we turn today, we see Govern-
ment infringing on the civil liberties of
its citizens. This Government surveil-
lance, this keeping of dossiers, these
dirty tricks seem to pervade every level
of American Government today. These
activities have taken many forms, they
have been overt and covert, they have
been insidious and they have been un-
disguised.
The list of those Government de-
partments and agencies involved in this
spying seems endless. The White House,
the FBI, the CIA, the IRS, the Secret
Service, the U.S. Army, and State and
local government in at least four States,
have allegedly been involved in main-
taining -files or improper surveillance on
tens of thousands of American citizens.
A pattern of abuse is clear. On every
governmental level, we see elected rep-
resentatives of the people and their
agents conducting improper and illegal
surveillance activities for the sole pur-
pose of identifying and harassing dis-
senters and political opponents who, for
the most part, exercise their constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights in a legal and
lawful manner.
Abuses on the Federal level have been
well documented in recent months. The
laundered Rockefeller Commission re-
port, even with its extensive gaps, is
simply the latest in a long and sad series
on revelations concerning misuse of
power within the Federal executive
branch.
These same kinds of abuses, on State
and local levels, have not yet been so
well documented. Enough of these activ-
ities have been disclosed, however, to
give us a strong indication that the Fed-
eral Government was not alone during
the past 10 years in its illegal surveil-
lance.
We have seen cases of State and local
agencies, in some cases using Federal
funds, maintaining improper and pos-
sibly illegal surveillance on private citi-
zens. In my home city of Chicago, for ex-
ample, it has become clear that the police
intelligence division was used, at least in
part, to maintain surveillance upon thou-
sands of Chicago area residents who
never had been the subject of criminal
investigations. Police officials have ac-
knowledged after months of denials, that
surveillance was maintained and files
were kept on literally thousands of Chi-
cagoans whose only "crime" was some
connection with any one of dozens of
political, civic, and community groups
within the city who the administration
perceived as a threat to its policies. Files
were maintained on, among other people,
Senator CHARLES PERCY; myself; Father
Theodore Hesburgh, president of Notre
Dame University; Arthur Woods, chair-
man of the board, Sears, & Co.; Illinois
State Attorney Bernard Carey; and Illi-
nois State representative; and at least
three aldermen of the city of Chicago.
In addition, secret grand jury testi-
mony of the former superintendent of
the Chicago Police Department, made
available to the press indicates that the
Superintendent was aware of illegal sur-
veillance activities, including wiretap-
ping and burglaries which were under-
taken by the intelligence division.
The General Accounting Office has re-
cently completed, at the request of myself
and others, an investigation into the
use of Federal funds for these activities.
It has determined that nearly $10 mil-
lion was spent on the police intelligence
division between 1972 and 1974. Nearly
$5 million of these funds were Federal
moneys?$3.9 million to LEAA funds and
between $539,000 and $779,000 in revenue
sharing funds.
The GAO was unable to determine
whether or not revenue sharing funds
were used to pay salaries of those officers
who engaged in the political spying of the
intelligence division. Its lack of subpena
power and a continuing State grand jury
investigation severely limited its investi-
gation in this respect.
Enough information was gathered by
the GAO. however, to warrant further
investigation. Therefore, I have written
Chairman Roratro of the House Judiciary
Committee and Chairman ULLMAN of the
Ways and Means Committee, whose com-
mittees, of course, do have subpena
power, asking them to determine pre-
cisely what role Federal funds played in
the political intelligence activities of the
Chicago Police Department.
In the case of the revenue-sharing
funds, I have also informed the Office of
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
June 16, 19proved For Recitkvt,RomissaLWEeORTY-M01101M00800110060-9 H 5553
h3
every level of government in this country,
and in almost every single case, the Fed-
eral Government seems involved, either
directly or indirectly.
Whether it is the use of Federal money
to fund the intelligence activities of local
police departments or the improper use
of Federal data banks or Army support
of right-wing terrorists or Cointelpro or
the White House plumbers or any of the
others, these sickening abuses of the
"*Constitution have gone far enough.
If unchecked, these activities could in
a very real sense, mean the end of Amer-
ican democracy as we know it. Should
they continue on the massive scale that
they have existed in recent years, a
cornerstone of our system of govern-
ment?the right of dissent?would be in
serious jeopardy.
Corrupt and power hungry officials and
petty despots to the contrary, however,
the first amendment is still with us.
? Those of us who see injustice and in-
equality in this country will continue to
speak out in order to make this a better
country. We will not be deterred. We will
not be intimidated.
Activities such as those I have outlined
here today, will only redouble our efforts
to speak out against these abuses.
This Congress, however, must put a
stop to these activities wherever they
occur. 11 1 cent of Federal money, money
that we appropriate, is used for these
abuses, it is our responsibility, Our obli-
gation, to expose it and end it, once and
for all.
Mr. GUYER. Mr. Speaker, as indicated
by Vice President ROCKEFELLER'S recent
report on the CIA, there is a definite need
for more powerful legislation to further
protect the individual's right to privacy.
Despite the fact that most States have
enacted laws to protect the individual,
the right of privacy is often routinely
violated. I am referring to cases in which
individuals are victimized by information
on mailing lists that Government agen-
cies unethically make available. Citizens
are forced to provide personal informa-
tion about their public and private lives
to such organizations as census bureaus,
credit associations, police files, and
others. Even information from personal
income tax reports is often not kept con-
fidential.
Personal records are almost as readily
available as the daily newspaper?and all
too often, the individual is unaware that
the information contained in his records
is being clandestinely used.
The continuance of invasion of per-
sonal privacy is not only degrading and
embarrassing but is an outright con-
tradiction to the spirit of the fourth
amendment. In a nation where individ-
uality is so greatly treasured, tolerance
of such invasion is unpardonable.
? From my participation in the Repub-
lican task force on privacy, I became
acutely aware of the many abuses made
on the individual with regard to loss of
privacy. During our concentrated efforts
to protect the rights of juvenile offenders,
we unearthed countless cases where, due
to readily accessible court and police rec-
ords, these individuals have been branded
"criminal" for life, and thus have been
denied equal opportunities with other
citizens of the country. There is an ob-
vious need to eliminate such stigmatizing
effects and to allow the individual to be-
come a member of society with a clear
slate.
I am especially hopeful that violations
of the right to privacy will soon become
a relic of the past. The right to privacy
is a freedom that should be guaranteed
and cherished by all.
Mr. KEMP. Mr. Speaker, I wish, first,
to commend my colleague, the gentleman
from Ohio (Mr. MOSHER) , for providing
Members an opportunity this afternoon
to address the problems associated with
assuring the individual's right to privacy.
The gentleman has been in the forefront
of efforts to safeguard privacy?efforts
which have been, and are continuing to
be, transformed into legislation and en-
acted into law. Together with other Mem-
bers, such as the gentleman from Cali-
fornia (Mr. GOLDWATER) he has helped
to increase substantially the conscious-
ness of Members and the public on the
nature of the threat to personal privacy.
This has been one of the principal is-
sues in which I have been involved also.
I think the protection of personal privacy
is fundamental to the rights of free men
and women?the specific rights enumer-
ated in our Constitution and the prem-
ises which underlie them. It is a pro-
tection against the unwarranted intru-
sion of someone else into the life of the
individual, and if one examines the mul-
titude of actual and alleged violations of
this right to privacy in recent years one
can see quite clearly that "someone else"
is most often an instrument of govern-
ment.
The intrusions upon privacy and the
growth of government have been coexist-
ent.
Nothing is more to blame for the rise
in government interference and inter-
vention in our private lives and security
than the notion that government can
solve all our problems and must be given,
therefore, the unrestricted range of au-
thority to do so.
Only when we, come to full grips with
those notions will we ever secure our-
selves and our posterity against infringe-
ments on the right of privacy.
Jefferson observed that:
It is the natural course ,of events that
liberty recedes and government grows.
While accurate, Jefferson's observa-
tion stated only one specific aspect of
a larger and more complex equation. To
wit: As external, collective human con-
trol over, and interference( with, a per-
son's life intensifies, individual liberty
shrinks proportionally.
In this larger sense, the real threat to
Individual liberty is the collective will of
any, institution or group of people which
has the power?economic, political, or
whatever?to coerce, intimidate, control,
deny, or even give. The recognition that
it is the natural course of events for lib-
erty to recede as government grows is,
then, only one manifestation of threats
to liberty, albeit the most evident threat
in both Jefferson's and our times.
The lessons of history teach us that
this growth of collective power can come
from institutions other than govern-
ment. The problem is not singularly the
"bigness" of these institutions, in rela-
tion to the individual and the exercise of
free choice, but such "bigness" does ac-
centuate the problem. It tends to reduce
the range of alternative choices of con-
duct available to the individual.
In the 20th century, particularly in our
Nation, it has been the growth of?the
"bigness" of?government which has
posed the single greatest threat to hu-
man liberty. This growth in government
is occasioned by the erroneous notion;
that only government can solve the ma-
jor social, economic, and societal prob-
lems of our era, and that government
schemes and regulations are preferable
to the laws of supply and demand and
the exercise of free choice by individuals.
Woodrow Wilson, a doctor of philoso-
phy in history and a recognized scholar
on the processes of maintaining indi-
vidual rights before coming to the Presi-
dency, warned that?
Liberty has never come from government.
. . . The history of liberty is the history of
limitations of government power, not the
increase of it.
In contradistinction to the classical
liberalism embodied in these profound
observations of Jefferson and Wilson, de-
spite the clear warnings from history as
prior human experience, and even de-
spite the all-too-apparent results of the
rapid growth of government in our mod-
ern age, we seem, as a people, to have
learned little. For, that government has
grown disproportionately to the whole of
society is factually indisputable, and that
such growth has occasioned an ever-
growing threat to individual liberty is, in
my opinion, equally indisputable.
In both absolute and percentage terms,
government's growth has been virtually
without restraint during the past nearly
half century. It has exceeded all bounds
of necessity and perspective.
What are the facts?
Between 1940 and 1976?
The Federal Government's gross an-
nual revenue rose by 42 times--from $7
billion to $297.5 billion;
Total Federal expenditures rose by 35
times?from $10.1 billion to $349.4 bil-
lion?and will probably go even much
higher in 1976;
The Federal debt outstanding rose by
14 times?from $42 billion to $605 -plus
billion;
Federal expenditures per person rose
by over 15 times;
The Congress enacted nearly 15,000
public law;
Federal employment zoomed to over
2.8 million people;
Federal forms, to be painstakingly
filled out by individuals and corporations,
grew and grew in number and com-
plexity;
Federal investigatory surveillance, and
monitoring staffs grew to enforce each
and every measure:
The number of Federal initiatives,
most of which are reinforced through
interventionist regulatory powers and
policies, mushroomed; and
The Federal agencies which execute
these powers and policies?and, fre-
quently, call for more?grew accordingly.
It is almost impossible to itemize the
areas of conduct now subject to Federal
Approved For Release 2001/08/30: CIA7RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
II 5554
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?HOUSE June 16, 1975
control because there are so many, but
a cursory examination of any Govern-
ment organization chart shows us the
areas of our lives now subject to Govern-
ment regulation; health, education, wel-
fare, labor, Commerce, housing, trans-
portation, finance, agriculture, environ-
ment, communications, wages and prices,
energy. labor-management relations,
trade, alcohol, tobacco, firearms, savings,
community relations, civil affairs, land
and natural resource uses, recreation,
commodities, securities, insurance, mar-
keting, consumer affairs, productivity,
nutrition, research, forestry, product
standards, travel, economic development,
shipping, vocational and career oppor-
tunities, employment standards, occupa-
tional safety, child development, retire-
ment and income security, rehabilitation,
interest rates, credit availability, land
sales, aviation, railroads, highways,
safety, institutionalized voluntarism, arts
and humanities, equal employment op-
portunity, export-import terms, truck-
ing, small business, veterans, postal serv-
ice. ad infinitum.
The unfortunate, yet perhaps inescap-
able, impact of the exercise of this vast
amount of Government authority was in-
fringement upon privacy.
The manifestations were myriad; data
banks. -wiretapping, electronic surveil-
lance, eavesdropping, credit histories,
medical histories, income tax informa-
tion, information systems, regulatory
report filings, disclosure statements,
data exchanges.
Separately?and, most assuredly,
when taken collectively?these devices
and procedures add up to a growing in-
fringement on the right to be let alone,
the right to privacy.
We simply must come to better under-
stand the relationship between the ex-
tent of government and the threats to
privacy. Government can carry out its
almost unlimited functions only through
information gathering, analysis, dissem-
ination, and exchange. Thus, we should
reduce the range of those functions.
We can, and we should, do those thing's
which we think are necessary to protect
the right of privacy, and such measures
RS the Privacy Act of 1974 are definitely
steps in the right direction,
think most Members are aware of my
efforts in that regard?the sponsorship
of legislation which was incorporated
into that act. the Goldwater-Kemp pri-
vacy amendments to the Federal Energy
Act of 1974, the support for additional
protection of student records, the intro-
duction of the first comprehensive medi-
cal privacy proposal. But throughout that
work I was, and I remain, constantly
aware of the more fundamental causes
of the intrusions we are trying to guard
against?the growth in Government in-
tervention in our private lives.
We can address the causes of invasion
of privacy with substantial effectiveness
only when we address the size and ex-
tent of government and set about to re-
duce and limit it.
This, I think, we must very soon do, or
our entire way of life will be substanti-
ally altered?and it will not be for the
good.
GENERAL LEAVE
Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, I
ask unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days in which to
revise and extend their remarks on the
subject of the special order today of the
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Mosirea).
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the req test of the gentleman from Wis-
consin?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. (Mr.
McFssr . Under a previous order of the
House, the gentleman from Pennsyl-
vania (Mr. COUGHLIN), is recognized for
60 minutes.
[Mr. COUGHLIN addressed the House.
His remarks will appear hereafter in the
Extensions of Remarks.1
ANNIVERSARY OF THE LENINGRAD
TRIAL
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from Pennsylvania (Mr. EILBERG),
Is recognized for 30 minutes.
