LETTER TO ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER FROM J.D. HUMPHRIES, III

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000100490001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 10, 1977
• Content Type: LETTER

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J. D. HUMPHRIES III
October 10, 1977
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20013
It was a pleasure to have met you on your
trip to Atlanta to speak to our Atlanta City
Forum. We certainly appreciated your willingness
to speak to Atlantans, and we hope that you feel
that you were enthusiastically received. Your
speech was tremendous and all the comments which
I heard was extremely favorable.
I am hopeful that you can spend more time
in our city in the future and wish you contiIue '
11 7
STAT
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 ARTICLE App 7For Release j0R1fL1 +A : j '88-01315R00 100490001-3
C;~l 4 "'..GE-L3_ Z and
THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION
-Things are looking up `for the
CIA. ?_
Admiral Stanfield 'Turner,
President. Carter's new head of the
Central Intelligence Agency, was
in town the other day for a speech.
He had some good things to say.
The CIA's morale had been low
because of a series of 'revelations
that made the. agency look some-
times like a- combination of Mur-
der Inc. and the Keystone Kops.
That was bad for the image. The'
? agency's :.over-all performance
was forgotten in'the. -welter of
stories about . assassination' at-
tempts, efforts to make, Fidel Cas-
tro's- whiskers fall off, and-,mad
scientist "experiments : on :unsus-.
? petting American citizens. Con-
gress and the general public began
to. ask who, if anybody; had final
.control' of CIA. operations?:. Could
=it. do anything it wanted; no ques
'-lions -asked? Could it keep even
'the: President in ' the dark" as to,
svbat it was up to?-Were congres- --:
American people.
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sional . "oversight"-::committees.;
atually oyerseeing, or simply look-'
Adm. Turner said 'the CIA is
turning the corner on the morale
problem. The American people
'know full well that we must have
a good, competent Central Intelli-
gence Agency,' and that -includes
some covert operations.
But the GIA is. 'after `all an
agency of government,' not. the
whole shoal, and it should be ac-
countable. Adm. Turner assures us
that it is-accountable: The Presi-
dent," for,"example, has ordered an
end to . assassination attempts
against anybody, anytime, any-
place. And while Turner sees risks'
in' the additional congressional:
oversight imposed in recent years,
he admits-the oversight process is
needed. So is the recognition that
the agency'cannat serve the coun-.
try well'unlessit understands and
is in tune with. the' 'attitudes,
Values,! morals and ethics. of the.
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TI'li.: ATLANTA (OP;S ? I'ii,'I I(il
;27 October 1977
.. 'l.r r~~...,- ..5 ~i'~ .n'}?.. ...a.. ~~ (. ?e. ~/:, ,fin
StyJIP,f 1~II;RItINC1~ An admiral who was 'a classmate of5 tiieCIAanexu_ss.of:criticism
f''If the Central Intelligence Agency' Turner 'said President' Carter has '.u'aderstand'ng'of what we do and ho
wanted to subvert a foreign government` ordered. the CIA to take no part "in am ` we dp it. today it. would have ,to' get .the.presi- l..assassination of anybody; anyplace'' f'
dent's approval and then notify no fewer 'i SIe said the agency prohibits .con
.than :eight congressional committeees, One of Carter's campaign promises -?tractural.relations" to buy information
CIA Director Stansfield,Turner said in was-to forbid such past CIA activities as from news reporters, clergy or mission<
-.,' ier`" ,'arles : `; t - '~, ;
lots to' assassinate .Cuban Prem
.Atlanta Thursday d ~. P
S caktn to the Atlanta Cit Forum - Fidel Castro of to overthroan elected The CIA , is it declassifying all that '
Turne ,generally approved of nervlp Marxist leader in Chile. we can declasiify'.' while "tightening the
created' public watchdogs over CIA ac- "We do. very little' of this today,' noose"' on genuine secrets, he said.
tivities?as,part of "making' A match be- T,.`,.-;Turner said, referring to;"covert action , r,; r ~'~ '' ' w ` - =
in the attefi t tYe are persuaded'--'Turner sald,?.
tween ',morality and ;.'the , necessary F to influence events inl
secrecy of an intelligence operation" another country without; attribution'; ~, that the intelligence apparatus =af our.
