CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: December 16, 1975
• Content Type: OPEN

Lease...2001AM CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1
December 16, 1P4A2 ?V61WitftSIONAL KECORt4? Extensions of Remarks
shall was born and raised, and the post's
Marshall Hall is named in. his memory.
The Uniontown Bypass is a modern
highway providing quick and safe access
to the entire Tjniontewn area a,rici will
play an important role in the economic
development of the. areal ,
Peneral Marshall was vne Qf Araerica's
great States=11, and Thlientown resi-
dents are especially pleased_ tp honor the
General in this small but appropriate
manner.
LEOISLATION INTRODUCED TO IN-
. CORPORATE CrOLD STAR WIVES
OF,AM CA
HON. EDWIN B. FORSYTHE
gICVV JERSEY
IN THE ROUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2104dall, Ilece4nber 1.5, 1975
Mr. PORSYTNE,. Mr. Speaker, I re-
cently introduced legislation to incorpo-
rate the Gold_ Star Wives ef America.
This IgAlOnea erganization was estab-
lished in 1945 by the widows of members
of the Armed Forces who ,clied while in
active service of their countrY,
groWing, active organization, it now
has snore than 2.000 energetic members
located in every part of the Nation.
The Gold Star Wives. Mr. Speaker,
shave been. seekbag incorporation in the
form of a Federal charter for numy
years. Because the Iiouse Judiciary Com-
mittee 1145 refused tat on such legisla-
tion in the past, I decided, in 1973 to seek
a I)istrict of CP1Inabia incorporation so
the Judiciary Committee could be by-
However, because the leadership of the
organization strengly believes they
should have a fuU.Yederal charter, I am
sponsoring 'this legislation, which un-
doubtedly will be referred to the House
Judiciary Committee.
Within the committee, however, there
prevails an entirely new atmosphere sur-
rounding Federal legislation ,to incorpo-
rate organizations, I believe the time is
right for the highly respeetable Gold
Star Wives of America to be federally
incorporated.
I know of no other group more deserv-
ing of national incorporation. Its mem-
bership is comPcsed of women who have
expertancecl the great anguish of losing
their husbands through active duty in
the Armed Forces of our Nation.
Their objectives are both praiseworthy
and significant; What More valuable con-
tribution to society can be made than to
bolster the fortitude and uplift the
spirits, as well as to aid materially, the
WidoWs and children of those who paid
the supreme sacrifice in the interest of
their fellow citizens?
The Gold Star Wives of America has
a role to play that is nationwide in scope
and worthy of IlatiOnal recognition. The
organizatiela has droller noteworthy ac-
cOraplishments to those made by our
vetpruas' and _adjunct organizations
which, have been granted national char-
ters, Txt additions, for several years Gold
Star Wives of Araerica has been partici-
pating actively in the Annual Women's
Forum on National Security, which is
composed of 16 organizations which have
received Federal charters.
I have been informed by the officers of
this organization that its goals could be
more effectively and easily attained if it
were incorporated at the national level.
The scope of its membership and busi-
ness now transcends any one State or
group of States. Its declared purposes
and activities extend to the widows and
children of servicemen ?killed who live
in every section of the country, and the
ntunber of chapters doubled in a short
time, as hundreds of new widows turned
to Gold Star Wives of America for as-
sistance with their financial and emo-
tional problems. Its officers and board
members reside in such scattered States
as Massachusetts, Washington, Califor-
nia, Colorado, Kansas, Minnesota, Vir-
ginia, Missouri, Louisiana, Kentucky,
New Jersey, Illinois, Arkansas, Florida,
and Indiana. In every. sense of the term
and in all aspects of its operations this
is truly a national organization dedicated
to significant national purposes.
The Gold Star Wives of America has
repeatedly been 14indered and prevented
from giving assistance to the young
widows who desperately need the help
that could have been available to them
through this organization, solely because
of their lack of a Federal charter. Efforts
to make the Gold Star Wives of America
known through survivor assistance of-
ficers at military installations have been
refused on the basis that the organiza-
tion is not recognized as a reputable or-
ganization, while in other instances, con-
tacts at military bases have resulted in
inquiries to the Department of Defense
as to the reliability of Gold Star Wives
of America. Officials of the Veterans' Ad-
ministration, I am advised, have sug-
gested that a Federal charter should be
priority legislation for Gold Star Wives
of America, as a means of establishing
the status and integrity of this relatively
young organization. The organization
could thus acquire the respect and sta-
ture which come only to those organiza-
tions who are so recognized by the
Congress.
Mr. Speaker, I have carefully exam-
ined the criteria set forth in 1969 in the
Standards for the Granting of Federal
Charters by subcommittees of the Sen-
ate and House Committees on the Judi-
ciary. In every aspect it appears to me
that the Gold Star Wives of America,
Inc., more than measures up to those
required standards. It is clearly a nation-
al permanent organization operating in
the public interest; the character of this
organization is such that chartering by
the Congress as a Federal corporation is
the only appropriate form of incorpora-
tion; it is solely a patriotic, nonprofit,
nonpartisan organization devoted to
civic and membership betterment; and
it aspires to provide nationwide services
which cannot be adequately organized
without a nationally granted charter.
The objects and purposes of the Gold
'Star Wives of America are most com-
mendable. In addition to honoring the
memory of loved ones who paid the su-
preme sacrifice while serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States, it is
committed to assisting their, widows and
E 6707
children, both materially and spiritually.
One of its stated goals, for example, is to
provide the benefits of a happy, health-
ful, and wholesome life to minor children
of persons who died in the service of our
country. Another aim is to promote ac-
tivities and interests designed to foster
among its members the proper mental
attitude to face the future with courage.
Direct aid to the widows and children of
former servicemen is likewise an obliga-
tion which this organization has as-
sumed. I am pleased to note also that
the Gold Star Wives of America have
dedicated themselves to the noble cause
of safeguarding and transmitting to pos-
terity the principles of justice, freedom,
and democracy for which members of our
armed services fought and died. They
have likewise pledged themselves to as-
sist in upholding the Constitution and
laws of the United States of America,
and to inculcate a sense of individual ob-
ligation to the community, State, and
Nation. In all these respects this orga-
nization deserves the treatment which
Congress has previously accorded other
similar national groups.
Mr. Speaker, our colleague in the Sen-
ate, Senator BAYH of Indiana, introduced
similar legislation in the other body on
June 24, 1975. I strongly urge the prompt
consideration be given to the adoption of
these bills for incorporation of the Gold
Star Wives of America in order that the
organization can have the national
stature and corporate structure so essen-
tial to implement achievement of its very
desirable purposes.
NORTH CAROLINA
DAY CARE ASSOCIATION
HON. RICHARDSON PREYER
Or NORTH CAROLINA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, December 15, 1975
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Speaker, I would
like to share with my colleagues a posi-
tion statement from the North Carolina
Day Care Association regarding child
care delivery systems. I share the con-
cern of the Association about the Federal
Inter-Agency Day Care Requirements?
FIDCR's--of 1968 now incorporated into
Federal law through the enactment of
the Social Security Amendments of 1974.
One of the primary differences be-
tween the Federal requirements and
most State licensing requirements are
those requirements which call for more
staff and space. These differences can
make a dramatic difference in the cost
of proViding this care. Congress has
mandated a study of the impact of the
FIDCR's and I offer this statement for
your consideration as this matter is fur-
ther studied by the Congress:
NORTH CAROLINA DAY CARE ASSOCIATION? -
POSITION STATEMENT ON CHILD CARE DELIV-
ERY
SYSTEMS REVISION: ADOPTED AUGUST 7,
1975
The NODCA promotes these premises as
vital to child care in our state and nation:
1. The child is the responsibility of the
parent (s) . The community has the responsi-
bility for providing services to help in the
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ITh R9 AL
development of every child to his fullest po-
tential. The community also has the respon-
sibility for providing information to assist
parents in the selection of these services.
2. Quality child care service should be
available in every community to every child
whose family needs and wants them. Child
care services should be diverse enough to
meet the varied needs of different children in
different families and allow the parents
choice in what program best fits their child's
needs.
3. On the basis of need, public funds
should be used to enable the parent(s) to
exericse their responsibility and right to pur-
chase child care. All barriers to the flow of
public fun.ds should be removed so that all
existing child care programs, both public and
private, are being utilized and government
operated programs are initiated only when
services cannot be provided under private
auspices.
S. 622: "ENERGY FLIM FLAM"
HON. WILLIS D. GRADISON, JR.
OF OHIO
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, December 15, 1975
Mr. GRADISON. Mr. Speaker, I am
shocked that the Congress of the United
States would play games with an issue
as important as our national energy
policy.
In an area where there is an urgent
need for comprehensive, foresighted leg-
islation to meet our future energy needs,
the Congress has chosen the politically
easy way out, rolling back oil prices until
atter the next election then allowing
them to rise until controls are lifted. This
legislation is polities at its most cynical.
The energy bill we are considering
today makes a serious mistake in treat-
ing the American people as "economic
illiterates," to quote an apt phrase from
the Cincinnati Post. Supporters of the
bill would have us believe that this is a
consumer bill. Nothing could be further
from the truth.
S. 622 ignores the damage that a tem-
porary price rollback would cause at this
time. A rollback would encourage con-
sumption precisely at a time we are try-
ing to reduce gasoline usage. It will in-
crease imports precisely when we are
seeking to reduce our dependence on for-
eign sources. It will discourage domestic
production when we wish to become en-
ergy independent.
Finally, it will create legislated short-
ages and long lines at the gas stations.
Passage of this bill will put the United
States at the mercy of the OPEC nations
through their ability to set the market
price of oil.
Congress needs to pursue long range
policies which will encourage domestic
exploration and development of our en-
ergy supplies. I will continue to support
gradual elimination of price controls on
oil together with a windfall profits tax,
This tax is necessary to assure that ad-
ditional revenues are plowed back into
continued energy research and develop-
ment rather than used to further enrich
the oil companies.
Mr. Speaker, it is time we stopped play-
ing "politics as usual" in Congress an
got down to the tough decisions needea
in pressing issues. I believe the American
)eople will no longer stand for this kind
politically-motivated policymaking,
n which Congressmen look out for them-
ielves first and the Nation second.
As an indication of the failure of Con-
gress to fool the American people on this
issue, I am including copies of two edi-
Gorials from Cincinnati papers, the Cin-
cinnati Post and the Cincinnati Enquirer.
[From the Cincinnati Enquirer, Nov. 13,
1975]
A SELF-DEFEATING LAW
It is the very kind of program to "benefit"
the American consumer that has put us in
bondage to the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) and that the
Congress has just adopted in trying to legis-
late lower petroleum prices.
From the early 1950s on, it was the con-
scious policy of the federal government, both.
Congress and the executive, to increase pros-
perity by holding down the cost of gasoline,
jet fuel, heating oil and natural gas.
Prosperity is a much-desired and worthy
goal, but the national energy policy was
shortsighted and self-defeating in the long
run.
We have given the 13 member nations of
OPEC the power to set the price of crude oil,
and with that the steadily rising price of re-
fined petroleum products. We have done so
by deliberately making ourselves dependent
on this source of energy, and discouraging
both domestic production of it and economic
use of it by holding the price down. The
chasm between the needs of the nation and
the price-consumption policy of the federal
government is most strikingly and painfully
clear in the shortage of natural gas.
By seeking to decree that the price of a
barrel of domestically produced petroleum
shall be only about two-third of that of im-
ported oil over the next few years, the Con-
gress is hurting the national economy and
undercutting the very prosperity it seeks to
promote.
At the legislated price of petroleum the
Congress would have, Americans are going to
Use ever more OPEC petroleum.
They will do so because mixing domestic
and foreign crude oil together in price low-
ers the net price by about a fourth. That as-
sumes the present ratio of about 40% im-
ported oil to 60% domestic oil. The lower
price encourages consumption without, how-
ever, generating an equal increase in supply.
The Congress fails to legislate greater sup-
plies because it controls neither the decisions
of the OPEC nations on the price at which
they will be willing to sell their oil leer the
decisions of the American petroleum indus-
try on production here at home.
The Congress can, of course,' influence
those decisions. The influence in this piece of
legislation is negative. It discourages domes-
tic production by the artificially low ceiling
price set on our awn petroleum and by al-
lowing the petroleum industry to pass
through to the consumer the costs of im-
ported oil. There is no short-term profit loss
to the industry from the legislation, al-
though there is a long-term profit gain that
it would be forced to forgo.
This is a bail piece of legislation. It de-
serves to be vetoed by President Ford.
[From the Cincinnati Post, Nov. 19, 1975]
ENERGY FLIMFLAM
With its eye fixed firmly on the 1976 elec-
tion, Congress has decided on an energy bill
that is good politics and bad national policy.
And what may be worse, President Ford,
who knows better, is reported by his aides
to be leaning toward signing Congress' handi-
work.
The measure treats Americans like eco-
nomic illiterates, believing that they will be
so grateful for temporanly cheaper gaso-
line that they will overloc k long-term dam-
age to the country.
If Ford swallows the bill it woiald promptly
roll back the average pr ce of a barrel of
domestic crude oil by 12 ier cent, from the
present level of $8.75 to $` .66.
That is designed to cut tie price of gasoline
by 3.5 cents a gallon. Due er its complicated
provisions, the bill woull keep gas prices
down until the election l safely past. Then
they would start rising and would be 3.5
cents above today's price i when price con-
trols expire in 40 months.
The plan is an ingenious one to allow con-
gressmen to posture as champions of the con-
sumer and promote the re-election of as
many as possible. But it uould be harmful in
at least three major ways.
By artificially lowering gasoline prices, it
would encourage consuription when con-
servation should be the watchword.
By cutting the oil industry's income, which
Is already slipping, it would cause a drop in
exploration and a faster ,lecline in domeetic
oil production.
As a result of using mo e fuel and produc-
ing less, this country wonld have to import
more high-priced foreign all, now 40 per cent
of overall consumption.
Inevitably we would beeome more depend-
ent on the pricing and a' tpply whims of the
OPEC cartel and more vulnerable to another
embargo.
Apart from its baelc :laws, the measure
contains a number of user ul provisions, These
include requiring Detroit to produce more
fuel-efficient cars; setting energy standards
for household appliances building up an oil
reserve to protect agaInt t an embargo, and
helping small coal operators to increase out-
put.
Such steps toward a sensible energy policy
show that Congress MD VD better on the oil-
price Issue?If President Ford vetoes its film-
ilam and demands an honest bill.
ANGOLA IS OUR NEW VIETNAM
HON. HERMAN BADILLO
OF NEW 70EN
IN THE HOUSE OF RI PRESENTATIVES
Monday, December 15, 1975
Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Speaker, Sunday,
the New York Times' story on the wors-
ening situation in Angola stated:
When the United Stapes finally evacuated
Saigon in defeat, a national debate on Amer-
ican policy seemed inurenent It never really
occurred. . . . Now the same subject seems
to have returned, cancel Angola: American
and Russian power ane influence colliding
in distant places that are in, as Mr. Kennedy
said, a small world.
And what has changed since the end
of our involvement it Vietnam? Appar-
ently not much. CIA Director Colby tells
us that his interpretation of the War
Powers Act does not Preclude "paramili-
tary operation." And to, Henry Kissinger
and William Colby have consulted, and,
now the $25 million of the taxpayer's
money has been spent covertly, we are
asked to believe that this is another in-
volvement in the American interest.
The parallels with Vietnam must be
drawn and reinforced We have been told
that the Communists have put much
more money and arms into Angola than
we have and so we have to "catch up."
Yet in doing so we have aligned ourselves
with South Africa?a country whose poli-
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December 16, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?Extensions of Remarks
cies we loudly proclam as being repug-
nant to US. As in Vietnam, we proclaim
the right of the people to determine their
own future, and yet we have allied our-
selves with factions in Angola that are
so weak that they are almost certainly
doomed to failure.
And yet we persist. Despite the fact
that we may lose close allies like Zaire
and Zambia, despite the fact that Africa-
watchers have been advising against our
inVolvement for many months, and most
of all, despite the War Powers Act, the
Secretary of State has once again chosen
the imperial route of unilateral action
in the formulation of our foreign policy.
It is my fervent hope that before the
Congress recesses we will assert our
_ role as an egual partner in the policy-
.
making process, and inform the admin-
istration just how antithetical our con-
tinued involvement in the affairs of an-
?dux country is to the Congress.
%"4 fon9wwg articles from yesterday's
and today's New York Time clearly
define the situation in Angola, and the
folly of our role:
No QUESTIONS PLEASE
(By Anthony Lewis)
BosTofs, Deceinher 14.--tEn the lest six
months the Ford AcireinistratiOn has secretly
supplied $25 million in arms and money to
factions it favOrs in Angola. The President
has just approved another $25 million. Amer-
ican pilots are flyingff ve American artillery
spotter planes in and out of Angola from
neighboring Zaire.
The Angola operation is already one of the
largest covert actiOirks ever rapunted by the
United States outside Inflochinp., and it
raises large questions of policy. Does the An-
golan faction we oppose, which gets hid
from the Soviet 'gni= and Cuba, threaten
American interests? Is there any realistic
4311auce of defeating it, or is the prospect an
endless struggle without success? And more.
But there is a fundamental question of
process before those of policy. If American
action is needed, why should it be clandes-
tine? Why has our policy on so dangerous
a problem been made and executed in secret?
The answer given is that U.S. aid might
embarrass the recipients if sent openly.
American motives are suspect in Africa these
days, in part because of leftist bias but also
because of the record of American activities
In the Congo, Chile and elsewhere.
But an operation as large as that in An-
gola could hardly be expected to remain
secret for long, so that 'answer is less than
persuasive. In any event, the Angola action
has now been disclosed in considerable de-
tall--by unnamed sources who sounds Very
much like the C.I.A. Continuing to handle
the policy covertly is not likely to avoid em-
barre,sstrient.
The Angolan affair, in fact, makes clear,
what must often be the real reason that offi-
cials choose the covert path. It is more con-
venient. It allows policy to be made by a
handful of men who know best. It avoids
annoying questions by Congress, the public
and experts within the executive branch.
After Vietnam, an open decision to inter-
vene in an armed struggle thousands of miles
from the United States and ontside our tra-
ditional sphere of interest would surely have
aroused some questions. There is no need for
conjecture. Seymour M. Hersh of The New
York Times has disclosed m
feirgieago,yr_
ernmental OppoOtlpil,
24143figunpresse .
.4aeit tate Kissinger made the deci-
sion for military aid against the advice at
his own Assistant Secretary for African Af-
fairs, Nathaniel Davis. Mr. Davis felt so
strongly about it that he quit the job last
August. Since then Mr. Kissinger has cut
down the flow of cables on. Angola to the
department's African specialists and even
to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
which also opposed his decision.
Mr. Davis is said to have seen three main
dangers in the growing U.S. involvement in
Angola. The factions we favor are so weak
that the policy probably will not work. A
prolonged struggle ending in failure would
deeply damage the two African figures on
whom we most rely, Presidents Kaunda of
Zambia and Mobutu of Zaire. And the United
States may become identified with white
South Africa.
Those arguments look rather convincing
today, attar a direct South African military
intervention in Angola and after the decline
in the fortunes of the Angolan groups fa-
vored by the Ford Administration.. But right
or wrong, the arguments should have been
heard?heard by someone other than. Henry
Kissinger.
Under the American system, secret deci-
sions by one official or a few are wrong in
principle. They also tend to be wrong in
practice. Whatever good we can imagine co-
vert operations doing, what they actually did
Is evident enough in the major examples:
Vietnam, Laos, Cuba.
Henry Kissinger's record snakes it particu-
larly unwise to leave policy on Angola largely
in. his hands. A National Security Council
memorandum drafted under his direction in
1979 predicted continued Portuguese power
in Angola, and thereafter some help was giv-
en to Portugal in its colonial war. This ab-
surd episode is described by Tad Szulc in the
current issue of Foreign Policy.
But the point is much larger than the
specifics of Angola. Our attitude toward that
affair will really indicate whether we have
learned from Vietnam and Watergate and
the rest how much harm we do to ourselves
by secrecy?by letting a handful of officials
make policy without public examination of
the premises.
The worst danger of covert action on such
a scale is that it may commit the United
States to a position and make extrication
awkward. That may indeed be the intention.
The time to stop the process is now. Senator
Dick Clark of Iowa has a forehgn aid bill
amendment that would bar any Angolan aid
unless Congress has authorized it. That pro-
posal takes no position on the rights or
wrongs in Angola. It would simply make sure
that the country has a constitutional op-
portunity to look out for quagmires before
taking this large step.
THE MINI-VIETNAM IN ANGOLA
(By C. L. Sulzberger)
WINDHOEK, S017TH-WEST AFRICA.?The An-
golan mess bears some resemblance to Viet-
nam, if on a smaller scale. The civil war
started among rival nationalists after the
principle of independence had been gained
and foreigners intervened to suit their global
interests. But, unlike Vietnam, no great-
power intruder came from regions near the
chosen battlefield.
The external forces involved aren't stran-
gers to the game. The United States has at
various times exerted tangible influence to
attain policy goals in Zaire (formerly the
Belgian Congo). The Soviet Union has in-
vested much in unproductive attempts to
control Zaire, Sudan and Egypt, and in areas
where success was achieved, notably Somalia.
China has Nen. involv.esi?in..Alric
over SLausja.,?Aquatagjxxoney, engineers and
esilltiarv. experts to various lands including
Zalie, Tanzania and Mozambique.
Everyone has used one or another form of
mereenazies: unemployed professional sol-
diem or military,units from smaller ideologi-
cal allies. Thus, Russia has been employing
convnando troops from its little client, Cuba,
E 6709
on African assignments since the 1960's.
North Korean officers are on a training mis-
sion in Zaire.
All these factors play a role in the civil
war that has engulfed Angola, just north of
South-West Africa (controlled by Pretoria).
Three principal guerrilla groups are fighting
each other to gain ascendancy and an odd
mixture of foreign nations are directly in-
volved.
The Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola, headed by Agostinho Neto, which
seems at present to have an upper hand, is
heavily backed by the Soviet Union. There is
evidence that Soviet advisers are helping Neto
in Luanda, his capital, and that Moscow has
sent him an extensive inventory of arms.
Standing loyally with Russia is Fidel
Castro, who has dispatched between three
and five thousand Cuban regulars to spear-
head M.P.L.A. attacks. The Cubans are the
only large non-African combat force in An-
gola. Several hundred of them are combat
veterans of the independence struggle in
Guinea-Bissau.
The two anti-M.P.L.A. guerrilla forces,
UNITA (National Union for the Total Inde-
pendence of Angola), and F.N.L.A. (Front
for the National Liberation of Angola), have
'joined in. uneasy alliance. UNITA is led by
Jonas Savimbi and F.N,L.A. by Holden. Ro-
berto, brother-in-law of Zaire's President Mo-
butu. This coalition is at present supported
by Communist China, the United States,
Zaire and South Africa.
The United States uneasily opposes the
threat of a Soviet-dominated Angola that
would provide Russia with naval and air
bases and a strong-point aimed at the enor-
mous mineral wealth of Southern Africa and
Zaire. Even if Moscow proves unable to con-
trol these resources, it would be in a position
to deny them to others with its strong navy.
Washington is well aware of this danger
and the Soviet threat to move into the South
Atlantic as it has in the Indian Ocean, but it
is leery of direct involvement because of its
Vietnam experience. China has less of a
complex.
Last June Mr. Roberto boasted: "All my
troops have been trained by the Chinese."
Whether Chinese instructors are still with
F.L.NA. cannot be proved and some reports
claim Peking is diminishing its role. But
China is concerned with its third-world rela-
tions and is extra-susceptible to copper-pro-
ducing states, from Chile to Zambia and
Zaire, where Robertot brother-in-law is boss.
South Africa, for its part, fears Soviet ef-
forts to spread revolutionary propaganda in
South-West Africa and also through the Af-
rican National Council in the republic itself.
Small South African forces have been sta-
tioned twenty miles inside southern Angola
with instructions to engage in hot pursuit, if
necessary, 200 miles northward. There are
South African advisers and armor farther
north and its troops apparently control Sar
da Bandeira airfield south of Huambo.
It is still early to forecast how the Angolan
contest will end. So far the Soviet Union has
shown great resolve but, in the past, its stay-
ing power in West Africa has not been im-
pressive. China, on the other hand, has been
courting the black states for years and its
ideological practices have considerable ap-
peal. But African nations have not been nota-
ble for tying themselves inexorably to any
ideological creed.
The outcome in Angela--zand its eventual
implications?may be affected by any United
StaleS" determination to step up its role or
even by the import of further mercenaries( by
one or another competing group. Well-
trained professional soldiers with good weap-
ons have shown they can have considerable
effect on African battlefields.
The Black Companies now being led around
Angola by Cuban ideologues or white officer
hirelings are every bit as important as the
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E 6710 CONGRESS] ONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks DeceAiber 16, 1975
White Companies of unemployed English
knights who settled 1,rguments between Ital-
ian city-states following the Hundred Years
War. But this time the ultimate strategic re-
percussions might echo on a global scale.
COMMUNISM AND THE WAR In ANGOLA
(By George M. Houser)
The conflict of opposing political move-
ments for control of an independent Angola
is rapidly escalating into an international
confrontation reminiscent of Vietnam, and
United States spokesmen are grossly distort-
ing the real issues involved.
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has
pointed an accusing finger at the Soviet
Union and Cuba for intervening in Angola.
Characteristically, United Nations Ambassa-
dor Daniel P. Moynihan went further when
he said that Soviet involvement in Angola
was a erst step in the colonizing of the whole
continent. But little is said about reported
United States military aid sent to Angola.
American spokesmen are simplistically
portraying the Angolan conflict as "Commu-
nism" versus "anti-Commusism." The Popu-
lar Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(M.P.L.A.), whose government at Luanda
has been recognized by sixteen African states
(33 countries in all), is constantly described
as "Marxist," "Soviet-backed" or just "Com-
munist." The National Front for the Libera-
tion of Angola (F.N.L.A.) and the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola
("UNITA) are called "anti-Communist."
Before any portion of the American people
respond to any call for Vietnam veterans to
join the fight against Communism in Angola,
several important factors should be con-
sidered. What about the Communism of the
M.P.L.A.?
I have been in touch with the leaders of
this movement for many years, most re-
cently last March when I was in Angola,
where I met with members of all three polit-
ical movements. They make no secret of a
basically socialist orientation in their design
for Angola.
In a continent where there is little pri-
vate accumulation of capital, socialism of
one sort or another is an accepted norm.
Capitalism is a reality in most of Africa only
through the interests of foreign corporations
and enterprises. So organizing a society along
socialist lines is to be expected.
Such a form of social organization should
not automatically end United States willing-
ness to maintain friendly relations. And in-
deed the United States has recently agreed to
diplomatic relations with Guinea-Bissau and
Mozambique, counties in which the political
parties (African Parties for the Independence
of Guinea and Cape Verde and the Front for
the Liberation of Mozambique) have pro-
grams very similar to that of the M.P.L.A.
In fact, all three had been joined in an al-
liance against Portuguese colonialism for
more than fifteen years. Why then does the
United States treat the M.P.L.A. differently?
The issue is portrayed as Soviet influence
and control In Angola. Soviet support of the
M.P.L.A. is not new. It goes back to the be-
ginning of the armed conflict in Angola in
1961. Scandinavian countries gave support to
the M.P.L.A., too. The M.P.L.A. would have
been glad to take help form wherever it was
offered?even from the United States.
Where was the United States during the
years of struggle? It was firmly welded into
an alliance With Portugal and had a policy
of avoiding .1seekisstireeWitteeetffie .liberation
movemente in Portuguese colettestesseesteese
The United States limited its "support" to
high-sounding statements on the right to
self-determination. The M.P.L.A. has little
reason to be grateful to the United States.
M.P.L.A. support from the Soviet Union does
not mean Soviet control in Angola. It has not
meant this in Mozambique, .Guinea-Bissau,
or Cape Verde.
Some Americans may find this difficult to
understand in view of our widespread biases
against the Soviet Union and Communism.
But these political movements, after long
years of combat against the Portuguese, will
not easily accept domination by a new foreign
power. It is a gross and demeaning distortion
of reality to present the men and women of
M.P.L.A. as Soviet puppets. And certainly the
Cubans are not taking over Angola.
There is a second distortion involved in
official United States interpretation of -events
in Angola. Spokesmen have said virtually
nothing about United States involvement in
Angola. Covert United States support for
the F.N.L.A, and UNITA was admitted in
testimony before the Senate Foreign- Rela-
tions Committee on Nov." 6 by William E.
Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence,
and Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs.
The New York Times reported Friday that,
according to a high-ranking Government of-
ficial, the United States had sent $25 million
in arms and support funds to Angola over
the last three months and planned to send
s25 million more in supplies. The official said
that the first sum had been distributed by
the Central Intelligence Agency.
This aid has gone principally through the
Government of Zaire, which since 1962 has
been the mainstay of the F.N.L.A., the most
conservative of the Angolan parties.
Major publications here and abroad have
reported that United States transports have
been flying daily from Zaire into F.N.L.A.
military centers in northern Angola, such as
Ambriz, with guns, ammunition and gas.
For Mr. Kissinger and other United States
leaders to point the finger at the Soviet
Union and make no mention of United
States involvement in the conflict in An-
gola is hypocritical.
United States spokesmen have made no
mention of South Africa's growing inter-
vention in Angola. Presumably the involve-
ment of this white-supremacist state is an
embarrassment the United States would pre-
fer to ignore. But this involvement is an im-
portant development in the Angolan conflict,
with far-reaching repercussions. It was the
incursion of South African troops that has
led Nigeria's "moderate" Government?even
in United States Government eyes?to rec-
ognize the M.P.L.A. government in Luanda.
There can be no doubt about the growing
South African intervention. When I was in
Zambia in early November, I was told by high
Zambian officials that at that time South
African troops and some dissident Portu-
guese mercenaries from Angola and Mozam-
bique had already occupied a strip fifty miles
deep across southern Angola.
South African columns have penetrated
hundreds of miles into the interior, with
many casualties reported and at least one
reconnaissance plane shot down.
An immediate objective of South Africa
is to use the Angolan fighting as a smoke-
screen behind which it can eliminate the
forces of S.W.A.P.O. (Southwest African Peo-
ple's Organization, the main liberation
movement of Namibia) from northern Nam-
ibia and southern Angola.
Namibia?South Africa calls it South-West
Africa?is the territory occupied by South
Africa in defiance of United Nations deci-
sions that even the United States has sup-
ported.
South Africa sees the Angolan conflict as
the real beginning of the war for its own
statelseeles Wee _s_whiteeelorolnated state in
aoutheette gouth Africa has
been attempting et:Iteelf into the
golan elements, is directly abetting South
African strategy. It is not helping the An-
golans preserve their independence but mak-
ing them victims of the most reactionary
force in Africa. It would be a tragedy for
the United States to repea,t the errors of
Vietnam because it look, upon the Angolan
conflict as an occasion for another anti-
Communist crusade.
......??????111.10MW-4.1???????????.-
"INTEGRITY IN THE BUSINESS
LANDSCAPE," AN ARTICLE BY
STANLEY MARCUS
HON. JOHN BRADEMAS
OF INDIANA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, December 15, 1975
Mr. BRADEMAS, Mr. Speaker, one of
the most thoughtful and public spirited
business leaders in th3 United States is
Mr. Stanley Marcus, .thairrnan of Nei-
man-Marcus of Dallas, Tex.
I believe that every Member of the
House of Representatives and Senate will
read with great interest the following
article by Mr. Marcus "Integrity in the
Business Landscape," published in the
New York Times of DeiTmber 15, 1975.
The article, which follows, was ex-
cerpted from an address Mr. Marcus de-
livered in Omaha, Neb.:
INTEGRITY IN THE IHTS7NESS LANDSCAPE
(By Stanley elarcus)
There is a massive h as of faith in the
business community by the American peo-
ple?and perhaps a loss of faith on the part
of businessmen as well.
Let's not kid ourselves into believing that
the negative attitude I oward business is
merely part of an "anti-Establishment" mood
throughout the nation. It is a lot more
specific than that?and .1 lot more justified
than that.
Americans still bellevi in the free-enter-
prise system. They have no quarrel with
profit-making. But they do have a quarrel
with unethical and questionable business
practices conducted at tie public expense.
They do have a gnarl el with companies
which pollute our water And air and are ap-
parently indifferent to the hazards of pollu-
tion until the Governmt 'it intervenes.
They do have a quarrel with that majority
of businesmen who have fought and ob-
structed and delayed eeery piece of pro-
gressive legislation en;?cted during this
century.
Who among the business community today
would seriously propose that Congress repeal
our child-labor laws?or the Sherman Anti-
trust Act? The Federal Reserve Act, the
Securities Exchange Act? Or workman's corn-
pensation? Or Social See arity? Or minimum
wage? Or Medicare? Or civil rights legisla-
tion?
All of us today recognise that such legisla-
tion is an integral part of our system: that
it has made us a stronger, more prosperous
nation?and, in the long run, has been good
for business. But we can take precious little
credit for any of the social legislation now
on the books, for business vigorously opposed
most of this legislation.
I wonder sometimes ii we really believe in
the free-enterprise system. When those who
Western alliance on the back of thisetteiiiiscseasees the. greatest stake in it often turn out
Communist cause. Now South Africa is call- to be ite fiWeiNkftmaeste6issei, wonder if free
lag for the Western alliance to stop a "take- enterprise can survive. '...--aliatgate,4144,;-,s.
over" in Angola. Can it survive when some of its greatest
The current United States position, sup- proponents seem determined to strangle the
porting the most conservative internal An- life force of the system?competition?with
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though exports are vital and most be Main-
tained, the American consumer Must, never
again be forced to subsidize foreigp sales.
Access to American grain supplies must in-
stead be assured on a, basis consistent with
maintaining reasonable food prices at home.
That objective can be accomplished by es-
tablishing an export policy in place of the
stop and go non-policies of the Republican
Adrainistration?non-polieles which rob cell-
isomers, farmers and, our trading partners
alike. The policy.I advocate would set mini-
mum and maximum quantities for all major
foreign buyers, so that 4uctuations in de-
mean:is will be smoother by requiring import-
ing nations to accumulate stocks in times
of high world production. Our Government's
approval would be needeci for a country to
buy more?or Igsa?tb.a.n the agreed amounts.
To assure, adequate domestic supplies, the
United States would announce to the world
its domestic requirements, as well as its
commitment to foreign customers and less
develbped countries. We would make it clear
tint those supply requirements would be
met 1:13' Whatever management devices are
required.
As an eseential.element ,of our ..exPott Pol-
icy, the United States should take the lead
in, creating, with other exporting and im-
porting nations an international reserve pro-
gram for grains?as caned for by the World
Food Conference. Such a reserve would serve
not only the interests of the participating
countries but also our moral obligation to
the hungry.
These policies would not displace the free
enterprise ,aystern. Rather, they would put
that satem to work for people by taking the
shoat out of supermarket purchases and
farm laleg, ut .we must re,cogialze that the
system will nOt work if farmers and con-
sumers are, plOed against each other in a
struggle which can end only in losses for
both. Theeotapactbetween. fanners and. con-
sunless Which X propose guarantees neither
group. everything it might wish. As in. any
partnership, there are risks to be shared and
hard choices to be infrifiP. The accommodation
of 'conflicting interests which I propose
means some give and take by all. The reserve
System puts a ceiling on the prices consum-
ers raust pay in bad crop years, just as it
sets a floor under the prices farmers will get
in surplus crop years. I believe American
farmers and consumers will accept this.
To cement the, new alliance between. farm-
ers and constuners? we must also focus at-
tention on those trends In equipment menu-
fe.eturing, food processing and agricultural
marketing that work against the interests
of producers and families alike. When, ac-
cording in the Federal Trade Commission,
supermarkets enjoy a? DM return on in-
vestment. when monopoly in the manu-
facture of farm machinery costs farmers a
quarter of a billion dollars each year, when
monopolistic meatpacking robs consumers
of a half a billion dollars annually, when
bread prices rise nearly 17% at the same
time flour prices fall 25%, and when shoppers
continue to be misled by labeling and ad-
vertising that distorts the truth about nutri-
tion. It doesn't take an expert to conclude
that manufacturers and middlemen need
to be brought into line?and fast. It's not
enough to talk about vigorous antitrust
enforcement in litigation that will take
years and may consume millions of dollars.
In food, as in fuel and medical care?and
in every industry that is vital to daily sur-
vival?legislation is needed that would shift
the burden of proof against those wielding
coneentrateer or Irresponsible economic pow-
er. Wherever those interests fail to justify
their structurls and practices to fair-minded
melt and women, they must be broken up or
subjected to whatever controls are needed
to create prices people can afford, under
marketing principles people can accept.
'What all of this adds up to is a specific
instance of that principle I described on the
day I announced my candidacy: Above all,
what this nation and the world need Is a
commitment to a common existence_a
sharing ,of benefits and burdens in a com-
munity of interest between groups that can-
not succeed or even survive unless they come
to perceive their mutuality of concern and
learn to act in creative concert rather than
divisive competition.
We have long talked about turning our
swords into plowshares. But the truth is:
We have yet to make the most of the plow-
shares already available. When the world's
most resourceful farmer, working the world's
richest soil with the world's most advanced
agricultural technology are manipulated by
politics, subordinated to middlemen, and
pitted against both consumer needs and
the realities of hunger and malnutrition, we
can be sure the fault ilea not with those
who produce our food but with those whom
we have elected to high office. It is time
to bring new vision and new leadership to
the farm and food policies of America. That
is ray pledge in this campaign: it will be the
commitment of my presidency.
A LETTER FROM THE HEART
HON. ALBERT W. JOHNSON
OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN ilia HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, December 16, 1975
Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania. Mr.
Speaker, I was quite pleased last week to
notice that a letter to the editor had
been published in the Bradford, Pa. Era
which was written by Mrs. Sarah Smith.
Mrs. Smith is a resident of East Smeth-
port, Pa., which is located in my 23rd
Congressional District. Mrs. Smith calls
on the people of the United States to
pray for our Nation during these troubled
times, and also comments on the belief
that prayer and Bible reading should be
allowed in the public schools. I would like
to share Mrs. Smith's warm letter from
the heart with my colleagues. The letter
is as follows:
OTIIER VOICES
Dear Sir: While reading The Era Saturday,
Nov. 22, I read where President Ford picked
certain Bible verses to be read for eight days
beginning Nov. 23 through Nov. 30. Being a
Christian I know this is a good idea, not only
for the eight days mentioned, but all year
round. This great country of ours can stand
a lot of Bible reading and prayers.
As I stated in an editorial last spring about
prayers and Bible reading being out of our
schools, that's when some of our young peo-
ple started a life of crime. Many children
never hear the word of God, only when it's
used as a swear word. In the Era Nov. 15 our
Congressman, A. W. Johnson, (In whose home
here In Smethport I work as part-time house-
maid and caretaker), had an article about
putting prayers back in our schools. After
working in their home over twenty years and
the many talks we have had about this. I
really know he means it, but one man can-
not do it alone. Our whole nation must stand
for the cause.
As we read in the passages from the Bible
given by President Ford, let us also read and
remember-
2 Chronicles, 7:14?"If my people which
are called by my name shall humble them-
selves and pray, and seek my face, and turn
from their wicked ways, then I will hear
from heaven and forgive their sin and will
heal their land."
We all know our country needs a lot Of
APes:
E67,23
healing. We also know that our country was
founded for religious rights and it seems
that even this is being taken away from us.
So as we stand on the threshhold of our 200-
year celebration next year, let everyone of
God's people pray for our nation. It can still
be a nation to be proud of.
So let's all of us that are called by His
name and those who wish to be called by His
name humble themselves and pray. I know
our God will hear and answer. This may not
get printed before Thanksgiving day, but it
Is for all the year round. Those that claim to
love the Lord, please pray without ceasing for
our country.
MTS. SARAH SMITH.
ENERGY CONFLRENCE REPORT
SPEECH OF
HON. RICHARDSON PREYER
OF NORTH CAROLINA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, December 15, 1975
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Speaker, I am
pleased by that part of the text recom-
mended by the conference report to ac-
company S. 622 which adds a new sec-
tion 11 to the Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act of 1973 and which deals
with the regulation which the 1973 act
mandated the President to issue under
section 4(a). The new section 11 will re-
quire the President to "promulgate, pur-
suant to the limitations and authority
under section 12, such amendment, or
amendments, to the regulation promul-
gated under section 4(a) as he deter-
mines are necessary or appropriate?
first, to modify any provisions of such
regulation In a manner which is consist-
ent with the attainment, to the maxi-
mum extent practicable, or objectives
specified in section 4(b) (1) ; or second,
to eliminate any provisions of such regu-
lation no longer necessary to provide for
the attainment of such objectives." Pres-
idential action would follow a hearing
procedure which would allow interested
parties to comment on the operation of
the existing regulation.
My interest in this section results from
my concern that the existing regulation
works to stifle competition although the
law, and the clear congressional intent,
requires FEA to "restore and foster com-
petition."
The relevant section, section 4(b) (1)
of the 1973 act, says that the regulation
shall provide for?
(D) preservation to an economically sound
and competitive petroleum industry; in-
cluding the priority needs to restore and
foster competition in the producing, refining.
distribution, marketing, and petrochemical
sectors of such industry, and to preserve the
competitive viability of independent refin-
ers, small refiners, nonbranded independent
marketers, and branded independent market-
ers; (emphasis added).
However, one section of the regulation
now in effect, section 211.63, does pre-
cisely the opposite, and would appear to
lock in a monopoly of wholesale mar-
keters while keeping out new competi-
tors. Until recently?November 24?this
regulation said: -
All supplier/purchaser relationships in
effect under contracts for sales, purchases
and exchanges of domestic crude oil on De-
cember 1, 1973, shall remain in effect for
the duration of this program. . . .
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks December 16, 1975
Thus, the regulation requires producers
to continue sales to the same marketers
with whom they were doing business on
December 1, 1973, and prohibits new
crude oil marketers from purchases
which would disturb these relationships.
No provision is made by which new crude
oil marketing companies may obtain
supply sources. Competition is denied.
The effect of this is to freeze in, pro-
tect and perpetuate a monopoly. Data
filed by one of these companies with the
SEC reveals an enlargement of profits
under the challenged regulation which
resulted in those profits jumping from
$19 million in 1973 to $59 million in 1974.
Per barrel profits had a corresponding
Increase.
The U.S. District Court for the western
district of Texas, San Antonio Division,
in a decision October 6, 1975, captioned
Basin, Inc. v. Federal Energy Adminis-
tration, Civil Action No. 75-CA 250, is-
sued a preliminary injunction against
PEA. It ruled:
There is a substantial question as to
whether section 211.63 of the regulations,
Insofar as it denies plaintiff as a crude oil
marketing company the right to purchase
crude on and makes no provision for alloca-
tion of supply purchased by the crude oil
Marketing industry on a fair and equitable
basis among the members of that industry
Is in compliance with the Congressional
mandate of the Emergency Petroleum Allo-
cation Act of 1973 to restore, foster, and
preserve competition in all segments of the
petroleum industry. . .
The court found that as a result "the
plaintiff will in all likelihood be forced
to discontinue its business." Clearly free
enterprise competition was not being
served by the regulation in the court's
mind and an independent business was
threatened by the enforcement of a reg-
ulation which this Congress did not an-
ticipate in its 1973 act and which is con-
trary to the intent of the Congress in
encouraging competition.
The FEA appealed that decision and
amended its regulations.
On the eve of the argument in the
Court of Appeals, after months in which
PEA acknowledged inequity in the ex- ,
isting regulation, the new regulation was
Published. The announcement identified
the purpose of the new regulation as "to
allow for the new entry into the business
of marketing crude oil"?conceding the
inequity the court had already found.
However, the new language then ne-
gated the impact it should have afforded
by requiring as a condition to the estab-
lishment of a new supplier-purchaser
relationship that the new wholesale
marketer obtain from the refiner "their
written consent to the proposed supplier
substitution." Commonsense tells us that
few refiners, if any, would want to con-
sent to the substitution. He already has
a relationship with the entrenched large
operator who is protected by the FEA
regulations and the refiner would not
imperil that arrangement by telling the
marketer to stop selling to the refiner,
move over and give up part of the busi-
ness to the little competitor. All the
competition the 1973 law envisioned is
undone by a telephone call between the
earties to the existing relationship. It
would appear that the new regulation
might become an invitation to collusion
arid clearly violates the spirit of the
sotutory mandato for competition.
The joint explanatory statement of
tie conference committee on the bill
which became the Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act of 1973, said of section
4 (b) :
It is imperative that the Federal Govern-
rent now accept its responsibility to inter-
v 3ne in this marketplace to preserve compe-
l-on and to assure an equitable distribution
o critically short supplies. Toward this end,
tie conference substitute requires the Pres-
Went to promptly implement a mandatory
anocation program which must be drafted
so as to accomplish Congressionally defined
o4jectives. These are set out principally in
s,)ction 4( b) of the conference substitute.
ery generally stated they establish guide-
nes for the priority uses of fuels covered
by this Act and set forth standards of action
concerning the competitive structure of the
industry and general economic policy to be
followed in the establishment of the fuel
ailocation program. (Italics added.)
The history of the efforts of smaller,
independent marketers to engage in the
lind of competition mandated by the
1973 law is best told in the San Antonio
eeetsion. The FEA regulation does not
foster competition; it stifles it. The new
regulation offers no real change.
The new section 11 is the best hope we
resently have for a real change. It is
ur best hope for the kind of competi-
tion the Congress intended in 1973 and
ihich it must reaffirm today.
U.S. SECRET INVOLVEMENT IN
ANGOLA
HON. ANDREW YOUNG
Or GEORGIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRE'SENTATIVES
Tuesday, December 16, 1975
Mr. YOUNG of Georgia. Mr. Speaker,
s we now witness the agony of civil strife
in the newly independent African state of
Angola, we are more each day made
:mare of the covert role our Nation is
playing in this tragedy. This dangerous
eourse, embarked upon by the executive
1)ranch of government in the spring, is
'reing challenged in the Congress and by
.eublic interest groups increasingly across
)ur Nation as an inappropriate response
,0 southern Africa events.
John Marks, author of the article in-
serted below, represents this growing
sosition of advocacy. Currently, he is an
Associate of the Center for National
security Studies in Washington and is
loauthor of the book, "The CIA and the
Cult of Intelligence." He has served as an
Ixecutive assistant to Senator CLIPPORD
:14?ASE of New Jersey and also as an assist-
Int to the director of the State depart-
nent of intelligence, Mr. Ray Cline.
I have recently returned from a visit
o Zambia where in conversations with
,iberation groups based in that country
and with President Kenneth Kaunda and
Foreign Minister Rupiah Banda much of
John Marks' analysis was confirmed
:through their observations.
I believe, Mr. Speaker, that it is crucial
that the Congress act now to cut off the
flow of U.S. funding to various factions
In Angola and that all U.S. military in-
volvement in the way of armaments and
supplies be immediatel v discontinued.
The Congress must havt the courage to
stipulate that outside intervention on the
Part of South Africa aid the military
escalation supported by I ne Soviet Union,
Cuba and above all the United States
must cease and that an African initiated
political solution ought to be a priority.
Angola, after years of truggle to liber-
ate itself from the cruel power of Portu-
guese colonialism, should not have to suf-
fer a more devastating period of external
power partitioning. Ae Iola, after 500
Years of.imperial domination, should and
must be left alone to cu)rdinate its own
prospects of nationhood.
There is no basis, Mr. Speaker, for the
United States to wield its vast power
within the confines of the fragile new
State of Angola. To cohtinue along the
path of covert or overt ietervention there
will be a monstrous mistake for our na-
tional destiny and pee plehood. I urge
every one of my colleaeues to read the
article below and then to act decisively
to change this course oC American his-
tory:
Tns SECRET WAR ANGOLA
(By John Ma-ks)
The United States is tod.iy deeply involved
In a war in Angola. Like the Vietnamese and
Laotian conflicts in their early years, the
Angolan war is?as far as the public and
most of the Congress are concerned?a secret
war, rim by the CIA. But a was true in Indo-
china, the President himsglf has been mak-
ing the key decisions. In 'act, at about the
same time last spring that the Indochina war
was finally ending and toe administration
seemed determined to show its toughness
(d la Mayaguez), Preside: t Ford personally
authorized the CIA to provide covert money
and arms to two African in iependence groups
In Angola.
The Soviet Union, Cube, and other coun-
tries have steadily increa,ed their aid to a
third Angolan liberation group in recent
months, and the adminisi nation has reacted
by escalating the CIA programs. A well-
placed government source reports that the
CIA is now spending "in Vie tens Of millions
of dollars" on the Angolsn war. According
to the source, U.S. Air Foi C-Ml transport
jets, flying in behalf of th.- CIA are regularly
landing at the airport in K:nshasa, Zaire (the
former Congo, bordering on Angola), and
disgorging tons of militia' r supplieS, includ-
ing machine guns, light artillery, and 41111-
munition; these supplies are in turn being
flown into Angola by smal planes.
According to another government source,
Henry Kissinger pushed 1 ird last spring for
the CIA intervention. "Honry wanted to be
told why we should in ervene," says the
source. "not why not." Ma oy within the gov-
ernment, including Nathaniel Davis, then
the State Department's highest official for
African affairs, were opposed, but Kissinger
carried the bureaucratic Aruggle, first at a
meeting of the supersecrel 40 Committee and
then, ultimately, when toe President gave
his approval or?as the policy-makers say--
"signed off on" the secret war.
The President's momont of truth, the
source believes, came lad.t spring when he
endorsed the decision of the 40 Committee
(chaired by Kissinger) to give several hun-
dred thousand dollars in "overt "black bag"
funds to Jonas Savimbi, head of 'UNITA, the
independence group baseo in southern An-
gola. The immediate quest ton, in the source's
words, wa,-, whether or not "to put Savimbi
in the genie, to have the =-1A give him some
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By this, he explains, the US government
provided the Salazar dictatorship with a
modest degree of military and political sup-
port; took a public stance in favor of non-
violent change in the colonies; and secretly
subsidized (but never with enough support
to turn the tide) independence groups com-
mitted to armed revolution against Portugal.
The official says that the CIA had the
"habit of picking out single individuals and
making them our guys, somehow assuming
they would turn out all right. It was mainly
a cash-in-the-envelope kind of thing?con-
science money to show American good in-
tentions." In Mozambique, the source notes,
the CIA's man was Eduardo Mondlane (the
FRELIMO leader who was assassinated a few
years ago), and in Angola it was Holden Ro-
berto.
Roberto's FNLA operated out of bases in
Zaire?as it still does?and ranch of the
CIA's assistance to. Roberto flowed through
the CIA's surrogate, Zaire's Mobutu. In 1969,
according to the official, the Nixon adminis-
tration decided to end the CIA's "program
aid" to the independence groups, as part of
a larger Nixonian policy to ease up American
pressure against white-minority rule in
southern Africa. The CIA did, however, re-
tain a connection with Roberto, according to
three State Department aides, paying him as
an intelligence, source. Therefore, when the
Ford administration decided last spring to
become actively?if covertly?involved in An-
gola, it was a relatively simple matter, as one
official describes it, "to turn Roberto back
on."
In fact, Roberto was never really turned
off, since in the 1969-1975 period, his brother-
in-law Mobutu supplied him with large
amounts of weapons and other aid. That aid
came at least indirectly from Mobutu's most
important foreign benefactor, the United
States. Mobutu told a visiting US congres-
sional delegation this summer that he ex-
pects to be reimbursed for all the assistance
he has given to Roberto. Knowledgeable
Capitol Hill aides believe that the pay back
has come in the form of the administration's
current request for a $79 million aid pack-
age for Zaire (roughly a ten-fold increase
over last years aid levels). Nevertheless,
Henry Kissinger explained to Congress that
stepped up military assistance ($19 million
of the total amount) was needed "to help
modernize (Zaire's) forces and meet its le-
gitimate defense needs in view of increased
threats to its security?particularly that
posed by the instability in Angola." Kissinger
failed to mention that Zaire needed the help
because it had been giving away large
amounts of its own military supplies to
Holden Roberto's FNLA or that Zaire's own
troops had been fighting in Angola. (It is
illegal under US law for American military
to be used for "non-defensive" purposes or
to be transferred to a third country.)
The administration has so far chosen to
keep most members of Congress (and of
course, the public) in the dark about the
secret war in Angola, although in accordance
with a 1974 law it informed a few senior
members of six House and Senate commit-
tees last spring of the CIA's actions. One ad-
ministration official who opposed the policy
noted how disappointed he and his fellow
dissenters were that the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee (of whose members only
Senators John Sparkman and Clifford Case
were briefed) did nothing to stop the CIA's
paramilitary programs. He believes that
"especially in the context of the times and
current attitudes toward the CIA," the sen-
ators could have threatened to go public
with the information or at least call a meet-
ing of the full committee to discuss the situ-
ation. Neither Sparkman nor Case?nor any
of the witting members of the five other
committees?did anything of the kind.
Another senator?Who was not briefed?
notes that the oversight law requires only
E 6725
chfps." The Agency was already providing
a modest level of secret assistance to another
faction, the FNLA in the north, but the
source states that Kissinger and Ford were
clearly aware that adding umrrA to the
American payroll would signal a major es-
calation, indeed a commitment declaring
that the UnitectStates was not about to allow
the third independence group, the MPLA,
to control Angola.
Angola, which was granted independence
by Portugal on November 11, is a rich, fertile
Country, twice the size of Texas, blessed with
abundant supplies of oil, iron ore, atomic
minerals, and diamonds. State Department
officials deny that the American interest
there is economic, although the number two
man in the Defense Department has told a
congressional committee that American pol-
icy is tied to "resources we will need in the
future." The administration claims that its
principal concern In Angola is to show the
Soviets that they cannot make advance in
Africa through the victory of the group they
(and many other countries) support, the
MPLA.
Unfortunately, the conflict inside Angola
does not easily reduce itself to an ideological
struggle, a conflict between communist and
capitalists. All three of the independence
groups have come out in favor of some form
of African socialism, and each has a strong
tribal base. The MPLA is unquestionably to
the left of the other two groups, but then the
MPLA has also been able to work out a rela-
tively smooth working relationship with Gulf
Oil, which continues to operate extremely
productive wells in the northern enclave of
Cabinda. Moreover, independence groups
with similar views to the MPLA have taken
over in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau,
without any apparent damage to American
interests. .
Henry Kissinger stated on September 23,
"We are most alarmed at the interference
of extra-continental powers [in Angola] who
do not wish Africa well, and whose involve-
ment is inconsistent with the promise of
true independence." He was presumably
talking about the Soviet Union and not the
United States. In any case, with both pow-
ers currently stepping up their involvement,
the stage has been set in Angola for a classic,
cold war confrontation. The result, so far,
aecarding to a well-placed State Department
official, has been "a mutual ante-raising, an
Inconclusive situation, and a hele of a lot
dead Angolans."
The great power conflict in Angola is fur-
ther complicated by the fast that a lot of
other foreign -countries are involved. A gov-
ernment source reports that the aridai have
joined with the United States (and South
Africa) in aiding UNITA. French assistance
is going to the FNLA through Zaire. Zaire it-
self is helping both UNITA and the FNLA,
arii in fact, a key element in the American
decision to intervene was the fervent urging
of Zaire's President Mobutu, who is the
United States' most important client in
Africa. The Chinese had been giving mili-
tary aid and training to the FNLA, but they
have now backed off as the US rote has
Increased. Portuguese mercenaries are serv-
ing with UNITA and the MLA, and two gov-
ernment officials report that another factor
In the US intervention was a desire to coun-
ter leftist forces in Portugal who support
the MPLA. Support for the MPLA has arrived
from Cuba and from newly independent
Mozambique. Still other countries are do-
ing what they can for the faction of their
choice. All three independence groups have
foreigners fighting with them.
If this all seems horribly complicated, it
Is. There is some thought in Washington
that the administration believes it can get
away with waging secret war in Angola be-
'cause the public will not be able to under-
stand what the initials stand for or who is
on what side.
But the country with the largest direct
involvement in Angola is currently white-
supremacist South Africa. South African
troops entered Angola in late October, ac-
cording to communications intercepts picked
up by US intelligence, and there are now two
separate mechanized South African units,
With a strength between 1000 and 1500 men
each, operating inside the country. Addition-
ally, a separate armored column of about
1500 Africans and 500 white mercenaries?
equipped in South Africa and staging from
South African bases?has in the last month
been steadily advancing through southern
Angola and seizing key positions from the
MPLA, ostensibly in behalf of UNITA and
the FNLA which have joined together in a
shaky alliance.
A State Department policy-maker, while
acknowledging that the South Africans were-
supporting the same groups as the United
States, says rather defensively, "The South"
African operations are not in concert with
us. We did not initiate them. Whatever
they're doing Is strictly on their own."
There may well not be any overt [but, of
course, Covent US-South African coopera-
tion lie Angola, as there was in the Congo
(now Zaire) during the early 1960's when
South African intelligence worked together
with the CIA to recruit mercenary forces
fighting in an earlier CIA secret war. The
CIA may not even be taking advantage of
what three government sources describe as
the "close" liaison relationship which the
CIA has maintained for many years with
South African intelligence. But even if the
OIA has been able to resist joint planning
with its South African counterparts, there
is no way the United States is going to avoid,
as one official says, "being tainted with the
South African brush." For all effects and
purposes, the official believes, the South Af-
ricens are "our faithful allies," backing the
same two Angolan clients. As the secret war
proceeds, the official believes that the United
States is building up an increasing debt to
the South Africans, who "are not at all ad-
verse to calling in their markers." Indeed,
Smith. Africa already has asked the United
States and other western countries to in-
crease their aid to South African-supported
forces in Angola.
Because invading columns must maintain
radio communication with their own head-
quarters, supply bases, and supporting air-
craft, American policy-makers have been able
to keep track of the South African advances
inside Angola by having the National Se-
curity , Agency (NSA) monitor their radio
channels. Similar techniques have been used
to produce data on increased Soviet and
Cuban activity, and the administration has
net hesitated to selectively leak this highly
classified information to the press. Thus, the
New York Times reported on November 21
that 3009 Cuban "fighting men and advis-
ers" have been sent to Angola "in recent
weeks" te support the MPLA. No mention was
made in the article of the South African
frees that had already invaded the coun-
try a month before, although the "United
States officials" who provided the story pre-
sumably had access to the intelligence prov-
ing the South African presence. The Milos
article does state (in the 13th paragraph)
that "an undisclosed number of South Af-
rican military advisors" were with UNITA's
forces in the south.
Although CIA money and other support has
been going to UNITA since last spring, the
Agency has seemed content to largely leave
the southern front to the South Africans
while the CIA's major effort has been in the
north in behalf of Holden Roberto's FNLA.
According to five different CIA, 'White House,
and State Department sources, Roberto has
been secretly on the CIA payroll since 1962.
A former White House aide recalls that
during the Johnson administration, Amer-
ican policy toward the Portuguese colonies
was "to play all ends against the middle."
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E 6726 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks Decemb 'r 16, 1975
that the committees be informed, and makes
Ito provision for congressional review or ap-
proval. The senator notes, however, that the
CIA has taken the lack of Congressional ob-
jections as their tacit approval for covert
operations.
This fall, after the New York Times' Leslie
Oelb wrote the first article about CIA assist-
ance to the FNLA and UNITA, Senator Dick
Clark, the chairman of the Foreign Relations
subcommittee on Africa, asked that the full
committee be briefed by the CIA and the
State Department on the US role in Angola.
According to reliable sources, only "three or
four" senators out of 16 members bothered
to attend. Partial accounts of the adminis-
tration briefing, which apparently centered
on covert arms shipments to the FNLA and
UNITA, quickly leaked out to the New York
Times and the Washington Post, but nothing
appeared in the press about the large sums
of money involved or the growing South
African presence.
Finally knowledgeable about what was go-
ing on, Senator Clark had a real problem. He
opposed the CIA's secret war in Angola, but
the testimony he had received was classified.
Revealing it would have put him in violation
of the Senate's rules. Congressman Michael
Harrington had faced the very same dilemma
last year when he read a secret transcript in
which CIA Director Colby laid out how the
CIA had destabilized the Allende govern-
ment in Chile from 1970 through 1973. Har-
rington chose to disclose the information,
claiming a higher responsibility to reveal
CIA misdeeds. As a result, Harrington was
fiercely attacked within the House for break-
ing the rules, and he was forced to submit
to censure proceedings. Clark has chosen not
to go public. Instead, he is fighting back
through the slow process of legislation. He
now plans to introduce an amendment that
would cut off all military aid?overt and
covert?to Angola and Zaire.
When I called Senator Clark, he would not
talk about the secret war. He stated, "If I
were to tell you that the US was involved in
covert activities in Angola, I could be kicked
out of the Senate." He agreed that his free-
dom of action had been limited by receiving
the classified briefing, but he stressed that
having access to the facts would not prevent
him from taking a position against the se-
cret war in Angola.
