CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A023400080001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 20, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2003/10/22: CIA-RDP79T00975A0234SI1et3
25X1
'DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Department review completed
Secret
N2 42
20 December 1972
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A023400080001-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO23400080001-3
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO23400080001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/1Il' ;J 1P79T00975A023400080001-3
No. 0304/72
20 December 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
VIETNAM: Communists broadcast propaganda on talks
impasse. (Page 1)
CHILE: General Prats' activism ruffles both oppo
sition and some government politicians. (Page 3)
MALTA: Mintoff again threatens British over base
issue. (Page 5)
INDONESIA: Severe rice shortages producing polit-
ical fallout. (Page 7)
USSR: Foreign leaders flocking to Moscow for 50th
anniversary celebrations. (Page 9)
PERU-CUBA: Visit of Peruvian military delegation
to Cuba could presage closer relations (Page 10)
Approved For Release 2003/10/2$ECAU79T00975A023400080001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A023400080001-3
SECRET
VIETNAM: The Communists have developed some
additional propaganda formulations to cope with
the impasse in the peace talks.
On 18 December, an authoritative Hanoi article
denounced President Thieu's proposals of 12 Decem-
ber for an expandable holiday cease-fire and the
joint release of prisoners of war. According to
the article, Thieu attacked all the "basic princi-
ples" of the draft peace accord of 20 October
when he called for withdrawal of North Vietnamese
forces from South Vietnam and for the creation of
a "permanent political" boundary at the DMZ in-
stead.of the provisional demarcation line that now
exists. The lengthy discourse attempted to demon-
strate that Thieu's proposals, both new and old,
did not originate with him, but were only made at
the instigation of the US as part of an American
"plot" to alter the basic content of the "approved"
peace agreement.
The article's insistence that Thieu is a US
"puppet" is designed in part to pin the blame for
the impasse on Washington rather than Saigon. In
addition, Hanoi probably is trying to head off any
gain in Thieu's stature among the South Vietnamese
as a result of his independent stance on the nego-
tiations. The theme that Thieu is a powerless US
puppet exploiting his country for American inter-
ests has been a constant part of Hanoi's political
line in South Vietnam. Hanoi doubtless hopes
thereby to fuel pressures for Thieu's removal fol-
lowing a cease-fire. It is likely that the Viet-
namese Communist effort to portray Thieu's pro-
posals as a manipulation by Washington will be
intensified in the weeks to come.
The Hanoi article was accompanied by an edi-
torial from the Viet Cong's Liberation News Agency
on 18 December that attempted to provide additional
propaganda justification for Hanoi's refusal to
agree explicitly to the withdrawal of North Viet-
namese troops from the South. In the course of
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2003/10/2~Ee1k79T00975A023400080001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO23400080001-3
SECRET
denouncing alleged US and South Vietnamese efforts
at "trampling on the just and fair content" of the
draft cease-fire agreement, the editorial claimed
that the bulk of the North Vietnamese in the South
were "fighters and sons" of the Vietnamese who had
regrouped to the North under the 1954 Geneva Agree-
ments. This is the first known instance in which
the Vietnamese Communists have admitted obliquely
that troops from the North are in the South by
asserting that they are really southerners fight-
ing in their "own homeland." This line may also
become a more prominent theme in the Communist
propaganda output in the future.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/1 0/gi f j 1 79T00975AO23400080001-3
 Approved For Release 200 D I1I-RDP79T00975AO23400080001-3
CHILE: General Prats' assumption of an active
political role is causing consternation among op-
position and government politicians alike.
Prats had been interior minister only a little
over three weeks when President Allende left on 30
November for a two-week trip, but showed no hesi-
tation in assuming responsibility as chief execu-
Ithe UP leaders--
particularly the Communis s--rep tedly expressed
consternation over the implications of the gen-
eral's aggressive behavior in the usually pro forma
role of vice-president. They fear that he intends
to identify the armed forces increasingly with the
administration in order to enlarge the military
role in directing the country.
On the other hand, Prats has taken actions
that opposition parties criticize as partial to-
ward the UP. On 15 December, Christian Democratic
Party President Fuentealba accused Prats of a
whole litany of misdeeds. The conservative Na-
tional Party started criticizing Prats' conduct
as pro-UP even earlier, probably stimulated by
his reported belief that Chilean industrialists
are feeding leftist extremism hhbbey their unrealistic
i p~ Po el dstea~ /~2 1CIA-R MT0097 Lp51q fllf Q~ -3
on non 79 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
25X1
 Approved For Release 2003OR/?.RF RDP79T00975AO23400080001-3
Prats himself takes the position that his ob-
ligations are only to the president and to the army.