, country cannot serve.that country.well?~
At the same' time, . Turner declared t But clandestine intelligence-gather 'unless it understands and is in tune with't
that- secret spy -operations :are . still , lag, as opposed to trying to influence the attitudes, the values, the morals, they
needed and warned that leaks of CIA se- events somewhere," #5 still "a;;very ethics of the people of this country
",.,.,:,,
t
.
essential arrow in our` quiver," he said '- r ' 1. w,
crets have caused "nervousness" among
foreign intelligence contacts The additional- congressional sugar
Cloak-and-dagger spying is a tool vision of the CIA imposed in the Iasi two'
Turner also said, in response to a that has to be used sparingly" but is 'still years Is 'a needed `? 'surrogate process for
question, that widespread attacks on al- :? ,necessary even' "with'all the new won.;':.-.-- public oversight,,' he said, but there are
leged CIA abuses in recent years have derful, technical means available to us "risks" involved t ~ f
undermined his agency's morale. today'. such as spy satellites; he said The risks' are "Intelligence` by tt-
!'Suddehly you,come borne one day Clandestine spying IS almost exclu ''. .0 't -,'taking information that is a.'
' and your children say, `Gee; are you sively . an overseas operation" and easiest to get, rather. than most crucial'
really, working at, the Central Intelli- are
.:;::'; ,.'and further leaks of secret' data,-.he,
American' citiiens ; protected' frarn
Bence Agency, Dad, that terrible, place?' ? CIA 'abuses bylaws, presidential d~rec said r ti ? f?, t:w
It hurts, and it has hurt, Turner said.
Lives and agency regulations, he said. ^:Turner former: presidenC. of: the
But. the ,CIA Is "now turning the `:Ile said he' is 'very determined to ti aval` War College'and commander,-l4'
cnrner" on the; morale. problem and op insure that the mistakes, of .the pereep z chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe,
the growing (public tion of mistaken, in ,the past will not r.?..was the kickoff speaker for the Atlanta
recognition that we must have :a reoccur" a City:' Forum Inc a group formed re-
good Central.Intelligence Agency," he
centty,?'to attract. national newsmakers
said: ;Turner later. termed the. attacks on once a month to.downtown Atlanta."' y: . . ._'1t:. m M- .. . S .. .. : I w
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UN PIG- THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION
7 October 1977
Ii
'' Admiral Stanfield Turner, now the The questions worry him still; after
director. of the Central Intelligence his first eight months in a tough as-
. Agency, finished at the top of his class at Annapolis signment. Turner is persuaded, he
a' Y~ t
4 few years ago. ?;._,; =~, says, that the intelligence apparatus
He was an atb of a country can not serve that coun
`, Iete as well as a try well unless 'it both understands
and is attuned to the values and ethics
;bright student a , At .
..'Combination.T x $ E of the country. But then a question,
es a "When does the need for good infor-
especlot!
c g , to the: mation outweigh the desire to have
pealin
American values reflected In all that
:;Rhodes, Scholar- L x
- ship committees' we do?"..
,and indeed Turner himself Is not certain of all
Turner studied In ' the answers and says so. One of the
England after ^, great problems is quite simply that
graduation as a Rhodes .scholar. One the values applied in judgment of any
of his less happy athletic experiences, intelligence action change over time,
In Atlanta in fact `said Turner the standards applied, say, In 1987 or
came
In
a visit the other -fact; said T was 1997 may be quite different from the
part of a Navy football team favored standards considered proper right
t0-whip Georgia Tech by three touch- now. Another problem is secrecy. By
downs;;. Tech won that day b two definition, 'most intelligence opera-.
y 1 tinny era secret This means if is no
" - -?? ' usually possible to float a trial bal-
Turner gotta Atlanta on one other loon, as It is in most government
occasion
back in 1974
wh
n
l
?
,
en a
o
d operations, and get some public rear-
Annapolis ''classmate of his from; tion.
