REVIEW OF THE REAL CIA BY KIRKPATRICK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01350R000200350002-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 1, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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REVIEW OF THE REAL CIA BY KIRKPATRICK By Professor G. Bondarevskiy _ ~l a - ~= ~+ a S f 2 ~s
Source: Zna.mya, Moscow, July 1969, pp 237-243 ^l 5
Recently a book written by Lyman Kirkpatrick and bearing this title was
published in the USA, Great Britain, and Canada. Numerous books, magazine
and newspaper articles have been published on the sinister activities of the
Central Intelligence Agency. One of the books on this topic -- The Invisible
Government -- written by the knowledgeable journalists Wise and Ross, swell
Ito the Soviet reader.
However, Kirkpatrick's work differs basically from all books previously
published about the. CIA; preceding works and articles were written by news-
papermen and writers, by political figures and jurists, while the book under
review belongs to the pen of a man who spent a quarter century in American
intelligence and who for the last 15 years of his career was Inspector General
and Administrative Director of the CIA. To a considerable extent, the con-
tents of the book justify its promising subtitle; 'An Inside Man's View' of
the strength and Weaknesses of the Most Important Inst tut tin tour Cam-
meat.
The author gives us a stop by step account of all stages in the activi-
ties of the CIA. In 1942, the intelligence agency that had been set up at
the outset of World War II under the innocent name of Office for the Coordi-
nation of Information was divided up into the Office of Strategic Services
(OSS) and the Office of War Information. The OSS immediately began specializ-
Ing not only in intelligence but also in sabotage activity as well. The com-
bination of cloak and dagger, of espionage and sabotage became a characteris-
tic feature of all subsequent American intelligence activity. In January
1946, the Central Intelligence Group was set up to take the place of the MISS
which was disbanded after World War II. In 1947, the national security law
changed the Central Intelligence Group into the Central Intelligence Agency.
B. Kirkpatrick. The Real CIA, Now York, The Macmillan Co
1968, 312 pp.
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The first 3 years of activity of this new headquarters of American intel-
ligence and espionage were filled with the struggle for first place against
the intelligence organs of other government institutions -- especially against
the Department of Defense and the State Department.
When in 1950, US ruling circles launched their bloody adventure in Korea,
/iashington decided to consolidate the authority and influence of the CIA.
General Bedell Smith, who had been Eisenhower's chief of staff during World
War II and subsequently American Ambassador to Moscow, was appointed its di-
rector. The reorganization of the CIA carried out by Smith with the active
assistance of the book's author, who became his assistant for administrative
affairs, completely removed individual subdivisions of the CIA from the control
of the State Department and Department of Defense and led to a considerable in-
crease in its activities abroad and at home. Devoting particular attention to
the expansion of CIA scientific-analytical divisions, Bedell Smith recruited
very prominent American scientists. The National Research Committee Ekomitetl
"as established. It was responsible not only for analyzing all covertly ob-
ined. data from abroad, it also drew up long-range intelligence plans . Cha-
racteristically, Harvard Professor William Iaanger, a major American historian
and the author of a number of works on problems in international relations and
colonial policy was appointed chairman of this committee and assistant director
of the CIA. Professor Sherman Kent, author of the well-known work Strategic
Intellce, became his deputy.
Kirkpatrick admits that the CIA, reorganized in 1950, devoted an
amount of attention to all manner of intelligence activity directed against
the Soviet Union and also at studying the economic potential of our Homeland.
He confirms the fact that many far-reaching decisions of the State Department
and White House, connected with the long-range planning of American-Soviet re-
lations, were based on the economic predictions of CIA experts who, as the
American government itself was forced to admit subsequently, substantially
underestimated the state of and, in particular, the growth rate of the Soviet
The aforementioned attempts to consolidate and expand the CIA nonetheless
did not eliminate the struggle in US ruling circles surrounding problems con-
nected with control over lutelligence work. This was particularly manifested
at the beginning of the SO's when the infamous MacCarthyism began to acquire
more and more influence. After becoming the Chairman on the Senate Government
Operations Committee and Chairman of the Senate Standing Subcommittee on In-
vestigation, Senator Joseph MacCarthy -- a political opportunist and obscu-
rantist -- who enjoyed the support of the nation's most reactionary circles,
repeatedly tried to assert a kind of control over the State Department and
CIA. In his book, Kirkpatrick, who during this period was Inspector General
of the Agency, cites very interesting details concerning this period. As is
r known, MacCarthy's principal weapon was to publicly accuse the heads of the
nation's most important restitutions of employing communists. Even such an
ti-communist citadel as the CIA had its ton. After each attack by the
Senator, Allen Dulles, the new CIA director asked MacCarthy for the names of
secret communists who had supposedly penetrated American intelligence, but to
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no avail. Nor did matters stop here. According to Kirkpatrick, the "MacCarthy
underground," by which he means a group of persons secretly working for Mac-
Carthy, systematically blackmailed CIA personnel, threatening to expose their
'weaknesses," overindulgence in alcohol or relations with women, etc., and de-
manded that they furnish materials that would be compromising to the leader-
ship. Ultimately, Allen Dulles categorically forbade CIA personnel to have
any contact whatsoever with MacCarthy's official or unofficial representatives.