Clark traces the problem in Angola to the
"super-powers who want to play out the cold
war in every part of the world." He believes
that "the super-powers ought to be able to
get together with a spirit of detente to say
it's in their own best interest?and that's
all anyone seems concerned with?not to let
this thing get out of hand."
For the moment at least, the super-powers
along with the South Africans and other
outsiders seem perfectly willing to fight on
to the last Angolan. There is no evidence of
restraint on any side nor. of meaningful
negotiations which could bring the blood-
shed to an end. A clear military victory for
any faction appears unlikely, and the alter-
natives seem to be either an endless war or
partition of the country into three feuding
parts. (The latter solution might not be too
objectionable to US policy-makers with a
South African-supported UNITA state in the
south, Holden Roberto's FNLA in the north,
the MPLA squeezed into the middle, and the
northern enclave of Cabinda, where Gulf oil
has large holdings, either controlled by
Roberto or brother-in-law Mobutu who has
been openly coveting it for Zaire.)
Nevertheless, in violation of the constitu-
tional provision that only Congress can de-
clare war, an American president has once
again used the CIA to take the country into
a secret war. Against Castro's Cuba, the tac-
tic was a miserable failure. It didn't work in
Vietnam where the CIA's secret involvement
grew into the commitment of half a million
American troops. Nor did it work in Laos
where the Meo tribesmen who fought the
Cl Ws Armee Clandestine were largely deci-
sted by the time the US government was
forced to withdraw.
All one can say is, here we go again. . .
aielED FOR INCREASED HEW COM-
MITMENT TO BLACK COLLEGES
HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL
OF rirvir YORK
rl'HE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, December 16, 1975
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, the Ares-
el it economic crisis is severely affecting
tie black colleges in America. These are
mstitutions which have historically pro-
vi educational opportunities for mi-
nority students who would otherwise be
denied access to higher education. The
esidents of a number of black colleges
met recently with David Matthews, Sec-
rutary of Health, Education, and Wei-
ii re, to discuss the plight of their schools
al id the urgent need for an increased
Yuderal commitment to their survival
x id expansion.
I include at this point in the RECORD
mmis accounts of the meeting and dis-
cr tssion :
'STY-POUR BLACK COLLEGE PRESIDENTS TELL
HEW or NEED FOR PARITY
WASIIINGTON.?The presidents and aides
sm 44 black colleges and universities met
sa A Tuesday with the new Secretary of
H ualth, Education and Welfare, Dr. David
ithews, to press for parity of educational
fa ilities for their students.
While they received no definite promises
fr sm Secretary Mathews, former president of
II e University of Alabeana who knows many
ce the black college heads personally, his
01 ice has ladiexted that there will be follow-
u meetings with these colleges to find ways
ee meeting their needs.
Speaking for the colleges were; Dr. Charles
S. Lyons, Jr., president of the conference
Ii onsoring body, the National Association
Ct. r Equal Opportunity in Higher Education
and also chancellor of Fayetteville, N.C.,
S- ate University who presided; Dr. Roy D.
H Aeon, vice president of the a,ssociation and
esident of' Hampton Institute.
Dr. Milton K. Curry, Jr.. president of the
U sited Negro College Fund and heed of
n shop College; and Dr. Charles L. Hayes,
puesident of Albany, Oa., State College and
ci .airman of the Office for Advancement of
P iblic Negro College Advisory Committee. All
ol the colleges represented are members of as-
s( elation. Mark Fisher, IV, is its executive
et eretary.
Goal set by the speakers was for a leader-
slip partnership between their colleges and
tie federal government to achieve parity for
t] e historically black colleges by the 200. If
Mich a partnership is not set in motion, the
Cs liege heads expressed fear that the rela-
te ee gap between the number of whites
and blacks who finish college will continue
tx: widen. The gap, they said, widened from
es van percent in 1960 to 13 percent in 1974.
Major emphasis was placed on the need
ft r more opportunities at black colleges and
nversitles for their students to pursue
p ofessional and technical education. For
ce ample, there are only two black medical
celleges with a third being developed at
()rehouse.
Also the college heads pressed for more
fends for student aid programs. They said
they now need $250 million for such aid,
h stead of the $100 million they are receiving.
Dr. Mathews, Who indicated a great under-
standing of the problems of black colleges,
was introduced by Dr. Joffre T. Whisenton, a
former teacher of educatiot al psychology at
the University of Alabatne. whom he has
brought hen) to serve as he special assistant
for educational policy. For the past several
year, Dir. Whisenton has been with the
Southern Association of Co leges.
The following black colleges and univer-
sities were represented at the conference:
Alabama A & M, Lomax-Han eon college, Miles
College, Oakwood College, etillinan. College,
Tuskegee Institute, Delaware Slate, Federal
City College, Howard, Wash.ngten Tech. Ed-
ward Waters College, Albany State, Atlanta
University, Fort Valley State, MLYITIS Brown,
Pine, Southern, Bowie State, Morgan State,
Shaw College at Detroit. Al corn, Rust, Utica
Jr. College, Lincoln University of Missouri,
Barber-Scotia, Fayetteville State, Johnson C.
Smith, Livingstone, Shaw, St. Augustine's
College, Wilberforce, Oheyney State, Lincoln,
Benedict, South Carolina State, Fisk, Lane,
Tennessee State University, Bishop, Texas
Southern, Wiley, Hampton, et. Paul's College
and Virginia. Union.
BLACK COLLEGE PREsreretee TELL HEW OF
NERD FOR PAR air
WASHINGTON..--"We boldly propose that
the federal government recognize the his-
torically black colleges as ehe major archi-
tects, traditionally, of equal opportunity
with attainment and productivity," a group
of black college presidents told Dr. P. David
Mathews, Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare in a meeting last week.
"We further propose that in concert with
this additional development, HEW develop
a leadership partnership with the historically
black colleges for the purpose of achieving
parity in all areas of higher education and
parity in all professional and technical fields
in the work force."
The National Association for Equal Op-
portunity in Higher Education met with
Mathews, a former president of the Uni-
versity of Alabama, to map out a "Partner-
ship for Leadership in the Development of a
Year 2000 Plan for Parity In Education."
They recommended to Mathews that blacks
participate in the policy planning and re-
view process for all major HEW agencies;
that the federal government undertake an
annual collection of racial data in higher
education; that programs having a "signi-
ficant impact on equalizing opportunity for
blacks" not be regionalized and that dis-
criminatory funding patterns be ended in
minority programs.
A black college president panel told
Mathew that black colleges play a special
"role" in higher education. "We have 100
years of experience in deeling with those
victimized by elementary and secondary
school discriminatory patterns," said Dr. Roy
D. Hudson, president of Hempton Institute.
"More than half the baccalaureate degrees
are given by black colleges,"
Dr. Milton IC. Curry, president of Bishop
College, said that black Institutions "trained
young people to believe le themselves
and told them if they had integrity or heart
and developed their intellieence, they could
make great achievements."
Mathews pledged "cooperation" with the
black college organization, representing over
100 black colleges, but did not detail any
specific programs. He called the black col-
leges a "reservoir of hope and determina-
tion."
Afterwards he expressed ivmpathy for the
plight of many black colleges caught between
desegregation decrees aimed at integrating
their facilities to a "tiepin; point" where in
effect they may no longer remain "black."
Black college enrollment is now approach-
ing 200,000 with a pattern of growth from
about 140,000 in 1966 to almost 200,000 in
1975. Freshman enrollment. increased by 10.7
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December 16, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-- HOUSE H 12665
tleman from Washington nor anybody
? in this room nor the President of the
United States can tell us today where he
is going to spend or cut that $395 billion.
Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise to
close the debate on this issue.
I want to commend the members of
the conference and particularly the staff
'for the monumental job of getting the
paper work done in such a short period
of time.
This is a responsible bill. The economy
of this country is in trouble. The indica-
tors during the past 2 months have indi-
cated a downturn at a time when we
ought to .see a strong upturn in the
economy. It would be suicidal. in my
judgment to allow a tax increase of major
proportions to go into, place in January.
This Congress cannot allow that to hap-
pen. If the President persists in his effort
to move to a spending ceiling in fiscal
- year 1977 on this bill and decides to veto
the bill, I am con#derit that this Con-
gress can override.the veto.
This tax cut extension is of importance
to the Nation. It is something; it seems
to me, that we cannot go home without
providing. This is a responsible package.
We have considered it carefully. It is a
worthwhile bill. ? We have extended for
six months the withholding. levels that
are now in place?the withholding rates
we put in place in the Tax Reduction Act
of 1975 and we have also extended the
tax cuts for this 6 months.
Mr. Speaker, this 6-month period will
give the Congress an opportunity to work
its will on the tax reform bill that is
now pending in the other body. At that
time we can also look at the economy to
see whether the tax reduction should be
extended.
Mr. Speaker, this is a sound Package.
I urge its approval overwhelmingly by
the Congress. ,
The SPEAKER. The question is on the
motion offered by the gentleman from
Oregon (Mr. ULLivrax) that the 'House
suspend the rules and agree to the con-
ference report on the bill (H.R. 5550).
The question' was taken.
Mr. SCHNEE'BELI. Mr. Speaker, on
that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic de-
vice, and there were?yeas 2-56, nays 160,
not voting 18, as follows:
[Roll No. '1981
YEAS-256
Abzug Bolling de la Garza
Adams Honker Delaney
Addabbp Bra demas Dellums
All en Breckinridge Dent
Ambro Brinkley Derrick
Anderson, Brodhead Diggs
Calif. Brooks Dingell
Andrew s, Brown, Calif. Dodd
N. Dak. Burke, Calif. Downey, N.Y.
Annunzio Burke, Mass, Drinan
Ashley Burton, John Minoan, Oreg.
Aspin Burton, Philip Early
AuCoin Carney Eckhardt
Badillo Carr Edgar
Baldus Chisholm Edwards, Calif.
Barrett Clay Eilberg
Baucus Cohen Emery
Beard, R.I. Collins, Ill. Evens, Colo.
Bedell Conte Evan's, /nd.
Bergland Conyere Eying, Tenn.
Bevill Corman Fary
Biaggi Cornell Fascell
Binghp m Cotter Fisher
Blanchard D'Amoure Fithian
Biouin Daniels, N.J. Flood
Boggs Danielson Florio
Boland. Davis Foley
Ford, Tenn,
Forsythe
Fountain
Fraser
Fuqua
Giaimo
Gibbons
Ginn
Gonzalez
Green
Gude
Hall
Hamilton
Hammer-
schmidt
Hanley
Hannaford
Harkin
Harrington
Harris
Hawkins
Hayes, Ind.
Hays, Ohio
Heckler, Mass.
Hefner
Helstoski
Henderson
Hicks
Holland
Holtzman
Horton
Howard
Howe
Hubbard
Hughes
Jenrette
Johnson, Calif.
Jones, Ala.
Jones, N.C. .
Jones, Olda.
Jordan
Earth
Kastenmeier
Kazen
Keys
Koch
Krebs
LeFalce
Landrum
Leggett
Lehman
Levitas
Litton
Lloyd, Calif.
Lloyd, Tenn.
Long, La,
Long, Md.
McCormack
McDade
McFall
Abdnor
Alexander
Anderson, Ill.
Andrews, N.C.
Archer
Armstrong
Ashbrook
Befalls
Bauman
Beard, Tenn.
Bell
Bennett
Biester
Bowen
Breaux
Broomfield
Brown, Mich.
-Brown, Ohio
Broyhill
Buchanan
Burgener
Burleson, Tex.
Burlison, Mo.
Butler
Byron
Garter
Cederberg
Chappell
Clancy
ClaUsen,
Don H.
Clawson, Del
Cleveland
Cochran
Collins, Tex,
Conable
Conlan
Coughlin
Crane
Daniel, Dan
Daniel, R. W.
Derwinskl
Devine
Dickinson
McHugh
McKay
Madden
Madigan
Maguire
Mahon
Matsunaga
Mazzolt
Meeds
Melcher
Meyner
Mezvinsky
Mikva
Miller, Calif.
Mills
Mineta
Minish
Mink
Mitchell, Md.
Moakley
Moffett
Mollohan
Morgan
Moss
Mottl
Murphy, Ill.
Murphy, N.Y.
Murtha
Myers, Pa.
Natcher
Neal
Nedzi
Nix
Nolan
Nowak
oberstar
Obey
O'Brien
O'Hara
O'Neill
Ottinger
Patten, N.J.
Patterson, .
Calif.
Pattison, N.Y.
Pepper
Perkins
Peyser
Pickle
Pike
Pressler
Preyer
Price
Railsback
Rangel
Rees
Reuss
Richmond
Riegle
Rinaldo
NAYS-160
Downing, 17a.
Duncan, Tenn.
du Pont
Edwards, Ala.
English
Erlertborn
Esch
Eshleman
Fenwick
Findley
Fish
Flowers
Flynt
Frenzel
Frey
Gilman
Goldwater
Gooding
Gradison
Grassley
Guyer
Hagedorn
Haley
Hansen
Harsha
Hastings Passman
Hechler, W. Va. Pettis
Hightower Poage
Hillis Pritchard
Holt Quie
Hungate Quillen
Hutchinson Randall
Hyde Regula
Ichord Rhodes
Jacobs Roberts
Jarman Robinson
Jeffords Rousselot
Johnson, Colo. Ruppe
Johnson, Pa. Barasin
Kasten Satterfield
Kelly Schneebell
Kemp Schulze
Ketch-um Sebellus
Kindness Shriver
Hisenhoover
Rodino
Roe
Rogers
Emmen?
Rooney
Rose
Rosenthal
Rostenkowski
Roush
Roybal
Russo
Ryan
St Germain
Santini
Sarbanes
Scheuer
Schroeder
Seiberling
Sharp
Shipley
Sikes
Simon
Sisk
Slack
Smith, ]:ows
Solarz
Spellman
Staggers
Stanton,
James V.
Stark
Steed
Stokes
Stratton
Studds
Sullivan
Symington
Taylor, N.C.
Thornton
Traxler
Tsongas
'Ullman
Van Deerlin
Vander Veen
Vanik
Vigorito
Weaver
Whalen
White
Wilson, C. H.
wirth
Wolff
Wright
Yates
Ye,tron
Young. Ga.
Young Tex.
Zablocki
Zeferetti
Krueger
Lagomarsino
Latta
Lent
Lott
Lujan
McClory
McCloskey
McCollister
McDonald
McEwen
Mann
Martin
Mathis
Michel
Milford
Miller, Ohio
Mitchell, N.Y.
Montgomery
Moore
Moorhead,
Calif.
Mosher
Myers, Ind.
Nichols
Shuster
Skubitz
Smith, Nebr.
Snyder
Spence
Stanton,
J. William
Steelman
Steiger, Ariz.
Steiger, Wis.
Stuckey
Burke, Fla.
Casey
Ford, Mich.
Gaydos
Hebert
Heinz
Symms
Talcott
Taylor, Mo.
Teague
Thone
Treen
Vander Jagt
Waggonner
Walsh
Wampler
Whitehurst
NOT VOTING-18
Whitten
Wiggins
Wilson, Bob
Wilson, Tex.
Winn
Wydler
Wylie
Young, Alaska
Young, Fla.
Hinshaw
Jones, Tenn.
McKinney
Macdonald
Metcalfe
Moorhead, Pa.
Patman, Tex.
Runnels
Stephens
Thompson
Udall
Waxman
The Clerk announced the following
pairs:
On this vote:
Mr. Udall and Mr. Thompson for, with Mr.
Hebert against.
Mr. Waxman and Mr. Moorhead of Penn-
sylvania for, with Mr. Stephens against,
Mr. Ford of Michigan and Mr. Metcalfe for,
with Mr. Casey against.
Mr. Macdonald of Massachusetts and Mr.
Jones of Tennessee for, with Mr. Runnels
against.
Messrs. ANDREWS of North Carolina,
JEFFORDS, and FOUNTAIN changed
their votes from "yea" to "nay."
Mr. FOUNTAIN changed his vote from
"nay" to "yea."
So the motion was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced
as above recorded.
PROVIDING FOR BEGINNING OF 2D
SESSION OF THE 94TH CON-
GRESS
Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Speaker, I offer 9.
joint resolution (H.J. Res. 749) and ask
unanimous consent for its immediate
consideration.
The Clerk read the title of the joint
resolution.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from Mas-
sachusetts?
There was no objection.
The Clerk read the joint resolution as
follows:
HI. RES 749
Resolved by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the
second regular session of the Ninety-fourth
Congress shall begin at noon on Monday.
January 19, 1976.
SEC. 2. That (a) notwithstanding the pro-
visions of section 201 of the Act of June 10,
1922, as amended (31 U.S.C. section 11) , the
President shall transmit to the Congress not
later than January 21, 1976, the budget for
the fiscal year 1977, and (b) notwithstanding
the provisions of section 3 of the Act of
February 20, 1946, as amended (15 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1022) , the President shall transmit to
the Congress not later than January 26, 1976,
the Economic report.
The joint resolution was ordered
to be engrossed and read a third time,
was read the third time, and passed, and
a motion to reconsider was laid on the
table.
LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM FOR TO-
MORROW AND REMAINDER OF
WEEK
(Mr. O'NEILL was given permission to
address the House for 1 minute and to
revise and extend his remarks.)
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H 12666 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE Dec
Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Speaker, I have
taken this time in order that I may give
the schedule for today and for tomorrow.
Mr. Speaker, all legislation has been
completed for today. We will meet to-
morrow at 10 a.m., and the program for
Wednesday will be as follows:
First we will consider H.R. 5559, th
tax reduction extension conference re -
port. There will be a rule on that, of
course, and that will be the first item
on the calendar for tomorrow, followett
by H.R. 10979, the railroad revitaliza-
tion and regulatory reform bill, with an
open rule and 2 hems of debate.
Then we will bring up H.R. 8235, the
Federal Aid Highway Act, with an open
rule and 3 hours of debate. The rule ha,
already been adopted on that.
Next, we will bring up Senate Join-,
Resolution 121, the quarterly adjust
ments in the support price for milk con
ference report.
Finally, we will consider H.R. 9771, the
Airport and Airways Development Act.
with an open rule and 2 hours of debate
Mr. Speaker, in view of the fact that
the Members are going to the White
House tomorrow evening, we would hope
to be able to finish at a reasonable hour
We would appreciate it if we could keep
Members on the floor because there an
those who like to ask for quorum calls
We would like to finish the _whole
schedule at a reasonable hour on Friday
in view of the fact that there are a
couple of airplane strikes and many 03
the Members of Congress have made ar-
rangements to go home.
Mr. Speaker, we hope that everybody
in the spirit of Christmas, will keep that
in mind.
That is all the legislation for today.
and I thank the Members.
U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA
(Mr. SEIBERLING ask e and was
given permission to address the House for
1 minute and to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Speaker,
share the misgivings of the gentleman
from Ohio (Mr. Mor) on the question
of Angola. I wonder whether our coun-
try is backing into another Vietnam.
The Russian involvement in Angola ia.
very disturbing. But so is U.S. inovlve-
ment. Particularly disturbing is the fact
that the Congress was not consulted in
advance about the actions being taker
by the administration with regard to
Angola. We do not even know for sure
what actions are being taken by tlu
administration.
Furthermore, it appears that once
again, high officials of the executivf
branch have deliberately lied to us. Two
weeks ago at a large dinner in connection
with the Pacem in Terris Conference
Mr. William Colby, Director of the CIA
publicly stated that the United States
was not, directly or indirectly, supplying
Ony military or paramilitary assistance
to any of the factions in Angola. That
statement was, as we now know, absol-
utely false.
We are given the impression that once
again, the executive branch is acting
unilaterally without approval by Con-
gress, without disclosing the facts, and
without having made any attempt to
bring the conflict before appropriate
international organizations, such as the
United Nations Security Council.
Mr. Speaker, although I would strongly
oppose sending U.S. troops to Angola, I
am not now prepared to say that the
Congress should prohibit any and all
forms of assistance to any of the factions
in Angola. However, I think it is time
the Congress demanded full and accurate
disclosure of the facts and the oppor-
tunity to participate in the formulation
of national policy on this dangerous
situation. To that end, I am introducing
a resolution to prohibit military assist-
ance to any faction in Angola without
specific authorization by Congress.
osel
NEW YORK CONSTRUCTION LABOR
ASSAILS INTERSTATE RIP-OFF
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from New Hampshire (Mr. CLEVE-
LAND) is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, the
gentleman from Ohio, the ranking mi-
nority member on the Committee on Pub-
lic Works and Transportation, and I have
received telegrams from the construc-
tion industry and trade union locals in
New York City protesting the intent to
wipe out the West side highway construc-
tion as an interstate project under H.R.
8235, the Federal Aid to Highways Act of
1975.
New York labor and management make
a compelling case that any Interstate
capital funds resulting from the inter-
state withdrawal would merely allow di-
version of city and State capital con-
struction funds for operating subsidies,
with no net gain in construction for mass
transit. I include the text in the RECORD
at this point with one caveat: While
otherwise an excellent statement, it ap-
pears in error in the assertion that trust
fund moneys?as distinguished from
general revenues?could be diverted
temporarily under the "Beame Shuffle."
Now, I ask, Mr. Speaker, are we going
to upend the entire interstate program
from coast to coast and make ourselves
party to this brand of mischief?
For those Members to whom the text
Is not self-explanatory, I commend the
minority views in the report to accom-
pany HR. 8235 and the "Dear Col-
league" circulated to Members Monday
evening by the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. HARSHA).
The text follows:
HR. 8235, DECEMBER 8, 1975, THE 1975
HIGHWAY ACT
On behalf of the 100,000 construction
tradesmen and the 475 contracting arms in
our city alone who would be affected by
the above referenced House bill, we wish to
thank you for your opposition to the Abzug
amendment appearing under section 109,
pages 42, etc.
We are currently experiencing unemploy-
ment of 40% to 90% and disastrous bank-
ruptcies on behalf of employers. The west
side highway is necessary as a self-help
project (no charity) to save New York City.
You undoubtedly, in your capacity, have
recognized the causes for New York's present
economic plight.
mber 16, 1975
Transfer of capit ,1 funds to expense
budget items:
The city of New "Stork administration
a past master of and has a long standing
practice of transferrtag capital monies or
disguising capital inwiles for operating ex-
penses. In just last Year's capital budget, $30(
million out of $1.1 bIllion went for operat-
ing expenses disguisod as capital budge(
items and this has be on the history for well
into two decades.
State bond monies:
In late 1960 the voters of the State of Nev:
York approved a hige way and mass transii
bond issue. These monies were to build
among other things, Second Avenue sub-
way extemion to al, Bronx. The mon let
were diverted to op( -ating expense items
and now, we, as New Yorkers, have only ivy()
huge holes in the ground on Second Ave-
nue and massive unemployment. channel
13, WNET, the Educational and Community
Public Service TV station in our area con-
ducted a program to 3 past summer where
they characterized those financial manipu-
lations as "The Great Train Robbery".
(A) Irresistible impulse, from over 30 yettrE
of seeing how things happen in New York
City, the Abzug amendment would once again
establish the game plali whereunder the local
officials would be subjected to irresistible
pressure to cancel the West Side Highway
project. (a project that can save New York
City) and divert thoi 1 monies to some al-
legecl capital subway project.
(B) The amendment provides for purchase
of passenger equipment, including roiling
stock which is once al-ala the old technique
used not to build any more subways, and of
course, not to build the West Highway.
"BEANIE RIDER" TO Tat: URBAN MASS TRAITS-
PORTATIMq ACT
Mayor Hearne, 51, cough the -Beanie
Rider" can now borrow up to 50%
of Federal grant moneys allocated to New
York for capital construction of mass transit
facilities and use said monies for operating
expenses, providing a 1.romise is made to re-
pay. You know the env cannot repay any-
thing, nor will it be :,ble to in the future,
except the highways trust fund's money that
could be transferred te mass transit can now
be used as operating expense funds just on
a promise to repay.
Please save the city from another two
generations of fund .shifting so that we can
have jobs and save our city. The Abzug
amendment language .s subtle and sophis-
ticatedly disguised and hides the actual pro-
cedures that will be followed and have been
followed.
Please save us.
General Contractors Association, City of
New York; International Union of
Operating Engineers, Locals 14 and IS;
International Union of Laborers,
Locals 731, 1010, 1018, 147, 29; District
Council of Carpenters? Timbermen
Local 1536; Doekbuilders Local 1456;
Metallic Lathers Local 46; Teamsters
Local 282.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from Connecticut (Mr. MeKiistismy)
is recognized for 5 minutes.
[Mr. McKINNEY addressed the House.
His remarks will appear hereafter in the
Extensions of Remarl:s.]
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from Alaska (Mr. Youlte) is rec-
ognized for 5 minute.
[Mr. YOUNG of Alaska addressed the
House. His remarks v. ill appear hereafter
in the Extensions of Remarks.]
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December 18, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL ItECORD ? SENATE S 22805
unilaterally stop our own assistance, at
least to the extent that assistance is be-
ing put into the civil war within Angola
by other outside forces.
As I said at the beginning of my re-
marks today, in open session, I believe
that the policy of the United States
should very clearly say that we believe
that the people of Angola should be free
to make their ozoi decisions about what
kind, of government they want. They
snould be free to state, without any inter-
vention on the part of any other country,
which one of the groups of people or
leaders within their own country they
would select to be their leaders; and that
we would hope that not only we would
refrain from intervening in their internal
political processes but that we have the
right to insist that all other countries
likewise refrain from interfering in the
httesmal political affairs of the nation
of Angola.
Unfortunately, that is not the situa-
tion that exists today in Angola. We have
foreign intervention in the internal po-
litical affairs of that country. Unfortu-
nately, they are not free to make their
own decisions today and we would hope
that we can apply our diplomatic and
economic pressures in a way which is
constructive enough to lead to the time
that the people of Angola will again be
free from the intervention and interfer-
ence of foreign countries in their internal
affairs. 'Until that time comes, there is,
I think, a need for caution in terms of
our precipitate withdrawal of our assist-
ance to one or two or three factions that
exist and the almost predictable course
of events that would follow from our
withdrawal without any quid pro quo,
without any paralleling or corresponding
reduction in the efforts of the Soviet
Union to bend the events in that country
to their own desire.
One of the other concerns that I have
with the resolution of the Senator from
Illinois is the rather broad and inflexible
application that is called for in para-
graph 4 of the resolution, because that
paragraph reads as follows:
The President, pursuant to his authority
under the Export Administration Act of 1969,
should curtail exports to countries which
persist in intervening in the conflict in
Angola.
Mr. President, I think, it would be
understood almost from the beginning
of any discussion of that provision of the
resolution that any Senator representing
a farm State is going to be concerned
about the application of that language.
It has very little standing except to say
to the President of the United States, "If
other countries are persisting, you shall
apply the sanctions of the act." That
Would mean, under the Export Adminis-
tration Act of 1969, that the President
has the authority, and, under this reso-
lution, would be directed to use it, to cut
off all trade with countries that are in-
tervening in Angola. I think we would
have an opportunity to adjust to that
so far as farm commodities are con-
cerned. But we could not adjust to it
immediately.
The farmers in this country are the
most efficient producers in the history of
the world when it comes to turning out
a greater and greaterllow of agricultural
commodities. Since the Korean war, and
up until 1973, our policies in the United
States have been geared to cope with
the surpluses created by that tremen-
dous ability to produce.
Mr. LONG. Will the Senator yield for
a unanimous-consent request?
Mr. McCLURE. I shall be glad to yield
to the Senator from Louisiana for a
unanimous-consent request without los-
ing my right to the floor and without
the resumption being considered a second
speech.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
\
SUSPENSION OF DUTIES OF -
\ TAIN SILK?HR. 7727
AMENDMENT NO. 1322
1?. LONG. Mr. President, I int/oduce
an endment to H.R. 7727 This
amen ent is known as the d adwood
bill. It eals with the so-called 4adwood
provisio s which simplify the te laws by
removin from the Interna} Revenue
Revenue
Code thos provisions which re obsolete
or no long r important and frarely used.
Th provi 'ons, which hifre been de-
veloped ove a number orears, would
repeal almos 150 sectio s of the In-
ternal Revenu Code anc would amend
more than 850 ? her sect' ns of the Code.
The bill also w ld m e other simpli-
fying changes su as lhe substitution of
the term "ordina i ome" for phrases
in present law wh obtain this result
by referring to the i 'come as "gain from
the sale or exchany' of property which
is neither a capital ss 't nor property de-
scribed in section 231..'
The deleted pr visio would include
those which de only ith past years,
situations whic were n rowly defined
and are unlike to recur, s well as pro-
visions which ave largely utlived their
usefulness. I some situation, provisions
would he ad ed to preserve tie right of
persons to ontinue to receil) benefits
under Cod provisions which'generally
would be o-pealed.
The cf.:4 dwood provisions do ot at-
tempt to achieve simplification ough
substan ive changes in existing law.
Theref 0 re, the provisions do not Veal
with 6olicy issues or with substan ive
chant es in generally applicable p -
visio s.
I
/
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPRO-
PRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1976
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of amendment in disagree-
ment No. 75 to H.R. 9861, an act making
appropriations for the Department of
Defense for the fiscal year ending June
30, 1976, and for the period beginning
July 1, 1976, and ending September 30,
1976, and for other purposes.
Mr. McCLURE. Since the Korean war
and up until 1973, our policies had to be
directed toward what to do with the abil-
ity of the farmers of the United States
to produce more food than we could con-
sume in the markets in our own country.
So we had an elaborate system built up--
jerrybuilt, some say?over the years to
deal with the twin problems of too much
production and how to reduce produc-
tion. So we had farmers paid not to
produce; we had programs to encourage
and to pay farmers for withholding land
from production. We had commodity
purchase programs in which the Govern-
ment bought the commodities off the
market, removed them from the market;
we had storage programs to pay people
to store commodities that were excess to
our needs. We had all these programs
and we had Public Law 480, which is not
a very, euphonious title for a bill which
then became known, with more artistic
fervor, as the food-for-peace program.
Through this, we used our surpluses to
try to feed hungry people in this world.
All of this *as evidence of the tremen-
dous ability of the farmers of this coun-
try to produce more than we could con-
sume in this country.
In 1973, for the first time, because of
the demand for food and because of the
ability of various foreign countries to
purchase that food, we were able to ex-
port enough of our surpluses that we
began to reach the point that our agri-
cultural commodities could find a free
market price. Since 1973, those prices
have moved to a price that is established
by a market and not by a governmental
program. That, I believe, Mr. President,
has been progress.
I think not just the farmers of the
United States have benefited greatly
from that, but so have the communities
in which they live?the automobile deal-
ers, the implement dealers, the ware-
housemen, the people in Peoria have
benefitted from that because they manu-
facture the machinery that has been
sold to those farmers.
I might, incidentally, note that in the
very brief period of time following the
initial massive purchase of wheat by the
government of Russia, when the price
of wheat moved up very rapidly in my
area of the country from an average of
about $1.85 a bushel to better than $5 a
bushel, it took less than 6 months for the
price of a tractor to double.
I do not think it cost more to produce
a tractor in that period; it was just a
reflection of the old supply and demand
law again. Farmers had a little bit more
money and they were willing to spend it
to update some of their older equipment
and replace some of it and the demand
on the market exceeded the supply and
the price went up.
The price doubled, literally doubled.
A large, four-wheel-drive tractor that is
used in the wheat-growing areas of my
State, that had sold for about $20,000,
went to $43,000 in 6 months. A self-pro-
pelled combine of the type that is much
in use in that same area; in that same
period of time, went from about $28,000
to $48,000.
I might add that the price of wheat
may have peaked out at around $6 a
bushel. Certainly, a great many farmers
got better than $5 a bushel. The price
went back down to $3 a bushel, but I did
not see the price of a tractor go down,
following the price of wheat going back
down.
But the farmers of this country have
been able to survive and they will survive
on the market condition, which is the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE December 18, 1975
situation which I think we should all
support. They can do so only if they have
access to world markets for the sale of
the produce that cannot be consumed
in this country. If we are going, under a
resolution like this and for other reasons
than the management of our agricultural
surplus, to limit the sale of agricultural
products, as they would be limited under
this resolution, then, Mr. President, we
must be prepared to pay the price of go-
ing back into a regulated agriculture and
pay the price of the kinds of agricultural
programs that we had in the late 1950's
and through the 1960's; a price that is. I
think, not an inconsiderable one.
If you will compare it to the cost of
the continuation of the program we are
talking about here it is very dispropor-
tionate. I have heard it said that because
we are talking about committing an ad-
ditional $28 million to a program in An-
gola, we must change our foreign policy.
I am suggesting if that $28 million is the
reason for us to change that foreign pol-
icy, let us look at the hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars and probably billions of
dollars that will be required to adjust
our agricultural programs to the realities
of a foreign policy that turns in the way
that is suggested by the resolution of the
Senator from Illinois.
The Senator from South Carolina (Mr.
TinTemoNn) has circulated a resolution
which has slightly different wording, and
I would commend that to the consid-
eration of the Senate. I certainly hope
that, perhaps, if we get to the considera-
tion of the resolution of the Senator
from Illinois, we may also consider the
possibility of modifying the language
more along the lines of the resolution
suggested by the Senator from South
Carolina.
That resolution, as I recall?and I do
not seem to have a copy of it at the mo-
ment?states that the President shall ex-
plore the possibility of economic sanc-
tions while instituting diplomatic pres-
sures, and shall report back to the Con-
gress of the United States within 60 days
specific economic sanctions that he
thinks should be applied.
I think that formulation rather than
the more rigid formulation in the Stev-
enson resolution may be the kind of ac-
tion the Senate could responsibly take
today in trying to resolve the question
of how to respond to the changes in An-
gola and the changes of the political
situation brought about by the Soviet
Union's intervention.
I have been handed a copy of the res-
olution, and section 2 of that resolu-
tion states as follows:
The Senate requests the President to sub-
mit to the Congress such recommendation as
he deems appropriate regarding the reduc-
tion, prohibition, suspension or termination
of trade with the Soviet Union in the event
he is unable to successfully negotiate an
agreement referred to in the first section of
this resolution within 90 days after the
adoption of this resolution
That, I think, is the kind of flexibility
necessary so that we might avoid the
consequences that seem to me to flow
from the language that is in the Steven-
son resolution.
These are several of the reasons why
I think we must be concerned not only
about the policy implications within An-
gola and foreign policy but the impact
of our response upon domestic political
policy. The domestic political policy is
not unrelated to what we may decide is
right to do in Angola.
It has been suggested by some that we
.el iould not be involved in Angola because
the United States does not have that
much at stake in Angola. That implies to
me, at least, that we will never be in-
velved in providing the means by which
people can fight for their own independ-
ei ice, if they desire to do so, against for-
eign subversion or subversion within
their own country supported by foreign
powers unless the-United States has a di-
rect security interest in it.
I would ask the Senate if that is the
same standard we are applying in the
Middle East as we approach the multi-
Milton dollar aid to the nation of Israel.
I ani not suggesting that we should not
provide military assistance to Israel but
I am saying we are applying that mili-
tery assistance to Israel because we be-
lieve it is right that they ought to have
the opportunity to fight for their own
to irvival.
Are we willing to make that moral
jedgment and to commit ourselves and
our resources to the support of the peo-
ple in Israel because they happen to be
more like us and are unwilling to do so
in Angola because they happen to be
black? Is that the kind of policy this
Senate is about to adopt? Is that the
kend of motivation we would be proud to
have ascribed to the action that is taken
by us?
I, happen to believe we are right in
saying to the world that Israel has a
reght to exist and that we underscore
that by providing them with whatever
aesistance is. necessary for them to fight
for their survival.
Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. McCLURE. In just a moment.
I think we also ought to, in the same
spirit that motivated the President in
enunciating what has become known as
the Guam doctrine, say that we will pro-
vide the means to people who desire to
fight for their own survival when they
ace threatened by subversion that is be-
Ii supported from external forces.
I think the President was also right in
that policy enunciation when he said we
ace not going to try to fight everyone's
bottles for them. But I believe if we are
going to say we are not going to be the
policemen of the world, we also ought to
recog-nize there are struggles going on
ithin this world?there have been and
v ill continue to be?where it is sought to
subjugate people against their will to
satisfy the ambitions of large powers out-
side their countries, and the United
States cannot morally ignore what hap-
pens in those instances.
I would be happy to yield to the Sen-
a ,or from Oklahoma for a question.
Mr. BARTLETT'. I would like to point
cit to the Senator from Idaho there are
those who advocate passage of the Tun-
nay amendment, and then also appar-
eetly advocate the Congress overtly pass-
ing the necessary legislation to provide
for military support in Angola, and to
do this openly either on regular legisla-
tion or with special consideration.
It seems to me this creates a hiatus
that would be very dangerous, and I just
wonder if the Senator from Idaho would
comment on this to give me his opinion
of the danger of a hiatus that would exist
during that period even if Congress did
adopt later on an amount of military help
equivalent to that which is contemplated
now with the readjustment of the funds.
Mr. McCLURE. Well, let me say to the
Senator from Oklahoma that has to be
one of the major concerns that confront
us now.
Certainly I agree with those Members
of the Senate who say the kind of in-
volvement we are engaged in now, that
we are apparently engaged in, where we
started out with a few thousand dollars
and now we are up to $25 million spent
and $7 million programed, and $28 mil-
lion requested, is the kind of decision in
which Congress should be involved; that
it cannot be a covert operation, it should
be an overt decision.
It is my feeling that it is already an
overt policy. If it was ever a secret policy
it no longer is. So the decision we are
making now is not whether to get in-
volved to that extent, it is a question of
whether we are going to stop being in-
volved to that extent because we already
are.
The President of the United States,
through the activities of the State De-
partment and the CIA and, to some de-
gree, pursuant to the involvement of
appropriate committees of this Congress
that have approved at least portions of
this action in the past, has already
brought us to the point where the world
sees us as being involved in Angola.
If we adopt the Tunney amendment
now we stop that involvement, and the
signal is not whether we may decide at
some future date to get involved again,
but the signal is we have stopped being
involved and, I think, that has immedi-
ate consequences in the perception of
peoples around the world as to the will
of the United States, the direction of the
United States, and it simply is not some-
thing that will not affect other people's
beliefs concerning the United States, and
they will start making policy decisions
of their own based upon that decision as
they see it and not await a further deter-
mination by Congress as to whether we
wish again to program moneys to put
In at some time in the future.
It is not a neutral step.
Mr. BARTLETT. If the Senator will
yield further, the Senator makes a very
good point about the whole matter be-
ing overtly known and discussed by the
people of this country.
The reason I mentioned the hiatus is
that presumably the funds can be re-
assigned within a matter of several weeks
after the first of the year, and on the
other hand, new legislation for Angola
would take several months at the earliest.
So a hiatus would be created if we
passed the Tunney amendment and then
waited until later congressional action.
On the other hand, Ii' we would pro-
ceed with further aid now, there would
still be the opportunity for the Congress
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December 18,
to decide what future action it would
want to take and there would be the
chance for a more orderly transition
from the covert actions that have been
sanctioned and established as options
for the executive branch by the legis-
lative branch, there would be more time
for transition from those options that
are now being exercised by the executive
branch to whatever was decided later
on by the joint decision of the Congress
and the executive branch, would that
not be the case?
Mr, McCLURE. The Senator is correct.
I might add to that, it seems to me
that one of the options that is available
to us at this time to avoid that hiatus
might be, for the time being, to operate
under the continuing resolution which
has already passed, rather than seek to
get final action on this legislation at
this time.
I say that because whether we like
It or not, some kind of signal is going
to come out of any kind of action we
take on this bill. Some kind of signal
Is going to be fla,shed to the participants
in the struggle and others who are not
participating in the struggle if we adopt
the Tunney amendment or if we defeat
the Tunney amendment.
The situation that would occur if we
operate under the continuing resolution,
as I understand it, would be this, the
Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of
the Appropriations Committee (Mr.
MCCLELLAN), has indicated that the re-
quest for reprograming of funds will
not be granted until the committee has
had an opportunity for a hearing and a
briefing and a discussion and a deter-
mination by the committee, which means
that the funds which they seek to re-
program would not be available until
some time after Congress convened again
in January.
The Congress, in the meantime, would
not have said that they cannot continue
to use the money which is in the pipeline
now, and it would not have said they
could not reprogram other moneys which
might be available. I think there is a
discretionary pool that exists that does
not require reprograming, and that
"'would be available in the absence of the
Tunney amendment, although a very
much smaller suin of money.
It might be possible for us just to hold
this matter in abeyance until we come
back in January and operate, mean-
while, under the continuing resolution
with the much more constricted ability
to use additional funds in Angola and
make the determination at that time
after the committees have had the op-
portunity to be briefed and to discuss
and make their own decision.
Mr. HASKELL addressed the Chair.
Mr. BARTLETT. Will the Senator
yield to me for one more question?
Mr. HASKELL. I just wonder if the
Senator from Idaho will yield without
losing his right to the floor while I offer
an amendment to S. 1469 which involves
the Alaska Claims Act. It should not take
- long.
Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may yield to
the Senator from Colorado for that pur-
pose without losing my right to the floor
and without my resumption being con-
sidered a second speech.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS SETTL
MENT ACT AMENDMENTS
Mir, HASKELL. Mr. President, I ask
the %air to lay before the Sen 4e a
mess from the House of Repreent-
atives on S. 1469.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
STONE) lid before the Senat the
amendment\ of the House of Rep sent-
atives to the bill (S. 1469) to rlrovide,
under or by \amendment of the Alaska
Native Claims' Settlement Act, for the
late enrollment of certain Natives, the
establishment of an escrow ac ount for
the proceeds of of,
lands, ie treat-
ment of certain payments ailcl grants,
and the consolidation of e 3ting re-
gional corporations, -end for pther pur-
poses. ,
(The amendments of the House are
printed in the RECORD %if D,?ceinber 16,
1975, beginning at page `II1624.)
Mr. HASKELL. I wish\tb thank the
Senator from Idaho.
Mr. President, I would 1 e to preface
this by stating that I am ftnfqrmed that
the amendments I am albut 'to ask the
Chair to lay before the S ate have been
cleared with both Senat s froni-,Alaska,
Senator GRAVEL being h re. It has been
cleared with Senator F max anct\ a,s a
'
matter of fact, has Wen cleared Ivith
the Department of the Interior and 'has
satisfied all concerned. ??
Mr. President, I senft to the desk seVc
eral amendments and minor substantive
amendments, and ask tinanimous consent \
that they be considted en bloc.
The PRESIDING rviCER, Without '
objection, the, ame,r ments will be con-
sidered en bloc. Th clerk will state the
amendments. .
pro-
ceeded to read th amendments.
The assistant ligislative clerk pro-
Mr. HASKELL. /1 ask unanimous con-
sent that further reading of the amend-
ments be dispened with.
The PRESIDI G OFFiCER, Without
objection, it is #) ordered.
The amendnents are as follows: _
1. On page 1, line 3, strike "authorized"
and insert in li u thereof "directed".
2. On page 2i line 22 strike "village cor-
porations" and Ansert in lieu thereof "Village
Corporations".I
3. On page2` line 23, strike "Alaska Native
y
Claims" and sert in lieu thereof "the".
4. On pag el 2, line 24, strike "who" and
Insert in Heti thereof "the Village Corpora-
tion or Corphrations of which".
5. On pag 2, line 25, strike "receive sur-
face and su surface entitlement" and insert
in lieu the eof "acquire title to the surface
and siibsu4f ace estates of said reserves".
6, On pare 3, line 12, strike "the minimum
number'' nd insert in lieu thereof "a suffi-
cient nu ber".
7. On page 4, line 24, strike "reexamina-
tion" arI insert in lieu thereof "redeter-
minatio ".
8. On age 5, lines 6 and 7, strike ", issued
pursue t to section 14(g) of the Settlement
Act, p taining to land" and Insert in lieu
there? "pertaining to lands".
9. qn page 5, lines 14 and 15, strike "the
proce ds which" and insert in lieu thereof
"the proceeds, together with interest, which".
10. On page 5, line 16, strike "pertaining
nds" and insert in lieu thereof "pertainin
t such lands".
\11. On page 5, line 18, strike "together wi
interest",
2. On page 5, line 24, and page 6, ljtne
1, trike "deposited in the Treasury of he
United States or".
13 On page 6, lines 7 and 8, strike de-
posit such deposit to bear simple int rest
at a tate determined by the Secretary qt the
Treaskay" and insert in lieu thereof: "de-
posit1,10 the date of payment with imple
intere at the rate determined by tile Sec-
retary 9f the Treasury to be the rate ayable
on short-term obligations of the United
States prevailing at the time of pay ent".
14. 01\ page 6, line 12, strike "( 5 U.S.C.
162 a)" and insert in lieu thereof '7(62 Stat.
1037)". 1,
,o ".
15. On 'page 6, line 18, strike "srsection."
and insert in lieu thereof "secti
16. On pre 7, between lines 5/ and 6, in-
sert "Temp rary exemption from,' certain se-
curities laws".
17. On page 7, line 17, between "all" and
"information" insert "the". ;
. 18. On page 7, between lines pl and 22, in-
sert "Relation'to other programr.
19. On page, 8, line 4, after "1964" insert
"(78 Stat. 703)\ as amended"./
20. On page 81 between lineis 21 and 22, in-
sert "Merger of rtive corporations".
21. On page 1 , line 4, bertween "corpora-
tions and share lders whip-i" and "partici-
pated", insert "alici. who".
22. On page 11`. line 1, Strike "consolida-
tions" and insert In lieu Vaereof "consolida-
tion".
23. On page 12;', line 114, strike "Alaska
Natives" and insert V-4. Hein thereof "Natives".
24. On page 12, line& 18 and 19, strike
"Alaska Native RegiOnal Corporations or by
.! in Alaska or by".
Alaska Native" andiknaert in lieu thereof"
Regional Corporatio
25. On page 13, lint* 1 and 2, and lines 5
and 6, strike "Alaska IRegional Corporation"
and insert in lieu thereiof "Regional Corpora-
tion in Alaska" in both laces.
- 26. On page 13, lips , 8, and 9, strike "In
e event section 5(1a) of the Settlement Act
14 amended to reopen the Alaska Native Roll
thereof "Whenever addi tonal enrollment
for\additional enropinenI and insert in lieu
undk the Settlement Act 'is permitted pur-
suant\ to this Ac t or any dther provision- of
law,". 1
27. Oi\page 4, line 11, itrike "such Act"
and inse t in lieu thereof '/the Settlement
28. On pltge/13, line 12, beItween "enroll-
ment" and .?'elect" insert a cOmma.
29. On pag '13, line 14, strilike "the Settle-
ment" and ifert in lieu thereof "such".
30. On page 3, line 15, strilke "Natives'"
and insert in 1 u thereof "Native's".
31. On page ii, lines 18 an 22, strike
"Alaska" in/ bath aces.
1 m insert in
il
32. On pitge 13, 1 es 23 and 24,1 strike "re-
gional orillage cooration"
lieu ther of "Region 1 or Village\ Corpora-
tion".
33. On/pages 15 and 1, amend sec ion 11 to
read as follows:
"SEc. fil. The boundary ?etween th south-
eastern; and Chugach re ons shall be the
141st 7i.eridian: Provided, at the gional
Corp?, ation for the Chugach region s all ac-
cord lo the Natives enrolled -to the village
of Y kutat the same rights nd prin,ileges
to u e any lands which may b conve d to
the egional Corporation in th
Icy fBay for such purposes as s
ha e traditionally made thereof,
bu not limited to, subsistence hula
in and gathering, as the Regional
tin accords to its own shareholde
s all take no unreasonable or arbitrary
lative to such lands for the primary
ose and having the effect, of impairin
urtailing such rights and privileges.".
vicinity of
h Na Ives
clud ng,
'ng, h-
a-
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S2808 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE December 18, 1973
e
340n page 16, line 12, strike "COOK IN-
N
LET TTLEMENT.--".
35. 0 page 16, lines 15 and 16, strike
" 'region \hereinafter" and insert in lieu
thereof "h einafter in this section referred
to as the
\
'Region' ".
36. On pag 17. line 6, strike "Alaska Na-
tive Claims". e
37. On page tee, line 21, strike "set forth
therein" and inseke in lieu thereof "and the
Region, as a mat* of Federal law".
38. On page 17, lb a, 12 and 17, betwee "Ile " and "approxi-
22, page 18, lines 5,
\
7
mately", "(3) " and "Federal", "(4) " and
"township", "(5)" and ",twenty-nine", and
' (6) " and "lands", in eaetiecase, insert -title
to".
39. On page 18, line 5. strike "townships 10
south" and insert in lieu thereof "township
10 south". e
40. On page 18, line 21. strike "Alaska
Native Claims". .
41. On page 19, line 10, strike eoweter" and
insert in lieu thereof "Region so longe,as the
Region owns such lands". . e
42. On page 19, line 11, strike "Alaska 'Vet-
tive Claims".
43. On page 19, line 15, between "land\
and "without restriction" insert "conveyed". ,.
44, On page 19, line 18 and lines 23 and
24, strike "Cook Inlet Region, Incorporated,"
and in both places insert in lieu thereof "the
Region".
45. On page 19, line 23, between "11(a)
(1)" and the comma insert "of the Settle-
ment Act",
46. On page 19, line 24, strike "the Region"
and insert in lieu thereof "the Regional Cor-
poration",
47. On page 20, line 2, between "11(a) (3) "
and "as" insert "of the Settlement Act-.
48. On-page 20, lines 3 and 4 e.nd line 20,
strike "Cook Inlet Region, Incorporated," in
both places and insert in lieu thereof "the
Region".
49. On page 20, line 17, strike "the Region"
and insert in lieu thereof "the affected Re-
gional Corporation".
50. on page 20, line 10. between -any sec-
tion 11(a) (1)" and the period insert "with-
drawal".
51. On page 20, line 17, strike "affected
Region" and insert in lieu thereof "affected
Regional Corporation",
52. On page 21, lines 5, 7, and 8, 16, and
21, strike "Alaska Native claims" in each of
the four places it appears.
53. On page 22, lines 8 and 9, :strike "35
townships of subsurface" and insert in lieu
thereof "3,58 townships of oil and gas and
coal".
54. On page 21, lines 19 and 20, strike "re-
gional corporation or village corporation"
and insert in lieu thereof "Regional Corpo-
ration or Village Cosporation".
55. On page 22, line 2, strike "Alaska Na-
tive Claims-.
56. On page 23, lines 9 through 11, strike
Provided, That if the land is not used for
the above purposes it shall revert to the
United States".
57. On page 23, line 16, strike "Act:" and
insert in lieu thereof "Act, and the convey-
ance of such lands shall also contain a pro-;
vision that, if the lands cease to be used foe/
the purposes for which they were convey
the lands and title thereto shall revert/ to
the United States:".
58. On page 24, line 9, after "Act." sert
"This conveyance shall be conMderd and
treated as a conveyance under the/Settle-
ment Act",
59. On page 24, lines 15 and ?46, strike
"Alaska Native Claims".
60. On page 26, line 1, str9C "corpora-
tioria" and insert in lieu zherloi "Corpora-
tions".
61. Page , line , striki("Alaslca Native
Claims". ,
62. On page 25, lines .57 and 18, strike
"Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of
December 18, 1971 (86 Stat. 688), Is hereby"
and insert in lieu thereof "Settlement Act
is".
63. On page 28, line 2, between "2033" and
'If" insert ", or any successor provisions,".
64. On pages 27 and 28, strike each of the
periods between and including line 6 on page
27 and line 6 on page 28 and insert in lieu
of each such period a ,setnieelon.
65. On page 28, line 6, directly after the
eumber "13" and the semicolon provided
or in amendment no. 65 above insert "S.M.,
Alaska, notwithstanding" and delete "Not-
withstanding" on line 7.
66. On page 28, line 21, between "assigns,"
end "and" insert "such".
67. On page 29, line 23, and page 30, line
e strike "Alaska Native Claims Settlement
let (85 Stat. 588)." and insert in lieu thereof
"Se ttl ement Act".
68. On page 29, line 8, strike "national
?rests system" and insert in lieu thereof
'National Forest System".
69. On page 29, lines 11 and 12 and line
3, strike "Alaska Native Claims" in both
1'laces.
70. On page 29, line 18. strike "Group
I orporations" and insert in lieu thereof
't corporations organised by Native groups".
,71. On page 21) lines 19 and 20, strike "the
Ne'elve Corporations for the cities of" and
insert in lieu thereof "and the corporations
i egarrized by Natives residing in".
72. eu page 30, line 20, after "Kenai," e.nd,'
leave "hillier" insert "all as defined on tiya
(.et, and".
73. On pigs 31, line 4, between "the" end
i
' Secretary" fserl, "apt ropriate' '. ,
Mr. McC E. Will the Senatoiyield
i Jr one question?
Mr. HASKELlb\ I yield to theAlenater.
Mr. McCLURE.I want to malte certain
I understood the Senator, I wa,s talking
e t the time he made, the sOtement.
My understanding 'is that these are
t ichnical amendments 'arhich have been
6 )scussed wtih the Sena* from Arizona
(Via FANNIN) ?
Mr. HASKELL. WS. I a\l'i informed
t let they have beereteleared\with Seis-
e tor FANNIN, that Utley are sa't, sfactory
,
ti Senator Glum; that they ai satis-
f eitory to Senay ST,reeNS, and fuether-
ti ore, I am infer, ed they are satisfactory
V) the SecretaeY of the Interior. e,
?
As the Senator knows, I can only 'No
o 1 what I am informed. \
,
Mr. I-IAqK:ELL. S. 1469 makes certain
a nendments to the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act in order to resolve vale-
o is ditinculties which have arisen dUr-
ing the implementation of that act.
S 1a69 was passed by the Senate on Au-
g-if 2. 1975, and was passed by the House
co December 16, 1975, with an amend-
ti ent in the nature of a substitute. With
/bet a few exceptions, the House-passed
i) 11 is the same in substance as that
p issed by the Senate.
Mr. President, the House has added
eertain provisions which, while they were
n e. in the Senate-passed bill, have been
',IC subject of hearings and considera-
Thee by the Senate Interior Committee.
I will briefly describe those new sections
-a eich should be accepetd by the Senate
wah certain changes.
Section 8 of S. 1469, as added by the
Ii Juse, relates, to the establishment of
a 13th region and the incorporation of
a 13th Regional Corporation for the
benefit of enrolled Natives who were not
permanent residents 'if the S of
Alaska.
When the Secretary of the/Interior
certified the final Native roll 911 Decem-
ber 18, 1973, he also declarefi that less
than a majority of the non esident Na-
tives voted for the 13h nd the 13th
region issue had failed, AJZI nonresidents
were, accordingly, enrolled in the ap-
propriate region in Alsiska. Two orga-
nizations--the Alaskae'ederation of Na-
tives International, c. and the Alaska
Native Association/ of Oregon?repre-
senting the interests of nonresidents and
the concept of the 13,,h region, sepa-
rately, brought -uit against the Secre-
tary in the 1.14 District Court for the
District of Coeumbia re, uesting that the
declaration et the Secretary be declared
invalid and that the 13th region be
established, On October 6, 1975, the dis-
trict court entered an order implement-
ing an Other order in 1974, directing the
Secretary to ceate the 13th region, en-
roll therein all nonresident Natives who
had/indicated, on their ;ast formal com-
munication with the Secretary, their de-
s e to enroll in a 13th region, and to
rovide for the incorporetion of the 13th
egional Corporation.
Section 8 -is necessare to supplement
the court's order. The amendment pro-
vides that no change in enrollment to
either the 13th region or to one of the
12 regions in Alaska which is required or
permitted by the court's order shall affect
any land entitlements of an Alaska Na-
tive Regional or Village Corporation ex-
isting at the time of the creation of the
13th region. Also, it provides that, in
furtherance of the court's order, any can-
cellation of stock of a Native shall he
without liability to either the corpora-
tion or the individual Finally, it provides
that in the event the Native roll is re-
opened for new enrollment, eligible Na-
tives who are permanent- nonresidents of
Alaska are to elect whether they wish to
enroll in the 13th region or the appro-
priate Alaska region at the time of their
enrollment.
Section 10, as added by the House, re-
lates to a certain land selection problem
in the southeastern region of Alaska Con-
cerning which the comi iittee has twice
\received testimony. This section provides
that Sealaska, Inc me- select its ap-
imately 200,000-acre entitlement
lands which were withdrawn in the
al forest for selection by village
Ons of the southeastern region,
ere not so selected. The sec-
es that Sealaska, Inc., may
y lands on Admiralty Island
wal for the village of An-
ion, no sections can be
idrawal for the villages
xman, unless the Gov-
f Alaska or his dele-
setection. This sec-
flit Sealaska's se-
f ro
natio
corpo
but whi
ton pro
not select a
In the with
goon. In acid
made in the wi
of Yakutat and
ernor of the State
gate consents to sue
tion is necessary to
lection rights under t Settlement Act.
Section 11 as added lie the House re-
solves a boundary dispul t between Sea-
laska and the Chugath .egion. The
amendment is supported by ? affected
regions.
Section 12 as added he the House re-
lates to a settlement of a land selection
problem in the Cook Inlet Region. On
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the giro call be rescinded.
The P7 DL- 1110110 OFFICER.. Without
objoction, it i o ordered.. .
The questio is on agreeing to the
amendment' of e Senator from Michi-
gan. Under the a evious order, there is
a time limitation 40 minutes on the
amendment, to be - .ually divided be-
't.ween the Senator f ern Michigan (Mr.
GR,IFY2N) and the Se ator from Cali-
fornia (Mr. Tummy). I o yields time?
Mr. CLARK. ivtr, Presi ent, I suggest
the .,ahsence Of a quorum, d ask unani-
moll$ '. laSCO t ,that the ti e for the
ekt
qUOrtrra ce84, equally divid
Mr. M . IVEr.,Pre,siel reserv-
ing the right to object, what as the
request?
The Faila411:00 OFFICER. J
divide the ' time On the quorum
. equally.
consent that the order for under the Defense Appropriation Act,
which would have to be reprogrammed
if they wanted to do something about
Angola, still does not change the various
military necessities.
We may decide, if the House and the
Senate agree on this conference report,
that we are going to tighten our belt
on program A, B, C, or D and cut $33
million out of it. We may and we may not.
My amendment will make that un-
necessary. It will facilitate an agree-
ment between the House and the Sen-
ate, as there may be great difference of
opinion on that score, and it will get
the matter down to its essentials. To
argue about a $33 million provision in a
$90 billion bill seems to be unnecessarily
throwing a monkey wrench into the
t to works, We know what we want to do. If
all we decide to do it, let us not compli-
cate it with a money equation.
Mr. McCLURE. l%1O objective. Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, will the
The t'RES,1DAZIO (AVIM'a. Withou Senator yield?
Objection, it is so ordered. Mr. JAVITS. I yield.
sggest the absence of Mr. YOUNG. I think this is a good
a quorum, a endment. I do not think it is the
The PREaDIPTG OFFICER. The clerk int ion of the sponsors to delete
will Pea .the roll. mon in the bill. I think some Sen-
ators, hough, assume that the $28 mil
lion ha already been approved, whi
haino
, Mr. JA TS. Of course. It leaves the
conference cement in balance be-
cause the tv o sides have agree ?the
House and th Senate?and we,klo not
disturb that agi ment.
However, we ye a new pro em, just
arisen, and ndbo 's feathe can be
ruffled if we try to al with t in a sub-
stantive way rather an lug to dis-
turb what may have the give and
take on the money ci.. n the confer-
ence.
Mr- CRANSTON. 5' both Sena-
tors who have spoken A at eelieve that
the principal sponse of t e Ttumey
amendment?and I m one of em?are
totally prepared support Javits
approach, becaus we recognize t t our
principal object e, which is to c t off
funds used for ramilitary, covert, d
other -purpose in Angola and aro d
Angola, will ?e served by the amen
ment that ey change in the dolla
figure. It is hope that members of the
Appropth ons Committee who are con-
cerned e out a change will look with
greater eenevolence upon our amend-
ment.
Mr JAVITS. May I say, in fairness to
the thors of the amendment, that they
we told that in the parliamentary sit-
on, they had to move to reduce the
omit; otherwise, their amendment
ould not be in order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of the Senator has expired.
Ur. JAVITS. I yield myself 2 addition-
- al minutes.
d- Whereas, my amendment is only in
ent order because theirs already has been
of in order. So that everybody's role is se-
cure.
..14444taut legislative clerk
prOcee - ? a call the roll.
Mr,. JAVTTS. W. PreSident, I ask
unantruous ,oeneent that the order for
the gAlo f1, -call be rescinded.
na, - idIUM1011 i 0 OFFICE4. 'Without
objection. It is so ordered.
