HOW $ TOPPLED ALLENDE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01314R000300450021-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: September 22, 1974
• Content Type: NSPR

(Lj iao"6 THE SI DAY
Approved For Release 2004/10$ 843E
STAT
'HEN thelate' Salvador
Allende, President of
Chile, remarked defiantly in
1971 that the United Stetes
marines were not "going to
impose their will, here,' he
had misunderstood t h e
strategy of the enemy.
For the Central Intelligence
Agency the Chile operation was
not to be aft old-fashioned mili-
tary intervention as in the
Dominican Republic, nor a
blood and guts affair, as in the
Bay of Pigs.
Money was to be the weapon
in Chile. Too -many dollars in
the wrong places, so far as
Allende was concerned; too few
in the right places. The rest
would be left to the pressures
of an economic crisis.,
.. The C.I.A., contrary to the iIU-
pression 1 ft by various leaks of
documents, wg;r not responsible
for every-tbing. It conducted only
the strictly political and internal
side of the operation, while
being In olved in the overall;
planning.
Starving Allende of credit
was pri.:,arily the responsibility
of the State Department, which
worked through Government
companies in Chile suggested f intervention" as- he told a
that they should proszde money 1 Chilean businessman in London
which the C.I.A. would then in 19;0.
funnel into anti-Allende activi- Chile's short-term credit n-ith
ties. The idea was rejected as American banks shrank from
unsvorkable. The same idea was #9d million in 19i0 to #14 million
Put up by - the multi-national in 1972. For 'openly 1 political
corporation, International Tele- reasons arising from Allende's
phone and Telegraph (I.T,T.) ',campaign against American
after Allende was elected. >Anterests, the . _k-por'Import
Between 1970 and 1973 more
than #3ra. Was appropriated Bank (a Federal institution in
for ? Washington) announced it would
antiA.lende'acti -'ties. The basic give no loans or guarantees to
tactic was to support the middle- Chile,
class opposition,- including the. The official lead, was un-
small businessmen, such as the doubtedly reflected in the
lorry-owners. Thanks to Chile's general
and
soaring inflation the C.I ~..--and cocet whichofta took place.
the middle classes--got excellent International institutions such c s
value through the currency black the Inter-American Development
market. The inflow was the equi- Bank and the World Bank took
valent of about #17m. the hint or responded to
Allende's position was weak American pressures. - Only the
from the start. He had been International Monetary- Fund
elected with a minority of the .'declined to cut back on credit. .
vote in a country where the { After the coup, the aid and
middle classes are. exceptionally the credit bean to flow back to
strong by Latin American Chile--more than #300m. from
standards. - private -banks and international
Each move, each fresh burst ? organisations. For a modest in-
of inflation, infuriated and con- vestment there had been a high
solidated his opposition. The return, even if Chilean demo
-
C.I. A. money helped keep the cracy had vanished in the
middle classes opposition from process.
collapsing amid the tur
i
mo
l
. -
Money 'went to strikers, politi?-i
l
parties and the media, grin=
Export-Import Bank and exerted 1 ca
iiifiuence on the Inter :American Santiago urio, the main
Development Bank and the Santiago newwspspaaper; In the 1973
World Bank, where the tinted municipal elections alone some
States has veto power. #030,000 was spent.
But what has been called the Allende-..-and doubtless the
'."invisible blockade" was a con, great majority of Chileans-' ut
fused affair. Even if D. Iii: ia- knew what was happening, but - Was ger had not been. in tae back- pnve fors to stop a proC~w
ground pulling strings, bankers which he foresaw leading to his
would have been unwiliin; to overthrow. The strike by im.
make leans to such a bad risk Poverished lorryowriers in 1973
as Dr. Allende's Chile. was kept going for a month and
The strictly C.I.A. side of the su
a mmery ofI that nvear nnonltess
operation was approved by than 250,000 members of the
former President ?eixon and middle class were on strike.
monitored by the Forty Cerra-
mittee, an inter-departhrental The C.I.A. and the present
body which is usually chaired by ruling ncy had no claim that the
tae Presidents adviser on part in the actual
national security affairs. At the coup. Howeve+, the American
moment Dr. Kissinger (s,-ho military and the C.I.A. kept in 11
wears two hats as Secretary of close contact' with the Chilean
State and security advisee) pre- services throughout the Allende
sides, years. It required little in the
llendn became a target as slay of reasoning power - to.
deduce that aBight-snr.g coup
far ba-._ as 1962 and `.ot rein by the ril;`ary would
o?rerthrosti
than his death in 193 Allende.
.nearly #:D million was seen' first
on t-'?::.,, to keep bile' out of
c!:. or In 1 ? 1 'none than #lrh. went
on a :;di?`n Eeulardo l:re.'s
Cl ris'_.. Democratic p .t', the
ma'. : --o?ition to A::enue in
the E:__ ;?~ that yea,-. la the
sat~ie _ alarmed Ainer:c,
The Chilean President s?: is
unable to' end the links which
pro" ded for joint m. noeuvres
by the two navies. 'Military aid
continued to arrive from the
United States. although in di>.n-
inis?led qa atiries. at a t'me
when the Chilean National = -
:-line. could not obtain credit
buy m_,. Borings.
The invisiale blockade"
contrn''ed b-. Dr. Kisstn;er, the
pivotal figure in the campaign
I t f '' ce, M
Approa e s bd 4
short of a Dominican-etcie
------------------
By DAVID ADA IIS%XFA IT'
in Washington
CIA-RDP88-01314R006300450021-1