Nor did the battle between the CIA and MacCarthy end here. The facts
cited by Kirkpatrick show that even during the time of the OSS, General Strong,
head of the Pentagon's military intelligence, did everything in his power to
undermine the authority of the now intelligence organization in the eyes of
official Washington. In no way did relations improve after the formation of
the CIA. The author admits that during the postwar period, Strong created a
competitive intelligence organization that the CIA was compelled to finance.
When the flow of confidential funds to Strong was out off, he gave MacCarthy
falsified documents compromising the CIA. Once again, the old charges that
communist agents had infiltrated the executive organs of American intelligence
were raised. Anti-communist propaganda reciprocal accusations, and intrigues
became so intensive that, as our author admits, there were many mental disor-
ders among CIA personnel. It reached the point where Agency leaders were com-
pelled to employ a special staff of psychiatrists.
Nonetheless, the Internal discord, intrigues, and reciprocal attacks did
not weaken CIA activities directed toward the development and intensification
of the struggle against democratic and revolutionary-liberation movements in
the various corners of the globe.
The data in the book reveal the methods employed by US ruling circles,
which did everything in their power to strengthen the positions of their in-
telligence service on Cuba during the first postwar years. Kirkpatrick flew
to Havana three times between 1956 and 1958 to render assistance to the rotten
regime of Batista. And on his first visit, he was received with plat cere-
mony by Batista. It is not without interest to take note of Kirkpatrick's
admission. He did indeed give the bloody Cuban dictator a special message
from Dulles, but not from the director of the CIA, but instead from his
brother -- the Secretary of State. In this document, John Foster Dulles gave
instructions to Batista on the organization of a special agency to fight com-
munism. As it later turned out, all directives of the Brothers Dulles were
carried out. However, this by no means improved Batissta's situation. And
then, in the bowels of the CIA the plan for sowing discord among the "Move-
ment of 26 July" was born. But this evoked energetic opposition from Batista's
counterintelligence, which feared that the Americans would refuse support to
his regime. In this struggle between the two intelligence services, matters
reached a curious state. Once, CIA agents were even taken by surprise in a
safe apartment while briefing certain liberal leaders who were supposedly con-
nected with the "Movement of 26 July."
By the second half of 1948, the situation of Batista and his henchmen
had become entirely untenable. Fierce battles raged in the American Embassy
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in Havana: how could American influence an Cuba be consolidated? At that
time, the Brothers Dulles worked out a new maneuver in the strictest secrecy=
the replacement of Batista by a military Junta. All measures pertaining to
the implementation of this plan were carried out by CIA representatives; at
the personal direction of John Foster Dulles, this new turn in US diplomacy
and intelligence was even kept a secret from Earl Smith, the American Ambassa-
dor in Cuba. But all efforts were in vain. The Cuban revolution was triumph-
ant (1 January 1959).
The facts cited by the author in the chapter entitled "Batista's Cuba"
emphasize the enormous part that the CIA plays in all US foreign policy and
confirmed tafact most CIA represent dictives of the ruling
behind the backs
of f America are ~ by
of their own Ambassadors.
Having lost the "battle for Batista," the US ruling circles adopted a
policy aimed at open intervention in Cuba. The author throws additional light
on the preparations for and the execution of one of the most shameful under--
takings by American imperialism. Kirkpatrick in detail describes the life of
the 200,000 Cuban emigres in the USA, their internal struggle for power and,
in particular, for doles from the American treasury. This struggle has been
waged by more than a hundred emigre organizations who have besieged the State
Department, CIA, FBI, the Senate and House of Representatives with various
plans for intervention, sabotage, and with endless demands for more and more
allocations.