MX, ANt.S. Mr. pre8i4ent, I ask
unanimous consent that I MAY yield my-
self time on the time reserved on my
amendment *which is to follow the Griffin
amendment* and I Would like, to yield
myself _5 Min
The e a OIC. 14 there
objeetioi ? chair hears none, and it
is 60 Or
ivfX; S
ation vill
1Y in VIP e
the gran am
a. mozront .0
and then w
arnendraent lieeee On. nay amendment.
The thrt of the Oriffin amendment
Is to prevent groat going into Angola any
U.S. military or ciyiliart forces involved
In hOSI. ,i,u or over ,or from off the
Ali
shore4 0 g ola? un on
less Congress specif-
ically a,Utp , orizes At.
The: 4hrust.ot the. Tunney amendment,
EIS It Welrld be enameled by my amend-
ment, which will either be added onto
the Grffin amendment or will,be a sepa-
rate ainendrnent fullyspialifleci, once the
Griffin amendment is, acted 14140n. is that
only intelligence gathering wlll be per-
mitted as an activity in respect of An-
gola, under the Defense Appropriation
Act, which is the subject of the confer-
ence report.
The difference between inY
merit and the present Tunney tune
merit ?.is tdivat the , Tunney wren
prOpOS:os to recluse by $33 million
the Iterna. of appropriation in con-
ference report. I omit any sue reduc- Mr. President, I hope the Senate will
tion and simply keep the sum it is. realize that we have achieved our objec-
The reason for my action is is: Obvi- tive. Whatever decision we make, even if
ously, it is important to get e greatest it is on the negative side, will be a na-
conSerious here, and there e Members tional policy decision. The House and
who feel that the funds, programmed the Senate will have passed on this par-
, ;)resident, the Situ-
Pet49.44en.ted, .45 sho,14 -
re?preSent action on
will, analyze in
what that will cle?
gr net the Qrifan
1.44R000400100018-1
ow'
S2?
ticular question. I hope very much that
we will make it positive an that we will
start anew, as we should ave started
when this sum got to be 5 million and
we began to put milita materiel into
the situation.
I do not believe t at the transition
will be harmful to t executive depart-
ment, because it ? obably takes some
time to absorb thi kind of military aid
in the area, any w, and it will give us
an opportunity or a more deliberate
judgment as to hat must be done and
how much.
In the Fort gn Relations Subcommit-
tee?I am c nfident the committee will
take it?w have materially accelerated
the proce re by which the administra-
tion can act and Congress must act if
it wishef to stop.
So I hink this is a plan which holds
toget er. I am very hopeful that we will
get t e Defense appropriation on its way
an will have dealt effectively with our
pr,?lems respecting Angola.
flufr. President, I say to the acting ma-
rity leader that it will be my purpose
now to seek advice from the leadership as
to whether they will accept a recess until
1:45, because Senator GRIFFIN has asked
our indulgence, as he has necessarily had
to see the President.
Mr. CRANSTON. Certainly.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum, and I ask
unanimous consent that the time may be
charged to both amendments and both
sides of both amendments.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. JAVITS. I suggest the absence of
a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSlarLD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OrviCER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
RECESS AANTLE, 1:50 P.M.; AND UNAN-
IMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
animous consent that the Senate stand
ecess until the hour of 10 minutes to
d that teginning at that time there
limitation of 10 minutes on the
amendment to be equally di-
n the Senator from Michi-
GRIFFIN) , the sponsor of the
and the Senator from Cali-
Tummy) , and that the vote
merit occur at 2 o'clock.
2,
be
pend
vided ?
gan (M
amendme
fornia (Mr.
on the amen
There being o objection, the Senate,
at 1:15 p.m., essed until 1:50 p.m.;
whereupon, the ate reassembled when
called to order b the Presiding Officer
(Mr. CRANSTON).
DEPARTMENT OF D
NSE APPRO-
PRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1976
The Senate continued w the consid-
eration of amendment in ? agreement
No. 75 to H.R. 9861, an act ma ng appro-
priations for the Department ? Defense
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976,
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Approved For Re I eee VaingS/1/81?1:ATMEFRIV-
00hisgin40010001.2fel.ct inber 18, 1975
and \for the period beginning July 1, 1976
and lending September 30, 1976, and foa
other purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. WU(
yielde. time?
The Chair, in his capacity as the Sen-
ator from California, suggests the/ ab-
sence of a quorum.
The lerk will call the roll.
The sistaaat legislative clerk, p o-
ceeded t< call the roll.
Mr. CLURE. Mr. President, I ask
unanhnois consent that the orderlor th(
quorum dell be rescinded.
The PRVIDING 0101010ER. (Mr. HAS-
KELL). Wi out objection, it is so ordered
Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous ,consent that Samantha Sen-
ger and John Cevette, of Senator HAS
-
HELL'S staff, be granted the privilege of
the floor during the consideration of ano
voting on alI tariff bills teday.
The PRESIDING OFFICIPIR. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCLIIRE. Mr. Preeldent, I sug-
gest the absence of a quortim.
The PRESIEZtNG OFFIOVER. The clerk
will call the roll
The second ststant Legislative clerk
proceeded to cal the roll.
Mr. ROBERT ?BYRD. Mr. President.
I ask unanimous consent that the ordei
for the quorum dtll bei rescinded.
The PRESM G ,O.FieiCER (Mr.
Pacswooe). Without Objection, it is so
ordered.
Under the previqua order, the Senate
will proceed to vote on the amendment
of the Senator from?lVfichigan.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, have the
yeas and nays been: erdered?
The PRESIDINO OFFICER. The yeas
and nays have not been ordered.
Mr. ROBERT C; BYE). Mr. President,
I ask for the ye
and, nays.
Is a sufficient
The PRESID G 011.CER. Is there a
sufficient second Thee
second.
The yeas an `nays were ordered.
The PRESID G OFFCER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment of
the Senator from Micltgan. On this
question the y as and nays have been or-
dered, and 4ie clerk will\ c,all the roll.
The legislit1ve clerk called the roll.
Mr. ROBRT C. BYRD1 I announce
that the Senator from Indiana (Mr.
BATH), is liecessarily absent.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the
Senator fi>m Arizona (Mr. OLDWATER),
is necessally absent.
The r ult was armounce4?yeas 26,
nays '72, s follows:
tiRollcall Vote No. 60b Le
YEAS-28
Eastle:Ici
Farm
Fong
Garn
Griffin
y P., Jr. HAIDSelt
Helms
Hrusk
nici Laxalt
Baker
Bellmo
Buckl
Bartletst
Byrd,
Harfr
Curt
Dole,
DonW
1
Ab urezk
Al
Al en
B all
B ntsen
den
rock
rooke
umpers
Long
McCI lan
McClure
Morga*
Scott, ugh
Stenni
Thurm , d
Tower ,
Young
NAYS----72
Burdick Colvcr
Byrd, Robert C. Durkin,
Cannon Eagleton
Case Ford
Chiles Glenn
Church
C Gravel
Clark
Hart, Gary
Cranston Bart, Philip ,
Rartke
Raskell
Hatfield
Hathaway
Railings
Huddleston
Humphrey
Inonye
Jackson
Javits
Johnston
Kennedy
Leahy
Magnuion
Mansfield
Mathias
McGee
McGovern
McIntyre
Metcalf
Mondale
Montoya
Moss
Mutikie
Nelson
NW=
Packwood
Pastore
Pearson
Pell
Percy
Proxmire
Randolph
Ribicoff
NOT VOTING-2
Bayh Goldwater
Roth
Schweikor
Scott,
William
Sparkman '
Stafford
Stevens ;
Stevenson,
Stone
Symington
Taft
Ta1made
Tunn
Weick
So Mr. GRIFFIN'S amendment re-
jected.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursuant
to the previews order, the Senator from
New York recognized to call up his
amendment.
Mr. TUNNY. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment wairej ected.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I yield for
that purpose.
I move to lay \ that motion on the
table.
;
The motion to Dty on the table was
agreed to.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr, President, I yield half
a minute of my time to Senator Cue=
for a unanimous-eonsent request.
The PRESIDIaG -OFFICER. Will the
Senator withhold for just a moment. Will
those in the aisles please remove them-
selves from the aisles lifIhe Senate is
not in order. t
I believe tlie Senator fit= New York
said half a minute to the Senator from
Nebraska.
was
SUBSTITIJTION OF SENATOR BROCK
FOR SENATOR FANNIN AS A CON-
FEREE?H.R. 10727
Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Preside*, I ask
unanimous consent that the \Sena.tor
from Tennessee (Mr. BROCK) be
confetee on H.R. 10727, and the
from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN) be r
as a conferee on that bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. CURTIS. I thank the Senator. \
tuned a
enator
mved
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPRO-
PRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1976
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of amendment in disagree-
ment No. 75 to H.R. 9861, an act making
appropriations for the Department of
Defense for the fiscal year ending June
30, 1976, and for the period beginning
July 1, 1976, and ending September 30,
1976, and for other purposes.
Mr. JAVITS. I call up my amendment
and send it to the desk to be stated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will state the amendment.
The second assistant legislative clerk
read as follows:
The Senator from New York (Mr. Javits)
proposes an amendment No. 1312 to amend-
ment No. 1303.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike "205,800,000" and in lieu of the
language proposed to be inserted by amend-
ment 1303 insert the following: "8205,600.-
000, none of Which, nor any other funds ap-
propriated in this Act may be used for a y
activities involving Angola other than in-
telligence gathering, &La which funds are .
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask for
the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OrTICER. Is there
a sufficient second? There is a sufficient
second.
The yeas and nay:: were ordered.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I yield
myself 5 minutes.
Mr. President, th amendment pro-
poses only to elhnintte the figures from
the Tunney amendment which reduced
the amount of $205,600,000 down to
$172,600,000.
My amendment co4,ains the same fig-
ure agreed upon in conference, $20,-
600,000, and it includes the Tunney
language.
Mr. President, may we have order. I
will be through very quickly.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the
Senator withhold? The Senate will please
be in order.
Mr. JAVITS. The reason for MY
amendment is simple to strip this con-
troversy, which we have debated at such
length, of any question about the
amounts involved. The amount will re-
main exactly as the conferees agreed on,
but we do include the injunction against
spending any money appropriated in this
act or any part of that $205 million for
any activities involving Angola other
than intelligence gathering. That is the
whole sum of it.
The reason for it I - we have been to7c1
that the way in which money would be
available if we did nothing for the Angola
operation will be by reprograming other
funds for various purposes contained in
this act, and it was my feeling as the
debate developed that as the conferees
had arrived at a balance of their respec-
tive views on money?that is what the
essence of this bill Jr all about?and as
It was made clear to as there was no sum
of money here for Ar gola, it would have
to come from cuttine down other pro-
grams on which they had agreed, which-
ever ones they were, which they called
reprograming, it seen ied to me the pro-
ponents of the fundr mental proposition
put before us by Senator TurrNgv, by
Senator CLARK, and others, really would
only embarrass their cause by seeking to
reduce the money. There was no point
to it once we got the basic prohibition
established, and that '7 what this will do.
May I say for my colleague, Senator
TUNNEY, and others on that side that
they could not have gotten into this
situation in a parliamentary sense unless
they had done something about the
money. But having o =ened the door, we
should now walk through it, and I hope
the Senate will carry this as the substi-
tute language for the Tunney language
without renegotiatir the dollars in-
volved.
My final point, 11.2r President. that it
will save a lot of time -,vith the other body
if they are in any mood to do anything
about Angola. It will certainly be a lot
easier to get them to do it if they do not
have to retrade all their deals on the
defense appropriations.
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For those reasons, Mr. President, I
hope every one of the parties interested,
except on a straight division of whether
we will Or will not go the Tunney route,
will airee that this amendment is the
right course to follow and that, as this
amendment replaces the whole of the
Tunney arriendrnent, this will be the final
action on that proposition.
Mr, President, I yield to the Senator
froni California 2 minutes.
Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, the Sen-
ator from New York and I have had a
chance to discuss his substitute at some
length and the way he described the
Impact of his substitute is, in my mind,
correct.
I think the substitute offered is a good
one. I point out the reason that the $33
million as 'Placed originally in my amend-
ment was that it would have been out
of order if we had hot referred to a dollar
figure in the 'amendment in disagreement
No, 75 that came over from the House.
We no longer need that dollar figure.
The dollar figure did represent our best
estimate of the rnoneys that had been
spent or were being programed to be
spent in Angola.
Therefore, I am prepared to yield back
the remainder Of my time, and let us
have a vote on the Senator's amendment.
I think it is a good one.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ate will be in order. Again will those
conversing in the well please go some-
place else. Will those conversing in the
well please 'leave the Chamber.
Mr. sAvrrs. Mr. President, in yield-
ing, I would appreciate it if the Chair
would inform me so that I do not use
the last 2 minutes of my time.
I Yield.
Mr. BUIVIPERS. just one short ques-
tion. One thing that did not come up
yesterday and did not come up this
morning that I was curious about, and
that is whether or not this amendment or
the Timmy aniendment as it was orig-
inally written, 'would be other than an
expression of the sentiment of the Sen-
ate and would it have any more than
possibly an inhibiting effect on the pos-
sible use of any other funds the CIA has
which could be used for covert activities?
Mr. JAVITS. I am not so young in this
body as to believe that in a budget run-
ning into several hundred billions of dol-
lars that the administration could not
find money to do this. It would obviously
bar them from using money in the $90
But I really believe with such a preci-
sion of expression by the Senate and the
House on such a major bill as the de-
fense appropriations bill, I would not
believe the administration would move
In that direction and, if it did, I assure
the Senator there are lots of other ways
In which a body as large as that ma-
jority which turned down the Griffin
amendment could see that they rue the
day. So I do not believe we are acting
other than very substantively and deci-
sively'if we adopt the amendment I have
sent to the desk.
May I say, Mr. President, that aniend-
ment, is for myself and Senator HUM-
PHREY of Minnesota.
Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for one question?
Mr. JAVITS. Yes.
Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, the
Senator from California a moment ago
referred to the( dollar amount figure in
his amendment which the Senator from
New York seeks to eliminate as being
the best estimate of the amount of money
that had been spent or would be repro-
gramed.
Am I not correct in remembering the
statements made by the Senator from
North Dakota and the Senator from
Arkansas that a request for reprogram-
ing in this dollar amount had been made
but, as a matter of fact, no reprograming
has occurred and, I think, the Senator
from Arkansas indicated that before the
committees were about to grant such an
authorization, there would be hearings
and further inquiry by the committee?
Mr. JAVITS. That Is my recollection,
and I hope we are both correct, because
whatever happens to this conference
report?
Mr. YOUNG. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. JAVITS. Of course I yield.
Mr. YOUNG. The amount is to be pro-
gramed, it is $28 million. I think the
Tunney amendment deletion of claim
money is not necessary to accomplish his
objection.
Mr. JAVITS. I thank my colleague.
Mr. McCLURE. Would the Senator
from North Dakota not agree with the
Senator from New York and myself that
although that request have been made,
no sum of money has been reprogramed?
Mr. YOUNG. In fact, Chairman Mc-
CLELLAN notified the CIA he would not be
taking up the reprograming until Con-
gress convenes in January.
Mr. McCLURE. I thank the Senator.
Mr. JAVITS. I might say to Senator
YOUNG, the chairman's trusted minority
senior member, I would hope that what-
ever happens to the conference report,
we hear rumors there are intentions to
debate it until we quit, and things like
that, that is up to all those involved, but
I would hope with the clear expression
of view by the whole Senate that at the
very least it is intended by this repro-
graming method to let them use the
money, that the matter would be sub-
mitted to the Senate, and if it felt we
cannot wait the 20-odd days involved,
I would hope it would be submitted to-
day, tomorrow, or Saturday.
I think that is the least due us, having
gone through the enormous exercise, and
at long last trying to join the Congress
and those major policy decisions on for-
eign policy, and being, as Arthur Van-
denberg, for one of the first times in
modern times, in at the takeoff instead of
just at the landing, so many of which
will crash.
Mr. TUNNEY. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. JAVITS. Yes.
Mr. TUNNEY. I feel so strongly that
this amendment offers the Senate an op-
portunity to express its opinion on the
basic principle that no moneys under
this defense appropriation bill ought to
go to Angola for military purposes that I
ask to be a cosponsor of this amendment
because it is directly on point, the? lan-
guage is exactly the same as the amend-
ment that has been introduced by me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from New York asked to be advised
when he had 2 minutes remaining. He
has 2 minutes remaining.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that Senator Tux-
NEY may be added as a cosponsor of the
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am pre-
pared to vote now, but I do not see any-
one from the Appropriations Committee
who could speak for them, so I reserve
the remainder of my time.
Mr. TUNNEY. I think that I control
the other half of the time. I am happy to
yield the floor to the Senator from New
York.
Mr. BUCKLEY. I thank the Senator
from California.
Mr. President, I rise because he stated
that a vote in favor of the Javits amend-
ment would constitute a vote in approval
of the principles underlying the Tunney
amendment.
I just want the RECORD to make it clear
that a vote to improve an undesirable
amendment does not constitute a vote of
approval for that same amendment.
So I do not want my vote that will be
forthcoming to be confused with ap-
proval of the Tunney proposal.
Mr. TUNNEY. I am prepared to yield
back my time unless another Senator
wishes to speak.
Mr. YOUNG. Will the Senator yield
me 1 minute?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On whose
time?
Is this on the time of the Senator from
California?
Mr. TUNNEY. Yes.
Mr. YOUNG. I ask the Senator from
New York, does his amendment embody
the language of the Tunney amendment?
What I am trying to determine is does
your amendment restore money, and also
encompass the Tunney language?
Mr. JAVITS. It does.
Mr. YOUNG. I support that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that Senator CASE
may be made a cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Who yields time?
Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, a par-
liamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator will state it.
Mr. McCLURE. The pending amend-
ment is an amendment to the Tunney
amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. An
amendment in the nature of a substitute
for the Tunney amendment.
Mr. McCLURE. And if this amend-
ment is adopted, it would require a fur-
ther vote upo nthe Tunney amendment
as amended?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is
correct.
Mr. McCLURE. I thank the Chair.
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. TUNNEY. I am prepared to yield
back my time unless there is any Sena-
tor that wants to have my time.
Does any Senator request time?
Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, could v e
clarify whether the Javits amendment
does include the Tunney amendment?
Mr. TUNNEY. The Javits amendment
Includes the language in the Tunney
amendment with one exception. The $33
million is eliminated.
Mr. FANNIN. But not on the?
Mr. TUNNEY. The only way the Tun-
ney amendment can be adopted is to have
a vote. This represents a substitute for
my amendment.
Mr. FANNIN. That is what I wanted to
know.
I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. TUNNEY. Will the Senator from
Idaho agree to yield back the time ey
does he want to use my time'?
Mr. McCLURE. There is a little con-
fusion, will the Senator yield for a
moment?
Mr. TUNNEY. Certainly.
Mr. McCLURE. So we can qualify the
situation so that everybody may know
exactly-what is involved here.
The Javits amendment is an amend-
ment in the nature of a substitute for the
Tunney amendment, but a vote for the
Javits amendment does not adopt the
Tunney amendment.
If the Javits amendment is adopted,
there would still be a vote on the Tun-
ney amendment as amended by the Sen-
ator from New York.
Mr. TUNNEY. That is correct.
Mr. McCLURE. So that I, for one, al-
though not necessarily in support of the
Tunney amendment, would support the
Javits amendment as being an improve-
ment.
I think the Senator from California
has indicated he thinks so, also.
Mr. TUNNEY. I would just like to say
that I think if the Javits amendment is
accepted, it is going to make it very clear
what the sentiment of the Senate is in
respect to cutting off funds to Angola.
It would then be my view, if the Javits
amendment carries, it would then be
clear that a majority of this body wants
to cut off funds under this defense ap-
propriations bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. TUNNEY. I am prepared to yield
back, but the Senator from New York de-
sires to speak.
Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I went
to some pains just now?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There
will be order, please.
Mr. BUCKLEY. I went to some pains
just now to rebut the presumption just
stated by the Senator from California.
My vote in favor of the Javits amend-
ment must not be construed as a vote in
favor of cutting off these funds for co-
vert affairs in Angola.
Mr. TUNNEY. Then I suggest the Sen-
ator vote against it.
Mr. BUCKLEY. The Senator from Cal-
ifornia has no right to instruct me how
to vote or determine the reasons for my
vote.
Mr. TUNNEY. I have no right, but I
make the suggestion.
Mr. JACKSON. Will the Senator yield
for a unanimous-consent request?
Mr. TUNNEY. I yield to the Senator.
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that Dan Dreyfus
and Ben Yamagato be granted privilege
of the floor in connection with H.R. 3474.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it es so ordered.
Who yields time?
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that Charles Warren
of my staff, be granted privilege of the
floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I yield
back the remainder of my time.
Mr. DOIVIENICI. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a unanimous-consent
request?
Mr. TUNNEY. Yes, I yield to the Sena-
tor from New Mexico.
Mr. DOMENIC'. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that Frank DuBois,
of my staff, be granted privilege of the
floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. TUNNEY. I yield back the remain-
der of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time
having been yielded back, the question is
on agreeing to the amendment of the
Senator from New York. The yeas and
nays?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi-
dent, I ask unanimous consent that the
Senator from Washington (Mr. JACK-
SON) may proceed for not to exceed 3
minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
(Abjection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
/
ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVET,OP-
MENT ADMINISTRATION i AU-
THORIZATIONS
Mr. JACIVN. Mr. Presideot, I ask
the Chair to . y before the Senate a mes-
sage from the House of Representatives
on H.R. 3474, \e
The PR ES' WW1 0 FkICER ( Mr.
PacrewooD) laid efore the Senate the
amendment of the. Hooke of the Represent-
ativesSenate
to e amerid nt of the Sena
to the bill (H.R. 347) to authorize ap-
propriations to the E ergy Research and
Development Administration in accord-
ance with sectyr 26t of the Atomic
Energy Act of 54, as ainended, section
305 of the Energy Reorganization Act of
1974, and seceion 16 of the,Federal Non-
euclear Energy Research aiod Develop-
ment Act of 1974, and for othter purposes.
(The Amendment of the' House is
)rnted, in the RECORD of December 11,
1975, beginning at page H12424.),
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, move
.-e) concur with the House amendm?.s to
he Senate amendments to the fluse
mil. A
Mr. President, this amendment which
'Mlle over from the House was a pa
of the original conference report o
December 1-8, 19245
e
ERDA. The House deleted certain loeri
gliarantee provisions and in situ oil shale
letiae provisions from the bill and other
than that they sent the bill back as the
Senate had adopted it .
t
I eve cleared this matter with Sena-
tor ASTORE, who handles the nuclear
part f it, with Senator FANNIN and Sen-
ator EAKER
Weare all in agreement that in 'view
of thetmargin of vote in the House, there
is no noint trying to go back to canfer-
ence or sending it baek with an aamene-
ment, despite the fact the Senate/passed
the bill tO to 10.
Mr. resident. the confers haft
adopted the provisions of the Senate Ver -
sion of the bill whieti would authorize
the Administrator of ERDA tat' guaran-
tee loans for the construction of one-
of-a-kind Aacilities to demonetrate new
energy tee nologies. Among the technol-
ogies which were eligible for euch assist-
ance were energy Proluctio from solid
wastes, sola i energy appli ations, geo-
thermal ene gy, conversio of coal to
synthetic fu s, and pro ction of oil
from shale.
the conferees Would have authorized the
Another Senate pretasit adopted by
Administrator to carry t, in coopera -
tion with industry, a car fully controlled
experiment in c mmerc 1 production or
oil from shale us g in .situ methods. The
in situ method, i uccessful, would elim-
inate most of e extreme environ-
mental conseque es which will other-
wise result from% mining and above
ground retorting of shale. It would
greatly reduce wat use, water quality
degradation, and production of solid
wastes for disposal. ,
On December 11 in an unprecedented
i
action, the Hous Of Representatives
bowed to the de wiles of some of it:,
Members and v ted separately upon
these two provis ons of the Senate-ap-
proved conferenle repo t. The provisions
were rejected and the remainder of the
conference rept is new before us as an
amended bill. i 1
I intend to
cept the deei
prove the bill
do so not be
cision but be
other provis
I am not e
Home will
ternatives
mentione
ove thattthe Senate ae-
on of the House and ap-
ithout ean ndment. I will
ause I agre with the do-
ause it is im rtant for the
ns of the bill t become law.
ouraged to believe that the
accept any r sonabIe al-
the two provi 'ons I have
at this time.
Mr. Pr sident, the House
ai
these pr visions was rernar
loan gu ntee provision was
some M bers as a $6 billion
the ene gy industries. It was j
hemen y opposed by others as
step i nationalizing the oil
Editor Is in major national ne
suppo ed both arguments.
I a ure the Senate that the P
woul i have neither of the alleged
It s ms self-evident that it co
hay both.
e debate includes contentions
debate on
able. The
posed by
ipoff" by
t as ve-
the first
dustry.
papers
thi
to
ision
tilts.
not
that
is a gift to major oil companie and
imonials that It is opposed by m jor
companies. It includes content n.e
at these kinds of facilities will be en-
s ructed immediately by industry with Out
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b'ecembr 18, liWroved
Fed er?assistance and contentions that
they at?mpossible dreams and that the
guaranted loans will default.
The h tory of discussions about syn-
thetic fu s policy is dramatically re-
flected in t e House debate. This Nation
is no longe self-sufficient in petroleum
resources, bu it has vast resources of coal
and oil shale. We consume energy pri-
marily in thr forms?gas for industrial
and domestic eating:, liquid fuels for
transportation, nd electricity. All of
these demands c uld be supplied from
coal, oil shale, an more advanced sys-
tems if socially, e vironmentally, and
economically accept le conversion tech-
nologies could be reazed.
There are those whk remain compla-
cent that industry wi \bring about the
technologies When the ivarket dictates,
and there are those who b lieve the tech-
nical or economic probles are insur-
mountable. Industry has b n alleged to
be on the verge of demon,s ating shale
oil and coal gasification pro uction for
years, but action is never forth oming.
Meanwhile, fundamental national
Policy decisions are being mac based
upon gross assuniptions about ou1energy
fUture. The viability of domestic ergy
self-sufficiency is critical to our' ter-
national posture, even if we do not clpose
the course of energy self-sufficiency.
Real changes in life style and sev re
energy conservation decisions are be'
deferred because of complacency tha
technological solutions to the energy
crisis are possible. Our, energy-based
etOnomY continues to face the uncer-
tainties of increasing prices and short-
ages.
The provisions stricken by the House
Were intended to encourage early dem-
onstrations of available, but unproven,
technologies?to assess the real techno-
logical, environmental, economic, and
social consequences of synthetic fuel pro
duction. They were not intended?a
could not?conunit us to a synthetic fu s
future, but they would provide the b is
for reasoned and rational decisions.
The House action ,peems likely t re-
sult in one more costly deferral of tion;
to extend for at least another any
real initiative to find out if sy thetics
are a solution to our problems.
At best, our continued ambiv lence on
research and, demonstration ? f energy
alternatives will condemn u to taking
expedient and blind action n synthetic
fuels at some future date It will con-
demn us to crisis comniit ents without
the safeguards without d iberate analy-
sis, and without knowle ge of the con-
sequences. At worst, it ill condemn the
American public to g ater dependence
upon Arab oil and gr ater expansion of
the nuclear altemat e. And it will re-
Suit not in energy onservation, but in
economic deprivati n.
I hope that t e opponents of this
measure in the ouse and the critics in
the media will aend some time during
the forthcomi holiday season reflect-
ing on the opt ans we have for the future.
If, they rema convinced that there is
seine Way t t new energy technologies
will materi ize without energy industry
involveme without government assist-
ance, or out experimentation I hope
that they will advance their own pr
posals for our consideration early ne t
year.
If they have no alternative propo
I hope that they can constructively up-
port a program of the kind whic has
been deleted from this conference eport
before more crucial years of le time
are wasted in inaction.
Mr. President, I think we ar in com-
plete agreement on the part o the par-
ticipants in the conference oi both sides
of the aisle.
I yield to the Senator fro Arizona.
Mr. FANNIN. Mr. Presi nt, I concur
with what the distingu7shed Senator
from Washington has sai .
It is unfortunate the House did take
out a very important a,cet of the bill,
which was the loan g arantee program.
It is going to be ver damaging to the
program.
At the same ti e, we do not have
sufficient time to go into that matter
with the House. t was such an over-
whelming vote. do not think it would
be wise to try at this time to place
that particula item back in the bill.
Mr. BU RS. Will the Senator
yield?
Mr. JA SON. I yield to the Sen-
ator.
Mr. F . There were two items.
The othe was on the old mine involve-
ment, the $750 million.
Mr. ACKSON. That was the other
bill.
Mr ANNIN. That is right.
M . JACKSON. This involved the sit-
at' n of the loan guarantee provision.
r. BUMPERS. I think that answers
question.
e House dropped the $6 million loan
ntee and the oil shale project,
hose are the only two things?
Mr. ACKSON. That is correct.
Mr. OMENICI. Mr. President, I re-
luctantl support H.R. 3474 the ERDA
authoriz 'on bill, as amended by the
House. I m disappointed the House
struck the rovisions which would have
prOvided a l? guarantee program for
synthetic fue development. I feel there
is an urgenc to bring about the com-
mercialization if synthetic fuels. How-
ever, I do not eel that we can delay
on approving th authorization of funds
for the Energy search and Develop-
ment Administrati , because the rest of
the provisions in t bill are extremely
Important to the Na on as we strive for
energy independence.
I am hopeful that members of the
Senate Interior Comm ttee who spent
long hours developing th legislative lan-
guage contained in sectio 103 will make
every possible effort to ass e that simi-
lar legislation is consider separately
early in the second session.
I cannot stress enough the portance
of a loan guaranteed program to insure
the development of our synfuels ? rogram
in the United States. It is impo nt to
the State of New Mexico because have
several coal gasification plants pr sed
for the northwest corner of the te.
These plants offer an option to conti ed
excessive dependence on foreign so es
of energy. We cannot allow the millio s
of tons of coal in the United States to Ii
000400100018-1 S 22779
for another 3 million years, unused
unattended to while the Nation's energy
eeds go unmet.
Intelligent, resourceful, and envirpn-
entally sound development of tgese
able resources, which offer so uch
to erica's desire to be energy )hde-
p- ? ent, must proceed. But, it qbnnot
without an aggressive p gram
of vernment aid in what is au enor-
mous expensive proposition.
Th technology for producing pipeline
qualit synthane?synthetic mqthane or
natura gas?has been demon trated in
Scotian in a coal gasifica on plant
using a iomb1nation lurgi an4 methana-
tion pro?ss to create 25 nyThion cubic
feet of gc per day. While th1s plant is
100 times mailer than th commercial
size synt plants propsed by com-
panies in is country, th fundamental
process is kn wn well eno h to minimize
the technic 'sk that thtse larger plants
will not func on proper &.
The synth c fuels p oject can involve
both mining a d m acturing facili-
ties requiring uge l7lvestmentu in re-
source a.ssessm t, rsource acquisition,
and development essary infrastruc-
tures and comm y facilities. Protec-
tion of the enviro eat also can require
costly environmen analysis and safe-
guards. The fin 1 community will in
all probability more conservative
Investments unl e Federal Govern-
ment is willing a a. cipate.
The PRESID I G 0 CER. The ques-
tion is on agr he motion of the
Senator from n.
The motio d to.
Mr. JAC ON. Mr. P esident, I move
to reconsid the vote by\which the mo-
tion was a -d to.
Mr. FANNIN. Mr. Presid, I move to
lay that motion on the table.
The tin to lay on the table was
agreed
Mr. ARRY P. BYRD, JR. Mr. Presi-
dent, voted to approve the egislation
autho izing funds for the E ergy Re-
searc and Development Acimin stration,
as odified by action of the 1ouse of
Rep esentatives. Our R. & D. pro ams in
en gy are an essential element in our
na ional effort to achieve greate inde-
p & dence from unreliable foreign s urces
o petroleum.
I favor the House position as m-
?
o
ared to the Senate proposal and 7-
port the changes made by the Housf
Representatives.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPRO-
PRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1976
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of amendment in disagreement
No. 75 to H.R. 9861, an act making ap-
propriations for the Department of De-
fense for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1976, and for the period beginning July
1, 1976, and ending September 30, 1976,
and for other purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question now recurs on the amendment
of the Senator from New York to the
amendment of the Senator from Cali-
fornia. The yeas and nays have been or-
dered, and the clerk will call the roll.
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S 22780
Approved
For ROW3O9giti11941:: RifirMIUZ-MgP0434100 040 01 01:10180n 1,(-31. 18, 19 'lig
, )(2) to assure the burn line treatment ;of
m1'11818 during transportation in commeck:e:
an 1,1
(6) to protect the owners of animals from
the theft of their animals by preventing the
sale or use of animals which have ;been
sthele
T lI
Congress further finds that it is e.ssen-
tial to regulate, as provided in this Aet, the
transportation, purchase, sale, housing, care,
handling, and treatment in animals by car-
riers oft by persons or orgsnizations engnised
- i
in using them for researen or experimental
purposes or for exhibition purposes or hold-
ing them for sale as nets or for any such
purpose er use.
SEC. 3. Section 2 of such Ant (7 U.S.C. 2132)
is amended?
i 1 ) by striking out sussections (c) am;
(d) thereof and inserting in lieu the follow-
ing:
"(c) The term 'commerce' Means trade.
traffic; tranfnxirtation, or other/ commerce?
"(1) between a place in a state and any
place outside of such State' or
"(2) which\ affects trade, traffic, transpor-
tation, or other commerce deseribed in para-
graph (1). '
"(d) The term 'State' nieatis a State of the
United States, the Districs Of Columbia, the
Commonwealth - of Puerte Itico, the Virgin
Islands, Guam, American Safnoa, or any other
territory or possession of tie United States;".
(2) by strikink out the term "affectine
commerce" in subsections (e) and (f) and
inserting in lieu thereof "In commerce"; (3)
by amending subsection Ag) thereof to read
as follows: ,
"(g) The term 'animal' means any dog
cat, monkey, guinea /fig, hamster, rabbit.
bird, horse, or any nthar animal, which the
Secretary determiners is it :ended for use for
research, testing, exPerin-entation, or exhi-
bition purposes, or w1Vch is used or intended
for use as a pet. Wit ti respect to a dog, the
term also includes; dog used for hunting.
alp
security, or breeding Arposes. The term does
not include farm a ins\s/f, such as, but not
limited to, livestocilt or ,psultry, used or in-
tended for use as food Of fiber, or livestock
or poultry used oriintenced for use for im-
proving animal niltritioni breeding, manage-
ment, or production efficiency.".
(3) by amending subsection (f) theretif bs
Inserting after "sir sells- nnd before "iiny'
the following: "" or offers for sale.",
(4) by furthet ameridingnubsection (f) by
inserting a sernfleolon afterithe word "pets"
and by striking ", but snob term excludes
any retail pet Store except sisch store which
sells any anirnels to 4 inseid(ch facilii s, an
exhibitor, or al dealer,"; ,
(5) by aan iding suisse tioni(h) thereof by
striking out7 ", which w u
0 ere t rch,ased In
commerce the intended d tribution of
which affects commerce, or will affect corn-
s. l!41 rrierce," and inserting -in lieu ntherecif "in
commerce 'j and i
, (6) add ng at the end thereof\the follow-
ing new sib section: t
"11) TIle term 'carrier' means any person
subject t regulation by 1he fate ate Com-
merce Oommission, the Civil A
Board, ge the Federal Maritime Co
or any hther person or Class of pe
gaged,
mats f
to suc
Secre
SE
is ate
The second assistant legislative clerk
called the roll.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD, I announce
that the Senator from Indiana (Mr.
BaYI-1) , the Senator from Louisiana (Mr.
LoNc) are necossarily absent.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the
Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER)
is necessarily absent.
The result was announced?yeas 93,
nays 4, as follows:
(Rollcall Vote No. 606 Leg.]
YEAS-93
Abourevk
Allen
Baker
Bartlett
Beall
Belimon
Bentsen
Biden
Brock
Brooke
Buckley
Bumpers
Burdick
Byrd, Humphrey
Harry F., Jr. Inouye
Byrd, Robert C. Jackson
Cannon Javits
Case Johnston
Chiles Kennedy
Laxalt
Leahy
Magnuson
Mansfield
Mathias
McClellan
McClure
McGee
McGovern
McIntyre
Metcalf
Mondale
Montoya
NAYS-4
Scott,
William Is
NOT VOTING-3
Both Goldwater Long
So the Javits amendment (amend-
ment No. 1312) to the Tunney amend-
ment (amendment No. 1303) was agreed
to
Glenn Morgan
Gravel MOSS
Hansen Muskie
Hart, Gary Nelson
Hart, Philip A. Nunn
Hartke Packwood
Haskell Pastore
Hatfield Pearson
Hathaway Pell
Helms Percy
Hollings Proxmire
Hruska Randolph
Huddleston Ribicoff
Roth
Schweiker
Scott, Hugh
Sparkman
Ste fford
Stevens
Stevenson
Stone
Symington
Tart ,
Talmadge
Thurmond
Tower
Tunney
Weicker
Williams
Young
Church
Clark
Cranston
Culver
Dole
Domeniei
Durkin
Eagleton
Eastland
Fannin
Fong
Ford
Garn
Curtis
Griffin
Stennis
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I move to
reconsider the vote by which the amend-
ment was agreed to.
Mr. MOSS. I move to lay that mo-
tion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment of
the Senator from California (Mr. Tux--
HEY) , as amended.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Tile Sen-
ator from Montana.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
yield to the Republican leader, without
losing my right to the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ate will be in order. The Senator from
Pennsylvania may proceed.
TEMPOR CONTINUAT N OF
CURREN TAX WITH OLDING
TABLES? 815
Mr. HUGH S TT. MI/President, I
send to the desk bill ?roviding that
the current tax wit' ii ding tables re-
main in effect until M h 15, 1976.
It is obvious that sse has been
reached between th Presid t and Con-
gress. The purpos of my bill to allow
Approved
egUtiations to proceed on the spenci-
eeiling issue while keeping the rh-
I olding tax rates at current levels or a
bort beriod of time.
Mr. Rresident, I would ask for im-
iediate consideration of my 41 but I
calize that an objection would be raised.
"herefore, ask unanimous cqnsent that
i:iy bill be cansidered as having been read
twice and be laced on the calendar until
F uch time as the Democratic Leadership
( ecides to bring this matter before the
I enatc.
The PRESIDIIIG OFFICER. Without
. bjection, it is so Ordered. The text of the
, _
1 ill is as follows: '
tiXs8 .
S. 15
Be it enacted by , e enate and House of
e7.presentatives of' the% United States of
/
le:writ:a in Gong ess aAentbled, That (a)
i ection 3402(a) o the Internal Revenue Code
ni 1954 (relati ' to income, tax collected at
. ?ince), as a nded by section 205 of the
' 'ax Reduct Act of 1975, is amended by
nserting ir the second se tence thereof
be followi ? "The tables so pr scribed with
aspect t wages paid after ember 31,
975, an on or before March 15,s 1976, shall
fe the me as the tables prescri ed under
his section which were in effe on De-
. emb 10, 1975.".
(b Section 209(c) of the Tax lie\uction
tot /of 1975 is amended by striking ou "be-
January 1, 1976" and inserting in lieu
ereof 'on or before March 15, 1976".
\
',..NIMAL WELFARE AMENDMENTS
OF 1975
Mk, WEICKER. Mr. President, I ask
manimous consent that the Senate pro-
eed tie the immediate consideratiOn of
3. 1941, which was reported froM the
ommittee on Commerce today,
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
)bjection "\to proceeding to the mmedi-
N
(te consi ration of the bill?
There b g rio objection, e Senate
)roceeded t consider the b (S. 1941)
Lo increase e protection orded ani-
mals in trans and to assurelhe humane
treatment of si:maLs, and fbr other pur-
poses, which as been ported from
the Committee .,,on Co erce with an
amendment. '
The amendmei was agreed to. .
The bill, was o ered to be engrossed
for a third readin rOad the third time,
and passed, as fall
Be it enacted by Senate and house
of Representatives e United States of
4 merica Congre s aAembled, That this
Act may be cited /as the, "Animal Welfare
Amendments of 1 5". .
SEC. 2. Section of the Act of August 24,
1966, as amende (7 U.S.C. 2\31). is amended
to read as folio :
SHORT TITLE ND DECLARAT OW POLICY
SECTION 1. a) This Act n be cited as
the "Animal Welfare Act".
(bc The ngress finds that nimals and
activities w ich are regulated un er this Act
are either interstate or foreign commerce
or substa lly affected such co merce or
the free ow thereof, and that re lation of
animals and activities as provide in this
Act is ecessary to prevent and e minate
burdens/upon such commerce and effec-
tively egulate such commerce, in ord -
use n research facilities or for exhib tion
purposes or for use as pets are prov ed
(1i)/ to insure that animals intend for
humane care and treatment;
\
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onauties
mission,
ns
t the business o.: transporting ani-
r hire or providing services inAidental
transportation, as designate by the
ry of Transportatim.".
k
. 4. Section 3 of such Act (7 U.S.Cs2133
ended by inserting after "his facilities"
and /before "comply" is the first peoviso
the f the following: -. including any; ter-
mi
ito 1 facilities used by such person,". '
, EC. 5. Sections 4, 11, and 12 of such
('li.U.S.C. 2134, 2141, and 2142) are ame
b striking out "affecting commerce"
i serting in lieu thereof "in commerce".
/ SEC. 6. Section 6 of such Act (7 U.S.C. 1361
ib amended by striking out "Every research
facility and every" and inserting in lieu
Approved For MaPgsf8Mil/
CO W1E6AbilDPHANCIV4R000400100018-1 S 22781
district courts of the United States shall have
jurisdiction to enfOrce any such order by ap-
propriate means. Xi";
(4) by amending subsection (c) thereof
by inserting "knowingly" after "who" and
before "violates"; and
(5) by adding at the end thereof of the
following twci new subsections:
"(d) Any dealer, exhibitor, carrier, or op-
erator of an auction sale subject to this Act
who is determined by the Secretary, after
notice and an opportunity for a hearing, to
have vierfated a provision of this Act or of a
standafd or regulation prescribed pursuant
to th0: Act, shall be liable to the United
Stat ea for a civil penalty. The amount of
such penalty shall be not more than $2,000
fon-each violation, and if any violation is a
continuing one, each day of violation con-
stitutes a separate offense. The amount of any
auch penalty shall be assessed by the Secre-
tary by written notice. In determining the
amount of such penalty, the Secretary shall
take into account the nature, circumstances,
extent, and gravity of the violation commit-
ted and, with respect to the person found to
have committed such violation, the degree of
culpability, any history of prior offenses,
ability to pay, effect on ability to continue
to do business, and such other matters as
justice may require.
"(e) Any action under this section may be
brought before a United States Magistrate in
the district court of the United States in any
judicial district in which such person is
found, and such magistrate shall have juris-
diction to hear and decide-such action.".
SEC. 13. Section 21 of such Act (7 U.S.C.
2151) is amended by adding at the end there-
of the following two new sentences: "Record-
keeping requirements prescribed pursuant -no
section 8, and standards promulgated pur-
suant to subsections (a) and (b) of section
10, shall be prescribed or promulgated in ac-
cordance with section 553 of title 5, United
States Code, except that interested persons
shall be entitled to make oral as well as
written presentations. A transcript shall be
taken of any oral presentation.".
SEC. 14. (a) Section 23 of such Act (7 U.S.C.
2153) is amended by striking out the last
sontence.
(b) Such Act is amended by adding at the
end thereof the following new seetion:
"Sac. 26. There is authorized to be appro-
priated to the Secretary to carry out the
provisions of this Act not to exceed $4,000,000
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976, not to
son sublec to regulation by it.". exceed $1,000,000 for the transitional fiscal
SEC. 11. ection 16(a) of such Act ( '7 U.S.0 quarter ending September 30, 1976, not to
is amended? n exceed $4,000,000 for the fiscal year ending
eptember 30, 1977, and not to exceed $4,000,-
0 for the fiscal year ending September 30,
1 8.".
c. 15. Section 24 of such Act (7 U.S.C.
2154 is amended?
(1) by inserting "and carriers" after the
term ealers" in the third sentence there-
of, and
(2) by dding after "of this Act" and be-
fore the f?od at the end of the first sen-
tence the f lowing: ", except that the regu-
lations relat g to carriers shall be prescribed
not later tha nine months after the date
of enactment c the 'Animal Welfare Amend-
ments of 1975.'
SEC. 16 Sectiok 25 of such Act (7 U.S.C.
2155) is amended
(1) by striking kut "and" at the end of
paragraph (2) there f;
(2) by redesignatin paragraph (3) there-
of as paragraph (4) th eof; and
(3) by inserting therein the following new
paragraph:
"(3) recommendations and conclusions
approved by the Secretary of Transportation,
the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration and the Chairman of the
Civil Aeronautics Board, concerning flight
safety, including the aircraft, its environ-
December 18, 197
thereof "Every research facility, carrier, and", danger such animal or other animals during
Sae. 7. Section 9 of such Act (7 U.S.C. 2139) , transportation in commerce. Any such cer-
is amended by inserting after "dealer," the tificate shall be issued at a time interval, and
first time it appears the team "a carrier,", shall be retained by the receiving carrier for
and the second time it appears the term a reasonable period of time in accordance
"carrier", a with regulations of the Secretary.
SW. 8. Section 10 of such Act (7 13.5.0. "(c) No carrier involved in the transpor-
2140) is amended by deleting ''amon forms tation of any animal in commerce shall par-
Supplied by the Secretary" in the first sen- ticipate in any arrangement, or engage in
tence thereof and by adding after the sec- any practice, under which the cost of the
ond sentence thereof the following 'awo new transportation of such animal, or any other
sentences: "Carriers shall keep such -records charges (including the purchase price of any
as are necessary to carry out this Act, with such animal), is required to be paid and col-
respect to the transportation, recetving, lected upon the delivery of such animal to
handling, and delivering of animals, as the the consignee, unless the consignor guaran-
Secretary may prescribe: Provided, That' in tees in writing the payment of transportation
the case of those carriers required to main- charges, including, where necessary, both the
tam n records under requirements of other. return transportation charges and an amount
Federal agencies, if the Secretary determines sufficient to reimburse such carrier for all
that any additional records are needed for \out-of-pocket expenses incurred for the care,
the purposes or this Act, and proposes to
require such records, such requirements
shall not become effectiVe until they have
been approved by such other agencies. Any
Such records shall be made available at all
reasonable times for inspection and copying
by the Secretary.".
SRC. 9. Section 13 of such Act (7 U.S.C.
2143), is amended?
(1) by amending the title thereof to read
as follows; "HUMANE STANDARDS FOR ANI-
MALS";
(2) by inserting "(a)" immediately be-
fore the first sentence thereof;
(3) by amending the second sentence
thereof by inserting after "Such standards"
and before "shall include" the following:
"shall apply with respect to the facilities of
any person licensed or registered pursuant to
this Act and with respect to any terminal
facilities used by a carrier subject to this
Aet and"; and
(4) by adding at the end thereof the
following two new subsections:
"(1)) The Secretary shall promulgate
standards in accordance with this subsec-
tion to govern the transportation in com-
merce, and the handling, care; and treatment
Ip connection therewith, by carriers, of ani-
mals consigned by any dealer, research facil-
ity, owner of a pet, exhibitor, operator of an
auction sale, department, agency, or instru-
mentality of the Federal Government or of
any State or local government, or other per-
son. Such standards shall include, but need
not be limited to, minimum requirenaents
with respect to containers, feed, water, rest,
ventilation, temperature, handling, veteri-
nary care, and other factors determined by
the Secretary to be relevant to assuring the
humane treatment of animals in the course
of their transportation in commerce. Such
standards shall be designed to assure the safe
transportation in commerce of all animals
receved in healthy condition and to safe-
guard such animals against disease, injury,
and death in the course thereof. The Secre-
tary may revise such standards to the extent
necessary or appropriate. Such standards may
include a requirement that no animal of a
designated kind shall be?
"(1) delivered by a dealer, research facil-
ity, exhibitor, operator of an auction sale
owner of a pet, or by a department, agenc
or instrumentality of the Federal Gover
ment or of any State or local governm t,
to a Carrier, for transportation in comme e;
Or
"(2) received by a carrier, for trans orta-
tion in commerce, from any person or vern-
ment entity described in paragraph
)
unless it is accoMpanied by a cert' cate is-
sued with respect to such animal y an ac-
credited (as defined by the Seer' ary) vet-
erinarian, Each snail certificate hall attest
that such veteriarien inspected such animal
within a time interval which all be speci-
fied And that, when so inspe ed, such ani-
Mal appeared to be free of an infectious dis-
iatee or physical abnormality' hich might en-
/
Seeding, and storage of any such animal in
the event that such animal is not claimed
upam delivery. Such transportation shall be
perfaitted by the carriers after a period of
twenty-four hours.".
SEC.'. 10. Section 15 of such Act (7 1J.St.
2145) is amended by adding at the end
thereof 'tale following new subsection:
"(e) n, addition to other applicable re-
quirement, the Secretary shall consult and
cooperate With the Secretary of Taaneporta-
tion, the Acitninistrator of the FederAl Avia-
tion AdminiAration, the Chairman of the
Civil Aeronautics Board, the Chairman of
the Interstate Gommerce Commassion, and
the Chairman of he Federal Mayitime Com-
mission with resr)ect to the Otablishment
and enforcement of humane fitandards for
animals in the course( of their/transportation
in commerce and in i rming facilities prior
to and after such tran ortakion. 13efore pro-
mulgating any standard erning air trans-
portation and related h?dling of animals,
the Secretary shall consu ith the Secretary
of Transportation, and e dministrator of
the Federal Aviation Adm istration who
shall have the autho ty to isapprove any
such standard if he. notifies me Secretary,
within thirty days aifter sucht nsultation,
that changes are natessary in th interest of
ing the safety the air-
ent. The
e Civil
itime
ctive
as
a-
safety flight inclu
craft, its environ
Interstate Com
Aeronautics Bo
Commission, t
lawful autho
ent, or its equip
erce Commission, t
d, and the Federal M
the extent of their resp
ties, shall take such a,cti
is appropria?o implement any determ
tion by the/Secretary with respect to a p
2146(a))
(1) b
tence t
time
(2
the
inserting "carrier," in the first sen-
ereof after the term "exhibitor", each
ch term appears in such sentence;
by striking out "or" before "(4)" in
hird sentence thereof;
I by inserting before the period at the
of the third sentence thereof the follow-
g: ", or (5) such animal is held by a
arrier"; and
(4) by adding the following new sentence
at the end thereof: "The United States at-
torneys are authorized to prosecute all crim-
inal violations of this Act reported by- the
Secretary and to invite civil actions to en-
force orders of and to recover all civil penal-
ties assessed and reported by the Secretary,
or which come to their notice or knowledge
by other means.".
Sac. 12. Section 19 of such Act, as amended
(7.U.S.C. 2149), is amended?
(1) by inserting after "exhibitor," each
time the term appears the following: "car-
rier,";
(2) by striking out "one year" in subsection
? (e) thereof and inserting in lieu thereof
"six months";
(3) by amending subsection (a) thereof
by striking "violation, and 1f" and inserting
in lieu thereof the following; "violation. The
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S 22782 \ CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE Dece,nber 18, 1915
merit, or equ nient as they relate to the
carriage of live animals lir air transporta?
tion; and".
SEC. 17. Section (c) of such Act (7 U.S.C.
2146c) is amended yo, striking ", and the
provisions of title II the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 46k Stat. 856; 18 U.S.C.
6001 et seq.) ,".
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPRO-
PRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1976
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of amendment in disagree-
ment No. 75 to H.R. 9861, an net making
appropriations for the Department of
Defense for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1976, and for the period begin-
ning July 1, 1976, and ending Septern -
ber 30, 1976, and for other purposes.
ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS ON ANGOLA
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I rise
to support the amendment offered by the
.Senator from California, Mr. TUNNEY,
which I have cosponsored, to halt covers
U.S. involvement in the civil war in
Angola.
It is evident from the secret session
recently concluded that the Senate as a
body has neither been informed of the
details of our military aid to one of the
factions in Angola, advised of the poli-
cies being pursued nor been given an
opportunity to express its view on this
matter.
- We are faced with a secret operation
that may reach an expenditure of $60
million. Those are taxpayer dollars be-
ing used in a way that promotes au es-
calation of the civil war and massive and
tragic loss of life and property that in-
evitably will result.
We all deplore the intervention by the
Soviet Union and Cuba in that newly
independent nation of Africa. Yet we
neither promote our own interests nor
those of a peaceful solution by respond-
ing with a CIA-financed covert opera-
tion, apparently conducted in concert
with the Union of South Africa.
The Congress has an equal role in for
policymaking with the administra-
tion. Our obligations cannot be fulfilled
if we are kept in the dark or if we are
confronted with an opportunity to act
only after the fact. And that is what we
are faced with in Angola. A major covert
operation has been conducted without
full public explanation of the policy being
pursued or the interests, objectives, and
goals that policy is designed to promote.
Until Congress is given that oppor-
tunity and makes that determination. I
do not believe we should permit the con-
tinued expenditure of tax dollars by tile
CIA in the Angolan civil war.
And I believe that even were the ques-
tion before us today as a request for
authorization for such action, the risks
of that policy clearly outweigh any
fleeting short-term benefits.
First, we know that covert involve-
ment of U.S. money and U.S. personnel--
whether CIA employees or mercenaries
hired by the CIA?in a foreign civil war
can ensnare this Nation in growing and
undesired commitments. Although we
are told that there is no intention of
producing another Vietnam on the con-
tinent of Africa, the dangers of step-by-
step increments of U.S. money, man-
power and Prestige are clear.
Sarnayana's warning seems never so
apt as today that those who will not
learn from history are destined to
repeat it.
If we have learned anything from
Vietnam, it is that the United States
cannot police the world. Any effort to
do so in Angola without full public and
congressional acceptance of the need for
the expenditure of U.S. resources in a
foreign civil war cannot be sustained--
and should not be sustained.
Second, if we look at the continued
statements of the Council of the Orga-
nization of African Unity in opposition
to foreign intervention in Angola, it is
clear that our actions?however fre-
quently we identify them as a reaction
to Soviet and Cuban initiatives?will be
condemned as foreign intervention. We
cannot hope but antagonize many of the
African nations with whom we desire
improved relations.
Third, it is unchallengeable that
throughout black Africa. our involve-
ment on the side of the white supremacist
regime of the Union of South Africa and
increasing reports of our acting in con-
cert with that government, will be cause
for attack. Ultimately, we could well find
ourselves isolated from the dominant
forces on that continent?a result which
clearly is not in our interests.
Finally, the actions we are taking to
finance covert operations which prolong
the bloody civil war yield tragic human-
itarian consequences: loss of life, crea-
tion of new populations of refugees, dis-
ruption of food supply and resulting mal-
nutrition and hunger. Those covert op-
erations have involved already some $33
million with up to $60 million authoriza-
tion. Yet our support for humanitarian
relief has been limited to $200,000. This
juxtaposition of priorities is not in the
interests of the people of Angola nor in
the interests of the United States.
Let us look at the long story behind
our current involvement in Angola.
Angola, as a colony of Portugal, gained
its independence on November 11. Yet
because of the abundant natural re-
sources spread throughout that terri-
tory, both internal and outside forces
have spent months and years vying for
full control of this land. To some ob-
servers, the conflict and internal strife
were inevitable. For, the end of colonial-
ism in African countries has too often
been followed by a scramble among war-
ring factions that seek to enjoy the
spoils, even before the local residents
have a chance to begin guiding their own
fate_
Too much of what is happening in An-
gola today has been repeated time and
sime again throughout the colonial
world. Thus, after years of colonial rule,
an African nation emerges with its own
internal struggle for powers already
drawn upon ethnic, tribal and historical
Adding to that, is the awesome might
,ss: the superpowers in the Soviet Union,
he United States, and China.
Our Government reluctantly admits
.nvolvement for the sake of protecting
our interests?particularly our interest in
Angola's potential on supply. And for
years, along with the Russians and the
Chinese, our Government has been a sup-
porter of at least one liberation faction
in Angola.
Zaire. Zambia, and other black African
states are also deeply involved in Angolti,
and for their part the people of Angola
are forced to question this deep involve-
ment in Angolan affairs by se man:: -
eign governments. Yet, a third facti---,
poses one of the rs--:st imponderab'o
aspects of thh; cntire conflict. For, t':
Republic of South AL'ica has also con-
nutted troops, munitions and other 2'e -
sources to the Angolan struggle. Our de-
bate today on this serious matter inuet
focus noon the real dangers posed by
the US, involvement in that troubled
land. As long agc$ as 1969, the administra-
tion decided that black Angolans would
not obtain majority rule in the land of
their birth. And so, our Government
chose to support the Portugese govern -
ments of Caetano and Salazar.
But, for at least 13 years, it has been
reported, the CIA has funneled assist-
once to the FNLA--one of the three An-
golan liberation parties. When Portugal's
government collapsed in 1974, independ-
ence for Angola and all of the Portugesc
colonies became the hallmark of the new
Portilgese government's democratic ex
periment.
After that event, the world's attention
cautiously turned to the anticipated
buildup by interests outside of Angola- -
interests that have been nurtured by a
continuing search for power, but inter.
ests that bore no compassion or empathy
for self-determination. In 1974, Portu-
gal, after 500 years of colonialism, sur-
rendered her claim to that land, far from
the shores of Lisbon.
And now, in 1975, the mighty nation,
of the world have reached out to pull
apart any hope for Angolans to deter-
mine for themselves how that newly
formed state ought to be directed.
I fully support and have cosponsored
the amendment to prohibit military
funds for use in Angola, because I agree
with those who feel that a continued
U.S. buildup can only provide fuel for
the warring factions to blaze away at
each other.
And the victims of continued fighting
will be not only the soldiers of MPLA,
UNITA and FNLA--bus the women and
children and those who are too old to
fight who will be the tragic, helpless tar-
gets of the rockets, bullets, and miseiles
that are "Made in the USA."
There are clearly no easy answers to
the problems posed by tile conflict in An-
gola. Yet. the issues considered by the
administration have too often been sur-
rounded in secrecy. So that even now, as
the Senate comes out of a closed briefing
and debate on this grave matter, there
still remains the difficult issue of where
should this country place its resources, its
public policy anti its moral commitment.
For me, that question has a plain and
direct response. The United States should
not be involved in Angola. Not
only should we get out, but our doing so
should be a signal for South Africa, for
China, for the Soviet Union, for Zaire
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December 18, 197'5 CONGRESSIONAL RECOKD sEN A i S 22783
and for every foreign government to ex-
tricate themselves from Angola's civil
war.
Indeed, if our Government insists on
being involved, then we should seek ways
not only to encourage the ouster of all
foreign governments, but we should make
It clear that this Nation is ,prepared to
a.sthist any and every effort to negotiate
a settlement between the forces of libera-
tion in Angola.
Next year as Americans around the
world celebrate an independence that
has such precedents throughout civiliza-
tion, at least we should be prepared to
support and assist those efforts designed
to insure that peace may prevail in the
new nation of Angola.
Last October I listed at least five dis-
tinct steps that the United States can
and must take in order to serye the causes
of peace and justice in Angola.
First, the United States should respect
the territorial integrity of Angola, as
urged for that country by the three An-
golan parties and the Organization of
African Unity. All efforts to partition the
country or separate Cabinda must be
vigorously opposed.
Second, we must do what we can to
halt all foreign involvement and inter-
Vention?including our own?so that the
future of Angola can be decided upon
by Angolans themselves.
Third, we should support efforts both
within Angola, and on the part of third
parties, to mediate between the rival
groups to Angola, to halt the bloodshed,
and to seize opportunity for a peaceful
transition to independence. In particu-
lar, we should support the Conciliation
Committee of the OAU in its attempt to
bring a solution to the Angola crisis.
Fourth, we should demonstrate a will-
ingness to work with any Angolan gov-
ernment that emerges as the people of
that nation work out their own plans for
sel t-development.
Finally, governments and interna-
tional organizations should offer hu-
manitarian assistance to victims of the
fighting, wherever they are found, and
thereafter, give financial and technical
assistance to Angola to help rebuild the
country.
We have in this instance a good op-
portunity for the United States to de-
velop a policy regarding an African na-
tion that has been designed by the Af-
ricans themselves. For too long our Gov-
ernment has taken its cue on African
policy from other nations in Europe. In
this case we know that the OAU has con-
sistently urged all foreign interests to
leave Angola. It is clear that our Govern-
ment deserves to take Its lead from
those in Africa who want Angolans 'to
decide for themselves the fate of their
great land.
I urge my colleagues to support the
pending amendment to the Defense De-
partment appropriation so that peace
and reason can replace the fire of war
that is now consuming the new state of
Angola.
