CIA'S SECRET WAR IN ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01314R000100660020-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: September 24, 1975
• Content Type: IR

p
i5&,~Q'0f/Y0412 : CIA-RDP8f14RQ001,0p6t~.00g-0-
CIA'S SECRET WAR. IN ANGOLA
"We are most alarmed at the interference of extra-continental powers who do not wish Africa
well and whose involvement is inconsistent with the promise of true independence."
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
September 24, 1975
The United States is today deeply involved in a brutal war
in Angola. Like the Vietnamese and Laotian conflicts in
their early years, the Angolan war is - as far as the public
and most of the Congress are concerned - a secret war run
by the CIA. As was true in Indochina, the President himself
is making the key decisions. In fact, at about the same time
that the Indochina war was finally ending last spring, Presi-
dent Ford personally authorized the CIA to provide covert
money and arms to African independence groups in Angola.
Although the Ford Administration has repeatedly stated
that the United States will not become militarily involved in
Angola, official sources reported on December 12 that the
CIA is now spending S50 million on the Angolan war, and
has already sent five artillery spotter planes piloted by
Americans into the Angolan battle zones. According to
these sources, IJ.S. Air Force C- 141 transport jets, fying in
behalf of the CIA, regularly land at the airport in Kinshasa,
Zaire (formerly the Congo), disgorging tons of military
supplies including rifles, machine guns, light artillery,
rocket launchers, and ammunition; these supplies are in turn
being flown into Angola by small plane. In addition, the
International Bulletin reported in its December 5 edition
that U.S. mercenaries are now fighting in Angola. David
But-kin, a Vietnam veteran who is recruiting mercenaries in
New York, Chicago, and California, has admitted the
existence of a nation-wide recruitment effort.
The evidence of large-scale CIA intervention is now clear
(as is the intervention by the Soviet Union, Cuba, South
Africa, Zaire, and other powers). The CIA's involvement
was first reported by Leslie Gelb in the New York Times of
September 25, 1975. On November 8 and 9, Gelb and
Walter Pincus of the Washington Post both reported that
CIA Director William Colby and Under Secretary of State
Joseph Sisco briefed a closed session of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on the involvement. An independent
investigation by the Center for National Security Studies
has no's confirmed these reports and uncovered the details
of President Ford's dA:P(SRY@On@rtl Q QiR.OQNtQ112
7 S
The Decision to Intervene
President Ford was not so much faced with a.decision to
intervene in Angola last spring as he was with the question
of whether or not to support and increase a long-standing
covert CIA involvement there. The CIA had been funding
the FNLA and Holden Roberto since 1962, according to
five different Administration sources. To other govern-
ment sources report that Roberto's brother-in-law, Presi-
dent Mobutu of Zaire, started receiving secret CIA funds
and other aid soon after Zaire gained its independence in
June, 1960. In Angola, like Zaire more than a decade ago,
the CIA provides large amounts of secret money and arms
to its local allies who are fighting against groups backed by
the Soviet Union.
The CIA's involvement in Zaire grew steadily during the
Kennedy and early Johnson administrations. During those
same years, the policy toward the nearby Portugese
colonies, including Angola, was to "play all ends against the
middle," according to an ex-White House aide. This policy
meant providing-Portugal with some military and political
support, and taking a public stance in favor of nonviolent
change in the colonies. In secret, however, the CIA sub-
sidized independence groups committed to armed revolution
against Portugal, but never with enough support to turn the
tide. According to the White House source, "The CIA had
the habit of picking out single individuals and making them
our guys, somehow assuming they would turn out all right.
It was mainly a cash-in-the-envelope kind of thing, con-
science money to show American good intentions." The
CIA funded various liberation movements from 1960 on,
and FNLA's Holden Roberto was a major recipient.
In 1969, the Nixon Administration decided to end the
secret "program aid" to the independence groups as part of
a larger policy decision to improve American relations with
the white regimes in southern Africa (Portugal's colonies,
Rhodesia, and South Africa). According to State Depart-
ment aides, the CIA did not totally drop Roberto but kept
CIA PtBI$} hB114R00Q@ 60DW#e. Five years later,
A4. LL (..L i c. C t
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12: CIA-RDP88-01314R00010Q616 NCE REPORT
when it became clear that Angola would receive in-
dependence from the new government in Portugal, it was a
relatively simple matter, as one Administration official puts
it, for the CIA "to turn Roberto back on."
Thus, with Roberto already safely inside the American
camp, President Ford's key decision last spring turned on
whether to start funding a second independence group,
UNITA. The 40 Committee, chaired by Henry Kissinger,
had already approved S300,000 in secret subsidies for Jonas
Savimbi, head of UNITA, and the President personally ap-
proved that action, according to an Administration official
interviewed by CNSS. The source stated that both the Presi-
dent and Kissinger were aware that adding UNITA to the
U.S. account constituted a major step, close to a commit-
ment that the United State, would not allow the MPLA to
control Angola.