Plains told him that he was going to But there clearly are precise CIA
run for President of the United States. guidelines today that did not exist a
That same classmate, one James Earl few years ago. For one, a specific
Carter, tapped Turner at the begin- directive from the President forbids
ning of the year as the new director of the CIA from. narticiuatine in or plan-
the beleaguered CIA. Turner's Navy ring the assassination of anybody,
record was an impressive one, and he anytime, anyplace. For another, the
was quickly confirmed by the Senate. President himself must authorize' any
The new CIA head does not quite action that could be. considered "cov-,
=like the ? "Intelligence -Czar" title ert," designed not just to gather Infor-
.sometimes used to refer lo him, but matron but to influence events is
that. title Is pretty close to being accu- another country.
rate. Since naming him as CIA direr-; There are also special Senate and
-.tor, President Carter has given Turner'
additianat authority to oversee the ? Rouse intelligence committees which
oversee CIA operations In a real way
budgets of other intelligence-gathering these days, something not true even a
agencies and also a general responsi- :year or so ago.
''bility to make sure there Is not too Admiral Turner Is impressive.' He
much overlapping in such operations. 'seems tough-minded enough to press
:-: But. Turner, in objecting to that for the kind of intelligence needed to
Czar title, emphasizes what he views provide for American national se-
the need for a healthy "competition" curity on whatever front. He also
among the various intelligence agen seems attuned to the values of this na-
cies.- Maybe. the same information tion in the best sense, aware that the
could be available in a general way to values and ethics and morals of an
different agencies, in his opinion, and open . society must ultimately . be
;yet the Pentagon experts and the CIA, "applied in judgment to what the CIA
might analyze and evaluate informa- or any other governmental agency
Non in different ways. ... . ! undertakes.- That's a strong combina-1
Turner, of course, took over the CIA Lion. .
fat a hard time, a time when some off Footnote: 'Turner's speech . ? in!
that agenc''s rreY1Vs t0 vcr 04/10/13: i1 PP i~ k bOfl?(A4O 001-3
underL~41MsP5~ group, pp At ants City Forum, whose;
general way many people were al- aim is to bring- a distinguished na-!
ready concerned about the proper role tional speaker to a breakfast meetine
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PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
Admiral Stansfleld Turner
Atlanta City Forum
October 6, 1977
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CHAIR: Ladies and gentlemen, we are indeed fortunate
this morning to have as our first speaker in the Forum series
Admiral Stansfield Turner. I believe our country is also fortun-
ate In having Admiral Turner as head of the Central Intelligence
Agency, for he brings to it the energy and enthusiasm which has
permeated his career from a very early point In time. Admiral
Turner Is a native of the state of I l l inois. When it came time
to go to college, he entered Amherst College and, after two years,
entered the Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland. He had a rather
distinguished career at Annapolis In that he graduated number
one from his class and was a classmate of President Carter. He
continued his education by taking post graduate Instruction at
Oxford University in England where he was a Rhodes Scholar.
From that time forward, he has been very actively engaged
in a naval career, rising steadily through the ranks to the rank
of full Admiral in 1974. His career In the Navy has been replete
with accomplishments. And it would be a tedious task to enumerate
them all.
Suffice It to say, he has had fleet command of the 2nd
Fleet. He has been president of the Naval College of War, where
he Instituted drastic and massive reforms and changes to upgrade
and make more comprehensive the program presented at that college.
He was called to service by Governor Carter -- I beg your pardon;
he Is now President Carter -- during this past election to head
this nation's Central Intelligence Agency.
I think it's Important to note that the Central Intel-
ligence Agency has come under a significant amount of criticism,
Justifiably or unjustifiably, throughout the past nine years
when the word "national security" and other such things have taken
on connotations that people don't take it seriously -- perhaps
they once did -- but are very crucial to our continued national
existence.