Mr, GAM Mr. President, the debate
we are engaged In today is a momentous
one, a historic one. Far more is at stake
than the fate of Angola. Both sides of
the debate over the strategic importance
of Angola are correct: we can live with-
out a non-Communist, non-Sovietized
Angola, and at the same time,, Angola is
of enormous importance in today's geo-
politics. That is true because the fate of
Angola will help to answer the question,
"Whom does America protect?" So far,
the answer to that question appears to
be, "Nobody." Angola is important be-
cause of its effect on the perception of
American strength by both friend and
foe.
Just incidentally, the failure of Soviet
action in Angola would preserve a meas-
ure of freedom to the people there, but
the larger significance is its effect on the
fate of other non-CoMmunist nations
throughout the world.
I have been concerned about the se-
crecy involved in the U.S. contribution
to the anti-Communist resistance in
Angola. Concerned because action of this
kind tends to be ineffective, unless it is
coupled with some &Olt of national re-
solve, which expresses itself in diplo-
matic terms. It was the lack of such a
resolve that led to our defeat in Viet-
nam, which in turn has contributed to
our paralysis in Angola. As an editorial
in the London Daily Telegraph noted yes-
terday, "America's self-imposed defeat"
in Vietnam has been the best weapon the
Communists have had. Of course, in the
case of Vietnam, our leaders failed mis-
erably to develop a natonal resolve. They
failed on the one hand because they were
themselves unsure about our objectives
there, and on the other because they
proceeded in secret. It is the secrecy of
our action in Angola which is also trou-
bling today. In my view, we ought to
strip away the mask of secrecy, move
openly, and communicate with our con-
stituents the true importance of stand-
ing firm in Africa.
For instance, Mr. President, suppose we
were to continue our present level of aid,
send in the $25 million or so we are talk-
ing about today, using the Governments
of Zaire and Zambia as conduits, and that
we were at the same time to say to the
Soviet Union that if a single Mig-21
leaves the runway in Angola, we will sim-
ply break off all arms limitation talks, in-
definitely. I am willing to bet that the
Migs would never take off.
Suppose we were to couple our econom-
ic aid with notice to Fidel Castro that
his action in Angola constitutes a clear
violation of the agreements reached with
the United States in 1962. Cuba agreed
at that time that there would be no ex-
port of the revolution, and we agreed to
forego any further attempts to liberate
the unhappy people of that island. Sup-
pose we were to tell Castro that since he
has violated the agreement, we no longer
consider ourselves bound by it, and that
we are going to resume active naval op-
erations in the Carribean, for the purpose
of preventing any further shipment of
Cuban soldiers to Angola. Again, I am
willing to bet that we would see some seri-
ous action towards a decrease in Cuban
activity in Africa.
In short, Mr. President, if we are un-
willing to intervene directly in Angola,
we should immediately raise the dipro-
mate costs to the nations that do inter-
vene. Such a course of action should be
obvious, and would be if we were not
blinded by the rhetoric about the benevo-
lent nature of the Neto movement in
Angola. Listening to some of the de-
scriptions of this movement is very rem-
iniscent of the descriptions we heard in
the late 1950s of Fidel Castro, or the
earlier descriptions of the "agrarian re-
formers" in China.
However, it is only fair to note that
such a policy is incompatible with the
policy of d?nte as recently practiced in
the United States. In that respect, Secre-
tary Kissinger's angry comments about
foreign involvement in Africa are some,
what startling. Secretary Kissinger has
shown an almost amazing tolerance for
offensive and insulting action by the So-
viet Union and her client states. Now, all
of a sudden, he is upset about Soviet in-
tervention in Angola. Well, Mr. Presi-
dent, a number of us have been upset
about Soviet actions for a long time. My
constituents have never understood the
passion for accommodation which has
characterized the State Department, and
American foreign policy in general. My
constituents are strongly opposed to
treating the Soviets as good buddies, be-
cause they feel in their bones that
Angola-style action is what we can al-
ways expect from them. And they are
correct.
Some observers, more sophisticated
than the Senator from Utah, are now
coming to the same conclusion. Victor
Zorza, in this morning's Washington
Post, claims that there has been a shift
in Soviet policy, away from accommoda-
tion and in the direction of confronta-
tion. The increasing willingness of the
Soviets to confront us is explained as
follows:
The military buildup is increasingly giving
it the confidence?and the hardWare?with
which to intervene in far-off places, and to
disregard calls for moderation.
With all due respect to Mr. Zona, I
do not, myself, see any shift in policy, but
I am glad to see that he now joins me in
questioning the intentions of the Krem-
lin.
I return to a point hinted at earlier,
and one which I have made many times
on the floor of the Senate: psychological
relations are important in geopolitics.
Very often the amount of our contribu-
tion; or the degree of our involvement is
less important than the will we show in
acting at all. What I am asking us to do
in Angola, Mr. President, is to stand up
for the principle of self-determination,
and to act to minimize the interference
by Communist nations in the affairs of
a small, but strategically located coun-
try. To do so, we will have to free our-
selves from the constraints imposed on
us by our blind adherence to the 'policy of
d?nte.
If we do not Angola will be dominated
by the Soviet Union, as Somalia is al-
ready, as Guinea is already, and as sev-
eral other nations of Africa threaten to
become. Angola's fall will further vali-
date the good old domino theory, which
was restricted to Southeast Asia only by
its attackers.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, during
the past several days the Senate has at-
tempted a substantive discussion of the
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Angolan crisis. We have met in secret ses-
sion twice. We have debated several
amendments, one of which I am a co-
sponsor, and a resolution setting forth
certain policy perspectives on the matter.
The decisions we have made or will make
by our votes are important ones for which
the Congress, in exercising its power,
must bear a major share of the responsi-
bility for the events that result there-
fsom.
Before I detail why I believe the prop-
er policy choice for the Congress is to
legislate a cessation of covert support for
any of the Angolan factions, it is neces-
sary to set forth certain basic considera-
tions. First, the Angolan conflict is not
another Vietnam in any meaningful an-
alytical sense. This is the case even
though there are certain generic sim-
ilarities in that both can be viewed as
primarily internal conflicts while at the
same time being situations wherein the
Soviet Union has attempted to expand
its influence by massive support of one
of the contending parties. Our reaction
in both cases, however unwise it may
have been or is, has been predicated on a
belief that our interests demand some
form of support for elements opposing
the Soviet-backed groups. But. I empha-
size that these are generic similarities
endemic to any so-called liberation
struggle in which Soviet expansionism
and U.S. interests collide. These similar-
ities do not provide an adequate basis to
judge the specific case of Angola.
Far too often in our discussions in the
Congress and in performing our educa-
tional responsibilities to the American
people, the Vietnam tragedy is being used
as an emotive rationale for certain
actions when what is needed is sober, re-
sponsible analysis of a unique situation
and its relevance to U.S. interests. It
is wisdom to learn from past errors. It is
folly to be the prisoner of them.
Second, our limited involvement to
date in the Angolan conflict is not an-
other example of Executive malfeasance,
nor an indication that the Executive has
tried to cover up its actions by ignoring
the congressional channels set up for
the processing of highly sensitive infor-
mation. There are designated individuals
in this chamber who have been or should
have been aware that the United States
has been interested in certain Angolan
groups for a number of years. The exact
nature of that interest may not have
been widely known, but the fact that we
have had an active interest in the An-
golan situation for some time certainly
should not have come as a great surprise
to many individuals in the Congress. Nor
would it have been impossible for other
Members, through study of the situation
there, to attain a general understanding
of how we have sought to promote our
interests.
On this matter the Executive has
reached certain conclusions based upon
its interpretation of information avail-
able to it and U.S. interests. We may
reach different conclusions at this point
in time. If we do, they should be based
noon our own best judgments on the
substantive issues involved in the An-
golan situation, not on any shallow at-
empt to argue the matter as a Congres-
ional Executive confrontation.
Third, contrary to what some have
rgued, I do' not believe that Angola is
unimportant to us. The plight of the An-
olan peoples should be of great concern
to our country. Angola is stategically
ocated close to important sea lanes. An-
g ola is richly endowed with natural re-
sources and will become one of the more
nportant countries of Africa in the
3 ears ahead. It is ludicrous to claim that
y-e have no interest in Angola's future
iti light of these factors; just as ludi-
crous, in fact, as the claim that our in-
t irests inevitably compel us to inter-
code further in the present conflict.
Finally, the Angolan conflict, while
mainly a war between competing groups
ii Angola, is not without its interna-
tonal implications. The relatively mas-
s we involvement of the Soviet Union and
Cuba in the conflict, the abhorrent pres-
f nce of South African forces in Angola,
end our own comparatively modest in-
% olvement to date have made the conflict
more than just a civil war. We obscure
hie complex nature of the problem by
eltegorizing it as such.
Having examined the Angolan ques-
ton with these considerations in mind,
I have concluded that long-term U.S.
i tterests will not be served by continued
c )vert support of any of the contend-
ing factions. No convicing case has
hos been made for such continued sup-
port under existing conditions. The far-
tons that we have helped cannot hope
attain effective control of Angola. Our
continued covert involvement serves to
h terease rather than decrease Soviet in-
fluence over elements that may come out
o the conflict in the strongest position.
Cur involvement runs counter to the ex-
p-essed desire of OAU countries for a
cessation of all foreign intervention in
ngola. Our present policies threaten to
cceate an association, at least in the
luinds of many Africans, of ourselves
with the South African forces who have
intervened in. Angola. Any such associa-
tion with a country whose government
continues to advocate racial separation is
anathema to most Americans and will ill
sorve our interests in Africa for years to
come. For these and other reasons, con-
tained U.S. covert support for any of the
fsctions in Angola is not the proper
course of action for the United States_
I am naturally concerned with the
illingness of the Soviet Union and its
c lent state, Cuba, to intervene in the
Angolan conflict. Such intervention. I
believe, is one indication that d?nte, as
wakticed by the Kremlin, could be used
; a cover for Soviet expansionism. While
o le must hope that such will not be the
case, it is impossible to ignore the con-
tradiction posed by the Soviet interven-
tion in Angola.
The Soviet Union may gain certain ad-
vintages if the faction it is supporting
wins uncontested control of Angola. One
such advantage would be Soviet access
to and possible control of certain port fa-
cilities in Angola. This would provide
SiOscow with an opportunity to project
a very strong naval presence in the South
Atlantic and along shipping lanes of
great importance to Western Europe and
the United States. Sovii t control of An-
golan resources would also be very dis-
turbing. Yet, I am firmly convinced that
such advantages, if they materialize, will
be shortlived. African states, whatever
their expressed ideologi ?s, will not long
tolerate dominance by any outside
power. They have struggled too long for
independence to forfeit it to the Soviet
Union or anyone else. Indeed, I venture
to predict that the Soviet Union will be
astonished at the depth of ingratitude
the MPLA will manifest a the aftermath
of the current struggle should it emerge
as the victor.
? The need now is for the United States
to fashion its policies so that it will be
in a position to provide any party that
ultimately gains control in Angola the
option to establish good relations with
our country. In doing so we will give an
Angolan regime the opportunity to avoid
dependence on the Soviet Union or some
other power. It is a proper objective of
U.S. foreign policy to provide such an
option. To be in a position to do so we
must indicate our willingness to abide
by the desire of the majority of African
states for nonintervention in Angola by
any outside power.
Mr. CASE. Mr_ Presid,,nt, I believe we
have come to a watershed in our rela-
tionship to black Africa If we approve
stepped up covert military assistance to
Angola today the America.n position in
black Africa will be damaged severely
and, increasingly, we will find ourselves
isolated on that continent.
While we were involved in helping one
of the factions in Angola as early as last
March, the first Presidential decisibn to
give some limited military aid came in
the middle of July. That was after at
least one other black African country
decided it had to resume military assist-
ance to the non-Soviet factions?the
FNLA and UNITA. It wa... at a time when
the People's Republic of China was back-
ing the non-Soviet factions in Angola.
At that time the President's decision
to provide limited militery aid was un-
derstandable. The Soviets were involved
with MPLA; the opposing factions in
Angola had the backing of several black
African countries and she Chinese.
Conditions have now changed dra-
matically. The Peoples Republic of
China has pulled out. A- the same time
the increasing presence c-f South African
soldiers has put the United States in an
unhappy position. The Soviets will be
quick to paint us an ally of white South
Africa, anathema to mos; black Africans,
In the hope of isolating us from black
Africa as a whole. On- supporters in
black Africa will fall by the wayside if
we fall into this trap.
The signs of deteriorahrin have already
set in. At the beginning of this week no
less than 15 African nations?two of
them Moslem Arab states?had decided
to recognize the Soviet-hacked MPLA as
the legitimate Government of Angola.
This increasing support. for the MPLA
will not be ignored by the Organization
of African Unity. So far the OAU has
remained neutral and has tried to bring
the warring factions in Angola together.
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The danger is that the OAU's policy will
change to support for the Soviet-backed
/VtPLA as African politics polarize on this
Issue.
At the early stage American support
for the FNLA and 17NITA was shielded
somewhat by the backing for those fac-
tions given by other black African coun-
tries. It is unclear how long other Afri-
can countries can afford politically to
continue their support if the United
States steps up its military aid.
To pursue the course we are on is
self-defeating in the context of African
politics. We cannot win in the long run.
Nor, can we win in the short run. Ac-
cording to the CIA, if the United States
Were able to give Soviet-style support?
and if we could provide military advisors
and pay for mercenaries to fight in An-
gola?then the FNLA and TJNITA might
have a chance to hang on. Because the
Soviets are likely to match us in the de-
livery of arm.s and the commitment of
foreign soldiers to the conflict, it is clear
that at best, we too, can only "hang on."
Now is the time to call a halt. The
termination of military aid is essential I
believe, if we want to preserve for our-
selves a meaningful role in black Africa
and to protect our long run strategic in-
terests in tile region. It is essential too
for the creation of conditions in which
the African nations can settle the prob-
lem and at the same time preserve their
Independence from outside domination.
AN ASSESSMENT OF CUBA'S INVOLVEMENT IN
ANGOLA?CASTRO'S CONSISTENT FOREIGN poucy
Mr. STONE. Mr. President, for the past
several days we have been debating a
course of action with regard to the cur-
rent situation in Angola. It is no secret
that Cuba has sent thousands of armed
soldiers to join combat for the Soviets in
Angola. Finally this body and the entire
weld is beginning to understand how
Fi-
del Castro operates and what he stands
for.
Our ()facial State Department position
of encouraging relations with Castro
seems to have been silenced. Perhaps
those who have been proponents of re-
laxed relations, who have called for uni-
lateral concessions to Castro, are now
beginning to realize what they would be
getting into.
The December 22, 1975, edition of U.S.
News & World Report contains an edi-
torial by Howard Fleiger entitled "Fidel's
Fidelity." It is an article which provides
a revealing analysis of Castro's tactics in
seeking our favors. It aptly points out
that Castro has not altered his policies.
that separated the United States and
Cuba 15 years ago and has never shown
a willingness to change these policies of
international subversion in return for
improved relations with us. It warns that
the only policy-changing to occur will be
submission on our part to Castro's game.
I ask unanimous consent that it be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
FIDEL'S FIDELTY
(By Howard Ffieger)
One thing you should not forget about
Fidel Castro: whatever else he may be, he is
Very consistent.
Cuba's latest Joint venture with the Soviet
Union of intervention in Angola re-empha-
sizes the point.
Those in the U.S. who have been in favor
of easing the American embargo and of en-
couraging renewed contacts between Wash-
ington and Havana would do well to keep this
fundamental fact in mind:
If any concessions are made. Castro expects
the United States to make them. He isn't
going to. He has made it perfectly clear from
the beginning that his system is untouchable
and there is to be no softening of his Govern-
ment's anti-U.S. foreign policy at any price.
In all fairness to Castro, he has never
promised to change his basic policies in re-
turn: for improved relations with the' U.S., or
even hinted at a willingness to do so.
Those in America who feel he might change
are indulging in wishful thinking. They get
no encouragement from Castro now. They
never have from the day he seized Cuba.
All one needs to do is look at the record.
Castro has never kept it secret.
During the 1960s, Communist Cuba backed
revolution throughout Latin America, and
its propagandists and agents encouraged
anti-Vietnam War demonstrations in the
U.S.
Young Americans were welcomed to Cuba?
in fact, invited in with all expe:ases paid?to
cut sugar cane and study Marxism.
When it became apparent during the early
1970s that revolutions in this 'Hemisphere
were not a fertile field for Communism, Cas-
tro shifted tactics. He did not shift goals.
Now he is interested in forming commodity
exporting associations among Latin American
nations as a type of economic warfare against
the United States. Cuba is a member of the
new Latin American Economic System com-
prising the countries of Latin America and
the Caribbean. The U.S. is not a member. As
a matter of fact, it was not asked to Join.
. Last August, it began to appear in Con-
gress and elsewhere that sentiment was on
the increase in this country to break the ice
with Castro and get the two Governments
on more accommodating terms. How did
Fidel Castro receive the news? By making it
emphatically clear that, come what may, he
had no intention of altering his anti-U.S.
ways.
The Cuban dictator reacted by holding a
conference in Havana on Puerto Rican inde-
pendence. He made One Of his typical
speeches on that occasion. He declared that,
if he were faced with a choice between a re-
sumption of Cuban-American relations or
backing Puerto Rican independence from the
U.S., he would choose the latter without
hesitation. It makes no difference to him that
only a relative handful of Puerto Ricans ac-
tively agitate for independence.
Now Castro has sent thousands of his sol-
diers into Angola inAfrica to join forces with
troops from the Soviet Union. These are not
mercenaries or soldiers of fortune. They are
Cuban army regulars.
As pointed out in a news story in this
magazine recently, the Angola force is only
one of the detachments of Cuban troops that
have been 'deployed in 10 countries?not to
act in Havana's interest but against the in-
terests of the United States, which opposes
armed intervention by outsiders in the af-
fairs of newly independent nations.
What it adds up to is this:
If the U.S. if willing to deal with a dic-
tator who has no intention of altering the
policies that separated Washington and Ha-
vana 15 years ago, then there is a possibility
of resumed contacts between the two.
" But nobody can say the signals from Ha-
vana are obscure. They couldn't be- clearer.
If relations improve, it will be the U.S. that
has changed?not Fidel Castro.
' Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, what
Is the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pend-
S 22785
ing question is on agreeing to the amend-
ment of the Senator from California
(Mr. TUNNEY) as amended by the amend-
ment of the Senator from New York (Mr.
JAvrrs) .
Mr. MANSFIELD. Are we prepared to
vote?
Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield briefly to the
Senator from New York.
Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I have
an amendment that I am prepared to
offer in due course, an amendment to
the amendment as amended.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment is not in order.
The question is on agreeing to the
amendment of the Senator from Cali-
fornia, as amended.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
wonder if I could get some indication
from the Senate as to whether or not it is
prepared at this time to vote on the
amendment of the Senator from Califor-
nia, as amended by the amendment of
the Senator from New York.
Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. McCLURE. I would hope we could
have some time for debate in open ses-
sion on this matter. I do not know that
Senators are ready to set a time limita-
tion on it.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the vote on the
pending question, that is, the Tunney
amendment as amended by the Javits
amendment, occur at 4 p.m. today.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I object.
The PRESIDING OrriCER. Objection
is heard.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I make the request
for 5 o'clock.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
Mr. GRIFFIN. I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection
Is heard.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I make the request
for 7 o'clock.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I object.
The PRESIDING OkleiCER. Objection
is heard.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I make the request
for 9 o'clock.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I object, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection
is heard.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Well, I better go
through all the way. I make the request
for 11 o'clock tonight.
Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Mr. Presi-
dent, I object. -
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objec-
tion is heard.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous
consent that the vote on the pending
amendment occur at the hour of 10
o'clock tomorrow morning.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I object
for the time being.
The PRESIDING 010FICER. Objec-
tion is heard.
Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, it is
very apparent that there is a filibuster
in progress against the Tunney amend-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE Deeembcp 18, 1915
ment as amended by the Javits amend -
ment. I hope that the Senate will be
a ware of the possibilities inherent there-
ill
We had held out a faint hope that we
could adjourn sine die tonight. That is
an impossibility.
We still have some hope that we will
be able to adjourn sine die tomorrow;
but if we do not, we can anticipate being
'm on Sunday; I hope not next week, but
perhaps. I hope that those who have had
to scrounge for airplane reservations
will not be too inconvenienced by what
has developed in the consideration of
this most important amendment. affect-
ing our participation in the affairs of
two of the three factions struggling for
control in Angola.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Tarr). Without objection, it Is so ordered.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that Bruce Thompson, of
my staff, be permitted the privilege of
the floor during the consideration of this
matter.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
/
MILK PRICE SUPPORT ADJIiIST-
MENTS?CONVERENCE REPQRT
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President. I
subknit a report of the co tee of
confeVence on Senate Joint ?talon
121, and ask for its immediate nsidera-
tion. ,
The VRESIDING WWI ER (Mr.
TAFT). The report will be stted by title.
The assiatant legislative lerk read as
follows:
The commite of conference on the dis-
agreeing votes pf the two,/ Houses on the
amendment of tie Senate to the bill (S .J.
Res. 121) to pr ide for fquarterly adjust-
ments in the sup ort p e of milk, having
met, after full a !re conference. hal,e
agreed to recommen ad do recommend to
their respective Ron thti report, signed
by all the conferees.
The PRESIDINci FFICER. Is there
objection to theSco deration of the
vonference report?
There being o object n, the Senate
proceeded to colisider the report.
I The confen ce report is rinted in the
Pause procee mgs of the R CORD of De-
(Tniber 12, 1q75, at page H12 9.)
Mr. HUMpHREY. Mr. Presirt. I am
gratified that the House has p -sed leg-
islation y sterday which I intioduced,
Senate J9lnt Resolution 121, by a 07-111
vote, de gned to help deal with kite of
tile mo /t pressing problems facing,our
Nation
this bill establishes the quarterly ad-
jusanent of the price support level for
milk, to assure dairy farmers that the
pri li ; assurance provided through the
dairy price support program will be more
nes rly attuned to the cost of milk pro-
dui tionakAs amended by the House of.
RearesentAtives, the support level for
milk woad be increased to 85 percent oi
p.iiity. t
'I he Senate has twice passed legisla-
tion embodykig these features?and by
sill stantial mlirgins--in the last year.
.1 or the past everal years, dairy farm-
ers have been cjight in one of the tight-
est cost-price sq eezes ever encountered.
Pr( duction costs iave skyrocketed but
ITWk prices have n kept pace.
in 1972. we pro ced almost 120 bil-
lion pounds of milk fi the United States,
I il at year the milk aupply was in very
cline balance with theademand for milk
a:a i dairy products. During late 1972 and
early 1973, prices for cilia and dairy
pa ducts began to rise serally. Unfor-
tunately, rather than rmit market
fones to operate so as t4 bring forth
tie additional production ieeded, the
administration ordered repe ed expan-
sin Is of dairy product impois for the
CX) ress purpose of depressing rices.
While these sections were not medi-
ately successful, the ultimate re,411t was
the accumulation of inventories oX dairy
preducts in this country and a decNne in
the farm price for milk of almost 2 per-
cert from March to July of 1974. ?
While dairy prices have recovered 'Xe-
cot tly, producers are still not meetiti,g
pacduction costs, and some of the lin '
p x vement has been due to reduced f
costs. And the outlook at this point, s
uneertain as to what will happen to feed
costs in the future.
in Minnesota, we have always 'been
proud of our dairy industry. In s ite of
cli
tin Flanigan report, I would nat Oncede
that our dairy farmers are less/efficient
thin producers in any other country.
But today that industry is threatened.
During the last 2 years, 5,009 Minnesota
dairy farmers quit. Right n*, the num-
ha of dairy farms in the state is at an
a:.1 time low. /
in the past, declining nOrnbers of dairy
hti niers and dairy cows as been made up
for by larger units ai higher produc-
tml per COIN.
We are not cert 1n how fast dairy
fat mers can respon,4 to the need for in-
cacased productior And we need to face
tin cold, hard fa? that despite the will-
ingness to put i 7-day weeks, 52 weeks
a !ear, the dal farmer just is not re-
eel ang enoug return to provide the liv-
ing needed fqt his family.
We all k r what inflation has done
to our econ my. On the farm it has been
en n shar. . Fertilizer, fuel, feed, equip-
ment, ta es, interest rates?every item
the pro cer faces has increased in cost
in he 1 st few years. In some cases, these
in( re es have been as much as 200 to
30t cent. Only recently have these
trends slowed down with the recession.
'she dairy farmer has witnessed the
*ion of his investment. In August
1973, the average dairy cow in Minne-
sota was worth $590. The total value of
the State's milk cow inventory was
$537.7 million. Two years later, the' aver-
age dairy cow in Minnesota Os only
worth $355 and the value of the State's
dairy herd had eroded to $310,e million.
Faced with this situation, 'the dairy
farmer has had little alternative. He has
been forced to cut back. For some, this
has taken the form of culling herds more
closely. For others it has meant reduc-
tions in rates of feedinas For all too
many others, the choice has been to leave
the business entirely. a
As this has been ddne, we have seen
milk production fall. (Prom the balanced
situation we saw in/1972. when produc-
tion was almost 120 billion pounds, we
saw it drop to 1,15.4 billion pounds in
1973; 1974 produCtion was almost identi-
cal with the 1973 level.
While milk production has gone up by
1.9 percent irif November over the same
month in 1974, total production for the
first 11 months of 1975 was down 0.1
percent over the same period last year.
November milk production in Minne-
sota wasfa modest 1 million gallon in-
crease Wer the previous month, but was
3.2 minion gallons or 6 percent lower
than ihr November 1974.
Minnesota's milk production for the
firstill months of 1975 was 706.9 million
gallons which is down 35.4 million gal-
loiis or 5 percent below the same period
lest year.
Unfortunately, the Department of
Agriculture has again resorted to scare
tactics as to what this bill might cost
consumers. They claim that this bill
could lead to price increases of 3 cents per
alf gallon of milk, 7 cents per pound of
utter. and 43 cents aer pound of
c eese.
at we have learned to discount the
U A cost estimates. Ana we also know
that educedmilk prices paid to farmers
resul in little benefit to our consumers.
In karly 1974, prices paid to dairy
farmer declined by almost 25 percent,
but ther was almost no change whatso-
ever in p ces paid for milk at the super-
market.
Our urbdt consumers have seen that
the Nixon- rd-Butz roller coaster farm
prices do no serve their interests. It is
far better to'assure farmers a reliable
income so that they at least have the
opportunity to iake a fair income.
This bill woul not result in any pur-
chases at present nce market prices are
well above the 85- ercent support level.
And while some p chases may be re-
quired during the spr1g flash period, this
is a small price to maiptamn some stabil-
ity and keep our produ s in business.
I would like to shath the projections
prepared by the Nation Producers
Federation which indicate two things;
First, a support level of 5 percent is
needed to induce enough toduction In
'meet our needs; and second, Iie Govern-
ment cost of these prolira1s will be
minimal. \
The following is the production-con-
sumption data on which this conclusion
Is based:
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In billions of pounds
Estimated
1974
\ actual
1975
projected
1976
1977
Production
ti. 4
115. 0
116.0
117.0
Imports
3.9
1.4
1.7
1.7
Beginning inventory
5.
5.8
3.7
3.0
Total supply_
123. 5\
122. 2
121.4
121.7
Ending inventory
5.8
. 3.7
3.0
3.4
Total use.. _ _ _ .
117.7
118.4
118.3
Export;
I. 2
1.0
1.0
Fed to calves__
1. 6
1.3
1.2

Military
I. 1
1.
1. 1
1. 1
Civiliat use
113.8
115.
115.0
115.0
The assumptions on which t ese pro-
jections and estimates are made ti,re rea-
sonable and conservative. ImpoI are
projected at the norm which has -pre-
vailed for several years, somewhat higher
than those for 1975. The "fed to calv
figure is declining, because there a
fewer cows-and calves-on farms.
Civilian use, which has shown an in-
crease in recent years, is projected as
stabilizing with the slight per capita de-
cline in consumption offset by the in-
creased population total.
There have been extensive hearings on
this bill both in the House and the Sen-
ate which have detailed the problems of
dairying and particularly the ever in-
creasing production costs.
The consensus of the recently held field
hearings by the House Agriculture Com-
mittee supported the two provisions of
this bill as being essential to restore
stability in dairY production and reverse
the present trends which could lead to
shortages in dairy products.
For our Nation's best long-term in-
terests, imports are not the answer. In-
stead, the answer is to encourage our
dairly farmers to maintain a production
sufficient to meet our needs.
Even at 85 percent of parity, these
figures paint a grim picture which I hope
proves to be too conservative. It shows
that in the current year and in 1976 we
will be using more dairy products than
are available to us through production
and imports. Because dairying requires
several years to redevelop production,
these figures show that setting supports
at 85 percent of parity now will barely
correct this situation by 1977.
That is why, if we are to maintain ade-
quate dairy supplies, it is necessary for
us to make this adjustment now-to give
dairy farmers assurances through an 85
percent of parity support level that it
will pay them to stay in dairying and
to produce our needed dairy supplies.
The longer we wait, the longer it will
take for this situation to correct itself.
Mr. President, as originally passed by
the Senate, the joint resolution provide
that-effective for the period beginnin
on the date of enactment and ending n
March 31, 1979-the Secretary of A? 1-
culture would be required to adjust p-
ward the support price of manufac o? ring
milk at the beginning of each qua ter to
reflect any estimated increase du ng the
immediately preceding calarter the in-
dex of prices paid by farmers fi produc-
tion items, interest, taxes, and arm wage
rates.
As passed by the House, the resolution
provided that the date for the termina-
tion of the quarterly adjustment would
be March 31, 1978, instead of March 31,
1979, in order that this legislation would
again be considered when new farm
legislation involving other major com-
modities is considered.
The House also added an amendment
which required that the support price for
milk be established at 85 per centum of
the parity price therefor.
The Senate conferees were readily
agreeable to the termination date change
and found the House persuasive in re-
spect to the 85 per centum support price
for milk. As a result, the Senate receded
to both amendments.
Mr. PRESIDENT. There has been some
controversy regarding the cost of the
conference report on Senate Joint Reso-
lution 121.
As usual, the Department of Agricul-
ture has estimated a cost figure which
I feel is unjustified.
As a result, I had a cost estimate pre-
\vared.
That cost figure is substantially less
th'n their as determined by the Depart-
me t.
Ba ed on an assumed production of 11B
net
75-76
ng the
d $44.2
pro-
billion pounds of milk in 1976-77, a
117 bill n pounds in 1977-78, and ci
ian cons ption estimated at 115 b ion
pounds in ach marketing year, t
increases costs above the 1
costs amoun to $27.9 million du
e new program
econd year of/the
first year of t
million in the
gram.
Mr. President,
sent that these co
made a part of the
ask una
t dete
COR
There being no ob
rial was ordered to b
RECORD, as follows:
mous con-
[nations be
at this point.
c on, the mate-
? printed in the
1975-
Milk production (billion noun
CCC purchases:
Nonfat dry milk (netre
million pounds)
Additional milk utterfat
and nonfat soli ; billion
pounds)
ovals;
1976-77 1977-78
115 116 117
330 330
0 0 0
CCC cost, 85 perce parity with
quarterly adjust ent(millions):
Nonfat dry $200. II $220.1 $231.
Butter and heese for pro-
gram u 63.0 70.8 75. 6
Is
Total 263.0
Use for Go rnment distribution
at cost Mons) 103.6
t price support cost
(millions)
lucre e in CCC cost from 1975-76
( lions)
Inc ase in CCC cost less cost for
overnment distribution
290.5 307.2
114.2 121.3
159. 4
176.7 185.9
27.9 44.2
17.3. 26.5
The National Milk Producers Federation
contends that increased population and need
to rebuild commercial stocks will require 1
billion pounds additional milk for 1976-77
and another 1 billion pounds for 1977-78.
It is assumed that CCC will purchase the
same amount of nonfat dry milk for winch
no butterfat purchases will be made for each
year.
Government program use will not be less
than for the 1975-76 marketing year.
Program costs estimates based on USDA
projections of price support levels at as%
parity with quarterly adjustment.
Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, Senate
Joint Resolution 121, which involves the
milk price support program is a good
example of legislation ihich creates
great trouble for the budget. It was just
last week that Congress fixed budget
ceilings-ceilings which totaled $408 bil-
lion in budget authority, $374.9 billion in
outlays resulting in O' deficit of $74.1 bil-
lion. Most of us did not like that deficit
of $74.1 billion buy we recognized that it
was the product Of current law and cur-
rent economic alnditions. So, by an over-
whelming Senae vote of 69 to 23, we
approved this/budget. Now, only a week
later, we are/ faced with a piece of pro-
posed legislation which would add to
that huge deficit of $74.1 billion.
The budget we approved such a short
time ago/ included in function 350-the
agricultbre function-total budget au-
thorityl of $4.1 billion and outlays of $2.6
billioh. Existing programs based either
on 9laactment this session or in prior
yes-including the existing milk price
s port level of 80 percent parity-cause
tie totals in this function of the budget
to reach the ceilings. We have no room
fin this function for increased Govern-
ment support levels.
Yet, Senate Joint Resolution 121 would
ask us to increase the milk support price
level from 80 to 85 percent of parity.
The actual cost to the budget of this
change in support price will depend on
future market prices and thus we are
forced to use historical patterns and fu-
ture expectations regarding market
prices; nevertheless, according to the
latest USDA estimates, the budget cost
of the changes will approximate $90 mil-
lion for fiscal year 1976, 05 million for
the transition quarter, $290 million for
fiscal year 1977, and $120 million for fis-
cal year 1978.
These numbers total $535 million-ex-
tra dollars to be spent over the level to
be spent if the price support level is left
at 80 percent. And these extra dollars are
dollars we do not have-they will breach
the targets set in the agriculture func-
tion. This resolution itself is not subject
to a point of order but it will break the
agriculture budget and the increased cost
of milk support prices will simply crowd
out of, the budget something else which
was anticipated. This crowding out will
possibly occur next spring and it might
involve agriculture or it could involve
me totally unrelated Item.
upport price payment items are no
11 part of the agriculture budget. In
the agriculture budget targets set
ring had to
be moved up by $583
this fall due to increased com-
ayments. Such payments are
he so-called "uncontrollable
entitlement programs" which
cussed on this floor so many
. These are the programs
toniatic expenditures to
eel
the qualifications
law. By expanding
grams or expanding
ng programs, we are
insuring that more more of the budg-
et will be "uncontrollable," and less and
less of the budget will be available in
future years to meet the priorities
deemed most important at that time.
I urge my colleagues to return this
resolution to conference so that the sup-
port level can be put at 80 percent of
parity, a level which the marketplace is
sm
fact,
last
millio
modity
part of
mandator
have been
times this ye
which create
anyone who
'mandated by
these kinds of p
benefit levels in exis
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE Deco;
uses o and a level which our budget,,yin
affol
Mr. MPHREY. Mr. Presnt, I
move tha e Senate agree t e con-
ference repo
The PRESI I NG OFFICjidt. The ques-
tion is on agree to motion of the
Senator from Min
The motion was a eed to.
Mr. HUMPHR r. President, I
move to reconsiner the v by which the
motion was agreed to.
Mr. KENVEDY. I move to t.y that mo-
tion on the' table.
The ,p1otion to lay on the ta e was
agreed to. s?
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AP-
PROPRIATIONS FISCAL YEAR 1976
The Senate continued with considera-
tion of amendment in disagreement No.
75 to H.R. 9861, an act making appro-
priations for the Department of Defense
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976,
and for the period beginning July 1. 1976,
and ending September 30, 1976, and for
other purposes.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that Mr. Schneider
and Mr. Bates be permitted the privilege
of the floor during the consideration of
the Tunney amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER With/lit
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President. I ask
unanimous consent that Bob Jerome, of
my staff, be permitted the privilege of
the floor during the debate and vote on
this subject.
The PRESIDING OFFICER Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The question is on agreeing to the
amendment.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I slig-
gest the absence of a quorum. -
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, the
majority leader has indicated that, in
his judgment, a filibuster has been ini-
tiated. I do not know whether a. filibus-
ter will be maintained or not, but I think
that some serious questions should be
asked and answered in open session.
We have had the opportunity to dis-
cuss some of the issues in closed session:
and I shared the opinion yesterday in our
closed session that we spent far too much
of the time in the closed session talking
about things that were not directly per-
tinent to the question of aid to Angola.
This morning, we were able to confine
the discussion to the question of Angola,
but we oftentimes had comments that
were not pertinent to classified informa-
tion but were general discussion matters
relative to a policy decision on our for-
eign policy in support of an element
struggling in Angola.
It was my feeling then, and it is my
feeling now, that the public is entitled
to have a clear and public expression of
Members of this body of their concerns
and their view of the issues that are at
stake with respect to U.S. policy. I think
we need to do that on the record. We
need to do it out in front of the public.
That will be my purpose now?to try to
raise some of the .questions now that
nere raised hi the closed session.
Let me say, parenthetically, that after
saving spent 3 hours yesterday and 2
lours plus today in closed session, seek-
ng to determine what classified or secret
nformation was available to us that
.ears on this subject, I have to conclude
-hat the decisions being reached are be-
ug reached on the basis of matters that.
.,Iready have been almost fully reported
the press and that there is very little
:hat bears upon our decision that has
iot been reported fully in the press al-
eady. I do not, know whether that is a
latter of comfort to the people of this
euntry or whether that is a matter that
light shock them.
I had hoped that we would discover in
le closed sessions some factual Infos-
lotion concerning our policy and the
4mifieations and the aims of our policy
nit was not already reported. I had
_loped that we would find in the closed
ssssions some information that deals
ith or bears upon thennotives, the as-
irations, the involvement, and the goals
? the Soviet Union in their involvement
Angola. I find that, again, all or vir-
t, ially all of the information available to
Lie Senate in making our decision has
a ready been discussed fully in the public
p ass.
I had hoped that we would find out
nmething in the secret sessions about
the involvement of South Africa in the
? ruggie that is now going on in Angola,
Yet, the discussions that we have had in
? ese closed sessions indicate to me that
e Senate has no information and that
information can be made available
so the Senate in regard to the involve-
ment of South Africa in the ongoing
e?ent in Angola, save those things which
al seady have been discussed in public
pi int.
I make that statement as a hack-
inniund, simply so that no one will be
in sled as to the reason why I asked at
the time for the closed sessions. Not
? ng on any of the committees which
re -Oval these briefings or this informa -
ti in as a matter of course, I had hoped
to be informed by Members of the Seri-
? , who are thus privy to the infortna-
t presented to them in those closed
sessions, and I had hoped that I might
be better informed and better able to
mike a decision with regard to our
policy.
Slaving said that, let us look at what
? policy decisions might be. Let us
tal:e a look at where we are, and let us
determine, if we can, the effect of the
Tenney amendment upon our involve-
mint in Angola or, as a matter of fact,
up/n the general flow of our foreign pol-
icy. I think it is fair to state, from all
tin information---at least it is my son-
elusion from the information?that we
din not start it; that, as Portugal
gr sited independence to the native peo -
pki in Angola and withdrew that rem-
nant of colonial rule in Africa, there
Jo- 18, 1975
emerged within Argo) t three different
groups, each of whom was seeking to
control the flow of government after in
was granted to them.
I think it is also fair to state that the
record will indicate that each of these
three movements has some popular sup-
port, and that we have responded to the
flow by joining others :n support of two
of three factions and, in effect, in so
doing, against the third of the three fac-
tions, that faction being backed by the
Soviet Union and supported, also, by
some outside elements.
Those who argue that we should not
be involved have poinsed out that we
should not be involved because the So-
viet-backed element is the strongest.
most well organized, ant most dedicated,
and therefore the most likely to win of
the three elements involved; and, con-
versely, that we should not be involved
in backing the two elements with whom
we have chosen to affiliate our efforts be-
cause, being less strongly motivated and
less dedicated and presumably weaker.
they are bound to lose.
I asked one of the Members who had
indicated that we ought not to continue
our effort because it is bound to lose.
and some of us who had said it makes
no difference to the Untied States which
one of the factions wins, that then it
would seem to me obvious we ought to
join the Soviet. Union in backing the one
element that is going to win because
then we would be on the side of the win-
ner, and it does not matter who wins.
If that is the kind of logic that impels
us to a decision, I am distressed for the
policy of this country and, incidentally,
when I made that suggestion the people
who said we ought not back losers be-
cause they are losers, said, "Well, but
that is not the reason."
I simply suggested that certainly they
must think we were joining the other
side simply because the Soviet Union was
involved on one side and we automati-
cally took the other, end that seemed to
me to be a very unwise oolicy, and the
kind of a kneejerk reaction that does not
bear upon the logical snalysis of the
situation that there are choices.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. McCLURE. I would be happy to
yield without losing my right to the floor.
Mr. DOMENICI. My reason for inter-
rupting the Senator from Idaho is that
I have to leave the floor for a moment
and I wanted to ask the Senator one
question before 'left.
Based upon everything you have heard,
would you agree that if we adopt the
Tunney amendment that. we are effect-
ing a major change in American foreign
policy by adopting such an amendment?
Mr. McCLURE. I would say to the
Senator from New Mexico I agree with
him, although there are some people who
support the Tunney amendment who are
trying to persuade us that it is neutral
in regard to the future course of Ameri-
can foreign policy. -
I cannot view, it as such, and I do not
think the rest of the world would view
it as such.
Mr. DOMENICI. I would say to the
Senator that I am sure if we spend
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December 18, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 22789
little time on the floor in open discussion
and if we had expressions from both sides
to supplement what was said in the se-
cret sessions, then the public can judge
as to whether we are changing America's
foreign policy or not.
Let me ask the Senator one further
question. It is my understanding, based
upon everything we have heard to this
point in time, that there have been no
discussions, private or otherwise, Senate
committees involved or the Senate lead-
ership with the President of the United
States. Does the Senator understand that
to be the state of the facts?
Mr. McCLURE. I understand it.
Mr. DOMENICI. I would also ask
whether or not there have been discus-
sions directly with the 'secretary of
State on this issue prior to the presenta-
tion of the Tunney amendment.
Mr. McCLURE. I would_ say from all
the discussions we have had for the last
2 days on the floor and from some rather
detailed inquiry of the proponents of the
amendment and those who are deeply
involved in the appropriate committees
In the development of policy, that they
never presented any evidence of any
statement by the President of the United
States, that there was no hint that the
Secretary of State of the United States
made any statement to them nor had
they sought that information from the
Secretary of State.
Mr. DOMENICI. In all fairness, it is
true a number of committees have in-
quired of various CIA officials and
various State Department officials. How-
ever, my specific question is: To this
point in time has there been any direct
communication with the President of the
United ,States, or with the Secretary of
State, in reference to the effect of this
amendment on the foreign policy of the
United States?
Mr. MoCLURE. I would have to say
to the Senator there is no evidence of
any such direct contact or direct input
into the deliberations.
I think, in fairness, however, we should
Indicate that there are people within the
CIA and within the State Department,
Including Assistant Secretaries of State,
who have made such statements and, I
assume, the proponents would urge that
the Positions articulated by these men
are imputed both to the Secretary of
State or the President. But there was no
direct statement by the 'President, no
direct statement or involvement in the
statements by the Secretary of State.
Mr. DO1VIENICI. I say this to the dis-
tinguished Senator, from Idaho and to
my Senate colleagues because I am not
one who usually participates in lengthy
dialogs on the floor of the Senate. I
am one who has said the Senate ought
to be more intoIved in foreign policy, and
I am one who has said the American
people ought to be more informed on
what we are doing.
It does appear to me if those who pro-
pose this amendment thought that it was
a rather insignificant act, that there
was another option that would still be
open. That, as a matter of fact, we ought
not to get in on the ground floor of a
budding Vietnam. That in reality, with
the Russian massive buildup in Angola,
and with Cuban mercenaries approach-
ing between 3,000 and 5,000 :in number
already there, that what the world per-
ceives and what the Soviet Union per-
ceives to be the existing American pol-
icy may very well have seemed to change
to then as a result of this particular
amendment, whether or not the admin-
istration has another option yet to come
down the line in a few weeks. That this
amendment can be perceived as a major
change in American foreign policy with
reference to that part of the world and
the activities of the Soviet Union.
I say that because it appears to me if
that is the case, then regardless of what
we think we are doing in terms of tech-
nical changes in the way we fund this
kind of activity, it May indeed be per-
ceived as far more than that and may,
indeed, be far more than that because
perception may be reality in foreign
affairs.
Mr. McCLURE. May I say to the Sen-
ator from New Mexico that he has put his
finger on the problem, the crux of the
problem, that confronts many of us.
In spite of the urging of some who
support the Tunney amendment, who
say it merely leaves our options open
or, putting it in another way, it gives
the Congress of the United States an
opportunity to express its will prior to
the adoption of a foreign policy, that it is
not going to be perceived that way by
other people in the world who see that we
do now have, as a matter of fact, a policy
in Angola which will be, as a matter
of fact, changed by the adoption of this
amendment. I think the Senator from
New Mexico is exactly correct.
Mr. DOMENICI. Just one last com-
ment. I appreciate the Senator giving
me this opportunity while he has the
floor.
It appears to me that the issue that we
are discussing is so intimately tied into
the major issue of d?nte and our re-
lationships with the Soviet Union that
they cannot be separated. We do not
purport in this amendment to be ad-
dressing the relationships with the Soviet
Union as they exist today under the
guise of d?nte. It appears to me that
the long-term solution to the Soviet
Union involvement in Angola and an
ever-escalating effort on their part to
take over that part of the world is ul-
timately going to be tied to d?nte.
Does America, indeed, change its pol-
icies with reference to d?nte and the
Soviet Union or not? Is this the time that
we should? If it is not, are we ever going
to?
Are the economics between the Soviet
Union and America, including the sale
of technology, trade relationships, cul-
tural exchanges, SALT II, and all those
kinds of negotiations?could they not
be the leveraging mechanism for just
this kind of activity? And are we not
throwing that leverage out the window
when we completely change our policy on
this one without exercising that kind of
leverage?
? That is what concerns me. l think that
is clearly a prerogative of the executive.
It ought to be explored with the execu-
tive. In fact, I believe that a sense of the
Senate proposition telling the executive
that we want him to exercise whatever
leverage there is in that relationship, to
make it clear that we do not want the
Russians nor American equipment, nor
other foreign powers, in that part of the
world, would be a proper role for the
Senate. Such a sense of the Senate res-
olution could say that we want to ex-
plore this kind of use of American lever-
age since neither the Russians nor Amer-
icans can win in Angola. Maybe they will
all get out if indeed we exercise the type
of maximum leverage that is unrelated
to sending materials into Angola.
I leave with that and thank the Sena-
tor from Idaho for yielding. -
Mr. McCLURE. I thank the Senator
from New Mexico for making that state-
ment, because it focuses on something
I should have said at the outset that
motivates the Senator from Idaho. That
is that I wish the people of Angola were
free to make their own decision about
their own destiny without the outside
interference of anyone. I do not want
to see the United States interfering in
their internal affairs. I do not want to
see the South Africans or Soviets inter-
fering in their affairs. I would prefer
that the neighboring African states did
not interfere in the internal affairs of
Angola. I would prefer that these people
be allowed to work out their own destiny
in their own way, without the interfer-
ence of anyone.
The fact of the matter is that other
forces are involved, that the United
States has responded, over a period of
time, in a way which is perceived in the
world, partly as a result of the discus-
sions here in the Senate of the United
States, as a direct involvement and that
we cannot subtract that without signal-
ing to the world that the Senate of the
United States has directed a change in
foreign policy of the United States.
I think the Senator from New Mexico
Is exactly correct. -
Mr. DOMENICI. Just one final com-
ment. I think that certainly, the Sena-
tor from Idaho and others will discuss
the pros and cons of the actual strategic
value of this piece of the world to the
United States. There will be a very seri-
ous split of opinion as to whether it is
valuable or is not. I wish to make it clear
that to this point, I have not been talk-
ing about the fact that the Soviet Union
may very well be changing its policy with
reference to the direct intervention in
another major country and, perhaps, in
another major continent. That, in and
of itself, becomes a matter of grave na-
tional concern to America. If that is a
change in policy or an elaboration or an
extension of a policy, then we have to
look at it in terms of what options are
available to us to make sure that it does
not reach its final fruition or goal with-
out any limitation placed upon it.
It is my opinion that the Tunney
amendment sets no limit on the Russian
policy and does not perceive its potential
as a kind of openended change in Soviet
policy with massive support and mer-
cenaries taking over another country. It
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE December 18, 1975
is in that context that I have discussed
it with the Senator to this point.
Mr. McCLURE. I say to the Senator
from New Mexico, in response to that
question, that I agree with his statement
iind I agree with the implications that
will be read into actions by the Senate.
That is one of the dilemmas that I think
we face. When we discover a policy,
whether we agree with it or not, we can-
not directly move to stop that applica-
tion of that policy without that, in itself,
being a policy. We have never had the
opportunity to adopt a policy. We in the
Senate of the United States or in the
Congress of the United States have not,
until this time, congressionally adopted
a policy or articulated a policy for the
United States to follow with regard to
Angola. That is a tragedy.
Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Senator.
Mr. McCLURE. I agree with some of
iny friends, the Senator from New York
+ Mr. Jams), the Senator from New Jer-
sey (Mr. Can), the Senator from Min-
nesota (Mr. HUMPHREY). They have all
most eloquently stated the need for Con-
gress to be involved in the application of
foreign policy, particularly with respect
to what we may or may not be doing in
Angola, now or in the future. But I wish
that we had been involved in the develop-
ment of the policy. I hope that we will be
involved in the development of the pol-
icy. But I do not think we can, in this
context, adopt an amendment without
that, in itself, being the adoption of a
policy.
The Senators, some of whom 1 have
mentioned, and others, have said this is
too serious a matter to be decided by the
Senate of the United States without any
extended debate and without some hear-
ings and without some very serious con-
sideration of the implications of the pol-
icy. Yet, they would have us adopt the
amendment which, in itself, is an adop-
tion of a policy.
Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a moment?
Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I shall
yield to the Senator from New York if
I may yield without losing my right to
the floor, without the resumption being
considered a second speech.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCLURE. I yield.
Mr BUCKLEY. Mr. President. I thank
my friend from Idaho. I should like to
dispose of some pending business.
EXECU IVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE
Mr. BU EY. I call from th desk
H.R. 11184'end ask for its inunediate
consideration\
The PRESI
will be stated.
G OFFI R The bill
The assistant le slat'4 clerk read as
follows
A bill (H.R. 11184) t end title 3, United
States Code, to pro de or foreign diplo-
matic missions, to nereas the size of the
Executive Protect e Servic and for other
purposes.
The PRE
objection t
of the bil
DING OFFIC Is there
the immediate co ideratioxy
1)!It. CRANSTON. Reserving the right
0 Opiect, will the Senator explain the
requevst?
MraI3UCKLEY. This is similar to leg-
islation that was adopted by the Con-
gress 2onths ago, but which the Pres-
tient ve ed.
It had leen adopted in both Houses by
s very sulistantial majority. Since the
veto we ha Vte negotiated a tighter bill. It
provides f (vi reimbursement under spe-
cial circumst ces, controlled by the Sec-
retary of the reasury, for any extraor-
dinary expense incurred in the protec-
iaon of foreign ilomats coming to this
Country.
Mr. CRANSTON. Has action been
cleared by Senator Randolph?
Mr. BUCKINY.ik has been cleared.
In fact, an identical '11 was reported out
by the Public Works committee yester-
day. In addition, the 'chairman of the
subcommittee (Mr. MH,RGAN) has au-
t iorized me to go ahead 'and call up this
matter at this time. \
Mr. CRANSTON. I have' no objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the Senate will inoceed to its
immediate consideration. ?+
Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, as I
Love stated, I introduced a coinpanion
bill, S. 2796, on Tuesday. The Coiprnittee
on Public Works, yesterday, considered
i.? iie bill and reported it by unanimous
vote to the Senate.
s
Mr. President, I ask unanimous eon-
sant to have printed in the Rum)), an
e+(cerpt from the report (No. 94-573),
e4plaining the purposes of the measurk
There being no objection, the exce
as ordered to be printed in the RECO ,
follows:
PURPOSE
The purpose of S.2796, as reported, le to
increase by 350 the authorized nux6er of
Executive Protective Service officers nd to
rect the Service to provide, mid certain
mditions for extraordinary protec ve needs
ris foreign missions in cities where 0 or more
snob facilities exist. The Executiv Protective
Ssrvice would be authorized an encouraged
to delegate this special p ive service,
under limited circumstances, local police
is licials in those cities outse Washington,
E Cs with reimbursement.
BACKGROUND AND NEED E'OR LEGISLATION
Public Law 91-217 eh ged the name of
the White House Police tb the Executive Pro-
itsctive Service and exp ided its responsibill-
'ries to include the regflar protection of for-
e en embassies in th ashington, D.C., area
aid diplomatic mis ons outside Washington
a , the President direct on a case-by-case
b Isis. The author ed strength of the Service
'A as set at 850 o ers. Public Law 91-217 was
written in recto ition of the nation's obli-
gations under titernationai law and practice
te take all re sonable precautions in assur-
itg the safet of foreign diplomatic missions
aid their pe sonnet. The Executive Protective
!.i3 trvice als 2retained its responsibility to pro-
hoti the ildings and grounds of the White
Douse a Executive Office Buildings.
Since 1970, however, incidents of political
ttrrorIln have increased, along with the de-
nand?for protective s:ervices. A strong na-
tion interest exists in assuring the safety
eign officials visiting the United States,
er those visits are to Washington, D.C.,
of other areas of the United States. Develop-
ictents since the passage of P.L. 91-217 dent-
itistrate the need for protective services
wherever a substantial number of foreign
missions exist. As this need has increased?
a: Id it could increase still further?local corn-
/
mitnities should no longer be forced to bear
the full cost of what is essentially a national
obligation.
This in no way affects the day-t6-day
protection of foreign diplomatic missions,
which remains the responsibility of local
police departments outside Washington,
D.C. But h 2796 recognises that there are
instances of extraordinary protedtive need
when Federal assistance is wise Enid Justified.
This legislation facilitates suclif assistance.
The validity of this assistance can be
shown by the fact that the ptrmanent and
observer missions associateil With the Unt Sed
Nations pay no property of other taxes or
payments in lieu of taxes under Article 23
of the Vienna Convention and the Conven-
tion on the United Natimes. Nor do those em-
ployees of the United Nations who are aliens
pay local income taxes jib help offset any costs
that their presence iiti the city imposes on
rps
local government, out 4.000 of the 5,000
United Nations em oyees ^stationed in New
York City are fo ign nationals and thus
exempt from sit, local taxes. To a lesser
extent, a similar/burden is carried by many
cities.
PROVIiIONS OP LEGISLATION
xe
In additioro raising the personnel reil-
ing of the cutive Protective Service to
1200 officers from 850 officers, S. 2796 directs
the Secretitry of the Treasury to provide uni-
formed ppice protection el foreign missions
Ira caseseof extraordinary protective need in
cities where 20 or more such IIIISSIOriS are lo-
cated.i, ' The following cities, according to
Stat Department figures, have 20 or more
foreign consular offices: Chicago, Houston,
LctifAngelee, Miami, New Orleans, New York
C y, and San Francisco.
/To provide this protectien, the Secretary
fust also find that the protective need was
associated with the visit by a dignitary who,
at some point during his visit to the United
States, participated In the activities of an in-
ternational organization of which the United
States is a member, such as the United Na-
\tions. Or the Secretary must find that the
firotective need will occur at or outside either
a \permanent mission to such an interne-
tianal organization or an observer mission
thiiit has been invited to participate in the
worlt, of such an organization. Permanent
missinns are maintained by member states.
e
Obser r missions may be maintained by or-
c\t1
ganiza ons such as the government of
Switzerl nd or the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganizatio .
The au ority for such protection is ex-
tended in 'the case of the cities with 20 or
more missiOns to those places where the
visiting dignitary may be staying, not sim-
ply the officielt mission site. Representatives
of foreign govktiments and others who may
create a situati n leading so protection un-
)xt.
der this bill gene ally reside at a hotel, rather
than at what in lit be defined under the
strictest interpre ion as a foreign mission.
when visiting outsill\evWasbington, D.C.
This was the case urine the visit to New
York City in Novemb r 1974 of Yasir Arafat.
\it
the leader of the Pale tine Liberation Orga-
nization. The extraor _nary protection for
of New York City in ex RS of $700,000. To
that one-day Arafat vis cost the taxpayers
assure equitable treatment in such situa-
tions, this legislation covers the extraordi-
nary protective needs provkled at hotels or
other facilities utilized by te visitor.
This bill offers two wispiest, es to the ac-
tual extension of protection. he Secretary
may dispatch the necessary co element of
EPS officers from Washing ton. ut S. 2796
provides the Secretary with ne flexibility
to utilize the services, personnel, e uipment.
and facilities of State and local goy nments.
with their consent and on a reim urssible
basis, to meet such extraordinary pr ective
needs. '
Following any decision that an extra rdi-
nary protective need exists under the tSms
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December 18, Aroved Fo
Th northwest quarter of the south est
quarte of section 3, township 15 north, ange
4 east, Lse meridian, Valley County, daho.
SEC. 2. he conveyance authorize by the
first sectio of this Act shall be de upon
payment b. Valley County, Ida to the
Secretary of e Interior of an a ount equal
to the fair m aket value of h land, as
determined by e Secretary ter appraisal.
APPOINTME
CONFER
DITIONAL
S. 2718
Mr. MANSFIELD r. President, on
behalf of the Sen or rem Washington
(Mr. MAGNUSON) , ask nanimous con-
sent that the S ator fro Kansas (Mr.
PEARSON) be n ed as an a ditional con-
feree on the art of the nate on S.
2718.
The PR v,IDING OFFICER Without
objection, t is so ordered.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPRO-
PRIATIONS, FISCAL 'YEAR 1976
StM2SNMADIR:Er?161tWe7gPAIMR000400100018-1 S 22793
The Senate continued with the consid-
eration Of amendment in disagreement
No. 75 to H.R. 9861, an act making ap-
propriations for the Department of De-
fen3e for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1976, and for the period beginning July 1,
1976, and ending September 30, 1976,
and for other purposes.
Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Will the
Senator yield?
Mr. McCLURE. I am happy to yield to
the Senator from Virginia for a question.
Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Mr. Presi-
der t, I appreciate the Senator's yielding
and compliment him on the statements
he has made about the amendment that
has been proposed by the Senator from
Cal if ornia.
The Senator commenced his remarks
by reference to the majority leader's
con iments about a filibuster on this
amendment.
I was one who objected to a vote at a
definite time, but the reason for my ob-
jection was that it was 10 o'clock in the
evening and I do not think that is the
time to vote on such matters.
I am ready to vote right now, so I am
not participating in a filibuster in any
way.
In fact, I may vote in favor of the
Tunney amendment. I am inclined to do
that. I do have a concern.
Perhaps the distinguished Senator
from Idaho may be in possession of in-
formation that I do not have. I, like him,
did not receive a great deal of enlighten-
ment during the closed session of the
Senate, either yesterday or today.
Mr. McCLURE. Might I say to the
Senator parenthetically at that point, I
believe we had some good debate in the
closed session today, but the debate was
not really bearing upon matters that
were classified or secret and that could
not have been debated in full public view.
Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. I agree with
the Senator. That, in effect, is my
thought also. I am interested in what
the administration and what the De-
partment of State may or may not have
done in this situation that might relate
to this concept of d?nte, and whether
or not we can compartmentalize d?nte;
whether we can say, "We will sign agree-
ments with you and we would like to get
your signature on almost any agreement.
We feel we have accomplished something
because you signed a piece of paper."
Then be friends with the Soviet Union,
normalize relations with Cuba, and at-
tempt in some manner to combat the
activities of Cuba or Russia in Angola.
It seems to me that when we talk about
friendship we have to be a friend world-
wide. We cannot be a friend in one part
of the world and be conducting some type
of antagonistic effort in another part of
the world. It seems to me through diplo-
matic channels the President of the
United States and the Secretary of State
should indicate to the Soviet Union and
to Cuba that we would like to normalize
relationships; that we would like for all
of the nations within the family of na-
tions to be friends, one with another.
I do not think there is any doubt that
one has to be a friend to have a friend.
This means that one does not go around
in various parts of the world and at-
tempt to establish bases, attempt to take
over a newly formed independent nation.
It seems to me that Russia is badly
in need of grain. I am advised that Rus-
sia does have problems with regard to
feeding its population. I am not opposed
to assisting a friendly, needy nation any-
where in the world.
I understand we have been helping
Russia with regard to some truck factor-
ies, with regard to computers; that we
have been trying to help them develop
their oil resources.