Mr. EMBERG. Mr. Speaker, on this
date 5 years ago the Russian Govern-
ment shocked, and outraged the world
by sentencing 11 persons, 9 Jews and 2
Christians, to death or lengthy prison
terms for simply trying to act as free
men are supposed to be allowed to act.
The sentences, which were imposed to
deter other persons from their "dissi-
dent" activities were partially reduced
after protests poured in from around the
world.
Despite the harshness of the sentences
and other continued and brutal harass-
ment by the Soviet Government the Jews
of Russia are still trying to emigrate to
freedom.
Last month I visited Russia with some
other Members of Congress and we were
able to meet with some of these men and
women in Moscow and Leningrad. In
Kiev the people whom we were supposed
to see wese ordered out of the city for
the duration of our visit, but we were
able to meet with the wife of one of the
men who had applied for an exit visa.
In Moscow we spoke with: Vitaly
Rubin, Leonid Raines, Irma Chernyak,
Sophia Belotserkovskaya, Alexander
Lerner, Ida Nudel, Vladimir Slepak,
Anatoly Scharansky, and Joseph and
Dina Beilin.
Our Leningrad meetings were with;
Leopold Ekchilevsky, Boris Krumgalz,
Mark Freedin, Vladimir Sverdlin, Alex-
andr and Oksana Chertin. George Saki-
riusky, Dia and Elleonora Ginsburg,
Jeaniette "Janne" Kartseva, Felix
Aronovich. and Ilya Shostakovsky.
As I stated previously, the people with
whom we were supposed to meet in Kiev
were ordered out of the city. Their names
are: Ilya Zlobinsky, Vadim Sheinis,
Aleksandr Mizrukhin, Vladimir Kislik,
and Kim Fridman.
We were, however, able to meet and
talk to Mizrukhin's wife, Mile..
Every one of these people, without hes-
itation, said they wanted their cause
and themselves individually to get as
much publicity and support as possible.
They all asked us to mention their names
to the Russian officials with whom we
would be meeting later.
They absolutely contradicted the peo-
ple in this country who claim we are
hurting them or the cause of Soviet
Jewry by publicly supporting them or
putting pressure on the Soviet Govern-
ment in their behalf.
At this time Mr. Speaker, I would like
to place on the RECORD a statement of
support for the persons sentenced 5
years ago today at the Leningrad trials
and the more than 40 Soviet Jews who
have been imprisoned for trying to reach
freedom.
STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR PERSONS
SENTENCED
Five years ago today, justice was a victim
of the Soviet legal system,.
On this date in 1970, the Soviet govern-
ment shocked the world with the arrest of
eleven persons. All received harsh prison
terms, some as long as 15 years. One was sen-
tenced to death, but in response to cries of
outrage from the free world, the sentence
was commuted to 15 years.
Nine Jews and two Christians. They were
the "criminals" of the First Leningrad Trial.
For keeping typewriters in their homes,
they were criminals.
For owning books with the word "Jew"
In them, they were criminals. And for pos-
sessing letters from relatives in Israel, they
were criminals.
What followed their arrest was part of a
systematic plan to subdue the remarkable
Jewish national movement that emerged in
the USSR. It was a plan whose goal was to
silence and intimidate Jews seeking to emi-
grate to Israel. The defendants were charged
with such crimes as "betrayal of the father-
land:" "responsibility for the preparation of
a crime and for attempted crimes:" "misap-
propriation of State or public property;"
"anti-Soviet agitation or propaganda:" and
'participation in an anti-Soviet organza-
,ion."
Sadly, the Leningrad Trial was only the
leginning. Since then the Soviet Union has
-1sed its legal system to harass Soviet Jews
"vhose only crime is the desire to emigrate
to their ancient homeland, Israel?a right
1,uaranteed by Soviet law and international
Within recent months Mark Nashpits and
Boris Tsitlionik were arrested and sentenced
ta five years in exile for demonstrating on
ehalf of Soviet Jewish prisoners of consci-
e ace, including those convicted in the Len-
agrad Trials of 1970.
Mikhail Leviev, a Soviet Jew who sought an
eKit visa, was tried and sentenced to death
f -a? "economic crimes"; and Dr. Mikhail
S_ Item, a highly respected Vinnitsa physi-
c an, has been sentenced to eight years hard
h bor on trumped-up charges of accepting
ribes from his patients.
In these and other cases the defendants
cre refused counsel of their choice. Testi-
n my on their behalf was suppressed and
d-cuments fraudulently altered in order to
ccnvict them.
The arrests that took plade on June 15th,
li,10 are a reminder of the extremes to which
Sr viet authorities will go in seeking to pre-
In at Soviet Jews from emigrating to Israel.
But those arrests were not accepted in
si ence by men and women of conscience
throughout the free world. Just today, for
Instance, more than 500 lawyers from
throughout Greater Philadelphia have joined
to publish a newspaper advertisement vole.-
in t their outrage at this mockery of justice..
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
June 16, igeffroved For ReltmaRygMAElhEtIRSIMMOOMM0800110060-9 H 5543
the Veterans' Disability Compensation
Survivor Benefit Act (H.R. 7767) . I was
conferring with some other Members
and missed the vote.
Had I voted, I would have voted for
passage of the act.
PERSONAL EXPLANATION
(Mr. KEMP asked and was given per-
mission to address the House for 1 min-
ute).
Mr. KEMP. Mr. Speaker, on the Arm-
strong amendment I was temporarily de-
layed in my office with constituents._Had
I been present I would haye voted "aye."
GENERAL LEAVE
Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr.
Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that
all Members may have 5 legislative days
in which to revise and extend their re-
marks and to include therein extraneous
material on the subject of the special
order today by the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. EILBERG).
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Mc-
FALL). Is there objection to the request
of the gentleman from New York?
4,-,--peAViserevias no objection:
PRIVACY RIGHTS AND GOVERMENT
SURVEILLANCE
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
a previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from Ohio (Mr. MOSHER) is recog-
nized for 60 minutes.
(Mr. MOSHER asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. MOSHER. Mr. Speaker, in re-
cent years we have become increasingly
aware of the dangers that are posed to
the rights to privacy of American citi-
zens. In particular, we have become
aware of the dangers of warrantless
Government surveillance activities.
It is the purpose of this special order
to publicly express the concern felt by
many Members of Congress over the dual
Issues of rights-to-privacy and Govern-
ment surveillance activities.
Joining me today as cosponsor of this
special order is the gentleman from
Wisconsin (Mr. KASTENMEIER). We be-
lieve a bipartisan group of Members will
join us in this dialog.
When we requested the time for this
order we could not know that it would
come just a few days after the release of
the Rockefeller Commission's report to
the President. Certainly that report
makes this special order especially time-
ly and topical today.
Mr. KASTENMEIER and his Subcommit-
tee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Ad-
ministration of Justice have done a com-
mendable job of disclosing and docu-
menting questionable surveillance activ-
ities, and other congressional panels also
are bringing to light various abuses of
the Government's surveillance authority.
Other Members participating in this
special order may be discussing those
specific abuses or usurpations of rights-
to-privacy, and these will be helpful in
illustrating the nature of the problem.
But I think it also is important for us
to look beyond the actual events to their
implications.
Mx. Speaker, I am, especially con-
cerned by the "chilling effect" of war-
rantless Government surveillance. The
number of persons who are actually sub-
ject to surveillance is relatively small,
but a far larger number of people do be-
gin to fear that they are being secretly
monitored by the Government.
It is not uncommon for me, or for any
Member of Congress, to receive a letter
from a constituent that begins or ends,
"I know I'll probably end up in some FBI
or CIA file for making this complaint
* * *" Of course, such fears are essen-
tially needless, but they are real and
widespread nonetheless. I suggest we
should examine here why law-abiding
citizens live in fear of being spied upon
by their own Government.
We have no way of measuring how
many citizens fear to petition their
elected representatives for a "redress of
grievances" simply a right assured by the
Constitution, fear because they believe
their names will be placed in some omi-
nous Government file. We cannot count
how many citizens have been kept away
from political gatherings for fear that
they would be photographed and in-
dexed into someone's file. No one knows
how many individuals decline to con-
tribute to political organizations for fear
of being identified as "subversives" by
their Government.
We have no Way of telling how many
people are afraid to talk freely on their
telephones, because they suspect that a
click or a buzz on the line may be a
telltale sign of a wiretap installed by
Big Brother.
The point of all this is that 'many
individuals are living in fear that their
private activities may be monitored by
the Government. The chilling effect of
this is that many citizens consequently
refrain from writing to their representa-
tives, refrain from writing letters to
newspaper editors, stay away from po-
litical meetings, and otherwise shy away
from the lawful exercise of their consti-
tutional rights. It is a shame that any
American citizen would live in fear of
our own Government?the Goverment
which is supposed to protect and pre-
serve our rights.
To remedy this situation, Senator
MATHIAS and I have introduced the Bill
of Rights Procedures Act (H.R. 314). I
am pleased to note that we are joined
by more than 70 cosponsors in the
House; and I see that many of them are
here to participate in this evening's
special order.
Essentially, the Bill of Rights Proce-
dures Act provides that no agent of the
Federal Government can conduct any
form of surveillance on an American
citizen?for any reason?unless a court
order is obtained upon a showing of prob-
able cause. Any person who participates
in a warrantless wiretap or any other
warrantless surveillance activity would
be personally liable to criminal penalties.
Mr. Speaker, I think we must recog-
nize that surveillance, or any other in-
fringement of a person's basic right-to-
privacy, is an infringement of the citi-
zen's constitutional rights. In my view,
only the courts should have the authority
to permit abridgments of the individ-
ual's constitutional rights.
Presently, we have yielded to the ex-
ecutive branch frightening amounts of
discretionary authority in the area of
surveillance. I think it is now time that
we in the Congress move to restore the
proper safeguards for citizens' rights.
The Bill of Rights Procedures Act is
not the only rights-to-privacy bill now
pending in the Congress. There are many
other bills as well. Regardless of which
bill or bills finally are accepted, the ob-
ject remains clear. We must act quickly
to assure private citizens that they shall
not be subject to capricious surveillance
by the Government.
We must remove the Executive's dis-
cretionary authority to invade citizen's
privacy. We must restore the courts to
their proper role as arbitrator between
the citizens' rights to privacy and the
State's need to protect society.
It is our hope that this special order
will help to illustrate the intensity of con-
gressional feeling on rights-to-privacy
and the dangers posed by our present
state of virtually unlimited authority for
Government surveillance activities.
Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. MOSHER. I yield to the gentleman
from Wisconsin.
(Mr. KASTENMEIER asked and was
given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, as
chairman of the House subcommittee
now considering a number of legislative
proposals designed to limit the scope of
Government surveillance of Americans
I am pleased to join with my colleague
from Ohio, Congressman Mosias, in
sponsoring today's special order.
The scope of surveillance practices and
resulting invasions of personal privacy is
so vast that it is difficult to define nar-
rowly the subjects requiring close con-
gressional scrutiny and legislative
reform.
For example, the eavesdropper may be
a Federal investigator or an intelligence
agent, a local policeman, or -a private in-
vestigator, a soldier or a civilian. He may
use a wiretap or a bug. He may choose a
method totally unrelated to electronic
technology, such as examining our credit,
bank, medical, or business records. He
may open mail or he may cover mail?
examine outside of envelopes sent to us.
He may engage in eavesdropping pursu-
ant to a court order or he may simply
claim that the national security re-
quires it. His surveillance may be legal or
illegal.
My Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Administration of
Justice has already held a number of days
of hearings both this session and in the
93d Congress each dealing with a differ-
ent aspect of the problem, and we intend
to continue our work with the twin goals
of providing the Congress with sound leg-
islation and assuring the enforcement of
existing laws through vigorous oversight.
These hearings have, without a doubt,
established that the fundamental right
to privacy in America is today in a state
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
II 5544
Approved Fegeatamsylay/Wka/ORPATM 44R000800110010 16, 1975
of siege. Consider for a moment these ex-
amples from the testimony presented to
our subcommittee.
National security wiretapping: Despite
the plethora of revelations cascading
down upon us almost daily during the
last year about the abuses of the so-
called national security rational for Gov-
erment surveillance, the Department of
Justice continues to conduct approxi-
mately 100 warrantless wiretaps each
year. These wiretaps 'are not supervised
by any court; they are not reported to
the Congress; the subject of the wire-
tap is never notified that he has been
surveilled; he has no protection except
the goodwill of the intelligence gather-
ing bureaucracy. These national securi-
ty wiretaps may go on indefinitely. In-
deed, we heard testimony about one tap
directed against a domestic organization
which lasted for 25 years.
Telephone company monitoring: In
addition to indefinite warrentless wire-
tapping by Government intelligence
agencies we have also received extensive
evidence of the highly questionable
eavesdropping practices of the Nation's
largest telephone system?American
Telephone and Telegraph Co. Between
1965 and 1970, according to testimony of
Bell executives, the company secretly
monitored over 30,000,000 telephone calls
made by its customers. The subjects of
these surveillances were never notified
even though the purpose of the moni-
toring was to gain information which
might lead to criminal charges against
them. I should note that this practice
Is justified under a questionable extep-
tion to Federal wiretap laws which allows
the phone company even greater freedom
in conducting wiretapping than law en-
forcement agencies enjoy.
Police wiretapping: The subcommittee
heard testimony from the chief of police
of a major U.S. city describing systematic
use of illegal wiretapping by police offi-
cers. In some cases this wiretapping was
conducted with the knowledge of the
very Federal law enforcement agents
charged with enforcing existing anti-
eavesdropping laws. What is particularly
shocking is .that evidence from these
wiretaps was often disguished as having
come from unidentified informants and
used as the basis for search and arrest
warrants which ultimately led to con-
victions and prison terms for the unwit-
ting subjects of the surveillances. This is
completely repulsive tcrour centuries old
concept of due process of law.
Illegal private political wiretapping:
The same police chief who revealed ex-
tensive police wiretapping also made the
shocking observation that any person in
his city in a "controversial position
which possibly includes everyone in po-
litical life" is probably wiretapped "on a
fairly regular basis," in many cases by
private wiretappers operating wholly
outside the law.
