MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL J. BEDELL SMITH FROM ALAN G. KIRK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003200040021-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: January 6, 1953
• Content Type: MF

ADDRESS OFFICIAL. CAI pN ~ovedTFor Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDPS.0R0~1731 R003200040021-4
THE DIRECTOR OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL. STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD.
*Regraded 1JI7CtASSIPIED
when separated from
classified inclosures"
January 6 ! 1953
MEMORANDUM FORE General 'J. Bedell Smith
!'Arector of Central Intelligence
Enclosed is a short gaper on what PSB has
done. You might like to ?ceep this for your office
files.
D/D-24., 12/31/52
Cy #3.
NSC review(s) completed.
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December 31, 1952
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
I. ORIGINS
The Psychological Strategy Board was created to fill two principal needs.
The first of these was the need, as the conflict with the USSR intensified
after 1948, for an interdepartmental board of sub-Cabinet stature which could
effectively coordinate the planning for State, Defense and the Central Intel-
ligence Agency for their growing information and propaganda programs, and
mobilize a national psychological effort employing the full resources of the
Government. The second need was that of providing a means of obtaining
agreement between State and Defense as to more precise program objectives in
support of NSCts goals, for guidance to CIA in conducting covert operations
in fields other than that of propaganda.
II. ESTABLISHMENT
The Board was established on April 4, 1951, by a secret Presidential
Directive which made it responsible "for the formulation and promulgation,
as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for psychological
operations, of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and
programs, and for the coordination and evalu^.tion of the national psycho-
logical effort".
Psychological operations were defined as including all activities
envisioned under the two.NSC directives, which authorized the Governmentts
foreign information and propaganda programs, and which authorized certain
covert activities.
Named to the Board were the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. The President
subsequently authorized the attendance at Board meetings of the Director of
Mutual Security.
The Board was given a staff under a Director appointed by the. President.
Finally, the Directive stated that neither the Board nor the Director
would "perform any psychological operations" but would "utilize to the
maximum extent the facilities and resources of the participating departments
and agencies".
III. ACCOMPLISI3MyNT
After a short organizational period, the Board and its Staff went to work
on those substantive problems which came within its mission. These fell
roughly into the following min categories:
A. THIN REDUCTION OF COMMUNIST POWER
1. The Succession to Stalin
In the past many attempts have been made to develop plans to accentuate
and exploit the difficulties which might attend the passing of power by
Stalin to his successor. A program of psychological preparation for this
event was approved by the Board and work under it is going fi-rward.
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2. Priorities for and Objectives of Covert Activity
Since the agency charged with the responsibility for carrying on covert
operations over a wide area of activity has been handicapped in its forward
planning by too generalized statements of national policy, the effort was
made to prepare reasonably precise guidelines. This resulted in a paper
approved by the Board in the summer of 1952. Implementation of the con-
clusions set forth in this paper is proceeding satisfactorily.
3. Bxploitation of Defectors and Escapees
Although, again, the NEC had call,;d for action to maximize the impact
on the Soviet orbit of certain types of defection, further action was needed
in order better to exploit this Soviet vulnerability. PSB plans were
approved in December 1951 calling for the use of Kersten Amendment funds to
improve the reception, care,, resettlement and utilization of the escapees
and defectors then crossing the curtain. A further plan with respect to
escapees from the Soviet orbit (Phase B) has now been completed and is
scheduled for submission to the Board at its next meeting on January 15,
1953. This second phase provides basic guidance on action to increase the
flow of certain types of escapees and defectors and to exploit their
military and other potentials.
4. Doctrinal Warfare
Again, it had long been felt that an effective attack can be made on the
ideological assumptions underlying the Soviet system. After several staff
studies had opened up convincing possibilities in this field, the Board
authorized formal planning. A panel hg's been formed and has begun its work.
A progress report by the panel will be submitted to the Board at its
January 15 meeting.
5. The Korean War
At the outset of the BoardIs activities, the President requested a
psychological plan which, depending on events, would exploit either the
successful conclusion of Korean negoti.?.tions or their breakdown. A plan
for each contingency received Board approval in the fall of 1951, and there-
after the staff has assisted, the agencies in preparing necessary supporting
programs. Overt operational planning under those programs is now substan-
tially complete, and covert operational planning is currently being revised.
6. Reduction in Communist Fbwer in France and Italy
Although this had long been an NSC objective, the need existed for
interdepartmental agreement on courses of action to attain the objective.
Papers were agreed upon in the early winter of 1952 setting forth a number
of specific actions as guidance for the Embassies in Paris and Rome and
the operating agencies in Washington. This effort has been monitored by an
interdepartmental panel in Washington and its counterparts in the Embassies.
7. East-West Trade
An effort to develop a program which, without endangering our security,
could call'the Soviet bluff in its demands for East-West trade is continuing.
