LETTER TO MR. GEORGE BUSH FROM NANCY J. BRUCKER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01314R000300010038-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 72
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: December 23, 1976
• Content Type: LETTER

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THE FORUM FOR
CONTEMPORARY HISTORY
?
December 23, 1976
Mr. George Bush
5161 Palisade Lane NW
Washington DC 20016
Because of your interest in the subject, I have
marked for your attention a feature in the current
issue of Skeptic.
If you would like to respond, we would be pleased
to consider your comments for inclusion in the
letters section of the forthcoming issue.
Cordially,
Nancy J. Brucker
Associate Editor
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FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
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TO:
DD
D/DCI/ NIO
62
Compt
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DCI/DDCI
 mi Emir,
kWM
It there a place
; for spying
in a free society?
Can ? ?
? down. O!n the
g-ence community?
? to ?*.
with Big Brother
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WHERESHOULDWE
DRAW THE LI 01
NE o
Upon being informed in 1929 conduct by the CIA, FBI, et al., is not law-abiding Americans, from high
that cryptographers had so much over whether to spy, but in school students to U.S. senators.
cracked the Japanese diplo- what manner and upon whom. Critics warn that transgressions by
matic code, Secretary of State Should we spy on friends as well as the intelligence community and its
Henry L. Stimson was so incensed that enemies? Should our operatives be politicization by successive adminis-
the U.S. was "reading the other limited to the gathering of intelligence? trations brought us to the brink of an
gentleman's mail" that he promptly Or should they be permitted to Orwellian nightmare. The remedies
ordered the code-breaking equipment influence events in the U.S.'s favor - they propose range from more vigilant
destroyed and the experts dispersed. even if that involves direct, covert oversight and tighter control by
A dozen years later, the "other intervention ("dirty tricks") in the Congress to abolition of the intelli-
gentleman" repaid Stimson (then internal affairs of other countries? gence apparatus.
Secretary of War) with an unpleasant What methods are acceptable? What Defenders dismiss the excesses as
surprise made possible in large mea- are the proper limits of spying? How missteps which arose out of legitimate
sure by the Secretary's earlier generosi- can we best enforce those limits? counterintelligence activities, point
ty of spirit: Pearl Harbor. Had our We may be confused and troubled out the necessities (and advantages) of
intelligence apparatus not been virtu- about the role of spying in foreign spying in a hostile world, underscore
ally inoperative in 1941, we might have policy, but not about the implications the need for counterintelligence to
been in a better position to appraise of spying by the government upon us keep the world from spying upon us
Japan's war-making potential. and our fellow citizens. That is clearly and argue that tighter control and
Ambivalent as Americans may be unconstitutional, probably illegal and scrutiny will severely cripple our
about spying - the methods go totally unacceptable to most of us. So intelligence operations.
against our traditional notions of fair the center of the storm of controversy The central question is how to
play and openness, after all - few of rages around the revelations that the balance the imperatives of national
us today would challenge the wisdom CIA, FBI and Army Intelligence security against those of civil rights. In
of keeping ourselves informed about conducted extensive surveillance of the months ahead, two congressional
our antagonists. The current con- political groups in this country (dissi- committees and a presidential com-
troversy
touched off b
l
,
y an ava
anche dent and otherwise) and compiled mission will offer up answers.
of allegations of improper and illegal records on hundreds of thousands of
SKEPTIC is the journal of the Forum for Contemporary History, an independent, non-political, non-partisan
organization formed to provide opportunities for the free expression of controversial and divergent points of view. It grew
out of a series of debates-in-print about significant issues. Each debate was initiated by a "Forum Letter" from an
individual who, in some way, had made or influenced contemporary history. In turn, qualified spokesmen and Forum
members would rebut or comment upon the letter.
Although the format has changed, the spirit of debate remains. Each issue of SKEPTIC examines a topic of current
interest through articles and interviews which represent a broad spectrum of viewpoints.
SKEPTIC exists to help clarify the most important issues of our time ... to help readers understand the pros and cons,
organize their thinking and develop their own opinions. Entirely reader supported, SKEPTIC neither solicits nor accepts
advertising.
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 S W
THE FORUM FOR CONTEMPORARY HISTORY
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SPYING
u' WHERE SHOULD WE DRAW THE LINE?/ Henry B. Burnett, Jr. inside front cover
INTERVIEW WITH MORTON HALPERIN / Ron Ridenour _ 4
FJ THEU.S.INTELLIGENCECOMMUNITY / John Hamer _ -11
WHAT TRIGGERED THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY? 16
How Nixon Used the CIA / Tad Szulc, from New York _17
Will Congress Exorcise The Ghost of J. Edgar? /
Murray Seeger, from Los Angeles Times _21
Big Brother in Olive Drab / Christopher H. Pyle,
from The Civil Liberties Review_ -23
IJ THE CASE FOR SPYING -28
George Washington's Spy Network / Colonel Allison W. Ind __29
The Need for Intelligence / Allen W. Dulles -33
Can We Do Without Secret Intelligence Operations? /
William E. Colby -36
The FBI's Rebuttal / Clarence M. Kelley _40
Will CIA Survive this Anti-Intelligence Mania? /
John Ligonier, from Human Events _42
r]' THE CASE AGAINST THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
A New Solution for the CIA / I. F. Stone,
from New York Review of Books_ _47
Second Thoughts on the CIA / Harry S Truman __49
How to Close Down the Company / Philip Agee,
from Counter-Spy _50
A New Home for Your Fingerprints / TRB,
from The New Republic - - -52
A Question of Power / Frank J. Donner,
from The Nation _54
F' SURVIVAL HANDBOOK: How to deal with Big Brother / Sandra Stencel
VJ LETTERS
I READING GUIDE / Richard E. Kipling .-65
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Skeptic
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E'iKEP IC INTERVIEW:
Interviewer: Ron Ridenour
1-low does a member of the intelligence -ommunity feel
about the proper limits of spying when the instruments
of surveillance are turned against him? Morton Halperin,
once Henry Kissinger's aide., is suing for $2.5 million
the case of Morton Halperin, vicar and s. i tim. is
ill -rsstrativc of what can happen in a bureaucracy hooked on
r-pving and secrecy. A former New Yorker and graduate of
Yale (doc.orate in international relations), Halperin. 36,
joined the Defense Department in 1966 and soon became
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. Henry Kissinger,
w,u had Known Halperin at Harvard, later recruited him
into the Nixon administration and made him planning
group chief of the powerful National Security ( ouncil.