Other forms of surveillance: We have
also learned that the pervasive use of
surveillance does not stop at wiretapping.
It includes inspection of personal, sup-
posedly private records as well. For ex-
example, the way the famous White
House plumbers found out, that Daniel
Ellsberg was using the services of Dr.
Henry Fielding, a psychiatrist whose of-
fice they burgled, was by examining rec-
ords of his checking account, supplied
by a friendly bank teller.
Not only are our telephones and pri-
vate records subject to outside scrutiny,
but our mail as well. The Chief Post In-
spector of the United States told our sub-
committee that for 20 years the Central
Intelligence Agency opened and read the
mail of American citizens, knowing that
this practice was a violation of existing
Federal law.
Not only has mail been opened and
read, but every year the correspondence
of thousands of Americans is monitored
regularly by the process known as a mail
cover?the systematic recording of in-
formation contained on the outside of
envelopes. By this means any State, lo-
cal, or Federal body claiming to be an
investigative agency can find out how
many letters you send or receive and with
whom you are corresponding. There are
presently no statutory safeguards
against abuses of this practice. The Pos-
tal Service admits that it regularly con-
ducts mail covers for agencies with such
questionable connections with normal
police work as a local real estate com-
mission, a welfare department, and a
State fish and game commission.
Fortunately, the abuses of Government
power and of modern technology which
I have just described have not gone un-
noticed by Members of the House. At the
Present time 24 bills directed to the prob-
lem, sponsored by over 100 Members,
are pending in my subcommittee
It is my hope that after further analy-
sis by the subcommittee and the full
Judiciary Committee, this House as a
whole, will have an opportunity to de-
bate and vote on one or more of these
proposals.
I am taking the liberty of inserting
into the' RECORD a short description of
these pending bills.
Mr. Speaker, at this time I would re-
quest unanimous consent that the record
remain open for 5 business days so that
Members not present may submit their
views on this important subject.
SURVEILLANCE BILLS PENDING IN SUBCOMMIT-
TEE ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
H.H. 191 by Mr. Kastenmeier (Surveillance
Practices and Procedures Act of 1975). Re-
quires a court order for national security
wiretaps. Also mandates regular reports to
House and Senate Judiciary and Foreign Af-
fairs Committees on national security wire-
tapping and electronic surveillance.
HR. 112 by Mr. Kastenmeier (Freedom
from Military Surveillance Act of 1975).
Makes investigation, surveillance, and rec-
ord keeping regarding the beliefs, associa-
tions. political activities or private lives of
civilian citizens by the military a crime pun-
ishable by up to two years imprisonment or
$10,000 fine. Also provides for civil cause
of action, including class action, for actual
and punitive damages in the case of such
surveillance.
(Identical bills are: H.R. 266, Boland. HR.
2753, 2754, 2862 and 3284, 4339 Steelman and
49 others.
H.R. 539 by Holtzman and HR. 2556 by
Abzug are the same bill with slightly differ-
ent language).
H.R. 171 by Ms. Abzug. Makes wiretapping
and electronic surveillance conducted with
the consent of one party to the conversation
Illegal, unless pursuant to a court order.
(Same effect as H.R. 620 by Long.)
H.R. 214 by Mr. Mosher (Bill of Rights Pro-
cedures Act of 1975). Prohibits interception
of any communication by electronic or other
devices, surreptitious entry, mail opening, or
the inspection or procuring of bank, tele-
phone, credit, medical, or other business or
private records without a court order based
?)ri. probable cause a crime has been or is
about to be committed. Because probable
cause is required, this bill effectively abol-
ishes national security surveillance for in-
telligence purposes.
(Identical bills are: H.R. 414, Fish and H.R.
2330, 2603, 2604, 3113, 3467, 3855, 3874, Mosher
and 71 cosposors.)
H.R. 620 by Mr. Long of Maryland. Same
effect as H.R. 171 by Ms. Abzug. Makes wire-
tapping, recording, and electronic surveil-
lance conducted with the consent of one or
more parties to a conversation, but without
the consent of all parties, illegal unless au-
thorized by a court order.
(H.R. 620 has 13 co-sponsors; HR. 2453, an
identical bill, has 1 cosponsor for a total of
14 co-sponsors.)
H.R. 1603 by Mr. Drinan. Makes all wire-
tapping and electronic surveillance illegal by
deleting those sections of the law currently
authorizing such activity when authorized by
a court order.
H.R. 1864 by Mr. Kastenmeter (Freedom
from Surveillance Act of 1975). Makes in-
vestigation, surveillance, and record keeping
regarding the beliefs, associations, political
activity or private affairs of American citi-
zens punishable by one year imprisonment,
$10,000 fine or both, unless such activity is
conducted upon reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that the subject' of the surveillance has
committed a felony or is an applicant for
federal employment.
BILLS WITH MULTIPLE COSPONSORS
Ha. 214 (Bill of Rights Procedures Act, Mr.
Mosher, chief sponsor) total-72 Sponsors.
H.R. 414 (H.R. 2330, Mosher and 25 co-
sponsors) : Fish, Abzug, Anderson (Calif.),
Badillo, Conte, Conyers, Coughlin, Duncan,
Forsythe, Harrington, Helstoski, Holtzman,
McCormack, McKinney, Moorhead (Calif.),
Pettis, Quie, Regula, Roe, Ruppe, Sarasin,
Selberling, Stark, Talcott, Charles Wilson
(Tex.), Won Pat.
H.R. 2605, Mosher and 14 co-sponsors) :
Anderson (Ill.), Andrews (N.D.), Ashley, Bell,
Brown (Calif.), Each, Frenzel, Heinz, O'Brien,
Pritchard, Richmond, Solarz, Symington,
Whalen.
(HR. 2604, Mosher and 7 co-sponsors) :
Goldwater, Conlon, Heckler, Hinshaw, Hor-
ton, Lagomarsino, Thone.
(H.R. 3113, Mosher and 13 co-sponsors) :
Biester, Boggs, Cohen, Fenwick, Hechler
(W. Va.), Jeffords, McCloskey, Melcher,
Mitchell (Md.), Patterson (Calif.), Rangel,
Schroeder, Studds.
(HR. 3467, Mosher and 8 co-sponsors) :
Baldus, Fauntroy, Howe, Jeffords, Matsunaga,
Spellman, Steelman, Stokes.
(H.R. 3855) : Hammerschmidt.
(H.R. 3874, Mosher, Hammerschmidt and
2 others) : Keys, Long (Md.).
HR. 142. (Freedom from Military Surveil-
lance Act of 1975, Mr. Kastenmeier, chief
sponsor, and Mr. Steelman, total 72 spon-
sors.)
H.R. 266: Boland.
H.R. 3753: Steelman, Goldwater, Horton,
Koch, Vigorito, Martin, Melcher, Regula, For-
sythe, Solarz, Spence, Pritchard, Mathis,
'Phone, Keys, Charles Wilson (Tex.), Brown
(Calif.), Symington, Charles Wilson (Calif.),
Hefner, Edgar, Ryan, Anderson (Ill.), Mosher,
Talcott.
(H.R. 2754 Steelman, Goldwater, Horton
and 6 co-sponsors) : McKinney, Edwards
(Calif.), Mitchell (Md.), Studds, Anderson
(Calif.), Heckler (Mass.).
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
/91,Tproved For Rebw.G2figgiRpAipieEK310M6613200800110060-9
June 16, 11 5545
H.R. 2862: Charles H. Wilson (Calif.).
H.R. 3284 (Steelman, Goldwater, Horton
and 16 co-sponsors) : Gude, Tsongas, Har-
rington, Pattison, Obey, Coughlin, Quie,
Riegle, Lent, Leggett, Hannaford, Biester,
Matsunaga, Chisholm, Buchanan.
(H.R. 4339 Steelman, Goldwater, Horton
and B co-sponsors) : Hammerschmidt, Mc-
Cormack, Hawkins.
H.R. 620 (Abolishing One Party Consent
Eavesdropping, by Mr. Long (Md.) chief
sponsor) : Hechler (W. Va.), Riegle, Brown
(Calif.), Chisholm, Moss, Charles Wilson
(Tex.), Mitchell (Md.), Diggs, Rangel, Hel-
stoski, Collins, Harrington, Mink.
H.R. 2453 (Long and one cosponsor) : Leg-
gett.
Mr. DRINAN. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MOSHER. Yes, I will yield to the
gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. DRINAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the
gentleman for yielding.
(Mr. DRINAN asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. DRINAN. Mr. Speaker, when the
newspapers and the committees of Con-
gress only a few years ago began to un-
cover the surveillance activities of the
executive branch into the lives of our cit-
izens and elected officials, few persons
ever expected such revelations to reach
the magnitude they have. The initial dis-
closures, such as the wiretaps of the 17
public officials and newspaper reporters
in connection with alleged national secu-
rity Materials, were considered by many
to be abberations by an overzealous Ex-
ecutive seeking, in good faith, to protect
the Nation against subversion.
THE WIDENING SCOPE OF SURVEILLANCE
What followed, however, was a series
of disclosures which widened the circle
of persons who were considered proper
subjects of surveillance by the investiga-
tory units of the executive branch. We
soon learned, for example, that during
the sixties and the seventies, the U.S.
Army, in cooperation with the FBI and
other agencies, engaged in an extensive
program of surveillance over the lawful
activities of American citizens who were
merely exercising their constitutional
rights in protesting a terrible war in
Southeast Asia and other social and po-
litical injustices.
Civil rights groups, dissident organi-
zations, splinter political parties, and
others became the targets of extensive
surveillance by Federal ahd State in-
vestigators into permissible and pro-
tected conduct.
These surveillance activities did not,
to be sure, stop at the organizational
level. Not only did Government agents
consider members of these groups as
fair game for their intrusions into polit-
ical beliefs, but they also spied on per-
sons who had any connection with such
groups or their members. A few years
ago, a high school student in New Jersey
wrote to an organization which was then
the subject of Government surveillance,
apparently because sonieone in the Jus-
tice Department disagreed with its polit-
ical viewpoint. The student had written
for some information in connection with
a course in political thought. Because
the FBI then had a mail cover on the
group, the student's name was acquired
and an inquiry into her activities was
undertaken. Of course, the investigation
did not uncover any unlawful activity
nor anything resembling illegality. But
the data collected was used to open an
FBI file on the unsuspecting student and
retained by the FBI until the U.S. dis-
trict court ordered it destroyed.
Nor did the surveillance activities stop
at the borders of the United States. Fed-
eral agents kept watch over the activi-
ties of Americans in foreign countries,
including members of the Armed Forces.
I am sure this body recalls the snoop-
ing by Government agents into the lives
of American citizens residing in Ger-
many. It appears that such surveillance
was directed again at war dissenters and
persons who supported the Democratic
candidate for President in 1972. Such
surveillance must be considered a seri-
ous invasion of the constitutional rights
of citizens.
Federal agents have not allowed the
doctrine of separation of powers to in-
terfere with their information gather-
ing on Members of Congress. We do not
yet have an accurate picture of the ex-
tent to which the FBI and other agen-
cies maintained files on elected Members
of the National Legislature. When At-
torney General Levi appeared before the
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Judiciary
Committee, of which I am a member,
he sketched the scope of the surveillance
activities of the Federal agents into the
lives of legislators. While admitting that
this data collection was totally unwar-
ranted, Mr. Levi declined to give us any-
thing but the most general outline of
these intrusions in the legislative sphere.
Since that time, the Justice Depart-
ment has steadfastly refused to provide
sufficient access to our subcommittee so
that we might make an independent de-
termination of the, nature and scope of
these surveillances.
A CASE STUDY OF UNWARRANTED SURVEILLANCE
Only by actually examining one of
these files can one fully appreciate the
unwarranted invasion of privacy and the
wastefulness of the activity engaged in
by the FBI. I recently had occasion to
examine my own file which the FBI has
maintained for many years. After I had
spent more than 2 months pursuing my
rights under the Freedom of Information
Act, Director Kelly finally released to me
a copy of most of the material contained
in my file. He refused to provide certain
documents. Director Kelly stated that I
had never been a subject of a criminal
investigation. Nevertheless, the FBI had
assiduously collected 81 pages of mate-
rial concerning public activities of mine
both before and after my election to Con-
gress.
I will reproduce in the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD, in the immediate future, a copy
of the file provided to me by the FBI. I
will also attach an exchange of letters
with Attorney General Levi on this sub-
ject. I am placing this material in the
RECORD so that all of my colleagues can
see for themselves how the FBI is spend-
ing the taxpayers' money. Nowhere in
the statute which establishes the FBI is
contained the authority to amass infor-
mation on civil rights work, antiwar
speeches, or any of the other entirely
lawful activities described in my file. No-
where is the FBI or any other agency
given the power to monitor the political
beliefs and activities of American citi-
zens who are exercising their constitu-
tional rights under the protection of the
law.
Because the Justice Department has
refused to cooperate fully with our sub-
committee, it is impossible to specify the
scope of this type of surveillance and
recordkeeping by the FBI. If my file is
any indication, however, the total num-
ber of persons and documents involved
is staggering. Based on the limited infor-
mation available to us, it is fair to say
that the FBI presently has millions of
entries describing perfectly lawful activ-
ities of American citizens. How many
more such files are maintained by dozens
of other Federal and State investigatorY
agencies is unknown. We can only spec-
ulate on how many of the FBI's 19,178
employees and huw much of the Bureau's
$444.2 million budget is wasted on this
Insidious and unauthorized activity.
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH HAS NOT CURBED
ABUSES
What has been the Government's re-
sponse to these revelations? It has been
a grudging admission of the surveillance
activities, a limited attempt to disclose
publicly their extent, and a total failure
to take adequate remedial measures. The
press and the committees of Congress
have not even been able to get a Complete
picture of the matter. For example, only
after many, many months of pitched bat-
tle did the Justice Department give up
documents, highly "sanitized," to the
press and to our subcommittee regarding
the Cointelpro program, the operation to
disrupt lawful activities of private
groups. The Justice Department, includ-
ing the new Attorney General, has been
equally reluctant to provide us complete
Information on other surveillance activi-
ties. Thus the attempts by Congress to
exercise its proper oversight responsibili-
ties have been thwarted by the executive
agencies, which, in my judgment, have
an obligation to disclose such data to the
Congress when requested to do so.
