JOHN KENNEDY AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS HIS FINEST HOUR--OR A BOTCHED-UP PERIOD?

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP88-01350R000200630006-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 20, 2004
Sequence Number: 
6
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 28, 1968
Content Type: 
NSPR
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PDF icon CIA-RDP88-01350R000200630006-9.pdf166.54 KB
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T e #Sat -ona1 observer 28 October 1968 c Appf@1 *FL qR0 L Q#fa 1P7201 M jO I VRV_njj T I `j 1 l _l p'ZCr~ r'1'n 11 -n 7 r 1 Or Botched-Uo Fri&d' a ?~c r During that 10-week period, it will be bortlbcrs] were already being asscm-' Each Presidential administration recalled, President Kennedy and the U.S. bled on the island by the Russian 'tech- clods its best,to manage the news and the State Department denied time and time nieians.' He also told his staff to re- history of its deeds and misdeeds while again that Soviet missiles were going! Iterate his recommendation, which Mc in power. Since Dallas, hundreds o: into Cuba. Now hear what Robert Kenne- Namara had successfully opposed some books and untold magazine articles dY has to say In his article ' weeks earlier, that low-level observation ues ay morning, Oct. 16, 106., presses with the result, observed shortly after 9 O'clock, President Kenne- cation of what the regular U-2 flights tirc Andy Logan recently in American Earl- dy "called and asked me to the White were photographing." tore, that the late President's "line-liber- I-Iouse. He said only that we were taping Mr. McCone's deputy, Lt. Gen. Mar-, a)-fellow image had expanded uncounta-' great trouble. Shortly afterward, in his shall S. Carter, overruled him, and did ble times, been transformed and purl office, he told me that a U-2 had just fin- :not Include his recommendations in the' fled, burst all mortal bounds, and soared, ished a photographic mission and that ational estimates. "Carter's cxplana-i toward the realm of the supernatural.": the intelligence community had become Rion is that, as charge d'a//aires, and in ,vow we have the late Sen. Robert F. .convinced that Russia was-placing lilts- possession of all the Intelligence reports' Kennedy's recollections of the Cuban silos and atomic wea;ioris in Cuba. ;textually, which at that point McCone. Missile Crisis of October 1062 -in the No- The dominant feeling at the meeting was ' was not, it was his responsibility whether,' vcmber Issue of McCall's. The recollec. stunned surprise. No one had expected or' or not to include these statements," says. Lions seek to perpetuate -the thesis, al- anticipated that the Russians would de-' Mr. Krock. ready expressed by Sorensen, Schiesin- ploy surface-to-surface missiles In Cuba.' Mr. Lazo's account goes Into much ger, and Salinger in their books and arti- ... ' greater detail than dots Mr. Krock's,' c1es, that the crisis was, .indeed, the late ",yo o/Jtcial within the Government] noting that "in brushing aside the CIA' President's finest hour, more than mak- had ever suggested to President Kenne-I warnings, the Kennedy Administration' ing up for the disaster that was the Bay , dy that the Russian build-up in Cuba' relied to some extent on assurances it of digs. would include missiles. (Italicsi was receiving from the Kremlin that the.- From Robert Kennedy's article added.) i Russians meant no harm. On Sept. 4, the, emerges the picture of a courageous says Mr. Krock in his Memoirs. Soviet ambassador in Washington, Ana-toly. President who moved swiftly and surely , "Aug. 10. After examining secret intelli= General Robert in, F. called Aa. cs- to deal with the mortal threat of nude General Robert F. Kennedy y with me ar-tipped Soviet missiles empianted 00 gence reports he had received, McCone?sage from Khrushchev. The chairman dictated a memorandum for President his miles off America's shores, thus saving Kennedy, expressing the belief that in- (het Presidnt's) brother n ucn no one' by one' ry the world from nuclear holocaust. The ti- stalla.tlons for the launching of offensive, tle of the article, which is scheduled to missiles were being constructed on the else. It was a 'promise that the Soviets be published in January as a book by Island. His subordinates who prepared Would create no trouble for the W. W. Norton of New York City, is the 'national estimates' papers of the United States during the election cam- "Thirteen Days: The Story About HOW . [Central Intelligence] Agency recom- paign. ." the World Almost Ended." mended that he omit a statement of this: Robert Kennedy discusses this and Two Opposing Views belief until it was completely document- other meetings, with the Soviets during y'wo recently published books by 1e- ed. He ordered that it remain In the pa-]this period, conceding: "We had been de- delved by Khrushchev, but we had also spected authors cast grave doubts about pet'P this picture. They are Memoirs by Ar- Again on Aug. 17, says Mr. Krock, Mr. fooled ourselves." thur Krock of the New York Times, and McCone stated his, case In a high-level: Mr. McCone returned from his honey Dagger in the Heart by Mario Lazo, an meeting attended by secretary of State moon, says Mr. Lazo, flabbe; fisted to international lawyer who once represent- Rusk and Secretary of Defense Mc-'discover that "western Cuba had not, ed U.S. Government interests in Cuba. Namara, both of whom disagreed 'With' been flown over for a full month, and he From passages in both works (and this is him. Mr. McCone issued similar warn reacted Immediately, recommending confirmed perhaps unwittingly by Robert ings on Aug. 22 and 23. that the entire island be photographed at Kennedy's recollections) there emerges Mr. McCone's Daily Cables once, especially western Cuba. This rec- the clear inference that the late Press- + ommendation was made on Oct. 4W" Ten dent and his brother relied more upon, Then, Incredibly, in the midst of what) days were lost, however, before Mr. { the assurances of the Soviets that offen he believed to be a gathering crisis, Mr.! McCone's orders were carried out, the sive missiles were not being put into McCone departed a few days later for his' delay caused by disagreements in the Cuba than they did to the warnings of wedding in Seattle, Wash., and on Aug., top-secret "Committee on Overhead Re- W"none other than John A. McCone, direc- 30 for his honeymoon on the French Rivi-: connaissance," which determined the U-. tor of the Central Intelligence Agency era. But he continued to receive Intellig- 2 flight schedules, and by Mr. Mc- (CIA), that the missiles were being pre- I once reports, and on the basis of these he Namara who "Insisted that the U-2 pared. Both Mr. Kroeic and Mr. Lazo sent back almost daily cables to Wash- squadron be placed under the jurisdic- state state that Mr. McCone first expressed his Ington recommending that the "national tion of the Air Force, under his control.' V view to President Kennedy in August-10 estimates staff" of CIA "make a firm This was done-over CIA's stern objec- ,`s week before the President, on Oct. 22, statement of opinion that the SAM-sites tions. 1062, went on television to inform the [surface-to-air missiles] discovered in The U-2 flight of Oct. 14 confirmed world that many American cities now sat Cuba were being developed for emplace- that the Russians were- preparing offcn- STwiahin the range of Soviet missiles off its ments of surface-to-surface missiles with- sivc missile sites. "McCone's warning .shores. a 1,200-mile range and more, and that could no longer be ignored," writes Mr. -,',... _ . these missile.. parts. and Ir, [Soviet-Lazo. 1. .. The Kennedy Administration finally realized that the Kremlin had lied. The missile crisis was on." Approved For Release 2004/10/13 : CIA-RDP88-Oi350R000200830006-9 Cpntifzued about John F. Kennedy have -poured off "On T flights over uba be made to help verifi- d