CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A021800100001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 9, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
N2 42
9 May 1972
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No. 0111/72
9 May 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
SOUTH VIETNAM: Communist forces continue to press
in on Hue and Kontum City. (Page 1)
SOUTH VIETNAM: Top Communist field command issues
generally confident assessment of the current of-
fensive. (Page 2)
SOUTH KOREA - VIETNAM: Seoul reaffirms policy on
troop withdrawals. Page 4)
INDIA: Record grain crop greatly increases subsidy
costs. (Page 5)
PORTUGAL: Government to continue authoritarian
control over the press. (Page 7)
CAMEROON: Popular referendum that would abolish
present federal structure. (Page 9)
FINLAND: Parliamentary debate could lead to no-
confidence motion (Page 10)
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Demilitarized Zone
pang Tri
Tcheppr~k~~ 'Camp Evans
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C SOUTH VIETNAM: North Vietnamese commanders
are still moving their forces closer to Hue and
Kontum cities in preparation for the next round of
all-out assaults.
North and west of Hue, there have been more
enemy emplacements of large caliber artillery. Camp
Evans and Fire Support Bases King and Birmingham,
which are west of Hue, and most other government po-
sitions around the city are coming under progressively
heavier artillery attack. King has now been shelled
for 12 straight days.
Although Quang Tri City fell over a week ago the
Communists may require more time before they consider
themselves ready for another major offensive in this
region. They probably will order their infantry regi-
ments to close on South Vietnamese defensive positions
only after they are able to direct sustained artillery
barrages against them. Meanwhile, the Communists ap-
pear to be avoiding concentrating their infantry in
forward positions where they would be more exposed to
observation and allied air attack.
In the highlands, it has been two weeks since
the collapse of the South Vietnamese defensive line
along Rocket Ridge and ten days since the abandon-
ment of the second line of defense at Vo Dinh. North
Vietnamese commanders in the highlands, however, may
first try to clear their flanks of bypassed-
",outposts-before making a direct attack against Kontum City.
Enemy ground forces are probing the perimeter defenses
of Ben Het base, northwest of Kontum. This and other
b assed bases are being shelled regularly;?~,o
9 May 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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CSOUTH VIETNAM: The top Communist headquarters
in the South, COSVN, has issued a generally confi-
dent assessment of the current offensive, but it
warns of much hard fighting ahead.
the assessment, called Directive
35, claimed in mid-April that great victories had
been won over the South Vietnamese regular army
and that this afforded Viet Cong local forces an
excellent opportunity to re-establish their power
in the populated countryside. COSVN reportedly
asserted successes achieved in the first two weeks
of the offensive prove that Communist forces can
win a military victory in the South.
The rhetoric I iused in the
COSVN directive is no doubt intended in part to
raise the morale of Communist forces and spur them
on to greater efforts. COSVN does not routinely
pass out such praise during important campaigns.
In the past, when operations have not been going
well, COSVN has not been reluctant to talk frankly
about the failures of various subordinates. It
seems likely, therefore, that in the present in-
stance the headquarters is pleased with the ad-
vances made on several fronts during the current
offensive.
The COSVN assessment is not entirely optimis-
tic, however.
it contains some so er warnings about Communist
shortcomings and about obstacles that remain. Viet
Cong forces in the urban areas are taken to task
for not acting with sufficient vigor. While at-
tacks aaainAt the government's pacification program
6ave made big gains in some areas, in
of ers-sh u
c as the Mekong Delta--COSVN charges
the offensive is not moving fast enough.
(continued)
9 May 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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C COSVN reportedly observed that South Vietnamese
Army units in many areas have been driven out of
their "outer defense rings," but it warns that they
have pulled back to new in-depth defenses around
major bases and cities that will be difficult to
penetrate. COSVN also warns that the US is still
a dangerous adversary, but maintains that the US
will not be able to stem the current offensive,
especially if Communist units continue to attack
vigorously.
The directive insists that eventual victory
is certain and may be attained rapidly, although
Communist forces must be realistic and ready to
continue the fight for a long time. It asserts
that Communist forces have not yet committed all
of their available forces, and that they can con-
tinue to fight throughout 1972, and beyond, if
the allies refuse to make political concessions.
In general, the COSVN directive reinforces a
considerable body of evidence that the North Viet-
namese are relying heavily on their regular units
as the decisive forces in the current phase of the
war. While it calls on local forces, guerrillas,
and cadre in the cities to exploit the openings
created by the main forces, the directive leaves
the strong impression that military victories over
the regular South Vietnamese Army must come first.
COSVN appears to believe that main force actions
will create the kind of unsettled conditions in
which guerrillas and political cadre can once
again build up their strength and consolidate Com-
munist gains.
9 May 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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C SOUTH KOREA - VIETNAM: The South Korean de-
fense minister has state publicly that the limited
role of the two ROK army divisions in South Vietnam
would not be expanded.
In a statement to members of the Defense Com-
mittee of the National Assembly on 6 May, Yu Chao-
hung said that the zones of operational responsibil-
ity for the Korean troops (mostly in the southern
coastal area of Military Region II) would remain
unchanged despite US and South Vietnamese requests
that the zones be widened. He emphasized, moreover,
that there had been no change in Seoul's decision
that it would eventually withdraw its troops and
termed as "totally out of the question" the possi-
bility of dispatching additional troops to Vietnam.
