WHO IS MR. X

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01314R000300180018-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: January 4, 1971
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

Approved For Release 2004/16`/2 '.~C kDP88-0131 060300180iS
1~ 5`zc'S e J] ~~ ~C. 1cti.
11'Y StEWAP ALSOP
a t h E
FITTING THE ROLE
Brezhncv is in his 60s and has had
two heart attacks, and several other
members of the Politburo are approach-
ing senescence. Premier Aleksci Kosy-
gin had a flaming row with Brezhncv in
July, on the old issue of military-civilian
priorities, but he is also in his 60s and
has bad kidney trouble. He coiild be an
ally of the restive younger men, but lie
seems most unlikely to be their leader.
There are several possibilities for the
role of Mr. X, but only one of them
seems to meet all the requirements.
Politburo member Alcksandr Shcle-~
pin is that one. Ile is 52, young by
Kremlin standards, a former boss of the
KGB who has carefully maintained his
connections, and lie was shrewd and
ruthless enough to play the key role in
the deposition of Khrushchev, No one
really knows, of course, if the shrewd
Mr. Sliclepin is really Mr. X. But the
experts do not think-- they know--that
there is a Mr. X
and that a mounting
,
negotiated the Western publication of party press, etc.--aeerce that Brezhncv strug Yle for >ower is going on behind
Elio confessions of tp t9ivlecl)Fotb'di~eIea9~c2(M4/9012~iinGI -r 2DPAM11t t1E~R00i Qi1At511s.
l ASHINVC1"?N!..--Wlio is Moscow's NMir.
X? Who is the man in l\Ioscow strong
enough to defy party boss Leonid
Brezhncv iif the most public possible
way, and-so far--get away Nvith it)
This question has Washington's corps
of resident 'Kremlinologists both fasci-
nated and deeply puzzled. But they
agree that there must be a Mr. X,. and
that therefore a fierce power struggle
must be going on within the Politburo.
.They further believe that. the struggle
may burst into the open before the
Communist Party Congress next March.
In?that event, Boss. Brezhncv may suffer
the fate of Nikita Khrushchev in 1961,
.or; only last week, of Poland's \Vlady-
slaw Comulka.
There are sorn'c Kremlinologists who
thiiik they can put a 'name to NIr, X.
But consider, first, the evidence that
a Mr. X must exist. The evidence
centers around' the publication in the
West of Nitta Khrushchev's amazing
reminiscences.
Parts of the story are. still murky, but
the basic facts about the Khrushchev
memoirs are known. Initially, the key
role was played by Khrushchev's
daughter, Rada, and her journalist
husband, Aleksci Aclzliubci, editor of
Izvestia until Khrushchev's downfall.
Rada and Aleksci recorded the old
man's rambling, often inaccurate, fre-
quently farcical, and utterly fascinating
memories of the past.
At some point, probably in 1969, the
omniscient Soviet secret service, the
KGB, learned what the Adzhubeis
/Acre up to, and thereafter a remark-
able figure, Victor Louis, entered the
picture. There is no doubt at all that
Louis is an agent of the KGB, but he
is not at all an ordinary agent,
KGB MISSIONS
He lives in style at a dacha with a
private tennis court, and lie drives a
Porsche and an air-conditioned Mer-
cedes (air conditioning, since it is total-
ly unnecessary in 'Moscow even in
August, is the ultimate Soviet status
symbol). Louis has c~'uricd out several
delicate missions for the KGB, includ-
ing a trip .to Formosa to make contact
With the Chinese Nationalists. But he
specializes in contacts with the West.
For example, he peddled a bastard-
ized version of Svetlana Alliluycva's
memoirs in the \Vest, to undercut the
impact of the genuine memoirs. I-Ic also
don Lonsdale. The book was a clumsy /No. 1 last summer, and that he has
attempt to drive a wedge between the since slipped badly.
CIA and British MI-6, at the sane time Brezhnev is a hard-liner, both in
glorifying the KGB. In Moscow, he is terms of relations with the West and
the KGB's chief flack-lie , is often the internal discipline, and his chief sup-
unnamed "reliable Soviet source" in sto- Mort comes from the military. Recent
vies from Moscow.. - ? : personnel shifts have weakened the
Louis negotiated the agreement with position of the hard-liners. For example,
Time-Life for the sale of the Khru-'~ Leningrad party chief Vasily Tolstikov,
shchev reminiscences, for a suns on the a hard-liner and Brezhncv man, who
order of $600,000. The deal was signed was in line for elevation to the Politbu-
and scaled at a meeting between LOnis ~ro, has been sent as ambassador to Pe-
and Life executive Murray Gart in a king, where he can no more influence
Copenhagen hotel room in August, and events than if lie had been sent to the
it included a provision for the deposit Lubianka Prison.
of a large suns of money in a Swiss bank U.S. intelligence satellites have con-
in the name of the Khrushchev family. firmed a virtual halt to Soviet missile
SFCPFT OUF.RATION deployment, hardly likely to please
Marshal Grechko and Brezhnev's other
There is no precedent at all for this military allies. Russian diplomats in
kind of deal. But what is even more un- - Washington and elsewhere have taken
precedentcd-and deeply significant--is to hinting that Western policy should
that Leonid Brezhncv the Kremlin's be shaped to help the "angels" in Mos-
No. I man as party chief, could not con- cow, suggesting an angel-devil, or dove-
ceivably have known about and 'ap- - hawk, struggle for power.
proved the KG13-Victor Louis operation. Mr. X, at least for tactical purposes,
On this point, the Kremlinologists arc is presumably an "angel." \Vho is he?
unanimous. The reason is implicit in the Aside from the power to defy Brezhncv
book itself. It is not only an attack on- and protect Louis and the Adzhubeis,
Stalin and Stalinism-ii is a terribly he would logically have other charac-
damaging indictment of the Soviet sys- teristics. IIc would have close connce-
tenn itself, which is made to look both tions with the KGB or with a powerful
brutal and farcically incompetent. What faction of the h.GB. Ile would be very
is more, it is a specific attack on policies shrewd and very ruthless. And lie.
with which Brezhncv is closely identi-- would be comparatively young.
fied-the rehabilitation of Stalin, the
suppression of freedom and dissent in
Soviet literature and art, the tightening
grip on the whole Soviet Population.
The publication of the, memoirs in the
West was a major political act, which
would ordinarily require the explicit
approval of the whole Politburo. It is
inconceivable that it was approved by
Brezhncv and his ;supporters. There-
fore-Q.E.D.--there must be a Mr. X
strong enough to defy Brezhncv.
Mr. X must also be strong enough to
protect Victor Louis and the Adzhubeis.
In late November, Aclzliubci gave an
interview to Western reporters , openly
critical of the Brezluiev regime -anotli-
er act without precedent. The inter-
view was not for attribution, but the
KGB of course knew about it--and may
have ordered Aclzliubci to grant it.
There is other evidence of a brcal:-
down of lirezhnev's authority and a re-
sulting power struggle. Readers of the .