I am opposed to doing that sort of
thing when Russia is acting as a friend
as long as we are doing this but then goes
into another part of the world and does
not act in a friendly fashion.
As the distinguished Senator knows, as
a lawyer, there is such a thing as mu-
tuality in every valid contract. There is
consideration that flows in both direc-
tions.
It just appears to this Senator that
most of the consideration in our contact
with the Soviet Union is flowing out of
this country and into the Soviet Union.
I do not see the mutuality in these agree-
ments.
I wonder if the Senator has heard any
mention made in our discussions here
in the Chamber about diplomatic efforts
having been made by the State Depart-
ment, in effect, to say to the Soviet
Union: "If you want the friendship of
this country, if you want our assistance
In the way that you feel you need our
assistance, are you going to be a friend
and show your friendship throughout the
world by your actions as well as any
words which you might utter?"
Would the distinguished Senator have
any comment on that?
Mr. McCLURE. Let me respond to the
distinguished Senator from Virginia in
this manner, if I may.
First of all with respect to-whether or
not in the closed sessions we developed
any information concerning State De-
partment or diplomatic initiatives with
regard to the Soviet involvement in
Angola?and I think there was nothing
of a classified nature stated there and
I think, as a matter of fact, the only
information?
Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. I would not
ask the Senator to disclose any classified
information.
Mr. McCLURE. I am aware of that.
The only information that was dis-
closed or discussed was that the State
Department has sent a perfunctory note,
or at least they sent a note and received
a perfunctory reply, and they may have
followed that up with a perfunctory re-
sponse to the perfunctory reply. In other
words, practically no diplomatic initia-
tive directly bearing upon this issue, so
far as the Soviet Union is concerned.
Let me state further that I do not re-
gard the policy of d?nte, as I under-
stand it to have been articulated by Sec-
retary Kissinger, by President Nixon and
President Ford, as being a statement of
friendship between the United States and
the Soviet Union. It is, instead, a policy
under which the opposing forces in the
world may live together without imme-
diate armed conflict and with a lessening
of tensions which lessens the likelihood
of the outbreak of armed conflict.
I do not believe the policy of d?nte
ought to be confused with the statement
of friendship that we would all desire
occur.
Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. The distin-
guished Senator will recall that state-
ments have been made after conferences
with the Soviet Union and other Commu-
nist nations that while we have a differ-
ent type of government, and while we
may not agree as to all matters, we do
want to live together in peace and settle
our disagreements by negotiation rather
than settle the differences through any
type of armed conflict.
I believe such statements as this have
been made in general from time to time.
I submit that the Soviet action in An-
gola, as I understand that action to be, is
not in the broad, general spirit of d?nte
as it is generally understood to be,
whether we call it friendship between na-
tions, toleration of nations, or living to-
gether in the absence of any armed
conflict.
Would not the distinguished Senator
from Idaho agree that the executive
branch of the Government should, in
some way, convey to those who have
either military personnel or military ad-
visers in Angola that this Nation views
with concern their presence there, and
that it might very well jeopardize this
spirit that we have been trying to ac-
complish over the past several years?
Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I would
reply to the Senator's question in this
fashion: I believe there are a number of
things which can be done. I agree to-
tally with the sentiment expressed by
the distinguished Senator from Virginia,
that we should use diplomatic channels
to indicate to the Soviet Union, and to
other external participants in the inter-
nal affairs of Angola, that we believe the
Angolans ought to be able to make up
their own minds without outside
Interference.
We should express our concern to the
Soviet Union about their involvement in
attempting to back a less than one-third
segment of the society in Angola in order
to subvert and to impose their will upon
two-thirds of the people of Angola. I
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would hope that we would also utilize
the diplomatic channels that we can
utilize to put pressure upon Cuba, which
is the indirect pawn of the Soviet Union
and a direct participant in Angola to the
extent of 4,000 to 5,000 troops actively
involved in combat operations, using the
Soviet Union equipment supplied to that
one section in Angola in an attempt to
extend Soviet administration and domi-
nance over the lives of the people in An-
gola.
Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Is it not a
fact that this country has had an express
foreign- policy over the years of self-de-
termination for all the nations of the
world? This has been our expressed for-
eign policy; and would it not be consist-
ent with the expressed foreign policy of
this Nation to call that to the attention
of the Soviet Union or other nations that
have troops or Military advisers in the
African nation, and urge them, in the
general oVerall spirit of detente, that
they should withdraw from Angola?
The real thrust of my thought is that
any foreign policy such as d?nte not be
compartmentalized. In my opinion, it is
not realistic to practice detente in one
part of the world and not have it apply
in other areas of the world. Would the
distinguished Senator agree with that?
Mr. McCL17RE. I would agree with
most portions of the statement of the
Senator from Virginia, particularly one
point, in regard to the expression of the
? opinion to the Soviet Union that d?nte
Is indeed 'threatened by their continued
Intervention in Angola; and second, that
It is the policy of the United States and
it ought to be the policy of the United
States to support the right of self-deter-
mination of all people in all countries.
We have for many years supported a
declaration in the captive nations treaty
wherein we have said to the people of the
world that we still look back with abhor-
rence at the dominance of the lives of
the people in Latvia, Lithuania, and
Estonia by the Soviet Union; that we do
not like the interference in the lives of
the people of Finland; that we abhor
the interference in Hungary, when the
Soviets sought to change the lives of the
People there; that we have never liked
the interposition of the Soviet Union in
Czechoslovakia.
We believe the people of Czechoslo-
vakia should have the privilege of mak-
ing up their own minds what kind of
government they should have. We sup-
port and applaud the efforts of the peo-
ple of Poland to free themselves from
the dominance of their massive neighbor
to the east.
But we should be no less concerned
about the rights of the people of An-
gola, simply because they are a small
and less developed country. As a matter
of fact, perhaps we should be more sen-
sitive to their right to make their own
determination in their own way, simply
because they are small and less developed
than. some of these other nations.
Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. I appreciate
the Senator's yielding. Of course, I
would like for our country to be con-
cerned about the welfare of the small
nations of the world, for self-determina-
tion by all of the nations of the world;
but I also have a concern that we not
become involved in the affairs of another
nation without Congress having com-
plete information, without Congress par-
ticipating in the policymaking decision.
Although some individual Members of
Congress may have been consulted, I am
not aWare of the Congress as a body
being involved in the situation in An-
gola. I certainly do not want this to de-
velop into any type of affair that would
involve the use of American troops.
The distinguished junior Senator from
Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON) has a sense of
the Senate resolution which, in effect,
calls upon the executive branch of the
Government to endeavor, through diplo-
matic channels, to encourage the Soviet
Union and other nations, without naming
them, other nations involved in the An-
gola affair, to withdraw and to permit
that nation to determine its own internal
affairs, to govern itself.
I intend to support that sense of Con-
gress resolution in the event that it
comes before the Senate for considera-
tion. I understand it is cosponsored by
the distingiushed Democratic whip, and I
believe other Senators have cosponsored
it also. I believe it is a good resolution.
I would amend it somewhat to indicate
that this Nation will, to an extent, govern
its future relationship with the Soviet
Union by the actions that the Soviet
Union takes in Angola and other coun-
tries, so as to say that d?nte is world-
wide, that if it is going to work at all
it has to work all over the world, and
that it cannot work in one nation with-
out working in the others.
I have infringed upon the Senator's
time, but I thank him for yielding.
Mr. McCLURE. I thank the Senator
for his contribution to the discussion and
the questions that he has raised.
The latter subject that he referred to,
the resolution of the Senator from Illi-
nois (Mr. STEVENSON) , appears at page
S22539 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, be-
ing the record of the proceedings in open
session yesterday. I am told that the
Senator from South Carolina (Mr.
THURMOND) also ha S a resolution in
slightly different terms, but directed to-
ward the Senate amendment. I am told
that at least two other Senators are
sponsors of a third resolution with some-
thing of a similar aim, directing the Ex-
ecutive to become involved in very posi-
tive diplomatic efforts to bring pressure
to bear on those who would subvert the
internal processes of Angola to their own
ends.
I am perfectly willing, as one Member
of the Senate, to support appropriate ef-
, forts directed toward that end.
I would hope that we would change
? our policy that now eiists until we have a
quid pro quo for the change, and I
think that is the very importance of the
question we are involved in.
I yield to the Senator from Oregon
under the previously stated conditions.
Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, I
think the Senator from Idaho has put his
finger on it, and I would like to engage
in some colloquy with the Senator from
California.
We are talking about three different
things here, really. We are talking about
the resolution of the Senator from Illi-
nois, which is almost an embargo theory
because it does not relate just to the So-
viet Union; it relates to any nation, as
I recall his words, that persists in in-
volving itself in Angola. That could be
Zaire, South Africa, France, or any na-
tion that persists in involving itself.
That could be worthy of consideration,
although not hasty consideration, by the
Senate.
Then we are talking about detente, our
relations with the Soviet Union, specifi-
cally whether we should require a quid
pro quo; should we send them Ford
Motor Co. machinery if they do not get
out of Angola?
Then third, as I understand the
amendment of the Senator from Cali-
fornia he is, in essence, saying what our
unilateral policy should be toward An-
gola regardless of d?nte, regardless of
whether or not we adopt the Stevenson
resolution.
Is that a fair statement?
Mr. TUNNEY. The question as to what
we ought to do with Angola irrespective
of what the Russians do is one that we
could spend a good deal of time on. I am
happy to offer some thoughts to the
Senator from Oregon if he cares to listen
to my opinions on the subject.
Mr. PACKWOOD. I wish to hear them.
As I understand the specific amendment,
and I shall be fair, I think the world as
well as this country is going to read it,
and the headlines are going to be "Sen-
ate Rejects Angola," or words to that
effect; they are not going to get into the
niceties. This is one bill and one appro-
priation. I think that it is a philosophi-
cally fair conclusion to draw from the
debate that this is going to be our policy,
if it passes, toward Angola and may be
correctly a harbinger of what our policy
ought to be toward involvement in
Africa at all.
Mr. TUNNEY. What the amendment
does is to make it very clear that the
United States cannot send military
equipment to Angola, nor can it send
money to another country which in turn
will then make the purchases of military
equipment for use in Angola, but there
is nothing in my amendment that pre-
vents economic aid from being given to
Angola. There is no reason why we could
not participate in giving assistance to all
sides. We could give humanitarian aid.
Mr. PACKWOOD. I stand corrected
on that because the amendment of the
Senator is clear in that respect. In addi-
tion, we could gather intelligence in
Angola if we wanted to because the
amendment has exempted intelligence
gathering.
Mr. TUNNEY. Yes.
I wish to point out to my friend that
we now know that the Gulf Oil Co. has
made a very large payment of money, ap-
proximately $100 million, that has been
placed in the bank in Luanda of which
the MPLA has now control since the
Portuguese pulled out on November 11.
In effect what has happened is that we
have the Gulf Oil Co., an American cor-
poration, with a subsidiary in Angola,
drilling for oil, having made a very sub-
stantial $100 million payment to the side
that is being backed by the Russians, and
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our Government apparently did nothing
to prevent that payment from being
made. It is my understanding that an-
other substantial payment is due in the
very near future, and that there was an
agreement that $500 million would be
paid in the form of royalties by Gulf to
the bank in Luanda, which would then
be available to the government that was
in control and that government which
happens now to be the mPLA.
Initially there was that provisional
governinent that was made up of all three
factions, UNITA, the MLA, and the
IVIPLA. But the other two factions with-
drew and so now the MPLA has total con-
trol over these funds.
I only say to my friend that, if we have
a policy which on its face is operating
at such cross purposes as to allow, on the
one hand, an American corporation to
make those kind of payments to the
faction that we are now supplying arms
against, it really deserves some very
special attention on the part of Con-
gress before we make any arms avail-
able.
I say to my friend that, if we are going
to make arms available, it ought to be
clone through the route of the Foreign
Military Assistance Act, and we ought to
? have the Committe on Foreign Relations
go into it, as the Senator suggested ear-
lier. We ought to have a clear definition
of what American policy is, what Amer-
ica's interests are in Angola and other
parts of Africa. We ought to have a clear
understanding of what our State Depart-
ment and CIA perceive to be the Soviet
goals in Angola and in other parts of
Africa and then make a decision based
upon those facts.
What very deeply concerns me from
my oWri private investigation?and these
are conversations that I have had with
members of the CIA and State Denart-
meat officials, and conversations that my
staff as had?is that there really does
not seem to be any centrally controlling
objective of American policy in An-
gola. That is what I consider to be so
dangerous.
Mr. PACKWOOD. I think we are mak-
ing a central policy, and I am inclined
to agree with it, but when we vote on
the amendment of the Senator from Cal-
ifornia f think we are making a central
policy in this Congress for better or for
Worse,
What we are saying is that no matter
What happens, no matter what happens
in Angola, it cannot be worth the risk of
American involvement, with American
troops and American military equipment.
Earlier today, and I cannot remember
whether it was in closed or open session,
but the information was not classified,
we tried to determine if we knew what
the Russian intentions are. We do not
know. We have no idea what the Russian
intentions are.
We do not know if they plan to go in
and wipe out the entire politic as they
practically did in the Baltic countries
and make it a Russian puppet populated
by Russians. We do not know if they
plan to put in half a million troops and
hold the country by force against the
will of the people or whether they are
going to try to influence the govern-
merit through economic and military
aid and keep their own personnel out.
We have to operate under the assump-
tion they might do the worst, but we do
not know. That is ane.
Second, we are saying if Russia wants
to make the mistake, in our judgment,
the mistake of holding Angola by force
of sending in a half-million troops, and
probably Russia could hold Angola with
a half-million troops, if Russia wants
to make that mistake, Russia is prob-
ably writing off the rest of black Africa,
probably writing off most of any chance
to subvert South America, because every
nation would ,very clearly see what Rus-
sia had in mind and would have no truck
with them, would have no dealing with
them, and would probably make our job
in terms of gaining allies infinitely
easier.
If Russia chooses not to do that, if
Russia comes up with a hope and prayer
and some material in hopes they can get
a government that will be a Soviet-lean-
ing government on every occasion, then
I think they are mistaken. Nationalism
is rampant. Angola is going to go the
?way it wants unless it is subjected and
held down by literally Russian military
personnel. If that is the case, if this even
ends up being a Communist government
but an independent Communist govern-
ment we can deal with them.
We dealt with Yugoslavia. We are
dealing with China. We learned to deal
with Communist governments around
the world, including some of the Eastern
European ones. Where Soviet troops have
occupied them, the countries have en-
deavored toward the West. That we can
deal with.
I would be surprised if Russia were to
put massive troops into Angola and try
to hold Angola on the basis of sheer brute
force. But they might.
It seems to me, therefore, that our pol-
icy wisely says for better or for worse we
are going to leave Angola to the An-
golans. If Russia chooses to intervene,
because we think our best interest cannot
be served in any event by either trying
to fight to keep the 'Russians out or in-
volving ourselves, we think that what-
ever Russia does in that case we will
come out the winners.
Is that a fair statement of where we
are headed?
Mr. TUNNEY. I think that is a fair
statement as to where we are headed
assuming that the Foreign Relations
Committee in their consideration to the
Foreign Military Assistance Act takes
the same kind of action on that bill as we
are taking on this bill.
I cannot see any justification for an
intervention by the United States in
Angola. One of the things I should like
to point out to the Senator from Oregon
Is that reports that have come to me
indicate that in black Africa there are
many leaders who are wondering why
the United States is so quick to inter-
vene in Africa, when we did not partici-
pate in the U.N. debate and the various
attempts to get resolutions through,
condemning the racist policies of South
Africa, Southwest Africa, and Southern
Rhodesia.
There is no doubt that the reason why
we did not participate in those debates
in a meaningful way was that the United
States has had a very special relation-
ship with South Africa. We have many
economic interests in South Africa. We
have done a great deal of trade with
South Africa. Much of our mineral sup-
ply in this country comes from South
Africa in an unprocessed form or proc-
essed form as it is brought to this coun-
try to maintain our high technology
society.
Yet, the leaders in black Africa are
wondering why the United States is so
quick to put up $60 million for war in
Angola, when we would not participate
in these U.N. resolutions and debates in
connection with condemning racism in
South Africa.
Another point that I think is impor-
tant is that for 2 years we have been
cutting back on our economic aid to
Africa?not just Africa, but other parts
of the world as well. When we look at
the kind of commitment we have made
In the form of economic aid to black
Africa and then look at the kind of
money we would be willing to put in for
military equipment in Angola?after the
Russians came in or in a contemporane-
ous fashion with our own efforts to sup-
ply our military equipment?it is ade
clear to many Africans that the U ited
States really has no interest in their eco-
nomic development, in the kind o so-
ciety they are trying to restructur for
themselves, the quality of life that they
are going to have in the future, but that
the United States is only interestcl in
Africa as it relates to a defensive ploy
to counteract any maneuvers that the
Soviet Union has undertaken in Arica.
It is of particular importance to look
at this in the context of one state ent
that was made to me by a man whd had
spent many years in Nigeria. In the late
1960's, he was particularly friendly with
one minister in the Nigerian Govern-
ment, and this minister said?
The only way we could interest the United
States in Nigeria, to give us aid, is apparent-
ly to invent a Communist party.
In other words, at that particular point
in time we were giving much more aid to
Ghana, which looked as though it might
slip into the Communist fold. So we were
prepared to put money into Ghana, but
we were not willing to do anything for
Nigeria, which was considered our friend
and safe.
So this rather pathetic statement was
made by a minister in Nigeria:
The only way we can get aid from the
United States, apparently, is to invent a
Communist party, and then maybe they
will give us some aid.
Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, I
think there is a consequence to Russia's
actions, and it is negative to them. To-
day we heard how Russia, with brute
force, tramped into Hungary and Czech-
cislovakia and did not care about world
opinion. What that probably cost them
was control over all-of the Communist
parties in Western Europe. Today, if the
Communists were to win an election in
Italy, it would not be a Russian Commu-
nist party, because they have seen the
brutality of Russia. Russia knew that
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when they chose to choke off Czechoslo-
vakia and Hungary, and that is a de-
ciEdon they made. If they choose to go
into Angola With force, they are going
to lose more than they will ever gain.
They, will be able to hold Angola, but
they will lose the rest of the area.
Assuming that this amendment is
adopted and similar language out of the
Foreign Relations Committee, our policy
will be that, henceforth, American policy
toward Africa will be nonmilitary in-,
volvement, regardless of d?nte, regard-
s of the actions of other nations.
Mr. TTJNNEY. I concur with the Sena-
tor's conclusion, That is about as suc-
cinct an expression of What this amend-
ment is as I have heard on the floor.
? Mr. ?AC WOOD. I thank the Senator.
Mr. 1VIcCIATAE. Mr... President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may yield to
the Senator from North Carolina without
losing my right to the floor, that any
restunption by me not be considered a
second speech, and that under no cir-
cumstances I lose my right to the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the distinguished
Senator from Idaho. Mr. President, the
Tunney amendment presents us 'i,vith an
unacceptable choice. On the one hand
the distingnished Senator from Califor-
nia IS asking us to stop the executive
branch from giving any military assist-
ance directly, or indirectly, to strife-
torn Angola; while on the other hand
the executive branch proposes to use
funds in this appropriation bill to provide
Angola with at least $60 million in mili-
tary aid. We are asked to vote for either
one or the other. It is clear that the
Soviet Union has made a major thrust
In Angola, providing top-quality weap-
ons and an undetermined number of
Sovietj)ersonnel to assist the MPLA. It
is also clear that Castro has sent 4,000
trained Cuban troops to fight on the
Communist side.
Thus, on the one hand, if we vote
with tile distinguished Senator froM
California, we seem to be saying that the
executive branch has no authority what-
soeVer to respond to threuts of violence
outside the United Otates, no authority
to take steps to throw up barriers to the
spread of communism through force, un-
less approved in advance by the Con-
gress of the United States. But on the
other hand, if we vote against the Tun-
ney amendment, we seem to be giving a
Vote of approval to the way in which
the executive branch is conducting its
policies. If the issue had not been forced
here today, there would have been no
Implication that the Senate had partici-
pated in approving or disapproving our
nolicies in Angola.
Unfortunately, the issue has been
forced. It is within the purview of the
executive branch to conduct foreign pol-
ity on a day-to-day basis. We have tradi-
tionally given the executive branch dis-
cretionary funds for the conduct of for-
eign policy, and they have been used in
the conduct of policies such as have been
followed in Angola. Let it be clear that
the United States has not entered into a
war in Angola. We have supplied arms,
but we have not put troops or advisers
Into Angola. The scope of the war powers
is not under consideration here. What is
happening here is an effort to force the
issue of covert action before the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence has
completed its work and made its recom-
mendations, and before any consensus
has been reached in this body about the
nature and purpose of that kind of
activity.
But now that the issue, has been
forced, there is no way to run away
from it. It is a very difficult choice to
make for someone who believes that this
Nation desperately needs to resume a
world. leadership position, and to defend
our traditional values of human rights,
private property, and spiritual freedom
against the advance of communism.
When communism uses naked force and
internal subversion to conquer an in-
creasing proportion of the earth's terri-
tory and subjugate the people who are
unfortunate enough to live in the con-
quered territories, it is our proper role
to work to restore freedom to those areas.
Frankly, we cannot say that It is none of
our concern. As the proportion of the
global scope of activity is narrowed, the
choices that we, as a Nation, can make
grow fewer and fewer, and eventually
we will be so restricted that, our inde-
pendence as a nation?and the freedom
that independence guarantees us?will be
in jeopardy.
But is the choice as simple as it seems?
Must we abandon our role as the leader
of the free nations?as is implied in
the amendment of the Senator from
California? Are we voting here for a
choice between freedom and communism
for Angola? By no means.
If we adopt the amendment of the dis-
tinguished Senator, we force the execu-
tive branch to do nothing at all But by
doing so, do we deliver Angola into the
hands of the Communists? Given the
measure of Soviet determination dis-
played here, it is most likely that Angola
will fall into the hands of the Commu-
nists, with all. that such a collapse im-
plies: The deliverance of the Angolan
peoples into a Stalinist terror, the loss
of mineral resources that can help sus-
tain the freedom of the West, a base from
which Soviet forces can threaten South
Atlantic shipping lanes and project Vier-
rillas over the border into the territory
of South West Africa,
But if we reject the Tunney amend-
ment, what do we get? The word is out.
The millions of dollars which the admin-
istration is throwing into Angola are not
for the deliverance of the people there
or for the securing of the territory from
Communist domination. The millions of
dollars are for securing another "nego-
tiated settlement." The State Depart-
ment has, in effect, admitted that this
Is the case. Indeed, it appears that some
spokesmen for this point of view thought
that they were putting forth a strong
card in bidding for a "negotiated
settlement."
The Senator from North Carolina
wishes to say that he will never be part
of any negotiated settlement. We have
seen these negotiated settlements stale-
mated in Korea, imposed with indiffer-
ence in Laos, and thrust brutally upon
18, 1975
Vietnam. Is there anyone in this Cham-
ber or in the cloakrooms or in the offices
in the Dirksen or Russell building who
does not believe that a "negotiated settle-
ment" is negotiated, surrender? Have we
not learned the lesson of what happened
in Vietnam? Do we not realize that the
negotiating process for the Communists
is simply' a method to entrench their
positions more firmly? Do we not recall
haw the Vietnam settlement left the
Communist troops firmly in control of
their enclaves in South Vietnam, and left
them loopholes for resupply of those
troops? Do we not remember what a de-
moralizing effect the "settlement" had
upon South Vietnam as a nation?
I ask whether any Senator thinks that
the Cuban troops would be removed from
Angola under such a negotiated settle-
ment, and whether the Soviets would
withdraw their supplies and personnel?
After the experience which this Nation
has had under the negotiations conduct-
ed by Dr. Kissinger in the past, no one
could say with assurance that the Soviets
would withdraw, or would give up any of
the advantages they now hold, Indeed, I
can say right now that to press for such
key concessions would bring charges that
such firmness would threaten the "deli-
cate state of d?nte. I can hear it now.
I can hear the wails that we might even
endanger the SALT II negotiation. I say,
Mr. President, "So what?"
Mr. President, the sad fact is that it
Is better to pull out at once, than to
enter into a protracted negotiation lead-
ing to the ultimate takeover of Angola by
the Communists in any case. The Tunney
amendments?which I do not like; I wish
it had never been submitted?is never-
theless offering us the choice of outright
abandonment of our responsibilities or a
negotiated abandonment of our respons-
ibilities. That has been made clear in the
closed sessions of the Senate, yesterday
and today. The first is quick and cheap;
that is the Tunney amendment. The
second is long, protracted, painful,
and expensive. Both arrive at the same
ultimate end.
The comparison of Angola to Viet-
nam is valid only because we are de-
liberately making it another Vietnam.
What makes it a Vietnam are the restric-
tions, the obstructionism, and painful
trap of negotiations. Do we not remember
that in both Korea and in Vietnam we
had more casualty losses after the
negotiations began than before? Viet-
namization is a state of mind which pre-
sents us with immoral choices. Those are
the choices offered us here today by the
Tunney amendment.
The Senator from North Carolina will
not be taken down that path. I am pres-
ently inclined?oh, so reluctantly, Mr.
President?to vote for the Tunney
amendment in order to let it be known
that I will have no part of wasting money
when the goal is to negotiate a settle-
ment of the type which has always left
the Communists in place, and given them
a base for imperialistic expansion.
Mr. PACKWOOD. Will the Senator
yield for a question?
Mr. HELMS. I am delighted to yield.
Mr. PACKWOOD. The Senator men-
tioned our responsibility in Angola. What
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is our obligation? What are our responsi-
bilities to Angola?
Mr. HELMS. I am going to address
myself to that if the Senator will allow
me to complete my remarks. Then I shall
be delighted to discuss it further with
him.
Mr. President, the administration does
not need to sit on its hands. There is a
very simple way to get the Communists
out of Angola without getting us involved
there at all. The best way is to go to
where the decisions are made. The de-
cisions are not made in Angola; they are
made in Moscow. The Soviet thrust is a
major new policy decision of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union. Never before have the
Soviets shipped new armaments of a high
quality to client grotps outside of the
Soviet, empire, or its traditional area of
influence. Ann s ikere sent for cash to
the Middle East, and technicians, but the
thrust in the Middle East has been a
traditional goal of Soviet policy. More
Often, the arms sent to client states have
been used junk al no particular value.
ButT the arms sent- to Angola with no
payment asked, and the presence of hun-
dreds of Soviet personnel, are an entirely
new development, based uPon a new
worldwide strategy on the part of the
Communists. It is also indicative of the
Soviet military effort that for the first
time their arms preduetion is sufficient
to support suchhIpments. No one can
claim that the Soviet presence In Angola
is accidental, or a spur of the moment
decision. It is a long, calculated plan
which has been in operation for a long
time, and which threatens the peace-and
stability of every free nation on earth.
But does our adrninistration see this?
I think not. The Secretary of State is
still inflexibly conimitted to detente and,
to this date, I know of no one Who can
satisfactorily define the word "d?nte."
The President is committed to detente,
and the President recently got rid of the
single voice for reason and prudence in
his Cabinet In this regard, Secretary
Schlesinger. The President and the Sec-
retary of State go to China for no ap-
parent purpose and with no apparent
result. They are -planning to go to the
Soviet Union as soon as the SALT II
details are worked out, and we are told
that we must not disturb such delicate
negotiations. - -
More and more it is becoming evident
that detente is nothing other than a
name' fora protracted period filled with
negotiated settlements of -many kinds.
The overall impact of d?nte is the same
as the individual impact of each negoti-
ation process, and that is, to Mit it
bluntly, surrender. D?nte is the ration-
alization of surrender just as our nego-
tiations have 'been a protracted process
of confirming the Communists in posi-
tions of strength in various places
around the world.
So I say, Mr. President, let us go to
- Moscow not to Angola. This Senator says
no more wheat deali with the Commu-
nists, no more trade agreements, no more
tax concessions of the kind we approved
just the other day until the Soviets make
some Concessions. We do not have to
finance and supply the deficiencies of the
Communist system. We do not have- to
allow them to divert consumer produc-
tion into tanks, and farm machinery
production into weapons manufacture.
Why is it that the Communists do not
have tractors to get in their harvest
when, at the very same time, they are
able to produce guns and rockets for this
Angolan adventure? That is where you
get down to the nitty-gritty.
If we want the Cuban Communist
troops out of Angola, Mr. President?
and here I will begin to comment on
the question raised by my friend from
Oregon?if we want the Communist
troops out of Angola, let us go to Mos-
cow and have Moscow send a message to
Havana. Better yet, let us send a message
to Havana ourselves. Let Havana order
the Cuban troops home and, while we
are at it, tell Havana to send back to
the Soviet Union those Echo class nu-
clear submarines based in Cuban ports
and armed with 500-mile nuclear cruise
missiles.
Why on earth should the captive Cuban
people fight in Angola at the Soviet
whim? Why should the Cuban people al-
low themselves to be used as shock troops
for what is clearly the Soviet grand
design in Angola?
I think, Mr. President, the United
States should call upon the people of
Cuba to rise up against the Soviet's cyn-
ical use of their young sons in this
grand design and to throw off the dicta-
tor who has handed over the Cuban
youth for such purposes.
But, do we do so? No. Our policy has
been to encourage the resumption of nor-
mal relations, so-called, with the Com-
munist tyrant in Cuba, and there you go.
This is the fault of this whole question
that is before us today. Are we really
against communism? Do we really con-
sider it a threat to liberty in the world?
How much longer, how many more times,
will we surrender to it in the name of
d?nte or in the name of "negotiated
settlements"?
With reference to normalized relations
with Cuba that we hear so much about,
our diplomats worked hard at the Organ-
ization of American States meeting last
July to give the air of legitimacy to the
Castro regime. It bordered on the nau-
seating, Mr. President, to observe what
went on. In the name of d?nte we
worked against the interests of our sister
American States such as Uruguay, Chile,
and Argentina, whose internal order has
been disrupted by the export of Cuban-
trained revolutionaries throughout South
America.
What is our answer? Detente. I will
wager that not one citizen out of a hun-
dred in America can give a serious and
secure definition of the word.
Even our own security is threatened in
the major cities of this land by the Cas-
tro-backed Puerto Rican terrorist move-
ment while anti-Castro leaders are as-
sassinated right here in the United States
Itself.
So that is why, Mr. President, I am
fed up with negotiated settlements. I am
fed up with the United States never quite
saying what it means about communism,
stalemates, coalition governments, and I
think the American people are tired of
salami-sliced surrender carrying the in-
evitable enormous price tag.
I think the taxpayers are sick of sub-
sidizing Secretary Kissinger's mistakes.
If the United States is not seeking to win
then I think we should not enter into a
protected conflict where there is no in-
tent to win.
I suggest again that the Tunney
amendment, bad as it is, at least has the
virtue of giving the administration a
striking opportunity to reject mistaken
policies of surrender and adopt a clear
anti-Communist stance in the world.
Sooner or later we are going to have
to do it, unless later or sooner we decide
to surrender, period.
Now, the way to peace in Angola is to
get the Soviets and the Cubans out of
there. The way to do that is to get tough
with this thing called detente?whatever
it is.
No negotiation, not even a SALT nego-
tiation, is important if it allows the So-
viets to take the world, piece by piece.
I do not think there is a Senator in this
body who will deny that that is precisely
what has been going on.
I hope that whatever else the Senate
may do at this time and in connection
with this matter, we will at least en-
deavor to make sure that the American
people understand what is at stake.
In that sense, Angola, aside from its
mineral value, the shipping lanes ques-
tion and all the rest, is a symbol and it
Is an opportunity.
I promised to yield to the Senator
for a question.
Mr. PACKWOOD. No more than the
Senator from North Carolina do I trust
the Russians. I think they lie, cheat, and
steal and that their sole foreign policy
is based upon what is in their interest,
not that they like us or love us. I would
like to think our foreign policy would be
based upon what is good for us.
Mr. HELMS. Does the Senator believe
that is the case?
Mr. PACKWOOD. I think we delude
ourselves on occasion.
I am not a great supporter of d?nte.
I think from time to time there can be
things Russia and the United States
agree on, that happen to be in our mutual
interest. But we should realize then that
each nation agrees upon it and we should
not think it is because we love each other.
But as for Angola, forgetting d?nte
for a moment because I am not sure it
is ever going to work, what should be our
obligation toward Angola?
Mr. HELMS. I will answer the Senator,
as I tried to say in my statement, my
concern is for the interest of the United
States.
Mr. PACKWOOD. Right.
Mr. THURMOND. I wish to thank the
able, distinguished Senator from North
Carolina.
Some people have criticized the United
States' role in Africa, but, as a matter of
fact, the United States does not have
any bases iri Africa, does it?
Mr. HELMS. No.
Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true the
Soviets have a naval and air' base in Ber-
bera and Somalia with about 1,000 mili-
tary personnel there?
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Mr. HELMS. That is my under-
standing.
Mr. THURMOND. On the east coast
of Africa?
Mr. HELMS. That is my under-
standing.
? Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true also,
that the Soviets are in Mozambique by
giving arms and seeking bases there on
the east cpast of Africa?
Mr. HELMS. That is correct.
Mr. THt7RMOND. Is it not true the
Soviets are aware their naval facilities on
Guinea on the west coast of Africa pa-
trol the sea lanes off the west coast, of
ships and planes?
Mr. HELMS. That is the understand-
ing of the Senator from North Carolina,
Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true that
the Soviets have assigned about 2,000
military advisors to African nations
seeking influence, bases or both?
Mr. HELMS. My understanding is
identical to that of the Senator from
South Carolina.
I would ask the Senator if he would
estimate what percentage of the Ameri-
can people understand the facts he is so
eloquently bringing out by his questions?
Mr. THURMOND. I aux not too sure
that the American people understand
These things because for some unknown
reason, so Much of the press do not bring
out these facts when it seems to affect
'the Soviet Union.
I have never understood why some of
the media take the position they do.
With anything against the United States,
It seems they are right there, Johnny on
the spot.
Now, is it not true that the Soviets and
their socialist allies in Africa were in-
strumenta1l getting only 16 of the 46
states in the Organization for African
'Unity to recognize the pro-Soviet MPLA
faction?
Mr. HELMS, That is my understand-
ing.
Mr. THURMOND. Showing that out of
46 countries in Africa, only 16, through
'4 prodded by the Seviets, were only able
to induce 10 to recognize the MPLA fac-
tiOn as the zovernMent in Angola?
Mr. HELMS. That is factually in ac-
cordance WI MY understanding.
Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true that
the Soviets were behind the U.S. ex-
pulsion from the Tripoli Air Base in
Libya a few years ago?
Mr. HELMS, The Senator is correct.
Mr. THURIVIOND. Is it not true that
the Soviets armed And urged Egypt to
launch an attack to regain the Sinai?
Mr. HELMS. No question abou out.
Mr. THURMOND. Is it not also true
that the Soviets have sent in the past 10
years about $400 million worth of mili-
tary equipment tp 10 black African
countries, including Migs and tanks?
Mr. HELMS. The Senator is absolutely
correct, and that raises a question, the
Inescapable question of why.
So they could take over the continent.
Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true that
since 1974, Soviet military aid has gone
to Nigeria, Congo, Uganda, Mali, Tan-
zania, Zambia, Equatorial Guiena, and
the Central African Republic?
Mr. HELMS. The Senator did say mili-
tary aid, did he not?
Mr. THURMOND. That is right.
Mr. HELMS. I draw the distinction be-
cause that is the kind of aid the Soviet
Union gives in an effort to line up and
take over, and that is exactly, as the Sen-
ator so eloquently emphasizes, what they
have in mind in this case.
Mr. THURMOND. Is It not true that
the Soviets and Cubans have been train-
ing MPLA military representatives, esti-
mated to be about 2,000, in Cuba and
Russia since the late 1960's?
Mr. HELMS. That is my understand-
ing. I would say to the Senator that
earlier this year I visited some South
American countries and Castro-trained
terrorists are all over. They are being
sent out not only in South America, but,
as is so demonstrable in this case, in
Angola. It will happen throughout the
world in increasing intensity.
The Senator is exactly right.
Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true the
Soviets have transported between 5,000
and 6,000 Cuban soldiers, mostly blacks,
to fight with the MPLA and provided
them with heavy equipment, much more
deadly than the light equipment provided
by the United States to the other side?
Mr. HELMS. That information has
been completely verified. I would say
to the Senator.
Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true the
Soviets have sent about 400 military ad-
visers to assist the MPLA?
Mr. HELMS. That, too, is correct.
Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true that
only limited aid from the United States,
mainly some small arms, has been sent
In response to the heavy Soviet military
aid?
Mr. HELMS. That is the understand-
ing of the Senator from North Carolina,
yes.
Mr. THURMOND. Is it not further
true that the United States aid has not
been direct, but transported mostly in
commercial carriers through third coun-
tries such as Zaire and Zambia?
Mr. HELMS. That is correct.
Mr. THURMOND. In other words, we
have not sent planes over there, we have
not sent tankers over there, we have not
sent tanks and heavy equipment, such
as the Soviets have sent to the MPLA.
Is it true that intelligence believes the
Soviet interest in Angola is to acquire
use of the deepwater ports, the airfields,
and to monitor the passing ships?
Mr. HELMS. That is correct, as a pre-
lude to taking over the entire country.
Mr. THURMOND. Is it the policy of
the United States to favor a negotiated
settlement between all three factions in
the hope that what we have sent, or the
little aid that we may send, will create
a deadlock, thus forcing a negotiated
settlement? Is that the real purpose of
our Government so far?
Mr. HELMS. Here is where it gets
sticky in the understanding of the Sen-
ator from North Carolina. It depends
on where we go with our negotiated set-
tlements. If we settle on the Communist
terms, we are repeating the folly of the
past. I am hopeful, as the Senator has
stated, that if a negotiated settlement is
chieved, it will be done sensibly and in
the best interest of containing and re-
straining the advance of communism in
Africa.
Mr. THURMOND. Someone says that
we are getting involved over there. It
has been clearly stated by the admin-
istration, even on November 23 by Dr.
Kissinger, Secretary of State, that the
United States will not intervene mili-
tarily in Angola, has it not?
Mr. HELMS. I understand that is what
Dr. Kissinger said.
Mr. THURMOND. Is it true that, by
taking the position it has with regard to
Angola, the Soviets have proven again
that they are ready to foster violence
in pursuit of their aims? ,
Mr. HELMS. I believe that is correct.
Mr. THURMOND. Is it true that the
use of Cuban troops, Soviet advisers ahd
heavy military equipment far exceeds any
U.S. aid to the Angolan faction?
Mr. HELMS. There is no question
about that.
Mr. THURMOND. Is is true that con-
tinued U.S. aid,,tied to a prohibition on
any U.S. personnel involvement, might
force the Soviets to back off long enough
to bring about a negotiated settlement?
I realize on that question there is a dif-
ference of opinion, but that is the hope
of our Government in the matter, I
believe.
Mr. HELMS. It is a hope, I say to the
distinguished Senator, that I am afraid
Is tissue thin.
As I said in my earlier remarks, it is
my hope that there will be an under-
standing on the part of our leaders that
we have to deal with the Communists in
a fashion that will preclude a continua-
tion of our giving them everything they
want and their proceeding to do what-
ever they want to do. That is the way
d?nte has worked up to now, insofar
as the Senator from North Carolina is
concerned.
Mr. THURMOND. Does the Senator
feel that detente is not worth the paper
on which it is written unless one has the
power to back it?
Mr. HELMS. And the will and the
courage, I would say.
Mr. THURMOND. One has to have the
power and the will to use the power.
Mr. HELMS. Exactly.
Mr. THURMOND. Otherwise, d?nte
Is of no value.
Mr. HELMS. D?nte can be equated to
surrender without the qualities which the
Senator has stated.
Mr. THURMOND. Does the Senator
feel that the time has come in this time
of history, in this time in which we are
living, that the United States should take
the stand with regard to the Soviet
Union that, "If you do not get out of
Angola, and if you do not quit interven-
ing in the affairs of other countries of
the world, we are going to quit trading
with you. We are not going to sell you
grain, even though it might be to the
advantage of the farmers of America. We
are not going to sell you many other
things which would be of benefit to your
people in the way of comforts or even
luxuries. In other words, unless you
abandon your goal of world aggression
and intent to take over other countries,
we will not carry on business with you."
Furthermore, would it even be wise to
cancel diplomatic relations if they can-
not work with us on an equal basis?
Mr. HELMS. I say to the Senator that
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it is the impression of the Senator from
North Carolina that it is dangerous to
Dat a rattlesnake on the head. That is
precisely what we have been doing. We
have been acceding to the Communists
and the Soviet Union for all of these
years. We have protracted the negotia-
tions. We have, in the end without fail,
yielded on theirsterms. I say that is a bad
way to conduct foreign policy, if indeed
It can be called foreign policy.
Mr. THURMOND. Is it true that as
long as we attempt to placate and ap-
pease the Communists, the more they are
going to ask, the more they are going to
demand, and the harder it is going to be
for us to live in the same world with
them?
Mr. HELMS. Not only that, I would say
to the Senator, but in the meantime
they are growing stronger. They are
growing stronger with material assists
from us, as In the case of wheat, in the
case of the truck factories, in the case of
sorts of arrangements which have
been made through the years which, in
the judgment ofI the Senator from North
Carolina, were totally unwise and un-
justified.
Mr. THURMOND. Does the Senator,
for instance, go back to 1962 when Pres-
ident Kennedy agreed to sell the Soviets
wheat? We not only sold them wheat
which would enable them to keep more
Men in their missile factories and gun
plants, but also we guaranteed repay-
ment to the bankers that loaned the
Soviets the money to buy the wheat.
Mr. HELMS. The Senator is correct.
Mr. THURMOND. Does that make
sense? Is that 'helping to build up the
Soviet Government and keep its 200 mil-
lion people under their control?
Mr. HELMS. The Senator is absolutely
cor rect.
Mr. THURMOND. If people got hun-
gry over there, they would rise up in a
revolt, would they not?
Mr. HELMS. Or they would start grow-
ing their own wheat and building their
own appliances-.
Mr. THURMOND. And they would not
be building munitions to such an extent.
Mr. HELMS. That is correct. That is
all the Senator from North Carolina has
ever contended. Nobody would more wel-
come peace in the world and complete
accord with everybody than the Senator
from North Carolina. But that is not
What we are Moving to. We are moving
toward absolute totalitarianism in the
world,' and it is being done under the
screen of d?nte and negotiated settle-
ments, and, I might add, complete mis-
representation of so many situations.
I daresay to the Senator that only a
small percentage of the American people
understand really what happened in
Vietnam, the no-win war that the Sena-
tor is so familiar with, and all of the
tragedies that grew out of that. But I
think we have to confront the inevitable:
are Ike opposed to tyranny? Are we op-
posed to communism? Do we really un-
derstand what it is? And then the ques-
tion. Do we have the courage to stand up
to it? That is the question I believe which
is raised by the Tunney amendment.
Mr. THURMOND. Is it true that if this
country had enforced the Paris agree-
ment with regard to Vietnam, which we
probably could have done by using the
Air Force for 1 or 2 days to let them
know we meant business,- South Vietnam
would be a free nation today?
Mr. HELMS. I do not believe there is
any question about it. I have talked with
so many friends who were in Vietnam, as
I know the Senator has--:and he, far
more than I, as a matter of fact?who
have told me of the frustration they felt
in not being allowed to win a war they
could have won. Yet the American people
have been given an impression of Viet-
nam that is just not accurate.
They ought to ask some of the people
who were there. We should have won it.
Communism could have been contained
and restrained, but it was not done.
Mr. THURMOND. And is it not true
we could have won the war in Korea, but
had a stalemate?
Mr. HELMS. No question about it.
Mr. THURMOND. That was the first
war this country never won.
Mr. HELMS. No question about it.
Mr. THURMOND. And is not not true
that we had the Vietnam war as a
consequence?
Mr. HELMS. The Senator is absolutely
correct.
Mr. THURMOND. And there we spent
over $150 billion, had 50,000 men killed
and over 300,000 wounded, and then
turned tail and ran, so to speak?
Mr. HELMS. And we departed from
Vietnam with all of the concessions in
favor of the Communists. Their troops
were allowed to stay in the South, and
it is no wonder that Vietnam fell. All of
the concessions were given to the Com-
munists, and none to the people of South
Vietnam.
Mr. THURMOND. Is not the Senator
of the opinion that the United States
should not go to war unless we have to,
but once we go to a war we ought to
put all the power we have into it, air
power, sea power, ground power, artil-
lery power, all the power we have, to
win it, get out, and get through; and we
stayed in Vietnam 10 years and never
did that, did we?
Mr. HELMS. The Senator is correct;
we did not.
Mr. THURMOND. And does the Sena-
tor not think that is one reason the peo-
ple of this country now feel as they do
toward the whole situation existing
throughout the world?
Mr. HELMS. The people of this coun-
try have lost faith in so many of their
institutions because they have seen prin-
ciples eroded and even destroyed.
Mr. THURMOND. They have seen ex-
pediency control instead of principle,
have they not?
Mr. HELMS. I am sad to say the
Senator is correct.
Mr. THURMOND. I commend the able
Senator from North Carolina. I just wish
we had a whole Congress, Senate and
House of Representatives, who had the
vision, the ability, and the integrity that
he does, who could understand this world
situation and would be willing to grapple
with it as he does.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator for
his generous remarks, and I assure him
they are reciprocated threefold.
S 22799
Mr. President, is the Senator from
North Carolina correct in his impression
that he holds the floor as a result of a
unanimous-consent agreement obtained
by the distinguished Senator from Idaho,
which stipulated that under no circum-
stances would the Senator from Idaho
lose his right to the floor by yielding to
me? Is that correct?
The PRESIDING 010.FICER (Mr.
HUDDLESTON) . The Chair is advised the
Senator is correct.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair. I ask
unanimous consent that, with the right
of the Senator from Idaho protected as
stipulated in that tuaanimous-consent
agreement, I be permitted to yield to my
distinguished colleague from North
Carolina (Mr. MORGAN) .
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MORGAN. I thank my distin-
guished colleague from North Carolina.
Mr. President, I wanted to take this
opportunity to make some observations
concerning the matter that is before the
Senate, and also to repeat some observa-
tions that I had made recently concern-
ing our foreign policy.
While I think sometimes we are at-
tempting to conduct the foreign policy
of this country for and on behalf of the
President rather than by consulting and
advising with the President, I do believe
that the debate today has been as infor-
mative and helpful as any debate that
I have heard on foreign policy since I
have been in the Senate.
I was especially pleased this morning
to hear the very enlightened discussion
by the distinguished Senator from Illi-
nois (Mr. STEVENSON) , and I think per-
haps his point of view might be a satis-
factory solution to the question that is
before us.
Mr. President, I believe this: Notwith-
standing all of the oratory and the de-
bate, the problem facing us when we
turn to foreign policy is, in my opinion,
very easy to define. There are only a
small number of alternatives involved.
We can take up the call of isolationism,
pull back our initiatives, and ignore the
world. As the distinguished Senator from
South Dakota (Mr. MeGoymusi) pointed
out with a quotation from a news colum-
nist this morning, if we lost Angola "We
still have the Atlantic Ocean between
us."
As he read that ouotation to the Sen-
ate, I thought it rather ironic that I had
in my pocket at that time a quotation
frm the January 22, 199. CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD, that I had copied this morning.
It was a similar statement by a very dis-
tinguished and able former U.S. Senator.
It referred, of course, to the debate
then involving our rendering of aid and
assistance to our European allies after
Hitler had taken several countries in
Europe. So it, too, involved a debate on
foreign policy.
In essence, this is whqt that distin-
guished Senator had to say:
The United States need not and shall not
be involved. We have an isolated location,
and it is still isolated in spite of all of the
Improvements in air transportation.
That was as late as January 22, 1939.
But, Mr. President we found later that
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We were not as isolated as that distin-
guished Senator had thought on that day
in 1939. And I would suggest that we are
not as isolated today as the quotation by
the distinguished Senator from South
Dakota this morning would tend to in-
dicate.
In other words, if we take up the call
of isolationism, we can turn the world
over to the Communists, for both the
Soviet Union and China are expansionist
nations. Each wants to expand as far as
possible its sphere of influence. Russia's
domination of Eastern Europe and
China's domination of eastern Asia are
today almost accomplished facts. Only a
pitiful few nations in both parts of the
World have been able to maintain their
independence, and even they are in con-
stant jeopardy.
The Soviet Union and China have no
compunction about aiding Communist
Movements throughout the world. And
original although my remarks were pre-
pared 2 or 3 months ago, Mr. President,
I thought it interesting to note that in
the debate this morning it was pointed
out that when the Belgians granted inde-
pendence to the Congo, the Russians
were just as quick to move in then as
they have been in Angola now.
It was pointed out this morning by the
distinguished Senator from New York
(Mr. JAvns), a very able man, that the
Russians were kicked out of the Congo.
If my knowledge of history and my recol-
lection of recent events and investiga-
tions by the Church committee serve me
correctly, I rather suspect that the rea-
son why the Russians were kieked out of
the Congo was largely the covert action
of Our Government in the support and
encouragement given to that govern-
ment.
So I am not so sure that, if the Soviet
.Union decides to maintain its position in
Angola and wedo abandon it, the people
Of that nation will be able to rid them-
selves of the Soviet influence alone.
I doubt that any nation in Africa has
removed that influence walling some en-
couragement and assistance from those
who stand and resist the expansionist
programs of the Communist nations.
If we should choose in this country to
abandon democratic movements in the
third world, the Communist movements
are sure to succeed. As a matter of fact,
these Communist countries are always
ready to oppose any movement in the
world that seems sympathetic to the
Western ideals of freedom.
Angola is now the most obvious ex-
ample. There we already have heard
what the Soviet Union has done to
foment strife and trouble and to domi-
nate at least 30 percent of the population
of that country as the Portuguese have
moved out.
Communists are indeed persistent ad-
versaries and, if we should choose isola-
tionism as a policy, these adversaries will
quickly move into any vacuum our isola-
tionism creates.
Of course, isolationism is an extreme
position. Its other extreme is antagonism.
At times we Americans have also adopted
this policy. We did it at the coldest part
of the cold war. We opposed almost every
move or every initiative of the Soviet
Union and the Chinese. In large part our
efforts were mostly and highly success-
ful. Our efforts Maintained the freedom
of Greece, Italy, Turkey, West Berlin,
and South Korea, among Others.
We heard discussed in the secret ses-
sion ways in which we helped these coun-
tries maintain their freedom.
I suggest to the Senate and to my col-
leagues everywhere that had our actions
in Italy after World War II been made
public before they took place they would
have been totally ineffective and that
country would have succumbed to com-
munism shortly after World War II.
But this policy also got us into two land
wars in Asia. As we all know, one was
fought to an inconclusive result and the
other was lost entirely.
It was this extreme position and the
difficulties we were having making it wbrk
that has led, I believe, to the strained
isolationism that we now find in our so-
ciety today. Unfortunately, one failure
seems to erase all of our successes. Hav-
ing been bitten by one dog, so to speak,
we now refuse to approach any other.
We seem willing to abandon even
longstanding commitments. Our oppo-
nents are not so shallow. Defeats do not
deter their initiatives. To them any op-
portunity is an opportunity for success.
That they have often failed is not a de-
terrent. Failure to them is but a tempo-
rary setback. To us it seems to be the
end.
It is inconceivable to me that we should
withdraw so completely. It seems Moon-
ceiyable to me that we should have so
little faith in the ability of our ideas. We
made this Nation into a model of freedom
and prosperity. Do we now feel that our
position is too weak to propagate? Do
we now feel ?that others cannot benefit
from the freedoms which have been ours
to enjoy? Why are we willing to surrender
them to Communist totalitarianism?
It seems to me that some in our society
may be panicking. I suggest, Mr. Presi-
dent, our pride in this country has suf-
fered more than our position.
We are still the most powerful Nation
in the world. Whether we want it or not,
the position of leadership in the world
has been thrust upon this?Nation.
I have heard today in the Chamber of
this Senate the suggestion that, if the
freedom of Angola is so important, why
do we not call upon our NATO allies to
carry the burden of maintaining and
bringing freedom there?
I say, Mr. President, I would feel much
better about it if our good friends in
Western Europe were to assume more of
a role of leadership in protecting free-
dom around the world. But because they
fail to carry their part of the burden,
are we also going to fail in the role of
leadership that has been thrust upon us
by the high ideas that we believe in and
the success that has been ours?
How I remember, Mr. President. the
words of that young dynamic new Pres-
ident, John F. Kennedy, as I stood here
in the snow in 1961 and listened to his
Inaugural address and heard him say
words to this effect. I do not remember
them verbatim and I do not have them
here, but it was something to this effect:
Let every nation- know, whether it wishes
Us well or ill, that we shall pay any price,
bear any burden, meet any hardship, sup-
port any friend, oppose any foe, in order to
assure the survival and the success of liberty.
Have we in this country forgotten
those great principles to which we com-
mitted ourselves on that cold January
day here in 1961?
Because we badly handled our last con-
frontation in Vietnam, are we now to say
that we no longer will offer encourage-
ment and aid to those who have the cour-
age and the stamina to stand up and
resist Communist aggression and expan-
sionism wherever it is to be found in the
world?
I say that there is no reason for free-
dom-loving Americans to abandon the
Third World totalitarianism, for if we
do we are not only isolationists, we shall
find ourselves isolated.
So what alternative remains? If we are
to be neither isolationists nor all-out
antagonist, where can we stand? The
answer obviously is somewhere between
the two. The trouble with being all-out
antagonist is that each confrontation
brings the world to the brink of a nuclear
war, and no person in his right mind
can countenance that possibility.
So I think, Mr. President, that d?nte
with great powers seems inevitable. I like
to think of d?nte as meaning the im-
provement of our relations with other
nations, with Russia. I believe we should
have approached it more cautiously than
we did. But if we are to avoid this kind
of confrontation, I do not believe we
can rule out the question of d?nte.
I heard earlier in the debate that we
simply should cut off all aid to the Afri-
can nation of Angola and say to the So-
viet Union, "If you don't get out, we will
have no more SALT talks. We will sell
you no more wheat." We will rebuild, in
effect, the Iron Curtain.
I suggest, Mr. President, that rekin-
dling the hostilities that formerly existed
between the Soviet Union and this coun-
try may very well generate and create
more dangers for our Nation than the
matter we are considering now. We sim-
ply cannot go to war with the Soviet Un-
ion or with Communist China. The de-
struction that would result is simply too
horrible to contemplate. I think that no
one in his right mind can advocate such
a position. But this does not mean that
we should become isolationists.
I suggest that we are turning inward
at this point, although I am sure that
many of my colleagues will disagree with
me. But we cannot become isolationist
in this country. The Third World is fer-
tile ground for the growth of freedom
and democracy, and both overt and co-
vert forms of influence are available to
us. There is no reason in the world why
we should not use our influence to direct
the course of history in the Third World.
To me, it seems immoral not to do so.
If we truly believe that if men are born
with an inalienable right, we must be-
lieve that Africans and Asians are born
with it, and we cannot agree to any at-
tempt to alienate them. Freedom is too
precious to abandon. It is precibus here;
it is precious there; it is precious every-
where.
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Recent criticisms of our attempt to
steer the course of history in the third
vorld has led many to think that we
should abandon this meaningful alter-
native. Some are arguing that we should
only involve ourselves in the internal af-
fairs of another cotIntry when it is essen-
tial to our national interests. From this
premise they argue that since the affairs
of the Congo?Zaire?are not essential
to our national interests, we should not
have become involved in the eatly 1960's
In the Congo; that since the affairs of
Chile are not essential to our national
Interests, we should not have become in-
volved in Chile; and that since the affairs
of Portugal and Angola are not essential
to our national interest, we should not
have become involved in Angola.
So far as the Third World countries
are concerned, it is perhaps also possible
to argue that any particular nation's
affairs are not essential to our Nation's
Interest. Of course, what goes on in the
Congo, taken by itself, has little, if any,
effect on our national interest; and the
same can be said of Chile, Portugal, An-
gola, and any- of the other Third World
nations. But I suggest that we cannot
consider each nation by itself when con-
sidering what is and what- is not in our
national interest; for when dealing with
the Communist world, we have to deal
With it collectively. Although the
Congo?or Zaire, as it is now called?
Chile, Portugal, and Angola individually
have little, if any, bearing on our
national interest, if we permit each Third
World nation to go Communist, the result
Indeed will be detrimental to our na-
tional interest. For the result would be an
isolated America, buffeted by the winds
of a united Communist world, maintain-
ing its freedom only by the threat of nu-
clear war, cut off from natural resources
and trading partners?in short, one free
nation surrounded by a totalitarian
world.
Boy long does one think we can survive
in that kind of situation? The answer is
obWous enough. The freedom of men will
have been relegated to history.
But, believe me, freedom is much too
precious to be lost by default. Foreign
policy is an important ingredient in our
overall national program. It is a defense
not only for our shores, but also the
shores of other democratic Third World
nations. We must do what we can to
preserve the freedom of the world; for
we shall find that one free country in the
world--mirs--cannot survive alone. An
isolated country is sure to be only a tem-
porary bastion of freedom. It is our one
sure road to destruction, and I sincerely
hope that we do not follow it.
Mr. President, the debate before this
body now, in my opinion, is a debate on
more than the question of whether or not
we shall give another $25 million or $30
million of military aid and assistance to
Angola.
I conclude my remarks by saying, Mr.
President, that the remarks I made, es-
sentially, were prepared a long time ago.
I thought of making them several times.
But it is a question that has bothered me.
I do not understand how the President
can carry out his constitutional obliga-
tions and duties of conducting foreign
policy in a fishbowl. Of course, the
American people have a right to know.
But, Mr. President, many of the things
that are going on in Government we in
Congress must hold in trust for the
American people.
The present crisis was not handled by
the President in a vacuum. Appropriate
committees of Congress were kept in-
formed. I was informed as a member of
one of the committees. Nevertheless, I
think it is well that the question has
been debated.
I am not sure, at this moment, how I
would vote on the Tunney amendment, as
amended by the distinguished Senator
from New York. I have mixed emotions.
I think it would be catastrophic in a way
if we say to the President of the United
States, "You cannot do anything else for
the preservation of freedom in Angola."
It would say to those brave individuals?
and I am sure there are thousands of
them?Who thought they were going to
have freedom, "You cannot look to your
friends across the way for any more
help."
It would also serve notice, in my
opinion, to others seeking freedom and
seeking to maintain their freedom
around the world that they possibly could
not look to this great Nation for assist-
ance in preservation of their freedom.
No one would argue or contend for one
moment that we should even commit one
troop to that conflict. The President has
made that clear, and I voted for the
Griffin amendment this afternoon for
the purpose of reiterating that.
But where do we draw the line? I am
sure that is the same question that many
of those who have been looking to us
are asking tonight. I have detected, in
recent weeks, a definite crumbling away
of support for our courageous and brave
friends in Israel. Without our support,
that free nation cannot survive.
'On the other hand, I have agonized
over the thought that maybe it is best
to adopt this amendment in this par-
ticular debate, for if it is not adopted, it
will surely be a political issue in next
year's campaign to stir the emotions of
the American people?much as the de-
bate in the last campaign involved a
question of our foreign policy.
So, I may very well vote for it; I do not
know, realizing the dangerous conse-
quences of it.
I was particularly impressed this morn-
ing with the very calm and deliberate?
and I might say one of the few calm
and deliberate discussions e this issue
before the Senate of the distinguished
Senator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON).
It seems to me that he has approached
it in a logical manner, considering the
consequences both ways. I have joined
with Senator STEVENSON in sponsoring
his resolution, although it may never
come to a vote because of the rules. But
it seems to me that if we really do believe
in the United Nations, this might be the
proper route for us to follow.
?It involved more than immediately
calling on the United Nations to con-
demn, not just one nation for becom-
ing involved, but all nations that are in-
volved. As I recall the resolution, it called
for a cessation of assistance while this
matter was brought to the attention of
the United Nations and while our lead-
ers begin to work and negotiate with the
leaders of the Soviet Union. It seems to
me that this is an honorable and perhaps
the most effective way out of the di-
lemma in which we find ourselves.
Finally, it has been suggested that we
ought not to assist the two factions in
Angola because they are also being as-
sisted by other nations whose ideologies
do not agree with ours, other nations who
violate human.rights.
But I mention also that the African
nations did not condemn that nation,
although I do not understand and I do
not think anyone does, just how much
inir.olvement there is. But is there a na-
tion on the face of the Earth that has
violated human rights and dignity more
than the Soviet Union? We know of the
Indignities and the persecution that are
being endured by the Soviet Jews.
