LETTER TO ANGUS FROM JOHN V. HINKEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 136
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 2, 1975
• Content Type: LETTER

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JOHN V. HINKEL
2 April 1975
Dear Angus:
Many thanks for your gracious note
of March 28. We know you're very busy,
so you don't have to take any of your pre-
cious time to write any acknowledgements.
It goes without saying that we're
happy to pass on any information that we
think may be of interest.
Enclosed is some poop in that category.
Enclosures
Cordially,
thn V.Hinkel
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STAT
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df:QeaP88-01315R0002003500
JOHN V. HINKEL
2 April 1975
DearViiiig
Herewith latest "directive: from the
Coalition to Stop Funding the War.
Looks like this crowd still wants to
get blood from South Vietnam.
See "Proposed Peace Through Zero War
Aid" being organized for 4-12 May. A copy
of announcement of this ploy is attached.
The FCNL also is working overtime to
cut the D/D budget. See enclosed March, 1975,
FICNL Newsletter.,
Enclosu.res
Cordially,
John V. Hinkel
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Appr
coalition to stop funding the war
I I
4.1fie)it\J
17) P Fuvo 6, #1
lAjA4?--
110 maryland ave.,n.e. washington,d.c.20002
Action for World Community
American Ethical Union
American Federation of Teachers AFL-CIO
American Friends' Service Committee
American Humanist Association
Americans for Democratic Action
Business Executives Move for New National Priorities
Church of the Brethren
Clergy and Laity Concerned
Disciples of Christ, Department of Church Is Society
Episcopal Peace Fellowship
Friends' Committee on National Legislation
Indochina Mobile Education ProjecT
Indochina Peace Campaign
Indochina Resource Center
Jesuit Conference, Office of Social Ministries
Mennonite Central Committee. Peace Section
National Council of Churches
National Student Association
Network
Peace and Justice Committee.
Leadership Conference of Women Religious
Resouice Center, United Methodist Office
for the United Nations
SANE
Union of American Hebrew Congregations
Unitarian Universalist Association -
United Church of Christ. Center for Social Action
United Methodist Board of Global Ministries,
Wornens Division
United Methodist Church. Board of Church and Society
United Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.
War Resisters' League -
Wornens' international League for Peace
and Freedom
Women Strike for Peace
Wo ?O edera Is, k
34
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a_tiverup
March 31, 1975
CONGRESS STALLS
INDOCHINA CROSSROADS
Haven't we been here before? -- The sad scenes of frightened
refugees streaming down dusty roads, the same headlines splashed
across our front pages, the same old rhetoric of "bloOdb004,".
? "moral commitment," and "domino theory."
But now there is one enormous difference. After twenty long__
years, the futile policy of US intervention in Indochina is now
on the verge of being repudiated by the US Congress. Twenty Years -
but the lesson has been learned. As CBS commentator Eric plivm40
recently remarked, we are witnessing the "death rattle of
foreign policy."
The American people have helped to make it happen. The anti-
war activity of the last ten years -- and particularly of the last,
two years -- is finally coming to fruition. In the past six weeks
Congressional offices have literally been flooded with thousands,
of letters, mailagrams, phone calls, and personal visitations.
(Mail in some Congressional offices is reportedly running2097
against aid.) Eight out of every ten Americans are opposed to
Administration's policy in Indochina. The message has been 10
and "perfectly clear."
In response to this overwhelming public pressure, tha,AdminiS-
tration has intensified its own pressure campaign on the Congress.
,??
A Presidential press conference and almost daily statoPene-WDe-
fense and State Department officials have spotlighted the:400PROrsts
plight of the Thieu and Lon Nol regimes. /t is no secret that. -
are trying to blame Congress for the failure of their twenty-year-
old
, -
old war in Indochina.
coalition to stop funding the wa
110 InarylatiethAILIFPLCIVieihiftWoh,ditilD200025R000200350102 /5 46 8400
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The torrential outpouring of anti-war sentiment and the
Administration's pressure tactics have created a serious dilemna
for the Congress. The apparent demise of the Administration's
Indochina policy has created a "policy vacuum" which can only be
filled by a Congressional initiative. The main issue is respohsi-
bility for the US role in Indochina -- a responsibility that now
clearly belongs to Congress.
That institution, however,
has never been noted for strong
leadership. In this case the ten-
sions are overwhelming. The Ad-
ministration is accusing Congress
of "abandoning an ally." The Ameri-
can people, on the other hand,
are blaming their representatives
for squandering money and perpe-
tuating bloodshed. Seldom have
the political stakes been so high.
The Congressional reaction to this
situation has been to flee.
The Thieu and Lon Nol regimes
may be falling, but on March 27,
the United States Congress recessed
for two weeks without taking any,
decisive action 2a either thg. Viet-
nam or the Cambodian supplementals.
There were, however, several
/preliminary votes in House and Se-
nate committees and subcommittees.
(See chronological chart on opposite page.) As a result of these
actions, an $82.5 million emergency military aid package for Cambodia
will ga to the Senate and possibly the House floor soon after the
Congress re-convenes on April, 7.
There were probably two factors influencing this development.
The first is the misguided fear among many moderates and liberals
that a complete cut-off of aid would result in a bloodbath in Phnom
Penh. An appropriation of $82.5 million would, they believe, serve
to avoid such a scenario.
A second factor is simply the reluctance of a handful of com-
mittee and subcommittee members to assume complete responsibility
for such a monumental decision. Compromises within these small com-
mittees permit the issue to go to the House and Senate floors --
(2)
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ACTIOVSN
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ENTAI
ACTION
3/4 House Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Approp-
riations :ommittee defers action until Supplemental
goes through normal authorization process.
SIGNIFICANCE
Desperate Administration hopes of short-cutting
legislative process. fails, creating at least a
two month delay before final passage.
3/11 Htmphr,,.y Subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations
Committee passes $125 million military Supplemental
Amendment by a 4-3 vote.
Close surprise vote keeps open the prospects for
an Administration compromise. Moderate and liber-
al Republicans (Javits,Percy) receive high-level
pressure from Ford, and are greatly influenced by
McCloskey's "Bloodbath" testimony. Clearly indi-
cates that liberal votes can no longer be taken
for granted.
3/12 House Democratic Caucus passes resolution calling for
no further military aid to Cambodia and Vietnam for
Fiscal Year 1975 (189-49)
Resolution drawn up by 50 new Members of Congress.
Resolution is NOT binding, but it shored up support
against Congressional-initiated compromises. Admin-
istration sees that original request for $222 mil-
lion is doomed, and begins compromise offers of its
own to entice support.
3/12 Subcommittee of House International Relations Commit-
tee* accepts 4-3 the $82.5 million military aid compro-
mise with a June 30, 1975 termination of all aid to
Cambodia.
Again, McCloskey report induces offer of compromise
to Administration. Moderates balk at zero-aid
proposals.
3/13 Senate Democratic Caucus duplicates House resolution
by overwhelming majority.
Compromise drift has another setback; lines are
drawl more clearly against Administration position.
3/13 House International Relations Committee rejects zero-aid
proposal 24-6, but defers final action on Administration
request.
State Dept. adamantly rejects cut-off date idea, and
angers liberals/moderates. Delay is obvious tactic
to shift decision to Senate. Caucus Resolutions'
impact become visible.
3/17 Senate Foreign Relations Committee passes $82.5 million
military aid compromise. (9-7)
Administration reluctantly accepts this compromise
in order to force the issue to full Senate debate.
01.111M
3/25 Congress recesses, taking no definitive action in either
House= Senate.
The Big Stall...
*formerly Foreign Affairs Committee
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where all 535 members of Congress will have the opportunity
to debate and take a stand On war or peace in Cambodia.
****************
It is extremely difficult to keep pace with events in
South Vietnam and even more difficult to predict the exact
course of their development. Nonetheless, it would probably
not be too far-fetched to say that the situation which exists
in Phnom Penh today may exist in Saigon several months or even
weeks from now. It is no longer so much a question of what will
happen in South Vietnam but rather how and when. How many peo-
ple will have to die? How much suffering will have to be eni-
duredZ
Once again, those questions can only be answered by the
US Congress. It will have its next opportunity to do so
late April when it acts on the Vietnam supplemental request.
The Thieu regime's latest setbacks will undoubtedly have
an impact on Congressional attitudes toward further aid. The
question that each legislator must now ask is "How are we to
avoid another Phnom Penh?" The answer to that question is clear
through the implementation of the Paris Agreement. But that only
way to implement the Agreement is to end all war aid now.
Strong birArtisap suppprt for this position is no:developing
within IbACongress. Senators Charles Mathias(Rep.,Maryland)
and Adlai Stevenson(Dem., Illinois) have announced that they
will offer an amendment to the FY 1976 Department of Defense
Authorization Bill which would terminate all military aid to
South Vietnam on July 1, 1975/-- with the proviso that the Presi-
dent could suspend the aid cut-off for 120 days if he felt that
progress was being made toward a political settlement.
Many legislators, however, are impatient with this 120 day
grace period. Senator James Abourezk has indicated that he may
introduce legislation which would terminate military aid July 1
with no conditional clause.
Floor votes on aid cut-off legislation will probably come
in late May or possibly June. Passage depends on widespread
public support.
Here's how you can help to build it --
(4)
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RE F IftriTrr rrsA it5/01/A11 0A_RDffurr r000200350001-7
by Ed Block
As a result of the latest setbacks for the Thieu regime, large numbers of
civilians are abandoning their homes in different parts of south Viet-Nam. Such
movements have usually been described by the U.S. and Sai Gon governments as refugees
"voting with their feet " because of their abhorrence to living under Communist
control. There are many here in the U.S. who may find the flow of civilians into
Sai Gon-controlled areas difficult to understand, or may even accept the Administra-
tion's explaination of why people do not remain in Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment zones.
Based on my own personal experiences working with refugees as an A.I.D. official
in south Viet-Nam, I discovered that this notion of a political motivation for the
movement of refugees was pure propaganda, contrived to win U.S. public support for
Administration policies in Indochina. In fact, after speaking personally with hun-
dreds of refugees over a period of close to two years,I met very few who had left
their homes due to a fear or dislike of the Communists.
A major reason for such massive civilians movements is fear of the fighting and
a desire to find relative safety within the Sai Gon-controlled enclaves. Refugees
are afraid that once the Sai Gon forces are gone, the PRG-controlled areas will be
subjected to massive bombing attacks and artillery fire. Indeed, in the past few
days, their fears appear justified. Earl Martin, a Mennonite missionary, reports
from Quang Ngai that two-thirds of Ban Me Thuot, the capital of Dar Lac province,
has been destroyed by Sai Gon bombing. Press reports indicate that Pleiku, Kontum,
and other former Sai Gon areas are receiving the same treatment.
The PRG and north Vietnamese have no air force to bomb or burn villages and
cities -- and never have. It is primarily the impact of massive air bombardment in
rural areas by the U.S. and Sai Gon air forces which has caused the huge population
displacements we have witnessed over the past ten years. And it is this fear that
Sai Gon will destroy Hue, Pleiku, Kontum, Ban Me Thuot, Da Nang and other areas
from which its troops are withdrawing that is now causing people to flee.
In the past, the U.S. and Sai Gon goVernments have frequently bombed or shelled
populated cities and villages after their troops have been removed. The continuous
Sai Gon air raids over the PRG city of Loc Ninh is one of the most recent examples
of this strategy, but there are many other instances which can be cited.
In Tet 1968, much of the city of Hue was destroyed during the U.S.-Sai Gon
counter-attack to recapture areas they had lost in the initial fighting. Thousands
of civilians who had stayed in their homes when the U.S.-Sai Gon forces retreated
were subsequently killed or injured during this counter-attack. Certainly, the
people of Hue have not forgotten that tragic experience, and are now leaving the
city to escape from being caught in another Sai Gon air blitz.
In 1972, Quang Tri was completely destroyed by U.S. B-52 bombs and Sai Gon
artillery fire, killing more than 25,000 civilians who had remained in the city
when it was taken over by the PRG/NVA. Those who were able to escape were not
running from the Communists, but from the rain of death and destruction that was
being poured on them by the U.S.-Sai Gon military forces. After inspecting the
rubble of what had once been his home, the Quang Tri Red Cross Director told me
that many people from his province firmly believe the Americans are attempting to
commit genocide in Viet-Nam.
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Also in 1972, a picture was internationally published showing a young girl
running away from her village with her back aflame from burning napalm jelly, that
had been dropped by the Sai Gon air force. That girl was somehow brought to a
Sai Gon hospital for treatment. Do we then infer that she was "fleeing from Com-
munist aggression to the south," as the U.S. and Sai Gon governments have so often
described the movement of refugees?
Numerous studies, mostly carried out under the sponsorship of the U.S. Embassy
in Sai Gon, indicate that a great majority of refugees have not fled out of fear of
the Communists, but from the dangers of war. This was confirmed once again in a
New York Times (March 26) survey of hundreds of refugees now fleeing into Da Nang.
According to the article, refugees "appear to be fleeing in panic rather than for
political reasons .... Not one (refugee)said it was because he or she feared or
hated the Communists."
Another reason for the current refugee movement is the destruction of food
supplies and fresh water facilities by retreating Sai Gon troops. Recent news
reports tell of a "scorched earth" policy, whereby Sai Gon military officials
ordered everything destroyed prior to their withdrawal. Much of the city of Pleiku
for example, was reportedly burned to the ground as the Sai Gon troops retreated.
Finally, it should be kept in mind that there is good reason to be skeptical
of the refugee figures now being cited by the Sai Gon government. The Sai Gon
estimates of 900,000 refugees are based on a false assumption that the entire
population of cities from which it is withdrawing has now become "refugees from
Communism." However, the New York Times reports that approximately 70,000 people
or one-third of Hue's population still remains in the city. Observers in Quang
Ngai report that most residents of the province capital are not moving to Da Nang
but rather to safehaven areas in the mountains and villages controlled by the PRG.
In the Central Highlands, press accounts indicate that the mountain tribesmen
have joined forces with the PRG/NVA to drive the Sai Gon government out of their
territory. It is primarily the Vietnamese officials, troops and collaborators of
the Sai Gon government who are now making a hasty retreat from the Highlands. Most
of the original inhabitants, over one million Montagnards, are staying behind to
recover their homelands, brutally taken from them by U.S.-Sai Gon forces during
the Sai Gon "pacification" program of 1968-1972. The Vietnamese "convoy of tears"
along Highway 7 is, for most Montagnardsrin the Central Highlands, a "convoy of
hope."
I have found through my experiences that the U.S. and Sai Gon governments
have never really attempted to deal with the plight of refugees in Vietnam;
rather, civilian war victims have been manipulated to suit governments' own
military, political, and economic objectives. The myth of refugees "voting
with their feet" is a perfect illustration of this type of activity. If the
Administration is truly sincere about providing humanitarian aid rather than
political aid,then it should be made available to all refugees, including those
who choose to remain in or return to PRG areas. I urge you to write your Con-
gresspeople suggesting that this be required for any future U.S. humanitarian
aid appropriation to Viet Nam.
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action"
1: CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
"Peace Through Zero War AM"
In one month, we must make "Zero War Aid in 1975" a household term.
In one month, we must mount a nationwide campaign with such a magni-
tude of public support that Congress has no choice but to vote for
Zero War Aid to Viet-Nam in 1975.
National Campaign May 4-12:
Preparation must begin now and it must begin with us. A three-step
strategy. is proposed:
1.) MOUNT BROAD, VISIBLE, PUBLIC SUPPORT. Urge community, business,
labor, religious and academic leaders and organizations to
publically support an end to Viet-Nam War Aid in 1975.
2.) PUBLICIZE THESE ENDORSEMENTS THROUGH LOCAL MEDIA. Organize press
conferences and interviews, issue press releases, meet with local
editors.
3.) PRESS REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATORS TO SIGN BEFORE OR DURING THE
WEEK OF MAY 4 - 12:
THE PLPDGE TO END VIET NAM WAR AID
I pledge to vote for all legislative efforts (i.e. Mathias-
Stevenson Amendment, Abourezk Amendment) to end all U.S.
military aid to south Viet Nam in 1975.
4....01.ramilMi.moremorpm.m?
*********************************************
congress is at home...
'Take the opportunity to press your representatives on the pending
Cambodia and Viet-Nam Supplementals by:
ARRANGING VISITS or statewide conference calls between community
leaders and members of Congress. Bring along the local press.
WRITING LETTERS-TO-THE-EDITORS quoting the positions taken by your
representatives. This could provide an incentive for others. The
already committed should be commended, the uncommitted urged to make
a firm, public decision now on the Supplementals.
ENCOURAGING EDITORIALS sure to be read by Congress during recess.
ATTENDING REPRESENTATIVES' PUBLIC ENGAGEMENTS. Speak out. Leaflet.
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Aarl&GIMYr ninfsarffarflp:NCIAPIgaf A RCH 26, 1975
Torrent of Refugees in South Vietnam,
Laid to Fear Of War, Not of Communism
PANIC IS BELIEVED
TO DOMINATE FLOW
People Seem Afraid Mostly
of Being Left Behind as
'Everyone Else' Goes
Special to The New York Tirne$
SAIGON, South Vietnam,
March 25 ?The hundreds of
thousands of Vietnamese
streaming from their homes to
the rapidly shrinking Govern-
ment-controlled areas appear
to be fleeing in panic rathe
than for political reasons.
Some Western observers are
comparing the movement with
that of 1914, when the division
of Vietnam into a Communist
north and a non-Communist
south resulted in the flow of
a million or so people. Now,
as then, It is being said tha
"they are voting with their
feet."
In the last few weeks,New
York Times correspondents in
South Vietnam have inter-
viewed hundreds of refugees
from different parts of the
country. EAch refugee has been
asked why he or she chose
to join the human tide, aban-
doning home, possessions and
livelihood.
"Because veryone else is
going," was a typical reply.
Not one said it was because
he or She feared or hated Com-
munism.
Minority Stay Behind
Many are afraid that to stay
behind would mean exposure
to killing and destruction. Some
?including probably almost
one-third the population of Hue
?chose to stay,but most have
been fleeing.
"My people stayed back at
Quang Tri last time, in 1972,"
a woman said as she nurse
a baby. "There was bombing
and shelling all the time, many
killed. It's better to go to the
Saigon side, because the Corn-
munists have no airplanes."
But fear of the unknown
appsHrs at the moment to be
a greater driving force than
fear of any specific physical
dano,er.
The evacuation of Hue
seemed to typify this.
"We began to realize that
government offices were mo
ing away and that the army
was moving out, an elderly
woman said. "So the people
just started to move, too ?
government and soldier's fami-
lies first, and then many others.
People iust didn't want to be
left behind, with everyone else
going.
"We don't know what will
happen, but there are rumors
that the former Vietnamese
Emperor is returning to the
throne in Hue. Maybe that's
good, maybe it's bad. Who
knows. But whenever things
change, poor people suffer."
The former Emperor. Bac Dai,
lives in exile in France.
'No Good to Be Caught'
"I thiink the Communists
maybe will be all right," a
fleeing taxi driver said." But
it's no good to be caught in the
..war zone between one side and;
the other. That's where you can
be killed."
Some are afraid that if they!
stay behind they may starve
or run out of water. Some
cannot face the prospect, if
they stay behind, of never be-
ing able to see relatives and
friends in the government zone.
For the rich and the middle
class, for storekeepers and
businessmen, and especially for
those who appreciate the West-
ern-style urban luxuries, there
has been a special incentive
to flee the Communists.
Said a businessman from Da
Lat after he arrived in Saigon;
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
"Life in Hanoi and in Com-
munist Vietnam generally may
efficiently protect the poorest
people from disaster. But it
is brutally controlled, it is as
closed-in as a vacuum flask
and it is drab, drab, drab."
Conununist Permission
In some areas, Communist
authorities have been permit-
ting some residents to leave.
Such has apparently been the
case at Ban Me Thuot, which
fell two weeks ago, and at
northern towns in South Viet-
nam this week.
"I don't think people would
care very much about leaving
if they knew they could move
from one side to the other,"
a farmer said, "In fact it would
be better to stay, to take care
of my house and fields. But
right now nobody knows,
whether we could continue to'
move,
People do not talk much
about why they are moving,
unless asked by outsiders. They ?
seem caught up in the chaotic
momentum of escape, in which
families are divided, children
are lost and life is changed
forever.
"Since I left my village I
have been putting one foot
in front of the other for four
days," a man said as he
dragged his cart into Da Nang.
"Why do we go? We go because
it is time to go, 'that's all."
Br Attila lor the Philadelphia Inquirer
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CLE AP
ON FAGL'
ed For ?VIAERTACt8W-WI(NIR00020035000k7,_
27 November 1978
(J
Washington oundup
Hard-Line Gain
American Security Council has analyzed the results of the November elections to the
U. S. Senate and concludes that there is a marked shift toward a more defense-minded
and harder-line Senate, according to Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, retired chief of the
Defense Intelligence Agency. His group?Coalition for Peace Through Strength ?
contends the 20 new senators-elect will swing toward stronger defense and foreign
affairs actions since the "dovish wing" lost, including its "key spokesman for the
anti-defense, soft-line point of view," Sen. Dick Clark (D.-Iowa), who had a council
defense rating of zero, along with the late Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D.-Minn.).
Sen. Clark's successor, Roger W. Jepson (R.-Iowa), is considered a hard-liner, as
are the two new Minnesota Republican senators, Rudy Boschwitz and David
Durenberger. The council considers two other losers as weak on defense matters?
Sen. Floyd K. Haskell (D.-Colo.) and Thomas J. McIntyre (D.-N. H.), even though
Sen. McIntyre supported the Rockwell International B-1 bomber program?
although their replacements get high defense marks. Gen. Graham, speaking for the
council, considers that the "[Paul] Warnke-negotiated SALT 2 agreements now face
much more certain and serious opposition" in the new Senate.
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Ms. Judith
Co-Editor,
Box 1126
College of
Riverdale,
Hard
PARAPET 1979
Mount Saint Vincent
New York 10471
Dear Ms. Hard:
13 July 1978
Admiral Turner has asked me to thank you for your letter of
June 30th. In answer to your question, the Admiral would offer
the following advice:
"Plan carefully. Opportunities are rarely accidental.
They may surprise you, but generally they come to those who
are prepared."
"Think in terms of contribution. The greatest rewards,
peace and satisfaction, come from serving your fellow man.
Help others to realize their best potential, through your
example and your williggness to open opportunities to them."
"Always do your best. Here is the real key to success.
Set high standards for yourself, then exceed them. Look for
new challenges. Believe- in yourself and accept nothing short
of the best you know you can do."
The Admiral- Very much appreciates your thinking of him and sends
his very best wishes to the staff of PARAPET, to the students of
the College of Mount Saint Vincent and to you.
Sincerely,
Herbert E. Hetu
Director of Public Affairs
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(EWlege of ?Mount 45aint 9,9incent
ON-HUDSON
RIVERDALE, NEW YORK 10471
PARAPET 1979
Box 1126
June 30, 1978
gatA adinuAAI vitaimpild YduAmcw,
The 1979 yearbook staff from the College of Mount
Saint Vincent, a small private college in the Riverdale
section of New York City, would greatly appreciate your
answer to the following question: If your son or daughter
were graduating from college in 1979, what advice would
you give them to prepare their lives for the eighties?
We feel that being the last class of the seventies
is significant to our being as a body. We are not a prod-
uct of the rebellious sixties, but of the transitional
seventies, and we hope to reflect this throughout our year-
book, The Parapet. We have selected from every walk of
life, people who have been prominent in this past decade,
those who have aided in a particular field, or those who
have excelled in a field.
We believe that you are one of these people. As we
go to press in the near future, we would appreciate your
answer as promptly as possible.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
Sincerely yours,
JH/ams
94/664xL
Judith Hard
Co-Editor
PARAPET 1979
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e--?tf.C)! t< u
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Ca /411?-cLef4-4.-
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DENVER POST
4 September 1977
IA Funding Shadych
Officials at the 'University of Colorado
and Colorado State University said Tues:.
day that they ha?;en't been. told whether
graduate student at the University of
Denver was subsidized in the 1950s
through a foundation which, itself, was
subsidized by the CIA. The former student
any research on their campuses was Alden Sears; said Tuesday he didn't know
funded by the Central Intelligence AgencY,L..-fihere the money wag coming from,. but
but they, don't think any as,. ? ? ? his studies were academically. legitimate,
The two schools attract the overwhelne-? anyway. .. ? ? ? ?
ing Majority of dollars for, research in , DU Chancellor Maurice Mitchell said
the ? state. Their funding. from federal .Tuesday that the, letter. from the agency
source, Much Of U. for research, placed informing him that it had supported re-,.
CU 25th? nationally...2ns! CSU Ilaped search at he school was mimeographed,
On 1975 data., . .? ? ? ? , which ? led him to believe other schools
'IT WAS DISCLOSED. recently that a received . notice ? also. ? '?
our; ttly
t
CSU. oubted
BUT CU PRESIDENT Roland Kauten:
straus said he hasn't seen any similar
document and Jim Brown, director of the
office of research at CSU;said he hasn't.
either. .. ? ? '
Both schools forbid secret research. ThEi
rule of thumb at both campuses is, "If
you can't publish about it don't do iL
Sears did publish his findings, however.
DU Assistant Chancellor William Key
is to go to Washington next week to
examine the information the agency has
made available.
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1
' : ? . .., '.. .......
? .
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i ?
NEW YAW{ ntrEt- P? D ei?,f
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OCT 1974
?1.
U.5. L1'--i ftnicJ7J
p
ON
'Ford Gets Report Urging End to Cuban Embargo
By DAVID .BINDER
Speldel to The New York Tlates
WASHINGTON, Oct., 29?
Major changes. in.,United States
policies toward Latin America
were recommended today by a
group of prominent American
businessmen, scholars and,for-
mer Government' officials in a
report that was welcomed by
President Fort!.
Among the 33 recommenda-
tions of the privately financed
Commission on United States-
Latin American Relations Was
a call for an immediate and un-
conditional end to the 12-year-
old American economic sanc-
tions against Cuba.
The commission also called
on the United States to halt
covert intelligence operations
in Latin-American countries, to
terminate military supply
grants and to stop sending mil-
, ,.
,itary-adviser groups to the re-
'van.
The 23-member commission
was established five months
ago with about $80,000 in sup-
port from the Ford and Clark
foundations and from the
Rockefeller Brothers Fund. It
is headed by Sol M. Linowitz,
former United States delegate
to the Organizaton of Allied-
, can States.
On receiving a copy of the
!report from Mr. Linowitz this
' morning, President Ford said
that he appreciated the "con-
structive" work of the commis-
sion and that he would ask
Mr. Kissinger to meet with the
members.
A high United States official
concerned with Latin America
said the report was the best
ever produced by a private
American group on the subject.
"It can only. be a plus for
the State Department," he said,
adding, "These guys are lead-
ers and they will be listened
to."
- At a news conference, Mr.
Linowitz, who is a partner in
the Coudert Bros. law firm, said
that while the Administration
might find most of the com-
mission's proposals compatible,
it was sure to have difficulty
with its suggestions on eco-
nomic policy. These include:
gAbandonment of coercive
measures toward Latin-Ameri-
can countries that expropriate
American-owned companies or
bar commercial fishing by
American vessels as far as 200
miles from their coasts. This
would mean repealing a num-
ber of restrictive amendments
attached to legislation passed
by the Congress.
gEti#nation of the United
States veto power in the Inter-
American Development Bank,
which receives more than one-
third of Its funds - from Wash-
ington. ...-???
gGreater United States tariff
preference for Latin-American
goods..
The commission said that
the objective of' United States
policy toward .Cuba should be
to facilitate' her -participation
"in a constructive pattern of
inter-American and interna-
tional relations." The Adminis-
tration, it 'declared, should act
now to end the trade embargo
against Ctiba - and, "regardless
of progress or a Cuban' re-
sponse," move to drop restric-
tions on travel and. cultural ex-
changes. ? .
Then, the commission said,
if Cuba responded appropri-
ately, the United States could
discuss the resumption. of dip-
lomatic ties. ?. ?
On another . controversial
question, the commission, called
for the signing of a new Pan-
ama Canal treaty that would
recognize that Panama 'should
ultimately have sovereignty
over the waterway.
The members of the com-
mission are:
So r M. Llnowitz; W. Michael Blumenthal,
chairman, Bendix Corp.; Harrison Brown,
Professor of science and government; Califor.
nia Institute of Technology; C. A. Costanzo,
vice chairmen, First National City Bank;
Albert Fishlow, chairman, department of eco-
nomics, University of California (BorkeleY);
J. George Hatrar, former president, Rocke.
feller Foundation; Rita Hauser, attorney,
former United States representative to the
United Netions Human Rights Commission;
Alexander Heard,. chancellor, Vanderbilt Uni-
versity; Henry J. Heinz 2d, chairmen, H. J.
Heinz Cornoany; Andrew Heiskell, chairman,
Time, Inc.; the Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh,
president, University of Notre Dame; Lee
Hills, chairman, Knight NewsPapers, Inc.;
Samuel P. HuntkPgtori, Professor of govern.
meet, Harvard university;
Nicholas deB., Katzenbach, general counsel,
I.B.M., former Under Secreiewf of State, for.
MST Alderney General; Thomas Messer, direc-
tor, Guggenheim Museum; Charles A. Meyer,
vice president, Seers Roebuck. & Co., former
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-Amerl.
can Affairs; Arturo Morales-Carrion, Presi-
dent, University of Puerto Rico, former
Deputy Assistant Secretary at State for Inter-
American Affairs.
Peter Peterson, chairman, Lehman
Bros., former Secretary of Commerce, former
executive director, Council on International
Economic Policy; Elliot L. Richardson, fellow
of the Wurocirow Wilson International Center
for Scholars, former Attorney General, former
Secretary of Defense, former Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare. former
Under Secretary cf State; William D. Rogers,
attorney (resigned aflen appointment as
Assistant Secretor/ of State for Inter-Amer!.
can Affairs); Nal`anlel Samuels, oartnor,
Kuhn, Lordo & Co., former Under Secretary
of State for Economic Affairs; Kalman Sil?
vert, vogram adviser, International d:vi.
sioa,-Ford Foundation; and Clifton Wharton
Jr., President, Michigan State University.
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-,?-
cro9e o'i. Re
,..0 _ _
SEL Iti
30.OCT 1974 _ D )-5 Li 0) Le-L-3 f
tociAlailmE8874aarhswitroo3sotti ec, 114 ss 4.nd
'-
keeping discussion of the find-
s-)
W , /1-/
Othe'r , recommendations
lations occur, the report said,
cause all the Latin countries
codes in question:
and the United States have
pherie meetings.
U.S. policy should be adjusted
member Rita Hauser, former
sion; said such a policy would
not constitute intervention be off the agenda of hemis-
U.S. rePresentative on the
U.N. Human Rights. Commis-
accepted 'the human rights
accordingly. C o m m i ss ion
Where . human rights vio-
.
. . . incipde: ..':4_,... -.
'A private comn!ission Ford Foundation, Rockefeller r:' 4' signiits;: of a new Pana-
largely representing tradi- Brothers Fund, .Clark Founda- Ma CanalVeatyegiving Pans-
..
-tional U.S. interests in Latin tion and the Center for Inter- me jurisdiction over the water-
America called yesterday for AineriCan Relations in .New way, and: Withdrawal of the
? U.S. Armed Forces Southern
isU,S. En
Covet L Acts
By Lewis H. Diuguicl
Washington Post Staff Writer
ibis country to cease all covert York. Command from the Canal
activities in the hemisphere. Among the members was 'Zone. " ?
Sol M. Linowitz, former am- William D. Rogers, who re- ?? An end to. grant military
signed last month after his ap- aid and cutback of military ad-
pointment ' as' assistant secre- 'visory groups in Latin Amer-
tary of -state for inter-Ameri-
can affairs. The commission' ? Ilepeal of congressional
bassador to the Organization
'of American States and chair-
mai of the 22-member com-
mission, acknowledged that
;the group's Position on CIA
activities was in direct conflict
-Iwith President Ford's position.
In a press conference Sept.
-16, Mr. Ford defended -CIA
funding of opposition newspa-
( pers and political parties in
? Chile during the government
of Marxist President -Salvador Secretary of Defense Elliot Li
? Elimination of the effec-
Allende?which was over-
Richardson. ? ? tive -U.S. veto over many loans
Thrown Sept. II, 1973.