The W1,ite House in 1969 became increasingly frustrated
as .a succession of stories about U.S. activities around the
w:)ild appeared in the media. In an attempt to trace the
Ic.rks. Ni,,son ordered wiretaps on top government officials
and news persons. Kissinger supplied the names of 13
government employees who had access to secret inforrna-
ii in.
(Halpern-s open opposition to the Vietnam warstamped
h rn as a crime suspect. So with the nelp of the Chesapeake
& Potomac telephone Company, the FBI tapped
I' alperin's home phone in May 1969. No warrant was
issued-, no entries ever appeared on the "Elsur" (electronic
surveillance) index where the FBI normally records the
it rrnes of those overheard. Yet the tap remained until
February 1971, months after Halperin resigned From the
g )vernmrnt. Summaries of the conversations of Halperin
anc. his family members were sent to Kissinger. Nixon,
H.R. Haldeman. John D. Ehrlichman and Alexander Haig.
What c10 they hear? Family chit-chat, private business,
c cpressions of support for Democratic presidential
ctndidat( Edmund Muskie and more about Halperin's
v.c ws on the war. But no evidence at all of any leaks,
accordini, to the House Judiciary Committee's study
ncleased July IS, 1974. In fact, FBI agents had Suggested
t'rvo months after the tap was installed that r he
discontinued. lo no avail, Halperin was kept under
s .trveillance longer than any other suspect.
the H ilperins first learned of the wiretap when a news
I-roadcast on their car radio mentioned it in c.)nnection
vii ti the Pentagon Papers trial. I he government was f arced
t ; disclowc wiretap information in May 1973 by Federal
Court .lucre Matt few Bryne. Ihese activities led to
dismissal of the gov'rnrnent's case against Daniel Ellsberg
and Anthony Russ(. Indeed, this was the first revelation
taut the go ernmenr had used wiretaps to investigate news
Ieaks.
Now. with the heap of ACLU, the Halperins are suing
Kissinger. Haig, H. Ideman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell, Sulli-
van, unnamed FBI igents and the telephone company for
X2.5 million. the alaintiffs maintain that the tap was
obtained without it varrant and was therefore illegal, that
their constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech
and valets irom unr-,asonable searches were violated. This
suit is among th, major actions resulting from the
Watergate disclosures. and may he one in which private
citizen Richard M. Nixon is compelled to testify.
Despite ris troub es in the Nixon. administration and his
suppor for Musk. -, Halperin is still a Republican. "I
remain optimistic that we can change many of these
things." comments Halperin, "and the only conceivable
way is through one or both of the main political parties."
SKE:P I IC Contii hitting Editor Ron Ridenour inter-
viewed Halperin in his office at the Center for National
Security Studies in Nashington, where he is writinga book
on government but 'aucratic secrecy.
N
SKEP'i l(: You acre the National Security Council's
planning grip chi, l and i,ou were Kissinger's aide. Were
1 ou pros u an.v s(, -ret information:'
IIALPERIN: Lets of secret information, but not about
the kind of covert . )perations we've been hearing about.
SKF:P'IIC: Wow(l it he .safe to say that during that
period you tv ere pr, --war, or You essentially thought it was
necessary
HALI'FRIN: I vent into the government in July of
.966 as an sncreasin ely lukewarm supporter of the Vietnam
War. By 196 -, I thoutht we should withdraw from the war. 1
began working on ietnam, in fact, about the time that 1
became to!ally diseztchanted with U.S. policy.
SKFP*I I(: Ilut' did t'uu express those ideas? Did you
du anrthwg puhlu r.'
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MORTON HALPERIN
HALPERIN: No. I was writing memos on Vietnam to
my bosses making specific recommendations to stop the
bombing.
SKEPTIC: Would you say that your views had
something to do with the decision bvgovernment officials
to tap your phones?
HALPERIN: Oh, yes. There is no question that
Kissinger knew my views and he knew that other people
knew my views. That played a major role in the decision to
tap my phone.
SKEPTIC: J. Edgar hoover once said that you "could
he a leak." What is your response to that?
IIALPERIN: The FBI's notion of how to investigate for
a leak is to talk to two or three of their friends in the
Pentagon, and ask which people in the building don't like
the policy and therefore might leak something. They went
to journalist Bill Beecher, who broke the story of the
bombing of Cambodia. He told them it was the Air Force
which leaked to him. They ignored that. But then they went
to people who didn't even know who had access to the
stories which were leaked. So it wasn't the world's most
sophisticated investigation. Some of those people told
what they knew to be true, that I was opposed to the war
and thought we should get out, and that therefore it was
conceivable that I had leaked the story of the bombing to
Beecher. But it was just totally uninformed gossip from
friends of the FBI in the Pentagon.
I did not leak that story to Beecher. I told that to
Kissinger at the time and if the FBI had come to see me I
would also have told them.
Then they tapped my phone, which makes the whole
thing crazy because you can't learn whether anybody is
leaking by tapping his home telephone.
SKEPTIC: Did you know of the tapping?
HALPERIN: No. But Kissinger knew.
SKEPTIC: Why did you resign?
HALPERIN: Because I just didn't want to work with a
man who won't tell his staff what he is doing. Kissinger's
story is that the tap was put on to prove that his staff was
not being disloyal. But how can anyone prove that with a
tap?
SKEPTIC: Why. do you think they kept a tap on your
home phone after .you lift the government?
HALPERIN: I think the House Judiciary Committee's
conclusion is very clear and, if you read the letters the FBI
sent to the White House concerning my tap, you come to
the conclusion that the purpose was to learn about various
kinds of political activities that I was engaged in. But 1
don't want to suggest that the information was of
overwhelming importance to them. I think the point was
"Kissinger's story is that the tap was put
on to prove that his staff was not being
disloyal. But how can anyone prove that
with a tap?"
that as long as the tap was on, why turn it off?
SKEPTIC: Do you think they are still tapping you?