Of course, some of these agencies,
which engaged in surveillance, claim
they have taken corrective steps. After
Senator Ervin's inquiry into the Army
surveillance program, that department
stated that it had destroyed its files re-
lating to the lawful conduct of Ameri-
cans. No one has ever really checked to
confirm that action. Even if the Army
has destroyed the files, it is important to
note that the Army was never the sole
repository of the data collected. Such
information was freely circulated among
various Federal investigatory agencies,
including the FBI. It was part of the co-
perative effort of these agencies to car-
bon copy, every bit of information col-
lected and distribute it to the participat-
ing agencies. We have never received any
assurances from these other units that
the "Army files" were destroyed.
The Justice Department takes the view
that, if any citizen seeks access to his or
her file under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, such data will be disclosed. One
of the problems with this approach is
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
lv,"- '0041/4
11 5546 Approved FoglitifteisMIM3ftelygplgatip1444R000800110CA)a 16, 1975
that many citizens, who may have been
subjected to surveillance, do not know
that information about them is on file
at the FBI or another investigating
agency. For example, in connection with
the Cointelpro operations, the Federal
agents must have collected thousands
of names and indexed them in files which
still exist. When Attorney General Saxbe
and then Levi admitted that much of this
activity was improper, they were asked
If the Justice Department planned to
contact all persons who were affected by
the program. They declined to do so.
If the Department of Justice refuses
to advise citizens that they were sub-
jects of improper Government activity,
such as the insidious Cointelpro program,
and if the Department refuses to dis-
close fully the nature of such activities
to the Congress, what other avenues do
we have to check unbridled executive
behavior in these sensitive areas? The
only answer is continued attempts by
Congress to exercise its oversight respon-
sibilities and to enact legislation which
will control such operations. And if we
have to legislate partly in the dark be-
cause the executive refuses to divulge
sufficient data, I am one Member who
is prepared to do so.
LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES ARE NEEDED
The Congress began last fall to enact
legislation to control the executive
branch in its data collection activities.
First, we passed the Freedom of In-
formation Act amendments over the veto
of President Ford. That any President
should dare to reject a measure which
seeks to secure constitutional freedoms
by opening up files to citizens should
stand as an indication that the present
Chief Executive will not, on his own,
exercise the necessary restraint in
managing the executive bureaucracy.
Second, in December, Congress passed
the Privacy Act of 1974. Although this
law does not take effect until Septem-
ber 27, 1975, it will open additional files
to private citizens wishing to learn what
records their Government is maintaining
on them. While the law has a number of
deficiencies, it should provide a new
remedy for those who wish to look be-
hind the paper curtain which executive
employees have drawn across their file
cabinets.
There are a number of other measures
which Congress must enact if the con-
stitutional rights, including privacy, of
American citizens are to be restored to
their proper place in our scheme of gov-
ernment. At a minimum, we must: First,
press our right to examine clearly the
operations of the executive branch. If
the Justice Department or any other
agency refuses to disclose data which we
consider essential in performing our
overight functions, this House must be
prepared to issue subpenas to obtain the
materials; second, enact laws which will
prohibit executive agencies, particularly
the FBI, from collecting any informa-
tion which is unrelated to investigations
into criminal conduct or into the quali-
fications of a nominee for high office. We
cannot permit the agencies which we
established to have unbridled investi-
gatory authority to look into any ac-
tivities of citizens which they choose to
Investigate.
Additionally, Congress should: Third,
amend existing laws to allow easier ac-
cess by citizen to files Maintained about
them. Despite the new amendments to
the Freedom of Information Act, there
are indications that additional changes
may be necessary. A recent article in the
Nation, "You Still Need a Can Opener,"
catalogs some of the difficulties which
have arisen under the new act; and
fourth, at least with respect to investi-
gatory agencies, we should alter our
rules so that the legislative committees
have authority over the appropriations
of those units. It makes little sense for
the subcommittee of one standing com-
mittee to examine the budget of the FBI,
while another subcommittee of another
standing committee conducts oversight
of its activities. If Congress really means
to check excesses of the Executive, it must
be prepared to reform its own legislative
machinery to maximize its ability to re-
strain the other branch. The pending
resolution which would assign appro-
priations authority over the Justice De-
partment to the Judiciary Committee
should be passed at the earliest possible
time.
We must act swiftly to prevent the un-
warranted surveillance and information
gathering which has gone on for so long
to continue into the future. Before appro-
priating funds to the Department of Jus-
tice for the upcoming fiscal year, we
should insure that these funds will not
be used to conduct surveillance and
maintain files which are outside the
bounds of the Department's legitimate
law enforcement responsibilities. Conse-
quently, when appropriation bills for the
Departments of State, Justice, Com-
merce, the Judiciary, and Related Agen-
cies come before the House next week, I
Intend to offer an amendment to prohibit
any sums appropriated for the activities
of the FBI to be used to gather informa-
tion and maintain investigative files
which are not related to criminal inves-
tigations or other specific responsibilities
of the FBI which are authorized by law.
The adoption of such an amendment will
save the American taxpayers the money
presently being used to collect the kind
of information reflected in the contents
of my own file.
Mr. Speaker, I extend my gratitude for
arranging this special order to the gen-
tlemen from Ohio (Mr. Mosnza) and
from Wisconsin (Mr. KASTENMBIER), who
is also the distinguished chairman of the
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice, which
has examined some of these problems in
depth. It provides an opportunity for
each of us, outside the normal course of
our legislative duties, to bring to the col-
lective attention of other Members dif-
ferent thoughts and perspectives on the
whole range of problems created by the
untoward and outrageous surveillance
activities of the Executive.
But speeches alone are not adequate
for the task of eradicating the evils
which flow from the indiscriminate sur-
veillance by government of the lives of
our citizens. The words must be rein-
forced by action. If the bicentennial an-
niversary of our democracy is to have
significance, we must reaffirm in deeds
the principles upon which our ancestors
found this Nation 200 years ago. Noth-
ing short of that should be our goal.
Mr. MITCHELL of Maryland. Mr.
Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MOSHER. Yes, I will yield to the
gentleman from Maryland.
(Mr. MITCHELL of Maryland asked
and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. MITCHELL of Maryland. Mr.
Speaker, for many years I have argued
that the most grave threat to the demo-
cratic form of government does not come
from the Union of Socialist Soviet Re-
publics, nor from the People's Republic
of China, but that it comes from within
this Nation. That threat is the illegal
trammeling of civil rights and civil lib-
erties done in the name of national se-
curity. The threat grows out of an over
reaction to peaceable protest, an almost
paranoic reaction to the exercise of the
right to dissent, and an all pervasive,
unreasoning fear about "the Communist
takeover."
The recent disclosures about the illegal
and unethical practices of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the Internal Revenue
Services, and other agencies of Govern-
ment reveal how widespread and endemic
have been these practices.
I think we in this Congress have not
done enough to disclose the extent to
which local police departments, acting in
collusion with Federal agencies, have
violated the constitutionally guaranteed
rights of citizens, especially black citizens
and those who protested against the il-
legal war in Vietnam.
On March 4 I testified before the sub-
-ommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Administration of Justice. I testified
support of H.R. 3113.
In my testimony, I established the ex-
ent to which unlawful surveillance of
dtizens was done by the Baltimore City
Police Department. This evening I want
.o share portions of that testimony with
7011.
On February 14, 1975, 131 persons sent
he following statement to the Governor
if the State of Maryland:
As we approach the bicentennial of the
3unding of our Nation, we are troubled by
mounting evidence of police enroachment
)n rights guaranteed to citizens in the
kmendments to the Constitution. The pub-
,shed list of names of 125 organizations on
which the Baltimore Police Department
'athered information suggests the frighten-
ag and indiscriminate scope of their activity.
Vhen there are real crime problems, why
the Police Department wasted half a
;anion dollars a year of taxpayers money
a surveillance of such groups as the Na-
tonal Association for the Advancement of
colored People, the American Friends Serv-
Committee, the Baltimore Tutorial Pro-
3ct and the Interdenominational Ministerial
. \Mance?
While we recognize the necessary role of
he police to maintain order and to prevent
rime, for the Police Commissioner to justl-
y blanket surveillance of these groups listed
"prevent disorder, revolution and strife"
-4 absurd and tragic. The majority of people
._mvolved were not remotely connected with
.,ny activities that could be considered crim-
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
June
16, 19792q3proved For FaCipaRZEMOB12111:11TADIVID7-74/18MISR000800110060-9 11 5547
inal. They were persons who care about
America and were exercising their Constitu-
tional rights as assemble, to enjoy free
speech, p. free press, to seek redress of griev-
ances, hoping to make the nation more free
and more just.
With Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, we
believe our Constitution was made for
people of fundamentally differing views. The
strength of the United States has been in
diversity, in capacity to accept difference
and to profit from dissent. Civil Rights vic-
tories were won in the 1960s because citizens
used their right to protest against inequality
and injustice. The Vietnam war was halted
'n large measure because citizens used their
right to dissent.
Although some were aware of the pres-
ence of police photographers and infiltra-
tors in the 1960s and early 1970s struggle for
human rights and peace, only now is the
magnitude and threat of police spying in
Baltimore becoming apparent. We are
shocked by reports from the newspapers, the
American Civil Liberties Union and others,
and by the Police Commissioner's own ad-
missions concerning: Infiltration of Peace
and Civil Rights groups. Routine photog-
raphy of demonstrators for several years.
Collection of information on reporters
writing stories unfavorable to the Police
Commissioner, or on controversial issues.
Surveillance of persons who write letters
to editors of Newspapers.
Surveillance of Congressman Parren
Mitchell; inaltration of a meeting of the
Congressman's campaign staff.
Surveillance of numerous other public
officials, including the Baltimore State's At-
torney and the head of the Community Re-
lations Commission.
Surveillance of Black Clergymen.
ISD collection of reports on recent strik-
ing hospital workers.
ISD collection of reports on individuals
and license numbers of persons entering the
Friends Meeting House and other places in
Charles Village.
As citizens concerned for the well being
and enhancement of Baltimore, Maryland
and the nation, we ask you as head of State
and as the authority to whom the Commis-
sioner of Police is responsible, to bring to
an end the illegal and immoral activity of the
Police Department and to help restore an
atmosphere of respect and trust in this
branch of the government. We urge that you:
(1) End all surveillance of peaceful ac-
tivity by the Police.
(2) Inform the public of the nature and
scope of the activity (methods, not disclo-
sure of individual files), of the "Red Squad."
(3) Inform persons if they have been under
political surveillance and no criminal charges
have been filed against them. ()rant them the
right to examine their files, to destroy them
if they wish, and authorize the destruction
of duplicate files.
(4) Develop written standards controlling
Police Department surveillance and infiltra-
tion; restrict Police investigation to areas
where there is evidence of criminal activity.
(6) Develop a system of accountability,
giving an independent civilian body the
power to review Police methods, files, etc.
(6) Place the Office of Police Commissioner
under the Mayor, and encourage leadership
sensitive to individual liberty and sympa-
thetic to the rights of privacy.
Included among the 131 signers of this
statement were the names of over 40
religious leaders including Bishop Joseph
Gossman, the Reverend Hugh Dickin-
son, and the Reverend Vernon Dobson;
from the NAACP, Enolia P. McMillan,
president, and Leonard L. Saunders, vice-
president; also representatives from
Johns Hopkins University and Medical
Institutions; representatives from
Goucher, Townson State, Loyola and
CCB; from the American Civil Liberties
Union, the director, John Roemer, along
with 10 lawyers; included also are repre-
sentatives of the American Friends
Committee.
Based upon information made avail-
able to me to date, I am firmly convinced
that a national domestic espionage ap-
paratus existed in America. I further
firmly believe that this apparatus in-
volved the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion; the Army Intelligence; and local
police departments. In this domestic
espionage apparatus, information gath-
ered, without benefit of court orders, was
exchanged between local police depart-
ments and Federal agencies. The infor-
mation was gathered and exchanged on
persons and organizations that were not
Involved in criminal activity.
Obviously had the provisions of H.R.
3113 been in effect, this dreadful
Kafkaesque situation could not have
developed in my city and in other cities
across the Nation.
H.R. 3113 is a good, needed bill. I have
one or two areas of concern that hope-
fully can be cleared up today.
The first is with the language referring
to "private dwelling used and occupied
as a dwelling." I think this language
needs to be broadened and I shall ex-
plain why. During my primary campaign
in 1974, infiltration of my campaign
headquarters took place. Here is the
story as reported by the local press:
Leonard Jenoff, the secret police operative
who worked for dope trafficker John (Liddie)
Jones' lawyer, also infiltrated the offices of
Rep. Perron Mitchell, it has been learned.
Jenoff volunteered to work "morning,
night, plus weekends" in Rep. Mitchell's last
election campaign. He also took photographs
of Mitchell's campaign workers.
Jenoff is an admitted supplier of informa-
tion to the police department's Inspectional
Services Division (ISD), a clandestine intel-
ligence gathering unit that reports directly?
and only?to Commissioner Pomerleau.
One of Mitchell's aides said Jenoff asked if
he could take pictures of campaign workers
"for a photography course he said he was
taking." He turned over 10 to 15 pictures to
us. I don't know if any were given to the
police.
There is strong evidence to suggest
that in my previous congressional cam-
paigns similar infiltrations by paid or
unpaid police agents took place. These
persons could have, and I believe did, in-
spect records of telephone calls, credit
records, and the like. Therefore, I would
like to see the language broadened to
cover that kind of situation.
My second area of concern deal with
section 2519, "Reports concerning inter-
cepted wire, oral and other communica-
tions." I am aware of the complexity of
legal, bona fide information gathering by
agencies and I am keenly aware of the
need for confidentiality to govern such
operations. However, I do feel that the
person on whom information was gath-
ered ought be advised somewhere down
the line that he was the object of such
activities. Obviously, if the intercepts re-
sult in a specific criminal charge, then
the person would know.