"We strongly, believe, ? the bY the Inter-American Des-el-
- The 54-page report Of the commission said "that the opment Bank.
Commission on United States-
icies which the United States
Latin American Relations con- has inherited from the past
? demned past military . are inappropriate and
ventions in the area such as in ir-
relevant toett'n4: ch?inged reali-
the Dominican Republic in ties of the Present." ?
It called for an end to
special relationships" that
carry .a connotation of pater-
'America, such .as occurred nallsrn- "Any new U.S. policy
? more recently in Chile, is in- rnuste,of course,
nation-
defensible and should be
et -
al interests, but such interests
ended."
will be served by collaborating
. .
th
It called on the President wi Latin America "
.and the Congress to ensure
The commission also recorrre
-
"lhat all agencies of, the U.S. mended U.S. initiatives to end
overnment fully respect the the trade embargo on Cuba
sovereignty of the countries of rind to seek normal relations'
Latin America."
with the Communist govern-
? 'Llnowitz said sonic mem- ment?
hers favored calling for a
Further, the report asked for
worldwide end to CIA inter- an, end to restrictions on
Ventio but the commission
travel to and from Cuba and
n
decided to keep the focus on fry
> cultural, educational and
this hemisphere.
scientific exchanges with tbe
-
The commission presented Ishind? The commission made a
I
its report to President Ford,
yesterday at the White house.' strong recall mendation for
,
He said he favored improved: support of the Inter-American
Commission on Human flights,
(
includes G.A. Costanzo, vice amendments- requiring eco-
chairman of the First National' nomic reprisals against coun-
tries confiscating private
City Bank, 'which has exten- American' investments, and
sive Latin' interests; former passage of tariff' preference
Assistant Secretary of state for .goods of developing coon-
SCehaarrsl,e and liow fotI?vniiethri tries.
1965, and then stated:
-"Covert U.S. involvement in
the domestic politics of Latin
a n d saYi ng the United States
the recommendations
, should publicize the OAS
would bring eroup's the report to Sete; findines on human
retary of State Henry A. Kis- ?
rights violations.
singer's attention when he re-
. Though the human rights
turns to Washington.
Linewitz estimated the Abbrokeed0Fger Isoes r4pf
commission gias doctunlyo
ggt : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001.-7
of the study. betwn in Maye'lkii instance, the United States
*30,000. It was financed. by the
2e1 h.? ;or
t S
Latin relations, would read
WASH IN G1014 DAILY )
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8 SEP 1971 c_ 1-.0 1---V-e-t
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? ? - ' i
, .
By TED KNAP
ScripWioward Staff WrIler ,
While the flow of illicit nar-
-eotics out of Turkey has been
curtailed sharply, it has in-
creased substantially out of
'the "golden triangle" in Thai-
land, Laos and Burma.
- While Iran and India have
begun- effective controls over
? Their narcotics traffic, new
sources of supply are develop-
ing in Afghanistan and Paki-
:stan,- which have not.
Altho France has beefed up
its narcotics police force, the
. gendarmes have npt been able
to knoCk off any of the several.
heroin processing laboratories
known to be operating in se-
cret places around Marseilles.
These developments in nar-
cotics control efforts were de-
scribed today by the executive
director of President Nixon's
n n
newly established ?c abie
tt
Committee o n -International
Narcotics Control. The White
abuse announced formation of
the committee yesterday.
.Egir 'Bud'' Krogh, While
1-louse Aide named to head. the
committee staff, said in an in-
t er v ie w that emergence of
Southeast Asia as an impor-
tant source of heroin is ? the
"most disturbing" -new devel-
opment in the effort to curb'
The flow of hard drugs to
.Ainericans, both here and in
South Vietnam.
Mr. Krogh, just back from a.
tbur of the area; said the In:
export of illicit nar-
cotics from Thailand, Laos
and eastern Burma has been
"substantial" in the past:year.
- 'CONSUMER MARKET'
"We are concerned-," Mr. '
Krogh said, "about the United
States becoming the consumer
market for the golden trian-
gle."
? Turkey announced in June
that it would ban all (=rowing
of opium poppies and, id the
meantime, w.o u I d- purchase
more of the 1971 crop so as to
reduce its flow into illicit
channels. With U.S. aid, the
government has
bought up 140 tons of opium so
far this year compared with
63 tons all of last year.
? Mr. Krogh said the early,
but not yet conclusive, indica-
tions.. are .that Turkey ,is
"drying up" as a source of opi
um, which is processed into
morphine for medicaluse and
heroin for illicit use. Turkey
has been the main grower of
Opium poppies.
The White House official
said intelligence sources re-
port that between three and
nine . processing laboratories
arc in operation in the Mars-
eilles area of southern France.
Secretary of State William
Rogers, who heads the cabinet
committee, said F r an c e is
cooperating, but so far all the
laboratories have escaped de-
tection. ? ...- ?
91 EXECUTED
Mr. Krogh said Iran, which
has executed 91 persons for
narcotics smuggling since it
passed a death penalty law in
1909, and India have instituted
effective monitoring of opium
fields in those countries. He
said similar controls will be
sought in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, either thru.the Unit-
ed Nations or by separate
agreements with the United
States.
In addition to Mr. Rogers,
the cabinet committee consists
of _Atty.- Gen. John Mitchell,
L
Defense Sec.;t1i-y- .Melvin
Laird, Treasury Secretary
-John Connally, Ambassador to
the United Nations George .
Bush and CIA Director Rich-
hard Helms.
While the cabinet committee
conCentrates on curbing the
supply ? of narcotics, another
White House group headed by -
Dr.. Jerome Jaffee focuses on
the demand side, including de- ?
tection and treatment of ad-
dicts.
Dr. jaffee's office said to-
day it cannot claim that there
has been any reduction in the
rate of addiction among
American servicemen in South
Vietnani since Mr. Nixon or-
dered a "top prioriq: cam-
paign against it-in June. The
program has detected that 5.3
per cent of the 70,000 home-
ward-bound GIs given urina-
lysis tests had been recent
users of heroin. They are giv-
en some treatment before
being discharged.
With Americans'l caving
South Vietnam,' Mr. - Krogh ?
said that the use of heroin is
spreading now. among the Sai-
gon government troops and '
Vietnamese students..
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GUT,10 011, CO.)WORATION
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Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
112;'
,
cOrp a L0fC n
7e;
study in ct,. t a 11- 0 11
FOREWORD
INTRODUCTION: THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION
PART ONE:
1
THE RAPE OF ANGOLA
5
OPERATION CABINDA
7
GULF IN THE AMERICAS
10
VENEZUELA-50 YEARS OF WASTE
12
BIG STICK IN BOLIVIA
17'
'CANADA ON A LEASH
21
BUENA VISTA?
23
PART TWO:
RIGGING THE MACHINE
25
''-,--
OILING THE WAR MACHINE
? 29
MELLONOIL
30
FOUNDATION FACADE
- 32
- MEET THE MANAGEMENT
34
FOOTNOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
35
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0.0rft
.0
Viv
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This booklet was prepared by the members of the Africa
Committee of the Committee of Returned Volunteers (CRV)
New York. Chapter, CRV is made up of people who have
served overseas, mainly in the Third World, and who have
witnessed U, S. involvement in these areas, They have
come to 'realize that this involvement works for forces
that maintain the staus quo of wealth and privilege for
the few and poverty- and ignorance for the many. U.S.
policy, both corporate and governmental, must be radi-
cally changed, both at home and abroad. Our booklet
is one of many steps toward .the building of a movement
toward such change.
Committee of Returned Volunteers/New York
Africa Committee
65 Irving Place
New York, N.Y. 10003
Copyright () 1970 by Committee of Returned Volunteers/New York
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t , A
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,
\-/
"Most of my income is from oil and gas. I don't
regard it as any conflict of interest...If I
didn't represent the oil, and gas industry, I
wouldn't represent the state.of Louisiana."
-Senator Russell Long,chm, Finance Committee
"The spotlight here belongs more on lawmakers
and respectable men with bulging brown brief-
cases- entering the portals of government than
on lawbreakers an furtive- men with .little
black bags using side entrances of hotels. Gov-
ernment policy on oil has increasingly become
indistinguishable from the private policies of oil.
- Robert Engler ?
Robert Engler has referred to
the oil industry as "the first world
government," The preceding examples
illustrate how domination of resour-
ces and markets by Gulf and the car-.
porafe economy degrade governments
and societies throughout the world.
Now, we must bring the analysis home
and examine the basis and rationale
of this corporate power and the con-
sequences it holds forour own socie..
ty.
If oil is the first world
government abroad, it is also, as
some critics state, "the fourth
branch of the-OvernMent" in the
United States,p0 Through control
of the executive and legislative
branches of our government and
manipulation of public opinion,
oil has rooted Its power in the moot
favorable system of tax exemptions
accorded to any industry. In 1968,
American oil companies paid less
than 8% of their income in Federal
ncome taxes. Gulf Oil paid less
than 1% of its income in Felleral
II
Income taxes, less than taxpayers
in the lowest income bracket! The
twenty largest oil companies had
profits of $8,1-billion in 1968
and paid only 7j% of that amount I
Federal taxes, To .ssure the
continued flow of these profits,
oil- executives contribute generous-
ly to the campaign funds of those
who can be depended upon for an
"enlightened" vote, Such contribu-
tions are not limited to conserva-
tives, Eugene McCarthy raised.
$)4o, 000 for his presidential cam-
paign by lunching with oil magnat
at the Petroleum Club in Houston. J'
The most visible of the tax
avoidances is the oil depletion
allowance, a subsidy which costs
the Treasury $1.3-billion a year.33
The oil lobby allowed Congress to
reduce this Allowance from 27.5%
to 22% of gross income in 1969,
in hopes that this-would pacify
the public outcry against exorbi-
tant profits. This means that com-
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panies now deduct only 22% of their
gross income (provided that the
deduction does not exceed 50% of the
taxable'income). The change in per-
centage, however, Is one of degree,
not of kind; it avoids the question
of privilege which such subsidiz-
ing of private industry by the
public represents. The deple-
tion allowance was originally
granted to cover the investment
Involved in drilling. It was '
to cease once total amount al-
lowed was equal to investment.
The depletion allowance has since
been modified to cover the val-
ue of the oil and gas being ex-
ploited. Pressured by the in-
dustry, congress set the arbi-
trary figure of 27 1/2% to cover
capital depletion. The benefits
of double taxation, foreign taxes
can be written off dollar for
dollar against the U.S. corpor-
ate taxi 4 U.S. oil companies
operr,ting abroad b:ve been large-
ly successful in having the char-
ges of foreign govern;nents for
the privilege of extracting their
peoples' oil imposed in the form
of income taxes, rather than roy-
alties, Under the foreign tax cre-
dit provisions, the so-ca3led for-
eign income taxes are charged ag-
ainst U.S. corporate tax.
In addition, overseas and
domestic facilities which are
being built, but have not yielded
profits, can be written off as
losses. The companies are also
granted a depletion allowance on
1"011 men are a major source of campaign funds. The for-
) mer head of the Independent Petroleum Association of Amer-
Ilea said he gave $90,000 In one year in political donations."
-Christian Science Monitor, March 9, 1970.
of this treatment -allow the in-
dustry to recover its investment
many times over, making deple-
tion itself profitable! More
important, it grants private in-
dustry the privilege of treating
oil and gas, a resource right-
fully part of the heritage of
every American, as 'their own
capital assets for the purpose
of tax avoidance.
Another mechanism for taX
.avoidance is the foreign tax cre-
dit, which allows reduction of
US, corporate income tax in the
amount of de facto royalties paid
to foreign EOVEIWnts. Under a
1918 tax law mont to(eccourage
foreign investment of United States
capital by eliminating any threat
foreign oil. One fine day all. the
world's oil and all the world's
men will, be counted capital ass-
ets. of Gulf and its friends so
that they might better evade the
I.E.S,
. Tax avoidance is only part cf
corporate privilege; the industry.
also fixes the prices of oil and
its many derivatives. The ration-,
ale behind this monopolistic act-
ion is that production and con-
sumption must be balanced while
a0Ur1ng continuous profits to
the induatry. The cartel sets
the prices, and the smaller in-
dependents follow, Any attempt
to undersell the big companies
would get them driven out of
business. Avoiding such conflicts
im in the interest of the whole,
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-rev Li ?Iril.)Q:d.
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%.'?
1 ...,,..,,,,.. -b-e-;pa tr!, -:(1. :r.l.
lik,..
?.:'/..
- ,
,,,,
:.,,, ?.?
ii.y.A fi-,4
p?,,_,
kf, R
'.'?'?''\ l".',-'_--0\ ? - ii.,,i-N i!?4-1\
II
...
/or L-Ae Ca/7a//5s:
delo/e_ Z/0;7 i=iCe
industryas,_an n380 vice-;-pres-
ident said, such competition cre-
ates a situation where "the con-
sumer has...an undeserved break
in. his price."35
Any government official who
tries to tamper with the price
structure Is removed through the
Influence of the oil lobby. They
are branded as Incompetents whose
lack of understanding endangers
the public good. It is often
enough to drop a few well-placed
hints about their socialist sym-
pathies.
The fat pillar that holds
prices aloft is the oil import
3,-cf
s--/- a tst/cd
42c2/2,74,7
quota, a system restricting im-
portation of foreign oil to 12.2%
of domestic production in states
east of the Rockies. Middle east-
ern crude. oil,. -including trans
rort)-
to the U.S., costs about
'1.50 a barrel as opposed. to
43.00 for a barrel of domestic
crude. This subsidizing of do-
mestic crude costs the American
consumer between i5.2 billion and
$7.2 billion a year, an enormous
and inflationary subsidy to pri-
Vat? industry by the public. For
a family of four in Now York, the
import quota system costs an ave-
rage of $102.32 in extra costs
for gasoline and howGipg_ Q11. In
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cjnii LI (-3 CI
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Wyoming a similar family pays
058 more for the privilege of
?
usingrprice-controliod Ame-iicen
011.30
National security, i.e.avoid-
ing dependence on foreign supplies
is cited as the reason for the
Import quota, If this rationale
is weak generally, it moves to
the absurd when one justifies
the oil quota for Canada on the
likelihood of war with that coun-
try,
' The results of the recent
Presidential Task Force appoint
ed to study the Import quota il
lustrates the power and hypocrisy
of this industry, That Tank Force,
headed.by Secretary of Labor
Schultz, proposed that the import
Quota be replaced by a protective
tarriff cutting into industry
profits by about 20% and urged
closer ties with oil-producing
countries in the western hemis-
phere.as a means of realizing
greater security,
- Oil representatives. there-
upon conferred with. Mr. Nixon
and a presidential aide assured
leading oil men that the Presi-
dent would coma up with a solu-
tion "in the public interest,"
Sure enough, the Task Force was
dismissed, its recommendations
Ignored, and a new Oil Policy
CommIttee formed for further stu-
dies with Attorney General Mit- ?
chell replacing Schultz.
If the power of the private
government of oil is founded upon
a system of privilege embodied in
artificial high prices and a per-
verted tax structure, the exer-
cise of that power pervades our
society and' its institutions, The
Federal government is treated as
a useful appendage for obtaining
Control over,forpisn resources
while assoring the continuance
of the privileged status of the
industry at home.
Acceptable candidates are
backed by large contributions,.
key congressional committees are
stacked, and Washington's most
powerful lobby is kept busy de-
termining the course of congres-
sional legislation, Under its
political action program, for
example, Gulf maintains a Wash-
ington office, which was once
headed by Kermit Roosevelt, for
many of the C.I.A. (see last
chapter for-more details on
Kermit!)
While its Washington lobby
manipulates the Congress, the
industry manipulates public opin-
ion through a contrived mythology
of free enterprise, Public rela-
tions literature published by the
companies and organizations like
the American Petroleum Institute
perpetuate a myth of individual
competition with companies vying
with each other to 'servo the
public, This myth is furthe-o
embroidered by claims that the
Industry Is. progressive, ever
concerned with new developments.
No mention is made of the patents
applied for and left unused, kill-
ing competition before it is,born,
or the discoveries abandoned be:.
cause they seemed unlikely to yield
profit.
In transmitting the corporate
mythology to the public the comp-
anies do not limit themselves to
public relations propoganda and
the media. They also furnish
films (such as "Power for People")
to schools, geology kits to Boy
Scouts, and speakers to civic
groups, farmers' and women's org-
anizations. In attempting to .
lend local character to corp-
orate behavior, "even the Cub
Scouts, ages eight to eleven,
have been recruited, with oil
perhaps expected to join God and
country as objects, of duty of the
nation's youth. "30
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I
H IH
-kff t'?\
J_VIL/
Richard K, Mellon -- Overseer of
the familyfortune, estimated at
it to $-3-,bir1l1on, Richard 18 for-
mer Chairman of Mellon National
Dank and Governor of T, Mellon &
Sons) director of ACTION-Housing,
Alcoa. General Motors (Mellon int-
erest). Gulf Oil. the Pennsylvania
Co..and Pcnnsylvnnia Railroad Co,
(both Mellon interests). He is
also former State Director of Selec-
tive Service in Pennsylvania! He
is a former director of Koppers Co.,
General Reinsurance Corp., Pittg-
bur'gh Plate Glass and Westinghouse
Air Brake Co.
Charles M. Peeghly - Chairman of
The-T3oarli c5T?J-ons & Laughlin
Steel Corp, (a concern linked with
the Melions through the marriage
of their daughter Margaret into
the Laughlin family), Charles is
a director of Gulf Oil and other
Mellen-ominated companies inclu-
e Mellon National Ban:
east, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.
:and Dollar Savings Bank & Trust
'Co, He is a former director of
:Columbia Gas System, Inc., a trus-
tee of Carnegie Institute of Tech-
nology and Ohio Wesleyan Universi.
t4..i and a'director of the American
Iron & Steel Institute among many,
many others.
Dorsey -- President and a dir-
ector; of'-GUlf Oil and a director
of Goodrich. Gulf Chemicals, Inc.
He is a trustee of the University
of Pittsburgh, a member of the
Allegheny Conference of Community
Development, and a director of
the American Petroleum Institute,
the National Petroleum Refiners
Association, and the National
Industrials Conference Board, in
addition, he chairs the board of
PittsburPh's United Fund and belongs
to at least six private clubs, in-
cluding the infamous Duquesne Club
where the elite meet.
Approved
Kermit Roosevelt .- Kermit engineer.-
ed or the Iranian gov-
ernment by the C.I.A., paving the
way for investment by the Interna-
ional Oil Cartel (Gulf). After the
affair, Roosevelt (grandson of Teddy
"Carry a bqg stick") resigned from
the C.I.A., became Government Rela-
tions director in Gulf's Washington
office, and in 1960. Vice President
of Gulf.
Arthur Trudeau - Arthur was Pres-
ident of Gulf _ Research & De-
velopment, a subsidiary of Gulf
Oil, and is a trustee of Gulf Oil
Corp, Foundation. He is a Gene-
ral and the former chief of U.S.
Army Intelligence and Research
and Development, Department of
the Army, He is also a member of
the Armed. Forces Mgmt. Assocn.,
the Industrial Research Institute,
the American Petroleum Institute,
and several private clubs, inclu-
ding the Duquesne Club, He has
been decorated by numerous count-
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6e glum, 1:67nri a , 0 r C
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R0002
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
Deputy Director of CIA, Frank Carlucci
Committee on Foreign Relations
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
January 19, 1979
1
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HARPASproved For Release 2005/01
JUNE 1977
Arms Coalition
A group called the
Committee on the Pres-
ent Danger constituted
itself last year to
awaken us to the
"present danger." The
names of its 141
founding board mem-
bers provide a good
cross section of the
personalities and
interests in the AC (as
well as a couple of
surprises)?Saul
Bellow, William Colby,
John Connally, Lane
Kirkland (secretary.
treasurer of the
AFL-CIO), Clare
Boothe Luce, Norman
Podhoretz (editor of
Commentary), David
Packard (head of
Hewlett-Packard), Gen.
Matthew Ridgway
(Ret.), Eugene
Rostow, Dean Rusk,
Gen. Maxwell Taylor
(Ret.), Edward Teller,
Adm. Elmo Zumwalt
(Ret.). The chairman
of its policy studies is
Paul Nitze, who has
been involved in almost
every major effort to
jump up the defense
budget since 1949. The
committee has
consciously modeled
itself on groups of
distinguished laity that
campaigned before
World War II for
preparedness and, af-
ter, for the Marshall
Plan. It describes the
"present danger" as
follows: "The principal
threat to our nation,
to world peace, and the
cause of human
freedom is the Soviet
drive for dominance
based upon an
unparalleled military
buildup."
0020q.450o0l -7 IN\
I ? eILE t
J
C LA 2--c.
r
c5-11
THE ARMS ZEALOTS
Those who would expand "defense capability" are prepared to sell America short
by Daniel Yergin
S HAS BECOME customary when an old between the Soviet -Union and the:United States
administration departs and a new one in avoiding conflict, particularly nuclear war,
marches in, we are in the midst of a outweighs their differences, and makes arma
loud and passionate debate about control not only possible but necessary.
arms. Some of the relevant questions have be- It seems clear to me that these days the pulp-
come familiar over more than three decades of lic argument is going in favor of the AC. The-
such debates. Are the Russians getting ahead Carter Administration has already found itself
of us? Are they actively seeking world domina- hampered in its efforts to work out furtherpro-
tion? Should we spend more money on arms? posals for the strategic-arms-limitation talks..
Should we rush headlong into new military Before negOtiating with the Russians it must
technologies? Some of the questions are more negotiate with the AC, and that does not leave
recent, the result of nuclear parity between the much roorn for flexibility.-Meanwhile,the prop-
two superpowers and halting steps toward arms aganda campaign of the AC is growing. For
control. Is there or is there not a new Soviet instance, an organization called the American
military buildup? Is real and secure arms limi- Security Council has produced a film dwelling
tation possible with the Russians? Or are they on Soviet strength, The Price of Peace and
taking advantage of such agreements to achieve Freedom, which has been on television sta-
nuclear superiority? While the debate is east- tions around the country 225 times. Another
ly fogged in by the special codes used by those 1,250 prints have been dispatched throughout
who talk about arms (MX, MIRY, PGM) the the land. The Emergency Coalition Against
issues are clear?budgets, jobs, prestige, weap- Unilateral Disarmament got forty Senator&
ons systems, the structure of Soviet-American to vote against Carter's nomination of Paul
relations, the next spiral in the arms race, and Warnke for arms-control negotiator.
that most basic of all matters?survival. At the same time, various versions of in-
The argument in Washington and through- telligence reports, meant to strike fear into the
out the nation is between two "parties." On national heart, regularly find their way into.
one side is the arms lobby or what might be the press. Generals retire from active duty- to
called the arms coalition (hereafter to be abbre- carry their message to a wider public. The
viated as the AC). Its members are those peo- Central Intelligence Agency, usually thought
pie, both inside the government (particularly to be beset by critics from the Left, is one of
in the Defense Department and the Congress) the agencies that does not have a direct vested
and outside, who believe that the Soviet Union interest in an expanding defense budget, and
is an ever-expanding menace. They believe its analyses Of Soviet strength have, until re-
that we are still living in the Cold War, a con- cently, been the most balanced. But the CIA
frontation emanating from, as they see it, the has been subjected to a powerful assault from
predatory character of the Soviet Union. the Right, in the course of which it has virtu-
On the other side is the annscontrol lobby, ally been charged with purveying Soviet prop-
AtispiPoedinsollitigate t2thfoirnIr &At; P8V8Tit5R000200350001-7-
AIZTICLE APP.EABLD
Tiggiq.l
ak_h_DP88cR_E_D_
01315R000206
oiv: PAGE Al_20431-e-cl For ReleresRE01
LTc C-4(
ot-
tr
021 60T
asn nej eser
? ...s.a?
fri?' ateess, nes; ,rani
big-name group 'hats over arms buildup'
?By William Delaney barely six months ago. Its latest re-
WasHrgton Sr Staff Writer , port, 'What Is the Soviet Union Up
fo? ? the first of four it envisions
The .sign is a small one, neatly - this year was released today..
How the committee cattle into
being, how it assembled its list Of
supporters ? including such diverse
figures as Dean. Rusk and feminist
Estelle Ramey, former CIA Director
William E. Colby and teaahers' unio-
nist' Albert Shanker ? is illustrative
of the interlocking nature of Ameri-
can power structures. .
Washington has long been familiar
with such committees, the use of big
names to push a .cause or point of
? view, and in many respects the Com-
? rnittee on the Present Danger is ?
pretty typical. In some ways it is not.
Pinpointing its origin is as difficult
as pinpointing the birth of an idea.
Charts E. Walker, who was deputy
Treasury secretary in the Nixon ad-
ministration, remembers being im-
pressed by then-Defense Secretary
James Schlesinger's remarks on
Soviet 'military power at the eco-
nomic summit conference here in
September 1974. -
AMERICA'S DEFENSES needed
beefing rup, Walker was convinced.
But with the country just extricated
from the agony of Vietnam, and "de-
-tente"..the key word in Foggy Bot-
tom, nobodY much was talking about
combating Soviet military -strength,
apart from Schlesinger and the usual
? and usually ignored ? voices on
the right.. ,
"About that time," Walker recalls,
"I met and became friendly with
(Eugene V,) Rostow,"- the. Yale law
professor who had been an undersec-
retary of State in the Kennedy-John-
son administrations. ?
From his experience as foreign
policy chief of the post-1972 Coalition
for a Democratic Majority, Rostov:
was convinced that nothing short of a
distinguished bipartisan committee
? like the William Allen White com-
mittee that helped sell Americans on
the.l'ilarshall Plan to aid watadevas-
handlettered and taped to the rippled
glass door of Suite 1105 in the old La-
salle building at Connecticut and L.
It reads: "The Committee on THE
PRESENT DANGER."
Inside the suite, in a two-story, .
balconied conference room with a
,fireplace and antiques, past glory is
far more evident than present dan-
ger.
In what is said to have been the liv-
? ing room of Sen. Tom Connally in the
1930s stands the committee's
boomerang-shaped conference table,
(Its edges brass-plaqued with such
names as stateSman Dean 'Acheson
and economist J. K. Galbraith .and
military analyst Paul H. Nitze and
banker Henry H. Fowler, people who
met in this very room as the Demo-
cratic Advisory Council duringH
Eisenhower's second term. ?
Today Nitze and Fowler and a
bipartisan dozen or so of their friends
? with the public support of a long
list of such celebrities as Saul Bellow
and John Connally, Bess Myerson
and Clare Boothe. Luce ? .meet regu-
larly around the table to discuss what
they view as the present danger.
It is not pollution or crime or por-
nography. It is the military strength ?
of the Soviet Union, in relation to our
own. .
"TIME, WEARINESS, and the
tragic experience of Vietnam have
weakened the bipartisan consensus
which sustained our foreign policy
? between 1940 and the mid-60s,." de- ,
.clares the committee's manifesto.
"The principal threat to our na-
tion, to world peace, and to the cause
of human freedom is the Soviet drive
for dominance based upon an unpa-
ralleled military buildup." - ?
If you haven't yet heard of the
Committee .on the Present Danger,
? stick around.
It burst, on the Washington scene
right after' the presidential election,
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to-ted Europe ? would awaken the nation from its
apparent new apathy toward the designs of Soviet
Commanism.
"Gene and I kicked it around," says Walker,
"and found that Paul Nitze had been having a
similar idea."
Nitze, who quit in mid-1974 as a key Nixon arms-
limitation negotiator, was indeed toying with the
idea. He talked with David Packard, Nixon's for-
mer deputy Defense secretary, and with fernier
Johnson Treasury secretary "Joe" Fowler.
: Fowler was discouraging. He told Nitze he had
tried to start such a group around 1971, but "just
couldn't find the money."
In the spring of 1975, with Rostow and Walker .
freshly enthusiastic,' these half-dozen men began
discussing the idea in letters and phone conversa-
tions. .
"We're all friends," Rostow explains.
Finally, on Thanksgiving Day 1975 at his home
in Connecticut, "inspired by a couple of bloody
Marys before lunch," Rostow sat down and fired
off a memo to Walker and Nitze. "I said we'd had
preliminary discussions long enough. By God, why
don't we just do it?"
Some of their varied friends were already inter- ,
ested: AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Lane Kirk- -
land, Schlesinger. Nixon foreign policy adviser
Richard V. Allen, Washington attorney and Hubert
Humphrey associate Max M. Kampehnan, foreign .
policy scholar Charles Burton Marshall.
IN MARCH 1976, over lunch at the Metropolitan
Club here, a dozen of these men agreed to launch
the committee.
Money was, of course, a problem. The partici- .
pants decided to chip in what they could. They '
limited each donor to 10,000 a year. For the sake
of credibility, th-ey ruled out funds from people or
firms with substantial income from defense activi-
ties, and excluded from membership all public !
officials and candidates (Elmo Zumwalt joined '
only after his defeat by Virginia's Sen. Harry F.
Byrd Jr.). ?
- "There was a great sense of urgency to get this
started," recalls Charles Tyroler H. who ran a re-
search and development firm in the Lasalle suite
which had served as the Democratic think tank in
the 1950s (with Tyroler as its staff director).
Invited to the lunch by Nitze, he became the com-
mittee's director.
But. countering their sense of urgency was the I
still-wide-open presidential campaign. Nobody I
wanted the committee to be seen as partisan.
COnfinuegv
: "We decided to wait APIPrOftteld tFOIDRItieasei
convention to go public," says Tyroler. "But then
Reagan made his resurgence in North Carolina. It
became clear we'd have to wait until the election
was over. In August we set the announcement for
Nov. 11 ? but because of people's schedules, not
because it happened to be Armistice Day."
The group picked the energetic Rostov/ as chair-
man of its executive committee ? in effect, presi-
dent ? with Fowler, Kirkland and Packard as co-
chairmen, Nitze as head of policy studies, Walker
as treasurer and Ka.inpelman as counsel.
Executive committeemen were Allen, Marshall,
Rusk, Dean Edmund C. Gullion of the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, New York Republi-
can lawyer Rita C. Hauser, columnist John P.
? Roche and author Richard .1. Whalen (joined in re-
cent months by Zumwalt and Harvard Russian
, scholar Richard E. Pipes).
Following the Metropolitan Club lunch, six to 10
of these people would get together before noon
- every few weeks around the boomerang table to go
over Rostow's latest draft of the committee ma-
nifesto. They sent out for sandwiches or lasagna,
struggling word by word on the drafts.
There were other struggles:
? What to call themselves. Rostow remembered a
Committee on the Present Danger in the Korean
War era, an influential group concerned with pre-
paredness. The name was borrowed from Justice
Holmes' famous opinion (freedom of speech does-
n't give one the right to yell "Fire!" in a crowded
theater unless there is "a clear and present dan-
ger").? s
Others, however, thought Present Danger would.
sound entirely too shrill to some of those whose
names they hoped to enlist. They studied 16 other
name suggestions but eventually bought Rostow's.
As Kampelman puts it:
'If there is a present danger ? as we all agreed
there was there's no sense in pussyfooting about
it.'
* How to "go public."
"If we had done like most committees," says
Tyroler, "we would have taken out ads in The
Washington Post, The New York Times, The Wall
Street Journal and the international Herald-Trib-
une in Paris.
"There was some support for that, but fortu-
nately it was overruled. As of now we have spent
two-third of what those ads would have cost us."
Instead, the committee scheduled a news confer-
ence at the National Press Club, letting the media
deliver their message at virtually no cost to them.
* Costs had become more of a concern than some
members had anticipated at the initial meeting.
-"We thought we had $160,000 in sight," says
Tyroler, but by the time of the November news
conference, $70,000 had been raised.
. Virtually all of it came from individuals ? "peo-
ple we knew," says Walker. (Incidentally, two of
the three co-chairman of last fall's 'League of
Women Voters presidential debates project were
Present Danger officers: Walker and Hauser.)
To date, says Tyroler, the committee has raised
about $110,000 and spent $45,000, mostly on print-
ing, postage, office rent and payroll for Tyroler
id three associates. Officers ? not staff ? write
ne policy.papers, on their own time.
05/0JitiledINA4R113448a01t3ROMVOgi f-t
the committee hopes to conduct regioi
broaden discussion of "the present danger."
As it turned out, that name apparently failed to
offend the people ? liberals, conservatives, busi-
nessmen, scholars, blacks, women ? who were
asked to become founding board members of the
organization.