I had a Jewish lady in my office last
week who had emigrated from Russia to
Israel with her little girl, bringing me
information of her husband, who is con-
fined in prison in the Soviet Union. That
was information which indicated beyond
any doubt, to me, that her husband is
enduring the most trying hardships that
any human being can endure. So I say,
Mr. President, that no nation has in-
fringed upon the rights of its citizens
more than the Soviet Union and, not-
withstanding the Helsinki Agreement,
we know that the document which guar-
anteed to the citizens of Europe the right
to travel freely was nothing more to the
Soviet Union than empty promise and a
worthless piece of paper.
Even the great winner of the Nobel
prize was unable to leave that country.
So, Mr. President, I suggest this is, per-
haps, the most serious matter or certain-
ly one of the most serious matters that
has been before this body during the 11
months I have been privileged to serve
in this body. It is one that this body
should not approach emotionally and
uncompromisingly. It is one we should
try to resolve together for the best in-
terests of America and the best interests
of free men and women everywhere.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
STONE). The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask un-
animous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
STONE) . Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask un-
animous consent that James Lucier of
my staff be granted privilege of the floor
during the consideration of this amend-
ment and any votes thereon.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask it be
in order for me to ask for a quorum call
protecting the previously stated rights
of the Senator from Idaho.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
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Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a,quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator from North Carolina for
protecting my right to the floor under
the unanimous consent that we had
previously agreed upon.
As I think most Merribers of the Sen-
ate are aware, there has been for the
last hour and 45 minutes a meeting, at-
tempting to find a resolution of the prob-
lem we are now confronted with.
That meeting has not been completed
41 and discussions are continuing.
While those Members are involved in
that meeting and further discuss the
possible solution that might be applied
to the question that has been pending
before the Senate at this time and also
the parliamentary problem which con-
fronts the Senate in dealing with this
possible solution, I think it might be
useful to discuss for a few minutes some
of the arguments that have been raised
and have only been partially discussed
thus far in the open sessions.
There have been a number of Sena-
tors who have remarked that they are
afraid that this involvement in Angola
and Its progression portended another
Vietnam, that somehow we will be sucked
into another Vietnam. Yet the Senator
from New York' (Mr. JAVITS) very prop-
erly remarked Yesterday that the Griffin
amendment was unnecessary. The Grif-
fin amendment today was defeated, be-
-cause of the arguments that it was un-
necessary because of the passage of the
War Powers Act which makes it impossi-
ble for us to get sucked into another
Vietnam in the same way that we es-
calated through assistance, through ad-
visers, through military advisers and
then directly into troop involvement;
that is not possible any longer under
the War Powers Act.
I think the fears which have been
expressed, and I think legitimate fears
expressed by a number of the Members
of the Senate, that we might thus be
progressing into another Vietnam is an
inaccurate reflection of a very real fear,
not in technical terms of being sucked
Into another Vietnam, but in the way of
an escalation of involvement.
I think that is possible under what we
are talking about. I think if we confine
it to those terms we will understand the
concerns that people are expressing when
they use that terminology.
We not only have the War Powers Act,
but we also have on the record the state-
ment of the President of the United
States and of the Secretary of State very
clearly saying that no troops will be com-
mitted; that that is absolutely impossible.
So 'we are not talking about precisely
following the escalation of involvement
In Angola in the same way we did in
Vietnam.
It has been suggested by some that we
should not be involved as we are with the
'factions that we are simply because
South, Africa is also involved. Well, I
think that is an equal paranoia with
those who charge others with wanting
to be involved on the opposite side of the
Soviet Union no matter where they are
er why. I think just to be uninvolved be-
cause South Africa is involved is equally
blind as to be involved simply because
the Soviet Union is.
I am concerned, Mr. President, that
In the consideration of our policy here
we have not adequately reflected on the
problems that deal with Soviet aims,
goals, and penetration in Africa. Earlier
in closed session I made reference to
the situation that exists on. the other
side of Africa, on the Indian Ocean side,
in Somalia.
It has been suggested here that we do
not need to fear Soviet presence in An-
gola, because they are fiercely national-
istic: that the black African countries
are so nationalistic that Soviet presence
is an impossibility.
Yet, what is the fact in Somalia? Are
they less nationalistic than other Afri-
can countries? Is there anyone who really
believes that the leadership in Somalia
is less inclined to be concerned about the
maintenance of their independence than
other black African nations are? The
fact is that there is a Russian military
base in Somalia, at Berbera.
In July of this last year I had the
privilege of participating with several
other Members of the Senate in a delega-
tion meeting in Moscow with the lead-
ers of the Soviet Union. That delegation
was led by the distinguished Senator
from Minnesota? (Mr. HUMPHREY) and
the distinguished Senator from New York
(Mr. JAvrrs) . Others; including Senator
MORGAN, were present in that delegation.
As I recall, on the second day of July
we sat across the table from some of our
counterparts in the Supreme Soviet, the
leaders of that country in fact as well as
in name. The question was directly asked
about the allegations of a Soviet military
presence and base in Somalia.
They just ridiculed that. They were
sitting less than 5 feet away from me
when they did, right across the table.
They laughed at the suggestion that they
were involved. All they were doing at
Berbera was helping the Somalia Gov-
ernment build a port facility for com-
mercial port reasons.
Three or 4 days later the distinguished
Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. )3ARTLETT)
was present in that country with a
group from our Government inspecting
the facilities on the ground and from
the air in Berbera.
Our delegation happened at that time
to have moved on to Leningrad, in the
Soviet Union.
The Senator from Oklahoma has re-
ported to the Senate and to the country
by written report that their inspection
revealed not only the presence of Soviet
military personnel in Berbera, but the
construction of what is obviously a mis-
sile-handling facility in Somalia.
The President of that country had as-
sured our delegation that they could
have access to anything they wanted to
1,8, 1975
see. There were no areas in his country
that were off limits. The delegation could
go anywhere they wanted and look at
anything they wanted to look at in Ber-
bera to satisfy themselves.
The Senator from Oklahoma reported
to the Senate and to the country that
as they followed his charge to look, and
the guarantee of the President of that
country that they could look at any-
thing, they were denied access to certain
areas in Berbera; that they went to the
gates of the barbed wire enclosures and
were met with soldiers with guns leveled
at them from behind sandbags who said,
"You will not enter here."
The Senator's response was, "The
President told us we could see anything
we wanted to see. Why can we not enter
here?"
They said, "You cannot enter here,
because this is a Soviet base."
Yet, 3 or 4 days before I had been sit-
ting across the table from the leaders of
the Soviet Union in Mopcow and they had
told us there was nothing to those rumors
or charges.
So I do not think we can just brush
aside the consideration of whether or not
there will be expanded Soviet military
operations based in Angola simply on the
basis that these countries are fiercely
nationalistic or that we have no proof
they want to build a military base in An-
gola.
I believe it is a possibility. I believe it is
a consideration that ought to be included
in the evaluation of our policy concern-
ing Angola. From our discussions, both
in open sepsion and in closed session, I be-
lieve it is fair to say that, based upon the
evidence, we have not even considered
that fact. We should have considered
that fact.
The committees and those individuals
who have suggested to us we should ter-
minate involvement in Angola ought to
be able to tell the Senate, and ought to
be able to tell the people of this country,
they have considered that fact, and they
have decided after mature consideration
of that possibility further involvement in
Angola is not justified.
They cannot make that statement. In
fairness, I would think they would agree
with me they have not tried to make that
statement to us, because they have not
considered that possibility.
I am concerned, too, that the sugges-
tion is made that we shall confine our
new programing money and covert activ-
ity to intelligence gathering alone. I as-
sume that if we are going to do that, if
we are going to be consistent, we are going
to say that is true wherever we are in-
volved; we are not going to enter into co-
vert military assistance to any country.
Maybe the Members of this body who
have been suggesting that will make a
distinction. Maybe they will make the
distinction that we should confine the
reprogramed or covert activities to in-
telligence gathering and intelligence in-
formation activities, and that only in the
event of a positive action of Congress
shall we engage in military supply any-
where in the world.
I think that kind of a policy might be
very wisely adopted by Congress. I be-
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lieve that is a policy which I could sup-
port. But it has not been presented to us
' as a general pOlIcy for the Congress of
the United States or the Government of
the United States. It has been presented-
to us as a policy which applies only to
Angola.
I have to ask myself, why? What ra-
tional distinction has been made which
says that in this instance this shall be
our policy, but in other instances it is
not our policy?
I think we must be concerned about
the implications that that will have if,
- indeed, the distinction I have suggested
is not the reason why they are Making
that policy statement. If, without that
distinction, it is to be our policy that
we will supply money to acquire informa-
tion 'to guide our own decisions, then I
would suggest that that same kind of de-
cisionmaking process will apply also in
the Middle East. And what does that do
to the commitments that we have under-
taken with respect to Israel as well as to
other countries in the Middle East? Are
we, by that application of policy pursued
on a broader scale, then, to confine our-
selves to intelligence gathering and in-
formational processes, and are we going
to say, then, to other countries in the
Middle East, "There will be no military
assistance from henceforth from the
Congress of the United States and the
people of the United States?"
If that is to be our policy, or that is
the implication of those who seek in this
Instance to initiate that policy, then I
think we had better know it now. And
if it is not, then I suggest we had better
know what the rational distinction is
that keeps that from being the policy
that wpuld be applied in the Middle East
as well as in Africa.
Mr. President, I am concerned, too,
when we get into the question of how our
policy and our involvement in Africa may
affect the relationships between national
groups in Africa. It is suggested by some,
If I understand their arguments cor-
rectly, that we must not be involved in
Angola because to do so will inflame the
racial tensions in Southern Africa. Yet
It seems to me that a hasty application
of the Tunney amendment to this bill
and the signal that that would be to
the Soviet Union to increase its penetra-
tion in Angola and in Southwest Africa
could very well lead to a worsening of
racial relations, not because of the ac-
tion we took there, but because of the
action we take here.
Why do I say that? Mr. President, I
think it is obvious from the statements
that have been made by the people who
are involved in this debate in Angola?
not in the arguments made here, not in
the arguments made in NATO councils,
but in arguments made by people within
Angola itself?that the institution of rule
by the segment of society being backed
by the Soviet Union could lead to the
extinction of terrorist activities aimed
at a change of internal political policies
in Southwest Africa, in Rhodesia, and in
South Africa, and we would see across
those borders the beginning of the flow
of terrorist activities in much the same
way we have seen it across the borders of
Israel, which has exacerbated the very
difficult situation that exists there, and
that has made it almost impossible for
us to reach a resolution of the political or
military situation in the Middle East, and
we would see across the borders of these
countries the beginning of a guerrilla
warfare which is directed toward a
change of racial balance, and therefore
becomes a very real addition to racial
tensions in the entire region of South-
western Africa.
I think, Mr. President, that rather
than contributing to the easing of racial
tensions, we might very well, by this
action, exacerbate the racial tensions
that exist already in that area of the
world.
And when we start looking 'at the
question of, "Well, will the United States
be alined itself against black African
countries if we continue the policy which
is the policy of the United States today,"
I think it is well that we look toward the
best evidence of what may occur in the
minds of Africans by looking at their
statements.
I think the Senate ought to look at the
content of the debate that occurred in
the United Nations on December 10, just
a week ago yesterday. That debate, which
took place over a resolution which had
originally been devised to condemn the
policies of racial separation in South
'Africa. had been changed suddenly in its
character by a resolution offered by the
Soviet Union as an amendment to that
resolution, which would have condemned
South Africa's intervention in the in-
ternal affairs of Angola.
One difference, though, from the
statements that have been made here on
the floor of the Senate in the last 2 days,
is that that would have had automatic
unquestioning support of all black Afri-
can nations, who condemn South Africa
for their intervention in Angola. But
what was the fact? What did actually
happen?
The Soviet Union did not succeed in
their condemnation of South Africa in
that instance, becaus^ other black Af-
rican nations very quickly pointed out
that South Africa was not the only
country, even the major offender, in
the intervention in internal affairs in
Angola, that the Soviet Union itself was
the major offender in the intervention,
and the black African nations presented
an amendment to that resolution which
would have condemned all foreign in-
tervention in Angola; and in the debate
on that amendment it was clear that
they were talking about the interven-
tion of the Soviet Union.
The debate raged. I have transcripts
of the debate that took plate at thit
time.
The arguments were raised by various
of the black African nations in support
of and in opposition to the amendment
which was offered by the representative
of the Government of Zaire, condemn-
ing all foreign intervention in Angola,
to exclude that resolution which the So-
viet Union had offered which would
have condemned only South Africa but
to include the condemnation of the So-
viet Union's activities in Angola, and
that debate makes very interesting
reading for those who are concerned
about black Africans' reactions to for-
eign intervention in Angola.
The upshot or the final result of that
debate was that both of the amend-
ments were withdrawn. They were with-
drawn after the Soviet Union amend-
ment was rejected on a vote of 42 to 43
with 43 abstentions.
If those who believe that the black
African reaction to the intervention in
Angola must be so uniformly adverse
to the position that we have taken, I in-
vite them to look at that action taken
in the United Nations and to take a look
at the debate that took place and to
consider the vote that occurred only a
week ago yesterday in the United Na-
tions in New York, because I think it
begins to paint a very different picture
of black Africans' reactions to foreign
intervention in Angola.
For those who wish a little bit more
background about that debate and the
meaning of that debate, I invite the at-
tention of Members to an article that
appeared in the New York Times on the
11th of December which is entitled
"Moynihan Accused in U.N. on Angola."
But the point which I refer occurs in the
third paragraph in that article by John
F. Burns. I read from that article this
portion:
Diplomats in touch with the sponsors of
the amendment which was supported by the
Soviet Union and opposed by the United
States said that it had been withdrawn when
it became apparent It could not win a ma-
jority of votes in the assembly.
I also call attention of the Senate to
the article that appeared in the Wash-
ington Post on Thursday, December 11,
just 1 week ago today, a bylined article
by Victor Vorza, entitled "A New Wave
of Soviet Expansionism." He points to
a couple of matters which are of par-
ticular interest in our discussion of pol-
icy in Angola, and let me read briefly
from that article:
The relaxation of international tensions.
Pravda says, has been a powerful force be-
hind the new upsurge in the struggle for
the total liberation of peoples, and Commu-
nist Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko
explains that that support of national lib-
eration forces is an extremely important sec-
tor of our foreign policy work.
At another point in the same article,
Mr. Vorza makes this comment:
But if the Kremlin is allowed to get away
with it. Angola may prove to be only the be-
ginning of a new drive to expand Soviet
power under the cover of detente and not
just in the third world.
If Members wish further material and
editorial comment in regard to this situ-
ation, I suggest that they read the edi-
torial that appeared in the Washington
Post on the 15th of December in which,
among other things, the editorial had
this to say:
In the United Nations the other day, for
instance, the 'Russians suffered a smart set-
back, one of their first of this sort in years,
when the bottom fell out from under a pro-
posed amendment that would have ignored
Soviet intervention and condemned only
the Angolan role of South Africa whose in-
tervention is at once much smaller than
Moscow's and more justified.
Mr. President, I think it is important
for us to note this course of events and
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the commentary on the events by people
who have been much closer to it and I
hope more informed by it than has been
the case for many Members of the Senate
of the United States:
There is another factor that needs to
be considered as we look at the motiva-
tions of the emerging countries.
I agree with the statement that has
been made in the Chamber of this Senate
that no foreign power is going to have
great success in penetrating the govern-
ments of any of the African countries if
they do not use force. But if they are
willing to use force or if they are willing
to use enough economic aid to buy their
way in, they can, in some instances, be
successful in either subverting the gov-
ernment or turning that government's
interests toward their own interests.
Why is it that the Soviet Union has
failed in many of its overtures to emerg-
ing countries in the past? I think it can
be rather clearly stated because these
countries that are throwing off the yoke
of colonialism are not willing to substi-
tute one colonial master for another. I
think, as the colonial empires grew start-
ing late in the 17th century and through
the 18th and 19th centuries and were
used for economic exploitation of the col-
onized areas of the world, these people
threw off that yoke in order to seek not
only political freedom but economic op-
portunity for their people. -
Their experience when they have fallen
within the Soviet orb has been that they
get neither political freedom nor eco-
nomic progress.
To the extent that they are within the
Soviet orb, they find themselves exploited
in exactly the same way that they felt
themselves exploited under the colonial
empires of the preceding century.
The new colonialism of the Soviet
expansionism has been all too evident to
the people who have lived under it.
Witness the course of events in country
after country where the Soviet Union
moved in as colonial powers moved out.
We will find that those countries got only
one thing from the Soviet Union: mili-
tary support, military goods, and they
paid for them. They paid for them in
whatever resources they had at prices
which were very favorable to the Soviet
Union.
Analyze case after case after case of
countries that have gone that route,
tasted that cup, and discarded it be-
cause they found that, although they
could get military supplies to fight
against colonial oppression, they could
get military supplies to fight over who
should control the new country, and they
could get military supplies to subvert the
governments of adjacent areas or to dis-
rupt the political stability in the region
in which these countries are located, they
could not get any meaningful economic
assistance and no real economic growth
occurred for them.
So country after country after country,
having gone through that evolution, has
turned away from the help of the Soviet
Union and toward a greater and freer
economic coordination with the Western
powers. They do not seek to substitute
for the Soviet Union a different master
in any Western power or Western alli-
ance, but they seek opportunity of eco-
nomic growth and social betterment for
their own people. That is their motiva-
tion and a very proper motivation.
So I am in agreement with Members
of this body who have suggested that the
Soviet Union might well be walking into
a morass in Angola, a morass from which
they would find it difficult to extricate
themselves with any great gain, and they
might very well fail in their efforts to
subvert either Angola for a very long
period of time or larger areas of Africa
for any substantial period of time. But
we have not yet decided, and I do not
think we can decide, how much the So-
viet Union is willing to invest in that
effort, how much they are willing to in-
vest economically, how much they are
willing to invest from the standpoint of
prestige, how much they are willing to
invest in terms of military involvement.
They can, if they desire, make great
penetration and great inroads into the
political independence of various areas
of this world, as they have shown a will-
ingness to invest. We may not be talking
about evolution in which a government,
having tasted from the cup of economic
cooperation with the Soviet Union, dis-
dards it. We may be seeing the kind of
situation in which the Soviet Union feels
it is worthwhile to them to Invest mili-
tarily a sufficient force to gain a rela-
tively long-term political-military dom-
inance of an area, as they did in Eastern
Europe.
We know the sad litany of the coun-
tries that have been subverted by the
strength of Soviet military might in an
area where the Soviet Union felt that
it was worthwhile to make that invest-
ment. And they have done so.
I was interested earlier this afternoon
as the very able Senator from Oregon
(Mr. PACKWOOD) was talking about the
price they paid for their involvement in
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and they
have indeed paid a price, in terms of the
reaction of peoples in other countries of
Europe. But that was a price, presum-
ably, that they were willing to pay, in
exchange for the gains they made in
those countries during that period of
time and during the period cif time since
the revolution in Hungary and the at-
tempts by the people of Czechoslovakia
to gain independence over their own in-
ternal political processes.
Mr. President, I think there are a num-
ber of reasons why we must be concerned
about the evolution of a policy in Angola
that may have long-lasting and far-
reaching effects upon riot just one small
black African country.
I was interested in some of the com-
ments that were made in the debate in
the United Nations to which I made
reference earlier that touched on the
question of the reactions of black peo-
ples to domination by foreign countries
which are not black. I should like to read
from the remarks by the representative
Of the Government of Zaire at that time,
because I believe they shed light on the
attitudes of black nations.
I make this reservation as I read from
those remarks: They are translations,
obviously, and I apologize for any inac-
curacy in the translation. I hope the
translation is accurate enough to reflect
the truth of the statements made by the
representative of the Government of
Zaire in those debates. He said this:
In certain quarters it is believed that Zaire
is against the MPLA. We are not. The first
shot fired against the Portuguese colonial
administration did not come from the Soviet
Union but from Zairean national territory,
and in the first hours of the MPLA, where
was NATO?
Is there a desire deliberately to ignore the
history of the national liberation movements
in Angola? The Soviet Union believes itself
to be the champion and the savior of Angola.
At a time when the Portuguese colonial ad-
ministration was rampaging in Angola, where
were the armored cars, the tanks, and the
sophisticated weaponry with which the So-
viet Union is now flooding Angola? No doubt
Soviet weapons could not be seen to be used
against the Portuguese rights.
This is racism stood on its head. And now
they are dividing Angolan brothers, providing
them with murderous weapons and helping
them to kill each other. They are black, so
they can kill each other. But when the white
Portuguese were there, we did not see such
weapons coming into Angola. Whom are they
trying to deceive? Why play hide and seek?
At another point, later, he said:
And if the Soviet Union, that great friend
of independent Africa, were really as friendly
as all that, it could take into account the
decisions of our heads of state on the African
continent.
I think it is very clear, Mr. President.
that the black African nations, them-
selves, do not share the same fears about
our involvement in Angola as has been
stated and do not see our involvement in
the same light as some of the Members
of the U.S. Senate see it in terms of their
own statements here today.
Let me make just one additional refer-
ence to the pending resolution of the
Senator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON). I
made reference to that resolution earlier
today and pointed out to the Members
that it can be found on page S22539 of
the RECORD of yesterday. I have two con-
cerns with the resolution as presented by
the able Senator from Illinois.
' First, it has a number of preamble
clauses, and then in the resolution por-
tion there are six paragraphs. The first
five paragraphs refer to a number of
items that can be found in sequence, and
the sixth item is the one to which I want
to refer, because it says:
The President should suspend further as-
sistance to any faction in Angola pending ef-
forts to seek an end to all foreign interven-
tion in Angola.
I think that has an inversion in the
language of the resolution, an inversion
that I hope the Senator from Illinois will
correct. If that and a couple of other
items in the resolution are changed, it
would make it possible for me to support
the resolution, because I think the Sen-
ator from Illinois did not intend that we
do nothing, awaiting this kind of action
on the part of the withdrawal of those
people who are now involved in Angola.
He did not intend, I should think, to say
that we will do nothing until we say that
they have withdrawn.
Instead, I think it would be more con-
structive to say that as they withdraw,
we will react; and if they do not with-
draw, we will apply these sanctions. But,
pending that period of time, we will not
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Veto actiokif the legislation does not
conform exactly to the wishes of the
Secretary of Tsportation.
Mr. Presidentthe committee has held
hearings for hal/ a year on this legisla-
tion,\ and has r eived the advice of
countless experts b th within the Gov-
ernment and outsid the Government.
The bill is the product' f this exhaustive
process, and in the op on of both my-
self and the ranking ml?ity member
of the subcommittee, is fkr superior to
the proposals of the De artment of
Transportation. If we are g? to per-
mit these kinds of threats to etermine
the substance of legislation, R is my
opinion that we should just pl e the
administration's request legislat on
the consent Calendar, dispense wit re-
ferring it to committee, do away with e
studies that have been conducted
these issues by the Office of Technolog
Assessment and outside consultants,
and pass whatever Secretary Coleman
demands of us.
We have come a long way in meeting
the administration's demands on this
legislation, and the conference yesterday
made substantial further adjustments
designed to come more than halfway on
all the major issues dividing us. The ad-
ministration has yet to compromise on
one major issue. If we simply allow the
Congress of the United States to be push-
ed around in this manner, it would rep-
resent a negation of the entire legislative
process. The legislation before the Sen-
ate today is strongly supported by a tre-
mendous hearing record and a volumin-
ous report. The administration's de-
mands are supported by nothing other
than the political views of the Secretary
of Transportation and the Office of Man-
agement and Budget. I urge my collea-
gues to demonstrate by their vote here
today that the Congress will not be in-
timidated by these threats and will not
abandon reason and rationale in the face
of a Secretary of Transportation or an
Office of Management and Budget that
make unsupported allegations and ir-
responsible charges.
If this legislation is enacted as the
administration would like, it will do
nothing other than provide the Secre-
tary of Transportation with the total
power to restructure the Nation's rail
system without any public interest con-
trols, and the executive branch would be
given the complete and unfettered dis-
cretion to control the funding and op-
erations not only of the Northeast rail-
roads, but of all railroads in the Nation.
Aside from the problems that this would
cause in the courts with respect to the
question of whether Government has
effectively nationalized the northeast
and midwest rail system, it is my firm
belief that it would be very detrimental
to the railroad system of the entire Na-
tion. It is not the judgment of the Sen-
ate Commerce Committee that the
American system works best by grantin
total discretion to the executive branc
to do whatever it pleases with respect
a major sector of the Nation's traps-
portation system. ,
If the pending rail legislation lj not
enacted into law at once, at least 2- or
3-month delay of the long-planIed re-
vitalization of Northwest rail service is
Inevitable. Delay is costly to the taxpayer
and the reorganization process.
Grants to the Penn Central and other
bankrupts must continue, at the rate of
well over $1 million a day. These funds
are lost forever. They result in no im-
provements of service.
Grant funds will run out by the sched-
uled date for startup of ConRail under
the final system plan, unless funds now
dedicated to rehabilitation are repro-
gramed.
If new funding is not made available,
there is a danger that rail service will
terminate.
The bankrupt railroads are now run-
ning their operations on a going-out-of-
business basis that threatens the integrity
of the final system plan. They are assid-
uously selling off properties and run-
ning down inventories. Delay only feeds
this process. ;
\ Delay creates uncertainty that can;
set plans for participation in the final'
em plan of the Chessie System and
0th' solvent rail carriers.
y means that advance planning
for tr sfer of functions from the bafik-
rupts ConRail and Chessie will be
thrown to disarray and result in/extra
costs.
Delay w d cause a shutdown' of the
advance reh ilitation program-,-section
215. This wo result in imme5fiate lay-
offs of 3,000 e ployees and extra costs
of some $300 mil n to ConRail.
A lapse of serv e on some( commuter
and light density lines, ginning as
early as February robably will occur.
Extended delay 1k s rtup of the
plan may upset CqraMj financial per-
formance and cake 4fusion as to
whether the final sS, tein lan had been
fully successful. N
Delays also may add Ak, potential
claims against the . United ,'Itz.tes for
"erosion" of the asiets of the ankrupt
estates. - \
Mr. President, I m ready to vote'
'\
X would just 1 e to say that d1 ing
the .\
e time of this onference we have ad
the help of n alone some dedicat d
members of th Commerce Committee it.,
self, but fro *staff members, both on the \
majority an minority side. I think it
would be a ropriate for me to say this
at this tim
I do no now a man who has contrib-
uted mo /e to the success of this legis-
lation t an the Senator from Connecti-
cut (I41. Weimea). He has been out-
stand' g in his concern, his depth of un-
derst nding, and his realization that
what we are doing here is really provid-
ing/for a massive reorganization on a
pr ate enterprise basis of the railroad
stem, and in our hope that we will not
faced with this type of situation in
e future.
We know we have not cleared all the
errors, but I will say this: Without Sen-
ator WEICKER'S concern it would have
been very difficult for us to pass this leg-
islation in the form and in the positive
stance which it has at the present time.
I would also like to pay tribute to the
staff members, particularly Lynn Sut-
cliffe, general counsel; Tom Allison, Paul
Cunningham, Mal Sterrett, Geoff Baker,
S 23045
John Kirtland, and David Clanton for
the work they have done.
It has been one of the real joys to have
People who have understanding and wis-
dom and, at the same time, the ability
to move with ,speed at a time when speed
was needed..
It has been a real pleasure to work
with these gentlemen.
Mr. BELL. Mr. President, as a mem-
ber of thp Surface Transportation Sub-
committee and as a member of the con-
ference , committee, I urge the Senate
to approve S. 2718, the Railroad Revital-
izatiou and Regulatory Reform Act.
AO stated on December 4 when this
measure passed the Senate, this is must
legislation. It is simply imperative that
we, move ahead and allow ConRail to
take over as quickly as possible the op-
ations of Penn Central. From what I
ave heard, Penn Central is doing little,
-except depleting inventories and contin-
uing to allow its bankrupt operations
to go farther down hill. S. 2718 seeks to
stop this deterioration and not only to
develop a viable rail system in the
Northeast but also to assure a healthy
rail network nationwide.
Hopefully, the enactment of this bill
will signal an end to an era of neglect
for the Nation's railroads. Railroads had
not only been victims of neglect, but also
in many instances of public policy and
regulatory action which worked against
greater utilization of this energy effi-
cient, ecologically sound, and safe
transportation mode.
S. 2718 would:
First. Reform the regulatory system
and the regulatory agency, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. One exam-
ple is the expediting of railroad mergers
and rationalization in order to avoid
situations such as the Rock Island case
which dragged out for over 10 years.
Second. Implement the reorganization
of the bankrupt railroads of the North-
east. I am pleased that the conference
committee included the Senate protec-
tion against deficiency judgments. This
provision was included by the Senate
committee at my urging and is essential
for the acquisition by Southern Railroad
of the lines on Maryland's Eastern
Shore. This important section of my
tate thus will be able to count on serv-
ic s by one of the Nation's outstanding
ra oads.
rd. Reaffirm the commitment by
Con ss to the Northeast corridor proj-
ect wh h Congress endorsed in the Re-
gional il Act of 1973. This provision is
designed to bring modern, first-rate
transporta .on service to this heavily
populated a a of the country. Projec-
tions show in reased population growth
and additional ravel requirements. Ex-
isting transport tion systems will have
difficulty accom dating such growth.
Therefore, it beho s this Nation to get
on with this project. t has been studied
e. Delay today
costs and in-
enough. It is team ogically feasiable
and economically via
will mean only increase
adequate transportation omorrow.
Better ways to move peo. e in energy-
efficient, environmentally sound, and safe
ways must be given higher priority. The
time to act is now?not when another
energy crisis is upon us.
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S 23046
ourth. Provide a subsidy for local rail
lit service of 100 percent the first
90 percent the second, 80 percent
ird, and 70 percent for the fourth
th years. This will make certain
State and/or local communities
pers will be able to continue
es which they deem vital.
ndate continuation of rail
erviees for 6 months with a
fre
yei
the
and
that
and s
branch
Fifth.
commuter
100-percent federal subsidy for that pe-
riod and forte succeeding 6-month pe-
r, a subsidy of 90 percent
for 1 year and 50 percent
Year for State and local
encfes willing to con-
is provision is essen-
rail commuter serv-
roximately 500 pas-
senger g between Bal more and Wash-
ington, would be lost. 1un confident that
With this provision ray State will be
able to see that this impbrtant transpor-
tation service will continue, and
Sixth. Authorize a near, program to
provide for the conversion a,f abandoned
railroad rights-of-way to piablic use.
S. 2718 the bill before thesSenate to-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-- SENATE, December
- IRollcall Vote NO. 609 Leg.]
YEAS-51
Beall \ Hathaway
Biden Hollings
Brooke Iluddleston
Buckley Humphrey
Bumpers Inouye
Burdick Jackson
Case Javits
Clark Kennedy
Cranston Leahy
Culver Long
Durkin agnuison
Ford caeo
Glenn l4Govern
Gravel Mklntyre
Hart. Philip A. M calf
Hartke /do dale
Hat del d Mos
NA S-29
Allen Hanse
Baker Hart,
Bartlett Haskell
Bellmon Helms
Byrd, Ilruska
Harry F., Jr. Mansflel
Byrd, Robert C. McClell
rod. Thereaf
Will be availabl
for a succeedin
transportation a
Jamie this service.
tial for otherwise t
ice, which serves ap
day, is complex legislation. Gi
garitic problems and issues w
measure addresses and the cri
portance not only to the North
else to the entire Nation of their
tion, this is understandable.
While S. 2'718 is not perfect, an
comprehensive measure involving
tnariy issues and interests could be,
laeirertheless represents a Herculean e
fort and should be supported by the Sen-
ate.
As I look back on our work, the process
and procedures we mandated seemed to
have worked well. I feel the office of
Public counsel was particularly helpful
alerting communities and shippers re-
garding the act's impact on them and
In helping them to prepare their cases. It
was an open Process with inputs from
many. Again, not perfect, but as fair and
as open as seems humanly possible. ,
Of course, the final test of the wor
remains ahead. ConRail has an increasft
task confronting it. With the suppolt
Provided in the bill and with new ma-
ageriterit, there is reason for guarded ep-
timism. In any event, we had little
choices.
ning.
cated
. I am
ated in
n the gi-
ich this
cal tru-
st but
solue,
110
SO
The railroads had to be kept
Nationalization, as a few ad
would have been even more cost
pleased and proud to have partic
this historical and significant/effort. I
urge the enactment of the ebnference
report. ,g/
Mr. PERCY. Mr. Presiclen with some
reservations I concluded I, should vote
against the conference report on the Rail
Services Act, S. 2718.
While certain reductisins In outlays
were achieved in confere*ce, I still main-
tabs the bill authori4es expenditures
beyond what I believe tO be prudent both
k for improving
vice from Boston
District of Colum-
PPorter of rail pas-
eral and of .Amtrak
with all the other
iorities and our soar-
et / feel compelled to
With respect to Amt
Northeast corrider s
to New York and th
bia. I am a strong
senger serVice in g
In particular. B
Urgent funding
irig Federal bu
oppose spending which does not in et
what I consider to be a prudent and fflly
justifiable cost-benefit analyses.( I
applaud the movement toward Com-
promise but I do not believe we have
trimmed to the proper level yet.
I am disappointed that the Hoqse lan-
guage with respect to certifi tes of
value was largely retained. I be eve this
is a serious flaw in that it pe its and
may encourage years of litigation. The
virtual assurance that man, of these
suits Will not be decided a:a swiftly as
would have been the case had the Senate
language been accepted, I think will
deter financial institutions/ from making
capital available to our /railroads and,
possibly, our utilities.
Finally, I oppose giving authorities to
the U.S. Railway AssOciation which I
believe properly belo 'g in the Depart-
m /
ent of Transportati n.
For these reasons will oppose the act
as now drafted andt will vote to sustain
the Presidential veto that is expected.
Mr. WEICKERI Mr. President, I am
prepared to yield/back the remainder of
my time.
I want to thank the distinguished
Senator from." Indiana for his very
gracious remarks about me. I also want
to commend: Mal Sterrett and Geoff
Baker who Worked hand-in-glove in a
cooperative Way with the majority mem-
bers of the itaff.
I yield bAck the remainder of my time.
Mr. HARTKE. I yield back the re-
rnaindeabf my time.
The PRESIDING OietsiC'ER. All time
has b4etn yielded back. The question is
On a eeing to the conference report.
he yeas and nays have been ordered,
ad the clerk will call the roll.
e legislative clerk called the roll.
r. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce
tie the Senator from Indiana (Mr.
AY , the Senator from Texas (Mr.
3ENTS N) , the Senator from Nevada (Mr.
/CANN() the Senator from Florida (Mr.
' Crimes) the Senator from Missouri
(Mr. EA LETON) , the Senator from
Louisiani (Mr. JOHNSTON) , the Senator
from New exico (Mr. Moarroya) , the
Senator froIi Florida (Mr. STONE) , the
Senator from ississippi ;Mr. EASTLAND) ,
the Senator kom South Dakota (Mr.
ABOUREEK) , the enator from Mississippi
(Mr. Smalls) , nd the Senator from
Illinois (Mr. ST ESON) are necessarily
absent.
I also announce at the Senator from
Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) \is absent on official
business.
On this vote, the Se ator from Illinois
(Mr. STEVENSON) IS palrkd with the Sena-
tor from Florida (Mr. S NE). If present
and voting, the Senato from Illinois
would vote "yea" and the enator from
Florida would vote "nay."
Mr. GRIFFIN. I announ e that the
Senator from Tennessee ( . Baocx),
the Senator from Kansas ( . DOLE) ,
the Senator from Arizona (Mr. ANNIN) ,
the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. FoxG) ,
the Senator from Arizona (Mr. OLD-
WATER), the Senator from Nevada (Mr.
LAxALT I, and the Senator from Mar and
(Mr. MATHIAS) are necessarily absen
The result was announced?yeas 1
nays 29,, as follows:
19, 1975
Curtis
Domenici
Garn
Griffin
Abourezk
Bayh
Bentsen
Brock
Cannon
Chiles
Church
So the
Mr.
to reco
McClur
MorgaF
Nunn
Packyrood
NOT VOTING-- 0
Muskie
Nelson
Pastore
Pearson ,
Pell ,
Randolph /
Rlbicoff .'
Roth 1
Schwei
Scott, ugh
Spark an
Staffotd
Stev,ens
Syington
T ney
Joker
illiams
Percy
Proxmire
Scott,
William L.
Taft
Talmadge
Thurmond
Tower
Young
Dole
E,Agleton
Eastland
iVannin
/ Fong
y Goldwater
Johnston.
xalt
thias
M ntoya
St nis
Ste anion
Sto
nference report was a
RTKE. Mr. President,
sider the vote by which th
ferenc report was agreed to.
Mr WEICKER. I move to lay that
tion on the table.
e motion to lay on the table was
eed to.
r. PASTORE. May we have order,
pilease, Mr. President.
reed to.
move
Con-
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPRO-
PRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1976
The PRESIDING OrasiCER. Under
the previous order, the Senate will now
resume consideration of H.R. 9861,
which the clerk will state by title.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
Amendment in disagreement No. 75 to
H.R. 9861, an act making appropriations for
the Department of Defense for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1976, and for the period
beginning July 1, 1976, and ending Septem-
ber 30, 1976, and for other pimposes.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, let
us have order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ate will be in order. Senators will please
take their seats.
The Senator from Montana.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
leadership has been endeavoring all day
to arrive at an agreement affecting the
conference report on the defense ap-
propriation and the amendment offered
by the distinguished Senator from Cali-
fornia (Mr. Tummy).
We thought we had arrived at a rea-
sonable solution by means of which the
pending business would be laid aside and
the Senate would then have the oppor-
tunity to turn to the consideration of
such measure as the 200-mile leigslation,
in which the distinguished Senator from
Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON) is so in-
terested, and who has exerted so much
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muukxrcr, ?DAIMII000400100018-1 S 23047
pressure that I DM getting a bent back
from Contacts with him.
Then it was hoped that it would be
possible to turn to H.R. 9852, the so-
Called Mobile Housing Act, which has a
time limitation.
Then it was the intention of the lead-
erShip, because of the pressure exerted
by the distinguished Chairman of the
Committee on Appropriations?low key,
qUiet?that we would take up a bill to
establish improved programs for the
benefit of producers and consumers of
rice.
the proposed agreement we thought,
wUld ave been the best way out of a
Official situation, especially for the ad-
Ministration. We would have turned to
at least one and possibly two of these
Other measures, and what we did not
coMplete in that sphere would be taken
lip the first thing on our return next
January 19, the House willing to send
us a resolution to that effect, which we
do riot have at the present time.
Tlje matter was discussed with the
;chairman and the ranking melnber of
the Appropriations Committee, with the
Itepublican leadership, with people in-
tereated on both sides of the issue.
It was impossible to reach an agree-
ntent, and therefore we are faced with a
tt,?Which only will allow for more
allying on the part of the Senate.
r. President, I think I have covered
the main points.
- Mr, IIITGH SCOTT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr, /vIANSFIELD. If I may, let me
$41.11SkPlease. I think I have covered the
*thain points In what I intended to say to
the Senator at this time. I wish to say to
the distinguished Senator from Wash-
ling (Mr. MicicosoN) that I will make
'effort to bring up the 200-mile bill
'otirretUrn after the recess. I will make
e plege to the distinguished Sen-
or rom 'Arkansas (Mr. MCCLELLAN)
.0bI1C0/11/19 the rice bill, and I will make
tbe same *rinse to the distinguished
Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON)
concerning the mobile housing bill.
I hope' that in this respect we will be
able to advance the work of the Senate,
and at this time I am glad to yield to my
distinguished friend the Republican
leader of the Senate.
MOITYGH SCOTT. I thank the dis-
tinguished majority leader.
Mr. President in addition to much
Other agonizing over this issue, about two
dozen Senators spent nearly 4 hours yes-
terdaY afternoon trying to arrive at a
viable solution. There seems to me to be
at least substantial majority sentiment
for a proposal which would not have
satisfied anyone entirely, I suppose, and
certainly not satisfied everyone, but
which at least would have allowed some
raoVement in the area which the admin-
istration seilght, really, very hard indeed
to achieve; and I will say that the meet-
ing was With the Secretary of State.
This morning some of us met with the
majority leader in a further effort to
work out the order of business on the
basis of a declaration of intention by the
majority leader beginning next year.
. All of these attempts have fallen by the
wayside, because some Senators are of
One mind and one point of view here, and
others are diametrically opposed.
If the distinguished majority moves to
lay on the table the pending amendment,
while I would have to vote against the
amendment, I would like to make it clear
that that should not be interpreted as
reflecting my views on the Angola situa-
tion one way or the other, on the merits.
Such a motion may well be offered by
him in order to bring about a resolution
of the question. Perhaps if he does offer
it, it would be better to table it, and I
would so vote. Then we cart get on with
the rest of the business, and the Appro-
priations Committee can get on with this
tough situation, as well as a number of
others we will have to take up as soon
as we possibly can arrange the meetings.
I wanted the distinguished majority
leader to know that I myself hope that
under the circumstances the amend-
ment can be laid on the table, so that
when we come back in January, simi-
lar amendments could be offered and
similar arguments could be made. The
debate at that time might look differ-
ent. The administration feels that the
adoption of the amendment at this time
would be disastrous, would be a catas-
trophe, and they have made their views
very strongly clear.
Again I repeat, and then I am
through, that I am not stating my own
views here on Angola one way or the
other. I am very much concerned about
the American position. I am also con-
cerned about the impact on world opin-
ion of what the Senate may do here
today. I wanted the chance to get that
on the RECORD before the Senator pro-
ceeded further.
I thank the majority leader.
Mr. MANSeIELD. Mr. President, be-
fore I make the motion to, lay on the
table the Tunney amendment, I wish to
state unequivocally that I favor the
Tunney amendment; that I am against
our intervention in the affairs of two
of the three tribal elements within An-
gola; that in my opinion the national in-
terest and security of this country are
not involved in the events in Angola;
and I wish to say that I can see many
parallelisms between this situation and
the beginning of the adventure in Viet-
nam.
Mr. President, I move to lay on the
table the amendment of the Senator
from California (Mr. TUNNEY) , and I
ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
a sufficient second? There is a sufficient
second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
BELLMON) . The question is on agreeing
to the motion of the Senator from Mon-
tana (Mr. MANSFIELD) to lay on the ta-
ble the amendment of the Senator from
California. On this question the yeas
and nays have been ordered, and the
clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called
the roll.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce
that the Senator from South Dakota
(Mr. ABOUREZK) , the Senator from
Indiana (Mr. BAYH) , the Senator from
Texas (Mr. BENTSEN) , the Senator from
Nevada (Mr. CANNoN), the Senator from
Florida (Mr. Cnnocs), the Senator from
Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON) , the Senator
from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND) , the
Senator from Louisiana (Mr. JOHNSTON) ,
the Senator from Montana (Mr. Mar-
ems), the Senator from New, Mexico
(Mr. -MoNrovA), the Senator from Mis-
sissippi (Mr. STENNIS), the Senator from
Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON) and the Sena-
tor from Florida (Mr. STONE) are neces-
sarily absent.
I further announce that the Senator
from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) is absent on
official business.
I further announce that, if present and
voting, the Senator from Idaho (Mr.
CHURCH) , and the Senator from Florida
(Mr. STONE) would each vote "nay."
Mr. GRato.toIN. I announce that the
Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Baoex) ,
the Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE) ,
the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN) ,
the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Foxe),
the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GoLn-
wATER), the Senator from Nevada (Mr.
LAxAvr), and the Senator from Maryland
(Mr. MATHIAS) are necessarily absent.
The result was announced?yeas 21,
nays 58, as follows:
I Rollcall Vote No. 610 Leg.]
YEAS-21
Griffin
Hansen
Hruska
Long
McClellan
McClure
McGee
Baker
Bartlett
Beall
Bellmon
Buckley
Curtis
Dom eni ci
Allen
Biden
Brooke
Bumpers
Burdick
Byrd,
Harry F., Jr. Humphrey
Byrd, Robert C. Inouye
Case Jackson
Clark Javits
Cranston Kennedy
Culver Leahy
Durkin Magnuson
Ford Mansfield
Garn McGovern
Glenn McIntyre
Gravel Mondale
Hart, Gary Moss
Hart, Philip A. Muskie
Hartke Nelson
NAYS-58
Haskell
Hatfield
Hathaway
Helms
Hollings
Huddleston
Abourezk
Bayh -
Bentsen
Brock
Cannon
Chiles
Church
Morgan
Roth
Scott, Hugh
Stevens
Thurmond
Tower
Young
Nunn
Packwood
Pastore
Pearson
Pell
Percy
Proxmire
Randolph
Ribicoff
Schweiker
Scott,
winiam L.
Sparkman
Stafford
Symington
Taft
Talmadge
Tunney
Welcker
Williams
NOT VOTING-21
Dole Laxalt
Eagleton Mathias
Eastland Metcalf
Fannin Montoya
Fong Stennis
Goldwater Stevenson
Johnston Stone
So the motion to table Mr. TUNNEY'S
amendment was rejected.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question now recurs on the amendment
of the Senator from California, as
amended.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
have discussed this possibility with the
Republican leadership. I have received
no assurances, but I think it is worthy
of the effort.
I ask unanimous consent that there be
not to exceed 40 minutes on the Tunney
amendment, the time to be equally di-
vided between the distinguished manager
of the bill, the Senator from Arkansas
(Mr. McCLELLAN) and the distinguished
Senator from California (Mr. TuNNEy).
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S 23048 Approved FcEstEigeleMiXONIVILOREMZEDP-AIWA
The PRESIDING OF'FIC.r..a. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and it
Ia sO ordered.
Mr. MANSOIELD. Mr. President, I ask
for the yeas arid nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
a
sufficient second? There is a sufficient
second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. mAN8prEto. Mr. President I
yield to the distinguished Senator from
Kentucky.
ATE CONCURRENT RESOLTJTI
AND SENATE CONCtTRRENT
soLtrnoil 83?CORRECTIONS
ENROLLMENT OF S. 2718, RML-
R REVrrALIZATION AND REG-
'CIL TORY REFORM ACT OF '1975
Mr. RD. Mr. Pregident / serl two
oOtiourettt resolutions to the dek and
atkfors their immediate oonsid ation,
en bloc.
The PESIDING Ornurat. e con-
current resolutions will be stated by title.
The as tent legislative cler read as
follows :
A eoarurreit resolution (S 0/n. Res. 82)
to make con tionia In the enrollment of S.
2718, a bill tt improve the cii.hIity of rail
rough regu-
rail services
ion and im-
ther purposes
Con. Res. 83)
services in the\ TJnited States t
?ordination o
nd rehabilit
ng, and for
solution (
s in the #nrollment of S.
rove thl quality of rail
ed Sta s through regu-
tnatios of rail services
ehalilitation and bn-
nd or other purposes.
latory reform,
and facilities,
provement linen
concUrrent
to make borrectio
271.8, a bill to im
servicea in the 'CM
latory reform, coor
and facilities, and
provement financing,
Mr. FORD. Mr. Pe dent, these reso-
lutions make correc r, .ns in the enroll-
ment of S. 2718, wh is the Senate has
just passed. The cor tions are for the
purpose of seeing t t he bill meets the
agreement at the rence and what
we passed today. e s if worked long
and hard last nil t in rder to put it
together. These re sirirly technical
changes.
Mr. oraFTTN. o substaxtive changes?
Mr. vont). N substantW changes at
all.
The P G OFFICE1 The ques-
tion is on # eeing to the'concurrent
resolutions.
The conc ent resolutions% (S. Con.
Res. 82 and . Cori. Res. 83) we e agreed
to, as foriow :
S. Cox. RES. 8'2
Resolved y the Senate (the Houselof Rep-
resentative concurring). That the S retary
of the Se te is direated to make ?Orr tionra
in the en llment of S. 2718, a bill to 1 rove
the qu y of rail services in the U ited
States t rough regulatory reforni, coor na-
tion of all services and facilities, and r a-
bilitati n and irrrprovement financing, rid
for ot r purposes as follows:
e out section 308 of the bill in i s
y and redeSignate sections 309 throng
$L2 the bill as section 308 through 31
ther of.
S. Cox. RES. 83
sOlved by the Senate (the Rouse of
resentatives concurring), That the Clerk
the Senate is directed 'to make correc-
ns in the enrollment of S. 2718, a bill
'Improve the quality of rail services in the
Starr States through regulatory reform,
?Ordination of ran services and fatillties,
\nd rehabilitation and improvement financ-
Dig, and for other purposes as follows:
sc. 2. In section 308 of the Regional Rail
Rganization Act (as added by section 609
(b) of the bill) strike the bracket at the be-
ginntrig of the section.
Sec.. 3. In title VI of the bill redesignate
the sectand section 614 as 615, and redesignate
sections ,615 and 616 as 616 and 617 re-
spectively,
SEC. 4. In section 801(b) (3) of the Regional
Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, SS added by
617 of the kill as redesignated is amended
by?
(a) striking,." (1)" the second time it ap-
pears; and
kb) striking the brackets and the mate-
rial therein, except the quotation mark and
the final period. \
SEC. 5. Before tire section heading of sec-
tion 701 of the bill inaert the following:
"TITLE VII?NOR AST CORRIDOR
PROJECT IMP MENTATION"
SEC. 6. Section 4(m) f the Department of
Transportation Act, (as dded by section 803
of the bill) is amended tg inserting the last
sentence immediately af r the period of
the sentence preceding it.
SEC. 7. Section 4(n) of he Department
of Transportation Act (as dcled by sec-
tion 803 of the bill) is ame ed by strik-
ing "(1)" and inserting in lieu tereof "(p)".
SEC. 8. Section 4(o) of the Department of
Transportation Act, (as added by ection 803
of the bill) is amended by strikin "(1) " and
inserting in lieu thereof "(p)".
SEC. 9. Subdivision (e) of secti 20(3)
of the Interstate Commerce Act, as aklended
by section 307 of the bill is deleted an sub-
division (f) is redesignated as subdi ision
(e).
SEC. 10. Section 4(r) of the Departmen of
Transportation Act (as added by section ?
of the bill) is amended by striking " (1) " a
"(j)" and inserting in lieu thereof "(p)" an
"(q)" respectively.
SEC. 11. Insert a period after "(6) neces,
sary studies" in section 101 of the bill.
SEC. 12. In section 15(6) of the Inters
Commerce Act (as amended by section
of the bill) strike "(C)" and Insert in
thereof "(c)".
SEC. 13. In seotion 202(b) of the bill trike
out all of the matter starting with "f(6) In
any hearing under" and ending wit "at the
earliest practicable time".
Sec. 14. In the matter inserte /into the
Interstate Commerce Act by sec on 202(e)
(B) of the bill?
(1) strike " ' (9) (a)"
and insert in lieu thereof" ' (8)i(0";
i) of this part"
eof and insert
)(b)-(i) of this
ivision (b) strike
paragraph. That"
of "sudivision (d)
(2) strike "section 1(5) (B)
In new subdivision (b) to
in lieu thereof "section 1
part" and in such new su
"subparagraph (d) of th
and insert in lieu the
alleging that";
(3) strike in its enti ety clause (iv) of new
subdivision (c) ther of and insert in lieu
thereof the follown new such clause (1v)
" ' (iv) the inore e or decrease for any
rate filed within e second year following
such date of en ctment is not more than
7 per centum o the rate in effect on Jan-
uary 1,1977;";
(4) in new bdivision (d) thereof?
(A) after interested partY" and before
"that?" in rt the following: "or of the
Office of Public Counsel";
(B) af "injury to the oomplainant" and
before ";, and" insert the following "or, in
the case/ of the complaint of such Office,
njury ,to a member of the public or the
ublicizenerally";
In new subdivision (f) thereof after
rst sentence thereof and before the
1 sentence thereof insert the following two
nq sentences: "In any hearing under this
TAR000400gdotifhr 19, 1975.
section, the burden of proof is on the car-
rier to show that the proposed changed rate,
fare, charge, classification, rule, regulation,
or practice is compensatory, just, and reason-
able. The Commission shall specifically con-
sider, in any such hearing, proof that such
proposed changed rate, fare, charge, classifi-
cation, rule, regulation, or practice will have
a significantly adverse effect on the competi-
tive posture of shippers or consignees to be
affected by such change."
SEC. 15. In section 202(f) of the bill in the
clause preceding paragraph (1) thereof strike
"to" and in paragraph (I) thereof immedi-
ately before "modify" insert "to".
SEC. 16. In section 15(3) 6f the Interstate
Commerce Act (as amended by section 203(a)
of the bill) (1) strike "In determining" in
the first sentence of th t new matter and
insert in lieu thereof "With respect to car-
riers by railroad, in determining"; and (2)
strike "(C)" and insert in lieu thereof "(c)".
SEC. 17. In new section 5b of the Interstate
Commerce Act (as inserted in section 208(b)
of the bill?
(1) in paragraph (6) (a) (1) thereof strike
"discussions or";/
(2) in paragraph (6) (a) (it) thereof strike
"discussions ory.
SEC. 18. In .new section 24 of the Inter-
state Commeice Act (as Inserted by section
304 of the bill) --
(1) strike out the brackets and the second
sentence in subsection (b) thereof and insert
in lieu thereof the following: "The Director
shall be. appointed by the commission and
shall bV qualified and take office upon the
approvAl of such appointment by a concur-
rent psolution of the Senate and of the
HouVe of Representatives";
(7) in subsection (c) thereof strike "rec-
mrpriendations" and insert in lieu thereof
"recommendations";
/ (3) in subsection (e) thereof strike the
/Comma after President and all that follows
through the end of such subsection and in-
sert in lieu thereof a period.
SEC. 19, In section 306 of the Regional Rail
organization Act of 1973 (as inserted in
tion 609(b) of the bill) strike out the
cket immediately before "Sec. 306.".
c. 20. In section 403 of the bill?
(1 insert "(a)" immediately after "403.";
(2) strike "(c) Section 5 of the Interstate
Comm rce Act (49 U.S.C. 5) is" and insert in
lieu th eof "(b) Section 5 of such Act (49
U.S.C. 511s further".
SEC. 21 In section 404 of the bill, strike
the brack?efore "SEC.".
SEC. 22. kmencl the first six printed lines
on page 69 ?the Conference Report to read
as follows:
"PROTECTI N Or GOVERNMENT rums
"Sec. 608. Ti 'e III of the Regional Rail
Reorganization A?of 1973, as amended by
section 609 of th Act, is further amended
by inserting the fo wing new section:
" 'PROTECTION 0 GOVERNMENT FONDS
"'Sec. 307. (a) ATM .?(1) The Comp-
SEC. 23. In section 7(1) (d) of the Inter-
state Commerce Act as dded by section 306
of the bill, strike "or c ntract carrier sub-
ject to this part I, part part III, or part
IV of this Act" and inse t in lieu thereof
"carrier by railroad subjec to this part".
SEC. 24. In section 15(3) the Interstate
Commerce Act as amended b section 203(a)
of the bill is amended by fserting after
"proposed cancellation" the srds "involv-
ing any common carrier by rat oad."
Sec. 25. The amendment to section 6(6) of
the Interstate Commerce Act by ?ion 209
of the bill is amended by
(A) striking "each carrier or" and iserting
in lieu thereof "each common carrier y rail-
road subject to this part or rail" and
(B) striking "any carrier" and inse ting
"any such carrier."
Sgc, 26. Paragraph 9(b) of section 17 .of
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D'?tembt. 19,
the a. proach contained in S. 1823 an
H.R. 16 represents a reasonable
promis -nd the most equitable fo ala
for divis n of these funds am g the
three grou
The P IDING OPPIC ir. The bill
is open to a endment. I here be no
amendment to e propo , the question
is on the third adin of the bill.
The bill was 0 d to a third read-
ing, read the thin time, and passed.
Mr. BARTL . r. President, I ask
unanimous co cent t at S. 1823 be in-
definitely p poned. is is a compan-
ion bill.
The pISIDTNG 0 R. Without
objecJ6n, it is so ordered.
DEPARTMENT OP Dhe.e.NSE APPRO-
1=111AI:togs, rtscm, YEAR 1976
The Senate continued with the consid-
eration of amendment in disagreeMent
NO. '75 to H.R. 9661, an act making ap-
propriations for the Department of De-
fense for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1976, and for the period beginning July
1, 1976, and ending September 30, 1976,
and for other piirpoSes.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield? ?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President for the
information of the Senate, I am asking
this question of the majority leader: Do
we correctly understand that once ac-
tion is taken either way on the Tunney
amendment, that is final action in this
body, and it will then go 'to the other
body, and other action may be required;
but so far as we are conterned, that is
it?
Mr. 1V/ANSFIELD. The Senator is cor-
rect, because the conference report has
been agreed to and all other elements
in dispute have been agreed to.
Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. TUNNEY Mr. President, I am very
happy that the Senate, at long last, is
going to haVe an Opportunity to vote
up or down on an arriendment which is
designed to prevent any funds under this
defense appropriation bill from being
programed for military operations in
Angola.
I have tried during the past week to
make it very clear that I, for one, felt
that it was a disastrous policy for us to
become engaged in military action, either
directly or through proxies, in Angola.
Angola is a country which, unfortu-
nately, is undergoing a rather tragic
tribal war, teitilting in some more than
450 years of Portuguese colonial rule, a
rule that left about 10 percent of the
people in that country literate when it
ended. "
I think there is a larger meaning than
just Angola to the amendment which
I and a number of others have spon-
sored. It Seems clear to the that from
itoW Ori, We should not allow the execu-
tive branch of government to engage the
United State's, directly or indirectly, in
military actions in any part of the world
without the prior approval of Congress.
The Constitution makes it very clear
that Congress has the power to make
war. Yet, in recent years we have lost
that power to a considerable extent by
the executive branch taking unilateral
action and then presenting Congress
with a fait accompli.
What was attempted in this defense
appropriation bill was to secrete moneys
that were to go to Angola for military
purposes, to get Congress to approve of
those funds, not knowing what they were
approving, and then to say that they had
congressional approval, once those mon-
eys were made available, if anything
went wrong.
I am very pleased that we are at last
having an opportunity to vote on this
issue up or down.
should like to ask the distinguished
and esteemed chairman of the Commit-
tee on Appropriations a question.
As the distinguished chairman knows,
if my amendment carries, no funds will
be available under the defense appro-
priation bill for use in Angola, directly
or indirectly, for military purposes. The
only funds that would be available would
be for intelligence-gathering. Yet, with-
in the last couple of weeks, we have pass-
ed a supplemental appropriation bill
which, conceivably, might have funds in
it which could be used for military pur-
poses in Angola. It is my understanding
that the distinguished chairman has in-
dicated that before there could be -any
reprograming of any funds that are
subject to the supplemental appropria-
tion bill, the chairman, when notified by
the administration, by the President or
anyone else in the administration, that
such reprograming is going to take place,
would make that fact known to the full
Appropriations Committee. I also under-
stand that if the full Appropriations
Committee agreed to that request for
reprograming, the chairman would then
make such request to the full Senate;
and that the full Senate, either in open
session or in secret session, would have
the right to approve of such funds.
Is my understanding correct?
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, there
may be funds?the Senator said the sup-
plemental appropriation bill?
Mr. TUNNEY. In the supplemental ap-
propriation bill, yes.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Whether in the sup-
plemental appropriation bill or some
carryover funds from some other year or
appropriation, any reprograming re-
quest under the present system?and
there is one pending, as the Senator
knows, for $28 million in this instance.
The funds proposed to be reprogramed
there are out of this particular bill and
not funds in the supplemental or some
past appropriation, or carryover appro-
priation. So the pending request would
apply to this appropriation bill.
May I say to the distinguished Sen-
ator, as I said yesterday when I initiated
some effort to resolve this dilemma that
Confronted us, I said then and I repeat
now that, in view of what I thought the
sentiment of the Senate was then, be-
fore this vote a few minutes ago, I an-
nounced to my colleagues in the confer-
ence, where the Senator was present and
a number of other Senators, that I would
g 23051
not sign approval of reprograming in
this instance, except and only after full
committee hearings on this proposal and
a report to the Senate thereon giving the
Senate an opportunity to work its will
on the reprograming request. I made
that statement yesterday to the leader-
ship as well as the distinguished Senator.
That is the way I feel about it now.
Anyway, the Senator is aware that it
takes both the Appropriations Commit-
tees of the House and the Senate, and
also the Committees on Armed Services
of the two bodies to approve this repro-
graming request that is before us. Then
I think?I do not know, but I Would as-
sume the others feel as I do about it,
particularly now after the sentiment that
has been indicated by this vote, but even
before that. In view of the considerable
amount of money involved, I would not,
where there is any dissension apparent
in the Senate, take the responsibility for
authorizing such a reprograming person-
ally, and I doubt if many Senators would.
In this matter, I do not know wheth-
er now I shall hold any hearings at all
on it. I feel it would be going through a
futile exercise. I may not hold any hear-
ings at all. There may be some develop-
ments that will arise later that will in-
dicate that hearings should be held. But
as of now, with the situation before us,
and with this amendment as it is final-
ly resolved, I would hold no hearings at
all. This would indicate that no funds
could be used for that purpose.