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It wasn't so long ago that the intelligence gathering
forces of this country were less than sophisticated. In fact,
the only intelligence that the country had in wartime was Its
cavalry, which has gone by the boards. But the cavalry was
always the eyes and the ears of the Army and the Navy, and
consequently were the eyes and the ears of the country.
n
come a long way
e
v
W
e
'
hundred years. We've come up with some questions about morality
In Intelligence. But notwithstanding the fact that we do have
questions, we do need Intelligence. And it's my pleasure and
honor to Introduce to you this morning the eyes and ears of our
country and one of our best and one of our very brightest, Ad-
miral Stansfield Turner.
[Applause.]
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER: Thank you, J.D. Thank all
of you for being here. And I thank the Atlanta City Forum Board
for Inviting me to open this exciting new endeavor here in your
wonderful city of Atlanta.
I've
only
been to your city twice before in my life.
And each
time
I've
learned that Atlanta producers winners. And
I'm sure
this
just
Is going to be the same, and the Forum Is
going to
prove
to
be a great winner for your city.
Unfortunately, I resented the fact that I found a winner
here In 1944 when I came down with the Navy football team to play
Georgia Tech. We were three touchdown favorites when we went in
and two point losers when we left. I was very pleased, however,
when I came In 1974 and called on your then Governor and he told
me that two days later he was going to announce that he was running
for the presidency of the United States. And I was very pleased
when that turned out to be a true prediction. I was very honored
last February when he appointed me to this post, which I assumed
officially on the 9th of March. And In the seven months, almost,
since that day, I have spent a lot of my time, as J.D. Intimated,
looking at the past activities of our Intelligence organization.
Now I'm not here with you this morning either to attempt
to bury or praise the past. But I would like to say that the
process of exploring what has happened In the history of our
Intelligence operations makes those of us In charge of them to-
day very determined to assure that the mistakes, or the perception
of the mistakes in the past, do not reoccur. We're not just con-
cerned with what history will say about us or our agencies. We
are persuaded that the Intelligence apparatus of our country cannot
serve that country well unless it understands and Is In tune with
the attitudes, the values, the morals, the ethics of the people
of this country.
terms of intelligence In a
i
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Now., you may well ask me, and quite understandably, can
you maintain an effective Intelligence operation for the United
States of America and, at the same time, attempt to match the
moral attitudes and standards of the people of the country? And
that's a good and difficult question. And I would start by saying
there are two particular problems that we face in making this match
between morality and the necessary secrecy of an Intelligence opera-
tion.
The first problem is that it's not easy to pin down just
what the moral and ethical standards the country expects Intelli-
gence to adhere to really are. And those standards do change with
time. You're going to hear Ambassador Sol Llnowltz on the 2nd
of December. Look at the difference In the way Ambassadors Llnowitz
and Bunker negotiated this current treaty with the Panamanians on
a strictly bilateral basis of equality and what we did in 1903
when we signed a treaty not with the Panamanians, but with French-
men, to give us the right to a canal In Panama. And we did it
while the Panamanian delegation was somewhere between New York
and Washington trying to scurry to the negotiating table.
I'm just saying that our attitudes and what we feel Is
proper and moral In foreign affairs does vary over time.
The second problem that we have is simply that when
you are trying to decide whether an intelligence operation is
In accord with what the country wants, because almost all intelli-
gence operations are secretive you can't go and try It out on the
public. You can't put a feeler out and see whether it's going to
be acceptable. So that puts a particular onus on us to use our
judgment, to try to sense what the people want and what they not
only want today, but what they're going to want tomorrow, because
we must be concerned not only with attitudes today, but with what
people will say when they took from the perspective or 1987 and
1997.
Now, of course, we have help in setting our standards
and our procedures. We have help from the Congress; we have help
from the President, and we have help from other branches of the
executive branch of the government, like the Attorney General.
For Instance, when we're dealing in the rights of American citizens,
we have some very specific guidelines. We have, on the one hand,
some laws; laws, for instance, about wiretapping. There's an
article in your Constitution this morning about the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee has made one more step In approving a new wiretap
law which this administration has submitted to the Congress; a law
which we think goes further in balancing the proper equities between
the individual's rights to privacy and the government's right or
need to get information under certain circumstances.