"We picked the people as carefully as we
could," Tyroler says. "That was very time-con-
suming."
ON OCT. 27, with the election almost over, some
200 form letters from Rostow, on Yale Law station-
ery and labeled "PRIVATE," were sent out to the
invitees, along with statements on the committee's
aims and operations. H you agree with us, Rostow .
wrote, please tell us promptly on the enclosed post-
card.
The committee had hoped to get 100 names. But
as Nov. 11 dawned, it had 141 ? novelist James T.
Farrell, President Steven Muller of Johns Hopkins
University, Reader's Digest chairman Hobart
Lewis, Evelyn DuBrow of the International
Ladies' Garment Workers Union, industrialist J.
Peter Grace, Washington attorney Hobart Taylor,
Stanford political scientist Seymour Martin Lipset,
retired Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, New York intellec-
tual Norman Podhoretz of Commentary and his
wife, writer Midge Decter.
Talk to a number of these people about why they
lent their prestige to the committee and you'll get
remarkably similar. answers:
One or more of the organizers is my personal
friend or professional Colleague or served with me
on something-or-other. And while I may not agree
with every word in their manifesto, I agree that we
should be worrying more about the Soviet Union.
"Normally I don't get involved in this sort of
thing because I'm so busy with my feminism,"
says Ramey, a Georgetown medical professor who
was a pacifist before Hitler changed her views.
'WHEN I WAS 19 I walked around my college
with a sign that said, 'Butter, not Battleships,' and
when I was 20 I was walking around with a sign
that said, 'Where Are the Battleships?'
"I'm not for all-out, blockbuster defense spend-
ing and I don't think the committee is either, but
there are fashions in the country," and she feels
the pendulum needs to swing toward a more criti-
cal view of both Soviet military aims and U.S. de-
fense expenditures.
"I thought about it a good bit," she says of
Rostow's letter. "I know so many of the people in-
volved. It did give the names of other people I
respect and agree with." She mentions Kampel-
man, Decter. "I wouldn't join an organization that
just had John Connally." ?
The Committee on the Present Danger is "not
the most felicitous name in the world," observes
Podhoretz. "But I think there is a present danger
. . . We're in 1936, 1937, and the Churchillian role
needs to be played by someone. I don't normally
join organizations but this is possibly the most
important issue of our time."
He and Decter knew Karnpelman, Kirkland and
Rostow through the Coalition for a Democratic
Majority. As editor of Commentary he had pub-
lished an article by Rostow.
"All of us fairly well know one another," says
Hauser."We on the executive committee sat
?around thinking of people. It's an extraordinary
list, with far more names than we imagined we'd
get."
The founding board members were told in the
Rostow letter that "there is no obligation on your
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and thus far there has been no genera p rnee r Mg.
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TYTWLER SAYS the group plans more policy-
paper news conferences in coming months, and
hopes they get better play from the media heavies
than did the initial press conference in November.
"We were a little taken aback," he says, when
the networks ? each of which sent a crew and
correspondent to the session ? failed to mention
the committee on the evening news. And there was
!'not a line in the New York Times . . . Here was a
very distinguished group of people saying, 'Things
are not right,' and it's not news?
"Well, the Star had a damned good editorial that
pepped us up, but then the reaction started coming
in from out in the sticks, beginning in Baltimore,
and it was good."
Oh, there were criticisms: ."New Jeremiads
From Old Jeremiahs?" wondered The New Repub-
lic, surprised to find Saul Bellow in such company.
James Wechsler in the New York Post called it "a
front organization" for discredited Cold Warriors
who had managed to suck in a few "innocent"
intellectuals. Columnist Tom Braden said the only
Cold Warrior missing from the committee was
Nixon. In mid-January The New York Times ran
the committee's manifesto on its op-ed page.
So its message is beginning to stimulate discus-
sion ? increasingly, Tyroler hopes, on radio and
television.
WHILE THE COMMITTEE wants to be judi-
ciously non-partisan, its members take individual
stands ?as Nitzc did in op;posine, the nOrrinatiOn
of Paul W:-:unke as President Carter's arms-con-
trol chief.
Any policy paper must have the near-unanimous
support of the committee's officers. 04 the El
bomber, for example, Tyroler says "my impres-
sion is that there would be overwhelming support"
for it among his group.
Wary that such committees often outlast their
usefulness, keeping on largely due to institutional
habit, Tyroler sees the group's impact perhaps
diminishing after three to five years. But then
again, perhaps not.
"I think the present danger will continue indefi-
litely."
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?
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A - 1 '
JA.N.
? WASHINGTON -POST -
'Two Calls for Joseph Kraft to 'Repent'
Two years ago; Henry ICissinger
urged a national debate on "detente," ;
to which the issue of strategic superior-
ity is centrally relevant. This debate;
has never really got underway because;
those holding the view that the Soviet:
Union is not seeking strategic superior-;
ity and that, in any case, strategic supe-
riority is meaningless, have been un-
willing seriously to address the evid-
ence. Their technique has been either
to ignore the statements of those who
advance views opposed to their own, to
attack their motives, or as a last resort,
to accuse them of being unhelpful and
?
of offering no alternative. On the Jan. 4
Op-Ed page of The Post, in a column en-
titled "Righteous Concern," Joseph
Kraft goes even further. He suggests
that those prosecuting the opposing
, side of the debate are engaged in a con-
certed effort to place the Carter admin-
istration under threat of political re-
prisal. ' . ?
Many of us believe that this country
is in danger and, unless we bestir our-
selves, that that danger will increase.
Joe Kraft does not discuss whether the
available evidence supports that assess-
xnent; in fact, he agrees that Soviet mili-
tary strength is increasing. His attacks
and that of many of the others on his
side of the debate, is largely directed
against the motives of those who be-
lieve we should take such assessments
seriously and do something about
,them. Being one of those who take a se-
rious view of our strategic problems, I
feel called upon to say a few words in
defense of myself and those similarly
situated, and, in particular, of the Com-
mittee on the Present Danger.
The work to create such a high level,
bipartisan committee goes back to 1974
and 1975. The first draft of the Commit-
tee's initial statement was circulated to-
its members in March 1976. On August
23, shortly after the conventions, it was
decided to issue that statement on Nov-
ember 11 regardless of who won the el-
ection. This we did. A determination to '
persist in analyzing the evidence and in
bringing before the executive, the Con- ,
grew. and the public, where appropri-
ate, those judgments that the evidence;
appears best to support cannot justly
be said to pose a political threat. On the
contrary, the absence of people with
mch a determination could, in fact,
2onstitute a threat to the essence of the
1 emocratic process., ? . . -
It has been suggested by others?not
Joe Kraft?that those holding views
such as mine are motivated by venality
in being financially interested in in-
creasing armaments or in a search for
office. Ever since I first became asso-
ciated with the Defense Department 15
years ago I have owned no securities of
companies doing business with the De-
fense Department, whether in or out of
office. I have never sought office in the
executive branch; I have served when
asked. I have resigned whenever to
continue to serve loyally under direc-
tion appeared to me to be inconsistent
with my oath of office. .
I also consider the complaint to be
unwarranted that those who hold views
t similar to mine have failed to come up
with constructive alternatives. In each
. of the articles I have written on the
strategic balance, arms control and re-
- ? -
lated subjects, I have recommended
those courses of action that I judged to
be prudent and wise.
Since I was one of the earliest oppo-
nents of our increasing military com-
mitment in Vietnam, when many of
our now leading cloves were our lead-
ing hawks, Joe Kraft's tag "repenter" is..
hardly applicable, but neither do I
think the tag "righteous" to be fair or
illuminating. More importantly, I do
not think these pejorative tags are help-
ful in describing the new top foreign
policy, defense and intelligence ap-
pointees to the Carter Administration,
whom, from long association, I know to
be men of character and judgment.
As the reader can by now judge, to-
day I am angry. Tomorrow I will relax
and go about the business of continu-
ing as politely and reasonably as possi-
ble to support those propositions I be-
lieve both to be true and to merit con-
sideration by those who are called upon
to concern themselves with U.S. for-
eign and defense policies appropriate
for the future.
. .
PAUL NITZE
Arlington
(The writer is former Secretary of the
Navy and Under Secretary of -De-
fense.)
I o*
Joseph Kraft's column of Jar.. 4 sug-
gests that I am one of a "righteous"
. group that has 'suddenly raised "undis-
criminating alarms" to block the easing
of tensions with Moscow. Instead the
S "group" should be making "long term
constructive proposals" to meet what
he recognizes as'a growing Soviet mili-
tary capacity. Specifically he states that
I supplied staff support for Dean Rusk,
Paul Nitze and Eugene Rostow of the
' recently formed Committee on the Pro-
- sent Danger; and that articles by me in
Foreign Policy started the recent exam-
ination of the National Intelligence Es-
timates (NIEs) on the Soviet threat. The
results of that inquiry by an inclepend-
- ent team-picked by the CIA director, he
says, have been leaked in a way to exag-
gerate ? the menace. He contrasts this
. "righteous group" with the "repenters"
(such as Harold Brown, Theodore So-
rensen and Cyrus Vance), whose ap-
pointment by Carter, he believes
? prompted the "righteous" suddenly to
go public. In the new administration
the only "right" name in any important
: spot he says is Zbigniew Brzezinslsi.
I doubt that any of the serious men
. he mentions fit such simple minded op=
posites as righteous-repenter, hawk--
;. dove, good guy-bad guy or the like. If
- there are two "groups" that contrast
less starkly and in different terms they -
are far from tightly linked and uniform
internally. Harold Brown, for example,
cautioned us recently about declining
U.S. defense budgets and the large and
increasing Soviet defense effort. As for
myself, Mr. Kraft was simply wrong in
saying that I supplied staff suppport to
Mr. Rusk, Mr. Rostow, or Mr. Nitze. Nor
am I a member of the Committee on
the Present Danger. I had no part in
the team that recently took an inde-
pendent look -at past and present na-
tional intelligence estimates. Nor have I
! -seen their report.
tJLPaQ
? h sitt-..e, Pii beAl-
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Approved For RelerNelgW5/11011:1ci 'N I 20 3
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On U.S. Dealings With the Soviet
?-Following are excerpts from a state-
ment by the American Committee on
U.S.-Soviet relations. Among those
who signed are John Kenneth Gal-
braith, the Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh,
Donald M. Kendall, George Kerman,
Wassily Leontief, Eugene McCarthy,
Edwin 0. Reischauer, David Riesman,
Robert V. Roosa, Terry Sanford,
Thomas Watson Jr., Jerome B. Wies-
ner and Leonard Woodcock. .,
For the past year or two American
policy toward the Soviet Union has
oeen in the main neglected, adrift and
devoid of initiative. Liuring the recent
electoral campaign, U.S.-soviet rela-
tions suffereci from much misinforma-
tion and misleading rnetoric.
The American Committee on U.S.-
. Soviet Relations, concerned only to
promote American security and world
peace through those relations, urges
the new Aaministration to turn its
back on past timidities and to restore
both balance and initiative to Amen- .
can policy in this field.
The committee recognizes that there
are realistic limits to toe Improvement
of relations between Russia and the
United States. We recognize that the
Soviet leadership will have to ,make a
contribution no smaller than our own.
Unilateral concessions are not a real
issue. To our knowledge, no such con-
cessions have been responsibly pro-
posed, nor do we favor any. We are
under no illusions about the serious-
ness of the differences that divide the
two governments, particularly in the
field of policy toward third countries
and regions.
The committee believes that, despite
our disagreements, the relationship
can be improved in important ways.
We urge the .incoming Administration
to take advantage, wherever possible,
of all openings tor progress, including
outstandingly in the SALT talks. First
priority should be given to halting the
suicidal proliferation of nuclear and
other weapons. The security of our
country, as well as of our friends and
allies, must always be a prime motiva-
tion in our relations with the Soviet
Union. But security in today's world
cannot be achieved by expanding
armaments.
What is at stake here is the ultimate
issue of international lite today. We
must make every effort to probe sucn
possibilities as do exist. This will re-
quire not only discussion and negotia-
tion, but a considerable measure of
restraint, courage and initiative on
both sides. Indeed, the dangers of re-
straint are less than those of an all-
whatever it may ask of others.
The many misstatements and exag-
gerations of the recent electoral cam-
paign should be consigned to the past
and their place taken by a sober scru-
tiny of the real situation in Soviet-
American relations. It would be idle
to underestimate the seriousness of
the remaining problems. But it is
simply not true that the United States
in recent years has given everything
and received nothing in return in its
relations with Russia, or that the So-
viet side has never lived up to its un-
dertakings. A number of agreements
arrived at in earlier years are working
to the benefit of both parties. There is
no reason to despair of reaching fur-
ther agreements that would also re-
duce international tensions. What is
needed, in the first instance, is a
resolute abandonment of the stale
slogans and reflexes of the cold war,
a recognition that this is a new era,
with different problems and possibili-
ties; and a determination not to be
governed by the compulsions of mili-
tary competition?compulsions whicn
have seldom failed to lead to war in
the past, and which in terms of the
weaponry of this age are pregnant
with the possibility of utter catas-
trophe.
Beyond these measures of restraint
of the development of weaponry we
should pursue constructive purposes
such as mutually beneficial exchanges
in trade, science and culture; preser-
vation of our common environment;
raising living standards worldwide;
and promoting the ideals of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights
and the Helsinki Declaration.
The committee will support and en-
courage the liberalization of emigra-
tion policies and the recognition of
human freedoms, including the move-
ment of individuals in all countries.
The American Committee on U.S.
Soviet Relations stands prepared to
give the new Administration every
possible help and support in any ef-
forts it may make in the spirit of thes2.
considerations.
Following are excerpts from a state-
ment on United States-Soviet relations
by the Committee on the Present Dan-
Signers include Saul Bellow,
dam E. Colby, John B. Connally, C.
Douglas Dillon, Lane Kirkland, Clare
Boothe Luce, Paul H. Nitze, Norman
Podftoretz, Matthew B. Ridgway, Eu-
gene V. Rostow, Dean Rush, Maxwell
B. Taylor and Elmo R. Zumwalt.
1. N 1977
9 0
mon
Our country is in a period of danger,
and the danger is increasing. Unless
decisive steps are taken to alert the
nation, and to change the course of its
policy, our economic and military
capacity will become inadequate to
assure peace with security.
There is still time for effective action
to ensure the security and prosperity
of the nation in peace, through peace-
ful deterrence and concerted alliance
- diplomacy. A conscious effort of polit-
ical will is needed to restore the
strength and coherence of our foreign
policy; to revive the solidarity of our
alliances; to build constructive rela-
tions of cooperation with other nations
whose ' interests parallel our own?
and on that sound basis to seek re-
liable conditions of peace with the
Soviet Union, rather than an illusory
detente.
Only on such a footing can we and
the other democratic industrialized
nations, acting together, work with
the developing nations to create a
just and progressive world economy?
the necessary condition of our own
prosperity and that of the developing
nations and Communist nations as
well. In that framework, we shall be
better able to promote human rights,
and to help deal with the great and
emerging problems of food, energy,
population, and the environment.
The principal threat to our nation,
to world peace, and to the cause of
human freedom is the Soviet drive for
dominance based upon an unparalleled
military buildup. The Soviet Union has
not altered its long-held goal of a
world dominated from a single center
?Moscow. It continues, with notable
persistence, to take advantage of every
opportunity to expand its political and
military influence throughout the
world. The scope and sophistication
of the Soviet campaign have been in-
creased in recent years, and its tempo
quickened.
For filotv than a decade, the Soviet
Union has been enlarging and improv-
ing both its strategic and its conven-
tional military forces far more rapidly
than the United States and its allies.
The process of Soviet expanston and
the worldwide deployment of its mili-
tary power threaten our interest in
the political independence of our
mand mutuality of the Soviet n
out weapons race. We cankisitprOftd For Releae 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350?172
ion if
the United States is prepared to match
Approved For Rele4EW05715011MlifliNW1315R000200350001-7
friends and allies, their and our fair
access to raw materials, the freedom
of the seas, and in avoiding a pre-
ponderance of adversary power.
To sustain an effective foreign pol-
icy, economic strength, military
strength, and a commitment to leader-
ship are essential. We must restore
an allied defense posture capable of
deterrence at each significant level
and in those theaters vital to our
interests. The goal of our strategic
forces should be to prevent the use
of, or the credible threat to use, stra-
tegic weapons in world politics; that
of our conventional forces, to prevent
other forms of aggression directea
against our interests. Without a stable
balance of forces in the world and
policies of collective defense based
upon it, no other objective of our
foreign policy is attainable.
As a percentage of gross national
product, U.S. defense spending is
lower than at any time in twenty-five
years. For the United States to be
free, secure and influential, higher
levels of spending are now required
for our ready land, sea and air forces,
our strategic deterrent, and, above all,
the continuing modernization of those
forces through research and develop-1
ment. The increased level of spending
required is well within our means so
long as we insist on all feasible effi-
ciency in our defense spending. We
must also expect our allies to bear
their fair share of the burden of
defense.
From a strong foundation, we can
pursue a positive and confident diplo-
macy, addressed to the full array of
our economic, political and social in-
terests in world politics. It is only on
this basis that we can expect success-
fully to negotiate hardheaded and
verifiable agreements to control and
reduce armaments.
If we continue to drift, we shall
become second best to the Soviet
Union in overall military strength;
our alliances will weaken; our promis-
ing rapprochement with China could
De reversed. Then we could find our-
selves isolated in a hostile world,
facing the unremitting pressures ot
Soviet policy backed by an overwhelm-
ing preponderance of power. Our na-
tional survival itself would be in peril,
and we should face, one after another,
oitter choices between war and acqui-
escence under pressure.
We have established the Committee
on the Present Danger to help promote
a better understanding of the main
problems confronting our foreign pol-
icy, based on a disciplined effort to
gather the facts and a sustained dis-
cussion of their significance for our
national security and survival.
1 1
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THE GLOBE (Northern Virginia) C t
7 JULY 1977
6
1.(4 1-1-4e.e
ctL

?
-....,_
WASHINGTON ? The
Committee to Help the FBI
has run into trouble in trying
to exercise its First Amend-
ment right of freedom of
speech in Atlanta. Georgia.
The Committee tried to
place an.ad in the Atlanta.-1
. . ?
Constitution _ criticizing the -
Justice Department and At-
torney General Griffin Bell:
for launching -the prosecu-
tion of fahner FBI officials ,-
and agents for such actions
as undertaking wiretaps or -
_ secretive z.entries - without-,
warrants- irrAheir efforts- to
.,
- track dOwn? dangerous-
criminals,'Oncii-T former ? FBI Supervisor'-'John. Kearney, '
has- already l been indicted,
and thereiS e possibility that:-
1
? many others Will be indicted ::
if those Ainz,--the Justice'
- __Departmertt who are _eager
to prosecute-, have their
way..
--The Committee to Help
'the FBI submitted an ad titl-
ed, "Enough- of This
- NonsenseA' .to ,the Atlanta
. papter. It pointed out that
- ex-CIA ? agent . Philip Agee.
had been informed recently
by :.the Justice-Department
that he 'could return to the,
,U.S. withoutJear of lacing
-prosecution-even though he,:d
. had spilled.U.S._ secrets and
i fingered CIA agents around:.
the
;the wcirld..;,His activities had--
, endangered-,:many lives and
:had cost -.the:U.S. govern-;
fment millions to transfer and -
,?try -toi-protect agents,fingered-b-Agee.
, .
- Ageewas?-_Iiving
= England,tintik recently. He--.
,. had feared to-come to the.,i-
-U.S.- because?he was afraid -
he would be. indicted. The
British recently ordered him
to leave the country-on the
,.,ground that he had been in-]
contact with- foreign -in-
. telligence agents and. had _
been involved in activities
that could be harmful to the
security:,-.oh the United
Kingdom..
. At : tivis-zjuncturis.."--.Bert,
_Civiletti. the new head of the--
Criminal., Division
Department7.of ',Justice. lin--
formed Agee that he did no
? need .to worry? about, being,
.,prosecuted_the
_Espionage Act. -bay -a few
,months earlier. Civilettrs.
predecessor had advised
Agee that -;ne rnight7:be.
prosecuted.. -
At the same time the.
Justice Department was let-
ting, Agee off the hook. they.
were planning the prOsecu-:
tion of FBI agents- and of-.
ficials. who ?had _been
,volved in,warrantl:ess
wiretaps.,-a'nd_ mail ..sur-
:-veillance.- The committee%
lad pointed out that what the
FBI had done was similar to
some of ? the.-less spe-.
tacular deeds. of such pop-
ular heroes as TVs "Mission
-
?-
_
.Impossible" team:They had
done these things in an ef-
fort to try to. track down
such dangerous terrorists as
Bernardine Dorhn of the
Weather Underground. -
- The committee certainty
, ?
Made a good point in citing
the fact that the American
public- had `relished 'end;
_applauded kinds : of
guestionalbe\andZilleget
deeds -carried.: out the-
"Missioh:Impossible. team.
and other similarTV heroes:.
The Man - From Uncle....%To1
I Catch .a-Thielf-
-_-variety of private eye shows
-.come to mind. .What. are,
known 35 "black bag jobs.? ?
surreptitious, .entries to.. get.
the goods-on-the ...crooks.
were standard_ fare-in-these.
i.programs, -It, apparently
._never occurred :to ;anyone
that such: entries: were in
-,?
violation ofthe.law,,Indeed,
- --there- ts:. some --question
'whether---they=iWere,.,.- since
the courts regularly ruled on.
the admissablitty.:i-of
'evidence- 'obtained by
searches made,..without
-,benefit of a warrant without
ever suggesting,..ithat-::.the
-searchers- shoUld.. be jailed.
At the time, such actions by
the -authoritieSf'Werez-not
condemned, as the
ty of the TV shows indicates.:
But the Atlanta.Constitu-
tion look- with favor?
on-the committee's ad.-
they made-ffies',.feastinables-
request .-:_that.:;.--Subitantiation"
:;.of the .?Stateinerits-4?-about
Philip. .gee be prpvidedy-Mr..
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referenceizier.;'}_tgetiaT.,po:Fik.
;hide the-.-CoMpahy
r-baiked..:',indicatingithatt-no
documentation would-
make: '.the:::,a&zacceptable..
?One ?might..-conclude- that
they did not like theriticis
-e.of Attorney-.- General.,,Griffin
Bell,..who-hailifrorn-Atlanta
, Clearly-- the.. Constitution.
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LOS ANGELES, CALIF.
11 TIMES
Approved
M - 1,000,866
S 1,227,377
FEB 4 1977
el,
or Release 2005/01/11: CIA-RDP88-01315R000200/150801-A ian ck, 5,1 4
5 (--/-01, 2- ctt.4
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"Y
f;c5 /g 7/
iHE BOOK :REPORT
Ina
-?BYIt'OBERTKIRSCH ,
;Times Bock Critic ,
Scholar'S Shelf:. ., .
.?
.?,.-Stardey D. Bachrack's The Cominittee''don. e
.....tcbina Lobby" Politics; 1953-1.,g71. (Columbia University-a
"EreSs: $14.05) leaveS some central questions unanswered, '
but it is not through lack of trying by its author. The major
question is whether or not the CIA played a role in orga-
just after the Korean War, the Committee for One
? ? Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the
',-United Nations.. ? iaor -
The committee, which 'Went on to influence this COUri:
-trfs China policy for many years, was the brainchild of a
-,.:Inysterious Frenchman, Count Nicholas de Rochefort. Dr.
Bachrack,' working with the files of the organization, do-
nated to the Hoover Institution at Stanford University by
'Marvin Liebman, the group's longtime Secretary and puh-
a ...ircist, tracked the original idea of the.Committee to a letter
sent by De Rochefort to an aide to President Eisenhower.'
aide, C.D. Jackson, did not discourage De Roche-
-..fort,-though he made it clear he did not deem it appropriate
Pr the Administration to get involved in the organization
: of-a-group which would propagandize and lobby agalnst
Red China's admission to the U.N. ? a.; :a
second letter from De Rochefort indicated he' had
bade contact with Rep: Walter Judd of Minnesota, Chair-,--
rvan.of the subcommittee- on the Far East of the-House:
aign :Affairs Committee. - Rep. Judda a former medical
missionary to China and a dedicated supporter Of the Chi-
. 'ang Kai-shek regime, undertook to head a public appeal,
. In the White House-files Dr. Bachrack found a metnor-.
. and_urn from Jackson- to then Under Secretary :of State
',Walter Bedell Sinith, director ot.the CIA from-1950 to'N
?19,53: "Count N. de Rochefort, Who ras ceealtille active in
anti-Corfummist work but who for-some reason unknown
'',..troarn, did not enjoy-particularly good standing '
mer, outfit, is spearheading . a, public petition-drive
the inclusio-n of Red China in the United NaElons.",
:-;-Jackson Said the drive was directed to Western European
jalic'- opinion, He asked Bedell, Smith for his advice.
andwritten across the bottom of the dociiment Was: "9/g,
..rnith' advised best notato get,W.-1-1. (White Flonse} 1n4
"irolved in any way 7:01
.7;.This aroused, Dr. Bachrack's "curzosity: Could this De
? Itkiiefort have been a CIA agent? Could it have.been an
instance of a covert CFA domestic politicaloperation?,
;Ale asked the CIA to 'Provide information _Under the
;Fre-Qom of Information Act:The agency refused, claiming
#,had statutory exemption, and "neither confirmed nor. de-
tiler De Rochefort's possible affiliation. Dr. Bachrack sued:
the CIA. but lost. He sought to get. transcripts of De Roche-
forts testimony testimony in executive: session _before Judd's...sub-
osarnittee? but that was denied him five times. The. doc-
uments remain locked awaY.:for- 50 years perhaps to the
year 2C,03, under a House secrecy rule.
? .1).e*- Rochefort, who had given tip hisTierich
?afteraWorld.War II, died in 1964 at the age?of 62.11-10 was
: identified as a writer; linguist; professor at. Ainericaa
Urn-
v&sty apc;',!exwert. on tsahplopi
Perhaps', this chiRfa, scruptiiOus y_Tei?..!tua'y
build up some pressure to-reveal the CIA involvement, if
any, with the China Lobby's most. effective public organi-
a - zation. Though the CIA question is unresolved, the book
. itself is a case study of potent public relations, propaganda
- and political influence on the national level. ? -
The China Lobby had promulgated its myth that we
somehow "lost China." It found scapegoats among the old
China hands in the State Department, besmirched reputa-
tions and managed to suppress dissent and discourage al-
ternatives for American policy on China. ' , ?
: Dr. Bachrack points out that China was never "ours" t.6.
lose?"China policy, on the other hand, was." The Corn-
. mittee led by Rep. Judd and Liebman (until they fell out
because Liebman had ' used Judd's name on letters to
1.newspapers without securing Judd's permission) managed
!- to achieve a bipartisanship by recruiting both liberal and
/conservative figures to the Committee. Its propaganda was? brilliant, never failing to link its positions with other emo-
,-tional issues, such as drug smuggling, and it carried on
drives within Far Eastern countries where its influential.
? : Members had contact with high government officials.
- Gradually, the Committee lost its bipartisan makeup as
. some prominent Republicans and Democrats resigned from
the steering committee. President Nixon's China trip ended
the effectiveness of the committee. .
But it had zealously promoted its defense of the Chiang
regime and had perpetuated an hysteria which Made it dif-
ficult if not impossible to speak out with equal effect on the
'side of relations with Red China. So powerful was it at one
point that it was able to deflect several initiatives by Red
China in the direoliion of opening contact with the United
States. : . :
a This scholar& and eminently fair account is a refreshing
contrast to the usual blare and exaggeration of the China.
Lobby's defenders and attackers -; 'a -
>?:,.; -4-:!S '2;14 N' -
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-el- HUMAN E 7.FNTS
7 MAY 1 977 13 t
Liberals Press Bill to
Wreck Intelligence Agencies
House liberals are pushing legislation that would
outlaw all "political sureillance" and shut down
the intelligence gathering activities of both the FBI
and the CIA.
Introduced by Herman Badillo (D.-N.Y.) and a
dozen of his colleagues, the bill has the all-out sup-
port of such anti-internal security groups as the
American Civil Liberties Union, the Committee
for Public Justice and the Center for National Se-
citrity Studies. -
To a significant extent, the legislation incorpo-
rates the major provisions of a proposed piece of
legislation unveiled in the Nation's Capital in Feb-
ruary by former Atty. Gen. Ramsey Clark. The
thrust of that measure, as I I LIMAN EVENTS noted in
its March 19 issue, was sad to be looked upon with
some favor by various persons in the Justice De--
partrrienc and on the President's Domestic Council.
The Badillo proposal would:
0 Prohibit all electronic and "Political" surveil-.
lance. What the proponents mean by this, however,:
is no surveillance of virtually any organization,'
whether or not it advocates violence or swears al-
legiance to a foreign country.
0 Prohibit the "covert collection of foreign in-
telligence information abroad during peace-
time...."
0 Prevent the FBI from collecting information
on any person unless there was evidence that the,i
individual had already committed a crime or was !
about to commit one.
Repeal the Riot Act, which permits the fed-
eral government to prosecute persons crossing state!
'lines to promote violence, and the Smith Act, which ;
makes it illegal to advocate the violent overthrow !
, of the government.
"If this legislation as presently drafted is enacted
into law, -it %yin destroy the effectiveness of the :
FBI," says W. Raymond Warman, who retired Iasi
year as assistant FBI director in charge of the intel-
Approved
ligence division. In an interview with Kingsbur)
Smith of the Hearst Newspapers, Wannall said:
"It would put the bureau out of business in
intelligence-gathering, and that applies to or-
ganized crime as well as surveillance of radical
political organizations anti terrorist groups. It
would make it impossible for the bureau to
function effectively in the foreign intelligence
field."
Under the Badillo bill, the FBI could not invcsti
Rep. Ronald Dellums (left) (0.-Calif.) and Rep- Badillo
are pushing for legi.sletion designed to virtually destroy!
the intelligence gathering activities of the FBI and the
CIA.
gate any individual or group unless there was evi- !
deuce the person or group "has committed, is corn-
miffing, or is about to commit" a federal crime.
That would virtually cripple the FBI's drive against
the Mafia.
"Combatting organized crime is to a great extent
gathering information to prevent the commission
of a crime," Warman 'notes. "Under the proposed
legislation, the FBI would also be prohibited from
maintaining records on a suspect unless you could
prove he had committed a crime or was about to
commit one. This would make preventative action ;
virtually impossible."
The Badillo bill provides that once an investiga-
tion is completed, the file will be sealed by the at-
torney general. Six months later, the subject would
be informed that he had been under investigation
and the government must give him a complete ac- :
counting of what it had learned about him.
Thus, if insufficient evidence is developed to ;
provide an indictment, organized crime figures or
potential saboteurs must nonetheless be notified
that they were under investigation and precisely
what the FBI had learned of their activities.
The Justice Department. informs HUMAN.
EVENTS it has made no comment on the legisla-
tion, and even Badillo's office admits it may go too .
far fel the department_ But a lot of knowledgeable
For. Release 2005/MatTerA414111P8if-615:31ttiffi&Onto0pic-YitY
legal experts in the Justice epartment an over at
the White flouse who would like to see this bill-
t.,...netrrto. h Inw nf the
C L Cl
Ai ( ? -C-cc
?
1.1) 5
rot 6 i318-1-rm-34
R_ eL _
eree-et t-e-eeeLee. C).(i tie a?((-
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?Extei.gs;ons of Remarks ?E S6.1. St
February 22, 1977
ports concerning grand jury investigations
and the use of Immunity orders. Requires re-
ports in eight specieed areas. set forth ac-
cording to judeciel district.
xi/mailer ?
Requires the government to introduce cU
evidence in its posselort tending to prove
the innocence of a potential defendant.
Prohibits the grand jury from returning
an indictment on the beats of hearsay evi-
dence alone.
UTILITv BIT ,S SQUEEZE
COl\TSUN. MRS
BON.. TOM HARKIN
0? IOWA
IN THE HOUSE OP. REPRESENTATIVES
es Tuesday,: February 22, 1977
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Speaker, we must
not forget the consumer in our discus-
sions of the present energy crisis. Many
consumers who have heeded the pleas to
conserve energy have done a magnificent
job only 'to find -that their utility bills .
believe me wa have conee.rved) and for our
efforts and sacrifices we ere thanked by
having to pay these high prices for gas and
told It will go even higher.