Initially, Washington was inclined to wend individual groups of saboteurs
to Cuba. However, by the end of 1960 the ringleaders of the CIA had convinced
the White House of the need to change tactics and to place its stake on broad
intervent ion .
After the basic decision had been made on this question, the functions
between the various government organs and US institutions were divided up as
follows. the CIA was entrusted with basic preparations for the intervention.;
the State Department carried out a diversionary maneuver: its representatives
repeatedly declared that the USA had no intention of taking part in an inter-
As regards the Cuban emigres and the most aggressive American Senators
and members of the House of Representatives, they literally filled numerous
sittings of the congress, calling for the "salvation" of the long-suffering
Cuban people.
At the same time, intensive training of the "army of invasion" was under-
way at secret CIA bases in Guatemala.
As we know, after the failure of the intervention, American propaganda
loudly maintained that of all US government institutions, only one of the CIA
departments took part in the preparation of the intervention and then unof-
ficially. Kirkpatrick'e book enables us to refute these claims. It turns out
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that the highest military organ in the USA -- The Joint Chiefs of Staff -- re-
peatedly discussed the most important aspects of the intervention. The book
under review also enables us to refute another assertion of American propaganda
to the effect that the USA did not promise armed support to the emigres. Un-
gly, through gritted teeth, Kirkpatrick is nonetheless forced to admit
such a promise was made. In his analysis of the general causes of the
f the intervention on Playa Hiron, the author concludes that not only
CIA but all of official Was were to blame.
From the first days of its existence, the CIA has devoted much attention
to Africa. American intelligence became particularly active on this continent
toward the and of the 5O'ss. As a result of the enormous upsurge in the na-
tional liberation movement, the old colonial powers -- Great Britain, France,
and Belgium -- were forced to resolve the question as to the granting of poli-
tical independence in one or another form to their former possessions. This
caused genuine consternation in Washington. The USA began making feverish
preparations to strengthen American positions in the liberated African coun-
tries. It is notable that in the summer of '59, i.e., on the eve of "Africa
Year" (1960 -- the year of liberation for many African countries was known as
such), Kirkpatrick made a long trip through the African continent. Evidently,
his personal presence in the colonies and liberated countries was considered
by Washington to be particularly desireable for the preparation of a large-
scale plan for an offensive against this continent. Otherwise, it would be
difficult to understand why the author of the book, who after having suffered
from poliomyeletis was confined to a wheelchair, was sent on such a complicated
and difficult trip.
spector General. of the CIA and his associates from this departrsny
visited Egypt, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, South-
ern the South African Pepublic, the French and Belgian Congo, Nige-
ria, and Ghana. So it was that CIA resident agents, located in the political-
ly and economically strategic nations on the continent were inspected. This
shows the scope of American Intelligence activity in Africa. The author ad-
hat everywhere during his trip, he devoted much attention to the work
of Soviet engineers as well as that of engineering experts from other social-
ist countries.
Throughout the entire book, Kirkpatrick repeatedly emphasizes that the
degree to which the CIA is informed about international events Is considerably
greater than that of the State Department. Ile also mentions this in his ex-
position of events in Africa.
;ording to him, information he presented upon his return
concerning serious, impending cataclysms in the Congo, were net wit
skepticism by the State Department.
Defending the CIA from attacks by democratic forces accusing American in-
telligence both of exceeding its functions as well as of inefficient work,
Kirkpatrick reports curious details connected with the US role in internation-
al relations in the Near East. Up until the present, American scientists,
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diplomats, and publicists have maintained that Washington knew nothing about
the plans for the triple aggression against Egypt in 1956. These statements
are based on the public announcement by Dulles: "We were not informed." It
turns out that this was by no means the case. As early as 1955, the CIA had
warned the State Department concerning the consequences that would result from
the refusal of John roster Dulles to grant Nasser a loan for the construction
of the Aswan Dam. During 1955-1956, CIA agents and military intelligence
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the mobilized activities of the three powers and about the feverish prepara-
tions that were underway in Israel to hurl tank units into the Sinai Peninsula.
All this information was tallied, discussed in Washington, and systematically
enhower
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,ted not only to Dulles but also to President
In the book, much attention is devoted to problems connected with ump ov-
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.