Over and above the law, or in addition to the law, I should
say, we have directives from the President. For instance, we have
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a clear order from the President that no member of the intelligence
community of our country will contemplate, plan or in any way par-
ticipate in an assassination of anybody, anyplace. And beyond
presidential regulations, we have our own Intelligence regulations.
The CIA, for Instance, has a very clear regulation about relation-
ships with the media. We do not have any contractual relationship
wt,th accredited members of the American media. We do not use
media people as agents.
But at the same time, I would emphasize that we look
upon and we treat the American media as citizens, and. we think
they have the same rights as every citizen to share with their
government information which they may have that they want to pass
on because they feel It's valuable to their government. And I
find nothing Improper or nothing jeopardizing the freedom of
the press in having this kind of sharing where they give us
things that they know and, in turn, as we have for many years,
we share with them unclassified information that will be of value
to them.
There are other cases like this. We have a CIA regulation
that prohibits any contractual relationship with clergy, mission-
aries. But again, we treat the reverend as a citizen. And If
he wants voluntarily to come in and tell us something that's
Important to his country that he wants to share and help with,
we're happy to hear from him.
A more difficult area is our relations with academe,
because we do have to have contractual relationships with members
of the academic profession. If we ask a professor to write up a
paper, to do some research, to be a consultant, for Instance, he's
entitled to some reimbursement. So we do have contractual relation-
ships here. And I think that there's a danger in the academic world
today, because there are some who believe that any kind of a relation-
ship between the academic community and the Intelligence community
is Improper. And because this view has been held in some areas,
the relationships between our Intelligence world and our academic
world have narrowed In recent years.
I'm dedicated to trying to increase those In the years
I'd like to elaborate on that for a moment, because It's
not only important,. but it's controversial. Let me say that the
last thing that I ever want to do Is in any way interfere with
the teaching process, the curricula or the methods of teaching
on our campuses, or to in any way tarnish the image of the Ameri-
can academic community.
So we will not enter Into paid or unpaid relationships
with academics which would in any way prejudice their teaching
responsibilities. Nor will we deliberately use the academic status
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of anyone as a way of covering up our intelligence activities. But
within these limits there Is still lots of room, in my opinion, for
healthy and proper relationships between these two organizations;
relationships that need not In any way jeopardize the credibility
or the authenticity of our academic endeavors.
Let me give an example. Recently, I asked a Sovietologist
from a prominent campus to give us some help in analyzing some
questions about the Soviet Union's behavior. Now, I think it
would be a great shame If he were inhibited from doing that by
irresponsible pressures from within the academic community. This
man can come to us and provide a new perspective, new Insight into
the situation In the Soviet Union. He can stimulate us. He can
keep us from getting into a bureaucratic rut of thinking In the
same way all the time. And yet at the same time, he can go back
to his campus afterward, I think a broader man with deepr insight
because of the Information that he will receive when he's working
with us. He will get a deeper understanding, I believe, of the
process of the Soviet government, and certainly a deeper under-
standing of the process of how decisions are made in the American
government, because they are not always made like the textbooks
on the campuses say.
So I think that there Is an area of mutual benefit. And
there are other ways In which this can be a two-way street.
An Interesting one that happened to come to my attention
the other day concerns archeology. Archeologists are frequently
Inhibited frm going to places of great archeological value, either
because of political barriers or pure geographic barriers. But
aerial photography taken for Intelligence purposes often can
reveal more about an archeological site than you can find even
if you can get there on the ground. Traces of walls, traces of
cities destroyed by time or the ravages of war are frequently ap-
parent from photography. And we have lots of that. What a shame
It would be If we could not share this with the archeologists of
our country because of overly rigid rules by our academic community.
Well, let me say that In the United States and in respect
to United States citizens, your country's Intelligence activities
are carefully circumscribed by law, presidential directives and
Internal regulations. I believe these protect our citizens as
well as we possibly can.
Now, when we look to our overseas activities -- and
.intelligence Is almost exclusively an overseas activity -- the
problem of reflecting our nation's moral values in our Intelligence
operations becomes much more a judgmental question. We have to
look at the trade-offs very judiciously as we go about our business.