We have done everything posalble in. our
home to conserve energy and T. don't know
of anything further we can cio. r3 it fair that,
I have to continue to pay even higher prices
for gas? Listed below are some of the ineane
we have taken.
1. Insulated attic, all side walls and put
on storm windows in 1974.
2. We have caulked around all window and
door casings.
3. We have gradually dialed down?as- of
this winter (76-77) the thermostat is set a -
64--E6. (your pleas to the nation to dial down
to 63 didn't affect us?I already know how
uncomfortable that temperature is)
4. At night we dial down to 5e. :2
5. I pull -shades aud_ close drapes at the
windows at night on days the 51.13 doesn't
shine .
6. We have steam heat and we shut off
upstairs radiators when we get up in the.
mornings and turn theca back on at night.
'1. We have shut- off and don'; heat rooreas
we don'; need. - ?
a_ I dry about half of our laundry on lines
?continue to = . _ 9. We keep high humidity lit our house
- One- of my- constituents, Mrs. Mary -
quire this - ' ? - a Capitol Ilill press conference to publi-
Ellen Oodbout of lied Oak, Iowa, has- -- -io. I don" 't ha aellsiawasher or self clean- cize proposed Federal legislation which-
written a most eloquent letter to Presi- ? log oven etc ye; _ " they drafted to outlaw domestic intellf- -
dent Carter about the need to give. con? What more can be expected frOm..fe con- gence-gathering.- The three organize,-
The Goclbouts have '-ten many steps - '
e sumer?
Next are some facts and figures which win TTnIon. ACLU, the Fund fot- Cen-
sumers 3 bree-le. -'', --.:e'e ee ' ' ."-- . ' ''. e- ;:_4- - :.- ? -- - " - - - ? ' tions are the 21,rnericanSivil Liberties .
prove that .I have coneerved. Tnie la taken -
to conserve energy, such as adding in- ter for National Sect?Triudies. CISTS....
off our Iowa Power 'and Light bills. .
sulation and storm--windows eo their December and the Committee for Public Justice,
home and lowering their thermosta.t. The e c'n3erve - ,1973 (before we took step,s to
CRT: -' . r- :-- : - - ? , .. ? e , s
proof of their success is that last Decern- ) - .-- .: used 912 lewb cost 52327 . The three groups were presented in the '
, . . .
her they consumed 13 percent less elec- '. Used, 635 eel'e.. cost $66.83. ' media account of the press conference as .-
tricity- and 411 percent less natural gas December /975: _ - ' "civil liberties organizations. In fact the -
than they had 3years earlier--all this in - Used, ois icwh; cost e36.12. ,.....
..
? because,- we have health problems that re-
I alai praying for eorree action to berzefit
tanalliee across -the 03 lion such as us. .May
Clod direct you., Mr. President, to help people
like us?your people: I roust say I am happy
about the -steps you have taken to cut energy -
cost and consumption since you've taken
office. I'm disturbed with our lecel state In
the fact that they say they will not dial down
to 65 in the State Office Building. Why ehottiff
the houeholder then? I pray Cod will send
some answers to this problem.. ,
?? Yours truly,
? Mrs. Meer EI.Z.rN Gonsowv
-
BLINDING JUSTICE: THE CAM-
- : PATON TO OUl LAW THE 'U.S.- -
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES ?
" ?
HON. LARRY iY1cDONALD
GEO2A-r/A
IN THE HOUSE: OP R.,_,R.E.SENTATIVF.S
Tuesday. February 22, 1977
Mr. McDONAT D. Mr. Speaker, on Feo-
ruary 15, three organi7ations working to
extinguish America's foreiDa and domes- -
tic intelligence-gathering capability held -
the faCe of a severe winter.
.:,..-three are civil liberties groups only in the -
. Used, 320 cot; cost, $48.16. ? ? z.e.- 'sense that they are working to set- up
,
Despite their heroic efforts, their en- December 1976:- -.....conditions under which the civil rights -
Used, 791 kwh; cost $3226. ?
e guaranteed 'under our Constitution
ergy bill was higher-1n 1976 than it was .
in 1973?-..-.. - ? ? - , 3.3 ccr,.cost, .7 . - - ? ' - be destroyed 'The draft legislation, for
?at ?d,- nearly half as-, which congressional. sponsors are being'-'?
. Mrs: Goabout's letter speaks for itself..- m th we use
uYent gcasan tr.,- December as we did in 1973 . es--
sought, - will be considered' separately.'-'
gurr`esen:d it to -_th.e.,-.fttte. r:tiort of My., but the cost. is nearly- the same. It would be
_ ? . _impossible-for Me pay the bLi if I had
Deere PeesSIDEeir- darerzeze. I ha,ve never leze:;, used the same amount as X did in 1973 at
fOre written, to a President but I feel so - the. ctu-ent rates. Also notice that we used
strongly over ray concern about our- natural ' only-3 cot of gas more this December than in
vs-el-Isis that I'm praying you will give this 1975 and the Iowa Power representative corn-
letter- much consideration. 'When is some- merited to this fact that we had conserved
body-going to start looking at-the consumers"- because this December 1978 was 20 percent
side of this crisis? I realize we need to seek colder than December 1973.1 also paid a di!- ? .
new-ways and means for-new- energy and this ference of $13.63 for- those 3 ccf in a year's -
takes.money, but the consumer can't pay for time. When I see increases like that on. 3.
it . OIL .Why can't some . 'Federal money be, ccf it makes. me shudder--what- justifies lit---
made available for this?- The- average and- creases like that? How can anyone he ex--
below income families cannot continue to _ pected to keep up vrlth rising ?ccets such as.
pay prices such as we are now for gas much - these?. My combined bill with sales tax was
/engem Prt+141 all indications the price of gas $96.37 for this past December. ?I have to -cut
will go even higher and it will soon be On- down on food la order to pay it and I can-
possible to pay our bills?what' do we dos not continue to pay such prices. Mr. Presi-
then? 'Soother year Or so'like 'M13 Wad I'M. dent what a= X to do if elle continua, 4-
sure many people will have to consider go-- rise? - ; ? - ? -
lug on welfare roils or have some assistance - For these reasons; President Carter, I Neat!
with ? you to. set up some kinds of programs
that would give the consumer that conserves
a break in the cost of gas. I don't see how it
Is humanly possible for me to conserve much
more or for my husband to increase our in-
come anymore. He is a teacher and he sup-
plements our Income by coaching during the
school year and paliattng houses In the sum-
mer, Yes, there are people who have not done
their part in conserving but as a whole most
families -have taken means to conserve. so .
whY not introduce 3 program that would
benent the conserver and let those who don't,
pay the consequences..
evadable to keep warm. We have no choice
as to where to buy gas. other than from
monopolies such as Iowa Power es Light and
they continua to impose rate increase upon
_rate increase upon us. Plus they are allowed
to peas along to the consumer energy cost
_adjustraents. - ? ?
This hardly- seems fair to ma. -Seems to rue
that that when something Is sold to, me at
a set amount that's what X should 'be ex-
aected to pay, but this energy coat adjust-
-tient varies from month to month and Is
passed along to the consumer. I'm very de-
ereesed over the future outlook. I feel like
'in backed la a corner with nowhere to turn
or help so I'm taking this ineatieritprir rine
iftieaSkkaaiietAM
-onstantly- being asked to conserve (and type with cold hands. a
rExcuse this p i3
-o you and other heads or Ene ? nd I've lost my touch an-dp Itrj is difecut; to
First, a review of the organizations ancrl:t
Individuals sponsoring it is in order; ,5
- The ACLU was founded by socialistst.:
who, though preferring nonviolence?
themselves, cooperated for decades with --
totalitarian Marxist-Leninist organiza-'- -
tions under the direction of the Soviet
Union, Although professing concern for--
individual liberties, the ACLU continues, -?
to have among its leaders and mends ._
ship Communist Party, TISA- activists, -
'and other Marxist-Lentnists who can un- _
der no circumstances be considered civil
libertarians. =
In its 1970-71 annual report, the ACLU:'
announced: - - ?
. The ACLU has made the dissolution of the
Nation's vast surveillance network a top pri?
ority. ? * The ACLU's attack on the poe -
lineal surveillance 13 being pressed simul-
taneously through a research project. Mtge-
Um', anti legislation action.
The ACLU's Project on Privacy and
Data Collection, called more accurately
the "antisurveillance project" by activ-
ists, is headed by Frank J. Donner, iden-
tified In sworn testimony by three wit-
nesses as a member of the Communist
Party, U.S.A. For 20 years, Donner has
been a leader of the Commenist Party's
t$A, '"i$1011.101"350154ttitn of sub-
? -
The Committee for Public Justice was
founded in 1970 by Lillian Hellman who
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4(1,1,0i
c -
, (ye
Concerned Academics
c/o N.S.E.F.
Suite 4305
2000 P St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
May 5, 1976
Mr. George Bush
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Mr. Bush,
7 Executivs 1.-togi5tr7
By severing covert contractual relationships with missionaries
and at least some members of the media,, you have demonstrated
your concern in protecting the integrity and independence of those
institutions which are so vital to a democratic society. As
representatives of the academic community, we feel the same guar-
antees against misuse and subversion are needed to insure that
our institutions of higher learning are totally free of secret
and often unknowing participation ih CIA covert operations at
home and abroad. The following CIA practices are of great
concern'to-us.
CIA funded research at universities. The CIA has secretly funded
indliriaual professors and entire departments to carry out its
research and gather intelligence. We strongly condemn this
secret relationship between the CIA and the academic community,
which we feel undermines free and independent scholarly work.
In his Executive Order of February 18th, President Ford not only
_authorizes these secret research contracts on campus, but limits
knowledge of the CIA relationship to "appropriate senior officials
of the academic institutions and to senior project officials."
This practice has broad implications for the academic community.
In addition to the violation of ethical standards, this practice
means that many scholars, researchers and students may be working
on projects which they would find morally untenable if they were
aware of the funding source and possible application of their
research. Further, the CIA has been given the authority to put
past and present contractors or employees under physical surveil-
lance. Thus a professor who is knowingly or unkowingly working on
a CIA contract may be the target of a CIA investigation -- a grave
infringement on his or her right to privacy.
We therefore request that all CIA contracts or relationships with
individual professors, researchers, or students for the purpose
of research be publicly acknowledged.
Use of academic cover. In the past, CIA funding of academic
groups such as the National Student Association and Michigan
State's Vietnam program has caused great alarm on American
campuses. In addition, the CIA is known to have made use of
academic exchange programs; has Sent operatives overseas under
cover as students and faculty; and secretly hired students
and faculty to provide services for the CIA. The Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence report reveals that academics
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? 1? I 0 h.?
DAILY WORLD
Approved For Release 2005/01A 1AR:RAIWI4P88-01315R000 p usf-dz,.
1(2
C- e '
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By TOM FOLEY S.
. WASHINGTON. April 5 ? A computer firm in the capital area has agreed to end its
work for the Saigon police as a result of protest activities by Women Strike for Peace.
The announcement came from the Computer Sciences Corporation in Falls Church.
Va., after its offices were picketed yesterday by 20 members of WSP. -
1y, "It is not the responsibility of the Falls Church victory.
CSC to read the data cards the
She linked the end of U.S. aid to
. Vietnamese police put through the
the Saigon police computerized
computers."
data system with last night's sur-
Challenged on this by the WSP
group, he replied lamely. "If
prise action by the House of youRep-
resentatives on Vietnam. The
live in this environment, you are
Ifouse voted 177 to 154 to reject
not allowed intellectual curiosity."
He did not discuss the report
any increase in military assist-
ance money to the Saigon regime.
that Thieu still has an estimated
200,000 political prisoners in his Both actions, she saki, repre-
. prisons. sented "great victories for the
? Ms. Yillastrige was elated by U.S. peace forces."
? CSC has 56 computer special-
ists in Saigon working with Pres-
ident Nguyen Van Thieu and his
police state apparatus to maintain
an automated data system. The
system is a direct continuation of
the notorious Phoenix program
, run by Saigon and the U.S. Cen-
? tral Intelligence Agency under
which 45,000 South Vietnamese
.Were murdered as alleged sup-
pOrters of the National Liberation
Front.
After the WSP group had pick-
eted for about 20 minutes, John
E. Frank, CSC director of pro-
fram development, called in four
. of the women and informed them
that CSC would phase out its Sai-
? gon program and terminate it in
'? June.
Frank assured the WSP group
? that CSC will no longer train any
Saigon personnel in computer tech-
nology.
IIatfield amendment
Edith Villastrige, spokeswom-
an for WSP, told the Daily World.
today that the CSC decision was
evidently based on the realization
that. its activities might violate
: the Hatfield amendment.
The amendment, sponsored by
Sen. Mark 0. Hatfield (R-Ore),
and passed last December,' pro-
hibits the expenditure of U.S.
funds for military operations in
Vietnam. CSC could well be vio-
lating the amendment by helping
Thieu maintain a reign of terror
:through his army and police.
To get around the Hatfield
. amendment, the computer pro-
gram contract was administered
by the State Department, although
Its funds came from the Defense
Department, The State Depart-
ment ran the program through the
Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID), which maintains a
so-called Public Safely Office in
Saigon.
When questioned by WSP repre-
sentatives, Frank said defensive-
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20 MAY 1971 Pi 0 -3
Ar Ct. vy-t. 14e to:c
qr) 1 tio p1-a-
U ?
impufar Crille3'??
P
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rti
By RICK NAGIN Speaking at the anti-war rally,
ATLANTIC CITY, May 19:--The attorney Flo Kennedy quoted the
Computer People for Peace held SJCC program and stated that the.
:
, an anti-war -rally here today on responsibility referred to was ob-
viously responsibility to the mill-
: the boardwalk in front of Conven-
tary-industrial complex estab-
' tion IL:11 where the Spring Joint
C?oniput lishment (MICE).
ztr Conference (SJCC) a
!Was hokling it3 annt:a; meeting.Hundreds at rally
, Several hundred people at the
The SJCC brings tether mem- rally cheered as speakers ex-
bets of all c.?;:np!.; ter vs:tea:ion:al posed the involvement of the corn-
. Socie.tis to disci.z.:3 Latest deve:op- puter industry in racism, repres-
.tra9ts and enn::ne displays of sion and war.
Inew,machinery. . 7 h? Computer People for Peace
. About 10,000 people, nearly all (CPP) yesterday demanded the
"white men representing the cor- right to speak at the SJCC session
porations, universities, various on "computers in law . enforce-
police and governmental agen- meat," and to expose the repres-
cies, the CIA and the FBI, attend- sive threats posed by police use of
ed the conference. The theme of advanced computer technology.
the conference was "Responsib- ? They were refused but won the
ility." _ ? _right to ask Questions at an ex-
panded session, after speeches by
Lt. Daniel Cawley of the New
York City Police Department,
t. and by Herbert Avram, who dis-
! cussed a computer system he
?i developed for the CIA.
Avram refused to discuss the
I. CIA's interest in his system, when
asked by the CPP.
Lt. Jerome Daunt of the FBI
? . had been ,scheduled to discuss the
National Crime Information Cen-
ter, a central computer connect-
.,Ing local police departments in all
, states with the FBI, but he did not
?
show up. The CPP had prepared a
warrant to seize him on a citizen's
arrest...for conspiracy to violate
? the civil rights Of the American
.. ?
? people.
? The CPP also won the right to
hold its own session, which in-
''Cluded panels on data banks, min-
ority groups and women in the
industry, computers in the mili-
tary, unemployment and health
systems. ?
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P -e ?
Approved For Releasee95/11911-AVA7EpP88-0131349020000-00.1Q7-e ,
19 Sept 1970
oicitce-frined araiss
The Concerned Officers Movement (COM), a Wash-
ington-based group formed after the November mora-
torium, is the first organization to give officers a plat-
form against the .Indochina war. It's unsettling top
Pentagon brass.
COM was originally called Officers Resistance. The
name Was discarded as too radical. In July, the Navy
? prematurely discharged the Secretary of the Navy's
two top intelligence briefing officers, who belonged to
the antiwar group. Since then, press coverage has
spread the COM name; letters are pouring in from
officers stationed around the world, and chapters are
forming in Norfolk, Pensacola, San Diego, and Grand
Forks Air Force base, home of the ABM.
. So far, COM functions as little more than a weekly
political discussion group which meets in one of the
officers' apartments. COM has published three nem,-
letters (the first declares "the officer corps is not par:
of. a silent majority") and is trying to raise funds to
purchase a full-page ad in The New York Times, to
proclaim its existence to the nation. COM members
are considering sending active duty. officers to speak
with community groups, and to seek support from
congressmen and retired officers. Members would like
also to turn to issues beyond the war, issues such as
? military reform.
Rank-and-file GIs have been dissenting from the
- military for years, in . coffeehouses and underground
newspapers. COM wants to function purely as an
officers' organization unaffiliated with GI .groups,
which are generally more radical. "Officers have a
unique position, which should be used to advantage,"
; says Navy Lt. Phil Lehman, a COM organizer dis-
? charged early this summer. "We want to convey to
Middle America that there are people very ? much
? against the war, whose loyalty can't be ii-npugned."
COM's tactics and rhetoric will stay moderate. "We
can't indulge in rhetoric like 'smash the brass' and
'off the pigs,' " Lehman declares. "We want to influ-
ence moderate -Americans, and the higher reaches of
the military." .
To the Pentagon, any kind of dissent poses a po-
? tential threat. Defense Department regulations forbid
service personnel from lobbying "in combination," or
publicly complaining about specific grievanees which
would apply to COM members taking any .stand as a
group on military or political issues ? and from con-
duct "prejudicial" to good_ order and discipline._ Navy
officials say that so far, COM hasn't breached military
regulations: "but if they keep going in the direction
they have been, we'll have to take account," says
Navy spokesman, Capt. W. S. Busik. "It's .one thing
for individuals to express their private opinions, but
when they go public and take advantage of the uni-
form, it's anothef.".
Pentagon officials claim they have taken no disci-
plinary measures against COM members. A command-
ing .officer in .Norfolk, however, recently stripped a
COM member of his security clearance, and his au-
thority to give orders. Navy officials deny that the two
briefing officers in Washington were discharged as a
result of their COM activities. When the Secretary of
the Navy discovered they belonged to COM, they
were first transferred to routine jobs in a. division
which didn't even have job Openings; then they were
discharged, with 1200 other nonessential personnel, to
facilitate budget Cuts. "They set themselves up for
it," says Busik, who argues that if .the officers hadn't
joined COM in the first place, they wouldn't have been
transferred to insignificant jobs, and consequently,
wouldn't have been dumped.
Members of COM want to knoi:v just. how far they
can go and still remain within the protective limits of
the First Amendment. The group is considering asking
a federal court to issue a declaratory judgment, de-
fining the rights of officers and all servicemen to speak
their .minds in public. Some officers are testing new
ground ? 19 junior officers aboard the aircraft carrier
Hancock signed an antiwar letter and leaked it to the
press in June, and a new group is Concerned Grad-
.uates of the US Military, Naval and Air Force Acad-
emies. But, "most officers," says Lehman, "are afraid
to stand up and say what they believe, for good rea-
son. If 'you're a career officer, it's suicide."
Dan Zwerciling
?
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CHICA
SUN -T
pprove
0, ILL.
blES
- 51,086.
S (2,474 966
ug 1 2 2 1970
1
- .. tially political conflict,! said
They expressed concern that
ceived a Bronze Star for valor .
while a regimental surgeon in :the administration is engaging"
Vietnamin 968-69. .
. _ i in "systematic attempts to iso-
- . Unfortunat,
e,.y, much of the ' late. _dissenters" - and depict. thern "as somehow unpatriot-
I ' fi' ' ?,
; peace proposal is based on the . '
i assumption that our policy of lc." - ?"- ? - ? - --I,
i Wietnarnization' has 'been a "Our dissent is an -affirma-
success. Clearly it has failed" tion t
>, - tion of our belief in our politi-
,
,
' Livin cal system,' the former offi-
gston said in a press con- .
0 I
or Release 2005/01/11,: CIA-RDP88-01341fatk1266'350661-4 ) "
E
b.
0.9TrWrr CilTEJTAZ%flaiit.C.?z?
I-5;0
srcifeQitaher Viefrm wthcwt.
Ilv Pau! Gaiioway
ti xx?-?)
CI- A z-n-a 4 ?
C.9 r?-? Cc, c_ -e vx cd
?
6_ s
?
izaticin was supported- -15Y whom most (us.regard with
Three West Point graduates
4 recently published account of a
'
I- 'who saw- combat in Vietnam Central- Intelligance Agen ;
- criticized President Nixon's re- report wl1T estimated that
cent peace proposal Wednes-' :30,000 members of the - Viet
t- day and urged the prompt Cong have infiltrated the Sal-
withdrawal of American forces - gon government. ?
= from Southeast Asia on a spe- "Our view is that Vietnam-
Cifie timetable. . ? ization retards our proposal dis-
engagement rather than has
"The President's _
tens it because it prest-pposes
able in humane terms,
for a cease-fire, while desir-
the continued existence of a.
is
;
,- merely another effort to find a government that has sho-,n
little capacity to sustain itself
f military solution to an essen-
- Dr. Gordon Livingston, who re- three men stated.
without our assistance," the L
J
disgust."
?
Johnson said the My' Lai in-
cident was not "an isolated ab-
beration, but ; a logical con-;
sequence of our policy,"
which, he said, encourages
high-kill ratios.
"I can understand the re-
sentment of Americans when
-some soldiers are singled out '
as scapegoats," he added.
Perryrnan said he found
"great enthusiasm" for the
war by senior officers.
ference at-Sage's East Restau- cers ?
rrant, 181,E. Lake Shore:
- Appearing with Livingston, a
19C0 graduate of the U.S. Mili-
tary Academy, were Robert
[- Johnsen, a 1935 West Point
[-.graduate who served as a com-
pany commander with the 25th
Infantry Division in Vietnam
tr, in 1968-69, and Steven
Per-
ryman, who was graduated
t 'from the academy in 1964 and
i
Vcommanded an. engineer de-
, tachment in 1967-68 in Viet-
nam, also receiving the Bronze
Star. .
The three veterans; who
have left. -the service, are
Members of the Concerned
;ACademy Graduates, an orga-
nization formed three months
ago and composed of ,more
than 200 graduates of the cam-
try's five service acadernies .
who oppose further U.S. mili-
tary involvement in Itochina..
. They said their first-hand
view of the failure of Vietnam.'
' 1.4
Describing , the official ver-
sion of the war as "mis-
information channeled throu311 -
wishful thinking," they said ,
their experience contrasted
sharply with what many
Americans believe q.bout Viet- -
nam.
"Members of the silent ma-
jority have. been misled about I'
their young men in Vietnam,"
Perryman said. "Our soldiers
have become brutalized and
they brutalize the Vietnamese,
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Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-T r--
A i 9
AP048D-_.
(ADVANCE FOR USE TUESDAY, AUGUST ELEVENTH &
LISTEN LADIES
BY MARTHA BUCKWALAR
A GROUP OF WOMEN IN WASEINTON HAS STARTED AN ORGANIZATION
. TO ADVISE WOMEN WHO ARE CONCERNED ABOUT rglE ENVIRONMENT....
-TODAY'S LISTEN, LADIES BRINGS YOU SOME TIPS FOB GARDENERS....
AND A RECIPE FOR A BASIC DISE YOU CAN WORK YOUR OWN VARIATIONS
ON.
(WOMEN IN THE NEWS)
THE INCREASING CONCERN ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS HAS FOUND
RECEPTIVENESS IN MANY WALKS OF LIFE. ONE OF THE LATEST OR CUPS
TO ORGANIZE IS MADE UP OF WOMEN WHO MOVE IN THE TOP GOVERNMENT
AND SOCIETY CIRCLES IN WASHINGTON.
THE GROUP IS CALLED CONCERN INCORPORATED. ITS CO-FOUNDERS
ARE MRS. PAUL IGNATIUS, WHOSE HUSBAND WAS THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION'S
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, AND MRS. RICHARD HELMS, THE WIFE OF THE CIA
DIRECTOR. CCNCERN INCORPORATED IS STRICTLY A VOLUNTEER OPERATION,
AND THE WOMEN HAVE INTENTIONALLY KEPT IT SMALL--ABOUT WORKERS
ALTOGETHER. THEIR OFFICE IS A CUBBYHOLE IN THE URBAN COALITION
HEADQUARTERS.
(MORE)
DM430AED 8-10
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AWC:.1T, 1970 )
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7 t C-
Firrrf;LIT-4
lit
t ?
!
r
t C 42_(
t.Ck-,."-
by Viviane Peter .8: Connecticut Walker
conscientious staff of knowledgeable t o obtain a tree copy of Eco-Tips-
h a t does a woman do when she women who had already done some and to join the CONCERN mailing
research on pesticides, conservation, list for future fact-sheets, write to .
and consumer habits. We incorporated CONCERN, Inc., P.O. Box 19287, Wash-
as a non-profit organization and began ington, D.C. 20036.) ?
to study the problems. ' Commitment to public service is
"Somebody offered us free account- nothing new for Cynthia Helms. Born in
Mg service, and Somebody else donated Mauldin, England, she served as a WREN
an office they weren't using. We now (the British equivalent of our WAVES)
have a lot of volunteers, many teen- in World War. 11, soon after came to
aged, so. our bills are minimal," the U.S. with her first husband, an or-
thopedic surgeon, Dr. ,Allan McKelvie,
who accepted a fellowship at the Mayo_
Clinic. For five years they lived in
Rochester, Minn.,where Cynthia helped
raise their four offspring of whom she
now speaks with justifiable pride.
SAN MARINO, CALIF.
(2 f-
C e
is Married to- Richard Helms, di-
rector of the Central Intelligence
Agency?
? Does she lead a purposely obscure,
quiet, furtive existence, or does she set
put to make a normal life for herself?
Two years ago when, lovely, red-
haired Cynthia McKelvie, 46, a divorcee
with four children, was ever so quietly
married to handsome Richard Helms,
also divorced; she decided that his vital
work would not impinge upon hers.
She would pursue her own career and
actively cultivate her own interests. -
-The result is that Cynthia Helms
-works three days a week at the Smith-
sonian Institution, founded in 1846 in
Washington, D.C., from funds left by
James Smithson "for the increase and
diffusion of knowledge among men."
"I interview for a radio transcription
pries," she explains, "anyone con-
nected with the place?artists, scien-
tists, visiting professors. I also take off
one afternoon a week to get in some
tennis with Dick, and I devote the rest
of my time and energy to CONCERN."
?? CONCERN is a new environmental
action group organized by a handful
of prominent capital wives to alleviate
the nation's pollution problems. It ad-
dresses itself to the American house-
wife and attempts to answer her oft-
asked question-, "What can / do lo
help?"
'I was talking about the problems of
environment at a dinner party last win-
ter.wilh a friend, Nancy Ignatius" ['wife.
of Washington Post president Paul
Ignatiusl, Mrs. Helms explains, "and
we decided that it was no good think-
ing that other people would do some-.
thing to solve our ecological miseries, we've had at least 30 letters from in- .
We had to do it ourselves: dustry---aluminum companies, drug'
"Word got around and soon the tele- companies, soap manufacturers, super-
phone started ringing?people wanted market chains, all supporting our ef-
jo help. So we caxicip chose?a small
ovea ror Kelease 2005/01/11 :.?CIALRDPI38:011
forts."
Women of wealth
The basic difference between the
leaders of CONCERN and the leaders
of any other women's group is that at
CONCERN most are married to influen-
tial, wealthy, and prominent men. In
addition to Cynthia Helms and Nancy
Ignatius, the board of directors includes
Mrs. Russell Train, whose husband
serves on the President's Council on
Environmental Quality; Mrs. Robert
Kintner, wife of the ex-president of
NBC; Mrs. William Grayson, wife of the
ex-president of the Audubon Society,
and Mrs. Clyde Shorey Jr. and Mrs. Paul
Mickey, both married to prominent
Washington lawyers.
The group's first product is Eco-Tips,
a purse-size leaflet for housewives to
use when they go shopping. This handy
information sheet is designed to guide
the consumer away from life-destroying
products and practices.
"What we're trying to do," Mrs.
Helms points out, "is to educate and
encourage women to use their power.
As consumers they've got lots of it.
They can influence manufacturers by
refusing to buy products that are bi-
ologically destructive or wastefully
packaged.
"Since we've published Eco-Tips
Pipeline to youth
. "Our children," she says, "not only
keep us honest but in tune with all
sections of the country. Dick has one
-son, ? Dennis, by his first marriage [to
the former Julia Bretzman Shields of
Indianapolis]. Dennis is a lawyer in
Washington.
"My four are scattered. My eldest
daughter, 25, a graduate of Connecticut
, College, works as an economics re-
searcher. The other three attend college.
?one son at the University of Chicago
Law School, another at Hobart College,
and the youngest, 19, at Ohio Wes-
leyan."
Cynthia and Dick Helms occupy a
small apartment in Washington, D.C.,
but have a larger country place in
Lewes, Del.
"The kids love it down there when,
they can make it, and we try to go down,
almost every weekend."
Hush-hush on husband
Of her husband's work or of how it
feels to be married to a super-sleuth,
Cynthia Helms will say relatively little.
"Life with Dick is not trying. It's daily.
We live just as you do, a busy life. Dick?
51146&6268/3g6616t nd involved with'
toe, , 11
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HOUSTON, TEX.
f A
)? /o-et%
CHRONTCLE
S
1.070 ce, .
E ?279,608 ? 333,807
r
C(311)i
i Ck 7 It.-:)] l'E-...::) TP ? 1 if k ) ri: _3
1
2 , ...i t..- ,,,,,,...)...,,?; 1 li 21,......., ,
1
. li '
13Y LYNN LANG WAY
Chic.aga Daily Nows-Svn.:Timea Service:
shington ? National col-
?
turinist Joseph .Alsop should
'be getting some really inside
Information soon.
It; seems that several news-
papers. ran a story abont the
_current Mrs. Richard Helms,
vire or the CIA director, who
leads an environmental aetion-;:-
group called "Concern,- Moon:. ;
? punted." Trouble was that
'the wire service photo accom-
panying the article, -labeled
"CIA lto r and Mrs.
was only half right
? 'it actually showed??colum7
Alist.Alsop and the firSt Mrs.
named Julia.
The second and pr cent
;Mrs. Helms, named Cynthia,
:sayS she's planning to write
lAlsop and joke that "any
'state secrets he gets because
:of the publicity still belong to ?
y;s1
?: The CIA wasn't amused,
.however, and spent a day ter-1,,/
rifying reporters and photog-
raphers by telephoning their
desks with the ominous open-
? ing line, "This is the CIA call-
for .. ."
RICHARD HELMS
l'afeiyMfxup
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Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R00020035.9p0
Concerned Citizens of California
182 Diamond Street
San Francisco, Calif. 94114
Marjorie D. Martin, President
C.I.A.
May 20, 1977
The enclosed poster was found
on Castro Street at 1:30 p.m. May 20,
1977 taped to the door of the Georgina
Bakery, 420 Castro Street.
Since the information concerned
mentions your office, I felt that the
United States Gov't should be informed.
11.6 HI 6S
M. Martin
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
4-
Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315
Kiln K
AN MLA
HMOs OFF CUBA/
HuAir iiw
ThiS CIA 1.545-S1 iv t
"4?F1( ?`?See EvideAke
SL;de,skew :
110 SI;des oF 64-r1 01 oToi..fripl.k. EV iDeNce
Supressed la y The. rotcli4) cift, G-ov. yeitcS/
ir lft(
Alb SSif
FII" 3 JON
5"..3
firecuft- Sip)/
TO FIND TIME & PLACE OF NEXT
SHOWING CALL OUR 24 HOUR TAPED
PHONE CALENDAR:34
415-
OR WRITE US TO ARRANGE A SLIDESHOW
IN YOUR COMMUNITY, SCHOOL OR UNION.
COST IS RASED ON BUS FARE
N.W.A.R.C. (NORTHWEST ASSASSINATION
POB 42644 RESEARCH COMMITTEE)
S.F., CA. 941nT
MOVEMENT LABOR DONATED
FROM THE "BAY OF PIGS7TO DALLAS,TO
WATERGATE, TO MEMPHIS, WE HAVE
TRACKED, HUNT, STURGIS & NIXON
TO PROVE HOW THE SAME PEOPLE
KILLED JFK & M.L. KING.