IIALPERIN: Henry Kissinger once said that living in
Washington is a constant struggle against paranoia, and it
is a struggle in which I constantly engage. I must say the
government has not made it very easy for me in the last few
years. I guess on balance I don't think that my phone is now
tapped. On the other hand I don't conduct conversations
on the phone that l don't want the FBI to hear.
SKEPTIC: What is your opinion of Kissinger today?
HALPERIN: I think he has done a few good things. I
think he has done a great many bad things. For example, he
is the person most responsible for our stubborn refusal to
end our military involvement in Indochina.
SKEPTIC: Do .you think the country would he better
off without him in leadership?
HALPERIN: Yes.
SKEPTIC: In a recent interview in U.S. News & World
Report, CIA Director William Colby stated that it was
necessary to spy on friends and foes alike out of self=
protection and state sovereigntv..Just what is the case? Do
we intact spy on , friendl y governments? And if so, for what
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"I think we, the American people, all
s~zIare part of the blame. Remember the
Bay of Pigs? Very few of us said that we
had no right to mount an invasion
against another country.
1) trposes:'
HALPERIN: I have a problem about what I k:-iow trom
when I was in the government. So ll think to clarify things
yru should assume that what I am saying is what I know
from outside the government, and if it is not, I will tell you
"hat the source of the information is. I think it is absolutely
c ear that we feel free to, and do in fact, spy' in various ways
on friendly governments. The British, the Australians, New
/ealand and Canada are the exceptions. Sort of a white
Anglo-Saxon club. There are very specific agreements that
we do net conduct spying operations in those countries.
hut as one learns in the intelligence business, there are
wheels within wheels. My guess is that if a high official of
the Britisn government came to us, he would not be turned
away bu would be handled entirely separately so that
almost nobody would know that he was in fact giving us
information. All governments do it. I think that seems to be
part of the game. I think we have a perfect right to try to
Ind out what the British are doing or anybody else. The
clu.estion is what kind of activities are legitimate to engage
III.
SKEPTIC: Colhr also said that the National Security
ouncil and the con,ressional oversight committees do in
tint know in advance what the CIA proposes to spend its
rrronev on and that there are no secrets withheld from these
hudies. Is that true:'
HALPERIN: I 'm ink what Colby has said about
congressional committees is that nothing would be
withheld from them I'hey are told as much as they want to
know. But I think he has acknowledged, and certainly the
Committees themselves have acknowledged, that they
Ldn't probe very deeply and that they didn't know, for
example, anything in advance about the intervention in
Chile. I think the '40 Committee," chaired by Henry
Kissinger for the la,t five or six years, does perform an
oversight function. More than an oversight function,
ndeed it often ha, been the driving energy behind CIA
operations. Kissinge- certainly was in the case of the Chile
nterventior.. He ma- terminded it and was the person most
;anxious to nave it happen.
SKEPTIC:. Would rou say that if we want to assign
'dame for acts whici we don't think are either democratic,
legal or moral, v A,- should blame Congress and the
/'resident, since then have chosen to ignore what they don't
cant to know and t':erefore condone whatever occurs?
HALPERIN: Ye,, I think that's right. It would be as if
die mayor of a city mired thugs to collect the garbage and
then, when the thug, started beating up people who didn't
like the way they collected the garbage, blamed the thugs. I
think we, the American people, all share part of the blame.
Remember the Bay I Pigs'? There were very few of us who
said that it would ha e been worse it it had worked and that
we had no right to mount an invasion against another
::ountry.
I think that is changing. In the past, it has been taken for
granted that we hi ve an obligation to defend peoples
anywhere who are fighting for their freedom. I think many
Americans now tak _ a very different attitude: that what
happens in Cambodia. in South Vietnam, in Chile, or Cuba
is for those people to determine.
SKEPTIC: What does the NSA do with its billion dot'lar
budget and its 25,0(l) employees?
HALPERIN: The National Security Agency deserves a
tot of attention. It Ek supposed to break codes for the U.S.
and intercept comm~rnications. It has been alleged --an.d I
know nothing about this from my own government service
that the NSA monitors all overseas phone calls made by
anybody from the U.S. to anywhere in the world and
records the conversations. I think that is an allegation
which the Senate and House committees ought to look at
very closely.
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SKEPTIC: Why do intelligence policy makers seem to
assume the task of directing the destinies of other
countries?
HALPERIN: Partly, it's what they have been told
specifically to do and partly it's what they are trained to do.
This all comes out of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services)
experience in the Second World War, when these guys were
working to install the "right" kinds of governments. The
OSS types had great success in the 1948 operation in Italy.
Italy's government was threatened with the likelihood that
the Italian Communists would come to power through an
election. The U.S. government moved in with all the
techniques of the CIA. Everybody, including President
Truman, knew we were intervening in the Italian elections.
Many people will say that maybe we shouldn't have
intervened in Chile, but that what we did in Italy was right.
And it was a great success. The communists were kept out
of the Italian government until now. The OSS/CIA people
were set up and authorized to recruit and train people in
their own image and send them around the world to do the
same thing.
SKEPTIC: Their purpose is to keep the world safe for
capitalism?
HALPERIN: I don't think they would think of it that
way at all, and many would probably be sympathetic to
various kinds of socialism. A lot of people engaged in the
CIA, in their private lives, would be liberal democrats.
SKEPTIC: They are just doing a job, in other words?
HALPERIN: I think they think of the job as keeping
communist governments from coming into power. Part of
the theory, of course, is that totalitarianism of the right
often evolves into democracy but communism is irreversi-
ble. They believe that by supporting a right-wing
dictatorship, they might help it evolve into a democracy.
One of the dangers the CIA warns about is that if right-
wing governments suppress the people too much, a
revolution comes and the communists take over. So the
CIA has been actively involved in a number of countries in
creating parties on the left trying to establish alternatives to
communism. There is also a new idea in American foreign
policy, thanks to Kissinger, which is that we don't care
about the internal structures of other governments. We
don't care in the sense that it doesn't effect our policies; as
individuals, we may strongly prefer democracy, but as a
government, we shouldn't care about the internal politics
of the country. What we should care about is its foreign
policy.
SKEPTIC: Does that mean, then, that if we could he
assured that America's preferences were followed by
communists in Chile, Portugal or wherever, we wouldn't
"It has been alleged that the NSA moni-
tors all overseas phone calls made by
anybody from the U.S. to anywhere in the
world and records the conversations. That
is an allegation which the Senate and
House committees ought to look at very
closely."
tri to overthrow those governments?