Mr. TUNNEY. I understand, and if
there were an attempt to reprogram
funds under any other appropriation
bill that had passed?say 1974 funds or
1975 funds, would the Senator take the
same attitude? He is saying he would
take the same attitude?
Mr. McCLELLAN. I would not take it.
I have already taken it. I took it yester-
day, I take it today, I shall take it tomor-
row. I think the Senate has the right to
determine in these matters. I say fur-
ther that I have suggested in another
area that the Senate take some affirma-
tive action to change the present situa-
tion.
There are many requests for repro-
graming. Some of them come up in a
way that could not possibly have been
anticipated. Some Change in situation de-
velops and the reprograming process, I
think, is indispensable, maybe, to good
government. But it casts upon some of
us a pretty heavy responsibility.
I say to the Senator, not only in re-
spect to this particular item or request
that is now pending, there would be, pos-
sibly, other requests for reprograming
coming along where I would choose, and
where I think my colleagues on the com-
mittee would choose, rather than make a
decision ourselves, to hold hearings, pos-
sibly, and report to the Senate and, with
a resolution, give the Senate the oppor-
tunity to express its will. But there are
some of these requests where I do not
think it would be expedient or neces-
sary that every request for reprogram-
ing through that cumbersome process.
If there is anything further, I shall try
to answer the Senator.
Mr. TUNNEY. That answers my que,s-
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tion very fully. I thank my distinguished
friend and chairman for having made it
Very clear what he did yesterday in the
way of making a decision and now am-
plifying, on the Senate floor, what his
understanding is with respect to future
action on making funds available for
Angola.
Mr. PASTOR,E, Will the Senator Yield?
Mr. TUNNEY. Yes, I yield.
Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator add
me as cosponsor to this amendment?
Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the distin-
guished Senator's name be added as
cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
HarrsErsi). Without objection, it is so
ordered,
Mr. TUNNEY. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OrsICER. Who
yields time?
Mr, McCLELLAN. Has the Senator
yielded the floor?
Mr. TUNNEY. I have yielded the floor.
Mr. 1VIcCLELLAN. I yield to the dis-
tinguished Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. YO'TJNG. Mr. President, I shall be
voting against the Tunney amendment,
I feel that it is a serious mistake. The
most that could be made available under
the new procedureS of the Senate Com-
mittee on Appropriations just announced
by the distinguished chairman (Mr.
McCura,m0 would be $9 million. These
funds would require reprograming. If the
Tunney amendment is approved, there
will be no more funds. There could be
developments in Angola where maybe a
little more money would be very helpful,
It could mean the difference between
winning and losing. We might want to
provide additional funds, but it could
not be done in time to do any good.
We are nounclngl to the world that
we are through with Angola. I doubt if
this is the right way to do it. I can
tmderstand people's feelings, but I am
concerned about the many assertions
made that it would cost us hundreds of
? millions of dollars in Angola. That is so
far from the truth.
? May I say, once more, that even if the
Tunney amendment does not pass under
the bill, the most that may be made
available for CIA operations in Angola
would be $9 million, any additional would
require reprograming with the approval
of the Senate Committee on Appropria-
tions and the full Senate, las well as the
Appropriations Committee in the House
and the Armed Services Committees of
both houses.
We should not be establishing far
reaching foreign policy such as this with-
out even a hearing by the committee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield 4 minutes to
the distinguished minority leader.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, I
feel like another Senator who said to me
yesterday, ``When I listen to one side I
.an convinced, and when I listen to the
other side I am convinced," because there
is much to be said and much has been
said.
I do not like the Senate making for-
eign policy unilaterally. I, as a party
leader, have certain responsibilities. I
am aware, as I have said earlier, of the
fact that the Secretary of State and, I
presume, the President, regard this
amendment as disastrous to our foreign
policy in that part of the world.
Let me state the other side of it which
also concerns me. I do not like us to get
into situations which may tempt us into
escalation. I do not believe we have a
major national policy interest in Angola.
I do recognize that the presence of the
Soviet Union ought to be taken into con-
sideration, and that there should be some
response to it.
`,Tow, this raises for me, frankly, a
Very serious dilemma. As I said, in speak-
ing before the table resolution, I have
never failed to support every President of
the United States under whom I served
in his foreign policy objectives, and
sometimes that has been very difficult,
and it has been without regard to the
political party of the President, and I
do believe that, as a party leader, I have
that, at times, very difficult responsibil-
ity of seeking to advance the announced
foreign policy of the United States.
So my own personal concern and my
own heart is very heavy with the fear
that we may reach a point of involve-
ment which we have not anticipated.
My deep concern is that we may be
running a risk of more involvement than
we ought to assume.
On the other hand, as the leader here
representing the administration's view-
point, I have to conclude that I am
more directly bound to accept their as-
sertion as fact that the foreign policy of
the United States will be seriously ham-
pered by the adoption of the Tunney
amendment. This forces me with re-
luctance to conclude that I must vote
against the amendment.
I have taken the lead, with others,
in seeking compromises. I firmly believe
the proposed compromise discussed last
night would have been better all around.
I do not think the country is served by
extreme positions on either side. I think
if we had more time we would have
more moderation here.
I think we are setting a very danger-
ous precedent if we are going to uni-
laterally alter the U.S. foreign policy
and, for what is done here today, the
Senate had better be prepared to ac-
cept full responsibility.
So I find my heart very much tilted
in one direction. I find my sense of duty
leading me to the conclusion that I must
be consistent with supporting what I am
convinced is the firm conviction of the
administration that this amendment
would be bad for the national interests
of the United States and, therefore, I
will have to vote against the amendment
as sympathetically as I have listened to
the arguments on both sides.
I may say I had not made up my mind
until this very minute, and I have agon-
ized over it ever since the issue arose. I
wish these hard decisions would go away,
but they will not. They have to be faced,
and that is the way I am going to face
them.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield to the dis-
tinguished Senator from Idaho.
Mr. McCLURE. I thank the Senator'
for yielding his time.
Mr. President, I think there is so much
to be said that it is difficult to synthesize
it into the time that is available to us
today. Of course, there has been extended
debate on the floor of the Senate in the
last 2 days in both closed session and
open session in regard to this issue.
Let me say only this: The distin-
guished Senator from Minnesota, in the
session the day before yesterday, made
some comment about actions taken by
the Senate which might be interpreted
as fools following the fools. The diffi-
culty I have is determining who are the
fools that the rest are following.
I have a very difficult problem of res-
olution in my own mind based upon the
almost total lack of information that
this Senate had before us on which to
base our judgment.
I think there is one thing that has
emerged very clearly from all of these
discussions, and that is the administra-
tion is still following the practices that
have grown up over the years: They be-
lieve they can still, on sensitive matters,
brief only a few Members of the Senate
and have their policies adopted without
a full and open discussion in the Senate
of the United States.
Rightly or wrongly that time has end-
ed and I hope the administration in all
of its departments and agencies will have
come to the conclusion at last that they
must bring the Senate of the United
States into the discussion and give us
the facts by which we can make our own
determination.
There is as of today a confusion con-
cerning the facts of reprograming money
and how much money is available. The
fact is that under the Tunney amend-
ment, if it is adopted?and I have no
doubt that it will be?no sufficient mon-
eys can be reprogramed to keep any kind
of a viable operation going in Angola
during the period of time we are trying
to determine whether or not there should
be one.
The result will be, as a matter of fact,
that whatever operations the United
States is involved in in Angola will
cease?let me repeat, will cease. Let us
not kid ourselves one minute about the
fact that in some way we may be able
to reprogram and keep this program go-
ing in Angola while we decide in Janu-
ary or February what it is we want to do.
We are making that decision today.
Who are the fools following which
fools? Where is the information on which
'we should be making our determination
in regard to the cutoff of the program, a
change of policy because, make no mis-
take about it, there is in this amend-
ment a change ofpolicy.
It would seem to me that on a matter
of this gravity we should have in any
kind of logic or good sense given our-
selves the time to develop the informa-
tion base, which was not provided us by
the administration in the ordinary course
of events up here, so that we could make
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Detembjf. 19, 19 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE S 23053
an informed judgment about what our
foreign policy decision should be.
The Senator from California, exercis-
ing a perfect right on his part, has forced
Us to make a decision before the Senate
of the United States has enough infor-
mation upon which it can make that
decision. ,
Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator yield for
a brief comment?
Mr. MoCLURE. A very brief one.
Mr. NUNN. I want to answer that last
statement of the Senator.
We are being forced to make a decision
within adequate information. We are
being forced to make a decision with in-
adequate information. We are being
forced to make a decision that could be
fundamentally important to the United
States of America without having ade-
quate information.
I have heard in the last few minutes
classified information, I do not know
whether it is absolutely accurate, that
rebutes a lot of what was said in the
secret session here yesterday. We have
heard a one-sided presentation.
I dp not in any way blame the people
who feel the way they do on the Tunney
_?ainendment. I3ut on the other hand, in
the secret session we hear one thing and
now other information which cannot be
talked about on the floor, yet we are being
called on under a time limitation to vote
on an amendment.
There may be other people who feel like
I do, and that is, it is very uncomfort-
able to have to make the kind of decision
we are going to make with this kind of
time limitation when we are getting new
Information about every 15 minutes on
this subject.
I, personally, am very disturbed about
this uncomfortable, awkward, and I
think irresponsible position which we are
placed in, I do not blame any one in-
dividual, but I think it is not the way to
run a government.
Mr. McCLURE, I thank the Senator
from Georgia arid I agree with his senti-
ments.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's time has eXpired.
Mr, McCLURE. I yield the Senator
from New York 5 minutes.
Mr. BUCKLEY, Mr. President, I con-
cur with all the sentiments expressed by
the Senator from Idaho and the Senator
from Oeorgik
The fact is that we are subverting our
own procedures, procedures designed by
the Congress of the United States, for
better or for worse, to oversee necessary
activities of a sensitive, delicate type
that require a flexibility of approach
that this body simply is not equipped to
handle.
In the process, I believe that we are
throwing some signals around the world
that can be extraordinarily dangerous
In its potential.
Let us face it, we are not talking about
Angola in this respect, but we are talk-
ing about the impressions that coun-
tries around the globe, friend and foe
alike, will have from the action of this
body in arbitrarily and abruptly cutting
operations that the administration is
pursuing in full accordance with the law,
negotiations and operations that do not
commit the United States down the line
to extravagance or something that would
lead to warfare.
We seem to have abandoned any con-
fidence in the legislation we enacted last
year, the war powers law, which was
supposed to have protected us from any
such possibility, and at the same time we
are preempting the work of the Church
committee.
Let us face it, the Soviet Union is a
serious power. The Soviet Union has ob-
jectives that cannot be described as
either peaceful or friendly. The Soviet
Union is willing to make large commit-
ments. The Soviet Union can keep
secrets.
It seems to me that what we are doing
here today can only encourage further
Soviet adventurism around the globe,
and it can only discourage uncommitted
nations or weak nations from ever look-
ing toward the United States for any
kind of support.
I believe, Mr. President, that this is
a course of action that we are taking that
can only be described as reckless, ill-
considered, and dangerous.
I know that there is no hope of defeat-
ing the Tunney amendment, but I hope
that it will, nevertheless, be defeated. I
hope that over the intervening weeks
Members of this body will reflect on what
it is we are doing, reflect on the fact that
in a very important way we are usurping
the responsibilities that the Constitution
of the United States places primarily in
the Executive, that we have, in fact,
destroyed the abilities of this Govern-
ment to conduct covert operations.
I hope, Mr. President, that this amend-
ment will be defeated.
Mr. CLARK. Will the Senator from
California yield?
Mr. TUNNEY. Yes, I yield to the
Senator from Iowa.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the issue
before us is very clear, as several Mem-
bers here have stated.
The question is whether this body
wishes to go on record at this time
favoring the possible expenditure of an
additional $9 million in a tribal civil
war in central. Africa.
The question is really that simple.
As we know from other discussions
here, it is not going to be possible to
receive other funds through a reprogram-
ing OT other methods. So the decision the
Members of this body must make is
whether they feel that by spending
another $9 million, that somehow the
policies of our Government in Angola
are going to be suddenly turned around.
I think, in view of the magnitude of
the problem on bath sides, that is
inconceivable.
I think before yielding back, because
I know there are Members that are pre-
pared to vote, that we ought to face up
to that issue, each of us.
One can say many things about why
we ought to be in Angola or ought not to
be, but the real question is, if we vote
yes or no here, do we wish to authorize
and appropriate the money, $9 million,
to continue the war in central Africa.
Mr. MORGAN. If the Senator will yield
for a question, are we down to $9 million,
and if we are down to $9 million how did
we get there?
Mr. CLARK. I think it would be. But
It is clear from the figures the various
committees and administration officials
have presented to us that that is all that
is in this bill that could conceivably be
transferred. It is not earmarked for
that purpose.
Mr. McCLELLAN. That is not all that
will be transferred. That is all that could
be used without reprograming.
Mr. CLARK. Yes; and as the Appro-
priations Committee said.
Mr. NUNN. Is the Senator telling us
now, as far as the money is concerned,
this entire amount boils down to whether
we are going to save $9 million, or
whether we are going to spend the $9
million as far as the money part is con-
cerned?
It is not $28 million involved or $50
million or $60 million, it is $9 million?
Mr. McCLELLAN. In this bill, there
is only $9 million.
Mr. NUNN. I would just like to ob-
serve---
Mr. MeCLELLAN. That could be used.
None of the rest in this bill can be used
without reprograming, but I have ad-
vised the Senate would come to the Sen-
ate itself so it could work its will.
Mr. NUNN. That certainly is a fact,
In my opinion. I do not think enough
people realize that is the amount of
money we are talking about.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. MeCLELLAN. I yield to the dis-
tinguished Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the distin-
guished Senator from Arkansas.
I think the distinguished minority
leader indicated in his opening remarks
that he was heavyhearted. He was con-
cerned about the U.S. Senate assuming
the full responsibility of the decision.
The PRESIDING OrriCER. May I
interrupt a moment to say that the Sen-
ator from Arkansas has only 1 minute
remaining. I wanted him to be aware
of that.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I
beg the Chair's pardon, it is 40 minutes
to the side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
unanimous consent?
Mr. MoCLELLAN. I am compelled to
ask unanimous consent for another 15
minutes on each side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
Mr. MeCLELLAN. I was under the im-
pression I had 40 minutes. I am very
sorry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from New Mexico is
recognized.
Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Chair.
As I was indicating, I, too, am heavy-
hearted because we are going to assume
the full responsibility here today, not be-
cause I do not want us to, but because I
am firmly convinced we are going to as-
sume the full responsibility for denying
the U.S. Government an option in for-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE Decembol
eign policy for somewhere between $9
million and $28 million, which could be
determinative of America's relationship
with the Soviet Union and, more impor-
tantly, because we are doing it predomi-
nantly upon misinformation or lack of
information.
Suffice it to say that there has not been
a committee Member reporting to this
Senate who spoke to the Secretary of
State of the United States before this
matter came to the floor of the Senate.
As a matter of fact, while we come here
today to vote on this, it is only by acci-
? dent that informally the Secretary of
State was ealled to tell us the facts about
the options he is trying to protect here.
I can say this, if he is to be believed
then we are acting upon ? either the im-
pressions or opinions of other than the
Secretary of State, which are different
from his in at least five major areas.
Without going into details, I will say
What they are: his opinion as to whether
we are alining ourselves with white
South Africa so as to cause all of black
Africa to be aga4nst us. His answer is, no.
To the contrary, we have been invited by
two major black countries to continue
this participation for the next few weeks.
giebond, suffice it to say that we have
not been told all the facts as to why
China is no longer putting some arma-
ment in this area. I will not go beyond
that.
Suffice it to say that we have been led
to believe this is a unilateral effort on
our. part. We have been told some of our
isTATo allies have been talked to; that
the OA Unity group in South Africa has
been called upOn and will be working on
the matter:
Suffice it to say we have been told--
The nES/DING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's 4 minutes Have expired.
Mr. DCIMENICI. I thank the Senator
for the time yielded, and thank him for
accommodating nie.
Mr. MeCLELLAN. I yield 4 minutes to
the Senator from Mississippi.
. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if I may,
would like to point out I do not care
anything about the vote one way or the
other, particularly at this time, favorable
or not as to the money for Angola. I
believe the Senator from California has
already Won his point. He has driven
home the principles he is fighting for. He
has obtained results. There will be none
of this new money spent in Angola with-
out the consent of the two Appropriations
Committees of the Congress plus, as the
?-Senator from Arkansas has said, this
body. So, Mr. President, this primarily
Is a foreign relations policy question. We
are attempting to decide the question
,
her as a rider, a limitation, on an ap-
propriation bill.
We ought to have the testimony and
the counsel of the Foreign Relations
and Foreign Affairs and other commit-
tees: The policy question ought to be de-
cided in a bill, after hearings, and not
as a limitation on an appropriation bill.
?_ We are not going to settle the Angola
question here with a little limitation on
an approPilation bill. We are not going
to settle it tonight, tomorrow, this year
Or next year, in nriy humble opinion. This
Is going to be along, drawn-out affair in-
,.
volving many-of the countries of Africa.
But where is the Senate going in the
meantime?
We have a $90 billion appropriation
bill, plus the additional part that is in the
3-month period.
It has been worked on now for 13
months, to my own knowledge, by this
subcommittee, and the Armed Services
Committee considered the authorization
for the military hardware and personnel
and research that is in it. Some of the
best staff members on Capital Hill have
worked laboriously on this entire bill.
All adjustments have been made, every-
thing has been considered, as to what
will our spending policy for armament,
research and personnel for the military.
This is for 12 months and an additional
3-month period.
What do our adversaries think of us?
We have already run over 6 months into
the year for which we are supposed to
appropriate. This will take it over an-
other month?'7 months out of 12 for
this period for which we are appropriat-
ing already gone.
If I was an adversary of this country,
I would be thinking, "Those people do
not know what they want and they do
not know how to get anything settled
when they do want it."
The Senator from California has es-
tablished his point. I am not directing
anything at him except victory for his
side of this matter.
The Senator won his point for getting
consideration on this particular money.
There must be a policy evolved. I have
been wanting more of a policy evolved
on all covert matters. I have never liked
the taste of it.
I will say if this country is going to run
its foreign relations and military affairs
and everything else, by limitations com-
ing in at the last minute, with half of
the year gone, as limitations on appro-
priations bills and thereby set vast,
worldwide policy questions, then we are
on the way down. Everybody will know it
except us.
I say this deliberately because I an
concerned.
I hope that what little I can say?I do
not expect ,to change votes?will have
some warning value.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's 4 minutes have expired.
Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator yield
2 minutes?
Mr. TUNNEY. Does the Senator want
another minute or two to complete his
remarks?
Mr. STENNIS. I would like to continue
for another minute.
Mr. TUMMY. I yield.
Mr. STENNIS. I would just like to
mention several programs that are con-
sidered important. They have been de-
bated when the bill was up. The money
has been put in the bill. All items are still
being held up. No contract plans can be
made. Industry is standing by and the
Department is standing by. Everybody is
standing by having to wait, wait, wait
6 months, almost 7 months, but nothing
can be done.
I plead for a better policy than that,
not just for the Department of Defense,
but for all departments. Otherwise, we
are not handling our affairs, I humbly
suggest and with great respect to every-
one, in the right method and in the right
manner, and we are not being effective.
Particularly, let us not try here to settle
a worldwide policy question by a rider on
an appropriation bill. How far can we
go?
I thank the Senator for yielding.
Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator yield
3 minutes?
Mr. TUNNEY. I yield 3 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Massachusetts is recognized
for 3 minutes.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I think
our distinguished colleague and chair-
man of the Armed Services Committee
has put the question very clearly, when
he states that the real issue is whether
we are or are not going to decide policy.
I believe everyone in this body remem-
bers the years when, by the failure of
the Congress to act on the Vietnam is-
sue, we had indeed voted for a defense
appropriation that was thrown back to
us time and time again, and that we were
in error by approving a policy that kept
us in Vietnam. Every Member of this
body remembers that.
Without the inclusion of the Tunney
amendment we will be saying exactly the
same thing with regard to Angola. We
will permit the administration to say,
without the Tunney amendment, that we
have known about our Nation's involve-
ment in Angola, and yet we are un-
prepared to take a position on this pol-
icy issue.
I would agree with the Senator from
Mississippi, that this is the issue, whether
we are going to pass an appropriation
bill that is going to permit the admin-
istration to say, "They knew about it up
there in the Senate oZ the United States
and refused to take a position," or
whether we are going to heed the lessons
of Vietnam. As shown by the early votes
on this issue we have a clear bipartisan
majority in this Senate insisting, that
we have learned the lesson of Vietnam
as it applies to covert activity in Third
World countries, and that we are going
to stamp into policy on this bill this
afternoon the fact that we in the U.S.
Senate do not concur with the adminis-
tration, which apparently has not
learned the policy and has not learned
the lessons of Vietnam by suggesting
that we abandon the Tunney amend-
ment.
I am hopeful that for the very reasons
that the Senator from Mississippi has
stated, for the policy reasons, the
amendment of the Senator from Cali-
fornia will be overwhelmingly accepted.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. BARTLETT. Will the Senator
yield?
Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield 1 minute.
Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, the
question is not whether we decide to act
in this manner but it is how we decide to
act, whether we decide to act in haste or
act deliberately.
Are we going to just undercut the
executive branch of the Government,
which is following the outlines of con-
gressional options, and cut off what they
have already started without proper
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deliberations, without the full informa-
tion that we are entitled to have?
Certainly it is not a matter of favor-
ing covert action, but I think it is a mat-
ter of considering at some length what
the future policy should, be, and con-
tinuing the present support for the time
being, in order that we can act in Janu-
ary or February, after considering all
sides and all the facts and knowing what
we are doing.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr, President, will
the Senator yield on that point?
Mr. BARTLETT. You bet.
Mr. KENNEDY. 'Why not just put on a
moratorium now, and let the admin-
istration come up and defend the policy?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. TUNNEY. Does the Senator wish
more time?
Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, I would appre-
ciate it.
Mr. TUNNEY. I yield the Senator
another minute.
Mr. BARTLETT, I thank the distin-
guished Senator.
There was nothing in the legislation
which authorized the executive branch
to counter coyert actions by the Soviets
with covert actions by ourselves, and to
come up to Congress and justify that,
other than to do it through committee.
This is being done. But if we act very
precipitously here, in great haste, and
undercut them, who would really be
Speaking for the United States? I think
they would be saying around the world
that we are speaking with a forked
tongue, that no one knows what the
United States is doing, that the execu-
tive branch says one thing and Congress
acts contrary to that.
I think we should support the admin-
istration until we have a chance to con-
sider this matter in a deliberate fashion,
as a deliberative body should.
Mr. McCT,TILLAN, Mr. President, I
yield myself such time as I may require.
I would like to preface my remarks by
saying that whatever I may say is said
'With due deference to and respect for my
colleagues who may have differing views
from those which,I shall express. I speak
more, Mr. President, in the role of a
Senator than I do as chairman of the
Appropriations Committee, because as
chairman of the Appropriations Commit-
tee I have little Concern about whether
some particular item in an appropriation
bill is stricken out or some item is added
to the bill. Certainly that is true when
the sum involved is only $9 million.
But there is something much greater
Involved here than just $9 million.
Mr. President, I made every effort I
could to bring about a solution to this
situation. First, I sought not to have any
expenditure made between now and when
Congress returns. Yesterday afternoon in
the conference that has been referred to
there WAS an apparent agreement, or
obviously a possibility. of an agreement
to let the administration spend this $9
million, with the additional balance of $3
million they still have in the reserve
fund, which would carry the issue over
until we come back in January at which
time or during which time I proposed to
call the Appropriations Committee to-
gether and hold hearings, and give the
administration an opportunity to make
its case. I said the committee would then
report to the Senate on the pending re-
programing request and give the Senate
an opportunity to work its will.
That was clearly understood. There
can be no mistake about it. Now this
morning the Senate comes in and turns
down the $9 million in this bill. This ac-
tion denies the opportunity for the ad-
ministration to thoroughly make its case
and for us to hold hearings and do what
this body should do, conscientiously con-
sider and fully deliberate on this issue.
We are signaling to the world today?
we are signaling to the Kremlin at this
hour that now that you are there, what-
ever your ambitions are, whatever your
goals may be?even to establish a mili-
tary base right across the shipping lanes
of the Atlantic, we are moving out, and
"you can have it." We are saying we will
not even invest $9 million for 3 or 4
weeks' time, to give us an opportunity to
properly consider and deliberate upon
this issue before we decide it.
Yes, I think there will be great elation
in the Kremlin when they know what we
are doing and have done. I think there is
confusion and consternation in other
countries, who look to us for leadership
and wonder whether our word is good
any longer, or whether this Nation is so
divided that there can be no reliance
upon the efforts of our constitutional
officers whose duty it is to conduct for-
eign affairs for us.
Well, you have made the decision. To-
day you strain at a gnat. When you get
the foreign aid bill up, which provides
$1.5 billion in military aid to Israel and
$750 million to Egypt, Israel's enemy, in
economic funds, you do not strain there,
you swallow a camel.
What kind of a policy does this Nation
have? I think there is good reason for
the Senate, in meeting its responsibility,
to weigh most carefully the whole policy
in this field. But it is not weighing it
carefully now. It is precipitously saying,
"All right, Mr. Soviet, we are stepping
out; take what you want. You have got
the arms over there; you can overpower
these people if you want to, you can
establish military bases if you like. We
have no further interest."
God save America from that kind of a
retreating foreign policy and the con-
sequences thereof. You will have your
way today but this can well be a sad day
indeed for America and other areas of
the non-Communist world.
SEVERAL SENATORS: Vote! Vete!
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, I have
listened closely and carefully to the Sen-
ator from Idaho (Mr. MCCLURE), the
Senator from Georgia (Mr. NUNN), and
the Senator from New York (Mr. BUCK-
LEY).
I associate myself with these remarks.
Much of the argument heard on this is-
sue has been based upon inadeqiiate and'
oftentimes faulty information.
I am sure we all agree that we do not
want to back into another war with our
eyes closed. I would hope, on the other
hand, that with the important negotia-
tions taking place between our country
and the Soviets, we would not resolve a
worldwide policy issue in the fashion and
with as few facts as we presently possess.
Mr. President, I think the proposal
made by the distinguished chairman of
the Appropriations Committee has great
merit. I regret that it was not given the
consideration I believe it deserves.
I shall vote against the Tunney
amendment.
Mr. FELL. Mr. President, in consider-
ing the dangerously evolving situation in
Angola, in what has become the first
major test of post-Vietnam policy, it is
discouraging in the extreme that so little
appears to have been learned from the
past. Once again, a long and largely se-
cret U.S. involvement in a distant coun-
try has reached the threshold of a major
commitment. And, until recently, few
have been in a position to raise funda-
mental questions regarding the direction
and nature of this policy.
There is little need to trace the de-
tailed history of the present situation in
Angola. The United States, Soviet Union,
People's Republic of China, and most re-
cently South Africa have all attempted
both indirectly. and directly to influence
the balance of power in that country.
Por years three competing focal factions,
the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA have
sought to dominate this newly emergent
country. For years, this struggle was ob-
scure and hardly noticed; suddenly, it
is being debated everywhere.
What, then, is the reason for this
dramatic upsurge in interest in Angola?
It is difficult to believe, as some have
claimed, that it is due to any new-found,
strategic importance in Angola itself.
Angola has always possessed significant
mineral resources and has always been
the beneficiary of a fine harbor with mil-
itary potential.
Rather, increased American concern
in Angola appears to result, from
increased Soviet involvement in Angola.
The United States has been caught re-
acting to Soviet initiatives, while the
goals of American policy remain un-
defined.
As the situation now stands, unless the
United States injects a massive amount
of military assistance, the Soviet-backed
MPLA will emerge victorious. But what
will the Soviets have gained for all their
intrigue and efforts?
Quite simply, any Soviet "victory" will
be short-lived. The most powerful force
in the nonalined world is nationalism?
an ideology that rejects external control
regardless of whether the ideology comes
from the East or West. One has only to
recall recent Soviet failures in Egypt and
Mozambique to realize this fundamental
fact characterizing the world today.
Tragically, the United States is forfeiting
opportunities for long-term benefits in
Africa and elsewhere by over-reacting to
the short-term Soviet initiative in An-
gola. The United States would do far
better to take a long view of history,
condemning all outside interference in
Angola while concentrating on more con-
structive policies of assisting economic
and social development in Angola and
elsewhere.
Moreover, the United States has been
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tainted in all Africa by its "guilt by
association" with the Government of
South Africa. As a result, we are sure
not only to fare badly in Angola, but we
are sure to fare badly throughout the
entire continent of Africa until this ill-
adVised association is dissolved.
Today, more than 20 years since the
initial American involvement in Viet-
nam, it seems that the foreign policy of
the United States is still guided by the
philosophy of containment Yet cold war
perceptions of global strategy and "zero-
sum" competition with the Soviet Union
bear little relevance to a situation dic-
tated mostly by local loyalties defined
primairly by region and tribe. Manu-
f actnred rationales for the United States
Involvement in Angola cannot hide the
fact that Angola itself is not the issue;
rather, it would appear that Angola has
been chosen as but the most recent sym-
bol of U.S. determination to act inter-
nationally.
Before the United States further in-
volves itself in Angola, it is the responsi-
bility of the administration to explain
fully its policy both to Congress and the
American people. Many questions remain
unanswered. What is the strategic im-
portance of Angola? What are the impli-
cations of either continuing or terminat-
ing our involvement? What diplomatic
alternatives exist bilaterally with the
Soviet Union or multilaterally in the
United Nations for the United States?
Ultimately, however, Angola may be
most important for providing a dramatic
reminder that the United States has yet
to fashion a coherent foreign policy, for
the post-Vietnam era. What is clear is
that expectations of d?nte must be
lowered. D?nte is not a mutual com-
mitment between superpowers who sup-
port the status quo but rather a fluid
relationship which primarily attempts
to avoid direct confrontation. And be-
yond a more realistic view of d?nte,
what is required is a new definition of
Interests and commitments?one which
is supported by the American people and
which recognizes the limitations of
America's ability to influence events
everywhere in the world.
Mr. TUNNEY. I am ready to yield
back the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the
Senator from Arkansas yield back the
remainder of his time?
Mr. McCLELLAN, I yield it back.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the amend-
ment of the Senator from California (Mr.
DOWNEY) , as amended. On this question,
the yeas and nays have been ordered, and
the clerk will call the roll.
The legislative Clerk proceeded to call
the roil.
Mr. McGEE (when his name was
called). On this vete, I have a pair with
the distinguished Senator from the State
of Washington (Mr. JACKSON). If he
were present and voting, he would vote
"nay." If I were at liberty to vote, I
would vote "yea." I withhold my vote.
The roleg!dative clerk resumed the call
of the
The PRESIDING oFFichat. The
clerk will suspend.
The clerk is having difficulty hearing
responses of Senators.
The Senate will be in order.
The clerk may proceed.
The legislative clerk resumed the call
Of the roll.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will suspend. The Senate will be in
order so Senators may hear their names
when called. The Senate is not in order.
Senators are asked to take their conver-
sations to the cloakroom.
The clerk will not proceed until the
Senate is in order.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
some Senators Shave airline reservations.
I hope Senators will heed the request of
the Chair in the Chair's efforts to get
order in the Senate which is the duty of
the Chair, by the way, under the rule.
The PRESIDING OeviCER. The Sen-
ate is still not in order.
The clerk may proceed.
The legislative clerk resumed and con-
cluded the call of the r(411.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
may we have order in the Senate and
may the well be cleared?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senators
and staff members are asked to clear the
well. Senators are asked to take their
conversations to the cloakrooms. The
Senate will be in order.
The Chair thanks Senators.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. -I announce
that the Senator from Indiana (Mr.
awn) , the Senator from Texas (Mr.
BENTSEN) , the Senator from Nevada (Mr.
CANNoN), the Senator from Florida (Mr.
CHILES), the Senator from Missouri (Mr.
EAGLETON) , the Senator from Mississippi
(Mr. EASTLAND) , the Senator from Wash-
ington (Mr. JACKSON), the Senator from
Louisiana (Mr. JOHNSTON), the Senator
from New Mexico (Mr. MoNrovA) , the
Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PAS-
TORE) , the Senator from Illinois (Mr.
STEVENSON) , the Senator from Florida
(Mr. STONE) , the Senator from Indiana
(Mr. HARTKE) , the Senator from South
Carolina (Mr. HourNos), and the Sen-
ator from Georgia (Mr. TALMADGE) are
necessarily absent.
I also announce that the Senator from
Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) is absent on official
business.
I further announce that, if present and
voting, the Senator from IDAHO (Mr.
CHURCH) , the Senator from Rhode Island
(Mr. PAsron), and the Senator from
Florida (Mr. STONE) would each vote
"yea."
Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the
Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Smell),
the Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE),
the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN) ,
the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. FoNc),
the Senator from' Arizona (Mr. GOLD-
WATER) , the Senator from Nevada (Mr.
LAXALT) , and the Senator from Maryland
(Mr, MATHIAS) are necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present and
voting, the Senator from Arizona (Mr.
GOLDWATER) would vote "nay."
The result was announced?yeas 54,
nays 22, as follows:
fR011eall Vote No. 611 Leg.]
YEAS--51
Abouresk Hatfield
Allen Hathaway
Eiden Helms
Brooke Huddleston
Bumpers Humphrey
Burdick Inouye
Byrd, Robert C. javits
Case Kennedy
Clark Leahy
Cranston Magnuson
Culver Mansfield
Durkin McGovern
Ford McIntyre
Garn Metcalf
Glenn Mondale
Gravel Moss
Hart, Gary Muskle
Hart, Philip A. Nelson
Haskell Packwood
NAYS-22
Baker Domenic'
Bartlett Griffin
Beall Hansen
Bellmon Hruska
Buckley Long
Byrd, McClellan
Harry F., Jr. McClure
Curtis Morgan
Pearson
Pell
Percy
Proxmire
Randolph
Ribicolf
Roth
Schweiker
Scott,
William L.
Stafford
Stevens
Symington
Taft
Tunney
Weicker
Williams
Nunn
Scott, Hugh
Sparkman
Stennis
Thurmond
Tower
Young
PRESENT AND OWING A LIVE PAIR, AS
PREVIOUSLY RECORDED-1
McGee, for.
NOT VOTING-23
Bayh Eastland Laxalt
Bentsen Fannin Mathias
Brock Fong Montoya
Cannon Goldwater Pastore
Chiles Hartke Stevenson
Church . Hollings Stone
Dole Jackson Talmadge
Eagleton Johnston
So Mr. To/mimes amendment, as
amended, was agreed to.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I
move that the Senate insist upon its
amendment and request a further con-
ference with the House of Representa-
tives on the disagreeing votes of the two
Houses thereon, and that the Chair be
authorized to appoint the conferees on
the part of the Senate.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
HELMS). The question is on agreeing to
the motion.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask for
the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a
sufficient second? There is a sufficient
second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. FORD. Mr. President, a parlia-
mentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING 0.10.1010ER. The Sen-
ator will state it.
Mr. FORD. What is the question now?
If a Senator will vote "aye," what hap-
pens? If he votes "no," what occurs?
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I
have followed the usual procedure. If the
Senator does not want conferees, I will
withdraw the motion.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the
Senator withdraw his motion?
Mr. FORD. That answers my question.
The PRESIDING OeviCER. The mo-
tion is withdrawn.
SENATE AND ANGOLA: IN TNE TRADITION Or
WAYNE MORSE
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, today
the Senate has refused to accept what
might well later have been termed the
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? equivalent of a "Gulf of Guinea Resolu-
tion."
But we will now have no new "Gulf of
Tonken Resolution" opening the way to
a Vietnam-type disaster in Angola.
That is the meaning of the majority
vote for the Tunney amendment barring
any funds in the Defense appropriations
bill from being used "for any activities
Involving Angola other than intelligence
gathering."
We have refused to commit this body
by voting funds for covert purposes that
could be used to more deeply involve the
United States in a civil war. The voting
of funds could have been cited later by
the administration as congressional au-
thorization of deeper and ever more
dangerous U.S. involvement in Angola.
We have weighed the potential con-
sequences of intervention on an install-
ment plan, as Wayne Morse tried to get
his colleagues to do back in August 1964,
when the Senate was debating the Gulf
of Tonkin resolution.
Mr. President, we have over the past
several days heard repeated assurances
that we are defending "freedom" in
Angola.
We have heard assurances that what
the administration seeks will not lead
Inevitably to escalation.
We have heard again that the Presi-
dent has limited intentions, and that
Congress will have ample opportunity
under the exercise of its constitutional
powers, with the help of the War Powers
Act, to restrain the President, should his
intentions change.
All of this has a familiar ring.
But the simple fact remains that once
the President involves the Nation in a
war, whether with money, weapons, or
men, it is harder to turn back.
National pride becomes involved.
Crises develop which produce emo-
tional, not rational, reactions.
The time to stop is at the beginning.
Mr. President, I was not in this body
In 1964, when the debate over the Ton-
..kin Gulf Resolution took place.
? The approval of that resolution led
inevitably to ,the catastrophic escalation
of the war in Vietnam.
There are many here now who were
here then?and have long since come to
regret the action that the overwhelming
majority of the Senate took that day?
on August 7, 1064, by a vote of 88 to 2.
Just before that historic vote took
place, the late, great Senator Wayne
? Morse of Oregon, who?along with the
late, distinguished Senator from Alaska
Ernest Gruening?were the sole dissent-
ers that day, made a speech on the floor
of this body. For its courage, prescience
and inherent wisdom, it must go down
as one of the greatest speeches ever
delivered in the U.S. Senate.
Senators Morse and Gruening both
lost their seats in 19?8, and died less than
a month apart in 1974.
Their voices cannot instruct us now.
But, for the benefit of those who did
net hear that 1964 speech, and as a re-
der 0 those who heard, but did not
heed Ifs.1,nmage, I ask unanimous con-
sent that Senator Morse's speech be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
SPEECH OF SENATOR MORSE
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, in view of the
debate which took place last night, which
we did not contemplate at the time we en-
tered into the unanimous-consent agree-
ment, as I have stated to the majority lead-
er, I wish now that we had fixed the time to
vote at 12 o'clock today. There is little re-
maining to add, by way of rebuttal, to what
I said last night, except the points that I
shall cover this morning. However, I do want
to discuss in some detail the predated de-
claration of war aspects of this unfortunate
resolution.
I hope, as I said to the majority leader,
that the defenders of this unfortunate re-
solution will come to the floor of the Senate
and give a defense of it in answer to the
points that I made in rebuttal last night
and shall amplify this morning. I am wait-
ing for their replies.
I have a little reply of my own to make
this morning to the Washington Post. There
is a very fallacious editorial in this morning's
Washington Post entitled "Democracy's Re-
sponse." I ask unanimous consent that it be
printed at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as
follows:
DEMOCRACY'S RESPONSE
Congress is responding with commendable
promptness and with an almost unanimous
voice to President Johnson's request for sup-
port in the Southeast Asia crisis. The
President consulted the leaders of both
Houses and then asked for a supporting res-
olution not only because he felt the neces-
sity for congressional approval of what is
being done, but also because he wished to
demonstrate before the world the unity of
the American people in resisting Communist
aggression. That unity has been demon-
strated despite the reckless and querulous
dissent of Senator MORSE.
There is no substance in Senator MORSE'S
charge that the resolution amounts to a
"predated declaration of war." On the con-
trary, it reaffirms the longstanding policy of
the United States of aiding the States cov-
ered by the Southeast Asia Collective De-
fense Treaty in the protection of their free-
doin as a contribution to international peace.
It pledges military action only to resist ag-
gression against American forces in that
area. Of course, the President has authority
to respond to attacks upon American forces
without any approval in advance by Con-
gress. So the resolution means only a re-
commitment of the Nation to the policy it
has been following?an almost unanimous
recommitment in the face of the inexplica-
ble North Vietnamese challenge.
This means of reasserting the national
will, far short of a declaration of war, fol-
lows sound -precedents set in other crises.
President Johnson noted in his message to
Congress that similar resolutions had been
passed at the request of President Eisen-
hower in connection with the threat to For-
mosa in 1955 and the threat to the Middle
East in 1957. The same course was followed
in 1962 at the request of President Kennedy
to meet the missile threat in Cuba. None
of these emergencies lead to War. Rether,
the firm action that this country took inter-
rupted Communist maneuvers that might
otherwise have led to war.
Congress ought to be very pleased with
the now firm establishment of this mecha-
nism fer meeting an emergency with a unit-
ed front. Reliance solely upon the power
of Congress to declare war as a last resort
would not be appropriate in these days of
repeated criseg short of war. A resolution
S 23057
of support for the executive arm in meeting
an emergency has all the virtue of rallying
national strength behind a firm policy?
without taking the calamitous step of war
in this nuclear age. We surmise that the al-
most unanimous sentiment behind this res-
olution on Capitol Hill reflects appreciation
for the President's sharing of responsibility
as well as support for the tough punishment
for aggression that he initiated.
Mr. MORSE. The Washington Post has
demonstrated in editorial after editorial that
it does not have a good constitutional law-
yer on its editorial staff. The editorials pub-
lished in the newspaper demonstrated that
fact constantly. In an editorial which ap-
peared in this morning's issue of the news-
paper there appears the following statement:
"There is no substance in Senator Morse's
charge that the resolution amounts to a
'predated declaration of war,'"
One wonders whether or not the editorial
writer has ever read the joint resolution. No
one can read the joint resolution and the
authority proposed to be given the President
in the joint resolution without recognizing
that it would clearly authorize the President
to proceed to follow whatever courses of
action are necessary in his opinion and such
action would constitute authority to con-
duct war.
I should like to make an additional com-
ment on a statement in the editorial in re-
ference to resolutions / passed by previous
Congresses. In the body of the editorial the
statement is made:
"President Johnson noted in his message
to Congress that similar resolutions had been
passed at the request of Preeident Eisen-
hower in connection with the threat to For-
mosa in 1955 and the threat to the Middle
East in 1947. The same course was followed
in 1962 at the request of President Kennedy
to meet the missile threat in Cuba."
The editorial writer apparently had not
read, or certainly had not read recently be-
fore he wrote that editorial, the Cuban reso-
lution, for there is no similarity between the
Cuban resolution on the one hand and the
Formosa, the Middle East, and the pending
resolutions on the other hand
But returning to the comment of the
Washington Post that there is no sub-
stance in Senator Morse's charge that the
resolution amounts to a "predated declara-
tion of war," I should like to read for the
benefit of that unenlightened editorial writ-
er of the Washington Post page 2 of the
joint resolution:
"Resolved by the Senate and the House of
Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the
Congress approves and supports the determi-
nation of the President?"
Not the Congress, but of the President?
"as Commander in Chief, to take all neces-
sary measures to repel any armed attack
against the forces of the United States and
to Prevent further aggression."
The joint resolution thus gives the Presi-
dent warmaking power.
I shall come to another section of the reso-
lution same item in a moment. The Com-
mander in Chief, the President of the United
States, has the inherent constitutional power
immediately to defend the United States in
case of an attaek, but he does not have the
inherent power after that immediate defense
to proceed to make war. That is the distinc-
tion which this unenlightened editorial
writer of the Washington Post has never
grasped.
Mr. President, the right of immediate de-
fense is something quite different from the
right to proceed to lay out a campaign of
war. Under the joint resolution the President
would be given the authority to go beyond
Immediate self-defense of the United States
and proceed with a war campaign. That is
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why I say today, as I said in 1955, and as I
said at the time of the Middle East resolution,
that such resolutions constitute a predated
declaration of war. The Washington Post edi-
torial writers ought to consult with Senators
who occupy high positions in the Senate on
the other side of the issue in connection
with the defense activities of the country.
They might be surprised to learn that they
are not quarreling with the Senator from
Oregon in regard to the effect of the joint
resolution. The joint resolution does propose
to give the President of the United States au-
thority beyond the inherent authority that
he already possesses to act immediately in
national self-defense.
Mr. President, that is a very important dis-
tinction, in constitutional law. The Senator
from Oregon repeats that, under the Con-
stitution, the President has no power to wage
war until a declaration of war is passed by
the Congress. The joint resolution is a con-
travention of article I, section 8, of the Con-
stitution, just as the Formosa resolution and
the Middle East resoluticin were contraven-
tions of the Constitution and caused the se-
nior Senator from Oregon in the debate on
those two resolutitons to take a stand in
opposition. As one of the Armed Services
Committee leaders of the Semite told me this
morning. "Wayne, there is no difference be-
tween the position that you are taking to-
day and the position that you have taken
consistently with regard to the other resolu-
tions. No one can really quarrel with your
conclusion that the joint resolution does go
beyond the inherent authority of the Presi-
dent to act in the self-defense of our coun-
try and does vest in him authority to pro-
ceed to carry out a campaign that amounts in
fact to the waging of war."
Mr. President, I do not believe we should
do it. Tt is Dpit necessary to do it. There is
inherent power in the President as Com-
Mender in Chief under the Constitution to
meet an attack immediately, and then come
to the Congress of the United States asking
for a declaration of war. We should reaufre
those steps, rather than give the President
blanket authority under the joint resolution
to proceed to wage war without a declaration
of war.
Ah, but it may he said, and is said, by
Some in conversations with me, "But, WAYNE,
a President would not do that for very long."
do not care whether he does it for a
short time or a long time. It is not neces-
sary for him to do it, so long as he has the
inherent authority to meet attack with im-
mediate self-defense actions.
As I said in 1955. I believe it is important
in these trying times that we not extend
and expand the authority of the President
of the United States beyond the limits of
the Constitution.
It may be said that if the President should
commit an unconstitutional act under the
joint resolution, or if the joint resolution
in effect, as argued by the Senator from
Oregon, is an attempt to give to the Presi-
dent an unconstitutional power, he can be
checked. I wish I could say that he could be.
The difficulty in relation to these constitu-
tional questions as they involve the Presi-
dency of the United States is that we do not
have a procedure far having them tested in
the U.S. Supreme Court. That has been the
subject of great discussion, concern, and de-
bate among constitutional lawyers for many
decades. It is difficult to bring the President
of the United States before the U.S. Supreme
Court. Our constitutional fathers provided
for other procedural checks upon the Presi-
dent of tire 'United States, one of which is
impeachment, which, of course, is unthink-
able when we have a President who seeks
only in the exercise of his powers--though
he may be mistaken in regard to having ex-
ceeded an inherent power?to protect the
Interest of the *United States. But that is a
check that is provided in the Constitution.
Then, of course, we cheek the President In
regard to the purse strings by way of ap-
propriations.
We have the authority, of course, to check
the President by way of appropriations, with
his ancillary check on Congress of the veto.
It is not impossible to eventually get a case
before the Supreme Court involving the
vsarmmaking powers of the President, but
the legal road could be long and tortuous.
The time consumed would make the ques-
tion moot by the time it was decided as
-far as the emergency is concerned will give
rise to the issue in the first instance.
When Congress passes a joint resolution
such as this, it is practically impossible?in
fact, I think it impracticable?procedurally
to have the power checked, on constitutional
grounds, before the U.S. Supreme Court. I
do not know, and I know of no constitutional
lawyer who has ever been able to point out,
a procedure by which we could bring the
President before the Court on the charge
that he was making war unconstitutionally.
I can hear the Court, in refusing jurisdiction,
sat, "Congress will have to follow the pro-
cedures set out in the Constitution for check-
ing the President."
So I am concerned about the resolution in
respect to its giving to the President what
I honestly and sincerely believe is an uncon-
stitutional power?that is, the power to
make war without a declaration of war. It
feeds a political trend in this country that
needs to be checked. For some time past in
this Republic we have been moving in the
direction of a government by executive
supremacy.
It is very interesting to listen to the argu-
ments that one hears for extending and
expanding the power of the White House.
It is extremely important?and I speak sob-
erly and out of a depth of great sincerity?
that we never grant a single power to any
President, I care not who he is, that in any
way cannot be reconciled with that precious
fundamental foundation of our Republic;
namely, a system of three coordinate and
coequal branches of Government.
It is dangerous to the freedoms and
liberties of the American people to vest in
any President, at any time, under any cir-
cumstances, power that exceeds the con-
stitutional concept of three coordinate and
coequal branches of Government.
The American people will quickly lose their
liberty if you do not stop feeding the trend
toward Government by executive supremacy.
In my opinion, the joint resolution would
do just exactly that. It would give to the
President of the United States an authority
which, in my judgment, he does not need,
by any stretch of the imagination. He has
inherent power to react, in the self-defense
of this Republic, in the event of an immedi-
ate attack.
It is particularly essential that we con-
tinue to require a President of the United
States to conform to article /, section 8, of
the Constitution, in regard to making war,
and that we continue to hold any Presi-
dent?I care not who he is?under the strict-
est restraint with regard to the making of
war.
We have entered an era of civilization in
which an unconstitutional act of war on
the part of a President of the United States
can lead to nuclear war and the end of
this Republic, no matter how sincere a Presi-
dent may be in his intentions in respect to
exercising the power to make war.
We need to be on guard in respect to vest-
ing power in the ? White House. The White
House has plenty of power under the Con-
stitution. I am for giving the White House
no more power than the Constitution gives
him.
I have heard sincere colleagues on the
floor of the Senate?and I respect them?
differ with me in regard to the effect of the
joint resolution. There are also colleagues
on the other side of the issue who have come
to me and said, as did one who discussed
it with me this morning, "WAYNE, there is
no doubt as to the effect of the resolution
that you are pointing out, and that you
pointed out in 1955. It bothered sue in 1955;
but we have every reason to count on the
fact that the President of the United States
will not abuse the power."
Mr. President, I do not think he would
deliberately abuse the power, but he could
most sincerely exercise the power in a man-
ner that would result in great damage to this
Republic.
There is an elementary rule of law which
states that when we come to deal with pro-
cedural matters, if a procedure is subject to
abuse we had better change the procedure.
My majority leader, who always is courte-
ous to me and was exceedingly courteous to
me in arranging the format for this debate,
has heard me say many times as we have
served together in this body that we should
never forget that our substantive rights are
never any better, and can never be any bet-
ter, than our procedural rights. Our proce-
dural rights determine our substantive
rights. There are no substantive rights un-
less there are procedures for implementing
them.
I have said many times?and the statement
should be applied to this issue, because it is
applicable?let me determine the procedure
of any human institution or the administra-
tion of any law, and I will determine all the
substantive rights anyone may have under
that law, that tribunal, or that administra-
tive body. Let me determine the procedure
of any courtroom. and I will determine all
the substantive rights that can be adjudi-
cated in that courtroom.
Although some critics will say that this
principle involves a legalistic abstraction,
nevertheless the great principles of so-
called legalistic abstraction are principles
that determine, in the last analysis, whether
one remains a free man or not. This is true
because the procedures of our Government
written into the Constitution and the laws
of our country determine our substantive
rights as freemen.
In my judgment, the pending joint res-
olution tinkers with and impairs the great
procedural rights of the American people
written in article I. section 8 of the Consti-
tution?namely, that the power and the right
to declare war is vested in the Congress, and
not in the President of the United States.
War cannot be declared speculatively; war
cannot be declared in futuro under article
I, section 8 of the Constitution. War cannot
be declared to meet hypothetical situations
yet to arise on the horizons of the world. War
is declared in relation to existing operative
facts of the moment of the call for a declara-
tion of war.
In the resolution before the Senate?and
I shall read the section to which I have re-
ferred and another section momentarily?
the President of the United States would be
given power to make war in relation to opera-
tive facts not now in. existence, but which
may come into existence in futuro. That
cannot be reconciled with article I, section
8 of the Constitution.
For the education of the unenlightened
editor of the Washington Post who wrote
the ignorant editorial in respect to this con-
stitutional point, I hope he will reread arti-
cle I, section 8 of the Constitution, and
that he will read again?assuming that he
ever read the resolution before he wrote
the editorial?the section to which I have
referred and read, and which I repeat. That
part of the joint resolution reads:
"The Congress approves and supports the
determination of the President, as Com-
mander in Chief, to take all necessary meas-
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tires to repel any armed attack against the
forces of the United States and to prevent
further aggression."
Let :us analyze that sentence for a mo-
ment. Let us analyze that part of the sen-
tence that deals ivith the inherent power
of any, commander in chief, any President,
to repot immediately in the defense of this
Republic. That part of the sentence is not
needed. He has that power now. If there is
to be read into that part of the sentence
which starts on line 4?"to take all necessary
measure? to repel any armed attack against
the Sprees of the United States"?authority
to commit an act of aggression, preventive
in nature, it goes beyond the Constitution.
That was my argument in 1955. How well
I remember it. In 1955 I participated in the
Sallee format of committee organization in
which I took part yesterday namely, a joint
meeting of the Armed Servides 'Committee
and the Foreign Relations Committee. I op-
posed the Formosa reeolution. My recollec-
tion is that in 'committee in 1955 two of us
tea that position. When we came to the
tiOor of the Senate, my recollection is that
I WaS supported by a third fneinber, as / said
last night,. the great Senator from New York,
Herbert Lehman ; .and I believe we ended in
106 with three Senators voting against the
resolutien, As I remember my opening speech
in. 1955--and,?thaRECORD will speak for it-
self?I said, as I say now, that I was stand-
ing in a position on the floor of the Senate
in which a few ,other liberals had stood
throughout the history of this great par:
liaMentary body. Like them I was confront-
bd_with the choice of telling, the American
people What I was satisfied they were en-
titled to know about their foreign policy,
and run the risk Of violating the rules of
eeereCer of the Senate, thereby risking the
discipline of the Senate, or failing in my ob-
ligation to tell the American people things
that $ tlaought they were entitled to know
in regard to the foreign policy of the coun-
try and avoid running the 'risk of being dis-
ciplined by the .0e/fate.
If Senators will read that speech they
wlleee that I said I thought I could give
the American people what they should be
War led about within the rules of the Sen-
ate, without subjecting myself to Senate
discipline. Senators will tnci. that I said?I
paraphrase the Speech, but accurately:
"I wish to tell the American people that
this a preventive war resolution; and if
any Senator has any question about it, let
him go to the floor below and read the testi-
him go to the Foreign Relations Committee
on the floor below - and read" the testimony
of the Secretary of State?
Who Was then John Foster Dullee
'tan1 the testimony of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Military Estab-
lishment?"
Who was then Admiral Radford.
I said:
If Senators will read that testimony, they
will know that behind this resolution is the
proposal that the Military Establishment
and those in charge of American foreign p6I-
icy are to be 'given the authbrity to make a
strike against the mainland of China before
China makes a 'Strike against the 'United
States, Such a strike would be an act of
aggression. Such is strike would be an act
of war. Authorization for such a strike in
the Formosa resolution amounts to seeking
to give to the Military Establistiment,'with-
out a decleration of war, the power to make
War. Senators wfll find that clear power in
the rasorutiorr."
Senators will remeniber that in 1055 the
senior Senator from Oregon took that posi-
tion in the hearing before the committee gy,
ptsitiofi became known. -After I teink that
position the chairman of the committees sit-
ting jointly, Mr. Walter George, of Georgia,
declared a recess, and announced that he
would go to the White House for the pur-
pose of discussing with the President the
argstment that I had made in committee. He
went to the White House. Out of that con-
ference came the famous White House pro-
nouncement with respect to the Formosa res-
olution, in which President Eisenhower an-
nounced that he, and he alone, would make
the decision under that resolution as to what
course of action this Government would fol-
low in implementing the Formosa resolution.
Senator George came back and had a con-
ference with me. He thanked me for what
he considered to be the service I had ren-
dered. He said, "It was a very important
service. I would not support the resolution
in the absence of the White House an-
nouncement," He said, "WAYNE, I hope you
will work with me now to help get the
resolution through the Senate."
I said to the chairman of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, who served on that oc-
casion as chairman of the committees sitting
jointly. "That does not make it any better
so far as I am concerned. You missed the
point of my objection. Although the testi-
mony in committee would have left the im-
pression that the Secretary of State and the
military officials could have made the deci-
sion, they will still he making tb e decision,
because the President will follow their ad-
vice." I said, "I would not vote for it if
they had no voice in it at all, because I will
not vote to give to any President this power,
because the Congress of the United States
must jealously guard its prerogatives under
article I, section 8 of the Constitution. All
that the President needs to do is to come be-
fore Congress and ask for a declaration of
war. He has inherent authority to meet an
emergency that requires national self-de-
fense action prior to the time he gets to the
Congress."
Senators will note in the RECORD that I
used the beginning of the war with Japan as
a precedent. I said, "After the strike at Pearl
Harbor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt exercised
the power as Commander in Chief to defend
tihs country in national self-defense, but he
came to Congress for a declaration of war.
I made that argument in 1955. I repeated
it in summary form at the time of the Mid-
dle East difficulty, and I am summarizing it
again in this historic debate.
I have heard no answer in all the inter-
vening years to the constitutional point that
I now raise, and of which the editor of the
Washington Post who wrote the editorial this
morning is abysmally ignorant.
Mr. President, this joint resolution is not
needed for the defense of the Republic. It
should not be used to make an end run
around article I, section 8, of the Constitu-
tion. So long as an attack is in progress, the
President has the inherent power to protect
the Republic in self-defense. But there is
reserved to Congress, under the Constitution,
the responsibility of passing judgment on
whether, or not even an attack calls for our
declaring war. It may very Well be that after
a response to an attack, the attacking party
may start diplomatic maneuvers into mo-
tion?to surrender, to capitulate, to ask for
a negotiated settlement, or to resort to the
rule of law?which might cause Congress, in
exercising its authority under the Constitu-
tion, to check the President and cause him
to decide not to make war at that time. It
is an important procedural check.
It is easy, understandable, and natural in
a time of high national emotion, in a time
of strong patriotic fervor, to say, "Give 'em
th,e works." It is also true that in such an
hour of high national emotion and hysteria,
we who sit in seats of responsibility, so far
as the legislative process Is concerned, can
say, "Let us Wait. Let Us first analyze the
situation on the facts and 'then vote the au-
thority that is needed to Meitect the country.
Sincere and honest men can differ as to the
procedural form that the grant of such au-
thority shall take."
In 1955. and again in 1957 the senior Sena-
tor from Oregon took the position, as he
does in the instance of this resolution, that
the Middle East resolution and the Formosa
resolution would be grants of authority to
the President to exercise power which would
amount to predated declarations of war. That
should not he done. It is not necessary. All
the world knows that any country that at-
tacks the United States will be met immedia-
ately with the exercise of the inherent power
of the President, under the Constitution, to
defend the Republic. All the world knows
that if any country continues an attack upon
this country, the President will come before
this body and quickly, as the great Roosevelt
did after Pear Harbor, in 1941, obtain from
Congress a declaratien of war. What more is
needed?
A constitutional principle, is involved. It
is dangerous to give to any President an un-
checked power, after the passage of a joint
resolution, to make war. Consider the proce-
dural conmplications that could develop if
Congress decided that the President was
making serious mistakes in the conduct of a
personal war?for it would be a Presidetial
war at that point. How could the President
be stopped? He could not be stopped. Con-
sider what would happen to this Republic
if we got into that kind of conflict with
the President in carrying out the joint res-
olution.
But, say some, see what the end of sec-
tion 3 provides:
"This resolution shall expire when the
President shall determine that the peace
and security of the area is reasonably as-
sured by International conditions created by
action of the United Nations or Otherwise
except that it may be terminated earlier by
concurrent resolution of the Congress."
That would create a nice mess, would it
not? That would be a nice portrait of the
United States to paint before the eyes of
the world. What havoc of disunity that kind
of procedure' would encompass.
What is wrong with letting the Consti-
tution operate as written by our constitu-
tional fathers? Why this indirect amend-
ment of the Constitution? There are Sena-
tors, for whom I have deep affection, who
become a little shaken, in our private con-
versations, when I say, "What you are really
seeking to do is to get around the amending
process of the Constitution. In effect, you
are trying to get around article I, section 8,
by amending the Constitution by way of a
joint resolution."
I do not believe we ought to establish any
more precedents of this kind. I do not ac-
cept the argument that because we have
made two mistakes in the past?we made no
mistake in connection with the Cuban reso-
lution; and I shall speak of that later?be-
cause we made mistakes in the Formosa and
the Middle East joint resolutions, we can
make another one. Eyed a repetition of mis-
takes does not create a legal right in the
President. I do not believe it is good legisla,
tive procesS to repeat Mistakes. We ought
to stop making them.
In effect this joint resolution constitutes
an amendment of article I, section 8, Of the
Constitution, in that it would give the Pres-
ident, in practice and effect, the power to
make war in the absence of a declaration of
war. It is also important to demonstrate to
the world, including the free nations, that
the Constitution of the United States is not
an instrument to be tinkered with; that the
Constitution is a precious, sacred &omit-nen%
so far as our form 6f government is con-
cerned, and is not subject to subversion in
the 'legislative process. We should never miss
an opportunity to demonstrate this prin-
ciple to the totalitarian nittons of the world.