JOIN US. WE NEED TO ENLARGE OUR
STAFF TO PRESS THE INVESTIGATION
CAMPIGN UNTIL EVERYONE HAS SEEN
THE EVIDENCE. ONCE WE HAVE
HUNT, STURGIS & NIXON ON TRIAL WE
WILL BE ABLE TO EXPOSE THE ASSASSIN!
OF MALCOM X, FRED HAMPTON & KING.
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STAT
'\s Co.
Apprved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-013 R0000)0 50001-7
ci
San Francisco, CA 94126
Fc-Y
Mr. Herbert Hetu
Public Affairs Office
CIA
Washington D.C. 20505
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iTiD
HFEV,1
11-00Ri H
itedmes
STAT Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-013714300020 Witiffelnice on American
Civilization
STAT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
(?4,76
checked with Security. They had one reference to the
Conference on American Civilization. It was involved in the Woman's
Strike for Peace. It has to do with major problems facing high school
students, mainly Vietnaa on the home front. It is peace-oriented.
In the Congressional Record, 19 October 1965, he was mentioned
as a member of W. E. B. Dubois. He led the anti-war protest at the
University of Wisconsin in February 1965.
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STAT
Approved For Release 2005/01/11: CIA-RDP
0 P. Fcraei, sc e A3
A.141724?
di? c
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 07/7-0 41/1?;
c_.(4-11.0/ rejeko2i'sh&
February 19, 1976 7-
Washington, D.C. 20520
Mr. David Milbank
Office of Political Research
Room 3858
Central Intelligence Agency
Dear Mr: Milbank:
You are cordially invited to attend a Conference on V4114411PDALw.o.
Terro,j1ch will be held in the Department of State March
The objectives of the conference are (1) to gain a better under-
standing of the nature, causes and consequences of international
terrorism as a distinctive form of violence; (2) to identify
those factors which are likely to promote or inhibit international
terrorist activities in the years ahead; and, (3) to assess the
implications of these findings for US and other nations' interests
and policies. We hope to stimulate open and original thinking on
these matters and to have your active participation in the dis-
cussion. A copy of the agenda for the conference is enclosed.
In addition to the individuals cited in the agenda, we anticipate
that approximately 150 persons from government, private business
and the academic world will be in attendance. In general, those
invited will all have a practical or scholarly interest in the
field of international terrorism.
I would appreciate your letting me know at your earliest conven-
ience whether you will be able to attend. If you have any ques-
tions I suggest that you call either Mr. Robert P. Myers, Jr. or
Ms. Marilyn Williams of my staff (202-632-7796 or 3311).
We hope to see you in March.
Sincerely,
L? )7,..
Robert A. Fear y
Special Assistant to the
Secretary and Coordinator
for Combatting Terrorism
S/CCT - Room 2238
Department of State
Washington D. C. 20520
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Enclosure: As stated
STAT Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
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Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
DEPARTMENT OF STATE?
Washington, D.C. 20520
March 25, 1976
Welcome to our Conference on International
Terrorism.
Enclosed in this packet you will find your
plastic name badge, which will serve as your pass
to the building and to the eighth floor luncheon
area; it should be worn at all conference sessions.
Also enclosed are papers prepared by the prin-
cipal speakers which we received in time for repro-
duction. The remaining papers will be mailed to
you after the conference. The packet further in-
cludes a paper on "International and Transnational
Terrorism" prepared by David Milbank for this con-
ference, and a copy of a speech on "International
Terrorism" which I gave at the Los Angeles World
Affairs Council on February 19.
If messages are received for you during the
conference sessions, they will be posted at the
- registration desk. There are telephones in the
registration area where you may make outgoing calls.
If you need information during the conference
please go to the registration desk. Should you
require special assistance of any kind, Robert Myers
or Marilyn Williams of my staff, or Carolyn Duignan
of INR/XR, can be contacted through the registration
desk.
Welcome again. The conference should be a
fruitful and informative experience for us all.
Robert A. Fearey
Chairman
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?? ?
CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
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AGENDA
March 25, 1976
0900 Welcome (Main Conference Room - 1315)
Mr. Robert A. Fearey, Special Assistant to
the Secretary and Coordinator for Comh:Itting
Terrorism, Department of State (S/CCT)
0905 Introductory Remarks
Mr. Lawrence S. Eagieburer, Deputy Under
Secretary for Management, Department
of State
Oq15-1205
:7 0 - 1 4 0 n
Session I: Analytical Overview
This session will focus on analytically useful
definitions and typologies as well as on the
human and environmental determinants of inter-
national terrorist activity.
Chairman: Dr. Thomas P. Thornton
Member, Policy Planning Staff
Department of State
Speakers
Dr. Thomas P. Thornton
!Policy Planning Staff
Dr. Paul Wilkinson
University College, Wales
Dr. Ted ilurr
Northwestern University
-
Discussants
Dr. Martha Hutchinson
Wesleyan University
:or. Eugene. H. Yct-hvi
Readers Dio,est
Dr. Irving L. nurul,:ilL
Ruters Univer';ity
Luncheon - Benjamin Franklin Room - 8th Floor
Department of State
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. ,
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Session TI: The Phenomenon in Perspective
(Main Conference Room - 131-5):
This session will? cover: (1) trends and
patterns in the nature and intensity ot
international terrorist activity (includin;,..
transnational linkages); -(2) a value free
assessment of the impact of terrorism; and
(3) an analysis of the problems involved
in formulating and implementing effective
national and international counter-measures.
1400-1700
7.',()-1.900
-2000-2130
-2000- 2130
Chairman:
Speakers
Dr. Brian Crozier
Institute for the Study of Conflict
London
Dr. Brian Crozier
Institute for the Study
. of Conflict, London
Dr. Pans Josef Horchem
Office for the Protec-
tion of the Constitu-
tion, Cologne
- Dr. Gaston Bouthoul
Institut Francais de
Polemologie, Paris
Discussants
Dr. Paul Jureidini
Abbott Associates
General'Yehoshafat Parka!
Center for Advanced
Studies in Behavioral
Sciences
Stanford University
Dr. Bert B. Lockwood
World Peace Through
Law Center
Terrorism in Europe (Main Conference Room)...
Panelists: Dr. Crozier, Dr. Horchem
Terrorism in the Middle Fast (Main Conference Room)
Panellts: Dr. Jureidini, General Harkabi
Terrorism in Latin America (:zoom 1107)
Panelists: Dr. Moss, Dr. Jenkins
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0900-1150
1150-1250
1250-1350
_
Session III: The Decade Ahead (Main Conference Room)
rhe first part of this F,esion will be
devoted to gauging the effekts that likely
changes in the over-all political, social,
economic and technological environment may
have on the nature and intensity of inter-
national terrorist activity. The remainder
of the discussion will deal with the
specific problems posed by weapons of mass
destruction and the possibility of surrogate
warfare.
Chairman: Dr. Brian Jenkins
RAND Corporation
Speakers
Dr. Brian Jenkins
RAND Corporation
Dr. Robert Moss
The Economist
Dr. Joseph F. Coates
Office of Technology
Assessment
US-Congress
Lunch
?
Discussants
Dr. Boyer Bell
Columbia University
Dr. Andrew J. Pierre
Council on Foreign
Relations
Dr. Robert H. Kupperman
Department of State
ACDA
Seminar - International Terrorism's Challenge
to the International System
(Main Conference 7Tiom)
Moderator:
Prof. Richard Lillich
University of Virv.inia Law School
ranelists: Prof. Burns O. Weston
University of ToiNa Law School
Prof, A.A. FIL)Iros
tTniversit,. of Indiana Law School
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Session IV: Im lications of Terrorifor the
1400-1650
er aril Conference !loom)
Chairman and Moderator: Mr. Robert A. Fearey
Report by Conference Rapporteur
Dr. Chalmers Johnson
University of California
A panel discussion in which conclusions
emerging from the preceding sessions and
the rapporteur's report will be examined
and their implications for the US and
other nations' anti-terrorism policies
will be debated. A question and answer
period will terminate the session.
1650 Concluding Remarks
Mr. Robert A. Fearey
1700-1630 Farewell Reception - The Foreign Service Club - 2101
E Street N.W. (Cash bar).
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Vork ii,lreS a /7 in4,-?,4 /f-Q?
U.S. Is Said to Plan a New Approach on Terrorism
?
By DAVID BINDER
Special to The NeW York Times
WASHINGTON, March 26?
The Ford Administration is
planning a thorough revision
of its prograra for dealing with
international terrorism, includ-
ing consideration of more flexi-
bility on ransom demands,
Government officials have re-
ported.
? The Administration has been
committed up to now to rigid
" refusal to accede to any de-
mands for money or r other
concessions by terrorists hold- rorists who had kidnapped a
hstages. group of Stanford University
ing o
researchers. -
The new approaches to ter-
rorist problems emerged at the The officials said that Am-
, bassador Carter's negotiations,
close of a confidential two-day in defiance of the standing or-
conference on international ter-
rorism sponsored by the State der, appeared to have been
going quite successfully until
mpeoPsrm200ent'speciwallhicstsh frixadrawfo?ur- a relative of one e the hosta-
ges offered to pay ransom.
countries. Although Mr. Carter was later
pxpanded Office Considered reprimanded by Mr. Kissinger,
State Deparienent officials his action provokK1 '7 fresh
, said proposals were under stu- thinking about bargaining,the
dy for expanding its office for officials said.
combating terrorism to include The bargaining question came
emergency teams of psychia- up again and again at the con-
trists and police specialists fat ference, at which Mr. Fearey
miller with that is termed presided.
"coercive bargaining" in situa-
tions involving terrorists. I think the American con-
"There is going to be a big i
change," an official said. "But '
we haven't decided yet whether
to do it over a period of four
or five months or over a periods
of a year." -
At present the office, under
Robert A. Fearey, who is spe-
cial assistant to Secretary a
State Henry A. Kissinger as
coordinator for combating ter--
rorism, functions mainly as a
headquarters for information.
gathering and policy direction,
drawing on the resources of
other Government agencies. ,
,The officials said they be-
lieved Mr. rearey would be
replaced later this year by a .
former Central Intelligence
Agency officer who has had
considerable field and opera-
tional experience.
The critical issue on terrorism
confronting the Administration,
they said, was how to modify
the policy of simply refusing
to bargain with terrorists.
Tanzanian Case Cited
They noted that last summer,
W. Beverly Carter Jr., Ambas-
sador toTanzania, became in-
volved in bargaining with ter-
cept is totally inapplicable,"
said Martha Hutchinson, assis-
tant professor of government
at Wesleyan University. I
think we need to study the
possibility of bargaining with
terrorists."
Another participant, Seymour
D. Vestermark, consultant to
the International Association
of Chiefs of Police, remarked
that the New York Police De-
partment had trained officers
who are now experienced in
coercive bargaining" and had
had successes in dealing with
terrorists.
? Data Bank Developed
The conference themes in-
cluded attempts to define ter-
rorism, a review of terrorist
actions over the last 15 years,
policy planning, international
law, and regional reports from
the Middle East; Europe . and
Latin America.,
A C.I.A. official disclosed that
his agency completed develop-
ment of a pilot data bank last
summer for rapid retrieval of
information on terrorist ac-
tions.
Stastistical studies prepared
for the conference showed that
of 951 terrorist incidents from
1965 to 1975, 333, or more
than a third, took place in
Western Europe. Latin America
had 260 and North America
126. There were 122 terrorist
incidents recorded in ? the
Middle East and North Africa
during this period.
Reporters were barred from
the conference .on the ground
that the participants "could
talk more frankly then," a
State Department official said
after ejecting a reporter.
However, two journalists re-
mained as participants. They
were Robert Moss, an editor
of The Economist of London,
and Eugene H. Methirin, a
Reader's Digest editor.
?
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- Draft Working Paper -
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM:
DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSIS
by
David L. Milbank
NOTE: This draft working paper was prepared by the International
Functional Staff of thev,9014111 earch of the
Central,ipt-elligAneel;ency as a contribution to Department
of St9re s,25v:T6-March 1976 Conference on Internationa Terrorism.
The flews presented represent only those of the author, a
thefdraft is not for publication, quotation, or citation.
Iv
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD
THE DISCUSSION 1
I. THE OBJECTIVES AND BOUNDARIES OF INQUIRY . . 1
II. ESTABLISHING AN ANLYTICAL FRAMEWORK 3
III. THE PHENOMENA IN RETROSPECT 6
What, Where, and When? 6
Why? 9
How Cost Effective9 18
How Disruptive? 19
What International Constraints? 21
IV. THE OUTLOOK 23
Transnational Terrorism 23
International Terrorism 28
APPENDIX A: Significant Variables
APPENDIX B: Statistical Trends and Patterns in Terrorist Activity
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FOREWORD
The author owes a special debt of gratitude to Edward F.
Mickolus who, while serving with Office of Political Research
as a summer intern, designed and inaugurated the ITERATE (Inter-
national Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) data bank
that was used to develop the statistics presented in this study.
Nonetheless, several words of caution about these figures and
statistical inferences are in order. In the first place, there
are many significant gaps in our knowledge about specific in-
cidents and groups -- and even those terrorist organizations
and actions on which there is considerable reliable information
do not always fit neatly into the typologies that have been
created for them. Moreover, the universe of incidents under
review is small enough that unintended omissions (of which there
are undoubtedly many) or erroneous classification of border-
line events could have a statistically significant impact.
Finally, not only are the group actors in question most
diverse, but the environmental variables that might have
affected their behavior at any given time are legion.
Even in its pilot version, however, ITERATE represents a
potentially valuable research tool. And while the Office of
Political Research lacks the resources to sustain it beyond the
end of the fiscal year, it is exploring the feasibility of
transfering ITERATE to a new institutional sponsor with a
view to insuring its continued refinement and maintenance for
the benefit of the government community and to making as much
of the data as possible accessible to interested scholars and
businessmen as well.
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INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM:
DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSIS
THE DISCUSSION
I. THE OBJECTIVES AND BOUNDARIES OF INQUIRY
Despite historical precedents and parallels, modern-day
terrorism is very much a function of our times. Advances in
technology and growing world "interdependence" have afforded terror-
ists new mobility, new targets, new weaponry, and the near certain
prospect that their more dramatic acts will receive prompt and
world-wide publicity. At the same time, changes in the overall
political and economic climate over the past decade have provided
terrorists with a somewhat more hospitable environment in which
to operate.
Indeed, there has been such an upsurge of terrorist activity
in recent years that some observers have warned that we may be
entering a veritable age of terrorism. Among other things,
there has been a marked increase in the number of active terror-
ist groups as well as in the number of countries in which they
are operating. Internal and international cooperation among
terrorist groups has also risen notably. There has been a trend
toward bolder and more dramatic actions, with an accompanying
escalation of casualties, damage, and demands. And most
importantly, perhaps, there has been a quantum jump in terrorist
incidents affecting the interests of more than one state.
Not surprisingly, these developments have generated unprece-
dented interest in terrorism as a subject for serious research
and analysis. In sharp contrast with the situation which pre-
vailed only a decade or so ago, existing literature -- both open
and classified -- now offers a wide range of useful insights
into the root causes, logic, and characterstic attributes of
political terrorism as well as a substantial number of detailed
case studies.
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The trouble is that the picture
fused and incomplete. For one thing
accepted definition of terrorism per
national or transnational variants.
work that has been done on terrorism
effects of narrowly focused tactical
which emerges is still con-
there is as yet no generally
se, much less of its inter-
For another, much of the
suffers from the limiting
concerns or of particularistic
institutional and personal biases. And, largely because of
these differing perspectives and priorities, little progress
has been made toward development of a comprehensive and readily
accessible data base. In short, we are still hard put to explain
the current state of affairs or to venture firm predictions
about the future.
Of necessity, therefore, this study is an exercise in both
synthesis and innovation. It is confined to an examination of
international and transnational terrorism as defined in Section
II below (with primary emphasis on transnational terrorism as, in
the short term at least, potentially the more injurious to US
interests). Its principal underlying assumptions are three.
The first is that the basic societal problems and tensions that
can give rise to political violence -- and thus to terrorism --
are likely to prove particularly intractable in this era of
rapid change, growing nationalism and ethnicity, and world-wide
economic strains. Such irritants may, in fact, be treated as
"givens" in the global environment for many years to come. The
reader is forewarned that because of this, and because these
factors have already received considerable scholarly attention,
they will not be subjected to extensive analysis here.*
* These factors include weak and inefficient government, societal
rivalries and inequities, social and economic dislocations stemming
from the process of modernization, and high levels of frustration
born of social immobility or feelings of relative deprivation.
(The term relative deprivation is defined by its originator,
Professor Ted Robert Gurr, as a "perceived discrepancy between
the goods and conditions of life which members of a group be-
lieve are their due, and the goods and conditions which they
think they can in fact get and keep.")
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Corollary to the above, it is assumed that the potential
for domestic, international, and transnational terrorism will
remain high in the decade ahead and that the scope of the prob-
lem will therefore depend primarily on factors affecting the
opportunities, alternatives, and behavioral constraints faced
by the group actors involved.
Finally, it is postulated that it is not reality but man's
subjective perception thereof that is the most important determi-
nent of his political behavior. Hence, without neglecting the
many factors that have affected -- or that may affect -- the
objective capabilities and options of terrorist groups, this
paper repeatedly draws attention to those variables (e.g.,
cultural heritage, credo, and changes in the overall political
environment) that can shape or alter the prisms through which
the terrorists concerned view the world around them.
Broadly stated, the objectives of the study are to gain a
better understanding of the dynamics and consequences of inter-
national and transnational terrorism since 1965, to identify
those factors likely to promote or inhibit such activity in
the years ahead, and to assess the implications of these findings
with respect to future trends and developments. Such goals preclude
any effort to gauge the extent of the threat posed to US in-
terests and world order by any particular terrorist group or
consortium. Given the host of variables that would have to
be considered, that task must remain the province of traditional
and painstaking case-by-case analysis. It is hoped, however,
that the substantive generalizations and methodological
techniques that are set forth below will provide a valuable
frame of reference for more definitive treatments of specific
aspects of the terrorism problem.
? II. ESTABLISHING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
As may be inferred from these introductory observations,
the need to devise a sound multi-disciplinary approach was one
of the most challenging problems faced in connection with this re-
search project. As a first step, international and transnational
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terrorism were defined, for the purposes of this study, as
follows:
Common Characteristics: The threat or use
of fear-inducing extranormal violence for
political purposes when such action is intended
to influence the attitudes and behavior of
a target group wider than its immediate
victims and when -- through the nationality
or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its
locale, the identity of its institutional
or human victims, its declared objectives,
or the mechanics of its resolution -- its
ramifications transcend national boundaries.
International Terrorism: Such action when
carried out by individuals or groups con-
trolled by a sovereign state.
Transnational Terrorism: Such actions when
carried out by basically autonomous non-state
actors, whether or not they enjoy some degree
of support from sympathetic states.*
Next, in view of the fuzzy boundaries that separate terrorism
from other forms of violence as well as of the myriad of factors
which bear on terrorist activity, it was necessary to construct
a relatively detailed framework for screening and ordering the
available information. Briefly, a number of working hypotheses
* Given the element of governmental patronage that is common
to both, the boundary line between transnational and inter-
national terrorism is often difficult to draw. To the degree
that it can be determined, the key distinction lies in who is
calling the shots with respect to a given action or campaign.
Hence, groups can and do drift back and forth across the line.
For example, even a one-time "contract job" undertaken on behalf
of a governmental actor by a group that normally acts according
to its own lights qualifies as international terrorism.
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derived from a survey of the existing literature on both terrorism
and political violence per se were used to generate a list of
(1) key group and environmental variables that appear to have,
affected the scope, nature, and intensity of international and
transnational terrorism in recent years, and (2) analytically
useful event characteristics.*
The resultant tabulation is presented in somewhat abbreviated
form at Appendix A. It will be noted that, in addition to ful-
filling their primary (and distinctly traditional) disciplinary
function, most of the variables listed therein are amenable to
machine processing and manipulation. And while, as suggested
in the Foreword, few of the statistical inferences that are
highlighted below warrant a high degree of confidence, they can
and did -- serve to weaken or reinforce some of the author's
preliminary assumptions and hypotheses and to suggest other
trends and patterns that could be significant.
* Particularly useful general analyses of political terrorism
are to be found in Thomas P. Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of
Political Agitation" in Internal War: Problems and Approaches,
Harry Eckstein, ed. (London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1964);
Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict,
Research Paper N. 48, California Seminar on Arms Control and
Foreign Policy (Los Angeles: Crescent Publications, 1975);
Robert Moss, Urban Guerrillas (London: Temple Smith, 1972);
Brian Crozier, ed., Annual of Power and Conflict, 1972-73 and
1973-74 (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict); Paul
Wilkinson, Political Terrorism (London: Macmillan, 1974); Martha
C. Hutchinson, "The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism," The
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume XVI, Number 3, September
1972, pp. 383-396; and Philip A. Karber, "Urban Terrorism:
Baseline Data and a Conceptual Framework," Social Science
Quarterly, Volume 52, December 1971, pp. 521-533. The last-
named author stresses the synbolic qualities of political
terrorism and suggests that it can be analyzed in much the same
fashion as other mediums of communication.
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III. THE PHENOMENA IN RETROSPECT
What, Where, and When?
As previously indicated, international and transnational
terrorism were not yet matters of much official or academic con-
cern in 1965. In contrast to other forms of political violence,
there simply had not been very much of either since the close of
World War II -- at least not of the sort that made headlines.
Moreover, much of what there was had been associated with -- and
overshadowed by the more important consequences of -- clear-
cut adversary relationships stemming from either the Cold War
or the anti-colonial struggle. For the most part, noncombatant
third parties had been left unmolested.
It is true, of course, that two brief flurries of skyjacking
had already drawn attention to a potential new problem area.
But, for the most part, neither had involved more than a few
actions that would be classified as terrorism under the defini-
tion employed here. The first, in the early 50's, had been
comprised almost entirely of Eastern European aircraft comman-
deered for the sole purpose of escape to the West. And while
the second, which extended from the late 50's to the early 60's,
had been climaxed by the first postwar hijackings of American
airliners (thereby prompting the US to press for a comprehensive
international convention covering crimes committed on civilian
aircraft engaged in international aviation), it too had been
attributable primarily to individuals seeking personal advantage
-- e.g., expedient transport to or from Cuba or outright extortion
-- rather than political leverage or impact.
In any event, skyjackings tapered off again in 1963. The
overall level of international and transnational terrorist activity
remained relatively low through 1966, then turned upward against
the backdrop of intensified Palestinian guerrilla activity that
preceded the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Admittedly, the record up
to that point is sketchy. For one thing, the mass media still
lacked either the incentive or the technical means for systematic
and comprehensive coverage of terrorist incidents -- and many
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undoubtedly went unreported. But even if Figure 1 below sub-
stantially understates the number of international and transnational
terrorist incidents that occurred in the 1965-1967 period, the
international impact of this activity was negligible. Indeed,
when the qualitative dimension is added in, 1968 emerges as
International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents
250 ?
200
150
100
50
Figure 1
0
1965 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
588580 2-78
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a watershed year. At that juncture, a combination of Palestinian
initiatives and the cumulative impact of the broader environmental
trends discussed below seems to have finally sensitized dissident
groups throughout the world to their latent and growing potential
for effective transnational terrorist activity.
From 1 January 1968 through 31 December 1975, there were
at least 913 recorded international and transnational terrorist
incidents.* Of these, 123 were kidnappings; 31 were barricade
and hostage episodes; 375 entailed the use of explosive devices
of one type or another; 95 were armed assaults or ambushes; 137
involved the hijacking of an aircraft or other means of trans-
portation; 59 fell under the category of incendiary attack or
arson; 48 constituted assassination or murder; and 45 were
characterized by other forms of violence. All told, more than
140 terrorist organizations -- including a number of fictional
entities created to shield the identity of the true perpetrators
of some particularly shocking or politically sensitive acts --
from nearly 50 different countries or disputed territories
(e.g., Palestine) have thus far been linked to this activity,
and there may have been more.**
* This figure excludes terrorist attacks on US and allied
personnel and installations in Indo-China. It also excludes
most of the mutual assassination efforts and cross-border
operations associated with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The
only exceptions in this regard are incidents that either vic-
timized noncombatant nationals of states outside the principal
arena of conflict or were of such a nature that they became
the object of international controversy.
** There are relatively few political groupings in the world
that are totally dedicated to terrorist violence. As used here,
the term terrorist organization simply denotes a group that
has employed terrorist tactics.
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When these global
statistics are broken down
by geographic area and type
of event (see Figure 2 and
Appendix B) the picture which
emerges reveals a number of
general trends as well as
some marked regional and
time-related variations in
the frequency and nature of
transnational terrorist
incidents. The former is
illustrated by the general
popularity of American
targets. The latter
category includes the
distinctive behavioral
patterns exhibited by
Latin American terrorists,
on the one hand, and by
extremist formations
from the Middle East,
Europe, and Japan on
the other; the relative
quiescence of Sub-Saharan
Africa, the Soviet/East
European region, and
large parts of Asia;
the dramatic decline in
the popularity of sky-
jacking since 1970; and
the partially offsetting
rise in equally unsettling
barricade and hostage episodes.
Why?
Figure2
Geographic Distribution of International and
Transnational Terrorist Incidents, 1965-75
Transregional
Pacific and Australia
USSR/Eastern Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
Asia
Middle East and
North Africa
North America
Latin America
Western and
NATO Europe
568581 2-78
Total: 951
22
38
43
122
126
260
Together with the trends towards bolder actions and greater
cooperation among terrorist groups that were cited as particularly
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significant at the outset of this study, the commonalities,
differences, or changes in patterns of behavior that have been
described thus far are, of course, attributable to the interplay
of a host of variables. Only a few of these, i.e., the ones
that seem to have had the greatest direct bearing on the timing,
scope, and nature of the internationalization of terror, are
addressed at any length below. No attempt is made to develop
some sort of model or overarching theory with respect to this
phenomenon. Far more modest, the objective here is simply to
ascertain to what extent the current rash of transnational
(and, to a lesser degree, international) terrorist activity
is attributable to broad regional and global trends and develop-
ments as opposed to unique and possibly transitory local problems
and circumstances.
While some of them may seem to be self-evident, a few
general observations are needed here to set the problem in
perspective and to lay the groundwork for further analysis.
These may be summarized as follows:
Transnational terrorism, is by nature
more congenial to urban than to rural-
based grups and is thus characteristically
spawned by societies at a mid to advanced
stage of socio-economic development.
International terrorism, on the other
hand, being equally a function of a lack
of national resources and of calculations
as to the relative efficacy of alternative
methods of bringing latent national power
of whatever potential to bear in a given
situation, is not the special province of
any particular category of state.
Modern-day practitioners of transnational
terrorism have benefitted from a gen-
erally permissive international
environment -- a point which will be
expanded upon below. For the most part,
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therefore, the constraints on their be-
havior have either been a function of local
environmental factors affecting their objec-
tive capabilities, opportunities, and
alternatives or have been self-imposed
for tactical or philosophical reasons.
These latter restraints are, of course,
uncertain, for personal predilections
can be overshadowed by frustration or
desperation. Moreover, the inherent
dynamics and logic of a campaign of
terrorist violence are such that it has
a natural propensity to escalate over
time. Nevertheless, both cultural
heritage and credo have clearly been key
factors affecting individualterrorist
groups' perceptions of the limits beyond
which the level or intensity of violence
is likely to become counterproductive.
Since the efficacy and extent of repressive
internal security controls is probably the
single most important local environmental
variable affecting the frequency, form
and domestic impact of transnational
terrorist incidents in any given country,
the proliferation of this form of poli-
tical violence has both contributed to
and fed upon the recent trend toward more
widespread experimentation with various
forms of authoritarian rule. On one hand,
open societies and weak or permissive
authoritarian regimes are particularly
vulnerable to such activity -- and to its
domestic ramifications. On the other,
rigid and effective authoritarian rule
can foster transnational terrorism by
forcing dissidents to operate abroad.
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Like the earlier references to the basic societal problems
that can give rise to various forms of political violence, the
foregoing observations focus on the human and local environmental
factors affecting the extent, nature, and domestic impact of
transnational or international terrorist activity in different
parts of the world. The question remains, however, as to just
why we witnessed such a marked and enduring upsurge in trans-
national terrorism over the past eight years. In part, of course,
this phenomenon is attributable to a war-punctuated regional conflict
affecting the interests of a large number of nations and attended
by particularly deep-seated feelings of bitterness and frustration.
But it would not have grown to its present dimensions were it
not for the concurrent convergence and acceleration of a number
of changes in the global environment that had begun to take
shape much earlier.
These trends are difficult to disaggregate. Moreover, the
summary nature of this presentation precludes much in the way of
elaboration. Nevertheless, the following broad environmental
factors merit individual comment:
Growing Interdependence: Broadly construed,
the concept of interdependence embraces
both the dimensions and the consequences
of the thickening web of political,
economic, and technological dependencies
and obligations which, among other things,
has steadily eroded the autonomy (i.e.,
freedom of maneuver) of decision-making
bodies of all types throughout most of
the postwar period. It is invoked here
because the growth in both numbers and
importance of international, transnational,
and (as a consequence of localized moderniza-
tion efforts) subnational linkages over the
past decade -- together with a markedly
greater awareness thereof -- has had at
least a two-fold impact on the world-wide
potential for terrorism. On the one hand,
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it has created a host of new, vulnerable,
and potentially highly disruptive targets
for terrorist attack (e.g., commercial and
communications centers, transportation hubs,
international power grids and pipelines,
super tankers, and jumbo aircraft). On
the other, it has generated a sort of
identity crisis which has been reflected
in a troublesome countervailing upsurge of
nationalism and ethnicity.
For their part, the many other strains and
dislocations associated with the process of
modernizing change have swelled the ranks of
the alienated in many parts of the world.
They have also added millions of emigre
workers to the international pool of
political exiles and refugees on which
terrorists can draw for manpower and other
forms of support.
The impact of new technology on terrorist
capabilities with respect to weapons,
mobility and tactical communications has
already been cited. But whatever the
nature of a terrorist act or the means
of its execution, it must be remembered
that the role of the media is critical to
the spreading and intensification of its
psychological impact. Hence, among all
the technological advances in recent years,
the development of satellite communications,
and in particular, their upgrading in 1968
to include a television capability have
unquestionably been among the most important
in making transnational activity seem
attractive to terrorist groups.
The upsurge in transnational terrorism has
also been aided, and abetted by a "revolutionary"
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turn in the overall political environment
somewhat reminiscent of that experienced
about 200 years ago. The postwar order is
under challenge from all sides: from the
developing nations of the Third World; from
"maverick" Communist regimes; from disatisfied
second rank powers; and from a broad array
of social forces fired, with differing de-
grees of responsibility, by a new sense of
"social conscience." Terrorists have bene-
fitted from this state of affairs in many
ways. Among other things, it has:
Accorded an aura of legitimacy to
the acts of any terrorist group
claiming leftist revolutionary
or national liberation movement
status;
Frustrated efforts to develop
more effective international
countermeasures;
Facilitated transnational con-
tact and cooperation among
terrorist groups;
Fostered a significant increase
in the number national, trans-
national, and international
organizations providing national
liberation movements and other
"progressive" dissident forma-
tions with various forms of
direct and indirect support.
The attitudes and behavior of supportive states --
ranging from those willing to provide little
more than kind words and occasional safehaven
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to those that regularly furnish practicing or
potential terrorists with funds, arms, training,
documentation, and other operational support --
have, of course, constituted another key global
environmental factor affecting the scope and
nature of transnational terrorist activity
during the period under review. Variable might
be the better term, however, for the extent of
such assistance has tended to fluctuate with
changing appreciations of broader interests
on the part of the state actors involved.
1975, for example, witnessed a distinct
downward trend in such support.
In any event, if one excludes
the simply indulgent or in-
different (including those
liberal Western European states
like France and Switzerland
that, because of their
strategic location and the
extensive protection they
accord to democratic rights
and freedoms, have become
involuntary hosts to all
manner of foreign dissident
groups) the list of nations
in question dwindles to less
than a score. Counting a few
states that have recently
retired -- or partially
retired -- from the business,
these "activists" include
(but are not limited to)
Libya, Cuba, the USSR, China,
North Korea, Algeria, Southern
Yemen, Tanzania, Congo, Zaire,
Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Chile, and,
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however reluctant it has been
to engage in such activity,
Lebanon.