HALPERIN: No. I think that the argument then would
he that the government is unstable. Even if the communist
government claims to be friendly it will ultimately end up
taking unfriendly actions. Another concern is the prece-
dent it sets for other countries, where communists coming
to power are likely to present a threat.
SKEPTIC: What is your opinion of Colby as a CIA
leader?
HALPERIN: It is very unfortunate that at this period in
its history, the CIA is led by somebody who has been in the
covert side of the agency for most of his career, and who
comes out of the OSS. In addition, he bears the burden of
Vietnam, including the Phoenix program. On the other
hand, whatever one thinks of Colby, he has done some
things that 1 doubt Richard Helms and other agency
directors would ever have done. He reported to the
Congress in ways that ultimately led it to leak although I
don't think that was his intention on what former CIA
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"\tlany of the techniques which were later
used against the anti-war movement were
perfected in the anti-Hoffa campaigns of
the Kennedy Justice Department.'
di ect )r James Schlesinger had learned about the Jomestic
activities of the CIA. He has, to a degree, been more open.
SKEPTIC: He has said recently that the investigations
inin the CIA either do or could endanger me CIA's
operation abroad. Do you think that's a valid claim?
IIALPERIN: I think the CIA has forfeited the right to
mike that. claim. When an agency like the CIA, which is not
supposed to conduct any domestic activities, opens -he
tn.iil of American citizens, wiretaps the telephones of
American citizens, infiltrates agents in domestic organiza-
tions ter whatever purpose - it must he th.7rougnly
investigated. If, in the process, some activities that it
cc residers legitimate are in some way jeopardized, that is
the price we have to pay to make sure that. the agency is not
~rl;a.in in it position where it is tempted to engage in illegal
and unconstitutional activities. I think the whole not on
that the ('IA should be exempt from the law because it is
ci gaged in activity that is important to our security is
.,v-c-ng. I lie agency has shown itself to be potentially if
not. actually - very dangerous to our liberties at h, )rne. So I
consider this charge irrelevant.
SKEP1'I( : Does t ngagement in covert activities tend to
,.;(Ike one a political advocate and thereby lessen the
,ii;nificance o(in tellntence gathering?
IIALPERiN: Yes that's one of the problems with the
IA. It ha, become an advocate of its own operations
. they than a neutr:t t analyst of intelligence. I think the
-gency ought ":o get o it of covert operations and become an
organization which -valuates intelligence and does esti-
nates.
SKF L"l l(: Does :,tie FBI engage in illegal a(ts, in your
);union?
IIALI'F.IIN: The, engage in acts which are illegal in
the sense that they olate people's constitutional rights.
',t nether thev are violations of criminal statutes depends. It
,:is not it federal crin c to engage in wiretapping until 1968.
dose wiretaps were merely unconstitutional before then.
SKF.PTI( : What motivates the FBI to spend so much
ore of their resourr e.s in political belief areas than in
,~ancecl rime are, HALPERIN: fh,t. I understand, has to do with Mr.
ioover, whit for a to tt time denied that there was any such
~,ing as organized one. People who know something
i out it claim that he was afraid that if he turned his agents
loose on organized grime, they could be corrupted like so
many others were ' the money that was available to
organized crime. I d n't know whether that was true, but
r it long time he viewed the FBI largely as an anti-
ommurrist agency. I hat was convenient and congenial
ith his iisn ideot And for a long time, it was
consistent wish the opular mood in the U.S. Similarly, I
think the F81 was udder great pressure, as the CIA was,
from Johnson and i ien from Nixon, to go after the anti-
'sar movement. Par_ of the blame for this goes back to
I ranklin K sosevelt vho, after all, is the man who got the
1- BI out of the busing ss of just investigating crime and into
the business of polit cal investigation.
SKEPTIC: It is ieteresting that it was the most liberal of
I?emocrats, hrankliv l)elano Roosevelt, who brought the
I Bl into this area, .rtd Truman who created the CIA.
HAIJPFRIN: Ant it was John F. Kennedy's attorney
general, Robert K-nnedy, who decided that all the
-esources of the i overnment, including the Internal
Revenue Service, sh iuld be mobilized to find some crime
Mr. Hoffa hadcomritted and put him in jail. Many of the
.echniques which sere later used against the anti-war
movement were perfected in the anti-Hoffa campaigns of
the Kennedy Justice Department.
SKEPTIC : You r` aye written that the executive branch
)!government thrir s on secrecy and the Congress suffers
troth se crccr. Could r nu explain that?
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HALPERIN: I think Congress can influence what is
going on in the executive branch only if the country
generates sufficient outrage to convince enough congress-
men and senators to take the same position. Congress can
then enact legislation and make demands on the executive
branch that can be made to stick. When you know
something that is secret, you can't pass it along to your
constituents. You can't build a consensus in secret.
If a Congressman knows something that is secret, there is
nothing he can do with it. Congressman Lucien Nedzi knew
of the intervention in Chile and of CIA domestic
operations, for instance, but he felt he was given the
information under a secrecy oath and therefore could say
nothing. He couldn't use it to generate the kind of pressures
that have produced the Rockefeller Commission and the
congressional resolution which requires that committees,
including foreign affairs and foreign relations, be notified
in writing by the President before covert operations occur.
All of those things got pushed into existence, in part, by the
release of information about the domestic operations of the
CIA. All that information Nedzi had.
The Executive Branch, on the other hand, wants to keep
things secret, wants to keep Congress and the public out of
"its" business. Consensus can be built within the Executive
Branch about things that are secret because secret
documents move freely within the Executive Branch. In
Congress, there is no such easy access. It is often the case
that things remain secret in order to keep them from the
American public rather than to hide them from a
hypothetical or real enemy. But the argument over covert
operations has to be by definition an argument on the
merits and not on the secrecy part. Covert operation is
secret interference in the internal affairs of another
country. It is nonsensical to say that if we do it, it should be
made public. I think, instead, one has to say we don't need
it. I think we should not engage in covert operations. But I
don't think that's an argument about secrecy. That's an
argument about the substance of a covert operation. I don't
think we should be involved in the internal affairs of other
countries without the American people and the Congress
being able to approve or disapprove of it. I think there are a
lot of other things that are kept secret that should not be,
but which probably should continue. For example, the fact
that the U.S. flies reconnaissance satellites still is
considered by the American government - but nobody
else - as secret. That should be made public.