I n an open society like ours, there is no problem sensing
the trends of politics, understanding the economic posture and
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generally being able to predict what a country's going to do. You
can do that by your contacts with friends, by reading the newspapers
and watching TV and generally keeping your eyes and ears open.
But when we deal with a closed society, like the Soviet Union,
it's an entirely different matter. And I would suggest to you
very briefly that it's critical we know something about what Is
going on in a closed society, a closed society like the Soviet
Union in particular, where they have literally the capability
to devastate our country and Its society with intercontinental
ballistic missile weapons. We've got to know something of what's
going on there to be prepared. And we're working hard today to
develop strategic arms limitations so that we will reduce the risk
of any kind of an Intercontinental war. And yet we must have some
idea whether those people are living up to the terms of those agree-
ments. We must be able to see a little bit about what's going on
in that closed society.
And let me say that this need to peer inside a closed
society like this is much broader than just military matters.
Remember back in '72 when the Soviets suddenly, unexpectedly
and massively entered the world grain market and perturbed the
economic situation in our country and In a number of others. We
simply have to have some window onto these kinds of activities that
are shrouded from us and from the rest of the world.
Still, the benefits of gaining this vital kind of Intel=
ligence must be weighed against our fundamental desire, as a
country, to act with respect to other countries openly and honestly
and to treat their citizens with the same sense of respect as we
do our own. The question then is when does the need for good
information outweigh the desire of our country to reflect American
values In all that we do. The clandestine, the secret gathering
of Intelligence Is a very special matter. It's a tool that has
to be used sparingly. Consequently, we must always weigh whether
there's a possibility of getting the Information we need through
overt or less risky methods.
I assure you that with all of the new, wonderful technical
means available to us today, however, the traditional, the historic
clandestine spying operation continues to be an absolutely essential
arrow in our quiver of Intelligence collection capabilities. And
I believe It will remain so for many, many years Into the future.
So we must make very careful judgments as to the lengths we will
go In such clandestine activity in gathering information. Where
do the limits of pragmatism get overridden by -- i mean, where
does pragmatism override Idealism In the conduct of such operations?
Who Is to determine how far we will go in clandestine actvities?
I mentioned at the beginning that we face this dfficult
quandary that we cannot subject ourselves to adequate public scrutiny
or oversight, because. we must remain largely secretive. So I think
what we have to do is to develop a surrogate process for public
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oversight. And I would suggest that In the years of scrutiny and
criticism that we have just gone through with respect to our In-
tel l igence activities, out of that Is evolving today this process
of oversight. And let me cite a number of ways that have developed
to give us that kind of surrogate public oversight.
One Is the Intense interest which your President and
Vice President show in the intelligence process, that each spend
a great deal of time on It and dedicate a lot of thought to it.
Another Is that a year and a half ago the United States Senate
established a special select committee just on Intelligence.
And they have done, In my view, a splendid job of overseeing.
They look Into what we're doing. They get our deepest secrets.
They work with us very closely. But It is not a fraternal re-
lationship; It's one of oversight and supervision.
And I'm very pleased that In August, the House of
Representatives created a similar select committee, and we're
Just beginning to work with It. And in point of fact, your
congressman from Atlanta, Bryce Fowler, is a member of that
committee. And I happened to meet with him on Tuesday morning,
because he has been assigned to the subcommittee for evaluation.
And by that, we mean that that subcommittee will evaluate how well
we are doing our Intelligence collection and evaluation operations.
They will write a scorecard on us, a report card on us. And that
can Indeed be one of the most valuable functions of the committee.
Another form of outside oversight is a law which requires
that if we enter Into what Is known as covert action -- this Is not
Intelligence collection. Covert action is the attempt to influence
events in another country without attribution. It's the area where,
of course, the Intelligence world has been criticized the most In
years past. But the law now says that If we are going to under-
take a covert action on behalf of our country, the President must
sign off on It, and I must then notify eight committees of Congress.
And if you don't think that's inhibiting, why....
[Laughter.]