The leader of the opposition party echoed these
sentiments in pledging recently his party's willing-
ness to use "all available means" to block any gov-
ernment move to stop withdrawal.
The defense minister's statement reflects in-
creasing high-level concern in Seoul that the con-
tinued South Korean military presence in Vietnam
may have adverse domestic and international reper-
cussions. President Pak has been worried for some
time that any high Korean casualty rates might
generate popular concern and has tried to ensure
that these personnel losses are kept to a minimum.
More importantly, the South Koreans have grown par-
ticularly sensitive about their role as the only
remaining allied ground force engaged in combat
operations in South Vietnam. They see this as an
increasing international political liability, par-
ticularly as the level of US ground forces continues
to diminish. With this in mind, the South Koreans
probably will not modify their plans to withdraw
most of their troons y the end of this year.
I I
9 May 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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INDIA: A record grain crop is greatly increas-
ing costs of subsidies designed to encourage produc-
tion, but foodgrain exports may help recoup some
losses.
The government has been paying farmers artifi-
cially high prices for wheat--about double the world
market price-and has been selling it in government
shops at a loss. New Delhi, apparently reluctant to
antagonize the electorate in the wheat-growing areas,
has refused to lower the wheat procurement price as
recommended recently by its Agricultural Price Com-
mission.
The foodgrain crop for the year ending in June
is estimated at 112 million tons. With the cessation
of wheat imports and increased domestic procurement,
the government has had to earmark about $176 million
in the current budget for wheat subsidies, compared
with only $40 million last year. Profits from the
sale of low-priced imported wheat in previous years
had more than offset the subsidy on domestic wheat.
The subsidy this year, however, will be equivalent
to about half the central government's deficit an-
nounced earlier this year.
New Delhi expects to purchase 6.5 million tons
of wheat from the current harvest, some of which
will have to be stored. Government stocks of all
types of grains already amount to about eight mil-
lion tons. This is not excessive compared with
India's large population and normal variations in
crop output, but little storage space is left, and
over half of the stocks consists of wheat unsuited
to Indian tastes.
In addition to donations of 750,000 tons of
wheat and rice to Bangladesh, New Delhi reportedly
intends to export foodgrains, but competition for
foreign markets will be stiff. Barter arrangements
are possible, however, and could save India a little
foreign exchange. Press reports indicate New Delhi
9 May 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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is negotiating with Japan to trade 100,000 tons of
corn for urea, a commodity which India had intended
to get from the US before suspension of aid. India
probably can barter, st, a million tons this
year.
9 May 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 6
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PORTUGAL: Regulations issued last week to
implement Prime Minister Caetano's press law would
maintain authoritarian controls.
The press law passed last August provided for
abolishing pre-publication review. The catch, how-
ever, was that other provisions made editors re-
sponsible for any infringement of security laws in
anything they published. Under the new regulations,
advance censorship of newspapers has been extended
indefinitely. In addition, stringent sanctions,
including fines and imprisonment, can be applied
against editors and journalists if authorities find
violations of security laws.
The new regulations abolish the old censorship
commission and transfer its functions to the Sec-
retariat of State for Information under the prime
minister. As part of Caetano's habit of balancing
suppression with a liberal provision, the new law
provides for judicial appeal from administratively
imposed sanctions for press offenses.
The new regulations will disappoint those in
government who want to improve Portugal's image
abroad. At this time, however, the government
especially wishes to control criticism of its poli-
cies on fighting insurgency in Portuguese Africa.
9 May 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 7
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Cameroon Announces Referendum to Establish Unitary State
CHAD
SUDAN
NIGERIA
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CAMEROON: On 20 May Federal President Ahidjo
will hold a popular referendum on a draft constitu-
tion that would abolish the present federal structure.
According to Ahidjo's announcement, the present
structure, which includes the states of East and
West Cameroon, hinders "development efforts." He
cited specifically the Cost of maintaining three
separate governments and legislatures. In a con-
cession to West.Cameroon, however, he promised to
preserve the country's official bilingualism and
different cultures.
The federal union between Anglophone West
Cameroon and Francophone East Cameroon was effected
in 1961, following the separate emergence of the
two areas from the UN trusteeship system. Over the
years the political and cultural influences of
larger and richer East Cameroon, Ahidjo's political
base, have made significant inroads in the West.
The constitutional referendum is likely to
prove only a formality in one-party Cameroon, and
the coming unitary structure represents the capstone
to Ahidjo's carefully paced, and remarkably success-
ful, effort to forge a stable and economically ad-
vancing nation. While the transformation will cause
some anguish in West Cameroon, the younger politi-
cians there are intent on participating in the
ruling establishment and are probably prepared to
accept the change as an vitable development.
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9 May 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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FINLAND: Parliamentary debate on pension
legislation, scheduled to begin this week, could
result in a no-confidence motion against the mi-
nority Social Democratic government of Rafael
Paasio. Spearheaded by the Center Party, the non-
Communist opposition parties might join forces,
obtain a majority, and topple the ten-week-old
government. The Center Party is trying to expand
pension benefits to embarrass the Social Democrats.
The government argues that the Center Party had
ample opportunity to improve pensions as a member
of numerous past governments and that it has raised
the issue now solely as a means of returning to
power. Paasio may have the backing of the Com-
munists and the Rural Party on the pension issue;
both parties are to decide today if they will sup-
port the government. If they do, the opposition
probably will withdraw its challen e for the time
being.
9 May 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 10
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Secret
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