SKEPTIC: If you were the President and had the power
to make decisions about the intelligence community, what
would you trv to establish as a principle, a working pollee.
for those agencies which deal withjbreign-countries and for
"Covert operation is secret interference in
the internal affairs of another country. It
is nonsensical to say that if we do it, it
should be made public. I think, instead,
we have to say we don't need it."
those which deal with domestic intelligence?
HALPERIN: I think there are some simple rules. First,
no covert operations. They are inconsistent with the way
we should be making decisions. We inevitably end up
opposing democratic forces and corrupting democratic
processes. Second, I would limit the CIA to Langley,
Virginia and put it in charge of analysis, but not let it gather
intelligence. And I would limit the gathering of intelligence,
except in the case of the Soviet Union and maybe a few
other countries, to technical intelligence.
SKEPTIC: You would have actual spy agents?
HALPERIN: If a member of the Politburo of the Soviet
Union came to an American official, I see no reason to say
"no." That is very different from active recruitment of
people in Ecuador, for example.
SKEPTIC: Why would you make a difference between
Ecuador and the Soviet Union?
HALPERIN: Because the Soviet Union has the
capacity to destroy the United States in an hour.
SKEPTIC: There are those who would claim that what
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"For any surveillance, I would require a
*,Warrant from a judge, and for some kinds
of activities I would require approval
Strom the attorney general."
1 uti say muy he true in terms o/'the direct military threat,
Out that if F_cziador adopted a corvmunist way of li/c, and
lien someone else did, it could threaten our stcuria.
IIALPERiN: We still don't have the right to interfere.
SKEPTIC: Aren't you asking its to live unaer a moral
'ode thc.t other countries aren't operating uncl_":'
IiALPF:RIN: Indeed. I ask the American government
o do it great many things that no other government does.
117e third thing I would do is make clear that no domestic
s'arveillanee can take place except against people who it i_s
believed have committed or are about to commit a crime.
I or an', surveillance, I would require a warrant from a
j1 udge, ~rid for some kinds of activities I would require
approval from the attorney general.
SKEPTIC: Do you think that the intelligence commu-
nity is threatening freedom in our country todi r"
IUALPF,RIN: I think it has clearly weakened t. We
know 1 rom the Watergate tapes that Nixon felt that he
hadn't been ruthless enough in using the instruments in his
power in the first administration. Had he not spent his
second administration fighting Watergate, he might well
I,', ' launched programs which would have made his first
ith than, for four mare years and selected his successor, it's
ust not clear to me There it would have gone.
SRP19 I(': Do v cu think it could have developed into a
.ritalitarian society.'
11ALPERIN: I trL/ not to be excessively paranoid or
)ccssimistic or hyste ical, but I think we ran a risk far
'cater than any of .. understood and far greater than we
,hould.
SKETI(: What to You think, realistically, will come
at of the curreni investigations into the intelligence
unirnunit I.`
11AI,1'F:RIN: I am optimistic that they will be thorough
Ind serious. Whethc- they will lead to the kind of legislative
r hanges, that I'd lik,. to see remains an open question.
SKEP"1 IC: If we were to relax or eliminate our covert
iperurion~ abroad lo You think this would open up our
( ountrt' ni'ire to en Wiles.
IiALPF:RIN: Ni tin the slightest. One doesn't have to
urn around and elvninate efforts to deal with espionage in
the U.S.
SKEPTIC: Do ,ou think it is possible that the
intelligem c' agencit., the executive branch ofgovernment,
and the iii'titart' an already' so pot-t'erful that they will not
dive up av t suhstairtive power, and if a serious attempt is
made to di ).,o hi, thy' public that they will sirnpay resist with
the Juice tluyhave
IIAIi.I'F:RIN: N
SRLilt IC: If tlr' laws are made, do y'ou think they is ill
abide by rh,:ut"
HALPERIN: y ,t 100 percent, but I think you can
make vet.' substantial changes. For example, I think the
President of the 1 .S., with much less difficulty than
establishing welfar:" reform, could abolish the covert side of
the CIA.
SKEPTIC: Do r ou think that if' Congress makes laws
and a pre',ident sa s is e are going to abide h r these laws --
no ov.'rti;ruwing srovernments, for instance - elements in
the CIA 'night de, ide they just couldn't tolerate that and
simpl_r kill the pro odent or do something equally drastic''
HAIPERIN: I yndon Johnson said he inherited a
"Murder Inc." in atin America. When you train people to
commit political assassination, if indeed we do that: when
you train people to think it is legitimate to overthrow
governni _nts because you don't like their politics; there i,.
inevitahi, a dang'r that they will come home and do the
same thi:rg.i-hat in my opinion, is an unacceptable risk.
administration seem very tame. And if he'd gotten away
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The U. S. Intelligence Community
John Hamer
Everyone knows FBI and more people are getting to know CIA,
but A-2, G-2, ONI, NSA, DIA and several other agencies play
critical roles in the U.S.'s intelligence operations
Intelligence operations have had a the land' of Canaan" (Numbers 13:20), inherited almost no semblance of
long and influential, if little-known, and the provocative tradition of organized intelligence, relying for
history. Richard W. Rowan wrote in women in intelligence later was begun many years on diplomats and military
his encyclopedic history of intelli- by Rahab, the harlot of Jericho, who attaches for foreign information. The
gence, Secret Service (1967): "Spies sheltered the spies of Israel (Joshua Revolutionary army's spy network
and speculators for thirty-three centu- 2:1
ries have exerted more influence on ) was an informal, rag-tag operation.