He apparently believes that only by expanding mili-
tary influence in the government can he restore
political calm for the March elections. It is in-
creasingly apparent, however, that he relishes his
new role and may harbor ambitions to become presi-
dent himself. There is as yet no indication that
President Allende disapproves of his activism,
particularly since Prats' attitude shores up pres-
idential authority over UP politicians who often
fail to defer to him.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Vrr
Approved For Release 200?t1'Ot& A-RDP79T00975AO23400080001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/1" ]klp-PDP79T00975A023400080001-3
MALTA: Prime Minister Mintoff has threatened
to take his disagreement with the British to the UN
Security Council.
In response to his demand that Britain. and the
allies make up Maltese losses caused by the floating
of the pound, Mintoff received a letter from British
Prime Minister Heath on 18 December indicating that
London expects all parties to the base agreement
signed last March to observe the agreement. in letter
and in spirit. Mintoff's immediate reaction, con-
veyed to the UK High Commissioner, was to accuse
London of bad faith and of cheating Malta of five
million pounds. Before dismissing the British envoy,
Mintoff said "If you want to fight, we know how to
fight too; don't think you can stay on here for
14 million pounds.."
Mintoff subsequently informed the US, West Ger-
man, and Italian ambassadors that he interpreted
Heath's message as a threat to use force to maintain
the British military presence on Malta after his
deadline expires on 31 December and that the allies
would support London in this move. British forces
on the island-are making no obvious preparations for
departure--a fact that the Maltese appear to view
as a military threat. Mintoff also demanded that
the allies submit written notes dissociating them-
selves from Heath's position "within 24 hours" or
he would instruct his ambassador to the UN to raise
the matter with the Security Council. Rome and
Washington have already turned down this demand.
In order to place this matter before the Council,
the Maltese ambassador to the UN would first have
to secure nine of the 15 Council votes.
During his discussions with the ambassadors,
Mintoff talked about other sources of revenue and
other "allies." He said that he had "lost the
friendship of the Soviet Union" and did not intend
to lose any more friends, but that he would do what
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2003/10/ q&-RDP79T00975A023400080001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/10/gE(MLW79T00975A023400080001-3
was necessary to protect Malta. Mintoff may be re-
ferring to the inability of the USSR and Malta to
agree on whether the Soviets should receive permis-
sion to establish an embassy in Valletta before they
promise to extend economic assistance. The Soviet
ambassador in London, who is also accredited to
Malta, visited Valletta earlier this month but was
unable to resolve this issue.
Mintoff did not raise the deadline of 31 De-
cember and he has not yet ordered the UK troops to
leave the island. He told the US ambassador, how-
ever, that when the deadline expires, the British
would have only 24 hours to leave. The British es-
timate that the withdrawal would take at least 60
days after the plans are drawn up.
20 Dec 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA- DP79T00975AO23400080001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/10/2 ,aff 79T00975A023400080001-3
INDONESIA: Severe and apparently unexpected
rice shortages are producing political fallout in
Jakarta.
Food prices have skyrocketed and bureaucratic
failures and malfeasance in the government's rice
distribution system have been spotlighted in ensuing
publicity. Indonesian students, quiescent for many
months, have staged protests in the past few weeks
in several major cities. Opposition members of par-
liament, scenting a chance to embarrass the military
leadership, have called for an open investigation of
alleged corruption in the rice agency. Jakarta's
newspapers are keeping the issue alive by giving
wide coverage to various anti-government charges.
A complicating but not yet publicized aspect of the
problem is Mrs. Suharto's influence peddling on be-
half of certain rice contractors.
The food distribution problems are likely to
persist at least into next spring. President Su-
harto has attempted to defuse the issue by publicly
accepting pro forma responsibility for the emergency.
Some regional leaders and protestors, however, are
suggesting that the root cause of the problem is
economic manipulation by the nation's Chinese minor-
ity--who by and large control wholesale rice trans-
actions. Widespread acceptance of this allegation
could lead to serious anti-Chinese demonstrations,
especially if the government decides that the
easiest solution to its predicament is to allow the
Chinese to become the scapegoat.