In some of these states,
most of the support rendered
to foreign revolutionary
or guerrilla formations has
been directed toward influ-
encing the course of developments
in one or two neighboring countries
or territories. And for many,
perhaps a majority, the actual
promotion of terrorist violence
has been no more than a largely
unintended byproduct of their
activities. Nevertheless, in
one way or another, most of
these countries have directly
contributed to the recent rise
and spread of transnational
terrorism.
The overall economic environment can impact
on the problem of terrorism in a number of
subtle and, in some cases, countervailing
ways. For example, extra-cyclical world-
wide economic strains -- such as those
generated by the sudden quadrupling of
oil prices -- can so overtax the capabili-
ties of local regimes as to invite domestic
violence of a sort that could easily spill
over national boundaries.
The social and political effects
of cyclical fluctuations in the
overall economic climate tend to
be delayed and uneven. Never-
theless, medium to long-range trends
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can affect both the propensities
and opportunities for transnational
terrorist activity in any given
area. A prolonged and general
economic upturn, for example, can
increase local potentials for
political violence by causing
popular expectations to far out-
pace governmental capacities to
deliver. And in more affluent
societies, at least, the attendant
emphasis on materialistic values
can alienate significant segments
of the student and intellectual
communities.
Conversely, a prolonged economic
decline (something which a number
of observers predict the world will
experience for the next twenty years
or more) has generally tended to
dampen revolutionary ardor. Popular
expectations decline, and people
everywhere are preoccupied with
the exigencies of day-to-day exis-
tence. But the world has much
changed since its last broad
economic slide. Whether the
numbing effects of generalized
adversity will be felt as
strongly in the future is thus
open to question. Their poten-
tial impact on the level of
transnational terrorist activity
is even more uncertain. The
actors engaged therein are scarcely
representative of the general
population. They are few in
number and elitist by nature.
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And given the proven strength of
their convictions, they are likely
to be among the most resistant
to the psychological effects of
untoward changes in the overall
economic environment.
How Cost Effective?
The answer to this question depends on the vantage point of
the observer. The achievement of disproportionately large effects
from the employment of minimal resources is, of course, what
political terrorism is all about. Its most serious drawback
is that its consequences are, to a certain degree, unpredictable.
It can alienate those groups whose sympathy is sought. Rather
than disorient the masses, it can rally them to a previously
unpopular government. It can galvanize a weak or waivering
regime into forceful counteraction. In short, tactical successes
can, as in Uruguay and Jordan, lead to strategic reverses of
major proportions.
This risk is, however, easily accepted by those who dis-
pose of no effective alternative methods for achieving their
goals. Moreover, despite a number of disastrous episodes, the
overall balance sheet so far provides current and would-be
practitioners of transnational terrorism with grounds for con-
siderable optimism. Briefly put, the record shows that
transnational terrorists have generally been rather successful
in avoiding capture (or, if caught, in escaping punishment)
and in meeting at least some of their proximate objectives.
In the latter regard, their chances of garnering extensive
publicity when that is desired are, as previously indicated,
near certain.*
* Insofar as they relate to kidnapping and barricade opera-
tions, these points are strongly made in the unpublished RAND
Corporation study that is cited and excerpted on page 240 of
(footnote continued on following page)
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How Disruptive?
The human and material toll exacted by transnational and
international terrorism over the past eight years has been
relatively low. But the disruptive impact of this activity
has been magnified by the publicity it has received and by
its interaction with other destabilizing trends and forces.
Thus, while the terrorists have made no revolutions and,
by themselves at least, toppled no governments, they have:
Embarrassed several governments and contri-
buted to the downfall of a few;
Added an abrasive new dimension to both
North-South and East-West relations;
Contributed in no small way to the growing
international status and fortunes of the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO);*
(footnote continued from previous page)
Terroristic Activity - International Terrorism: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration
of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security
Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,
Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session; Part 4; May 14, 1975
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1975).
* The PLO is a political umbrella organization embracing
several Fedayeen commando groups. It was accorded recogni-
tion as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people (at the expense of Jordan) by the 1974 Islamic non-
aligned and Rabat summit meetings. In November of that same
year, it was granted observer status by the UNGA. All told,
some 50 states have allowed the PLO to open offices in their
capitals. In addition, five UN-affiliated international
agencies (ILO, WHO, UPU, ITU, and UNESCO) have granted it
observer status.
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Compelled some nations to temporarily abandon
their law enforcement function out of fear
of future retribution;
Aggravated and accentuated the dilemmas
generated within the existing international
system by the emergence of a growing company
of powerful non-state actors;
Introduced strains in relations among those
members of Western alliances or non-military
groupings who, because of divergent national
interests, feel constrained to adopt differing
positions with respect to specific incidents
or broader terrorist-related issues;
Reinforced the currently pervasive sense of
global flux and disorder;
Caused a large number of nations, including
the US, to divert substantial resources to
defense against terrorist attacks;
Adversely affected the quality of life in
many open or formerly open societies.
In short, while scarcely cataclysmic, the cumulative impact
of modern-day transnational and international terrorism has been
more disruptive than most of us would like to admit. Harking
back to earlier discussion, this state of affairs is both a
measure and, in large part, a consequence of increasing global
interdependence. As the dimensions and complexity of the web
of interstate and transnational linkages that together comprise
the functional core of the international system have grown under
the impact of technological advance, the reverberations of
events -- including terrorist attacks -- which disturb or threaten
its more important intersections have tended to become increasingly
widespread and sharply felt. At the same time, the limits within
which individual states can attempt to cope which such problems
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through unilateral action without risk of adversely affecting
the interests of others have steadily narrowed. But, as previously
observed, rather than encourage increasing interest in supranational
solutions, the frustrations born of this de facto shrinkage of
sovereignty have generated an unhelpful backlash of nationalism.
And this, of course, has been one of the key factors that have
affected the nature and effectiveness of the international
community's response to the terrorist threat.
What International Constraints?
With the exception of a number of bilateral agreements
providing, inter alia, for a greater exchange of intelligence
and technical assistance or, as in the memorandum of understanding
concerning hijackers of aircraft and vessels that was signed
by the US and Cuba in 1973, for the prompt extradition of
specified categories of terrorists, the international response
to terrorism has been relatively weak and ineffective.
For its part, the United Nations General Assembly has com-
piled a singularly unimpressive record. In 1970, for example,
it clouded and weakened the prohibition (in any case largely
exhortative) against state participation in -- or support of --
terrorist activity that was included in its sweeping Declaration
of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States by attaching overriding importance
in the same document to the obligation of states to assist
peoples struggling for the realization of their "right to self-
determination and freedom and independence." Three years later,
a 35-member ad hoc UNGA committee convened for the sole purpose
of hammering out a common position on political terrorism was
unable even to agree on a definition of the phenomenon, much
less on its root causes or appropriate countermeasures. And
while the UNGA did manage to give birth to a convention covering
the prevention and punishment of crimes against diplomats in
December 1973, only nine countries have ratified this agree-
ment to date, and it has yet to come into force.
This last was the most recent of the five international
conventions adopted over the past twelve years that have dealt
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with one or another aspect (in all cases rather narrow) of the
terrorism problem.* These agreements do reflect international
concern and at least a slim and fleeting majority consensus
that something should be done. But they presently do not,
singly or in combination, constitute much of an effective
constraint on terrorist activity. In the first place, many
states -- including a high percentage of those that have been
particularly active in supporting revolutionary or national
liberation groups -- are not yet parties thereto. Secondly,
the conventions lack teeth in that all make extradition or
prosecution of terrorists subject to discretionary escape clauses
and none make provision for the application punitive sanctions
against states that simply refuse to comply at all. Finally,
their exclusive focus on the safety of aircraft and diplomats
leaves a good deal of terrorist activity outside the cognizance
of international law.
But this, it would seem, is all the traffic will bear.
The US has tried repeatedly to correct some of these deficiencies
and has run into a stone wall of opposition on each occasion.
The obstacles which have blocked more effective international
action are, in fact, formidable. They have, as previously in-
dicated, included the controversy over justifiable versus
illegal political violence and a broad resistance to such
further infringements of national sovereignty as would be
implied in any inflexible curtailment of the right to grant
political asylum. On a less lofty plane, they have also in-
cluded a reluctance on the part of many nations otherwise
ill-disposed toward terrorist activity to commit themselves
* The other four are the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offenses and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, the 1970 Hague
Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Air-
craft, the 1973 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, and the 1971
OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the
Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are
of International Significance.
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to any course of action that might either invite direct terrorist
retribution or provoke the application of sanctions by states
-- particularly by oil-producing states -- that happen to be
sympathetic to the terrorists' cause.
IV. THE OUTLOOK
Transnational Terrorism
On balance, the outlook with respect to transnational
terrorism is not particularly encouraging. On the positive
side, the decline in the number of states willing to provide
terrorists safehaven gives promise of being lasting. It seems
most doubtful that the currently shrinking aggregations of emigre
workers will soon -- if ever -- regain their former size, and
this will probably have some small impact on the security and
resources of terrorist groups operating in Western Europe.
More importantly, political developments of a sort which pre-
sently seem to be at least possible could significantly reduce
levels of terrorist activity in such current trouble spots as
Northern Ireland, Argentina, and the Middle East.
But overall, the potential for domestic, international,
and transnational terrorism is -- as asserted at the outset of
this study -- almost certain to remain high. Furthermore, most
of the broad environmental factors that have contributed to the
feasibility, efficacy, and popularity of transnational terrorism
in recent years will continue to operate with at least equal
force in the decade ahead. The salience of some, in fact, seems
bound to increase.
Barring some cataclysmic event that reduces man-
kind to a more primitive order of existence,
technological advance, modernizing social and
economic change, and growing global interdepen-
dence are, for example, essentially irreversible
phenomena with an urgency and momentum that seem
more likely to increase than to decline in the
coming decade. While their political conse-
quences can, to a certain degree, be controlled
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by carefully tailored policy decisions (and
while technological advance is obviously a
two-edged sword) these processes thus bode well
to continue to aggravate the terrorism
problem by generating further increases
in (1) divisive ethnicity and nationalism,
(2) urban unrest, (3) terrorist capabilities,
and (4) societal vulnerabilities.
In the political field, the widespread erosion
of authority that has both invited and facili-
tated terrorist activity in recent years shows
no signs of abatement. For its part, the
postwar international order seems likely to
remain under challenge -- and thus in flux --
throughout the decade ahead. The phenomenon
will, however, continue to be most evident
at the national level where the increasing
difficulties of governance hold forth the
prospect of a further proliferation of in-
effective and unstable regimes.
The chances appear strong that (1) national
liberation and leftist revolutionary forma-
tions will continue to receive both moral and
material support from a wide variety of
transnational and international organizations
and (2) the trend toward greater transnational
contact and cooperation among terrorist groups
will gain further momentum.
Ominously enough, therefore, the wave of the
future seems to be toward the development of
a complex support base for transnational
terrorist activity that is largely independent
of -- and quite resistant to control by --
the state-centered international system.
The last trend does not, however, provide grounds for con-
cluding that the behavior of supportive state actors will become
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increasingly irrelevant. On the contrary, it suggests that
unless the principal patrons of subversion and revolutionary
violence cut back on the assistance they are furnishing to
practicing or potential terrorists more drastically than any
currently available evidence gives reason to expect, the
deleterious impact of their behavior may be considerably greater
than in the past. The hard fact is that it is difficult to tran-
slate such aid into leverage or control when there are other
readily available sources of support. Indeed, any assistance
provided to an extremist group under these circumstances risks
simply increasing the recipient's potential for autonomous
action.
For its part, the problem of extensive and sometimes sym-
pathetic publicity seems likely to persist in most parts of the
world. Moreover, there is a second aspect of the information
explosion that promises to continue to be troublesome: the
diffusion of terrorist-adaptable technological know-how and --
to a lesser degree -- of possibly inspirational speculation
about new and potentially ultra-disruptive terrorist tactics.
Although the objectives of such literature may be -- and most
often are -- above reproach, it can all too easily aggravate
the problems posed by the development and wholesale deployment
of sophisticated (and in many cases, man-portable) weaponry;
the world-wide proliferation of nuclear installations; and
the race, motivated by both political and economic considera-
tions, to sell nuclear technology and modern armaments to
developing countries. And these problems are serious enough
as it is. Indeed, despite the attention that has been paid to
nuclear safeguards and the physical security of sensitive in-
stallations and depots, the world seems to be moving toward
a state of affairs in which the limits of any "technological
escalation" of terrorist violence could depend more on the
self-imposed restraints affecting the behavior of the groups
involved than on lack of capability or opportunity.
It is, of course, the upper limits of the potential scale
of terrorist violence that are of most concern to us. Individual
terrorist groups already have the capability of manufacturing
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or otherwise acquiring a wide variety of weapons or agents of
mass destruction. More will be in a position to exercise this
option in the future. Just how likely is it that they will do
so?
That the threatened employment of such awesome ordnance
would have profound political and psychological effects is
undeniable. But it must be emphasized that there are major
hazards that would be involved for the terrorists as well --
not the least of which is the high risk of a disastrous public
backlash, particularly in the event that the group involved
were to end up in a position where it felt compelled to make
good its threat. After all, terrorists are generally in
business to influence people, not exterminate them. Moreover,
those that aspire to some sort of political legitimacy -- and
this means most of them -- are generally quite sensitive to the
need to take care to avoid alienating local and international
opinion.
The fact remains, however, that weapons of mass destruc-
tion cannot help but hold considerable temptation for militants
whose basic strategy of violence centers on wringing maximum
political leverage from publicity and fear. Hence it seems
prudent to assume that sooner or later some group is almost bound
to take the plunge.
Firm predictions as to how, when, or by whose hand this
may come to pass are not possible. But an appraisal of the
factors that would probably bear on such a decision suggests
the following general observations:
While the prospect of nuclear-armed terrorists
roaming at large can no longer be dismissed,
the acquisition, storage, transport, and
effective employment of nuclear devices still
pose practical problems of no small magnitude.
Furthermore, if worst comes to worst, the
destructive effects of such weapons are not
manageable. Hence, a more likely scenario --
at least in the short term -- would seem to
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be a terrorist seizure of a nuclear weapons
storage facility or a nuclear power plant in
a straightforward barricade operation. Such
a group need not threaten a nuclear holo-
caust (although that possibility would be
in the back of everyone's mind), just the
destruction of the bunker or reactor with
the attendant danger of radiological pollution.
An even more pressing threat, however, would
seem to lie in the field of chemical, bio-
logical, and radiological agents. In contrast
to nuclear devices, many of these are
presently relatively easy to acquire. Hence
the danger that they could turn up in the
hands of the sort of ultra-radical or psycho-
pathic fringe group that would have the fewest
compunctions about using them is very real.
Moreover, since small -- sometimes minute --
quantities are usually all that are needed for
potentially devastating effects, such agents
also tend to be easy to conceal, easy to
transport, and easy to introduce into the
target area.
As once again demonstrated by the world-wide reaction to
the recent assault on the OPEC ministerial meeting in Vienna,
any dramatic escalation of terrorist violence is likely to touch
off a new flurry of efforts to devise international countermeasures.
The sort of contingencies suggested in the foregoing brief
weapons of mass destruction scenarios would, of course, be virtually
certain to do so. But since the net balance of forces operating
within the international community promises to remain more
disintegrative than integrative, it seems doubtful that such
broadly based endeavors will prove much more effective than
in the past. The picture is not altogether bleak, however,
for the recent stiffening of a number of nations' policies toward
terrorists holds promise of opening up new possibilities for
bilateral and limited multilateral counter-terrorist undertakings
of proven utility.
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In sum, although it is unlikely to trigger a collapse of
world order, transnational terrorism promises to pose a trouble-
some problem for the world community until such time -- possibly
years hence -- that the international system gels into new and
generally accepted contours. The frequency and intensity of
violence will decline in some areas. The cast of characters
will be constantly changing. In all likelihood, technological
and organizational innovations in the security field will make
terrorism a more risky affair. Yet at best the overall number
of terrorist groups seems unlikely to decline -- and the number
of countries in which they are active appears destined to
grow. Furthermore, because of their symbolic value, their
availability, and the embarrassment they can create, the
popularity of American targets will probably remain high.
It seems likely that the constraints on terrorist behavior
will, through international default, continue to depend primarily
on (1) the terrorists' subjective orientation and (2) the policies
and resources of the countries in which they operate. Of necessity,
however, the impact of these will be uneven. Remember, too,
that the inherent dynamics and logic of a campaign of terrorist
violence are such that it has a natural propensity to escalate
over time. Moreover, all but the most isolated terrorists
groups will dispose of a common and cumulative media-fed pool
of experience and inspiration. Hence, even if the cited
constraints do result in some tapering off in the frequency
of transnational terrorist incidents during the next few
years, we should expect to witness steadily greater and
more widespread sophistication in targeting, execution, and
weaponry. And while, as suggested earlier, most groups will
probably continue to be deterred by both moral considerations
and calculations of the risks involved, the danger that a fanatic
few may ultimately resort to weapons of mass destruction is,
in fact, very real.
International Terrorism
International terrorism seems unlikely to pose much of
a threat to world order or US interests during the next few
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years. Even in its presently weakened state, the international
system subjects states to a host of legal obligations and practical
constraints that they can ignore only at considerable risk.
The continuing force of these considerations is evidenced by
the fact that international terrorism is no more prevalent today
than it was in 1968.
No change in this general state of affairs appears imminent.
But the sporadic employment of government-controlled terrorist
groups against Israeli targets both within and outside that
country's borders raises some troublesome questions about what
the 1980's may hold in store. And while their true sponsorship
has yet to be firmly established, so do the recent operations
in Madrid and Vienna through which hardlining elements associated
with the Fedayeen's "rejectionist" wing sought to bring pressure
on moderate Arab regimes.
These questions center on the kind of adjustments in inter-
national behavior that may flow from ongoing changes in the
distribution and component elements of national power and, no
less important, from the growing array of economic, political,
and technological restraints affecting the ways in which latent
power can be translated into effective leverage. Are Arab actions
a precursor of things to come? Is it, in fact, likely that,
lacking or despairing of more conventional means for defending
or advancing their international interests, an increasing
number of states will employ terrorist groups to wage "surrogate
warfare" against other nations?*
The case for increasing resort to some form of surrogate
warfare -- in itself scarcely a new phenomenon -- is, however,
far stronger than for the corollary argument that this develop-
ment is likely to be characterized by widespread adoption of
* A thought-provoking treatment of this question is provided
in Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of
Conflict, op. cit., pp. 21-22.
-29 -
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terrorist tactics. For one thing, the safety of deniability
would all but disappear if a state were to engage in such
activity on a regular basis. For another, barring total
collapse of world order and consequent international anarchy
(something that no state actor has reason to promote),
international terrorism is highly unlikely to gain acceptance
as an admissible form of behavior.
All told, in fact, it seems likely that the employment of
terrorist groups in a surrogate warfare role will continue to
be more the exception than the rule for some time to come. And
if this proves to be the case, it follows that while there may
be a slight upward trend in the annual total of international
terrorist incidents, the scope of the problem in 1985 should
not be much more serious than it is today.
- 30 -
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Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
terrorist tactics. For one thing, the safety of deniability
would all but disappear if a state were to engage in such
activity on a regular basis. For another, barring total
collapse of world order and consequent international anarchy
(something that no state actor has reason to promote),
international terrorism is highly unlikely to gain acceptance
as an admissible form of behavior.
All told, in fact, it seems likely that the employment of
terrorist groups in a surrogate warfare role will continue to
be more the exception than the rule for some time to come. And
if this proves to be the case, it follows that while there may
be a slight upward trend in the annual total of international
terrorist incidents, the scope of the problem in 1985 should
not be much more serious than it is today.
- 30 -
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Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
Radical Left (revolutionary socialists,
Trotskyites, Maoists, Guevarists,
Castroites, and other ultra-left
fringe groups)
Orthodox Communism
Extreme Right
Other
Pathological
Domestic base (extent of popular sympathy and
support, links with legitimate social or poli-
tical organizations, and links with other domestic
dissident groups)
Foreign links (with other terrorist organizations,
with international or legitimate transnational
organizations, and with foreign governments)
Life cycle (date of formation, period or periods
of transnational or international activity, and,
if applicable, date of demise)
Event Characteristics
Location of incident
Nature of act
Elementary Typology
Kidnapping
Barricade and hostage
Bombing (any type of explosive charge or
device, including letter and parcel bombs)
- 2A-
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Armed assault or ambush (with or without
sophistical weapons)
Hijacking (aircraft, ship, or other)
Incendiary attack or arson
Assassination or murder
Chemical, bacteriological, or radiological
pollution
Other
Number, status, and nationalities of human victims
Nature and national association of physical target
Number, nationality, and organizational affiliation
of the perpetrators
Nature of demands (publicity, prisoner release,
ransom, political action or change, arms, or safe
passage)
Targets of demands (governments, corporations, or
international organizations)
Outcome (duration of incident, identity and posture
of governmental and transnational actors participating
in its resolution, extent to which terrorists' de-
mands were satisfied, fate of human victims, fate
of terrorists, extent of property damage, and, if
applicable, identity of nations granting or facili-
tating safehaven)
Local Environmental Characteristics
Type, repressiveness, and effectiveness of govern-
ment (representative democracy, authoritarian,
or totalitarian)
- 3A -
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Societal traditions and attitudes with respect to
authority and violence
Homogeneity of the population
Current levels of popular malaise and internal
strife
Current level of socio-economic development
(including per capita GNP; levels of industria-
lization, urbanization, and literacy; and the
proportion of the population possessed of higher
education)
Recent and current socio-economic growth rates
(as above)
Societal inequities (markedly unequal distribu-
tion of income, discriminatory practices, and
systemic limits on social and political mobility)
Global Environmental Characteristics
Technological Advance
Sophisticated man-portable weaponry
(development, deployment, and inter-
national trade in such weapons)
Proliferation of nuclear facilities
Communications advances (developments
affecting both media coverage and
tactical communications)
-- Mobility-related developments
Interdependence
-- New vulnerabilities (those links
binding our increasingly interdependent
-4A-
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world -- e.g., commercial and communica-
tions centers, transportation hubs,
international power grids and pipelines,
super tankers, and jumbo aircraft --
that presently, or that may in the future,
offer feasible and potentially highly
disruptive targets for terrorist attack.
-- Reactive upsurge of nationalism and
ethnicity
Modernizing Social and Economic Change
-- Destabilizing local effects
-- Large emigre worker concentrations
Political Environment
-- The "revolutionary" atmosphere high-
lighted by the challenge to the existing
world order raised by the "have not" nations
-- The controversy over illegal
versus justifiable political
violence
-- Shifts in priorities and values
and the emergence of a strong
sense of "social conscience"
The dispersion and erosion of political
authority
The proliferation of non-state actors and
the parallel increase in the number of inter-
national and transnational organizations
providing moral or material support to
national liberation or leftist revolutionary
formations
- 5A-
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-- International agreements, treaties, and
conventions relating to terrorist acts
-- The behavior of states providing direct
and indirect support to terrorist groups
Transnational contact and cooperation among
terrorist groups
Significant international economic trends and developments
-- Extra-cyclical events
-- Cyclical fluctuations
- 6A-
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APPENDIX B
STATISTICAL TRENDS AND PATTERNS
IN
TERRORIST ACTIVITY
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100
75
50
25
0
1968
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Kidnapping
Total: 123
100
75
50
25
70
Bombing
Total: 375
72
74
0 IIIIIII
1968 70 72 74
100
75
50
25
Assassination
Total: 48
0
1968
70
568582 2-76
72 74
100
75
50
25
Barricade and International and
Hostage Transnational Terrorist
Total: 31 Incidents by Category,
1968-75
0
1968 70 72 74
100
75
50
25
Armed Assault or
Ambush
Total: 95
1968
100
75
50
25
70
72 74
Incendiary Attack or
Arson
Total: 59
0
1968 70
72 74
Total: 913
100
75
50
25
0
1968
Hijacking
(Air and Non-Air)
Total: 137
100
75
50
25
0
1968
70
Other
Total: 45
72
74
70
72
74
Includes 2 non-air hijackings.
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Geographic Distribution of Terrorist Incidents by Category, 1968-75
North America 69
Total: 111
21
1 1 1 1 1 1
Western and
NATO Europe
Total: 327
13
179
19
Middle East and
North Africa
Total: 119
8 7
43
Sub-Saharan Africa Total: 37
15
1 2 1
Asia Total: 43
6
1 1 2
Latin America
78
25
VcA
-
19
7
10
5
1 1 1 6 1 1 1 1 1
13
7 4
It I I
5
Total: 250
USSR/Eastern Europe Total: 19
Pacific and Australia
1 1 I
Transregional Total: 1
J 1 1 1
Kidnapping Barricade and
Hostage
568583 2-76
15
1 2
1
1 1 1 I
1 I
I 1
1
1 1
Total: 6
4
1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1
1
111
I 1 1 1
1 L
1 1
1
I
Bombing
Armed Assault Hijacking
or Ambush (Air and Non-Air)
Assassination
Incendiary Attack
or Arson
Other
*Mass letter bomb mailing.
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International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents Directly Affecting US Citizens,
Corporations, or Institutions
1968-4975
Kidnap
B & H
Bomb
Assa
hijack'
Assass.
Incend.
Other
Total
Total incidents
123
31
375
95
137
48
59
45
913
US citizens or property known to
have been victimized
59
4
136
37
29
15
33
17
330
11S government target of terrorist
demands
42
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
1968
Total incidents
1
0
24
2
6
4
0
0
37
US citizens or property victimized
1
0
1
0
0
3
0
0
5
US government target of demands
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1969
Total incidents
3
0
17
5
25
2
2
1
55
US citizens or property victimized
2
0
9
1
1
1
1
1
16
US government target of demands
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1970
Total incidents
26
1
17
6
47
6
2
9
114
US citizens or property victimized
15
0
12
4
16
3
1
5
56
US government target of demands
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1971
Total incidents
10
1
15
8
14
3
6
6
63
US citizens or property victimized
4
0
12
4
7
0
5
6
38
US government target of demands
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1972
Total incidents
11
3
38
6
16
4
3
5
86
US citizens or property victimized
l
0
18
2
3
0
1
1
26
US government target of demands
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1973
Total incidents
34
8
81
29
15
12
20
12
211
US citizens or property victimized
18
2
34
14
0
3
12
2
85
US government target of demands
0
1
o
o
o
o
o
o
1
1974
Total incidents
12
9
95
24
9
8
11
11
179
US citizens or property victimized
5
1
32
6
2
2
7
2
57
US government target of demands
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1975
Total incidents
26
9
88
15
5
9
15
1
168
US citizens or property victimized
13
1
18
6
0
3
6
0
47
US government target of demands
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
1 Excludes numerous non-terrorist skyjackings, many of which victimized US planes or citizens.
2 This figure does not, of course, reflect more than a score of cases in which ransom demands were levied on?or were
eventually at least partially satisified by U.S. corporations or private citizens.
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International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents by Regional Origin of the
Perpetrators-1968-1975
Kidnap
B & II
Bomb
Ass'lt
Hijack
Assass.
Incend.
Other
Total
North America
4
0
21
4
5
0
3
0
37
Western and NATO Europe
10
1
61
10
5
3
4
4
98
Middle East and North Africa
5
17
41
31
25
12
2
15
148
Sub-Saharan Africa
16
1
1
5
6
1
0
0
30
Asia
6
5
2
4
11
3
5
0
36
Latin America
53
5
45
8
12
10
5
12
150
USSR/Eastern Europe
0
1
3
1
15
3
0
0
23
Uncertain or Mixed
29
1
201
32
58
16
40
14
391
Total
123
31
375
95
137
48
59
45
913
International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents?Fedayeen and
Non-Fedayeen by Category of Event: 1968-1975
kidnap
B & II
Bomb
Assit
Hijack
Assass.
Incend.
Other
Total
Fedayeen or
8
18
48
35
19
13
3
15
Fedayeen
related
Non-Fedayeen
102
13
249*
53
79
29
37
22**
584
Unknown
13
0
78
7
39
6
19
8
170
Total
123
31
375
95
137
48
59
45
913
*Includes the sole transnational terrorist attack on a nuclear installation during the period under
review?the 1975 bombing of a nuclear power facility in France by the Puig Antich-Ulrike Meinhof
Commando. It bears note, however, that Argentina's ERP did briefly occupy an unfinished
Argentine nuclear power plant in March 1973, an act which falls in the category of domestic
terrorism.
**Includes the only two incidents in which a chemical, biological, or radiological agent has been
used to induce terror to date (the radio-active iodine employed by the self-styled "Justice Guerrilla"
in Austria in 1974).
International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents?Fedayeen and
Non-Fedayeen by Year: 1968-1975
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Fedayeen or
related
Fedayeen-
3
10
21
10
19
46
33
17
Non-Fedayeen
31
28
60
28
40
112
137
148
Unknown
3
17
33
25
27
53
9
3
Total
37
55
114
63
86
211
179
168
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I
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. O.C. 20505
11 March 1975
Mrs. Katharine Graham, Publisher
Washington Post
1150 Fifteenth Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
Dear Kay:
Thank you again for inviting me to the Washington
Conference on the Media az the Law last weekend. The
discussions of the various case studies were fascinating
and most worthwhile as we face these problems today.
It was great fun.
Sincerely,
;
(/
...._ \vr . -.Colby
Director
Identical letter to:
Mr. Fred W. Friendly
The Ford Foundation
320 East 43rd Street
New York, N. Y. 10017
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
- Mr. Thuermer
1 - ER
1 -DCI
/ 17 C
6 iM )1' e lc+ +
1-71
it) ----
/
L_v
0
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' THZ IVASEIINGTON POST ?
P
Approved For Release 2005/Q11.17 41- 88-0131R000200350001-7
c?i?A-1z33?5coo.'
(r) 7:\ 7, ? " 7.7/ "
0 Iedn, ed S 0,1 C4011ZP. e.(..i.)s orlin .
.?
'
?
. .
. "wit 0 110,
By Warren' Unna'
wa.shincion nut Staff Writer
. .
: A bipartisan, group of four
.Senators and four RePresenta-
f
tives yesterday announced a
Conference on the Planning of
. New 'priorities. to.foeus on this
;country's 'future, which , they
,find threatened more' from
Within than from abroad.., ....
The legislators,. in. sponsor-
ing the' conference, 'are delib-
erately circumventing the Sen-
,ate and House Armed Services
:and ' nefense Appropriations
'committees. They areereating
an unorthodox fOruni' on Ca'pi-
'tol' 1:liq, which will be',,mOre
?critical of the military-in-
dustrial . share of-America's:re-
sources... , -:?:: .' ''.;,.? :...
Rep. Jonathan B.' Bingham
?(D-N.Y.)' told a ,press.coof-
ence yesterday that he did not
think either committee on?the
House side, at least, "has done
the kind of job that should
have been done .in controlling
military expenditures !:''. .
Over the years, a majority ,of
the members'' have become
close to the military and tend
to do .what the military thinks
and wants." ' ''., .. ?
. .
We're'All Junior'
,
Sen. William 5.. Saxbe (It-
Ohio), 'speaking for the, four
sponsoring Senators, seemed
to share Bingham's criticism
and added:. "We're all j,unior
and we feel it is ?up ,to, us, to
'nave some influence." ? . ? '','
J.. Sen.! Marlow, W. Cook(R-
KY) said those of his 'col-
.cagues who' had to face the
electorate last fall were "im-
pressed with the enormity of
the discontent' in this country,
almost inevitably traceable to
ii1.1!.
? .
a
Ian ew
.S.: rli,oritzeo
?.,
our seeming preoceupatiOn the conference might look into ?
with military ventures.
"We found the ? American.
people .confused and disillu-
sioned With growing 'escalation'
of.'the 'arms rade and cow:law
ing, foreign intervention, .to
the neglect ..of our .great
do-
inestic ills," Cook explained.
Sem Harold E. Hughes (D.
Added! ',"Many believe'
that' th4S, cenntry can' ,, b, de;
stroyed more rapidly, by 'fail-
ing...to ? meet ??the ? domestic
needs ? ,'? .In the Simplest Ian-
gu?,' the' pl'iorities for ?ir
military are to Spend' and keep;
spending. The. ,prierities..for
our cancerous !domestic prob,
lems; are.. neglect, postpone-
ment and, tokenism.;!