The creation of a systematic, insti- Both sides employed spies during the
history than on historians." Indeed, tutionalized intelligence service in Civil War, but they were largely
spying is an ancient function, and the modern times is widely credited to ineffectual.
importance of intelligence information Frederick the Great of Prussia, World War I brought about the first
to civil and military strategy and who transformed the haphazard significant expansion of U.S. intelli-
decision-making is a concept as old as intelligence-gathering operations of gence activity, as the Army's Military
government itself. In 500 B.C., the the 18th century into a general military Intelligence Division staff grew from a
Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu, in staff function. By the late 19th century, small handful to some 1,200 during the
an ageless treatise on spying called Europe had become a network of war. It was cut back severely during
Roots of Strategy - Art of War, spies. Even so, the United States the isolationist years between the two
stated: "Knowledge of the enemy's
disposition can only be obtained from world wars, however, largely because
y This article was condensed from the of congressional skepticism and the
other men. Hence, the use of spies."I Editorial Research Report entitled lack of emphasis in State, War and
The Bible records that God instructed "Intelligence Community," by John Navy Departments on peacetime
Moses to send out agents "to spy out Hamer, associate editor for Editorial intelligence. But on Dec. 7, 1941, all
'Quoted by Sanchc de Gramont in The secret War( 1962),P 64. Research Reports. that ended.
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. ntra. Intelligence Agency:
Creation and Growth
It is generally agreed that the CIA
traces its beginnings to the gross
inciliizence failure that made the
Surprise Japanese attack on Pearl
I I irhor p -issible. The attack resulted
not somu2h from faulty intelligence as
lr srn the lack of an agency to evacuate
intelligence. Many warnings of the
inurninent assault were received but
tesnured because officials did not
believe that such a mass attack was
[[,Rhin Japanese capabilities.' Presi-
dent Roosevelt in July 1941 had asked
I. Will am J. Donovan to set up a
new intelligence service for possible
},'aiding ttse. "You'll have to start from
catch. We don't have an intelligence
1 1) R told Donovan. First
called the ( )Mice of the Coordinator of
Ilitarination, the service was trans-
f rimed in 1942 into the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS). Originally
intended to supplement intelligence-
g ithering activities of the military, the
f5S under the imaginative leadership
at "Wild Sill" Donovan quickly gained
a reputation for derring-do such as
parachut rag spies behind enemy lines.
Soon after the war. President
I roman abolished the OSS. But the
reed for intelligence continued, and
ii January 1946 Truman issued an
executive order establishing a succes-
s;)r to the OSS and a precursor to the
( IIA the Central Intelligence
(;_ooup. I he nevv body operated under
to execu ive council called the Nati;)n-
a 1 Intelligence Authority, consisting of
the secretaries of state, war, navy and
the President's personal military advis-
i. At Ii:-st it was primarily a coordi-
iiating group which prepared daily
intelligence summaries for I roman,
but it also was authorized to perform
it pgcial intelligence services under
the direction of the executive council
or the President. The first director
of Cen ral Intelligence was Rear
1t.fm. Sidney W. Souers, succeeded
N ten, rel.- oft he 5.n V wank Knox ent w ird of the attack.
to -xdaimec "fit ( , o d . t h i s can't he true I I I is muzt incan the
'Frl tics
in live months by Air Force Gen.
Hoyt S Vandenberg, who gave way
in May 1947 to Rear Adm. Roscoe H.
Hiilenk ietter-
I)urinkc lengthy postwar debate in
Congre,s on military reorgan:_ation,
the form of congressional legislation
on intelligence tool: shape. l lie Na-
tional Security Act of 1947 which
placed the armed services under a new
Dcparti ient of Defense, also created
both the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Nattonai Security Ci uneil.1
But it is clear morn the hearings on the
1947 act that no one knew exactly
Dulles was
a colorful figure who
received wide coverage
in the press despite the
CIA's intended secrecy and
gained an almost legendary
reputation as America's
"master spy."
what the nature of the nett beasts
would be. Rep. Fred E. Busher (R-Ill.)
once asked Navy Secretary James V.
Forres'.all: "I wonder if t.ner( is any
Ioundtltion for 'he rumors that have
come to me to the effect that through
this Central Intelligence Agency they
are co?itemplating operational activi-
ties."' it was it crucial quest ion. but the
congressmai recei.cd a vague reply.
1 he growth of the CIA in site and
scope iaralcls the eevelopment of the
Cold War, and the agency's early
leaders wen: military men. admiral
Hillenkoetter remained as director
until I Q50, when he was replaced by
Army Gen. Waiter Bedell Smith. 1 he
agency became more aggressive inter-
nationally under Smith, but man
who was to put his stamp on the CIA
was a civilian, Allen W. !Dulles, who
was named director by President Eisen
'.luu,e t inte_ un I :pen::.t lur in rhs } ,.- tilte I)epan
194'
power in 1953. the younger brother of
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles,
11len Dulles changed intelligence from
a shadowy business into a respectable
Professional career, attracting young
and liberal intellectuals from all over
the nation to loin the agency. Dulles
etas a colorful figure who received
[side coverage in the press despite the
CIA's intended secrecy and gained
,in almost legendary reputation as
America's "master spy."
During the 1950's, the CIA ex-
panded its activities in the realm of
covert political operations. It did this
not under the 1947 or 1949 acts, but
i iuough a number of super-secret
National Security Council intelligence
directives which Professor Harry
Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt Universi-
t' calls "the real operating constitu-
t Ion" of the C IA and which "only a few
hizh government officials have ever
,ctn." I hese filled the "loopholes" in
the congressional legislation and
created what many now call the CIA's
"secret charter." Today, through its,
Directorate of Operations, until this
scar called the Directorate of Plans.
the CIA collects intelligence informa-
tion and coordinates or engages irl
extensive secret operations around the
s orld. l he other halt of the agency.
called the Directorate of Intelligence,
researches and analyzes the informa-
non which is gathered and makes
reports to the President and the
National Security Council. The agency
Is believed to have about 18,001)
employees and an annual budget of
between $750 million and $ I billion.
Expansion Within American
Military Branches
Despite its fame, the CIA is neither
the biggest of the nation's intelligence
services nor does it have the largess
budget. (hose honors fall to the
Defense Department, which oversees
the multiple intelligence functions of
the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
Army, Navy and Air Force intelligent
services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
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the National Security Agency. The
DIA was set up in 1961 by Defense
Secretary Robert S. McNamara to
coordinate and eliminate duplication
in the separate intelligence units of the
three armed services. Although its staff
has grown to more than 5,000 and its
budget to nearly $130 million, the DIA
still has little independent power and
the other three units continue to thrive.