Although the rice problem may be politically
embarrassing for Suharto, it is unlikely to create
any immediate serious problems for his regime. A
longer range concern for the President, however, is
the possibility that rivals within the army will
try to use the situation to enhance their own polit-
ical power at his expense.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2003/10/22cd.JF_1.9T00975A023400080001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/RDP79T00975A023400080001-3
FOREIGN ATTENDEES
Eastern Europe
Hungary - Kadar East Germany - Honecker
Romania - Ceausescu Poland -
Yugoslavia - Vice President Dugonjic Czechoslovakia -
Bulgaria -
Western Europe
San Marino * Denmark * Sweden
Italy * U K * Spain *
Austria * Ireland * Portugal
Luxembourg * Belgium * Greece
FRG *
Norway - trade union delegation
Finland - President Kekkonen
Asia
Burma - Information Minister Brig. Thaung Dan
India - Vice President Pathak
Sri Lanka - Shipping and Tourism Minister Kalugalle
North Vietnam - Politburo No. 2 member Truong Chinh
Australia - Socialist Party leader Clancy
Bangladesh - Industries Minister Mustafa
Mongolia - Premier Tsedenbal
North Korea - Choe Yong-kon, titular head of state
Australia* Sri Lanka* Laos* Bangladesh*
South Vietnam*
Chile - Minister Hernan del Canto
Cuba - Premier Fidel Castro
Uruguay * Guyana * Puerto Rico
El Salvador * Honduras * USA *
Argentina * Brazil* Costa Rica
Venezuela
South Yemen - Premier Ali Hasani
Egypt - Deputy Premier Marzaban
Iraq - Public Health Minister Mustafa
Mauritania - Foreign Minister Mouknass
Syria * (& Baathist) Somalia * Turkey **
South Africa * Lebanon * Afghanistan
Iran ** Iraq * Algeria **
Israel *
*Communist Party delegation
**Unspecified government representation
Leaders cited are heads of delegations.
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A023400080001-3
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22,-ffV9T00975A023400080001-3
USSR: Foreign government and Communist party
leaders are flocking to Moscow for the celebration
of the 50th anniversary of the USSR later this
week.
The level of representation at the ceremonies,
scheduled to reach their high-point on 21 and 22
December, varies considerably. Moscow's East Eu-
ropean allies will be represented by party chiefs,
and a summit meeting will probably be held during
their stay. Cuba will be represented by Fidel
Castro, and high party figures from North Vietnam
and North Korea will be present. Those non-Commu-
nist nations of the Middle East and Asia that were
invited generally responded by designating middle-
level government officials as their representatives.
Few governments in Western Europe and Latin America
were invited, although a number of Communist party
leaders from those countries will be present.
The presence of such a heterogeneous group
of foreigners will offer limited opportunity for
serious substantive discussions. Some of the key
figures, however, may be able to review their par-
ticular problems with Soviet leaders. The Soviet
and East European leaders may use the visit to
discuss the CSCE preparatory talks and to consider
a position on force reductions in Europe.
A joint session of the Soviet party Central
Committee and the USSR and RSFSR Supreme Soviets
is expected on 21 December. No major business
is likely to be transacted, but Brezhnev report-
edly will make a major speech, which the foreign
guests will probably be invited to attend. The
following day apparently is being set aside as
the formal anniversary and will likely be marked
by a major parade.
20 Dec 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : WkAP79T00975A023400080001-3
25X1
 Approved For Release 2003/10/2 `: -?P79T00975A023400080001-3
PERU-CUBA: Members of a high-level Peruvian
military delegation, which included prime minister -
designate Mercado, have returned from two weeks in
Cuba full of praise for their hosts. The 30 offi-
cers from all services were particularly impressed
by the Cubans' favorable attitude toward Peru and
the quality of Soviet armaments in the Cuban inven-
tory. This lengthy visit could presage closer re-
lations between the two countries, and the Cubans
may hope that Mercado, on whom they lavished their
attentions, will be the instrument to effect this
change. More immediately, the impression made by
modern Soviet weapons being operated by other Latin
Americans could influence Peruvians to opt for pur-
chasing Soviet arms--especially at a time when the
seizure of a US-owned tuna boat threatens to end
prospects for a resumption of US military sales to
Peru,
20 Dec 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO23400080001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO23400080001-3
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO23400080001-3