This program would be limited to the non-strategic lists,
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-8. Germ Warfare
U. S. psychological plans to counter Soviet germ warfare charges, and
the Soviet Hate-America Campaign generally, were embodied in a staff study
and approved by the Board. A working group set up under PQC,reports pro-
gross and a paper is expected soon.
B . FREE WORLD BUI -ASP
With the emergence of Germany and Japan from occupational status, the
National Security Council recognized the importance of holding these anchor
points within the Western security structure and insuring their anti-Soviet
orientation. At the same time, it was recognized that the contestable under-
developed areas of the world lying in a great 'arc through Southeast Asia and
the Middle East required similar anti-Soviet orientation. In early 1952,
the Board accordingly directed preparation of psychological strategy plans
for Germany, Japan, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.
The German Plan, which aims at the integration of the Federal Republic
into the European Defense Community, has been successfully eomplistbd and is
being implemented. A supplement dealing with `the special problem of Berlin
is practically complete, and., it is hoped, will be ready for presentation
to the Board at its January 15 meeting. The Japan Plan, which envisages
psychological operations necessary to maximize Japan's contribution to the
attainment of U. S. objectives in Asia, has been successfully completed and
fully coordinated, and is now out for approval by vote-slip. The Southeast
Asia Plan, designed to prevent the free countries of the region from passing
into the communist orbit, is virtually complete, and is also scheduled for
submission to the Board for approval at the January 15 meeting. Similarly,
the Middle East Plan, which is designed. to prevent the extension of Soviet
influence in that area and to insure the availability of resources to the
U. S. and its allies for use in strengthening the free world, has been
completed and is scheduled for submission at the next meeting of the Board.
Key evaluation studies on (a) the effect of the U. S. psychological
effort in Italy since 1946 and (b) the psychological impact of the U.S,
foreign economic program in the United Kingdom will be presented to the
Board for approval at the Jsnunry 15 meeting. It is believed'that these
intensive soundings will yield useful clues for dealing with stresses and
strains now causing excessive concern in large parts of the free world.
C. PLNYING FOR GENERA HOSTILITIES
At the request of the National Security Council, PSB prepared a plan
which set forth the functions in the fields of psychological strategy and
operations to be carried out by civil and military agencies, including PSB,
in the event of general war,, and the means of bringing about the necessary
transfers of personnel and facilities. After approval by the Board, this
plan was submitted to the National Security Council and was approved by
the President as NSC 127/1.
In addition to this organizational and functional paper, the Board
approved a Propaganda Policy Guidance setting forth the lines to be followed
in the event of war with the USSR.
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D. EVALUATIVE REPORTING AND ANALYSIS
Since there exists in Government no formal means of obtaining an
objective evaluation and analysis`of the success of the United States1
programs in the struggle with the USSR, considerable emphasis has been
placed by the Board on this responsibility.
The responsibilities in PSB for evaluative reporting are fourfold:
1. Evaluative summaries and conclusions in the Board's reports to
the NSC on the status and progress of the national psychological
effort.
2. Evaluation and analysis of our successes and failures in certain
areas and functions.
3.
4.
Evaluative reporting in the form of intelligence support for
planning.
Evaluative reporting in the form of. briefings on current
intelligence for the Director and Staff.
IV. DIFFICULTIES ENCO ?ED
The Board and its Staff have encountered the usual difficulties which
face all new interdepartmental bodies. In PSB1s case these were accentuated
to some extent by the general language of its Charter which made uncertain
the Board1s actual role and made stronger provision for restraint than for
initiative. The Charter could either be interpreted broadly to call for a
sort of junior NSC interested substantively in all aspects of the struggle
with the USSR, or it could be construed narrowly to authorize merely a
higher-level coordinating committee in the field of propaganda. Although
the Board chose neither extreme in the projects which it undertook, this
question has never been satisfactorily answered and much staff time has
been lost as a result, Simi3i'ly, the related problem of how to expedite
decision has been troublesome. Whether it be in planning, coordination or
evaluation, substantive staff efforts have naturally encountered basic
divergencies of view. Since every im?ortant paper has to clear through at
least three agencies before presentation to the Board, it is not surprising
that major plans, for example, are taking about a year to reach the
implementation stage.
V. NEW TT4SKS
As work on the projects described above in Section III neared completion
preliminary surveys were begun by the Director and Staff, in collaboration
with agency staffs, looking toward the development of plans on the following
topics:
A. SOVIET ORBIT
1, Soviet Union: A renewed attack on the central problem as a whole.
(a b"?yiet rme F rce : Intensification of disaffection.
(Perhaps to be developed as one part of the comprehensive
USSR plan.)
2. Communist China.
3. uropean Satellites,,
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B. UNSTABLE OR CONTESTABLE AREAS
1. Indian Sub-continent.
2. French and Spanish North Africa.
3. Africa South of the Sahara.
4, Latin American Danger-jpots.
C. WESTN WORLD
1. Western tern uro es Reduction of tensions and hostility toward United
States policies.
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