However, if intercepts do not result in
such a charge?or charges?or if indeed
intercepts prove that the individuals con-
duct and behavior has not been inimical
to the best interests of the country, I
think the person has the right to know
that he was under surveillance and why
the surveillance took place.
Hopefully, you can clarify these two
problems for me. I have and will con-
tinue to support H.R. 3113 because it is
legislation needed to protect basic civil
liberties which are guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Ms. ABZUG. Mr. Speaker, will the gen-
tleman yield?
Mr. MOSHER. I yield to the gentle-
woman from New York.
(Ms. ABZUG asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend her re-
marks.)
Ms. ABZUG. Mr. Speaker, I would like
to extend my appreciation to the gentle-
man from Ohio (Mr. MOSHER) and the
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. KASTEN-
MEIER) for the foresight and insistence
that this issue of surveillance and privacy
be significally aired at this time.
Mr. Speaker, I believe that it is im-
portant because we have yet to complete
the responsibility that is placed upon us
by the Constitution and by the electorate
to make certain that those pacts which
we uncovered at Watergate will not be
covered over by a continuation of those
same activities through various agencies
of the executive branch of Government.
My own committee, the Subcommittee
on Government Information and Indi-
vidual Rights, has jurisdiction, as the
Members know, over the Freedom of In-
formation Act and the Privacy Act, and
in both of those connections we are pur-
suing very extensively the oversight of
various agencies which have been col-
lecting information on the American
people. Our citizens have the right to
know, and under the Privacy Act they
have the right to obtain all of the in-
formation and data which these agencies
have maintained.
In the course of our preliminary hear-
ings to date, we have been shocked to
find that there have been extensive and
deep violations of fundamental rights
of privacy, as well as first amendment
rights, of many, many untold numbers
of American citizens in this country.
Mr. Speaker, only last week we dis-
covered that instead of the Army's hav-
ing really destroyed all of the files of
civilians whom they havehad under sur-
veillance, they discovered by accident
some more files, now numbering at least
9,000. The Secret Service has indicated
it is maintaining surveillance on 47,000
citizens, although they admit only 300
of those persons could actually constitute
a threat to the life and safety of the
President or his family and other per-
sons under their protection.
The CIA, as we all know, has conducted
massive surveillance over the activities
of American citizens. These facts have
been developed in hearings being con-
ducted by the Select Committee of the
Senate, by my committee, by other com-
mittees in Congress, including the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, as well as the
Rockefeller Commission.
We find there have been serious inva-
sions of privacy through surveillance not
only by the CIA but also by the FBI in
an unauthorized manner, including vi-
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
II 5548
Approved ForattlwARMAOARIb?i3P_7_7til&b1s4iR00080011006A9te 16, 1975
latinn of the postal laws, in that first-
class mail was illegally opened. We have
also discovered unauthorized wiretaps,
infiltration of political groups, and out-
right burglary.
Legislative control must be exercised
in this area. The Congress must not only
continue its oversight activities, but must
enact legislation which will stop the kind
of abuse we have recently discovered.
My subcommittee will continue its
oversight in our jurisdictional area of
Government information and privacy.
We will also consider legislation designed
to control the excesses of the Govern-
ment police agencies. Hearings have al-
ready begun on amendments to the Pri-
vacy Act. These amendments will remove
the blanket exemptions granted to the
CIA and the Secret Service in the origi-
nal bill. The facts that have recently
come to light make it imperative that
the CIA and the Secret Service be held
accountable to each American citizen
whose rights have been abridged by their
activities.
In addition I am considering legisla-
tion which will control the spreald of
computers throughout the Govern-
ment?especially the linking of various
computers through advanced communi-
cations networks. I have also introduced
legislation which would prohibit the in-
terception of certain communications
unless all parties to the communication
agree to the monitoring or interception.
Mr. Speaker, I especially want to com-
pliment again the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. MOSHER) , who brought this special
order, because we can do a lot more to
bring this matter to the attention of the
Congress and the public.
(Ms. ABZUG asked and was given
permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Speaker, will the gen-
tleman yield?
Mr. MOSHER. I yield to the gentle-
man from Illinois (Mr. Mnrys).
Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Speaker, I want to
join my colleagues in commending the
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. MOSHER) for
his concern about this problem and for
his focusing the attention of the Con-
gress and of the people on this problem.
It is a problem that has not gone away,
and it will not go away unless all of us
express the kind of concern that he has
shown.
There is a feeling extant in the coun-
try that if one has nothing to hide, if
one has done nothing wrong, what dif-
ference does it make if somebody is fol-
lowing him around or if somebody is lis-
tening in on his telephone conversations?
And indeed there is also a feeling that,
after all, if a few thousand people or even
10,000 people are being watched and
spied upon and their activities are being
reviewed, in a country containing 213
million citizens this somehow is not a
very serious problem.
Mr. Speaker, I think, in addition to
the violations of the rights of people who
are being followed and who are being
Interdicted and their freedom threat-
ened, that there is a much more serious
problem, and that is the deterrent effect
that this kind of activity has on the
whole free society, because there is the
danger that, through surveillance or
even because of the popular belief tlia.
there is the existence of surveillance, we
will discourage the kind of full, free, and
unrestrained exchange of ideas and view
points on which democracy is based
When people and citizens and partici-
pants in political ,debate feel they mus;
restrain their utterances, that they Must
watch their tongues, that they must have
a care about which groups they join cir
which candidates they vote for and who
they write letters to or who they receiv.-
letters from because somebody might bc
watching them, we are taking that flm
step?but it is a very long step?toward
the very totalitarianism that these ac-
tivities are proclaimed to prevent and,
deter; then we are in our way in America
reaching toward the kind of closed soci-
ety that the CIA, the FBI, and all the
other intelligence-gathering agencies as-
sure us in the defense of their actionr
they are trying to keep from happening
It has long been the hallmark of to-
talitarian societies that only approved
persons ought -to participate in the polit-
ical process.
If we did not have the right ideas, if
we did not vote for the right people, and
if we did not have the right relationship-
with other people in the public arena
then we ought not get involved.
There was and is a deliberate effori
in totalitarian states to keep people frarr.
getting involved in political processes,
and if we do not want that kind of deter-
rent here, then we must finally put a
check on the kind of Government sur-
veillance of activities, particularly in the
political arena, which is going to put a
chill on that kind of thing in the po-
litical arena.
I suppose that one of the problems-
about trying to do anything about it is
that most of the time the Governmen1
agencies which are involved end up by
saying, "We did not do it, and we promise
to stop."
It is always a very ephemeral kind of
proof that one has about who is being
wiretapped, and about where the extent
of the surveillance exists. There is always
some kind of justification for it.
Mr. Speaker, I would only say that if
the Congress does not begin to treat with
seriousness of the problem that the gen-
tleman from Ohio (Mr. MOSHER) sug-
gests and my distinguished colleague, the
gentleman from Wisconsin, my former
chairman, suggests, I think we are going
to deserve the kind of trouble we have
because, when all is said and done, if we
cannot abide the very freedom that dis-
tinguishes this society from totalitarian
states, then the Government agencies
Which are engaged in that surveillance
are going to be the best justification of
all for engaging it because we will not be
able to exist in any other way.
Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for
yielding.
Mr. MOSHER. Mr. Speaker, I especial-
ly appreciate the emphasis the gentle-
man from Illinois (Mr. Mixvs) has just
placed on the chilling effect that the
atmosphere of fear has, which I empha-
sized in my earlier remarks. This seems
to me to be a matter of extreme concern.
Mr. Speaker, I now yield to the gentle-
man from New York (Mr. BADILLO) .
(Mr. BADILLO asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Speaker, I want to
commend the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.
MOSHER) and the gentleman from Wis-
consin (Mr. KASTENMEIER) , for having
brought up this special order which I
think is particularly appropriate for dis-
cussion at this time in view of the report
of the Rockefeller Commission.
I think that the statements and the
recommendations of the Rockefeller
Commission, which merely call upon the
President to tell the postal authorities
and the CIA not to do it again, that is,
not to violate the law, cannot be ac-
cepted by this Congress. I think in view
of those recommendations, it is urgent
that our subcommittee and the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, of which I am
a member, take action at this session to
pass either the bill advocated by the
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. MOSHER) or
an appropriate bill that will deal with
the question of surveillance.
I just want to cite one example of the
need for urgency. The Rockefeller Com-
mission report points out that there were
a limited number of mail openings that
took place during the 20-year period
where the mail was being opened, but
Mr. Cotter, who testified before our sub-
committee and who is the chief postal
inspector, indicated clearly that the ar-
rangement for the opening of the mail
was such that there really was no way
in which the postal inspectors could
know how many letters, in fact, were
opened by the CIA and the FBI per-
sonnel who were involved.
Therefore, in the light of that, to sug-
gest that it is enough merely for the
President to say to the agencies involved
not to take this action, I think is totally
inadequate. I think, therefore, we should
take action now.
I think we have to go even further,
frankly, because the report also points
out that the Justice Department had
agreed for a period of 20 years not to
prosecute anyone who was violating the
law and who was a member of the CIA
because they agreed to let the CIA, in
effect, investigate itself.
I think, under those circumstances,
the fact that President Ford said last
week that he was referring all of the
materials received from the Rockefeller
Commission to the Justice Department
is an inadequate recommendation be-
cause it is the Justice Department which
Itself is violating the law.
I think that not only do we have to
take action on a bill this session, but I
think we have to establish a special pros-
ecutor to see to it that those who are
responsible for illegal acts are prose-
cuted, including those people who are
within the Justice Department right
now.
So I think it is very appropriate that
we begin a dialog on this subject, and
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
June 16, /A4roved For Reis:OW.02E
that we complete the bill, report out a
bill from our subcommittee, the full
committee, and on the floor of this
House, and from the other body.
Mr. MOSHER. Mr. Speaker, I very
much welcome the expression of sup-
port of the gentleman from New York
(Mr. BADILLO) for the legislation that
is before the gentleman's committee.
Mr. KOCH. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased
to participate in the special order on pri-
vacy called for by our colleagues,
CHARLES MOSHER and ROBERT KASTEN-
MEIER. In the 93d Congress on April 2,
1974, Congressmen BARRY GOLDWATER,
Jr. and I sponsored a special order on the
issue of privacy and we were pleased
with the response of the members to our
concerns. The 94th Congress must be
concerned with the preservation of the
individual's right of privacy and I am
hopeful that today's dialog will elicit
some new thoughts and serious discus-
sion on this issue.
Last December 31, the President signed
Into law the Privacy Act of 1974. This
was the culmination of a 6-year effort on
my part and that of many of our col-
leagues to place controls on the Federal
Government's collection, use and dis-
semination of personal information
about citizens.
Earlier this year Congressman GOLD-
WATER and I introduced H.R. 1984 which
provides that controls similar to those
In the Privacy Act be placed on State and
local governments and organizations in
the private sector. The provisions of this
bill are by no means sealed in cement.
We have sent a questionnaire to orga-
nizations affected by this legislation to
ascertain the reactions to it. Approxi-
mately 500 responses have been received
and we will be tabulating the results
shortly. The results will be made avail-
able to our colleague, DON EDWARDS, who
chairs the Judiciary Subcommittee on
Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights,
and who will be holding hearings during
this Congress on the legislation.
The legislation which BARRY GOLD-
WATER, Jr. and I have introduced and
which we consider the basic draft is for
the purposes of eliciting comments. Un-
doubtedly, there must be additions, de-
letions and changes. That is nwhy the
Privacy Protection Study Commission
came into being so as to provide the
forum for that testimony.
The Privacy Act of 1974 calls for the
establishment of a privacy commission
which will report to the President and
the Congress in 2 years on the results of
its study on data banks in governmental,
regional, and private organizations. The
Commission is to determine what must
be done to protect personal information,
and the privacy of individuals. The Com-
mission members are Minnesota State
Senator Robert Tennessee; William
Dickinson, retired managing editor of
the Philadelphia Bulletin; William 0.
Bailey, executive vice president of Aetna
Life and Casualty; David F. Linowes, a
partner with Laventhol, Krekstein & Hor-
wath; Willis H. Ware, corporate research
staff member of the Rand Corp.; Con-
gressman BARRY GOLDWATER, Jr., and
myself.
ObTACI4RCORTIV143011(20;1135080011 0060-9 H 5549
The Privacy Commission has had
nearly a 6-month delay in getting started
because all of its members had not been
appointed. But now that the President
has announced his appointments, all
seven members will get together shortly
to begin our work. I am pleased that the
private sector and State governments are
represented on the Commission. I intend,
as I hope the other members do, to pur-
sue hearings regarding the impact of
privacy legislation with an open mind.
We have to be made aware of much in-
formation from the private sector in de-
veloping our report and I encourage or-
ganizations to submit their reactions
to us. '
The special order called for today is
devoted to the specific issue of domestic
surveillance activities of the U.S. Gov-
ernment. Last year the Annual Chief
Justice Earl Warren Conference on Ad-
vocacy sponsored by the Roscoe Pound-
American Trial Lawyers Foundation held
a conference on the subject of Privacy in
a Free Society. Three areas were dis-
cussed?data banks and dossiers, elec-
tronic surveillance, and political inform-
ing. I am appending from the report of
the conference, in which I participated,
the recommendations on electronic sur-
veillance.
The material follows":
FINAL REPORT?PRIVACY IN A FREE SOCIETY
PART A?RECOMMENDATIONS : ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE
'Summary
(Note: Final Recommendations on Elec-
tronic Surveillance emanating from the Con-
ference together with commentaries follow
this summary.)
The Conference undertook the study of
electronic surveillance in two areas?domestic
intelligence and law enforcement. The Con-
ference expressed strong opposition to elec-
tronic surveillance for domestic intelligence
purposes. It opposed, by a narrow margin, the
use of electronic surveillance for law enforce-
ment purposes.
In discussing two methods of electronic
surveillance, the Conferees were opposed to
both telephone tapping and room bugging.
However, they felt that room bugging was
more insidious than telephone tapping be-
cause of the much greater and less controll-
able invasion of privacy resulting from room
surveillance.