We should never forget that under Fascist or
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Communist regimes there are no rights and
liberties of the person
It is proposed, by this joint resolution, to
subvert the Constitution. We are engaging
in a subterfuge, so far as article I, Section 8,
is concerned. We should not do that. We
should not in any resolution tinker' with the
Constitution in respect to the powers and
prerogatives of the Pr?dent, and the limi-
tations upon such powers and prerogatives.
Going back to section 1 of the resolution,
I assert again that in the language "to take
all necessary measures to repel any armed
attack against the forces of the United
States," there is no question about the in-
herent power of the President to do so with-
out a-resolution.
I have stated that if this proposed grant
of P6wer implies 'that the right- of the Pres-
ident of the United States to take all the
necessary measures to "repel any armed- at-
tack against the forces of the United
Statee?which former Secretary of State
Dulles and Admiral Radford asked for in
1954?includes the authority to commit an
'act of aggression before an act of aggression
is committed ,against the 'United States, on
the basis of the theory of a preventive war,
that is a dangerous doctrine. It cannot pos-
sibly be reconciled with the Constitution;
nor can it be reconciled with sound national
policy.
renleinher that in 1955 former Secretary
of State Dulles said to me, "Would you wait
for the Red Chinese to strike?"
My reply was that when I thought of the
billions of dollars I had joined in voting
for the defense of my country, including
great Sums -of money for intelligenee serv-
ice, if there were particular concern about a
Red Chinese air base closet to the coast of
Alaska and our intelligence agency had given
us repOrtarta to what it had found in regard
to the size of that Communist air armada,
I would wish 'to believe that when the first
Red Chinese plane left the ground and
started for Alaska, our alerting stations and
our intelligence would 'be such that our
planes would meet it before it ever reached
Alaska.
At that. time, I also made perfectly clear
?
to foilner Secretary of State Dulles and
fornier-Chairrnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral 13,adforci, that under international
law weScquld -not possibly justify our being
an,, aggl'esSbr in 'the first instance. 1 frankly
stated that it was a risk Which we must run
in order to remaln in a ktind constitutional
framework, under our system of government.
Why should we give arbitrary discretion
to mere men who happen to hold office at
a given tirae, when the American people and
their lives. are at the mercy of the discre-
tion of those mere men?
One Of the great protections that the
American people have in constitutional
theory, under our form of government, is
that we are 11. government of laws and not
of men. Granted, we are a 'government of
laws, it is also true that those laws must be
administered by men. Human failings being
what they are, we Must always keep a check
on the exercise of the 'discretion of mere
men Who 4Cipiltitste'r government, or we shall
constantly run the risk Of being victimized
by arbitrary 6,ta capricibus discretion. '
'In 1955, I made clear that / had observed
too frequently the psychology of trigger-
happy military men, and the psychology of
diplomats who convince themselves that it
is necessary to pull the trigger before an act
.of war has been committed against us.:
Mr. President, we like to boast?and for
the most part our glorious history sustains
the boast?that we are not an aggressor na-
tion. Resolutions such as the pending joint
resolution, as well as the Formosa resolution
and the Middle East resolution, frequently
raise, grave doubts among our friends in the
,trok wor7.4, as to whether there are not great
differences between our theory and our
practice.
So, then as now, on the constitutional
grounds to which I objected in the Formosa
resolution, / voted against it?as I shall vote
against the pending joint resolution today.
/ repeat this, so that there can be no mis-
understanding of my position: So far as the
inherent right of the President to meet an
aggression in the self-defense of the Republic
is concerned, the pending resolution is not
needed. The President has that inherent right
now, under the Constitution. But, so far as
having any right to commit an act of war in
the absence of an aggression, he does not
have that right under the Constitution. The
'pending resolution cannot give it to him un-
der the Constitution.
Of course, we can sanction his exercise of
that unconstitutional right. That is what the
Senate will be doing today in adopting the
pending resolution.
In constitutional effect, the Congress is
caving to the President, "You can go ahead
and act unconstitutionally and we will look
the other way," because it is known that
there is no existing procedure :which would be
effective by which we can check the President.
Once the pending resolution is adopted, the
Senate thereby will sanction such conduct.
There is no way to check it by taking the
case before the U.S, Supreme Court for final
determination of the constitutionality of this
, course of action in time to be effective.
I am asked, "Should we not amend the
Constitution in this respect?"
? I believe that we should amend it by clearly
denying to the Congress the power to pass
such a resolution as this one. Because the
past situations such as are present in this
case are such rarities, so extraordinary and
so novel, I am enough of a political realist to
know that we shall never get anywhere with
that kind of constitutional amendment. The
only time we become interested in it is when
a crisis such as this exists. When a crisis ex-
ists, it is so serious that people are not going
to become interested in a very important con-
stitutional abstraction, even though it is a
constitutional abstraction which after all, is
determinative, in the last analysis, of their
rights as free men.
In times of hysteria and high national emo-
tionalism, it is only human for most people,
particularly those not sitting in the seats of
legislative responsibility, to be willing to look
the other way on such questions as I raise in
this debate again this year. But I believe it
is so dangerous to establish another prece-
dent toward the creation of a government by
Executive sunremacy in the United States,
that I am willing to stand up and oppose the
overwhelming riutiority against me, and take
all the Castigation and criticism which is
bound to be heaned upon :my head, for a
constitutional principle that I am sincerely
convinced is vital to the very preservation of
this Republic.
I am satisfied that if we continue to build
up a Wall, brick by brick, precedent by prece-
dent, which separates the executive branch
of the Government from the people, resulting
in making the executive branch of the Gov-
ernment more and more inaccessible to direct
control, we shall endanger the very survival
and Preservation of the Republic and our
constitutional system upon which it is based.
Mr. President, if it is self-defense we are
concerned about, we do not need this resolu-
tion. If it is lo empower the President to
commit an act of aggression before an act of
' aggreasion is committed upon us, as was the
program in 1955, and as was openly testified
to, let me say?I can say it now?as the
transcript will show, by the Secretary of
State and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff at the time, it is a dangerous prece-
dent, a power that never should be given,
never should have been granted by the Con-
gress, and should not be granted now under
the pending resolution.
Turning to the language I have read, "to
repel any armed attack against the forces of
the United States," does that mean that the
attack must have started, or does it mean
that all the President and his advisers have to
conclude is that in all probability an attack
may be made.
That is preventive war. There is no power in
the Constitution for the President of the
United States to wage a preventive war. I
cannot imagine a set of hypothetical facts
which would cause the President of the
United States, the Congress, the Department
of State, and those in the Pentagon Building
to become alarmed about the danger of an
attack against the United States that cannot ,
be taken immediately to existing channels of
international law. The right of national self-
defense would still vest in the inherent con-
stitutional power of the President.
The fact that we are not doing very much
about using those channels of international
law does not excuse Us. And as we use those
channels of international law, the inherent
power of the President to defend this country
continues. With all the military might of this
country at the present time, the world knows
that that power of self-defense is adequate to
protect the security interests of this coun-
try until the processes of international law
can run their course.
There is no question about the meaning of
the next four words on line 6 of page 2 clearly
authorize?"to prevent further aggression."
That is when the whole realm of judgment
upon the part of the President of the United
States comes into play. That is when we sub-
stitute the President for article I, section 8
of the Constitution. That is when we say to
tb e President, "You can go beyond acts of
immediate self-defense of the Republic. You
do not have to come to the Congress, as
Franklin Roosevelt did after Pearl Harbor,
and ask for a declaration of war. You can
proceed in the exercise of your judgment to
prevent further aggression."
The uninformed, unenlightened editor of
the Washington Post who wrote that stupid
editorial in this morning's paper has not the
slightest conception of the meaning of those
words. If he had, he would not have written
in his editorial:
"There is no substance in Senator MORSE'S
charge that the resolution amounts to a
'predated declaration of war.'"
?
There is no doubt that the language, "to
prevent further aggression," rouses all the
objections that I made in 1955 to the Formosa
resolution. This proposal seeks to vest in
the President of the United States the power
to carry on a so-called preventive war. By
preventive war, we mean making a war
against another country because it is as-
sumed that that country is about to make
war, or contemplates making war, against
the United States. Such authority is not to
be fonnd in the Constitution. The Congress
cannot give such authority to the President
of the United States as far as the Constitu-
tion is concerned. It can sanction the exer-
cise of the authority, but the exercise of
the authority would still be just as much
outside the Constitution as though the
President acted without the joint resolution.
The joint resolution could never make legal
the exercise of such authority by the Presi-
dent of the United States.
That is not the only place in the resolution
in which we would give to the President a
preventive war anthority. I refer the Senate
to section 2, line 7, which provides?
"SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital
to its national interest and to world peace
the maintenance of international peace and
security in southeast Asia. Consonant with
the Constitution?"
It has been agreed, by way of an amend-
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meht to the joint resolution, that that
means the 'PonStittreion ot the United
States? '
"and the Charter of the United Nations and
in accordance with its obligations under the
SoUtheesi Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the
United States is, therefore, prepared, as the
President, deter:tea, to take all necessary
steps, including he use Of armed force, to
assist any member or protocol state of the
eCtotheast Asia C011eCtive Defense Treaty re-
questing assistance in defense of its free-
dom."
President, that is an awfui, power to
give to a President. If the Washington Porit
does not think that that is a predated declar-
ation of war, the editor ought' to start asking
himself some questions about certain hypo-
thetical situations.
Shall we allow any President ofthe "United
States to decide, !Atli no 'chick?that' is, no
check for ienrced4te Application?to take all
necessary steps, including the use of armed
force, to absist any menthes- or protocol state
of the Southeast Asia Coll:cc-dye Defense
Treaty requesting assistance in defense of
Its freedom?
We bad better ?pease r'leng enough to take
a look at the nature of poipe Of the countries
involved, because Many of the' countries are
nOt free eoutitriei 14a,ny of those countries
ate totalitarian CouritrieS. Many of those
countries , are dietatorSblps. It is wishful
thinking to assume that it Would be safe to
give the President of the 'United States un-
checked authority: to'Proceed"fo Use American
boys in defense of those countries on the ba-
sis of claims that ects of aggression are being
committed against them by some other coun-
try, without a 'congressional 'Check. Have we
reached the point' in American foreign pol-
icy where we are going to permit the Presi-
dent to send. Americanboys tO their death in
the defense of military dictatorships, men-
archles, and fascist regitheg around' the world
with Which we have., entered into treaty obli-
gations involving mutual security, no matter
What the provocation and no matter what
wrongs they May haVe cbriamitted that cause
an attack upon f,hern? Are We going' to do
that without et'clack of,69ngress by way of a
declaration of Wan. What are we thinking of?
Whet, time' factor Would petify such precipi-
tate *lotion? a
Mr. President, this Senator will never vote
to send an American. boy to his death, any-
where in the world under any such language
as is contained in 'that part of the joint reso-
lution. It Is Of litrilOst importance that we
surround that language with ,a,eongresaional
check. And there is none.
One 'could Say, as I said a few moments
- ago, "But, Mr. Senator, the Congress can ter-
minate this authority by a concurrent reso-
lution."
,
I have already pointed Out the kind of
hassle that such a situation. would create,
and the lend Of.Cliaunity :that such action
would produce. The American people should
be protected from a possible abuse Of the
authority. So long as abuse of a procedure is
pdssible, the procedure should be Modified
to prevent the pOssibility of the abuse.
Mr. President, that is why it is so impor-
tant that we hold any, President?I care not
who he is?to Article T, section 8, of the Con-
stitutiell.ln the carrying out of mutual se-
entity agreements. We should hold him to
the approiAra/ f th-e bongrese ;before t1i6 fact
and not after the feet. .
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Sen-
ator yield?
Mr. MORSE. I. yield.
'Mr: Gatrzwrsls.. I wish the _Senator .would
discuss what seems to, me the RbViglia esca-
lation of the. War by the authority granted
in Seal= 2 of the joint resolution?
"To assist any member or Protocol state of
the Southeast Asia Collective IlefenSe
Treaty."
Mr. MORSE. I was about to do so.
Mr. Cbruzwrsza. Hitherto we have been deal-
ing wholly with south Vietnam. The Presi-
dent has stated his puirpose, which is quite
evident?not to extend the war.
In the section to which I referred we are
ineluding a number of additional nations
into which we could send our Armed Forces.
The Joint resolution would extend the pros-
pective war all over southeast Asia, would
it not?
Mr. MORSE. It certainly would, with no
check on it.
Mr. GRITENING. In other words, in effect,
the Congress would authoriZe an escalation
of the war to Thailand, Laos, Cambodia,
North Vietnam, South Vietnam--and what
else?
Mr. MORSE. Pakistan.
Mr. GRUENING. I have in my possession,
which I intend to present when the foreign
aid bill comes before the Senate, a statement
from a high official of Pakistan indicating
that his government has no intention of
'using the nearly $1 billion in military aid
that we have given to Pakistan to help out
our cause because it is needed in their pros-
peetive difficulties with India.
Mr. MORSE. The Foreign Minister of Pald-
stan in effect made that statement in Wash-
ington, D.C., when he addressed the Press
Club not so many weeks ago. He was asked
by a newspaperman at the meeting to state
whether or not Pakistan could be counted
upbn to 'be of assistance in southeast Asia.
He said, "No."
He gave his reason. Ills reason was Paki-
stan's involvement with India. Pakistan has
no intention of responding to any calls to
SEATO members.
I yield further.
GRUENING. It seems to me that the
joint resolution presents an unlimited au-
thorization for war anywhere in southeast
Asia, including Pakistan, which is really not
In southeast Asia, but which is in south cen-
tral Asia, and it seems to me a very danger-
ous, unwarranted, and unprecedented action.
Mr. Aloasz. Do not forget, Pakistan is a
member of SEATO; it obligations to South
Vietnam are the same as ours.
Mr. GRUENING. Yes; but It has shown no
disposition whatever to carry out its obliga-
tions under that treaty.
Mr. Mossz. That is correct: but, she being
a SEATO member, we would be obligated to
go to her assistance.
Mr. GRUEN/NO. This resolution, in effect,
is an authorization which would be the
equivalent of a declaration of war by the
Congress. Would it not be?
Mr. MORSE. I think so.
Mr. GRUENING. That is one thing I am
very apprehensive about. If we should get
into an all-out war, which I fear may happen,
this resolution would be considered the au-
thorization by the Congress to so proceed.
Would it not?
Mr. MORSE. That is correct.
Mr. GRUENING. I expressed my views on it
yesterday. I do not at all criticize the Presi-
dent?in fact, I think the President was cor-
rect?for repelling the assault, whatever may
be the background, on American vessels and
destroying the attackers. I approve of that
action, but the resolution goes far beyond
such action, which apparently precipitated
the request by the President for such a reso-
lution, and covers the whole of the south-
east Asia area. I distinctly disagree with the
administration policy.
As I have stated repeatedly, this was a
policy which the President inherited, and
from which I hoped he would disengage him-
self. He inherited it from the Eisenhower ad-
ministration, from John Foster Dulles, when
we picked up the fiasco the French had en-
gaged in with the loss of over 100,000 young
lives. We contributed vast sums of money
to that operation. It was obviously a failure.
Now we have escalated it, as could be fore-
8 23061
seen, and as I in fact did foretell, and as the
Senator from Oregon foretold, into an all-
out wax in southeast Asia. -Regrettably, the
end is not Yet. I am extremely fearful about
the situation.
This is a moment when patriotic passions
are around, and it seems indicated that we
should do whatever the President asks.
It is very painful for those of us who dis-
agree with the policy. I felt it was wrong
in the beginning and have repeatedly stated
for 5 months that I thought it was wrong,
and that we should continue to try to find
a peaceful solution; that we should take the
issue to the United Nations, and seek a cease
fire. It is, as I have said, painful not to sup-
port the President, but I cannot do so in good
'conscience under the blanket terms of this
resolution.
Mr. MORSE. As the Senator knows, last
night it was impossible for him, because of
a previous appointment, to be present when
I paid my high respects to him for his cour-
age, statesmanship, and leadership in this
matter for many months past. I said last
night that the Senator from Alaska had put
the issue squarely.
Now, in a very few moments, the Senator
from Alaska has summarized succinctly the
major points of the address I have been
making on the floor of the Senate the last
hour and 15 minutes. I wish to formalize
those points before I come to the next ma-
jor issue which I shall discuss in my speech.
What I have said expresses my views as to
the power that would be granted to the
President in the resolution.. It is what I
have called an undated declaration of war.
I summarize the points as follows:.
First, the unlimited language of the res-
olution would authorize acts of war without
specifying countries, places, or times. That
language cannot be reconciled with article I,
section 8 of the Constitution. It amounts,
in fact as well as in law, to a predated
declaration of war.
Next, as I said last night, we have armed
forces in South Vietnam, some 20,000. or
more, apparently, with the number increas-
ing by planeload after planeload. -
Senators can bemoan and warn against
a land war in Asia, but the resolution would
put the United States in the middle of the
Vietnam civil war, which is basically a land'
war.
Under the resolution Congress would give
to the President of the United States great
authority, without coming to the Congress
and obtaining approval by way of a declara-
tion of war, to carry on a land war in South
Vietnam. The choice is left up to him.
As I said last night, the interesting thing
is that South Vietnam, with a population
of 15 million, and an armed force of 400,000
to 450,000 men, has been unable, through all
the years of the holocaust in South Vietnam,
to put down a Vietcong force of a maximum
of 35,000 men. The Pentagon and the State
Department, in testifying before the com-
mittee, say the number probably does not
exceed 25,000. We have to have more than
20,000 American boys over there, to die in
whatever numbers they are killed, in an at-
tempt to win that war. And for whom?
Mr. President, the leaders of this Govern-
ment keep talking about freedom in South
Vietnam. There is not one iota of freedom in
South Vietnam, for the South Vietnamese
people, by and large, do not know what the
word means. I quoted, in a speech the day be-
fore yesterday, a letter I received from a Re-
publican Member of Congress, in full support
of the position I have taken on this issue.
I paraphrase it, although the quotation is
already in the RECORD. He said that the aver-
age man of North or South Vietnam would
not know what democracy looked like if he
met it on the main street of Saigon. The dif-
ference between their governments is like
the difference between tweedledum. and
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tweedledee. But both are interested in the
neg 'bowl of rice.
That is why this Senator has been pleading
for years, in connection with foreign policy,
that the great need of the United States in
the field of foreign policy is to export eco-
11011110 freedom, and to stop exporting mill.
tary aid, for 'Our military aid makes Corn-
raunista. Prepare the seedbeds of economic
freedont Unless the people are first eco-
country and we prepare for the growth of
freedom. Unless the people are first eco-
nomioaily tree, they cannot be politically
free; and, what is more important, they will
.never understand political freedom until
they are first economically free.
There is , great danger now that Con-
gress will give to the President of the
United States power to carry on whatever
type of war he wishes to wage in southeast
Asks. That is why I said, in answer to an
argument that VMS made on the floor of
the Senate yesterday, apparently some col-
leagues are laboring under the illusion that
perhaps the resolution would reduce the
danger of fighting a land war in Asia. There
la not a word in the resolution that has
any bearing on the subjedt. To the contrary,
the broad, sweeping, sanction of power?note
my language, because it canont be done
legally?the broad, arbitrary, sweeping power
Congress is sanctioning for the President
would in no way stop him from sending as
many America boys as he wants to send into
? Vietnain to make war.
As the Senator from Alaska has said over
and over again, and as I have joined him in
saying, all South Vietnam is not worth the
life of a single American boy; and the killing
of a single American boy in South Vietnam is
an unjustified killing. It ought to stop. It
is not going to stop until we turn our
warms,king polthy into a peacekeeping policy.
It is not going to stop until we insist that
our alleged allies in SEATO come in with
as many divisions of peacekeeping units
as are necessary to keep the belligerents apart
It is not going to stop until the United Na-
tions, under the procedures of international
law, can cathe in and keep the peace arid set
up whateVer" `controls are needed, by way of
i Mated Nations trusteeships if necessary,
to bring that war to an end.
TAU result will not be achieved by uni-
lateral military action. It makes me sad to
have to say ft, but / am satisfied that history
will reeard this horrendous mistake of the
United Stites in its false assumption in the
year 1964 that it could supplant in South
Vietnam military control by Asiatics with
military control by the United States.
We could never win such a war. We might
Win military victory after military victory.
If we did not stop the escalation, we would
kill millions of people, because the escala-
non, step by step, would lead to a11-out
bombing of North Vietnam and Red Chinese
eitiFe. When we were through, we should have
killed milli-one, and won military victory
after military victory, but we should still
have lost the war.
The United States can never dominate
and control Asia, With 800 million people
in China alone; That kind of war would
create a hitred for the United States and
for the white Titan generally that would per-
sist for centuries. Dominating Asia, after
, destroying her clties and killing her millions
by bombings?that is the danger that we are
walking into?would not make the white man
supreme in Asia, but only hated.
We know what the floods of human his-
tory do. Eventually the white man will be
engulfed in that Asiatic flood and drowned.
? I do not know why we should be so short-
sighted. it is difficult to follow the processes
of international law. I suppose the saddest
announcement that has been made recently
Is that of the Secretary General of the United
Nations, Mr. II Thant, from Burma, who is
not even a shadow of the great world states-
man who preceded him, Dag Hammarskjold.
He announced in Washington yesterday his
grave doubts as to whether the Security
? Council could help resolve the matter.
Mr. President, we will never know until
such procedures are tried. The Secretary
General should have been using his voice
and his influence to persuade the Security
Council to carry out its obligations under
the charter. Not a word has been heard from
the Secretary General in regard to the power
and authority for the General Assembly of
the United Nations.
The Secretary General knows the power
of the 'General Assembly if the Security
Council is incapacitated by a Russian veto.
a repeat what I have said for many months
past on the floor of the Senate. I wish to put
Russia on the spot. Let her exercise her veto,
if she dares. The rest of the world will be her
judge. We did not find her following that
'course in the Middle East, or in Cyprus, or
in the Congo.
I was highly disappointed by what I con-
sidered to be the abdication of leadership
and responsibility on the part of the Secre-
tary General of the United Nations in the
unfortunate statement he made in Washing-
ton yesterday.
The next point I wish to make, by way of
summary, is that the fear expressed by some
Senators in this debate against involvement
in a land war means no more than the reser-
vation expressed in 1954, that we should
not become militarily involved in South Viet-
nam. We did not intend then to do any of
the things we are now doing in South Viet-
nam. We did not intend then to do any of
pression of intention in 1954 came to naught.
This policy is sucking us into military in-
volvement deeper and deeper, and will con-
tinue to suck us in, under this resolution,
deeper and deeper.
Mr. President, you and I will be gone in
a few years; but I am satisfied that the end
oaf the road that we are traveling today will
be the engulfment and drowning in world
history of the influence of the white man
in Asia, if we follow this course of action.
I despair frequently at the fact that so
often people in positions Of responsibility are
inclined to think only of the present, and not
a century hence. Yet, when we are dealing
with matters of foreign policy and the roots
of peace or war, we need to remember that
the seed we plant today, be it a seed of peace
or seed of war, is the seed that will finally
come to fruition in a blossoming plant, per-
haps a 100 years hence.
I say most respectfully and sadly that in
my judgment, in this resolution, we are
planting seeds not of peace, but of war. Those
who will follow us in the years to come will
cry out in anguish and despair in criticism
over the mistake that was made in 1964 when
the joint resolution was passed.
Why do we do it? I do not know. We are
dealing here basically with a civil war be-
tween conflicting forces in South Vietnam.
So many in this debate have overlooked the
geographic problem. Let us not forget that
prior to the Geneva accord of 1954 North
Vietnam and South Vietnam were one peo-
ple. One could go into North Vietnam to-
day, after he had been in Saigon, and think
that he was still in South Vietnam. He would
feel the same way if he first Went to North
Vietnam and then to Saigon. They are the
same people. Unfortunately, as a result of the
partition under the Geneva accord in 1954,
they were divided into two countries, North
Vietnam and South Vietnam.
Many of the people in South Vietnam who
are involved in this civil war have close rela-
tives in North Vietnam. One reason why the
military dictator-puppet whom we are sup-
porting in South Vietnam, Khanh, is having
so much difficulty with the mass of the peo-
ple?and he is having a serious difficulty?
in his insistence that he must stage a blood
bath in North Vietnam. He will never get the
support of the people, because a blood bath
would kill the relatives of hundreds of thou-
sands of people in South Vietnam; and vice
versa.
It is a tragedy that the Vietcongs try to
subvert South Vietnam, but that is a real-
ity. The solution is not the exercise of mili-
tary might. As a critic of De Gaulle on many
points, I say that the sad fact is that the
De Gaulle solution is far superior to the
American solution. The solution is a political
and economic solution, not a military solu-
tion. De Gaulle is right. We should go to the
conference table. We should not take
the American position that we will go to
the conference table only after we dominate
the battlefield.
If we ever establish that principle, we shall
have assassinated the rule of law as an in-
strumentality for settling disputes among na-
tions. If we ever take the position that we
must first dominate the battlefield, that we
must be in control, that our orders must be
carried out, then going to a conference table
will mean only that the dominating author-
ity tells the others at the conference table
what, in effect, Adlai Stevenson unfortunate-
ly said in the sad speech he made some weeks
ago before the Security Council?that, in
effect, we are going to do what we think is
necessary, and the others can like it or not.
When he did that, as I said, he extinguished
his lamp of world statesmanship.
We cannot follow the theory that under-
lies the present policy of our Government:
namely, that until we first dominate the
battlefield, we will not follow De Gaulle's
suggestion to settle this dispute at the con-
ference table. De Gaulle is right. This prob-
lem will never be settled except by a political
and economic settlement. It can never be
settled by the imposition of the military
might of the United States upon Asia.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, in de-
bating the Angolan issue this week, we
did not plead ignorance. We tried to find
out the facts, both in regard to the com-
peting political consideration in Angola
and in regard to the amounts of money
potentially involved. We knew there was
money in this bill headed for Angola, if
the executive had had its way. To argue
that it was not specifically earmarked for
Angola and, therefore, we could not get
at it--as some did?while arguing that
there was, indeed, money in the Defense
appropriation bill that could be used for
Angola, was to admit either legislative
impotence or legislative complicity. I am
proud to say that such a position was un-
acceptable to a majority in the world's
most powerful legislative body.
In refusing to vote more money for
the covert funding of paramilitary ac-
tivities in Angola and environs, we have
rejected the road to another Vietnam.
We have only to listen to the global con-
frontation terms used to describe what
Is at stake there. This is the rhetoric
that led us into Vietnam.
Further, we have rejected insofar as
Angola Is concerned the closed system
under which so many fateful foreign and
defense policy decisions have been made
by a few men in the executive branch and
even fewer rnen in Congress. This is an
Important precedent. The Senate has in-
dicated today that it is fed up with "for-
eign policy by contingency fund." As a
body, it insists upon being involved in de-
cisions to spend millions of dollars
abroad covertly, after such funding has
been "authorized" by the 40 Committee
or some other secretive executive group.
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To sum up, Mr president, we have
sent some important messages today. We
have rejected a world view that sees
every foreign conflict in "United States
versus them," Americans versus Russian
terms. We have tried to evaluate our An-
golan policy in the context of more rele-
vant political and geographical realities.
My colleague, JOHN TUNNEY, has
Performed historic and effectual work on
this vital matter, providing real leader-
ship. So have Senators CLARK, BROOKE,
KENNEDY, HUMPHREY, JAVITS, WEICKER,
PERCY, and others. It has been a reward-
ing experienee to work with them.
I thank Bill Jackson, of my staff, for
his able aid to me.
We have reminded the 'executive
branch that congress will play a large
role in determining the policies of this
country, as, indeed, the people want us
to do?not to mention the constitutional
obligations placed upon the legislature.
And, very importantly, we have recog-
nized through five days of debate that
we have to improve the internal pro-
cedures of the Senate to insure that the
whole body can fully debate all issues of
great consequence to their nation's se-
curity.
Mr. President, in trying to group the
complex historical and political context
of the current Angolan conflict, I asked
my staff to develop information briefs
for me. I want to especially thank Ms.
Emily Thurber for her work in this re-
gard; it was grounded in actual experi-
ence in Africa for many years.
To accomplish all of these tasks, Mr.
President, a vigorous free press was in-
dispensable. I ask unanimous consent to
place in the RECORD an article by John
Averill in the Los Angeles Times, and
articles by David Binder and Sy Hersh in
the New York Times.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Los Angeles Times]
SENATE FOES OF ANGOLA AID OPTIMISTIC
(By John H. Averill)
Wasnneerow.?Senate critics of US. in-
volvement in Angola expressed cautious op-
timism Wednesday night that the Senate
will vote to block further military aid to
anti-Soviet factions in the West African
nation.
"I think we have the votes to win as of
now," said Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.),
who has helped revive the Senate's Vietnam
era antiwar coalition into a bloc opposed to
further U.S. involvement in Angola.
Cranston expressed that outlook in an in-
terview after Ford Administration supporters
blocked until today a vote on an arms-cutoff
amendment.
The amendment, sponsored by Sen. John
V. Tunney (D-Calif,), Would deny the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency funds to finance
military assistance to two Angolan factions
Opposing a third faction that is strongly
supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba in
a civil war.
Tunney, Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (ID-
Mien,) and other critics of the Administra-
tion's Angolan policy said it could lead to
another Vietnam-type commitment by the
United States.
In an emotional arm-waving speech,
Humphrey said that until recently the United
States was spending Only $150 million a year
on all kinds of assistance to the entire con-
tinent of Africa.
"Then in one month, we are going to put in
$60 million in Angola to chase the Russians
out," said Humphrey, a one-time staunch de-
fender of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
A better way to counter the Russians, he
said, would be to use trade leverage, such as
grain sales, to force them to withdraw from
Angola.
As a substitute for the Tunney amendment,
Senate Minority Whip Robert P. Griffin (R.
Mich.) offered a proposal that would prohibit
the use of U.S. military or civilian forces in
Angola but would not affect CIA spending.
"Cuba has sent thousands of well-trained
soldiers to Angola," Griffin said. He told the
Senate that those forces, armed with massive
supplies shipped in by Russia, have been
largely responsible for gains by the Soviet-
backed Angolan faction.
"I agree that we ought to slam the door
and keep it closed on the use of any U.S.
military or civilian forces in Angola," Griffin
argued. "But do you' want to close the door
on CIA flexibility? Is there no way that we
can assist the majority of people in Angola
who are resisting Soviet imperialism?"
Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa) said the Griffin
amendment did "asolutely nothing about
military assistance and CTA activities."
At the White House, Dep. Press Secretary
William I. Greener said the Ford'Administra-
tion has no intention of sending either mili-
tary or civilian advisers to Angola.
"There are no U.S. government-sponsored
advisers in Angola," he said under question-
ing. "Nor do we contemplate any form of
U.S, combat intervention there."
Tunney introduced his amendment after
the Senate wrangled behind closed doors for
three hours about the extent of CIA involve-
ment in Angola, a former Portuguese colony.
Emerging from the closed session, Tunney.
Humphrey and others said they were able
to learn very little about the extent of CIA
spending in Angola. The reason, they ex-
plained, was that Sen. John L. McClellan (D-
Ark.) , chairman of the Senate Appropriations
Committee one of the very few people in
Congress who is privy to the CIA budget,
interpreted Senate rules as barring him from
disclosing highly secret national security in-
formation.
Taking issue with McClellan's rule inter-
pretation, Tunney told reporters:
"I feel the Senate has an inherent right in
closed session to obtain secret information
which one or more senators may obtain as a
result of their position on a Senate commits+
tee."
Tunney originally proposed cutting $33
million out of the Pentagon budget which
he said he had reason to believe was ear-
marked for CIA operations in Angola. But he
dropped any dollar figure after Humphrey
said he understood that there was $750 mil-
lion in the Pentagon budget that could be
tapped by the CIA.
Tunney offered his amendment as a rider
to a $112.3 billion defense appropriations bill.
Any Angolan amendment that the Senate
might adopt would have to be approved by
the House.
, [From the New York Times]
EARLY ANGOLA AID BY UNITED STATES
REPORTED
(By Seymour M. Hersh)
WASHINGTON, December 18.?The Ford Ad-
ministration's initial authorization for sub-
stantial Central Intelligence Agency finan-
cial operations inside Angola came in Janu-
ary 1975, more than two months before the
first significant Soviet build-up, well-in-
formed officials report.
It could not be learned on what specific
basis the agency approval to deepen its clan-
destine involvement in Angola at that point,
but William E. Colby of Central Intelligence
told a secret Congressional hearing two
months ago that the January increase in
C.I.A. activity was needed to match increas-
ed Soviet activity.
The Soviet Union has been involved in
Angola since 1956 but, according to well-
informed American intelligence officials, did
not substantially increase its support for
one of the liberation armies in Angola until
March and April of this year. At that time
at least two shiploads and two planeloads of
Soviet war materiel were sent.
Told of the Administration's decision, of
January, 1975 a number of Government of-
ficials and lawmakers contended that it was
impossible without more information to de-
termine whether the subsequent Soviet
build-up had been purely aggressive and
expansionist, as Secretary of State Henry .A..
Kissinger and others have contended, or
whether it might have been in part a Soviet
response to the action by the United States.
$300,000 FOR ROBERTO
The Administration's high-level intelli-
gence-review panel, known as the 40 Com-
mittee, discussed Angola at its January
meeting?the first such discussion of the
African nation since the mid-1960's, officials
said. They said the group agreed to permit'
the C.I.A. to provide $300,000 clandestinely
to Holden Roberto, the leader of one of
three factions now seeking control of
Angola.
At the time, Mr. Roberto, whose links with
the C.I.A. began in 1961, was on a $10,000-a-
year agency retainer for "intelligence col-
lection," the officials said. Mr. Roberto leads
the National Front for the Liberation of
Angola, which also has been aided by Zaire
and China.
During the same 40 Committee meeting
in January, the officials said, the C.I.A. un-
successfully also sought authority to pro-
vide a $100,000 subsidy secretly to Jonas
Savimbi, leader of the National Union for
the Total Independence of Angola.
At the time, the movements led by Mr.
Roberto and Mr. Savimbi?since merged?
were trying to negotiate a settlement with
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola, a third liberation group, which has
been supported by arms and aid from the
Soviet Union since its formation in 1956.
Those talks failed.
There was a sharp division today among
Government officials and some lawmakers
about the significance of the 40 Committee's
decision in January to increase the funds
available to Mr. Roberto,
LINK TO MOM= SEEN
? Some officials belittled its importance and
argued that the funds, which reportedly were
not meant for direct military support, were
supplied merely to reassure President Mobutu
Sese Seko of Zaire that the Ford Administra-
tion was not going to permit the Popular
Movement to win the Angolan civil war. Mr.
Mobutu, who is Mr. Roberto's father-in-law,
was an early advocate of American interven-
tion.
Many others, including Senators and Rep-
resentatives who have had access to secret
C.I.A. briefings on Angola, believe that dis-
closure of the January decision to increase
the American involvement raises new ques-
tions about which nation?the United States
or the Soviet Union?initiated what inside
Angola.
"I think it's very important," one well-
informed official acknowledged. "That money
gave him a lot of extra muscle. He'd been
sitting in Kinshasa for nearly 10 years and
all of a sudden he's got a lot of bread?he's
beginning to do things."
Since the early 1960's, Mr. Roberto had
maintained his headquarters in Kinshasa,
the capital of Zaire.
The official's point was that the C.T.A.
source of the revitalized flow of funds for the
Roberto movement would be quickly per-
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.calved by the Popular Movement and its
Soviet supporters.
The disclosure further contradicts the in-
sistence of Secretary Kissinger in Senate
testimony that is still secret that the State
Department's Bureau of African Affairs had,
in effect, withheld information about Angola
from him early this year. He suggested that
the bureau had done so in an effort to limit
the options available to the Ford Adminis-
tration.
In January Mr. Kissinger was Secretary
of State and also President Ford's adviser on
national security. As adviser, he was chair-
man of the 40 Committee when the decision
was made to increase greatly the C.I.A. cash
subsidy to Mr. Roberto.
BEHIND TETE DECISIONS
In an extensive recounting of Washing-
ton's Angola decision-making, well-informed
officials also made these points:
C.I.A. statistics as of early last month show
that the agency had paid $5.4 million to
ship what was listed as $10 million in arms
to Angola between late July and October.
The high shipping costs were described by
many knowledgable officials as evidence
that the agency had been systematically
Underestimating the value of the weapons
chipped thus far, in an effort to make the
United States role appear as minimal as
possible.
The intelligence agency was explicitly au-
therized by President Ford on July 27, 1975,
to begin a $500,000 information program in-
side Angola as part of a 40 Committee de-
eision to begin major shipments of United
States arms there.
The precise date of the 40 Committee's
meeting in January, 1975, could not be
learned, but January was a pivotal month in
Angola.
JOINT POLITICAL PACT
On Jan. 6, leaders of the three liberation
Movements met in Kenya and signed a politi-
cal accord that was viewed as paving a way
for independence for the Portuguese terri-
tory. On Jan. 10 Portugal formally agreed to
grant independence in Angola in the follow-
ing November.
On Jan. 31 the three liberation movements
agreed to share cabinets posts and power
equally with a Portuguese contingent until
the formal date of independence.
The three liberation movements further
agreed to prepare for and hold national elec-
tions for a constituent assembly. Those elec-
tions were never held, however, as the coali-
tion dissolved over the next few monhts and
warfare broke out.
American officials were interviewed re-
peatedly by correspondents of The New York
Times in redeht ? weeks, but none suggested
what Mr. Colby and other C.I.A. officials have
said in recent seciret 'briefings in Congress?
that Soviet buildups in Angola before this
year Were in any way a factor in the subse-
quent United States decision to intervene
directly in July 1975 with shipments of arms
and aid.
100 'TONS or Aims
More than 100 tons of arms were reported
to have been landed by Soviet planes in
southern Angola and the Congo in March
and knit It was thethe shipments, American
officials haire aontended up to now, that led
to rapid military advances by the Popular
Movement and the subsequent decision by
Secretary Kissinger and President Ford to
intervene directly.
Throughout the spring, a *number of of-
ficials have said, the C.I.A. lobbied intensive-
ly for a larger tnited States role in Angola,
justifying its agrUnient on increased Soviet
activities. Specifically, the C.I.A. was seeking
high-level approval to begin supplying funds
directly to Mr. Savimbi.
. ,
The matter was discussed at a 40 Com-
mittee meeting in June, officials said, with
no tesOlution, although a full-scale National
Security Council study of the issues and the
various options was authorized.
It was at this point, State Department
sources said, that opposition to further
United States involvement was repeatedly
raised by Nathaniel Davis, then the Assist-
ant Secretary of State for African Affairs.
Mr. Dayis, who resigned in protest over
the Administration's policies on Angola, is
now Ambassador to Switzerland. He explicit-
ly argued in June that the decision by the
40 Committee to support both Mr. Roberto
and Mr. Savimbi would be perceived as an
escalation by the Soviet Union and lead, in
turn, to even more involvement by the Rus-
sians.
IN CONTROL OF LUANDA
Following the National Security Council
review, officials said, the 40 Committee met
on July 17, 1975. By then the Popular Move-
ment, using the Soviet supplies shipped since
March, had seized firm control of Luanda,
Angola's capital, and had won significant
victories elsewehre.
The Popular Movement was claiming con-
trol of 11 of Angola's 16 provinces.
The 40 Committee authorised the follow-
ing steps:
The direct shipment of arms to the forces
led by Mr. Savimbi and Mr. Roberto and the
replacement of arms that had been previous-
ly supplied and would continue to be sup-
plied by Zaire and Zambia, the two neigh-
boring African nations that supported the
American intervention. It was agreed to per-
mit Zambia and Zaire to provide as much
non-American equipment as possible at first
in order to minimize the overt link with the
United States.
Exposure through information programs
and other means of the Soviet arming of the
Popular Movement, with emphasis on the
possible embarrassment of African nations
relaying the Russian arms or in other ways
serving as conduits for such aid.
The use of an information program to
build the abilities and integrity of the forces
controlled by Mr. Savimbi and Mr. Roberto.
The dispatch of cash in two stages of
Angola, with $6 million to be expended in
Stage 1 and $8 million in Stage 2. The signi-
ficance of the two-tiered approach has not
been made clear by the sources.
i"ORD SUPPORTERS START FILIBUS, cat
ANGOLAN Am
(By David Binder)
WASHINGTON, December 18.?The Ford Ad-
ministration sought today to reach a com-
promise with the Senate that would allow
the United States to continue covert sup-
port operations in the Angolan civil war.
The move was initiated by Senator Robert
P. Griffin, Republican of Michigan, after John
L. McClellan, chairman of the Senate Appro-
priations Committee, failed to induce Presi-
dent Ford to concur in a system that would
enable the Congress to play a larger role in
deciding on such secret operations.
On Senator Griffin's invitation, Secretary
of State Henry A. Kissinger conferred with
about 25 leading Senators on an arrange-
ment that would end the present stalemate.
A filibuster is being conducted in the Senate
against an amendment that would immedi-
ately cut off funds for assistance to two An-
golan factions.
NO MEETING OF MINDS
Emerging from the meeting, Mr. Kissinger
said that it had not been "a meeting of
minds," but that he was taking the Senate
leadership's proposals to Mr. Ford.
Senator John Tunney, a California Demo-
crat, who is leading an attempt to cut off
all funds for Angola, said he intended to push
for the cutoff tomorrow.
"Nothing is acceptable that won't result
in a Cutoff of all funds for military aid to
Angola," he said. "I don't want to see more
money down this rathole."
The filibuster began about 2 P.M. when
Senator Mike Mansfield, the Democratic ma-
jority leader, requested a vote on the cutoff
amendment submitted by Senator Tunney
and 12 others.
Senator McClellan, the Arkansas Democrat
who has been managing the $112 billion de-
fense appropriations bill, slipped out and tele-
phoned President Ford, appealing for his ap-
proval of a procedure involving Congress in
the funding of covert operations.
The funds for the Angola operations have
come out of the defense appropriations, ac-
cording to officials of the Central Intelligence
Agency in testimony before a Senate com-
mittee.
According to other Senators, Mr. McClellan
proposed that in future requests for covert
funds, the President should first seek the
approval of the Appropriations Comrnittee
and, upon approval, the request would go di-
rectly to the full Senate.
Under the present system the Administra-
tion simply informs Senator McClellan and
his minority colleague on the Appropriations
Committee, Senator Milton R. Young, Repub-
lican of North Dakota, and they either ap-
prove or disapprove without any further air-
ing in committee or in the Senate as a whole.
A White House spokesman, William I.
Greener, said President Ford had discussed
the proposal with Senate McClellan, but "no
arrangement could be reached."
As the filibuster by conservative Senators
wore on, Mr. Kissinger arrived at the office
of Hugh Scott, the Republican Minority
Leader from Pennsylvania, and agreed to
provide the leadership with more informa-
tion about the Angola situation, as well as
the Administration's view on the covert op-
erations, on which $33 million has already
been spent.
HISSINGER CONVEYS OFFER
After two hours of discussion, Mr. Kis-
singer promised to convey a refined com-
promise proposal to the President and to re-
turn tomorrow with a response. The com-
promise was described by a Senator as in-
volving a concurrence of the Senate in a $10
million increment for Angolan aid, after
which the Administration would have to ob-
tain regular Senate approval of any further
funding.
The Administration is seeking $28 million
in additional funds for the Front for the Na-
tional Liberation of Angola in the north and
the National Union For Total Independence
of Angola in the south. The two groups are
opposing the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola, which has the support
of the Soviet Union and has established a
government in Luanda, the capital of the
former Portuguese colony.
The total aid projected by the Administra-
tion for Angolan aid this year comes to $60
million.
But, the Central Intelligence Agency's con-
tingency funds for covert activity are said to
total only $50 million, of which two-thirds is
already exhausted, either through expendi-
tures and commitments.
It is the belief of Senator Tunney and his
Senate allies that by amending the defense
appropriation to bar further covert expendi-
tures it can deny the C.I.A. the capacity to
continue Angola operations.
The Tunney forces showed their strength
early in the afternoon in defeating a sub-
stitute amendment by Senator Griffin that
would have allowed the covert operations to
continue. The vote was 72 to 26.
This left the pro-Administration Senators
with the filibuster as their only weapon,
made more effective by the nearness of the
Christmas holidays and the desire of a num-
ber of Senators to go home tomorrow or
Saturday.
Senator Tunney and some of his allies said
they were determined to force a resolution of
the issue, even if it meant staying in Wash-
ington. Several said they believe they had the
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0".a...56coniffer 19, AMISoved Forftie
60 votes needed to bring about cloture, end-
ing the filibuster and compelling a vote on
the cutoff amendment.
It was this threat, according to Adminis-
tration officials, that caused Secretary Kis-
singer and the White House to agree to the
compromise attempt.
While the Senate prepared for its third day
of debate on the Angola issue, the House In-
ternational Relations Committee approved
an amendment to the foreign assistance bill
that would, require the Administration to
clear future Angola expenditures with the
Congress.
ANATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTIO
81?PROVIDING FOR A CON
T1ONAL ADJOURNMENT OF C
MESS
M MANSFIELD. Mr. President, ask
that e Senate proceed to the cosid-
eratlo?f Senate Concurrent Resolution
81.
The BESIDING OFFICER. Th con-
current esolution will be stated b&r title.
The le islative clerk read as fo ows:
A concu ent resolution (S. Con. es. 81)
providing f r the adjournment of pongress.
The PRIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, tlie Senate will -proc ed to the
Immediate c nsideration of t concur-
rent resolutio
Mr. GRIEF. Mr. Presidenik, I suggest
the absence of quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call th roll. ,
The second as istant le slative clerk
proceeded to call tie roll. I
Mr. ROBERT C:' BYRDIMr. President
I ask unanimous c nsent hat the order
for the quorum call e res inded.
The PRESIDING p I" CER. Without
objection, it is so ordef
Mr. MANSFIELD. ? . President, I
withdraw my request 4p proceed to the
consideration of the c ncurrent resolu-
tion.
Mr. ROBERT C. B . Mr. President,
I ask unanimous con ent that Mr. Prox-
mire may proceed f 3 rinutes.
The PRESIDING .OFFI?. Without
f
objection, it is so or ered. I '?
Under the order f procedure, the con-
current tesolution; is laid aVde tempo-
rarily. I
The Senator fri.m Wisconsp is recog-
nized.
REAL ESTAT SETTLEMEN PRO-
CEDURES CT AMENDM NTS?
CONFEREN E REPORT
Mr. PROX IRE. Mr. President,
mit a report grb-
the committee of c fer-
ence on S. 23 7, and ask for its imnrdi-
ate consider. ion.
The PR SIDING OFFICER ( r.
HE LMS). Th report will be stated by ti e.
The sec ? d assistant legislative clei\k
read as fol
The co
agreeing
amendme
2327) to
"Real
1974,"
fetence
end to their respective Houses this
or signed by all the conferees.
Th PRESIDING OFFICER, Is there
obje ton to the consideration of the
con rence report?
OWS :
ttee of conference on the d1s4,
otes of the two Houses on thek
its of the House to the bill (S.
uspend sections 4, 6, and 7 of the \
ate Settlement Procedures Act of \
ving met, after full and free con- \
have agreed to recommend and do
MORIDP-z7110QA4tR000Llool00018-1 S 23065
here being no objection, the Senate
Pr' eeded to consider the report, as fol-
lows.
JoIi?EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE
COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE
The th.nagers on the part of the House
and the nate at the conference on the dis-
agreeing tes of the two Houses on the
amendmen of the Senate to the amend-
ments of th House to the bill (S. 2327) en-
titled "An Ac to suspend sections 4, 6, and
7 of the 'Real state Settlement Procedures
Act of 1974 ", submit the following joint
statement to th House and the Senate in
explanation of th effect of the action agreed
upon by the man ers and recommended in
the accompanying onference report:
TRUTH-IN-LE ING DISCLOSURES
The Senate bill co ained a provision not
in the House amen ents which would
authorize the Federal eserve Board to re-
quire the disclosure of 11 or a part of the
Information required in e Truth-In-Lend-
ing Act at or prior to the t e a written com-
mitment to make a real e ate loan was is-
sued. The conference repor does not con-
tain the Senate provision.
The conferees believe tha the advance
disclosure of truth-in-lending information,
which has been provided as page \three of the
RESPA statement, has been use ul to con-
sumers. With the repeal of section \6 of RES-
PA, there is doubt whether the Fe eral Re-
serve Board of Governors retains he au-
thority to require advance disci? ure of
truth-in-lending information. The co ferees
believe that continuation of some fotu of
advance truth-in-lending disclosure in on-
sumer real estate transactions has m rit.
However, this question was not treated in
hearings and neither of the banking commi -
tees has had an opportunity to consider th
deta:ls of such disclosure. The conferees be-
lieve that rather than include a truth-in-
lending provision in this Act, the appropriate
committees should consider the question
early in 1976, and recommend legislation ati
the earliest feasible time. I
COMPLETION AND INSPECTION OF SETTLEMEXT
FORM IN ADVANCE !
The Senate bill contained a provision not
in the House amendments which wou re-
quire the settlement agent to complete the
uniform settlement form one busin s day
prior to the day of settlement and make
it available for inspection by the iorrower.
The conference report contains the Sen-
ate provision in amended form. tIle provi-
sion as revised makes clear that, he obliga-
tion of the settlement agent tb make the
settlement form available prior to settlement
is to be triggered by the riquest of the
borrower and that the agent's/sole obligation
is to make available only that information
which is known to him at We time of disclo-
sure.I The amended langua also makes clear
that the information is o ly required to be
made available sometime uring the business
day immediately precefing the settlement
day.
WILLIAM 1/ROXMIRE,
KMAN,
A. Wn-Lisms,
KWOOD,
RN,
he Part of the Senate.
Y S. REUSS,
IAM A. BARRETT,
LIAM S. MOORHEAD,
BERT G. STEPHENS, Jr.,
NAND J. ST GERMA/N,
ART BROWN,
OHN H. ROUSSELOT,
gers on the Part of the House.
RESIDING OFFICER. The
will be in order. The Chair so-
e cooperation of Senators. Staff
ers are asked to cooperate simi-
JOHN Si'
HARRIS?
BOB PA
JAKE
Managers on
The
Senato
liens
mem
larly. The Senate is not in orler. The
Chair has plenty of time.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. But Senators
who have airline reservations ,do not
have plenty of time. I hope Mentrers will
accede to the request of the C air that
there be order in the Senate, 96 that we
can get on with the business./
Mr. NELSON. Mr. Preside t, I do not
believe that the Members/at the rear
of the Chamber have beex, able to hear
the Chair. I wonder if tl Chair would
repeat the request.
The PRESIDING OFIFICER. If the
Senator would speak to/them personally,
the Chair would apprebiate it.
Mr. NELSON. Me 15ers at the Repub-
lican cloakroom side pparently have not
heard the request, Vack by the entrance
door and on my 1 t. I wonder whether
the Chair would/ speak a little louder
or ask them to /turn on their hearing
aids again. /
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Vlsconsin may try to pro-
ceed now.
Mr. PRO MIRE. The conference re-
port is on he Real Estate Settlements
Procedure Act which we acted on a few
days ago./ There were two amendments
that we 'passed. The first amendment,
the Ho/se agreed to, we receded in the
Senate/on providing a modified 1-day
advanbe disclosure of settlement charges.
On tjie second amendment, the Senate
rece ed in the truth-in-lending area. We
thiyik we can work that out a little later
o I think the conference report, as
eed to, is one that is very close to the
ill as it passed the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
on is on agreeing to the conference
port.
he conference report was agreed to.
SEN TE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
81 PROVIDING FOR ADJOURN-
ME T OF CONGRESS
Mr. NSFIELD. Mr. President, I re-
new my equest that the resolution on
adjournm t be laid before the Senate.
It is my i ention, if it is agreed to, to
hold it at e desk pending an appro-
priate time.
The PRES SING OFFICER. The clerk
will state the c rrent resolution.
The legislativ clerk read as follows:
Resolved by th Senate (the House of
Representatives con rring), That when the
two Houses adjourn n Friday, December 19,
1975, they shall sten adjourned sine die or
until 12:00 noon on he second day after
their respective Membe are notified to re-
assemble in accordance th section 2 of this
resolution, whichever eve t first occurs.
SEC. 2. The Speaker of fe House of Rep-
resentatives and the Presid? pro tempore
of the Senate shall notify e Members of
the House and the Senate, espectively, to
reassemble whenever, in thei opinion, the
public interest shall warrant it, or whenever
the majority leader of the Sen te and the
majority leader of the House, ac ng jointly,
or the minority leader of the Sena and the
minority leader oil the House, actiIg jointly,
file a written request with the Sec tary of
the Senate and the Clerk of ..ne Hoiie that
the Congress reassemble for considera on of
legislation.
SEC. 3. During the adjournment of oth
Houses of Congress as provided in sectio 1
the Secretary of the Senate and the Cl k
of the House, respectively be, and they her
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S23066
Approved For 6091M12581011/111 ReaClaW7-7KOINIAR0004001kelevlbe
by are, authorized to receive messages, in-
cluding veto messages, from the President of
the United States.
Mr. MANbrata.D. And the date?
The legis tive clerk read:
When the to Houses adjourn on Friday,
December 19, 195.
Mr. MANS
agreed to Janua
Mr. CURTIS.
right there?
Mr. MANSFIELD.
Mr. CURTIS. 'What the status of
any similar resolution i the House of
Representatives?
Mr. MANSFIELD. We ha,Naot receiv-
ed any. Hence, we are forced "o take ac-
tion. Pending action by the Abuse, it is
the leadership's intention to h d it at
the desk.
Mr. WEICXER. Will the Senato
for a question?
D. Yesterday, we
9.
1 the Senator yield
s.
ield
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A resolution (S. Res. 336) to authorize
James Fstep, Senate Computer Center, and
Harold W. Needham, Superintendent, Sen-
ate Service Department, to appear as wit-
nesses in the case of Common Cause, et al. v.
Benjamin Bailer, et al.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the present consideration
of the resolution?
There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to consider the resolution.
Mr.- MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
want at this time to bring to the atten-
tion of the Members of the Senate the
legal proceeding brought by Common
Cause to have the court declare the
franking statute unconstitutional on its
face because according to Common
Cause it disadvantages challengers to
incumbents seeking reelection to Con-
gress, uses taxpayers' dollars for a non-
public purpose 'and discriminates against
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. other users of the mails.
Mr. WEIMER. The Senator sale For discovery and evidence purposes
this will be held at the desk pending an's in this case, Common Cause has sub-
enaed Senate records, including:
irst. The complaints with respect to
vidations of the frank received by the
Sele t Committee on Standards and
Cond ct and their disposition, advisory/
opinioN given by the committee and itt
staff?both written and oral?and inter-
pretive mekkiorandums prepared for cam-
mittee use as well as testimony /con-
cerning matters conducted by the/com-
mittee in exe utive session;
e Computer Ce ter rec-
e User's ide and
s which /show how
s of f,tanked mail
recipients are deveyeel,( how those
d the group-
appropriate time. Why is this not an
appropriate time?
Mr. MANSFIELD. We want to make
sure that the Senate is not caught short
again, as it was my first year as the ma-
jority leader, when the House passed an
adjournment resolution, left the city in
a 'harry, and left us with a pack of ex-
pensive legislation on our desks.
Mr. WEICK.E.R. I thank the Senator.
Mr. orarrm. Would it not be true, I
ask the distinguished majority leader,
that if we were to pass this legislation
and send it over to the House, then we
Could be in the situation that the ma-
jority leader has just described, because
both Houses do have to pass that ad-
journment resolution?
Mr. MANMELD. That is correct, but
If we passed it and went out, which we
never do, then the House would have to
take what they Were given, as we were
given by the House some 16 years ago.
Mr, GRIFFIN. Earlier, when the ma-
jority leader presented the resoluton, I
put in a quorum tall because I wanted to
send for the minority leader and let him
know that the Senator was calling this
up. If he cannot come to the floor, I take
it from the statement of the majority
leader that he would consult with the
minority leader before he would take it
from the desk and consider it.
Mr. mANtrran. Oh, yes, indeed.
The PRESIDING 0.e.HCER. The ques-
tion is- on agreeing to the concurrent
resolution.
Second. Sena
ords including
computer progra
names and addres
names are categorize
ings into which the na
arated, work orders f
and records which cl' clos
of franked mail la ls pri
use of each Senatdr, the ca
names maintained' on the Sen
puter by each 0-riator, the nu
names in each ,iategory, the code
nation for eaeh category; and
Third. Seriate Service Departm
records of the number of franked m
pieces sery each Senator, work order
from eac Senator reflecting the number
of newsletters printed and copies of all
newsletters printed.
Conimon Cause contends that the
fra is used for mass mail material that
is olitical in nature and for particular
flings that it says are targeted to
fiecial interest groups very much like
The concurrent resolution was agreed ampaign literature is. Common Cause
to. /has told the court that the Senate docu-
---,-awama....?. merits it seeks will show that what it has
AUTHORIZATION' FOR, APPEARAN E discovered so far is a very widespread
Or WITNESS practice.
A three-judge court found that the
Mr. MANSFIELD Mr. Preside4t, I documents were relevant to Common
send to the desk a resolution w the Causes case, rejected the Senate and
Concurrence of the distinguish ,d Sen- House claims of privilege, and ordered
ator from Pennsylvania, the R publican that the documents must be produced
leader, and me. This is a matter which with the identity of individual Senators
Was discussed at the Ilemocr tic confer- not disclosed as far as it is possible to
aide on. Thursday last an which I be- achieve this result withDut unduly ham-
/ie'Ve was discussed likew e by the Re- pering the full and expeditious processing
publicans. I ask that it read. of the lawsuit.
The PRESIDING 0 CER. The clerk We have given consideration to the
will state the resolutio alternative courses of action the Senate
es can be sep-
r ',address labels
the number
ed for the
gories of
te com-
ber of
esig-
nt
ake.
might take at this time with resp ct to
these legal proceedings and the co
der granting the discovery soug
Common Cause subpenas. Ba
have three alternatives. One
ply with the demands of
pursuant to the court's or
is a conteMpt proceedin
rt or-
by the
cally we
to com-
sUbpenas
r. A second
against the
Senate documents and /testify as de-
manded. The third is: to attempt to
achieve a compromise with Common
Cause. In deciding which alternative to
adopt we are guided by the following
considerations. ,/
The facilities cif the Senate Service
Department and/Senate Computer Cen-
ter are utilized/by the Senate, its Mem-
bers and comAittees for many types of
official busZess, including information
on the stat e of legislation, internal ad-
ministratiye records, information re-
trieval sterns for individual Senate of-
flees, a
questi
sent
tees
the printing and addressing of
naires, newsletters, and reports
by Senators and Senate commit-
no case are Members of the Senate
or' Senate committees authorized to use
*hese Senate facilities for political or
/personal purposes and Members of the
Senate and Senate employees are sub-
ject to disciplinary proceedings with re-
spect to such unauthorized use of these
facilities. For these reasons, the Senate
originally asserted its constitutional
privileges with respect to the Senate rec-
ords subpenaed by the plaintiffs in this
litigation and also its objection to any
attempt to obtain such records by sub-
penas requiring that these documents
be produced by Senate employees con-
trary to the express order of the Senate
as set forth in Senate Resolutions 423
and 431, adopted by the Senate on Octo-
ber 9, 1974, and October 11, 1974, re-
spectively.
In administering the use of these and
other Senate facilities and services, the
primary criterion is the size of the popu-
lation of the State of the Member, al-
though under the rules, regulations, and
practices of the Senate Members from
smaller States may make a proportion-
ately greater use of such facilities than
Members from larger States. A review of
records reflecting the use of these Senate
SVs indicates that 93 percent of the
ate mailed less than two pieces of
maij, under frank per voting age constit-
uent during the general election year
1974 'according to the records of these
units. llie seven Members of the Senate
who sen
voting ag
States whi
tion category.
Furthermor
ate sent out les
per voting age
frank in 1974, acco
In comparing 1974 e
to 1973 mailings, the
number of pieces of ma
for candidates and 60.4
candidates, according to
by the Senate computer. Th
ords also show that of the
mailing the largest volume
mail, two were candidates for r
and defeated, and the mailings
out two or more mailings per
onstituent in 1974 were from
fall in the lowest popula-
82 Members of the Sen-
than one Piece of mail
onstituent under the
ing to these records.
ction year mailings
verage increase in
was 31.6 percent
rcent for non-
ta computed
Senate rec-
Senators
franked
election
I the
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100018-1