"
Not `Isolationists'..',
: r? , ? .t
. "Hughes ":' emphasizect.; that
none of thesponsoring legisla-
tors were against a proper na.-
tional defense, nor were they
new "isolationists," the term
President. Nixon recently used
in' criticizing the military's
critics. II ? '
Bingharri also made it plain
that the conference-1Friday-
and Saturday is not going to
limit itself to underlining the
cost of. just one-big new weap-
ons system like 'the proposed
Safeguard Anti-Ballistic
. ?
sue.
He itemized two "much
larger" items, now under con-
sideration: 1 aircraft' carrier
forces. complete' 'with escort
vessels, at a cost of $11A bil-
lion 'each; 'and 'the proposal'to
spend $2.5 billion 'by replacing
the F-4 fighter, which 'cOtts $4
million !per,planei? with' the:F.
114, which. :Aosta 414 !??
per plane.
war, how, the military decided
to 'assign ,a priority for 15 car:'
. .
rice forces Instead'of, say, five;
or ten. "He said the "hest..;
guess" was that 15 was the fig..;
ure permitted for U.S. battle..
ships in 'the:1021 disirmaiiient?
conference and, the ,Navy,-vgas;
,still sticking by ? i
Mingo' ',Hearings ,r:4)
,
..Saxbe suggested, that. on
'way to help 'Congress gain . a
better, understanding 'Of' the.
coilntry'S' Feakprioritieis woidd
,
.he .to have those nior inembera.;
. .
ot;?the armed aervices .and
'propriations committees' sit In
on 'a hunger heating for 1"
change. ? ? , .?-
Other lekislatois sponiorink
the weekend 'conference are::
Sen. Alan' Cranston' (l-Calif.
and RepS..'Seyniour Halpern'
(R-N.Y.), George B. Brown Jr.
(D-Calif.) and Richard L Ot..;
tinger ????? ? ? .1
The conference,, which will
be a follow-up to an explora-,
tory, one in March, will have;
the :same 'chairman: Arthur,
Larson,, 'director ?of Duke Uni-
versity's World Rule 'of Law
Center 'and beacf,,of the. US.s.
Information Ageney. 'during
the Eisenhower Administrii-'
tion. ! ? ?:
Among the'partielpantS
be Herbert Scoville Jr., a for-,
y
mer top official for both the
Central Intelligence .Agenc
and the Arms Control and Dis?;
armament. Agency; ? James ?
science .advisor.
President ! Eisenhower; Derek
Shearer,' last .year'a..presicient
of the Yale student body; and
Barry ..Weisberg, .a University
Of California (Berkeley) gradue,
ate who, now is.a iellowlattthei
BZ4Y,,AX.O3
? e (-AO e.r? ;4-'4? ?
? CCP A. "cE r ? c
t a ? ?,,-1
S' V.?,0 ? i);, -0
. ?
. . ? :
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? J
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000212103S
,
ri-G-tr-
1--- t. et-t-1 0,3
C 1 CkjcC
WASHINGTON POST
1e, -a
12 April 1977
.1 1
7-1
-.1 ',Li t?).
01
By :3 tVoodward
- S:aft Writer
A former CIA explosives expert and
three Cu'rean exiles will soon be
sought by ie.:le:al authorities for ques-
tioning in :he investigation of last
year's Embassy Row bomb-murder of
former ehiiean Ambassador Orlando
Letelier, according to informed
sources.
Edwin P. Wilson, the former Cen-
tral Intellinence Agency operative,
and the three Miami-based Cuban ex-
iles came to the attention of federal
officials when they learned that Wil-
son was under FBI investigation in an
unrelated assassination plot abroad.
Wilson allegedly sought to recruit
the three Cubans to kill a political op-
ponent of the Libyan leader, Col.
Muammar Qaddafi,' last year, accord-
ing to the sc:nrces.
Wilson heads a small consulting
firm here called Consultants Interna-
tional. It is involved in the arms ex- .
port business. Wilson was out of the
country yesterday and could not be
reached for comment.
In reviewing information developed
in the Libyan investigation of Wilson,
investigators have established these
possible connections with the Letelier
The three Cubans arc not among
the 10 anti-Castro Cubans who have
reportedly been questioned already
by the grand jury investigating the
Letclier murder.
"These are new Cubans and a com-
pletely new direction for the case."
said one source familiar with the in-
vestigation. The sources said, how-
ever, that the extent of Wilson's in-
volvement. if any, could not be
I learned until Wilson is questioned.
I In the Libyan investigation, the
!sources said that Justice Department
attorneys are not sure if any U.S. law
has been violated because the depart-
ment has no jurisdiction to prosecute
crimes committed abroad.
The Libyan case is now in the Jus-
tice Department Criminal Division for
case: ?
? Wilson bad a secret contract with
the Libyan government to provide de-
tonation devices called "timing pen-
cils"?a tuba !filled with chemicals
that can be remotely controlled to
trigger explosions. Such a "timing
pencil" is believed to have been used
to detonate the bomb that exploded
beneath Letelier's car.
** The three Cuban exiles arrived in
the Washington area just three days
before the Sept-. 21, 1976, bombing of
Letelier's,car.
:?Gne_of_the Cuban exiles, an ex-
plosives expert believed to have been
trained by the CL-1, in the 1960s, met
in Miami recently with a close associ-
ate of other Cuban exiles who have
been chief suspects in the Letelier
ease. -- ?
Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M.
Propper. who is in charge of the Lete-
lier investigation, met 6eottfhj
cials last week and asked'Ibr- all flies
? -and information on? Wilson and the
three Cubans, the sources said.
review.
That investigation began last year
when CIA (All-el-61s learned that a for-
mer employee was allegedly recruiting
Cubans for terrorist activity.
According to the Sources. Wilson
was acting under a Contract with the
Libyan government and wanted the
Cubans to assassinate a Libyan who
had exiled himself to Egypt much like
Letelier had exiled himself to the
United States after the September,
1973. coup in Chile and a year of im-
prisonment there.
The Cubans turned dOwn the job of-
fer, which was made by Wilson at a
meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, ac-
cording to the sources. ?
Upon learning of this; the CIA re-1
quested the FBI open an investigation
of Wilson. This case was so sensitive
that President Ford was personally in-
formed of it.
Wilson's contract with- Libya :in%
eluded a promise to supply thousands
of timing pencils. "It is one of the
most alarming things I've ever seen.".
one source said. "There were enough
[timing pencils] contracted for to sup-
port terrorist activity for the rest of
the century."
The Libyan government has in the
past supported terrorist activity. At a
news conference last July 19, Presi-
dent Ford said, "We do know that the,
Libyan government has in, many waysi
done certain things that might have I
raReltraebt0006/0144114t1A,
ln addition. the sources saloRtgla8-01315R000200350001-7
0
F&Al-1.1 T. -71
more current CIA employees who
have access to supplies of timing pen-
cils.
It is not clear from the investiga-
tion how many, if any, timing pen-
cils Wilson actually -supplied to the
Libyan government. -
The sources said Wilson also tried
to recruit other former CIA employ-
ees to be explosives instructors in
Libya. -
One former CIA employee was of-
fered S100,000 a year but turned it
down. Wilson himself had contracts
valued at hundreds of thousands of
dollars with Libya, according to the
sources.
Wilson has declined to answer ques-
tions from FBI agents in the Libyan
investigation, the sources said.
Consultants International is located
at 142.5 K St. NW. An official there
said yesterday that the firm was not
involved in any questionable activity.
According to the firm's own promo-
tional literature. Consultants Interna-
tional could supply an army with
equipment including patrol boats, par- :
tonfinue'd
e ty.q 1.05/1J; is-cAL
Q A-41 b A P. ti A int
I lc o f 61.. e_ }ft
,s(1-
there is some evidence that Wilson
raay have h0 contact with one or
_ _
10 oo
Approved For Release 2005/01/11. CIA-RDP88-01315R(10400350001171 ?r,/, ,
FREEDOM. AT ISSUE
Summer/October 1979
How-Weak -Is the
,
Arnold Beichrnan
In March-April 1976, almost an entire issue of this
mogd:ine was devoted to a broad consideration of the on-
going controversy over the role of intelligence agencies in a
free society. Investigations of irregularities in American
domestic and foreign intelligence operations had revealed
considerable evidence of official cbu.se of authority, illegal
activities, and improper use of intelligence services. At that
time, we concluded that regulatory reforms, as well as some
form of continuing, efficient monitoring of the intelligence
complex, were essential, not only to insure the national
welfare, but to protect the civil rights of Americans. Papers
by five scholars and experts published in that issue explored
how respect for the 'law might be reconciled with the
concurrent need for intelligence secrecy. Included were
proposals for rrionitorin,!:,, systems and reform by Senator
Margaret Chase Smith, and former NSA intelligence
research analyst, Dr. W Thomas Nichols.
As the intelligence controversy continues, we here present
another, now burgeoning aspect of the problem: Has the
reform of our intelligence services, and the measures by
which we have sought to implement the "right to know," in
fact destroyed the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence opera-
tions, to the point where the national safety is at seriom risk?
2 once wrote a "spoor article which was published in the
..Washington Star under the headline: "NOW THEY
WANT IT TO BE TOLD: The CIA, It Turns Out, Is a Front
for SUBMAG."
My revelation purported to be based on "a bulky work
about aiihase of American intelligence activity which I am
certain few people know anything about." What I provided
was an "introduction" to this "bulky work" in which I
"disclosed" that behind a Central Intelligence Agency which
was continually being attacked was the real intelligence
agency, SUBMAG, an acronym for "submerged agency."
The CIA's raison d': re was to have its activities exposed and
debated while SU BM AG, unobtrusively, did the real work
of intelligence. Its existence was to be known only by three
persons?the president, SUBM AG's director of operations,
and the author of the introduction, "a middle-echelon New
York State political leader."
The then editor of the Washington Star, Jim Bellows,
thought the article was hilarious, and in dead-pan fashion
put it on the front page of the Sunday editorial section on
February 15, 1975. On the same day the story ran, I was tele-
phoned by a prominent Washington journalist specializing
in intelligence matters. (For obvious reasons, he shall be
nameless.) He congratulated me on my "scoop:" Since my
story referred to "unpublished appendices and the report of
a committee," his news organization, he said, was prepared
to purchase the appendices and the report.
Thinking he was pulling my leg. I replied with mock
stuffiness that they were not for sale. H7 snapped that money
was no object. Sui
211YPIFAVINORKNOriffcf.c
thought ii,
ought the "scoo.
the appendices, everythIng,
second's silence, and then:
"My God, I just put a story
Wait a minute ? r
sft,ov
5
(.4,4 y it; f tj
C 1}3( 0)2 (u1-
was a big joke. There was a
about SUBMAG on the wirer
He returned in a few moments to the phone. He ',lad tried
to kill it, but the story had gone ciut already. He said to me:
-The damn thing made so much sense, we all believed it.
And,
I
And, of course,, it did make "sense.". For eight years, the
CIA had been exposed in newspapers and magazines-1975 ;
has been dubbed the Year of Revelations?although the
really big expos?came later when the White House and
congressional investigations began. Was it conceivable, a
KGB executive might well ask,' that a superpower like the
United States would so hamstring itself that its secret intel-
ligence work?covert action, clandestine collection of
information, counterintelligence?would be paralyzed? .
The problem with writing and thinking about intelligence
in an open, democratic society is that everything in this
nether-world, this world of non-secret secrecy, is plausible.
Anything you want to Say about intelligence activity and its
practitioners is "true." The more improbable, the more
probable. The accusation is the verdict. Den ie; is really af-
firmation, affirmation equals suspicion, suspicion equals
indictment, and indictment raises the unanswerable ques-
tion:
Are secret intelligence agencies and their\ activities
compatible with democratic values and aspirations?
The late Jean Monnet had an answer. He once told,Jamzs
Reston that "a democratic country as open as America can
never really run a secret service and, if it tries to do so, in frie
end probably its losses- are really greater than its gain;."
Some might agree with Monnet; others might agree With
Professor Sidney Hook who, in arguing for the necessity of
strategic intelligence, said: "Every ettuation.of moral choice
is one in which the choice is not between good and bad, right
or wrong, but between good and good, right,a.nd right, the
good and the right. One good may be overridden by a greater
good; one obligation by a more pressing one:
Planning for the future
Some months ago I. was in Washington at a colloquium on!
"intelligence requirements for the 1980s," arranged by the !
Consortium for the Study of Intelligence and consisting. of a -
group of academics?law professors, international relations
professors, historians?who have decided to act on the belief
that intelligence is too important to be left in the hands of a ;
much beleaguered intelligence establishment.2 Participants.
in the colloquium 2130 included formerh high-re nking (77
and Federal Bureau of Investigation executives, ecru st2"
members of the Senate and House Committees ort inz6-
licence, and staff assistants of several senators.
The meeting in part reflected a growing disquiet in
Washington, particularly on Capitol Hill, that the ertire. :
intelligence controvetsy perhaps had gone too far, and that
CIA-R n.7 the significance of past
O
e or.rarniliMtet7pOWSIOAT:hate Bill 2525. comprising ;
a new charter for the intelligence agencies. The.colloquium ;
also arose out of a concern that, while the coneressional ;
Approved For Release 2d01/01-7/91 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350021-7
_ Y
ff."------ - - I
540.6%. ? ( - .0 / .2 1.---A-ttari-=,-
/9 egi
Consortium for the
Study of Intelligence
Intelligence
Requirements
for the 1980's:
Elements of
Intelligence
Edited by:
Roy Godson
"7_17
r-
NEW 'YORK, NEW yoRK
POST Approved Per Release 2005/01/11
EVENING ? 606,842
WEEKEND ? 352,297
tti 3 0, 1974.
. ? rv.i
fl
rnrri*.
LI a.
Lie
rje-.7.3
NI 11 I 411,111
t.11111
VI I rt.:4
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5,?9?? UARREN.CDUARDIJ
1[3 U 73 ST .
Nr, VOW: NY
... 4". Yar,I,25,.rstri t4 1'00
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01,
MIZRZN?CD:mizt,..1
5-3F,72. GI,,..463-16
nr=
YVV.E.? VIVVV,
aa
Driver's license made out to Edward
identily used by E. kroward Hunt:
'
By mvm rosENirrAL
Edward Joseph Warren is
a well-dressed man, a music
lover, a grin enthusiast, a
resident of Manhattan's least
exclusive hotels. He is 55
:years old and has only one
veal problem ? he doesn't'
exist.
? He is a figment of the
:imagination of the CIA. The-
oretically, Edward Joseph
'Warren is what a properly
:disguised spy should resem-
?!.ble on.a clandestine mission.
? Convicted Watergate con-
spirator E. Howard Hunt
lived the few and only weeks
, of Edward Josaph Warren's
"life" in the stunmer of 1971.
In need of a cover for his
work as a White House
"plumber," Hunt requested
and received from the CIA
paraphernalia designed to
conceal his true identity
while providing him a new
one. With the help of CIA
technicians, Everett cello \.tit`',1?-?
Hunt Jr. became Edward Jo-
seph Warren. ?
%Published Documents ?
The details of how Hunt
became Warren can be traced
from documents on file with
?the Senate Wa.tergate corn-
nut tee in Washington. The
'documents were published by
the cominittee as part of the
. transcript of its hearings.
; One document on file is a
; phony New York State driv-
er's license, with Arpaimyed
West Side address. This
J. Warren,
the
license was forged," said a
Dept. of Motor Vehicles
spokesman. "It was never
issued by our agency." He
denied any department co-
operation with the CIA.
Acting Manhattan District
Attorney Alfred Scotti, while
unsure whether he had juris-
diction, said if his office
cold it Would consider pro-s-
ecuting those who falsified
the license. "A forgery is a_
forgery," said Scotti, "even
if committed by the govern-
ment." A spokesman for At-
torney General Lefkowitz
said his office had no juris-
diction in forgery cases.
Wallach's was apparentlY.
Edward Joseph Warren's fa-
vorite clothier. A spokesman
for the store was unable to
explain how Hunt obtained
one of its cards. "The CIA,"
he said, ''has never 'request-
ed any assistance from Wal-
lach's."
The CIA also Issued Hunt
a life membership in the
National Rifle Assn. An NRA
spokesman was disturbed
about the forged document.
"It certainly doesn't make us
look good," he said. "We
wouldn't wani. to be involved
In anything like 'Watergate."
Other companies NyhOF;C
i(lOnf ification cards were
foreede inel ti ding First
Nationel City rani:, New
York Life insurance Co.,
Continental Insurance and
roi\ Re4actb."2actszoi iftt)-
ings of mitigna
. ? . .oni
/13? ? -e-A-) `f-t / 10 u i',0
: CIA-RDP88-01315R0022, ( /, 6
0A35000y1-.7 weyiLi ficLuitia3
P.1Lf
informed of the frauds.
A New York Life official.' 1-7 QC S ,
could 'remember no similar.
Incident in the insurance 6 R 3 I.
company's history. "Ilut what
can you do," he asked, "take
the CIA into court?"
.1Vouldn't Cooperate'
While saying that "no legal
.action was antiCipated," a
high Citibank official?who'
asked that his name not be
used?eniphasized that '"we
.clid not ? and would not co:e
operate with the CIA."..
Sounding annoyed, the offin
cial added: "I\Toboy likes to.
' get mixe up in anything like.
this." .?
The quality of the
forgeries is readily apparent.
'to experts. The code number
?on the drivers license, 'de-
rived from a secret formula
involving the registrant's
birth date and name, so
closely resembled the authen-
tic version that State Motor
Vehicle Depts. authorities
originally thought the li-
cense was real. The "state
claims it. did not give the
.code to the. CIA, but says the
information is known to state.
troopers and is on file with
the FBL?
The 'CIA's knowledge of
codes apparently extends be-
yond those in the public sec-
tor. On all but one of the
other cards, the correct com-
bination of numbers and let-
ters was meticulously faked.
An Inconsistency
The phony Continental
.policy card was numbered
11-AF-65?1092. A Continental
spokesman quickly spotted.
an inconsistency, howevert
noting that AF refers to an
auto policy, which would
have seven final digit., not
six as on the Hunt version.
A spokesman for the CIA
declined to comment, when
asked if the state and pri-
vate firms had cooperated
in preparing,' the falsiiicd
documents.. He also refused
to disclose the name of the
CIA ?section which prepares
forgeries of this nature.
"Everything we've had to
say :Wont. Watergate," raid
C1At-REW8840315R0002410350001-7
ready t old Congress. Any
quest ens have ban already
and hetplessn'ess
s 7
P?insrL.C,.7
y, /c. 1Fc 1,.
? --1
ummlignimusummikr,o-
R 4-
Approved For Release 2005/01/11: CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
fARTZCLE iiPPEAREEI THE WASHINGTON POST SjJkc.k_
ox PAGE 24 MAY 1977 p.- (k) es
9oss izcc
.;Ezek Anderson and Les Whitten
A Sti et
?
?
Control Data is preparing to sell the
Soviets a SU million electronic brain,
which could be turned against us to
track U.S. missiles, planes and subma-
rines. I: is also capable of decoding
sensitive U.S. intelligence transmis-
sions. ?
The miracle machine is the Cyber 76,
which will soon be on its way to the
Soviet Union unless there is a last-
minute stop order. It not only will be
the largst computer ever delivered
behind else Iron Curtain, but it is more.
than a decade ahead of the Soviets'.
own computer technology. It operates
at least 20 times faster than anything
the Soviets produce.
A top-secret, interagency study
warns tersely that the Soviets can con-
vert the Cyber 76 to military use. Not
only can it be used for tracking and de-
coding, but it could also improve the
production of nuclear warheads, mul-
tiple-headed missiles, aircraft and
other military hardware.
There is no sure safeguard to pre-
vent this, the study declares. An intelli-
gence source put it more bluntly. "For
a few bucks," he told us, "we're willing
to give the Soviets the Means to de-
stroy us. We're becoming our own exe-
cutioners." ?
Government Officials, citing the
strict secrecy, refused to show us a
copy of the study. But sources with ac-
cess to the original draft have told us
of its warnings. They fear it may be
softened in order to make the corn-
plater deal more palatable.
Contrcl Data executives, in repeated
meetings with U.S. officials, have insis-
ted that the Cyber 76 will be used by
the Soviets strictly to study the
titer for
cc of* e, 2- C
6 fas2-etc JL
weather. The company kept hammer-
ing at Washington to get an export U-'
cense. Final Commerce Departmenl
approval of the deal, according to our
sources, was imminent until our in-
quiries caused some hesitation.
The sale of computers to Russia was
pushed originally by ex-Secretary- of
State Henry A. Kissinger. Eager to pro-
mote detente, he overruled military
objections to earlier computer sales.
Now that the Soviets have already re-
ceivecl lesser computers, they will be
enraged if the Cyber .76' Is withheld
from them, say our sources. ? ? .
One high official source, talking to
us in cotuidence, related how a mys-
terious Soviet official showed up in the
United States a few years ago. The
Central Intelligence Agency immedi-
atley spotted him as a man with a pur-
pose. He had come here, the CIA
warned, to seek strategic U.S. coraput--
ers. -
The State Department, under Kissin-
ger, persuaded the CIA to soften its
warning and to pass off the visitor as
merely the house guest of Soviet Am-
bassador Anatoli F. Do brynin.
This helped lead to computer sales.
not only' to Russia but also to China
and liungaryeln return for these so-
phistieated computers, according to an
International Trade Commission re-
port, the Soviets have offered the US.
"horses, asses and mules" at favored
prices. Russia's famous vodka will also
be sold to the United States at a tariff
of $1.2.5 a gallon, instead of the present
$5.
- Frustrated U.S. officials complain
that the Soviets are getting the best of
the. deal. They have gained strategic
advances from the computers -that
have already been delivered, these nf-
fides assert. But the Cyber 75 would
give them.a technological boost that
no amount of vodkaso-uld justify, they
say.
The secret study -declares categori-
cally, that the wonder machine both
could and would:be misused by the
Kremlin for military purposes. Those
officials who favor the sale contend,
however, that the Soviets will use the'
Cyber 76 to increase their participa-
tion in a world meteorological net-
work. The result, they say, would be
better international weather data,
larger crops and fewer unexpected
natural diasters. -
A spokesman for Control Data aa-
sured our reporter John Schuber that
the computer can be set up in Moscow
in a way to prevent any misuse. Any
diversion to military, use, he said, could.
be detected immediately. Then Con-
trol Data would pull out its technicians
and refuse parts to the Soviets, thus
crippling the electronic monster.
But other computer experts told our
reporter Tony Capaccio that Control
Data's arguments are spurious. One.
former Control Data executive, refer-
ring to the alleged.safeguards, said de-
risively: -That's a joke." Other experts
agreed that the Soviets could train
their own technicians, and eventually
locate parts from other countries.
Footmote: At the Commerce Depart-
ment, spokesmen confirmed that the
secret study disclosed "some pro-
blems" relating to safeguards against
the misuse of the Cyber 76. But the
draft report, said the spokesman I
wasn't final. .
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
:cmviteontIOENJ
Approved For Release 2005/01/11: CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
C("1 c) 6, ?
OB
Minneapolis Tribune
Thurs., April 14, 1977
"
11
r,
L?
Associated Press
The CIA will send about 20 peo-
ple to study management prac-
tices in Minneapolis-St. Paul area
? eompan i es as part of its training
courses for CIA employees.
A spokesman for the intelligence
' agency said it has sent middle-
management executives on such
trips around the country for sev-
eral years.
; The names of the participating
firms were not disclosed by CIA
sources, although it was 'learned
that Control Data Corp. and Bur-
lington Northern Railipad are
_among them.
A spokesman for Control Data
said the computer company would
explain theory and practice of
human resources development
techniques. These would explain
methods used in classroom in-
-.struction, multimedia and comput-
er presentations and textbooks.
Among Burlington Northern offi-
cials who will speak to the CIA
group will be about half a dozen
corporate executives, including
Louis Melk, chief executive offi-
cer.
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
?
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
THE WASHINGTON POST
3 October 1975
Grain Data
Collected
y CIA
By Dan Morgan
WJyhin9,Da itAft writrr
The Central Intelligence
Agency has been collecting
detailed information from
private U.S. companies on
their sales of grain to the
Soviet Union and other
countries, even though the
same data is gathered by Cie
Department of Agriculture.
The grain export in-
formation ? obtained by the
agency's domestic collections
branch, which often debriefs
businessmen who travel
abroad -- is used to make
assessments of. the strategic
balance in grain supplies.
CIA officials have indicated
in the past that they consider
grain supplies to be an im-
portant element of national
security, and possibly a useful
gauge of international
behavior of the Soviet Union, a
major grain importer.
A recent series of detailed CIA !
inquiries to grain companies
includes -requests for in-
formation on worldwide'
Russian demand for grain,
and estimates of world sales to
the Soviet Union, or East
Europe, including American
grain sales on a Weekly basis.
A Department of Agriculture
spokesman said yesterday
that he had no idea why the
CIA was collecting the in-
formation. 'In 1973, Congress
gave the department
responsihil4y for compiling
weekly rePorts of all grain
sales abroad. In addition to
those weekly reports, U.S.-
based firms are now required
to inform the department
within 24 hours of any sale
exceeding 100,000 metric tons.
Referring to the duplicate
commercial export in-
telligence gathering of the
CIA., the chief of one major
grain company said this
week: "They stay in touch
with us all the time."
Edward W. Cook, chairman of
the board of Cook Industries, .
Inc., of Memphis, said in an
:inteiview that he often reports
the same information to both I
FFierReileaseg005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
Dbpartment. "They stay in
contact with people who are I
doing business with areas in
said. "It could be Brazil, could
be Russia, or it could be
France." Cook said the CIA
gets no more information
about the sales than the
Agriculture Department gets,
adding, "There doesn't seem
to be much coordination in '
Washington." A department '
official said recent1S, that it
sometimes seemed that the
CIA's export data was
reaching top officials of the
Agriculture Department
before the department's own.
CIA officials could not be
reached for comment
yesterday.
tic D AA,
cS.c.13 S /Z.
STAT Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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Approved
e)r_ci.i1 Goa k e5 ?11..
Ae ?"eizt?,c? -v.F.,? ?
For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01316R0gAtpq?(490ilifi e ? ?
? ? 1
et,,A.Vtei.Vt'4'.
? , ? ?
SOC ?tAT CO
4- -to
I ?
eLl ?11\lj 0
it can probably do so for a short period, an
When that period is over it should 'generally
? adirkit what it did arid why. For it is continual
exaggeration and distortion rather than the
vidual lie that are 'really damaging to a societ
Approved For Release'2005/01(11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
0-10, - ct_
DAILY WORLD
Approved For Release 220491/TA): CIA-RDP88-01315R000200354091:A,
s
arge
ile ad co sgigugon
peo
P< S'
e iles s
' NEW . YORK, May 1?The - costs of the escalating war in
following statement con-
lives and broken families. Run-
'.
away prices and taxes will in-
. demning U.S. aggression .? in-
crease further.. Paychecks and
against Cambodia was is; contract settlements will be cut,
'sued today on behalf of the . even as unemployment grows.
National .Committee of the ? Programs for schools, hospitals, - thomeho N at xnodo a rAodut on dt otths et rwo totro Ind ftoo r cterdy ,..
welfare, etc. will suffer even, ,.
Communist Party by James '? sharper slashes. ? .! to achieve the same results by '?
"Jackson, international af- , Jingoism, racism and repres- , scaling down U.S. ground forces, ..
:lairs secretary, and Daniel' . ? ?
mon will be further stimulated. ' ' with puppet troops increasingly '
Rubin, national organiza- , In our country where racism has . .atankdincgosouvaeltriesth. eTtforoautntedmfgh is
sintgo -
' tional secretary: . been the main tool of reaction for .
In launching his criminal ag-
..:. so long, it is not possible for Pres- deceive public opinion and reduce
gression against Cambodia, follow-
, ident Nixon to' rattle the saber:- the Massive popular opposition,
ing the bombardment of Laos,
jingoistically in justifying the ? . while pursuing the same aims.
,
slaughter of darker peoples in .: Such a policy was bound to fail,
President Nixon is violating the
Constitution of the United States for it does not recognize that the
and defying the expressed will' -
Southeast Asia, treating them as
mere pawns of U.S. imperialism, ,_' Thieus and Lon Nols can achieve -
without promoting racism at -'y no stable popular support because
of the American people. He is vio- , ? they serve the interests of U.S.
lating Cambodia's sovereign home.
tary means. Having failed to force
such a solution at the conference .
table or in fact on the battlefield,
Lt has sought to exhaust the Viet-
.namese in a war of attrition.
A rising tide of opposition at
,
rights and is recklessly gambling
It was no accident that at the .- imperialism and not those of their
.
with moving to a world nuclear
moment U.S. troops were being .own people. "Vietnamization"
? .
war. lie tries to cover up the deed
.was, therefore, both immoral and
sent into Cambodia, other, federal
troops were being sent to Connec- doomed to faiture because the
- ? and the danger by a series of lies
ticut. They were sent there to Provisional Revolutionary Gov-
, and false promises. That disas- ernment represents the popular
Gov-
intimidate and provoke a mass
trous course must be reversed, will for national freedom and the
rally opposing a repression which
. The most massive and militant
response by millions of our peo-
- Thieu-Ky regime is nothing but a
has especially singled out the
fascist, dictatorial creature of
pie must be mounted to the new, Black Panther Party and the black
criminal expansion of agkression community for victimization.
, the CIA.
in Cambodia. The mask has been Such a course requires Presi- "Vietnamization" immediately
removed. The policy pursued by
dent Nixon to couple his announce- required military buttressing of
Nixon is the continuous expan-
ment of expanded aggression with the Thieu clique to have any hope
sion of the brutal aggression in
threats not only to university stu- of success. These steps included
-
Vietnam, Laos and now Cambodia.
dents but even to the Senate and stepped up bombing in South Viet-
' '
' Thousands of U.S. ground troops ' Supreme Court. It requires lying
nam, increased bombing and mil-
itary action in Laos and the CIA-
? engineering coup in Cambodia.
But the CIA coup in Cambodia
rapidly suffered the same fatal
. weakness. The Lon No) regime; a
tool of the CIA, had no popular'
..support and was rapidly collapsing
' before the wrath of the Cambodian .
peoples. A new crisis then con-
fronted the military preparations
for "Vietnamization"; the next
? .logical step in its pursuit is being
taken, military action to save the
Lon No) puppets.
President Nixon acknowledged
?as well as planes and supporting about'invo vemen
units have invaded Cambodia to- country in the TV speech ten days
gether with Saigon puppet troops. r before and to the Senate two days
The inevitable result will be in- before the April 30 announcement.
It
tensified fighting throughout the requires acting contrary both,
entire area and a grave new to the 'will of the people ex-
threat to world peace. To the pressed in actions and polls and to
325,000 admitted U.S. casualties
the opinion of Congress and, there-
will be added new thousands in
by, violating fundamental princi-
, the stepped-up war. The toll of pies of the Constitution he has
Vietnamese, and now Cambodians sworn to uphold.
and Laotians, predominantly non- ?
combatant women and children, The new aggression arises out
Is of genocidal proportions. Song of a crisis in the policy of so-called
My's will increase ? "Vietnamization." U.S. ruling , that the military support had to be
In the U.S. the mass of workers, imperialist circles have sought to:;US forces and Saigon puppet
I particularly black, Chicano and maintain control of South Vietnam troops because Lon No) could
us-
Puerto Rican, will pay the heavy which can only be done by mill-
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ter no myw Lie 'massively
armed."
i Thus. in six months the decep-
tion of "Vietnamization" and .
troop withdrawals has become:
clear. It is obvious that the same
policy can only be pursued by '
increased U.S. military involve-
ment. ? ,
?
There is no doubt of the reply.
which the peoples of Vietnam. ?
Laos and Cambodia will give..
They will close ranks even more '
firmly and raise the level of poli-
tical, diplomatic and military
mass struggle against expanded '
aggression. The "six to eight '
week" operation in Cambodia
could not succeed even in six to
eight centuries.
There is no doubt that the Soviet
Union, other socialist countries
and all progressive forces in the
world will step-up every form of
support to these peoples.
Nixon's arbitrary criminal ac-?
? tion has incurred the wrath and
condemnation of the peoples of all
; continents. The only course for the-,
United States is in the opposite
? direction.
? Truly, there is only one possible
way to end the war. That is on the'
just basis set forth by the Provi-
sional Revolutionary Government,
proposals which in no way violate
the interests of the people of the
U:S.
This requires an end to the sup-v
port for the Thieu regime, the es-_ .
tablishment- of a popular coalition
government of neutrality, and the
complete withdrawal of U.S. mil.: .
itary forces. The U.S. must get
out immediately.