The source recalled that Kissinger pushed hard for the in-
creased CIA intervention. "Henry wanted to be told why we
should intervene," said the official. "not why not." Many
within the government were opposed. including Nathaniel
Davis, then the State Department's highest official for
African affairs and formerly ambassador to Chile during
THE ANGOLAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS
On November 11, 1975, Angola became a free country
after 500 years of Portugese colonialism. But independence
so Far has meant only a violent civil war for Angola, as three
competing African liberation movements, each massively
supported by outside powers, vie for power in the country.
Indeed, foreign intervention has turned the Angolan civil
war into a potentially explosive cold war confrontation. The
actual conflict in Angola, however, does not easily reduce
itself to an ideological struggle between communists and
capitalists. All three movements say they favor some form
of socialism, and each has stressed the primacy of national
reconstruction and independence.
The MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola) led by Agostinho Neto, is generally recognized as
the strongest and most radical of the three. The MPLA was
founded in the mid-1950's and began armed resistance to
the Portugese in 1961. It draws its primary support from the
Kimbundu people, who make up about 23% of the country's
population. Urban based, with a socialist orientation, the
MPLA seems to have considerably more support across
tribal lines and among educated Angolans than the other
two groups. Its forces currently hold the central portion of
Angola, including the capital city of Luanda, where it
declared itself the legitimate government of the country on
independence day.
The Soviet Union, Cuba, Algeria, Mozambique, and
Guinea-Bissau all recognize the MPLA's claim to
legitimacy, and all have furnished it with military
assistance. The MPLA started receiving modest amounts of
Soviet aid in the early 1960's to fight Portugese domination,
after first having been refused support by the United States.
However, it was not until after the April 1974 revolution in
Portugal, and most recently since the spring of 1975, that
the Soviets began providing truly large quantities of
assistance. Soviet ai is said t tn~~from riffs machine
aarove `~ `or le se 2004/1 nil'
guns, and ammunition to armored vehicles, mortars, anti-
aircraft guns, and ground-to-ground missiles. Additionally,
U.S, intelligence sources report that about 3,000 Cuban ad-
visors have been fighting with the MPLA since mid-fall.
The FNLA (National Liberation Front of Angola) is led
by Holden Roberto, and based almost solely .:mono the
Bakongo people. who make up about 13`" of the population.
Roberto is closely allied with his brother-in-lave. President
Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. and has spent most of his adult
life outside Angola in Zaire. Most of the territory controlled
by the FNLA is in the north, along the Zairian border. On
November 11, the FNLA and the third independence group,
UNITA, formalized a shaky alliance by declaring
themselves to be the legitimate government. with their
capital in the southern Angolan city of Huambo.
Most of the FNLA's aid over the years has flowed
through Zaire, with the United States furnishing the majori-
ty of outside support. The FNI-A is now also receiving aid
from Belgium, Nest Germany, France, Zaire, and South
Africa. The Chinese provided assistance to Zaire and the
FNLA until a fevv months ago, when they began
withdrawing their support. and by the end of October all
their advisors were out.
UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola) was formed in 1966 under its current leader, Jonas
Savinibi. Its base is among the Ovimbundu people, who
comprise 3S`" of the population. UNITA's strength is in the
southern part of Angola.
UNITA did not receive significant outside help during its
nine years of struggle for independence until earlier this
year, when Savimbi, in the words of a government source,
"event begging to any embassy that would give him some
money." Since then, UNITA has received help from the
United States, Britain, Zambia, and South Africa.
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100660020-1
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
the 1973 coup. State's A frican bureau in June recommended
almost unanimously that the United States stay out of
Angola. Moreover, Davis, according to an official directly
involved, warned that "neither Savimbi or Roberto are
i_>ood fighters - in fact, they couldn't fight their way out of
a paper hag. Its the wrong game and the players we got are
losers...
Since President Ford's decision, the United States has
maintained a "two-track" policy toward events in Angola.
Secretary Kissinger continues to publicly decry Soviet and
Cuban intervention, supporting the call of the Organization
for African Unite for negotiations between the combatants
and an end to outside interference. On the second track, the
L.S. government itself intervenes by sending funds and
arms to UNITA and FNLA. In addition to this covert
assistance, the Administration is requesting an un-
precedented increase in open aid to Zaire in FY 1976, as the
graph below indicates. The Administration has come close
to admitting that this assistance will be used in Angola, in
spite of a congressional prohibition on providing aid to
countries which pass it on to other parties or use it for non-
defensive purposes - both of which Zaire has been doing in
behalf of the FNLA.
ANGOLA: BACKGROUND NOTES
Zurich
FRANCE L r',
/SWITZ. ,
KEY
TURr.
I
IVORY
CENTRAL
AFRICAN REP.
CONGO
REP.
/ ZAIRE
Gulf of Guinea
6 500 1000
ZAMBIA
Size: With over 481,000 square miles, Angola is twice
the site of Texas. Angola lies on the southwest coast
of Africa, bordered by Zaire, Zambia, and Southwest
Africa (Namibia). Included in its territory is Cabinda,
a small coastal area north of the Congo River estuary
bordered by Con,4ppwRteA ftleT,,RRleaoo.2004/10/12
Population: Approximately 6 million people, with
population centers in the west coastal and plateau
re