Still another form of oversight Is what's known as the
Intelligence Oversight Board. President Carter recently renewed
Its charter, appointed three fine, distinguishd citizens to it --
Governor Scranton, Senator Gore and a Mr. Tom Farmer. And this
board has only one responsibility. It's to check on the legality
and the propriety of what we In the Intelligence world are doing.
You, any member of the Intelligence community, may write to this
board and say "That fellow Turner, he's really off the deep end.
You better look Into him." It doesn't go through me, and the
board reports only to the President what It finds In that kind
of a.case.
Now let me be very honest with you. There are risks
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in all of this oversight, two that bother me In particular. One
is the danger of adopting intelligence by timidity or intelligence
by least-common-denominator agreement. It's easy when the sequence
of people overseeing our activities, those who approve what we are
doing, to simply say, no, let's not take that risk. It's difficult
to make those tough decisions, to accept the risk sometimes.
And the second danger Is that as we go through this
process of oversight and proliferate the number of people who
know what we're doing, we have a danger of leaks. Now either
one of these can be serious. But I would say to you in sincerity
today that I believe we are working out a satisfactory balance
between the risks of oversight and the benefits of oversight.
But I w o u l d a l s o say that these procedures are -- some of them --
quite new. And the next several years are going to be very Impor-
tant to the our I n t e l l i g e n c e process as these settle down and we
find that equilibrium, that balance between risk and benefit.
And until that's settled, I can't guarantee you how it's going
to come out. I'm optimistic, and there's very much of a spirit
of good will in all of this. And everybody I've worked with,
from Congress' side, on the executive branch's side, is determined
that we wi l l maintain, as we absolutely must, a strong intelligence
capability for our country, but to do so within the limits of what
you, the people of the country, want in terms of morality and pro-
priety.
And to do the latter, we are now in the midsts of attempt-
ing to share with you, the public, more, be more open with you, more
about what the process of Intelligence is, how we go about our
business, and also more about the product of intelligence -- the
evaluations, the estimates that we make. We've released a number
of these recently; things like the energy study, the world steel
market studies, studies on international terrorism. These are
all things where we felt we could come to an unclassified level
and still have a meaningful product to share with the American
p u b l i c . And we hope that out of t h i s process of sharing w i l l
come a number of Important benefits.
But the most important one, I think, relates to the point
I made at the beginning, that we have to find, as difficult as It
is, what the standards are that the society wants us to adhere
to. And I think by sharing more with the public and staying
in touch with our society more, we can be closer to doing that.
And out of this I hope to see two principal benefits
come to our country. The first will be a greater contribution
by the public to the shaping of the morals and the standards by
which we conduct our Intelligence. And the second will be a greater
contribution by the intelligence community to the public in under-
standing the major Issues that are up for debate before it. What Is
more important to our democracy than a good public dialogue? We
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hope we will help with that.
Thank you.
[Applause.]
Q: Admiral Turner, have we ever discovered why the
Russians were bombarding our Embassy in Moscow with microwaves?
And are they still doing that?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, we've not discovered exactly why
they're doing that. And, yes, they are still doing it. They
have reduced the level of radiation.
You probably couldn't hear the question. The question
was, have we discovered why the Soviets have been bombarding
our Embassy in Moscow with microwaves, and are they still doing
It?
Yes, they're still doing It. We're not entirety sure
why they are doing it. They have reduced the level of radiation
to a point that we don't believe is injurious to human beings. But
it does cause us concern. We think It may be related to some way
of getting information back out, some reflection of sounds or
signals that are going on inside the Embassy; maybe as simple
as a typewriter punching. We just don't know.
Q: Admiral Turner, there's been some speculation the
[Rest.of question inaudible.]
ADMIRAL TURNER: The Soviet strategic strategy based on
achieving a war-winning capability?
I believe there's a fundamental difference In outlook
between the Soviet Union and ourselves with respect to strategic
nuclear warfare. I believe the Soviet Union, a country that's
been invaded historically, looks upon any form of war as some-
thing they must plan for from beginning to its ultimate end. And
they think through the entire processes of strategic nuclear war.
We are so determined there not be one and put so much
emphasis on deterrents that we think really to deterrence and
not exactly how we're going to pick ourselves up out of the rubble
and go on If there were such a war.