\ Such a fundamental change in ,
policy may be a defeat for certain
imperialist groupings but it will
be a victory for our people and,
country, as well as for the people .
of Vietnam, Laos and, Cambodia .
and of the whole world.
? ?
Among our own people there is
already the widest cry of outrage
yet heard against what is becom-
ing the longest and most dishonor-
able war in U.S. history. The task
is to give that mass sentiment,
especially among workers, black,
brown and white, and in the black
Community, organized and effec- ,
tive expression. It will need to
take many forms ? all kinds of
mass demqnstrations and mar-
ches. petitions and pressures on ?
those seeking election. There,.
must be a demand for all public,'
personalities to speak out against
the escalation. To the millions in':
labor who. spoke out previously
against the war must now be add-
ed the entire labor movement.
. ?
0
There are those who express
tiredness at demonstrations ex-
press defeatist sentiments.
Some excuse inaction by argu-
ing other issues are more impor-
tant than the fight to end the war,
while others substitute individual, .;
terror for mass action, and attack,'
non-Left and even Left sectors of
- ? ' ? ?? -4-
the peace movement as though
they were enemies.
Now is not the time for anyone.
under whatever cover, to abandon
the responsibility to act and to
organize the widest possible oppo-
sition to the stepped-up aggression.
This is the highest responsibility
to the people of the U.S., to the.
Vietnamese and other peoples of
Southeast Asia and to the people
of the world. By this history shall
judge us.
There is every possibility of vic-
tory.
President Nixon's moves re-
flect weakness and crisis of pol-
icy as well as grave danger. The
retirement at the polls of all war
supporters and the defeat of Nixon
and his running-dog Agnew,
after one term are fully realizable.
The possibility of defeating ra-
cists and anti-labor candidates,
and electing representatives of
peace forces, labor, the black com-
.mUnity, youth and women, who
represent advanced democratic
and even Left positions, exists.
? Not only does President Nixon
deserve to be retired after one
term, he deserves impeachment
for his violations of constitutional
government and of the best inter-
ests of our country. Mass action
alone can decide! .
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A.Plf.F.4.REO 8 OCTOBER 197o1
ON PAGE cite* 021 tx-ilp Q
C/4 q eLtdbtAi4)
:Ey?Jereitelah O'Leiry.
viumnaton :tar Sian Writer
Instigators probing the bomb
murder of Chilean exile Orlando Le-
teller are operating on the theory
that the slaying could have been
carried out by Latin extremists of ei-
ther the right or left and may even be
part of a much. larger conspiracy.
. It has been _assumed, by many
partisan spokesmen since Letelier
was killed here by a dynamite
charge in his car on Sept. 21 that the
former defense minister in the Marx-
ist Allende government was the vic-
tim, of the Chilean military junta's
DINA secret police organization. ?
But --officials ? investigating the
murder are far from ready to make-
that *assumption. FBI officials re-
fused to comment on the investiga-
-tion but it was made known yester-
day that the-probers are not ruling
out -the theory that-.Letelier might
just as Well have been killed by leftist
extremists to create a martyr as by-
rightist conspirators. - ? e
It was pointed out by sevecal offi-
cials, however, that Chile's rightist
junta had nothing to-gain and every-
thing to lose by- the ?murder of a
popular and peaceable Socialist lead-
er at: a time when _Chile's financial
problems were coming up for review
in Washington. = ? ? '
- SOME LATIN EXPERTS consider
that the Movimiento Izquierdista
Revolucionario, the activist wing of
Allende's government before the 1973
revolution, must be as much suspect-
ed as the strong-arm DINA organ-
lzation of the Chilean .military re-
- ? -
girne
? But suspicion alSo : has been '
-focused on a relatively new and vio-
lent Cuban right-wing organization,
CORU, whose principal leader is
Orlando Bosch, 49, currently a fugi-
tive from American justice because
...of his activities in Miami.. :rex, ee
robelnoludes Martyr Theory -
!so Suspect
zno- o cfr ti/.. froJe_fe 0 re. is el,?
C'4 d1
Ott. Al.dif)?:-.?
CORU. the Coordination of United
Revolutionary Organizations, is an
umbrella organization of five anti-
Castro groups that came -into exist-
ence last June and has been a source
? of apprehension to the State Depart-
ment ever since. ? - -
A U.S. official said some time be-
fore Letelier was killed , that
Washington is deeply disturbed about
CORU's bombings and terrorist ac-
tivities inside and outside the United
Stares. ,-
COM; ? - MADE LIP of five
cooperating groups: Accion Cubana,
a small Miami-based group which
claimed credit for bombings of
several Cuban embassies in 1974; the
National Liberation Front of Cuba,
also based in Miami and headed by
Frank Castro, which similarly has
claimed credit for bombings; the As-
sociation of Veterans of the Bay of
Pigs,: a Miami 'group ,headed by
Roberto Carballo; the Movimento 17
de Abril, a splinter group of the Bri-
gade 2506 which was formed last
_April and is led by :Juan _ Perez ,
- Franco; and the.Movimento Nacion-
alista Cubana, another Miami group
.led by Felipe Rivero Dias which has
been involved in bombings and other
terroristic acts within and outside the
United States. e- ? -"- ,
U.S._ sources say the five groups
joined CORU have agreed that the
organization will never claim any
I terrorist activities ? in the United
States and will publicly condemn
such actions in-order to avoid being
identified by-Americans as a terror
. organization. Frank Castro has al-
legedly formed - satellite .. terrorist
cells to carry out operations in the-
United States under the name of Jo-.
venes de Estrella (Youth of the Star)
In Miami and, as F14 in the New York
area .. ? ,-----
Intelligence sources have at-
- tributed several recent terrorist acts
to CORU members- including the
Sept.-1 bombing of the Embassy of
Guyana in Port of Spain, T idad;
? an explosion at the Mexican embas-
sy in Guatemala City on Sept. 1 and
other bombings in Barbados and
Jamaica.- - e :?
, ee, .:71,1 5 7 ?
THESE SOURCES SAY the Guya-
nese embassy was bombed in retali-
ation for Guyana allowing Cuban
planes to refuel there en route to
Angola. The Guatemala bombing re-
portedly was in retaliation for Mexi-
co's failure to release two CORU
_ members who tried to kidnap the
' Cuban consul in Merida, Mexico.
The latest incident of possible anti-
Castro bombing occured earlier this
week when a Cubana jetliner, was-
ripped by an explosion shortly after
taking off from Barbados on a flight
from Georgetown,. Guyana, to Cuba.
All 78 passengers were killed. A man
who called the Miami Herald claim-
ed a group called "El Condor"
placed a bomb on the Cuban plane.
Orlando Bosch. a pediatrician, is
now believed by intelligence sources
to be in Caracas, Venezuela. Accord-
ing to these sources. Bosch says' that
two anti-Castro activists affiliated
with the New York cell of CORU
were responsible foc the death of Le-
teller and that these men are the only
anti-Castroites still collaborating
!, with DINA. Bosch is said to be
claiming that Letelier's death was
neither planned nor approved by
CORU.':.-
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;
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pet,otc last year's Senite
Select Committee?s report on In-
telligence saying there was
rn.!s,a?e OA influence in U.S.
universities. the Central In-
telligenee Aeeney is still in the
edus:ation business. The. CIA is
Still funding research conducted
on many. of the nation'.s campuses,
is still recruiting students and
professors f.r est racurricul ac-
tivities.and is still helping foreign
spy agencies ..keep tabs on
dissident foreign students.
The full scope of CIA
involvement on campuses may
never be known. According to
the final report of the Committee.
scores .of professors, ad-
ministrators and graduate
students are actively engaged in
"open" and "eladestine" CIA
work. They recruit American and
foreign students, write propagan-
distic literature, conduct research
and travel abroad using their
cloak of academic. status for
cover.
Specifics of these operations
were deleted by the CIA before
the Committee released its final
report, including the names of.
whatever individuals and in-
stitutions that had been
cooperating .with the CIA. And
due to a Presidential order given.
last year. the CIA will continue
to enter into "contracts and
arrangements" for "classified or
unclassified research... with
.academic .institutions." It is not
yet known whether or not
President Carter will continue
this policy.
1.1 fr,71.:1; ;),
'43) I LI 111,11.k.e)!.i.3 1.,P,4;120
NA,7
However, an increasing, um-
ber of students and fa item-
hers
cm-
hers throughout the COUntry have
bee. ye very vocal in their disap-
prre.al with the too-cozy relation-
ship between the C:1A and
colleges. The unsavory flavor
ass.vjated with a nwititudc or
CIA activities has led several.
national academie associations to
condemn clandestine CIA
presence on campus.
Although they have received
little national attention, the
National Student Association, the
American Association of Univer-
sity Professors and the Council of
American -Political Science
Association
ha ?,?'e. passed
-
resolutions opposing ;lolly
initiation by government agencies
to involve academia in covert in-
telligence operations under the
guise of ?academ h ic research and
have asked their members not to
participate in such activities.
But for some, that is not
enough. Nathan Gardel. a
student attending the University
of California in Los Angeles,
wants to know the full extent of
involvement between the CIA
and the University system. Ile has
filed for this information through
the Freedom of Information Act
and is currently trying to have the
? 53.000 copying fee waived to get
? it. Gardel, however, has not stop-
ped there.
He wants to see all correspon-
dence between the CIA and the
nine-school university system
relating to the CIA recruitment
drive of lost year and all infor-
mation about UC contracts, Gar-
de( believes that the UC
president. David Saxon, has not
been entirely free with the infor-
mation. Garde( explained "this is
not to say he (Saxon) knows
everything" but we'd like to see
what he does know. At present,
the CIA is openly funding
weather climate research at UC
San Diego. Climate warfare was
used by the CIA in Vietnam and
Cuba.
?
ti
11 [11 it; r
-
More recently, an alleged CIA
connection with a college
professor of Brooklyn Collcv_e itt
New York has stirred con-
troversy to the point where the
faculty members of the political
science department have asked
for their colleague's removal
front the staff.
The professor, M iCh a C1 I.
Selzer, has been charged by
several faculty members, one of
Elicit his brother-in-law, with
being associated with the CIA. In
a statement to the president of
the college. the department mem-
bers said that because of Selzer's
'admitted agreement in covert
intelligence activities for the .
CIA, he has violated._ under-
stood, accepted statements (by
national associations) and casts
grave doubts of his credibility as
a teacher, scholar and
professional colleague... and that
his actions as described warrant
removal from the college.'"
Selzer, according to one
professor, first became. involved
wito the CIA last spring. Selzer is
quoted as saying "his work for the
CIA was only confined to
Europe." No other details are
known.
Selzer supposedly admitted his
CIA connection at a recent
deparmental meeting. He is now
in Israel on a leave of abserieu
but when contacted there b.
several New York ilewSiY1pCr,
Selzer denied that he had air
contact with the CIA. Ile al;.;
said tlE9 take.legat action
dismissed and is contemplatin2
libel charges.
- A spokesperson for the collei
said time president, Dr. Joh
Kneller, has alrcdy set up a eon;
mittee to investigate all facts am
alllegations pertinent to the cast
and assured all that Selzer".
rights would be protected.
In a prepared statement
however, Kneller said. "It is te,.
to an individual faculty membei
whether he wants to establi,h a;
'open.' relation with an in.
telligence agency. I stress Ott.
word 'open' because I think therm:
is cc; place in the academie com-
munity for a clandestine relation.
ship of any kind."
One organization, based in
Washington. D.C.., is attempting
to college and distribute any and
all information regarding CIA-
campus related activities. "Fhe
Center for National Security
Stitch ies offers information,
education material. pianphlets
and speakers for thosc? who v.ish
to join in - ending convert
operations on capiptts..Write or
phone Christy Macy at the Cen-
ter. 122 Maryland Ave.,
Washington, D.C. 20002, (202)
544-5330.
C-L-4 (-_(_i
oe- /
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(-
DALLAS HORNING NEWS CeA t. 04- H..-
ARTICLE APPEARED 22 August 1978
ON PAGE 4D
?
E. Howard Hunt allegedly in Dallas
k;7: t L. F.
ciri I-- 0 ter ../bArfi
e 4,4
Memo's existence denie
By EARL GOLZ ?
Stansfield Turner, director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, said here
Monday his agency has found no memo
stating that E. Howard Hunt was in-Dal-
las when President John F. Kennedy
was assassinated on Nov. 2Z 1963.
? The memo allegedly was written in
? 1966 and initialed by CIA Director Rich-
ard Helms and CIA counterintelligence
chief James .1: Angleton, according to a
story in the-Wilmington, Del., Sunday
News JournaL
THE MEMO ALLEGEDLY said the
presence of CIA agent Hunt in Dallas
on the day of the assassination "had to
be kept secret" and a cover story giving
Hunt an alibi for being elsewhere
"ought to . be considered," the News
Journal said. Hunt later was convicted
for his part in the 1972 Watergate
?
burglary.
The newspaper said Hunt was acting
chief of the CIA station in Mexico City
"in the weeks prior" to the assassina-
tion.
Accused assassin Lee Harvey Oswald
visited Mexico City in late September
and October 1963 and talked to officials
at the Cuban and Russian embassies in
an effort to arrange passage to Cuba,
the Warren Commission said. ? .
? Turner said neither Helms, Angle-
tbn nor Hunt has been quizzed by the-
CIA about the alleged memo because
. 'It's not our job to question them."
He said any probe into the existence
of the memo- should be ? done- by the
:..IIouse Assassinations Committee. .
In: Dallas . to.? speak at a
'luncheon.- sponsored - by the Dallas
- Council on WorldAffairs at the Shera-
.: ton-Dallas Hotel, said be-has no knowl-
edge the committee ever asked for or
obtained such a- memo. .He said his
agents have "turned ourselves upside
--aown"'-' to gev1. any information
: requested by the committee; ?
- "We have a working.. arrangement ?
.. with the committee as to what can be
turned over and what cannot," Turner
said..
All CIA documents about the
assassination uncensored except
when the identity of an agent might
endanger his life have been released
to the committee, he said.. . -
THE NEWS JOURNAL article also
said: "Some CIA sources speculate that
Hunt thought he was assigned by high-
er-ups to arrange the murder" of
Oswald. ?
. ? -
A.- letter purportedly: written by
Oswald on Nov. 8, 1963, asking a "Mr.
Hunt" for "information concerning my
position" was first printed by. The Dal-
las Morning News in the spring of 19Th
The letter, authenticated as
Oswald's handwriting by three
handwriting experts commissioned' by
The ? News; concluded, "/ am asking
only for information. I am suggesting
that we discuss the matter fully before
any steps are taken by 'me or anyone
else." " ?
" An unidentified source mailed a
copy of the letter from Mexico City to
. independent assassination researcher
Penn ? Jones Jr. of Midlothian. The
source claimed he delivered a copy to
FBI Director Clarence Kelley in. late
. 1974. .k
? The unsigned cover letter from the
' Mexico City source, written in. Spanish,
said the letter from Oswald to Mr. Hunt ,
"could have brought out the circum-I.
stances to the assassination of Presi-j
dent Kennedy." By mid-1975, Kelley ,
had not responded to the 1974 delivery.;
of the letter, the source said, so a copy
was sent to Jones.
HUNT REPEATEDLY has denied he
was in Dallas on the day of the assassi-
nation. He also has said he was-not in
Mexico City after 196L
- Hunt's explanation that he took off
at noon on Nov.22, 1963, and went shop-
ping and ate a Chinese dinner in down-
town Washington with his wife I
allegedly was described by CIA SciurCes1
as "a cover story concocted as. a result
of the Temo,",the News Journal article
said. -
"They (CIA source) say all ...of
Hunt's witnesses are CIA-arranged and
that his wife cannot be questioned
because she was killed in a plane
crash," the newspapersaid.
1? ej I
Z-41Mr
t( 6-5
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MAY
embirig-t.
!aimed.
y. roup
A1etterpurporflng to be from
a group aIIed . the. Continental
Revolutionary A r ra y (CRA)
claimed !responsibility- for the
bombind Monday if th6iAmere
fean,,-Nitional? Bank; ad. the
eastPepver home of apCentral,
Intelligence Amc.yei A-ki:Or-
-fitli.47reakt7 Robert Shaulit-
messittrported.
Shaughnessy, bead of the
polide (bomb squad, said the let-
ter was received Welneeelay af-
ternoon-by the Straight Creek
Journal, a weekly netspaper.
3 TYPED NOTES.' t.
The.letter made rtfirence
"the,oppression ? of the Puerto
Rican people," according to the
editor, Ron Wolf: Me - said the
letter consisted of Ihree -typed
notes. _ ? ,ee
. Shaughnessy' - diseountede the
authenticity of the ;letter. "We
have a number.af letters on,file
we. know -arc- Authentically
CRA, and a, comparison causes
us to doubt the 'authenticity of
this letter," Shaughnessy-said.
. The CRA, leell,eved to be a
sinal!, local ? grp14: of .anties,
t a lel ishme ritt persons, also
claimed responsibility for the
'bombing .of a ;Public Service
Co. of Colortlo ',facility. i
Adarn5 Countyiand a warehouse
owned by International -Tele-
phone 'le Telegraph Co. in lower
downtown Denver last year.
EARtIER 14TTER
A letter purporting to be from
the CRA also claimed responsi-
bility after bombing Feb. 3 at
the Park Central complex a few
blocks frora the American Na-
tional Bang. -
Four women- were injured
slightly in the explosion ? Mon-
day at American National, 17th
and Stout: Sts. No one plop
in the explosion at the home of
James M. $ornmerville, chief of
CIA-RDP88-01315R0020/01500'61)45 ? 6-e" V (''-?,/ (71:?-?
fil 10 strolltte.,..zufit
? ..7-4-1,41e-rs
DENVER, COLORADO
ROCKY MT. NEWS
M 214,490
S - 236 tgn 19151
6/1
e volt' f;6 .4-Al
)61-ia vny)
Paper: Revolutionary army claims bond? credit
A Denver weekly newspaper has received a-
-letter from a group calling itself the Continen-
tal Revolutionary Army in whieh the group
claimed responsibility for the Monday bomb-
ings at the American National, Bank and the
home of Central .Intelli?Agency regional
director Jamesirmxnerv1fle.
After obtaining a copy of the letter from the
Straight Creek Journal, pollee Capt. Robert
Shaughnessy said, "Certain elements in this
letter lead us to believe it is not authentic. We
have authentic CRA letters on file and the dif-
ference between them and this one calms us to
question the anebenticity of this letter."
Monday, four employes of the American Na-
tional Bank, 17th and Stout Streets were in-
jured
office.
when a bomb exploded outside their/
Approximately 12 hours later a pipe bomb ex-i
plWed outside Sonimerville's southeast Denveri
home. No one was injured. _
Shaughnessy said he can find no conneetioni
between the two blasts.
? The CRA is believed responsible for thei
bombings of a Public Service Co. substation in
Adams County a year ago and one at
fitting firm owned by International Tele-
a oil
phone & Telegraph Co. last October.
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_ .
e I. 4, 4 RU.4424.0.1
_ ;TARED
?
WASHINGTON POET
21 MARCH 19 83
ormI,Gree
The 'New Volunteers' of Silicon Vail
By Jay Mathews
Washington Post Staff Writer
PALO ALTO, Calif.?In a converted auto body shopa
few blocks from Stanford University, the' maelstrom of
money and competitive tension known as the Silicon Val-
ley has produced its oddest byproduct, 'a group of afflu-
ent dropouts bent on saving the world. -
Gene Richeson had cofounded one of the world's most
successful high-technology electronic firms by the time
be was 30. Ed Kyser had helped perfect a profitable ink
jet-printer before he was 40. Jim Burch was a writer and
vice president with the West Coast branch of a leading
advertising firm. Mike Helft was vice president of an
electronics firm.
_
Today each works -full time, without salary, at the Cre-
ative Initiative Foundation, a startling demonstration of
what can occur .when-boredom and nuclide -self-exami-
nation catchup-with those favored few-Americans who
have made it bigintheir 30s and 40S.-
The foundation, which has tackled a-range of contem-
porary problems,..-from- energy conservation to -chemical
contamination-to-the-nuclear arms race,.isdrawing a new
kind of volunteer bright and wealthy people willing to
abandon lucrative careers in the Silicon Valley, the dense
collection of electronics firms south of San Francisco that
offers chances for rapid advancement and instant riches.
Now headed by Richard Rathbun, an architect whose
father helped build one of this area's first high-tech
firms, Creative Initiative has 28 couples with one or both
partners engaged in -trying to stop the nuclear. arms race._
Most of the men are on unpaid leave from high-salaried
positions. Mark Blitz, assistant director of
the federal Action agency and an expert on
volunteer programs in the United States,
said he knows of no other program outside
Silicon Valley that has so many successful
executives abandoning their careers for full-
time volunteer work.
Blitz said some large firms are now offer-
ing paid leaves to executives to do nonprofit*. ;
volunteer work. Among such- volunteers is
Pete Paffrath of the Creative Initiative staff,
an IBM executive on a year's paid leave to
work on the-foundation's 'Beyond 'War" film
project. ?
Before he.decided to spend his time tell-
ing other businessmen of the need to create
an alternative to a nuclear holocaust, Riche-
son, 41, had climbed from a small-town boy-
hood in Telco; Tex., to success as a CIA sur-
,1
veillanw ?..1)
top of t e
form in 1969.
We Wan?
orp., win= he
bAft
/11 ?
"When we were first married, we had de-
fined a number of goals," said ?Donna Riche-
son, 38, a former CIA Staff , employe who
works for Creative, Initiative. "We would
have a family, Gene would advance himself
in his career. But we thought it would take
much longer-than? it took. We had our chil-
dren, we had a nice home, and we thought,
!What else is it thatlife is all about'?'"
Richeson's father died at age 60, when
Richeson_was?.30.1-began to think that I did
not have an 'unlimited amount of time," -he
said. With the 'stock he had accumulated in,
his company-he knew. he could afford to..iio 4
-something -else.- One partner-applauded .his ;
plan, another' "thought I was crazy,' "but*he
dropped it all in 1977 and, went to work for
Creative Initiative.
Bob Harwell was a divisional 'controller
withliewlett-Packard, a certified nubile- se- -
countant ,cautious ?approach io?
But he haPperreeto take one of the courses'
in philosophy kid' human relationships spon-
sored by Creative Initiative a decade ago, ,
-and found it to be 'a revelation." ?
When the group began its "Beyond War"
project; Harwell "made a very quick deci-
sion' and took a year off last May. The re-
action at Hewlett-Packard, which he calls "a
. very conservative company," was surprisingly
favorable. With his company stock holdings
and a trust fund left to his wife by an uncle,
they could still support themselves and their
three song.
The philosophical core of the Creative Ini-
tiative Foundation started with an electrical
engineer, lawyer and Stanford Business
School professor named Harry Rathbun, now
87, and his wife Amelia, now 77. The couple
turned an interest in philosophy into a series
of seminars on personal relationships and
alternative approaches to contemporary
problems, attracting people from the San ;
Francisco area.
Richard Roney, 38, on leave from .ROLM
Corp. to Work for Creative Initiative, said he
and his wife Regina, 37, attended a founda-
tion course called "Challenge for Change" 10
years ago.
He was struck by a book in the course
written by Victor Frankel, a psychiatrist who
- had survived the -Nazi concentration ramps ?
CIA-RDP88-9103?Et9lJ4t9.0350001 -7
"His point was.- if you had a larger purpose
in life, you could survive anything," Roney
A ved For Re,14 e 1 CIA-R
_
Ick-4-C7 rINC-2- CIL eiv (- 0
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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION 1"074;1767t70+
UNCLASSIFIED 1
CON F DENTIA SEC E
1 (...".
OFFICIAL ROUTING
TO
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DATE
INITIALS
EC F
,5- iFertel-g,c-WgZ)
.
03 Z
c in -
1,12-0
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
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CONCURRENCE
INFORMAIION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
Andrew:
called to say on or
about 1 March a court case, Oliver v. CREEP,
will take place with Barker and Martinez (of
"Watergate fame) suing CPE EP. p, The-4 will claim
that they were told by CREEP that Watergate was
a CIA caper.
will our man in
the witness chair. (DDO- tel is J that Knoche
was subpenaed last night., and tit
24 Feb.).
win
testify jdc
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
2/18/77
UNCLASSIFIED I I CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
FORM NO, 237 Use previous editions
1-67
USGPO: 1975-202-953
?
(40)
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STAT Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
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NEW YORK TIMES
13 JAN 1975 CIA 1.04 AGEE, Philip
Approved For Release 200/01/11 CIA-RDP88-01315ROODOVU-PONESTIC SPYING
. ?
Ex-Agent Says C.I.A. Screened Oil Staff
speciil to The Now York Time!
BRUSSELS, Jan. 12?A for-
mer agent of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency said here today
that the Creole Petroleum Cor-
poration, a subsidiary of the
Exxon Corporation, used. the
C.I.A. in 1960 to screen em-
ployes in-Venezuela.
The former agent, Philip
Agee, who has begun a cam-
paign to expose C.I.A. activi-
ties, made his statement *before
the Russell Tribunal II, .a seven-
day assembly of mainly left-
wing intellectuals investigating
charges: repression in Latin
' ?
Mr. Agee, who worked for
the C.I.A. from 1957 to 1969,
mostly in Latin America, said
he had been involved in the
screening operations for Creole
while working for the C.I.A. in
Washington.
It was? his job he said, to
check if prospective employes
of the company had left-wing
connections, in which case they
would not be hired.
Mr. Agee said he "guessed"
that the C.I.A. was still doing
*similar work for Creole. He
said such screening was a gen-
eral service the agency per-
formed for large American-
owned firms in Latin America.
Vice President Rockefeller,
whose family owns a large
number of shares in Exxon and
who is a former director of
Creole, was named earlier this
' I
month by President Ford tolyesterday that he had reached
head a panel to investigate officials of Creole in Caracas by
charges of illegal C.I.A. spyiin
on American citizens inside the
United States. ?
Ten days an a book by Mr.
telephone and that they had de-
nied categorically having ever
used the C.I.A. to investigate
prospective employes or cur-
Agee, "Inside the Company: rent employes.
C.I.A. Diary," was published in Hugh Morrow, a spokesman
Britain. The book recounts in for Vice President Rockefeller
detail his daily activities while said after, checking with Mr.
he was a member of the intel- Rockefeller yesterday that the
ligence organization Vice President had "never heard
,
of any use of C.I.A. to check
The Russell tribunal?named
after the late British pholoso- Creole employes."
pher and pacifist, Bertrand Rus-
Mr. Morrow said that Mr.
sell?also heard an appeal to-
Rockefeller had served as a di-
day from Isabella Allende, rector of Creole until 1958
daughter of -the late President
of Chile, Salvador Allende-
Gossens. Miss Allende asked
for international aid in obtain-
ing the release from a Chilean
prison of Laura Allende, a sister
of the President and a Socialist
politician who was arrested last
November by the Chilean police.
An earlier tribunal met in
Stockholm in 1967 and heard
allegations of American war
crimes in Vietnam. ? ?
when he resigned. That resigna-
tion took place when he be-
came Governor.-
Mr. Morrow added that the
Vice President relinquished his
stock in the company and had
no connection with Creole now.i
ORG 1 CREOLE PEIROXUM CORP.
Ri3",?Itrei soh
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The; TIMES (LOPI1A).11)
20 FEB 1975
Approved For 'Meese ?200501till.M.agID
? j:JU Rae_ JOD
? Our security -forces find theral
:.selves in an embarrassing sitl
th
don over e Crime Writer
. Association. _The ',"associatioi
have;i,askedk-chtlant17, Yard; t
p1.61,tde sonfebrie4tb give-a 61
t on 0I5, 0I6 and the. Specialj
Branch the .;Interuationa
Crime Writers'. Chnferenee, -tog
be held in London this autumn
They want somebody to giv
? a broad and authoritative out
line of security in this counini.
But the Yard has turned down
The_sett ot7gt, for.= securtty
reasons. Even mundane facts
about--: counter-espionage (the
work :of D15), espionage, (the
work of'. DM and the workjors.
the 'Special Branch are con-s
? sidered too delicate for. public-
airing. - ,..?-?,-,:!rm; ?-?. 1
? -Ted' Allbeury, one of" thr
organizers ? of the conference,
says that if. the Yard does:tiot--
provide a speaker- he will go.-
tr?Ttr?Central?Mt e th neuce
Agency.,- Theimikolde on lirtrish-
.securtty'could.:heqtiir
?Allbeury. has in mind as guest-
speaker the ubiquitous,,Ameri-:
.can, Miles Copeland, ;thoelf
'appointed expert on the CIAi
:who says he was once an agent.
;lie is sUre to be able ,t0.- cobble'
',together
less authoritative?than our
own people could -provide, 7- ????
? ? '1?.1- Le It ?
be.utz_y
P88-01315Tvo 3100ont , e
jra
ss 6 e .
3. c.3 C"?`' 6(21 1i'i
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STAT Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
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Approved For ReleattOfficklia4091/1.-+RARPRIa.9d5LISW00356e1
..,,,0000000,06~room
ARTICLE APPEARED 21 September 1978
ON PAGE 3-1.
Washington readers set their own trends when it comes
to Pitying DOOKS
? _
By Leslie Bennetts
'Special tone Washington Stir
No one has yet claimed you are what
you read ? not even, the most greed-
besotted author crazed by the relentless.
banality of his book tour ? but what
someone reads surely gives an indication
of what kind of person he is. And Wash-
ingtonians, it seems, have- their; own.
specific preferences, different from those-
of people elsewhere.
On any given week, the Washington
best-seller list is likely to reveal a sub-
stantially different set of titles than the
national list. Not surprisingly, local book-
sellers say what sells in Washington re-
flects the: city's major industry?
EXCERPT:
. ?
Another local favorite Is spy novels, .
which sell as well as bugging devices in
this town. Different neighborhoods serv-
ice a differed clientele; of course; at
Crown Books out in McLean, a couple of
miles from CIA headquarters, the recent
spate of CIA books fly oil the shelves
faster than you can say,.. "Make that
man's beard fall out!" Recently "The
Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben"
has joined works by John Stockwell,.
Frank Snepp and Vernon Walters as cur--
rent biggies. (In the magazine depart-
ment, the best-sellers out there are Pent-
house and Playboy:.) .
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cWational Inte11igeice Stu .d),/ /9' -
4/3?Ia?-e_ ?
SUITE 1102, 1800 K STREET, N.W.
? ? .
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
CIN ? An Update
? 1.
? ???
by
?
Captain Richard W. Bates, USN (Ret.
and
Constance Bates .
. ?
The founding and the first year's activities of the Commor ? ? ?
were reported in FILS, Volume 2, number 5, October 1983,
an update on Thomas Troy's report. ? ?
..
Professional intelligence officers have traditionally beer?
their work ? shouting their good works from the housetop ?
professional association which would bring public attent ?
simply not the thing to do. But Congress changed all that.
4.1.141.01?4?C?olow-C
i'fr-Ce09
lire? ss.7
C/R4
C
A / nni9
NS
P
? ?? s
e,e9 o g'
As Tom Troy wrote, "retired intelligence officers, old pros, ..? . pe_
ceaseless round of accusations, investigations, revelations, and condemnations of
the intelligence agencies. They had organized in defense of themselves, their
careers, their craft, their agencies. At the same time, they had found natural
allies ? retired military, defense specialists, some academicians, public-spirited
citizens ? whose concern for national defense made them also supportive of a
strong, effective national intelligence system."
"Out of the collaboration there came on the Washington scene, in the last decade,
more than a baker's dozen of either new intelligence organizations or old
organizations with a new interest in intelligence. From them came in the
aggregate much talking, meeting, fund raising, and prompting of causes and
projects. So much, in fact, that retired Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow of the
Security and Intelligence Fund (now the Security and Intelligence Foundation) was
laughingly moved to complain, 'There are too damned many people barking up the
same tree. There's need for some coordination.'"
4.ritaliza-AP
There had been some suggestion of a super-organization, to which all others could
belong, which would act as a coordinating body for their efforts. Some
organizations talked of combining, but as is normally the case, the question of
which organization would be subsumed brought all these efforts to naught.
At the October 1981 convention of the National Military Intelligence Association
(NMIA) at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., leaders of four
professional intelligence groups discussed the profession, and particularly the role
of their organizations. In addition to NMIA, the National
1
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