A broad consensus of the Conferees revealed
general skepticism toward electronic surveil-
lance as a tool and towards methods for con-
trol of its use. It is interesting to note that
this general skepticism was shown among
members of such a diverse group including
many with long experience in law enforce-
ment and in law. The opponents of electronic
surveillance based their conclusions on a
belief that electronic surveillance was of rela-
tively little value to conventional law en-
forcement, was used primarily for minor
offenses, produced very serious invasions of
privacy, and was quite difficult to control. It
should be noted that there was some discus-
sion about the validity of the available sta-
tistics, which indicated that electronic sur-
veillance was invoked most often in cases of
"minor offenses."
There were Conferees supporting some
electronic surveillance for law enforcement
purposes, who believed that the technique
should be used only for crimes of the utmost
gravity and only if controls are strengthened
and, together with those currently in the
statute, are more effectively enforced.
The Conference stressed that, if there were
to be any electronic surveillance, regardless
of its form., of American citizens, it should be
only with prior judicial scrutiny and ap-
proval?with a court order. A substantial
majority recommended that no surveillance
for intelligence purposes be permitted. How-
ever, if any electronic surveillance were au-
thorized, it should be only for solving spe-
cific crimes and not for obtaining general
intelligence about particular individuals or
groups.
The Conference also overwhelmingly rec-
ommended a series of procedural and other
controls. It suggested a requirement that,
whatever federal electronic surveillance is
done, it should be conducted only by the
Department of Justice, subject to criteria
and procedures examined at public hearings,
and under close scrutiny by congressional
committees. Also, the Conference urged that
persons subjected to illegal electronic sur-
veillance be permitted to recover damages
from the governmental agencies engaging in
such activity.
RECOMMENDATION 1
There should be no electronic surveillance
for domestic intelligence purposes?
(Adopted by substantial majority)
Commentary: While disagreement re-
mained as to whether electronic surveillance,
with restrictions, is permissible when related
to detection and prosecution of specific
crimes, a majority of the Conferees deter-
mined that electronic surveillance for domes-
tic intelligence should not be permissible.
RECOMMENDATION II
There should be no electronic surveillance
for law enforcement purposes.2
(Adopted by narrow margin)
Commentary: This vote represents the
fundamental division among the Conferees.
While there was general skepticism regard-
ing the effectiveness of electronic surveil-
lance, a narrow majority believed that law
enforcement authorities should not be al-
lowed to use electronic surveillance even for
crime detection purposes, and a minority
believed that electronic surveillance should
remain available for law enforcement, though
this group insisted that it be used only
for very serious offenses, and under very strict
controls. There was a group of Conferees who,
whatever their individual predilections on
this issue, made the point that our current
knowledge concerning electronic surveil-
lance at all levels of law enforcement (fed-
eral, state and local) is inadequate. Addi-
tional empirical studies are needed to deter-
mine the extent and the effectiveness of its
use.
RECOMMENDATION IN
State and local authorities should not be
allowed to engage in electronic surveillance.a
Mr. Michael Kenney wanted to be on rec-
ord as being opposed to all electronic sur-
veillance. His single Recommendation in this
area would be: "There should be no elec-
tronic surveillance."
s Mr. Kenneth Conboy dissents from this
Recommendation and adds the following
statement: "I cannot subscribe to the dubi-
ous logic of the proposition that, because
too many gambling warrants have been is-
sued in the past several years, no authority,
regardless of how circumscribed in execu-
tion, should be vested in the courts to issue
warrants in cases involving, for example, im-
minent bombings, aircraft hijacks, random
killings or barbarous political murders."
Ms. Mary C. Lawton wished it noted that
she abstains on propositions relating to elec-
tronic surveillance. She felt that more pre-
cise definitions of terms used in the dis-
cussions were needed.
Mr. Conboy did not support the Recom-
mendation because "the data supports the
conclusion that state authorities have been
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
II 5550
Approved FotiNtartpAbypgri3UWASIEL7W9gpR0008001100n9e 16, 1975
(Vote evenly divided)
Commentary: There was a sharp split over
whether state and local law enforcement of-
ficials (as opposed to federal officials) really
need electronic surveillance, whether they
have used it excessively and indiscrimin-
ately, and whether the judicial and other
controls in the statute do or can function
properly on the state level.
RECOMMENDATION IV
No electronic surveillance should be carried
out without a court order for any purpose
on American citizens on United States soil
or on American citizens in foreign countries.
(Adopted overwhelmingly)
Commentary: The Conferees drew atten-
tion here to the Supreme Court's decision
the United States vs. U.S. District Court, 407
U.S. 297, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752
(1972), which suggested in an 8-0 decision
that, in all cases of electronic surveillance
on American citizens or organizations for
intelligence purposes, that is, for purposes
unrelated to solution of a specific crime, a
court order is required. Also, the Executive
Branch has no inherent power to invade a
citizen's right to privacy without satisfying
an impartial magistrate that a justification
exists for such an intrusion.
This Recommendation expresses the Con-
ference's conviction that there be no war-
rantless electronic surveillance, under any
circumstances on American citizens.
RECOMMENDATION V
To the extent that electronic surveillance
Is permitted for law enforcement purposes,
it should be limited to crimes of the utmost
gravity.
(Adopted by large majority)
Commentary: While there was some dis-
cussion on the meaning of "crimes of utmost
gravity," the Conference reached no final
definition of the concept, except that it
would almost certainly include an imminent
threat to life.
RECOMMENDATION VI
If used at all, electronic surveillance for
law enforcement purposes should be per-
mitted only by court order and on probable
cause subject to the following conditions:
(A) It must be directly related to specific
criminal acts or activities;
(B) There must be a specific limitation of
the time during which the device remains
in place or in use; and the length of time
permitted should be the shortest possible;
(C) There must be a definite demonstra-
tion of the need for installation of the
device;
(D) There must be no other law enforce-
ment technique available for obtaining the
information, and the applicant must demon-
strate this fully;
(E) There must be restraint?responsible
action and accurate reporting by the law
enforcement officials carrying out the order.
(Adopted overwhelmingly)
Commentary: This Recommendation re-
flects specific problems in the present opera-
tion of the electronic surveillance statute,
and is intended to supplement and make
more effective the statutory controls.
RECOMMENDATION VII
Even when electronic surveillance is used
with regard to crimes of utmost gravity, there
should be no electronic surveillance of
rooms?no bugging of a room.
(Adopted by large majority)
Commentary: Bugging should not be
utilized under any circumstances. Bugging
was seen as a more serious invasion of pri-
__
more discriminating in the use of electronic
surveillance than federal authorites. For ex-
ample, the huge number of gambling war-
rants obtained were predominantly obtained
by the FBI. Also, jurisdiction for the most
serious crime in terms of penalty?murder--
is almost exclusively with state officials."
vacy than wiretapping since, while one can
refrain from using a telephone and thereby
avoid a wiretap, the presence of a room bug
in one's home or office makes it impossible
to be free from surveillance.?
RECOMMENDATION VIII
If any federal electronic surveillance is to
be permitted, the authority for all warrants
for wiretapping should be limited to a single
governmental agency?the United States
Justice Department. The Justice Department
should be the only federal agency to install
wiretaps on United States soil and on Ameri-
can citizens abroad.?
(Adopted overwhelmingly)
Commentary: Since electronic surveillance
is difficult to detect in the first place, a pro-
liferation of federal agencies engaged in wire-
tapping would ineluctably result in more
privacy abuses than would result if all legal
wiretapping were the responsibility of only
one agency.
The Conferees were mindful of the diver-
sity of government agencies engaged in elec-
tronic surveillance which were uncovered
during the Watergate investigations- some of
them accountable to no one but the Presi-
dent?with the Justice Department and the
courts being entirely by passed.
RECOMMENDATION Ix
The procedures and criteria by which wire-
taps and other forms of eavesdropping are
sought, and warrants for their use issued,
should be clearly and properly prescribed by
the United States Justice Department only
after complete public hearings on these pro-
cedures and criteria, such hearings to be held
in various parts of the country.
(Adopted overwhelmingly)
Commentary: If the Justice Department is
established as the only agency with the re-
sponsibility for federal electronic surveil-
lance, the citizenry should be made aware
of this. Furthermore, the citizenry should
be made aware of the precise processes by
which eavesdropping is permitted by the
courts and carried out by the Justice Depart-
ment. In this way the widespread fear that
government eavesdropping is pervasive can
be countered by a precise vesting of limited
authority?and accountability for any abuse
of that authority?in this one agency.
RECOMMENDATION x
A very strong congressional oversight com-
mittee should be established in both
branches of Congress to review all wiretaps
by federal agencies. This would apply to the
United States Justice Department if It were
established that it were the only govern-
mental agency authorized to wiretap.
Commentary: The unanimous approval of
this Recommendation reflects the strong con-
viction of the Conferees concerning the es-
tablishment of an active monitoring system
by Congress?representatives selected by the
citizenry?to ensure accountability on the
part of chose involved in limited, carefully
restricted, use of electronic surveillance.?
4 Mr. Conboy dissented from this Recom-
mendation and explained how he saw its re-
suit: "the law would simultaneously author-
ize (wiretapping) and condemn (room
bugging) electronic surveillance of the im-
minent criminal, contingent solely upon the
mode (phone conversation or face to face
meeting selected by him.)"
'Professor John Elliff suggests that "the
United States Department of Justice should
not be the agency to install wiretaps over-
seas, since its investigative jurisdiction is
primarily within the United States. How-
ever, the Attorney General might properly
be required to approve any wiretaps in-
stalled by another agency on American citi-
zens abroad."
'Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus informed the
Conference, that "not once, in the eighty
days during which I was Acting Director
of the FBI, was I called on to testify before
RECOMMENDATION XI
A reporting system should be undertaken
by the Justice Department, subject to prop-
er regulations to maintain confidentiality,
so that all information disclosed by taps can
be given to Congress for it to properly exer-
cise its oversight function.
(Adopted unanimously)
Commentary: The information would in-
clude: the duration or the wiretap; the need
for the tap; an affidavit submitted for the
Issuance of a warrant for the tap; the author-
ization by the Attorney General of specific
taps; what information the tap revealed and
the consequences of the tap, that is, whether
there was an arrest, conviction or any other
disposition.
RECOMMENDATION XII
A specific minimum amount of damages,
plus attorney's fees, should be available for
any violation of the wiretapping or other
eavesdropping statutes by federal, state or
local officials. These damages should be re-
coverable in a federal court from the partic-
ular governmental agency engaged in such
eavesdropping.
(Adopted overwhelmingly)
Commentary: The Conferees believed that
effective sanctions must be provided against
all who violate statutes concerning the use of
electronic surveillance.
Mr. BIESTER. Mr. Speaker, I wish to
commend the distingunished gentleman
from Ohio (Mr. MOSHER) , and the dis-
tinguished gentleman from Wisconsin
(Mr. KASTENMEIER), for their leadership
in further bringing to the attention of
the House and of the American public
the need for legislation in the field of
Government surveillance of private citi-
zens. I know firsthand the dedication to
civil liberties and indiivdual rights which
these two Members of Congress have ex-
hibited in their work in the House.
In March of this year, it was my privi-
lege to appear before the Subcommit-
tee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice, chaired by Mr.
KASTENMEIER. I testified on behalf of leg-
islation known as the Bill of Rights
Procedures Act, introduced by Mr. MosH-
ER Ill the House, and by the distinguished
gentleman from Maryland, Mr. MATHIAS,
in the Senate.
The Bill of Rights Procedures Act
would require any Federal agent to ob-
tain a court order before he or she could
conduct any form of surveillance on a
private citizen. The Government would
be required to demonstrate probable
cause that a crime had been or was about
to be committed before any warrant for
surveillance could be issued. The legisla-
tion is intended to be comprehensive in
scope, to cover all forms of surveillance,
including bugging, wiretapping, and all
other forms of electronic surveillance,
opening of mail, mail covers, entering of
dwellings, and the inspection or procure-
ment of the records of telephone, bank
credit, medical, or other private transac-
tions.
Mr. Speaker, I believe the need for
new legislation in the field of govern-
mental surveillance of private citizens
Is clearcut. The fourth amendment to
the Constitution of the United States
proclaims the right of the people to be
"secure in their persons, houses, papers
Congress about the FBI's Involvement In
electronic surveillance. It Is not in the pub-
lic interest for any such activity to go un-
monitored by the Congress."
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
June 16, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?HOUSE H 5551
and effects against unreasonable search-
es and seizures." Security, however, must
be more than an abstract legal proposi-
tion. If security is to have any meaning
at all, it must be a sure perception of
one's condition.
I seriously doubt that the American
people today consider themselves secure
against unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures. Twentieth century technology has
given governments and indeed private
institutions the ability to intrude into
the private realm of an American's life
with staggering efficieincy, sophistica-
tion, and secrecy. The technological ca-
pacity for an unprecedented degree and
scope of governmental intervention into
- peoples lives exists today. Without new,
stricter safeguards and more effective
means of oversight and control, there is
little reason to doubt that such tech-
nology will eventually be used, if indeed
aspects of it have not already been
employed.
The American people today are sus-
picious of government. They are skepti-
cal not only of its ability to solve prob-
lems, but they even question govern-
ment's basic motives. That skepticism is
healthy to the degree it results in de-
mands that the Congress of the United
States act forthrightly to end unneces-
sary and illegitimate intrusions into peo-
ple's Private lives. Only by responsibly
addressing Itself to this very basic but
complex problem can Congress restore
to the American public a firm sense of
security, a justified perception that one
is indeed safe against unreasonable and
arbitrary or capricious governmental
intrusion.
Clearly the questions at stake in con-
sideration of the whole issue of govern-
mental surveillance go to the very core
of the democratic process. This ;issue
forces us to contend with perhaps the
most basic question faced by a free so-
ciety: where do we draw the line between
the rights of the individual and the legit-
imate and necessary functions of society
as embodied in the Government?
Such a question has never been easy
to answer, and it is particularly difficult
In this complex and technically sophis-
ticated age. The introduction of national
security considerations further compli-
cates the issue.