I don't think that that makes the Soviets Intent on
having a strategic nuclear war. I think that's part of their
psychology: to think it through and to build the forces that
would fight a nuclear war. We are, In fact, building those forces
too, but we don't think that's true. We don't talk about that con-
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sequence as they do. And I'm not suggesting we're doing it wrong
or they're doing It right. I'm suggesting these are different at-
titudes and approaches that have their roots in our different
cultures.
[End of tape.]
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25X1
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 Atlanta City Forum
NEWS MEDIA NOTICE
October 6, 1977
Admiral Turner's address ("Secrecy and Morality
in Intelligence") marks the kickoff of the new
Atlanta City Forum, Inc., a nonprofit corporation
recently organized to attract national newsmakers
once a month to downtown Atlanta.
The Atlanta City Forum was modeled after a similar
institution in Cleveland, Ohio, which has been a
prestigious meeting ground for 65 years. The
purpose of The Atlanta City Forum is the exchange
of information and discussion of issues ranging
from politics, the economy, energy, the military,
religion, labor, and diplomacy.
With the nation's eyes on Georgia and Atlanta, the
forum series is expected to attract the nation's
leaders and experts in varying fields of interest.
The Atlanta City Forum was organized by a broad
cross section of Atlantans. It does not seek to
compete with nor upstage any other forum. Nor does
the Atlanta City-,,Forum, Inc. have a political
philosophy.
The Atlanta City Club, which is loaning its facilities
for the speeches, neither originated nor sponsors the
series. The speeches are open to the public.
The next speaker is Charles Kittrell, executive vice
president of Phil
lips Petroleum and the oil indus
most vocal
spokesman. Kittrell is scheduled t
For More Information:
Jim Gray 659-0919
Suite 2700 ?100 Peachtree St.. Atlanta, Ga.. (404) 522-000
ApproveAFe- 1k5?? 4p :LG - a ion
Advisory Board of Directors
Ivan Allen, Jr.
Albert J. Bows
Rodney M. Cook
Rev. P.C. Enniss
Richard P. Felker
Hon. Wyche Fowler, Jr.. M.C.
Harold S. Gulliver
Michael L. Lomax
Herbert H. Mabry
William E. Milliken
Arthur L. Montgomery
William W. Nash
Dan F. Sweat
Carl Ware
Lottie H. Watkins
 Approved For ease 2004/10/13: CIA-RDP88-0131500100490001-3
BIOGRAPHY OF ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral Stansfield Turner, United States Navy, was sworn
in as Director of Central Intelligence on March 9, 1977. In this
position he heads the Intelligence Community (the foreign intelli-
gence agencies of the United States) as well as directs the
Central Intelligence Agency.
A native of Highland Park, Illinois, Admiral Turner entered
Amherst College in 1941 and, two years later, was appointed
the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland. After
graduation in 1946 (Class of 1947), he served one year at sea
before entering Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar for work
on a master's degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics.
Following Oxford, he held a variety of sea assignments,
including command of a minesweeper, a destroyer, and a guided
missile frigate which he placed in commission. His shore
assignments included the Politico-Military Policy Division in
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, the Advanced
Management Program at the Harvard Business School, and Executive
Assistant and Naval Aide to the Secretary of the Navy.
He was selected for promotion to Rear Admiral in May 1970,
and shortly thereafter assumed command of a Carrier Task Group
of the Sixth Fleet while serving aboard the aircraft carrier
USS Independence. After that, he directed the Systems Analysis
Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
On June 30, 1972, Admiral Turner became the 36th President
of the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, with the rank
of Vice Admiral. During his two-year tenure there, he instituted
major revisions in the curriculum to strengthen its academic
content.
In August 1974 he became commander of the United States
Second Fleet and NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic. He served in
that capacity until August 1975 when he was named to become
Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH),
with headquarters in Naples, Italy. Upon assuming that position
on September 1, 1975, he was promoted to the rank of Admiral.
He held this command until his departure on March 2, 1977, to
assume his present duties.
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