In addition, the DIA quietly feuds with
the CIA over their roles.6
Army intelligence, commonly called
G-2, expanded in size during World
War I I and in prestige after the Korean
War. With a staff of some 38,500 and a
budget of $775 million, Army intelli-
gence has been severely criticized in
recent years for involvement in domes-
tic surveillance activities. Hearings by
Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D-N.C.),
chairman of the Constitutional Rights
Subcommittee, revealed that the Army
had some 300 offices and 1,200 agents
around the country collecting infor-
mation on civilian "radicals," "mili-
tants," students, politicians and other
citizens. The expanded military opera-
tions, begun during the Johnson
administration, were reported to have
compiled vast microfilm files and
computerized dossiers on some 25
million individuals.
The Office of Naval Intelligence,
with 10,000 personnel and a $775
million budget, is responsible for
gathering information on foreign
navies, submarine forces and beach,
port and harbor characteristics. It
claims to have eliminated spy ships
such as the Pueblo, captured by North
Korea in 1968, and the Liberty,
attacked and badly damaged in the
1967 Arab-Israeli war. The largest
military intelligence unit is the Air
Force's A-2, which runs the "spy-in-
the-sky" satellite program. It has
become perhaps the most important
element of the U.S. intelligence effort,
employing 60,000 persons and a $2.8
billion budget, spent mostly on recon-
naissance equipment.
"One of the best recent hooks on the intelligence corn nunity
re eois ranch about DIA activities: Patrick .I. McGarccv's C IA:
The Mprh and the Madness (1972)
51 A I A I 1 A R I (Gertrude Idle in real life), whose naked dancing led to lucrative love affairs with top
1-reach and German officials during W.W. 1. She was arrested as a spy by the French and was
executed October, 1917. rrtt 6r II MAN ARCHIVE
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CIA's Legal Foundations
fhe 1947 National Security Act gave the CIA five specific statutory
duties:
"(I) t o advise the National Security Council in matters cl:mcerning such
intelligence activities of thegovernment departments and agencies as relate
to national security;
"(2) To make recommendations to the National Security Council for the
coordination of such intelligence activities....;
"(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national
security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence
within the government .... Provided that the agency shall have no police,
subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions- -..,
"(4) 1o perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies. such
additional services of common concern as the National Security Council
determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
"(5, l o perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence
affecting the national security as the National Security Council ray from
time To time direct."
I he 1949 Central Intelligence Act firmly buttoned up the CIA'scloak of
secrecy by exempting it from numerous federal laws which governed other
agencies. Congress allowed the agency to disregard laws that required
"disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries or
numbers of personnel employed by the agency." It gave the director power
to spend money "without regard to the pro\isions of Taw and regulations
relating to the expenditure of government tends
meet was on the l-2 spy plane shot
Nat .anal Security Agency; down over Russia in 1960. The agency
t_)fller Mayor Groups has a huge $40-million complex of
Among the Defense Department's buildings at Fort Meade, Md., and
intelligence agencies, the ultra-secret several branches overseas.
National Security Agency (NSA) is Sen. Mi'ton R. Young (R-N.D.), a
almost in a class by itself. It is believed member of the special Senate Appro
to he primarily responsible for "com- priations Subcommittee on Intel-
imciunications intelligence" - making ligence Operations, has commented
.Aid breaking codes, conducting elec- "As tar as foreign policy is concerned
Ironic surveillance, and applying I think the National Security Agenc,
computer technology to the intelli- and the intelligence that it develop-
other members of the American
intelligence community include:
4tornic Energy Commission keeps
watch on atomic energy development
and nuclear weapons capability of
other nations.
State Department's Bureau of Intel-
IiKence and Research, relatively small
(335 employees, $8 million budget).
concentrates on gathering and analyz-
ing information
foreign policy.
Treasure Department has about 150
persons involved in intelligence, most-
ly obtaining economic and narcotics
information.
Bureau of Customs, with 800 agents,
investigates all smuggling cases except
those dealing with narcotics.
Bureau o/ Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms has some 1,600 agents to
investigate illegal traffic in spirits,
cigarettes, firearms and explosives.
The new Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration (DEA), as of July 1, 1973, wa:,
placed in charge of all federal narcotic:.,
investigations. It will have 2,000 agent;
and a $110 million budget during its
first year.
Secret Service investigates counter-
feiters and guards the President and
other top federal officials. It was
accused during the 1972 campaign of
providing the Nixon administration
with information on the Democratic
nominee, Sen. George McGovern. The
agency denied the charge.
Internal Revenue Service has some
2,300 agents in its intelligence division
Bence field. Created in 1952 by a has far mare to do with foreign polic'' and a $76 million budget. The i RS was
classified presidential directive, the than does the intelligence cfevelopec pressured by top White House staff
'NSA has about 25.000 employees and by the CIA." Ransom believes NSA'- members to provide politically valu-
its budget is estimated at some $1 bit- potential role is more ommou.s: able tax information to the Nix,,-.n
!.ion.
lhl~ National security Agi:ncy is
--NSA's outposts listen to Soviet svmb,it of the pervasiveness of technolog'
pilots living MIGs over the Soviet Because it chiefly involves machinery-
Union and to Bulgarian army telex has numagcd to sta% on politically neutr
traffic just to cite two examp'es ' a ground.... But 'NSA is a huge, seer-
" ;mn:uutus i hat hears watching :or it cote
N
administration but, according to
memos published June 28, 1973, by
The New York Times, the agency
resisted these efforts.
C.S. Postal Service has about 1,7't0
inspectors looking into postal-law
on an entire lu,p,;lation , violations on a $9 million budget.
m
d
ropp
g
I iltl i t neat d torlnat n exist, ,n the ssA but one c, ives
useful hook , lucid Kahn's Ihr cod,' &rnkecr(196-1) In 1960? 1984' were ever to, come In the Orwelha ~I Still other agencies with intelligence
I,~? ,SA .,oplnyec . licrnon I- Mitchell and William n. sense." functions: the Agenct'.lor Internatu,n
Munn. d OaLted t" Russia and Cc at the e1 a detailed statement ion i' l'an,, al Development, the CI. S. InJormat ~, )n
the ga r,llun and operations nt tagency I he r t !l ,fie f ub6 hmenr 11971E I
'lad s,n ' the Gnat American r~-ielgn Policy Machine," comp, i c e e , : l o n e is t updated e su.11 I 'n earlier h~
Agency, the Federal Communications
( r n t r , r ! Jnrrllix~ arc and Na,iundl Secu?in ( 1 ) ` , : ; I
Gl~uhingv nuurl, June 1973, p 1 1 4
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Commission, and the departments of
Commerce, Interior, Agriculture and
Justice.