As a member of the Committee on In-
ternational Relations, a member of the
Subcommittee on National Security dur-
ing the 93d Congress, and a former mem-
ber of the Judiciary Committee, I would
particularly like to examine the question
of governmental surveillance in matters
pertaining to national security.
Clearly all those in positions of public
responsibility must approach national
security considerations with a weighty
concern for the dangers inherent in the
prevailing international political system,
and the peculiar obligations which our
position within that system imposes on
the Government of the United States.
Few would dispute the need for the Gov-
ernment to deal with some especially
sensitive matters in secrecy. Few would
dispute the need for the Government to
preserve international trust in the con-
fidentiality of diplomatic discussions.
But equally clear must be the need to
deal with such legitimate national secu-
rity concerns within our constitutional
framework?to subject governmental
surveillance to proper and reasonable
standards of procedure, and to minimize
the scope for individual caprice or abuse
of power.
With regard to national security, what
balance do we properly strike? Where,
Indeed, doeve draw the kind of line which
protects both the individual and society
at large?
I would contend that under existing
procedure, the rights of the individual
under the fourth amendment are inade-
quately protected.
The law presently allows surveillance
to be undertaken on the authority of the
President?with such authority usually
executed by the Attorney General?when
national security is considered to be at
stake.
It seems clear to me that such a pro-
cedure?involving individual interpre-
tation of such a broad and ambiguous
term as "national security" does, indeed,
allow for abuse of power.
The Bill of Rights Procedures Act
would rectify that situation by linking
all surveillance?including that under-
taken on grounds of national security?
to a court order based on probable cause
that a crime had been or was about to be
committed.
In the case of national security, such
an order would have to be linked to sus-
pected sabotage, espionage, treason or
similar crimes.
Is this an unreasonable restraint on
executive power? Would such a require-
ment hamper the proper stewardship of
our national safety? Would it indeed
swing the judicial pendulum dangerously
In the direction of individual rights at
the expense of societal security?
I think not. Such a requirement is in-
herently reasonable and proper, and
would not have to subject our society to
risk.
I am supported in this belief by the
Honorable William D. Ruckelshaus, for-
mer Deputy Attorney General and for-
mer Acting Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Hardly a man
oblivious to legitimate national security
considerations, Mr. Ruckelshaus last
year stated before joint hearings of the
Senate Committees on the Judiciary and
Foreign Relations that he sees "no rea-
son why all wiretaps should not be sub-
ject to court warrant."
To restrict wiretaps and other forms
of surveillance to instances approved by
a Federal court, simply means the Gov-
ernment must establish to the satisfac-
tion of an independent arbiter that a
reasonable suspicion exists as to the com-
mission of a crime affecting the national
security of the United States. The Bill
of Rights Procedures Act would thus not
bar necessary national security surveil-
lance; it would simply subject the need
for that surveillance to prior assessment
by the judicial branch. Such a prior as-
sessment simply, but significantly re-
moves national security surveillance
from the realm of possibly arbitrary,
capricious action.
Government surveillance?divorced
from suspected criminality and un-
restrained by any check?imperils our
constitutional system, and thus under-
mines the very national security it is
ostensibly designed to protect.
If we are to protect our genuine na-
tional security interests as well as safe-
guard individual rights within our con-
stitutidnal framework, Congress must
respond to the complex challenge of
enacting new legislation on surveillance.
I feel confident that with dedicated
Members like CHARLES MOSHER and Boa
KASTENMEIER helping to lead the way,
Congress will adequately meet this diffi-
cult challenge.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. Speaker, I am
very pleased that my distinguished col-
league from Ohio, Representative
CHARLES MOSHER, and the chairman of
the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration
of Justice, Representative ROBERT KAS-
TENIVIEIER, have taken this special order
on the subject of surveillance and the
interception of communications by elec-
tronic and other devices of citizens of
the United States. I have had the pleas-
ure of testifying before Mr. KASTEN.-
MEIER'S subcommittee on Congressman
Mosnee's bill, H.R. 2604, the Bill of
Rights Procedures Act a 1975. I am a
cosponsor of that legislation, as I was in
the preceding Congress. This is Impor-
tant legislation and Congressman
MOSHER IS to be congratulated for being
its author and chief proponent in the
House of Representatives.
I do not believe that there is anyone
who can question the interest of myself
or my family in the quick and successful
combating of individual and organized
crime in the United States. I agree tiller
with former Chief Justice Earl Warren's
statement that the modern law enforce-
ment community must utilize all that is
legitimately available to it, including the
fruits of modern technology, in its battle
to stop crime and end lawlessness. The
quality of our life and the future of our
society are at stake in this battle against
crime.
My support for this bill stems from my
deep and sincere belief that the inalien-
able rights and liberties found in the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights?
especially the 1st, 4th, and 14th amend-
ments relating to freedom of speech and
association, security in one's property
and personal possessions, and the right
to due process?are being erroded by the
increasing use of surveillance as a pri-
mary tool and investigative aid by the
law enforcement community. There is
loose an idea that electronic gadgets and
surveillance are by definition helpful in
the prevention of crime and in the suc-
cessful prosecution of criminals. This at-
titude is apparently an outgrowth of
American technocracy: that things sci-
entific and technical in their general ap-
plication to daily life are good, healthy,
and desirable. It causes citizens and
members of the law enforcement commu-
nity to assume that the activity is corn-
patable with our basic rights and liber-
ties. But, such applications, when left
unquestioned, can clearly lead to abuse
and misuse.
This propensity recently received its
confirmation in the Watergate break-in
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
II 5552
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?}OUSE June 16, 1975
and in the illegal surveillance conducted
by the so-called plumbers unit. There,
surveillance was conducted that directly
violated our Constitution. Some of it
was accomplished through the misuse of
legitimate law enforcement operations.
In a few instances, Federal law enforce-
ment personnel unwittingly contributed
to the problem because they had no com-
prehensive, commonly identified and
agreed with criterion for judging the
legitimacy of the activity.
T have a sense of urgency about this
area of activity for each of us knows that
recent events do not stand alone, They
are not an abberation. To varying and
often lesser degrees, we know of events
like Watergate and of excesses in the
general law enforcement community
going back over 30 years. And, the
current situation at the Federal level
cries for improvement. Simply put, there
Is too much vaguely defined administra-
tive authority within the executive
branch that applies to the area of sur-
veillance. Operational authority is so
widely dispersed as to undermine stand-
ardization of surveillance criterion and
decisions. And., the situation has not been
made any better by the recent conflicting
and contradictory court decisions that
have been added to the "surveillance
mix."
Clearly what is needed is legislation
that defines the term surveillance, re-
stricts and regularizes the authority for
undertaking surveillance, and that estab-
lishes strong penalties for violations of
basic civil rights through illegitimate
surveillance. The Mosher bill, H.R. 2604
does these things. For that reason I com-
mend it to the careful attention of the
House. And, I thank my colleague for
arranging for this special discussion and
giving me the opportunity to participate.
Mr. METCALFE. Mr. Speaker, every-
where we turn today, we see Govern-
ment infringing on the civil liberties of
its citizens. This Government surveil-
lance, this keeping of dossiers, these
dirty tricks seem to pervade every level
of American Government today. These
activities have taken many forms, they
have been overt and covert, they have
been insidious and they have been un-
disguised.
The list of those Government de-
partments and agencies involved in this
spying seems endless. The White House,
the FBI, the CIA, the IRS, the Secret
Service, the U.S. Army, and State and
local government in at least four States,
have allegedly been involved in main-
taining files or improper surveillance on
tens of thousands of American citizens.
A pattern of abuse is clear. On every
governmental level, we see elected rep-
resentatives of the people and their
agents conducting improper and illegal
surveillance activities for the sole pur-
pose of identifying and harassing dis-
senters and political opponents who, for
the most part, exercise their constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights in a legal and
lawful manner.
Abuses on the Federal level have been
well documented in recent months. The
laundered Rockefeller Commission re-
port, even with its extensive gaps, is
simply the latest in a long and sad ser .es
on revelations concerning misuse of
power within the Federal executive
branch.
These same kinds of abuses, on Ste le
and local levels, have not yet been -1.)
well documented. Enough of these acti- -
ities have been disclosed, however,
give us a strong indication that the Fe ,-
eral Government was not alone durir g
the past 10 years in its illegal suwei- -
lance.
We have seen cases of State and loc
agencies, in some cases using Feder .1
funds, maintaining improper and po -
sibly illegal surveillance on private cit -
zens. In my home city of Chicago, for es -
ample, it has become clear that the poll( e
intelligence division was used, at least in
part, to maintain surveillance upon thot, -
sands of Chicago area residents wh s
never had been the subject of crimint 1
investigations. Police officials have Sc -
knowledged after months of denials, that
surveillance was maintained and file
were kept on literally thousands of C:hi
cagoans whose only "crime" was so m
connection with any one of dozens o:"
political, civic, and community group
within the city who the administration
perceived as a threat to its policies, File
were maintained on, among other people
Senator CHARLES PERCY: myself Father
Theodore Hesburgh, president of Notre
Dame University; Arthur Woods, chair-
man of the board, Sears, & Co.; Illinois
State Attorney Bernard Carey; and Illi-
nois State representative; and at least
three aldermen of the city of Chicago.
In addition, secret grand jury testi-
mony of the former superintendent of
the Chicago Police Department, made
available to the press indicates that the
Superintendent was aware of illegal sur-
veillance activities, including wiretap-
ping and burglaries which were under-
taken by the intelligence division.
The General Accounting Office has re-
cently completed, at the request of myself
and others, an investigation into the
use of Federal funds for these activities.
It has determined that nearly $10 mil-
lion was spent on the police intelligence
division between 1972 and 1974. Nearly
$5 million of these funds were Federal
moneys?$3.9 million to LEAA funds and
between $539,000 and $779,000 in revenue
sharing funds.
The GAO was unable to determine
whether or not revenue sharing funds
were used to pay salaries of those officers
who engaged in the political spying of the
intelligence division. Its lack of subpena
power and a continuing State grand jury
investigation severely limited its investi-
gation in this respect.
Enough information was gathered by
the GAO. however, to warrant further
investigation. Therefore, I have written
Chairman RODINO of the House Judiciary
Committee and Chairman ULLmAN of the
Ways and Means Committee, whose com-
mittees, of course, do have subpena
power, asking them to determine pre-
cisely what role Federal funds played in
the political intelligence activities of the
Chicago Police Department.
In the case of the revenue-sharing
funds, I have also informed the Office of
Revenue Sharing of the GAO report and
intend to forward such information as
may be gathered in congressional inves-
tigations for them to act upon.
The Office of Revenue Sharing has the
authority to conduct its own investiga-
tion into matters such as this. If they
determine that "improper" use of rev-
enue-sharing funds has occurred, they
may take action on one of several levels,
including demanding that the funds im-
properly used be returned to the Federal
Treasury.
Thereis no doubt that the responsibil-
ity of the Office of Revenue Sharing is
clear in these cases of policy spying. Il-
legal surveillance certainly constitutes
improper use of Federal funds. If it can
be determined by either the courts or by
a committee of the Congress, that such
surveillance was, -indeed, illegal, I would
hope that the Office of Revenue Sharing
uses its authority in this matter to apply
the most strict penalties against States
and cities that use Federal revenue-
sharing funds in this manner.
The General Accounting Office report
outlined the use of LEAA funds, as well,
by the police intelligence division. Nearly
$4 million of these funds was used by the
city of Chicago to establish a computer
system to which many city agencies, in-
cluding the intelligence division, seem to
have had access. In light of the wide-
spread misuse of such data banks by both
government and private groups, this too
would seem a matter for further study.
The General Accounting Office ob-
tained information on one other aspect
of intelligence activities in the Chicago
area. This concerned the 113th Military
Intelligence Group and its alleged sup-
port of right-wing terrorist activities. Ac-
cording to these reports, this Regular
Army unit provided information and
weapons to militant groups such as the
Legion of Justice and assisted them in
the systematic disruption of various lib-
eral organizations in the Chicago area.
These same reports alleged that the 113th
Military Intelligence Group exchanged
information and received assistance from
the intelligence division of the Chicago
Police Department.
The GAO, in its investigation, could
only determine that most files of the
113th Military Intelligence Group had
been burned in 1972 and those that had
not been destroyed "were not readily
available."
Mr. Speaker, Chicago may be one of
the most blatant examples of such mis-
use of authority by high administrative
officials, but it is certainly not the only
example. Similar cases have been report-
ed in Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Hous-
',on in recent months and this, too, may
inly be the tip of the iceberg.
At the time the GAO report on police
,ntelligence activities in Chicago was re-
:eased, I called the activities it outlined
'an obscene misuse of governmental
euthority."
What I said about Chicago is equally
rue about other cities where this may
have happened and equally true about
the Federal Government's illegal surveil-
lance activities.
These abuses have infected nearly
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
June 16, 1Approved For RelECONMEGAMIAVAIROORIM-00111486E0800110060-9 H 5553
every level of government in this country,
and in almost every single case, the Fed-
eral Government seems involved, either
directly or indirectly.
?Whether it is the use of Federal money
to fund the intelligence activities of local
police departments or the improper use
of Federal data banks or Army support
of right-wing terrorists or Cointelpro or
the White House plumbers or any of the
others, these sickening abuses of the
Constitution have gone far enough.
If unchecked, these activities could in
a very real sense, mean the end of Amer-
ican democracy as we know it. Should
they continue on the massiye scale that
they have existed in recent years, a
cornerstone of our system of govern-
ment?the right of dissent?would be in
serious jeopardy.
Corrupt and power hungry officials and
petty despots to the contrary, however,
the first amendment is still with us.
Those of us who see injustice and in-
equality in this country will continue to
speak out in order to make this a better
country. We will not be deterred. We will
not be intimidated.
Activities such as those I have outlined
here" today, will only redouble our efforts
to speak out against these abuses.
This Congress, however, must put a
stop to these activities wherever they
occur. If 1 cent of Federal money, money
that we appropriate, is used for these
abuses, it is our responsibility, our obli-
gation, to expose it and end it, once and
for all.