FBI as Nation's Primary
Internal Security Force
Any consideration of the intelli-
gence community must necessarily
include the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation. Primarily responsible for
domestic counterespionage, the FBI
also has jurisdiction over a wide range
of crimes including assassination,
hank robbery, kidnapping and inter-
state auto theft, and is the closest U.S.
equivalent to a national police force.
The FBI had its origins in Congress's
establishment of the Justice Depart-
ment in 1871. Justice was soon found
to have insufficient investigative re-
sources. So Attorney General Charles
J. Bonaparte in 1908 set up a small
group of special investigators in a
Bureau of Investigation. The bureau's
reputation sank steadily in the next 15
years under a succession of corrupt
and political attorneys general.
With the appointment of J. Edgar
Hoover as director in 1924 the bureau
steadily withdrew from political or
illegal activities. Attorney General
Harlan Fiske Stone, who named
Hoover to the post, said in 1933 that
his appointee had "refused to yield to
any kind of political pressure; he
appointed to the bureau men of
intelligence and education .... He
withdrew it wholly from extra-legal
activities and made it an efficient
organization for investigation of
criminal offenses against the United
States."10
The bureau during the 1930's won its
reputation for capturing such "desper-
adoes" as John Dillinger, "Pretty Boy"
Floyd, "Baby Face" Nelson and "Ma"
and Fred Barker. In 1935 it was
renamed the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation and in 1936 was givenjurisdic-
tion over espionage and sabotage. As
the years passed and the gangster
threat faded, the FBI turned to such
'('Quoted by Alpheus T. Mason. llarlan Fiske.Stone: Pillar of the
lax' (1956), p. 152.
matters as spying and subversion,
civil-rights strife, organized crime and
political terrorism. Its record during
World War lI is almost universally
regarded as outstanding; with the
onset of the Cold War the bureau
turned its attention to Communist
subversion. The FBI infiltrated the
Communist Party U.S.A. so thor-
oughly that people joked that the party
had more FBI informers than bona
fide members, but Hoover soon began
to stir criticism as being preoccupied
with Communists and insensitive to
civil rights in the South. Complaints
mounted during the 1960's as many
argued that Hoover had grown auto-
cratic and vindictive and was long
overdue for retirement.
The late Hale Boggs (D-I_a.), then
House majority leader, charged in
April 1971 that the FBI had tapped his
home phone. The allegation was never
proved. It was revealed at about the
same time that the bureau had moni-
tored conversations of Rep. John
Dowdy (D-Texas), who was convicted
of accepting bribes, and had spied on
1970 Earth Day rallies and on radical
leaders. In March 1971, the theft and
later publication of documents from
the FBI's office in Media, Pa., revealed
that the bureau's surveillance activities
were much more extensive than had
previously been imagined.
Although many federal officials
have maintained that domestic surveil-
lance of civilians has ceased, the
Watergate revelations have brought
new questions to bear on that conten-
tion. Many now argue that all domes-
tic surveillance activities should be
examined in a public forum, and warn
that the vast files compiled in the past
by the FBI might be subject to misuse
by government officials in the future.''
"Perhaps the best clue of all," Thomas
Powers wrote in The Atlantic in
October 1972, "is the 35,000 square feet
devoted to domestic intelligence files
in the FBI's massive new Washington
headquarters. All other crimes will get
only 23,000 square feet..." N
'See "Future of the FBI," Editorial Research Reports 1971 V()],
I, pp. 471499.
Reprinted by permission Gorr the Editorial Research Report of
July 25. 1973.
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Skeptic 15
 Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000300010038-1
WHAT TRIGGERED
THE CURRENT
CONTROVERSY?
nibarrassed by revelations of
its cooperation with the White
House "plumbers" and its $8-
million role in the overthrow
of ('hile~;.n President Salvador A1-
ende., the CIA had enough public
image trouble already. Then, on
lUccember 22, 1974, Seymour Hersh
disclosed in The New York Times that
the Agency had conducted extensive
str' eiilance in the U. S. apparently
in violation of' the National Security
A;t of 19,17 which limits it to foreign
espionage and compiled intelligence
files on some 10,000 Americans. The
('IA's domestic operations reportedly
included wiretaps, break-ins and
surreptitious interception of mail.
What had been a smoldering brush
tic exploded into a holocaust of
criticism which quickly spread to tie
1, 31. Iwo former assistants to J. Edgar
Hoover confirmed the long-rumored
existence of FBI files on the private
Ines of public figures, including
sco ral members of Congress.
Critics point out that these are only
the latest in a long series of illegal - or
at least questionable activities by
the U S. ntelligence community.
I hiough its counterintelligence
programs (COIN I'ELPROs), the FBI
to- many years conducted extensive
spying on political groups in the U. S.
I'liesc programs, unrelated to law
enli'reement. involved the use of
cle c :runic surveillance, informers,
ag'ntS pr' i ocatcurs and a variety of
"dirty tricccrecy.
16) Finally, there is no point even
tatting without planning to call the
nsiders, the kinds of people who have
_ontributed to the success of every
ruhortant Congressional investiga-
mu. The committees need to hear
est imony f rom agency staffers, wheth-
_r now employed or retired. But they
rust evaluate the testimony, from
..rh;ttever source, in the light of today's
rvorld. A vast intelligence bureauera-
- rooted in the needs and assump-
;r? is of the 1940's, is threatenee, by
heaving historic changes -not only in
the world political situation but in the
e1 y techniques of data collection. 'I he
persons involved will go to great
lengths to conform reality to their
deological biases and occupational
needs. What legitimate governmental
purpose should intelligence, both
domestic and foreign, serve? A sound
answer to that question will give
needed perspective to the problems of
authority, coordination, operations
and data evaluation.
In a post-Watergate America the-
ories of inherent Executive power can
no longer serve to justify secret
intelligence baronies either at home or
abroad. But does Congress have the
will and resources to forge a legitimate
alternative?tJ
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