Mr. GUYER. Mr. Speaker, as indicated
by Vice President ROCKEFELLER'S recent
report on the CIA, there is a definite need
for more powerful legislation to further
protect the individual's right to privacy.
Despite the fact that most States have
enacted laws to protect the individual,
the right of privacy is often routinely
violated. I am referring to cases in which
individuals are victimized by information
on mailing lists that Government agen-
cies unethically make available. Citizens
are forced to provide personal informa-
tion about their public and private lives
to such organizations as census bureaus,
credit associations, police files, and
others. Even information from personal
income tax reports is often not kept con-
fidential.
Personal records are almost as readily
available as the daily newspaper?and all
too often, the individual is unaware that
the information contained in his records
is being clandestinely used.
The continuance of invasion of per-
sonal privacy is not only degrading and
embarrassing but is an outright con-
tradiction to the spirit of the fourth
amendment. In a nation where individ-
uality is so greatly treasured, tolerance
of such invasion is unpardonable.
From my participation in the Repub-
lican task force on privacy, I became
acutely aware of the many abuses made
on the individual with regard to loss of
privacy. During our concentrated efforts
to protect the rights of juvenile offenders,
we unearthed countless cases where, due
to readily accessible court and police rec-
ords, these individuals have been branded
"criminal" for life, and thus have been
denied equal opportunities with other
citizens of the country. There is an ob-
vious need to eliminate such stigmatizing
effects and to allow the individual to be-
come a member of society with a clear
slate.
I am especially hopeful that violations
of the right to privacy will soon become
a relic of the past. The right to privacy
is a freedom that should be guaranteed
,and cherished by all.
Mr. KEMP. Mr. Speaker, I wish, first,
to commend my colleague, the gentleman
from Ohio (Mr. MOSHER) , for providing
Members an opportunity this afternoon
to address the problems associated with
assuring the individual's right to privacy.
The gentleman has been in the forefront
of efforts to safeguard privacy?efforts
which have been, and are continuing to
be, transformed into legislation and en-
acted into law. Together with other Mem-
bers, such as the gentleman from Cali-
fornia (Mr. GOLDWATER) , he has helped
to increase substantially the conscious-
ness of Members and the public on the
nature of the threat to personal privacy.
This has been one of the principal is-
sues in which I have been involved also.
I think the protection of personal privacy
is fundamental to the rights of free men
and women?the specific rights enumer-
ated in our Constitution and the prem-
ises which underlie them. It is a pro-
tection against the unwarranted intru-
sion of someone else into the life of the
individual, and if one examines the mul-
titude of actual and alleged violations of
this right to privacy in recent years one
can see quite clearly that "someone else"
Is most often an instrument of govern-
ment.
The intrusions upon privacy and the
growth of government have been coexist-
ent.
Nothing is more to blame for the rise
in government interference and inter-
vention in our private lives and security
than the notion that government can
solve arll our problems and must be given,
therefore, the unrestricted range of au-
thority to do so.
Only when we come to full grips with
those notions will we ever secure our-
selves and our posterity against infringe-
ments on the right of privacy.
Jefferson observed that:
It is the natural course of events that
liberty recedes and government grows.
While accurate, Jefferson's observa-
tion stated only one specific aspect of
a larger and more complex equation. To
wit: As external, collective human con-
trol over, and interference with, a per-
son's life intensifies, individual liberty
shrinks proportionally.
In this larger senseVhe real threat to
Individual liberty is the collective will of
any institution or group of people which
has the power?economic, political, or
whatever?to coerce, intimidate, control,
deny, or even give. The recognition that
It is the natural course of events for lib-
erty to recede as government grows is,
then, only one manifestation of threats
to liberty, albeit the most evident threat
in both Jefferson's and our times.
The lessons of history teach us that
this growth of collective power can come
from institutions other than govern-
ment. The problem is not singularly the
"bigness" of these institutions, in rela-
tion to the individual and the exercise of
free choice, but such "bigness" does ac-
centuate the problem. It tends to reduce
the range of alternative choices of con-
duct available to the individual.
In the 20th century, particularly in our
Nation, it has been the growth of?the
"bigness" of?government which has
posed the single greatest threat to hu-
man liberty. This growth in government
is occasioned by the erroneous notions
that only government can solve the ma-
jor social, economic, and societal prob-
lems of our era, and that government
schemes and regulations are preferable
to the laws of supply and demand and
the exercise of free choice by individuals.
Woodrow Wilson, a doctor of philoso-
phy in history and a recognized scholar
on the processes of maintaining indi-
vidual rights before coming to the Presi-
dency, warned that?
Liberty has never come from government.
. . . The history of liberty is the history of
limitations of government power, not the
Increase of it.
In contradistinction to the classical
liberalism embodied in these profound
observations of Jefferson and Wilson, de-
spite the clear warnings from history as
prior human experience, and even de-
spite the all-too-apparent results a the
rapid growth of, government in our mod-
em age, we seem, as a people, to have
learned little. For, that government has
grown disproportionately to the whole of
society is factually indisputable, and that
such growth has occasioned an ever-
growing threat to individual liberty is, in
my opinion, equally indisputable.
In both absolute and percentage terms,
government's growth has been virtually
without restraint during the past nearly
half century. It has exceeded all bounds
of necessity and perspective.
What are the facts?
Between 1940 and 1976?
The Federal Government's gross an-
nual revenue rose by 42 times?from $7
billion to $297.5 billion;
Total Federal expenditures rose by 35
times?from $10.1 billion to $349.4 bil-
lion?and will probably go even much
higher in 1976;
The Federal debt outstanding rose by
14 times?from $42 billion to $605-plus
billion;
Federal expenditures per person rose
by over 15 times;
The Congress enacted nearly 15,000
public laws;
Federal employment zoomed to over
2.8 million people;
Federal forms, to be painstakingly
filled out by individuals and corporations,
grew and grew in number and com-
plexity;
Federal investigatory surveillance, and
monitoring staffs grew to enforce each
and every measure;
The number of Federal initiatives,
most of which are reinforced through
interventionist regulatory powers and
policies, mushroomed; and
The Federal agencies which execute
these powers and policies?and, fre-
quently, call for more?grew accordingly.
It is almost impossible to itemize the
areas of conduct now subject to Federal
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
II 5554
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOL SE June 16 , 1975
control because there are so many, but
a cursory examination of any Govern-
ment organization chart shows us the
areas of out lives now subject to Govern-
ment regulation: health, education, wel-
fare, labor, commerce, housing, trans-
portation, finance, agriculture, environ-
ment, communications, wages and prices,
energy, labor-management relations,
trade, alcohol, tobacco, firearms, savings,
community relations, civil affairs, land
and natural resource uses, recreation,
commodities, securities, insurance, mar-
keting, consumer affairs, productivity,
nutrition, research, forestry, product
standards, travel, economic development,
shipping, vocational and career oppor-
tunities, employment standards, occupa-
tional safety, child development, retire-
ment and income security, rehabilitation,
interest rates, credit availability, land
sales, aviation, railroads, highways,
safety, institutionalized voluntarism, arts
and humanities, equal employment op-
portunity, export-import terms, truck-
ing, small business, veterans, postal serv-
ice. ad infinitum.
The unfortunate, yet perhaps inescap-
able, Impact of the exercise of this vast
amount of Government authority was in-
fringement upon privacy.
The manifestations were myriad: data
banks, wiretapping, electronic surveil-
lance, eavesdropping, credit histories,
medical histories, income tax informa-
tion, information systems, regulatory
report filings, disclosure statements,
data exchanges.
Separately?and, most assuredly,
when taken collectively?these devices
and procedures add up to a growing in-
fringement on the right to be let alone,
the right to privacy.
We simply must come to better under-
stand the relationship between the ex-
tent of government and the threats to
privacy. Government can carry out its
almost unlimited functions only through
Information gathering, analysis, dissem-
ination, and exchange. Thus, we should
reduce the range of those functions.
We can, and we should, do those things
which we think are necessary to protect
the right of privacy, and such measures
as the Privacy Act of 1974 are definitely
steps in the right direction.
I think most Members are aware of my
efforts in that regard?the sponsorship
of legislation which was incorporated
Into that act, the Goldwater-Kemp pri-
vacy amendments to the Federal Energy
Act of 1974, the support for additional
protection of student records, the intro-
duction of the first comprehensive medi-
cal privacy proposal. But throughout that
work I was, and I remain, constantly
aware of the more fundamental causes
of the intrusions we are trying to guard
against?the growth in Government in-
tervention in our private lives.
We can address the causes of invasion
of privacy with substantial effectiveness
only when we address the size and ex-
tent of government and set about to re-
duce and limit it..
This, I think, we must very soon do, or
our entire way of life will be substanti-
ally altered?and it will not be for the
good.
GENERAL LEAVE
Mr. K ASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, I
ask unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days in which to
revise and extend their remarks on the
subject of the special order today of the
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. MOSHER) .
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from Wis-
consin?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. (Mr.
McFsLn) Under a previous order of the
House, the gentleman from Pennsyl-
vania (Mr. COUGHLIN), is recognized for
60 minutes.
[Mr. COUGHLIN addressed the House.
His remarks will appear hereafter in the
Extensions of Remarks.]
ANNIVERSARY OF THE LENINGRAD
TRIAL
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from Pennsylvania (Mr. EILBERG) ,
is recognized for 30 minutes.
Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Speaker, on this
date 5 years ago the Russian Govern-
ment shocked, and outraged the world
by sentencing 11 persons, 9 Jews and 2
Christians, to death or lengthy prison
terms for simply trying to act as free
men are supposed to be allowed to act.
The sentences, which were imposed to
deter other persons from their "dissi-
dent" activities were partially reduced
after protests poured in from around the
world.
Despite the harshness of the sentences
and other continued and brutal harass-
ment by the Soviet Government the Jews
of Russia are still trying to emigrate to
freedom.
Last month I visited Russia with some
other Members of Congress and we were
able to meet with some of these men and
women in Moscow and Leningrad. In
Kiev the people whom we were supposed
to see were ordered out of the city for
the duration of our visit, but we were
able to meet with the wife of one of the
men who had applied for an exit visa.
In Moscow we spoke with: Vitaly
Rubin, Leonid Raines, Irma Chernyak,
Sophia Belotserkovskaya, Alexander
Lerner, Ida Nudel, Vladimir Slepak,
Anatoly Scharansky, and Joseph and
Dina Belli n.
Our Leningrad meetings were with;
Leopold Ekchilevsky, Boris Krumgalz,
Mark Frevdin, Vladimir Sverdlin, Alex-
andr and Oksana Chertin, George Saki-
riusky, Fla and Elleonora Ginsburg,
Jeaniette "Janne Kartseva, Felix
Aronovich and Ilya Shostakovsky.
As I stated previously, the people with
whom we were supposed to meet in Kiev
were ordered out of the city. Their names
are: Ilya Zlobinsky, Vadim Sheinis,
Aleksandr Mizrukhin, Vladimir Kislik,
and Kim Fridman.
We were, however, able to meet and
talk to Mizrukhin's wife, Mils,.
Every one of these people, without hes-
itation, said they wanted their cause
and themselves individually to get as
much publicity and support as possible.
They all asked us to mention their names
to the Russian officials with whom we
would be meeting later.
They absolutely contradicted the peo-
ple in this country who claim we are
hurting them or the cause of Soviet
Jewry by publicly supporting them or
Putting pressure on the Soviet Govern-
ment in their behalf.
At this time Mr. Speaker, I would like
place on the RECORD a statement of
support for the persons sentenced 5
years ago today at the Leningrad trials
and the more than 40 Soviet Jews who
have been imprisoned for trying to reach
freedom.
STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR PERSONS
SENTENCED
Five years ago today, justice was a victim
::f the Soviet legal system.
On this date in 1970, the Soviet govern-
ment shocked the world with the arrest of
eleven persons. All received harsh prison
terms, some as long as 15 years. One was sen-
tenced to death, but in response to cries of
outrage from the free world, the sentence
was commuted to 15 years.
Nine Jews and two Christians. They were
',he "criminals" of the First Leningrad TriaL
For keeping typewriters in their homes,
they were criminals.
For owning books with the word "Jew"
In them, they were criminals. And for pos-
sessing letters from relatives in Israel, they
were criminals.
What followed their arrest was part of a
:ystematic plan to subdue the remarkable
Jewish national movement that emerged in
the USSR. It was a plan whose goal was to
61lence and intimidate Jews seeking to emi-
grate to Israel. The defendants were charged
with such crimes as "betrayal of the father-
land;" "responsibility-for the preparation of
a crime and for attempted crimes;" "misap-
propriation of State or public property;"
"anti-Soviet agitation or propaganda;" and
"participation in an anti-Soviet organiza-
tion."
Sadly, the Leningrad Trial was only the
,ieginning. Since then the Soviet Union has
used its legal system to harass Soviet Jews
whose only crime is the desire to emigrate
to their ancient homeland, Israel?a right
,tuaranteed by Soviet law and international
Within recent months Mark Nashpits and
Boris Tsitlionik were arrested and sentenced
-.o five years in exile for demonstrating on
-iehalf of Soviet Jewish prisoners of consci-
including those convicted in the Len.
Ingrad Trials of 1970.
Mikhail Leviev, a Soviet Jew who sought an
exit visa, was tried and sentenced to death
'or "economic crimes"; and Dr. Mikhail
-thtern, a highly respected Vinnitsa physi-
4an. has been sentenced to eight years hard
Abor on trumped-up charges of accepting
-ribes from his patients.
In these and other cases the defendants
sere refused counsel of their choice. Testi-
nony on their behalf was suppressed and
Jocuments fraudulently altered in order to
onvict them.
The arrests that took place on June 15th,
_970 are a reminder of the extremes to which
-3oviet-authorities will go in seeking to pre-
-lent Soviet Jews from emigrating to Israel.
But those arrests were not accepted in
silence by men and women of conscience
.1noughout the free world. Just today, for
'3-stance, more than 500 lawyers from
-.Oroughout Greater Philadelphia have joined
o publish a newspaper advertisement voic-
' ng their outrage at this mockery of justice.
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800110060-9