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ing the complex and unwieldy firesucalas
r organizations. In summer 1950, following the latest major scandal resulting
ected with the failure of the gangaterish
from CIA activity {this time, conn
ll flight of the U-2 over Soviet territory and the sad culmination Of this epi-
sode for US ruling circles), it was decided in Washington to create a joint
study group headed by Kirkpatrick to investigate the state of A tca E el-
lince. After extensive work in Washington, the entire group me
The program on this trip included the study of the activity of all American
intelligence organs connected with NATO. They decided to return home on the
American liner United States and, during the voyage, to keep the secret docu-
ments in the safe of the ship's purser. The American intelligence agents were
shocked when literally on the eve of the flight [sic!] it was found that
$40,000 had been stolen from this vaunted storage place!
As is known, the CIA was the principal initiator of the U-2 flights. But
its leaders naturally tried to channel the dissatisfaction of US ruling circl-
es to other agencies. It was for this reason that Allen Dulles tried to have
his van appointed chairman of the study group. And Kirkpatrick did not let
him down. making broad use of CIA arguments, which explained the shameful
finale of the U--2 flight over Soviet territory as being due to the poor work
of American military intelligence organs who were insufficiently informed
about new Soviet ground-to-air rockets, the joint study group proposed that all
military intelligence organizations be combined under a single intelligence
agency of the Department of Defense. Kirkpatrick considers the implementation
of this plan to be one of his great personal accomplishments. He maintains
that prior to this reorganization, there were approximately a dozen top secret
intelligence bulletins published daily in Washington and after the reorganiza-
tion -- only two: the CIA Bulletin, designated for the President and the
Bulletin of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Thus, the threat evoked by the consequences of the U-2 flight over Soviet
territory passed, almost without touching the CIA. However, the consequences
of the even more scandalous failure on Playa Taffecteed,~his tadelhof
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American inte1 ig nce In a m
omoi,present Allen Dulles had to resign and MacCone$ the new director of the
CIA, immediately undertook a new reorganization, placing the very same
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Kirkpatrick at the head of a commission charged with drafting the reorganiza-
tion plan. it was first of all decided to consolidate the centralization in
the CIA proper and to strive for greater harmony in the work of the individual
administrations -- Information, operations, and scientific-research adminis-
trations; secondly, it was decided to increase the relative share of the USA
in the entire system of American intelligence and, even more. broadly, in the
entire system of US government organs. To this and, the Kirkpatrick commis-
sion proposed to expand the functions of the chairman of the President's con-
sultative council on intelligence affairs, a post which was also occupied by
the director of the CIA, and to make the latter the official head of all US
institutions and organizations engaged in intelligence. In January 1982,
President John Kennedy signed a directive addressed to MacCone, which stated:
"I want you to become the government's basic director of our intelligence work
abroad and I want you to make the coordination and operational leadership of
all US intelligence organizations a basic part of your work..."
Thus did a new post come into being, a post which opened up additional
opportunities for the head of the CIA to exert decisive influence on all as-
pects of US political life.
It is not by accident that Kirkpatrick entitled the eleventh, nex-to-last
chapter of his book, devoted to the functions and duties of the head of Ameri-
can Intelligence, "The President's Third Man." By this he wanted to empha-
size that after the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, the moat im-
portant role in the country was played by a ran occupying the position of
director of intelligence, a post not actually provided for by the American:
Constitution.
Kirkpatrick indignantly notes that in 1957 the American magazine United
States News and World-Report placed Allen Dulles in 34th place in the Wa1g-
tou erarc y, pr meat y can the basis of his wage level. Indeed, under the
1947 law the salary of the director of the CIA was included in the 5th cate-
gory at the same time that the salary of members of government was in the
lst category. In 1964, this "injustice'" was eliminated -- the salary of
CIA director was put in the 2nd category. To prevent the reader from gaining
the false impression that this post is lacking in importance, even after this
Kirkpatrick hastens to emphasize that the head of American intelligence is a
member of the National Security Council, the only other members of which ex-
cept for the President and Vice President, are the Secretary of State and
Secretary of Defense...
Using every means to defend the necessity for all-out centralization of
American intelligence and of increasing its importance in government dealings,
Kirkpatrick proclaims his belief that one of the most important factors in the
annihilation of the American fleet at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 was the
weakness and insufficient centralization of American intelligence. President
Roosevelt received intelligence Information from the reports of six persons,
including three secretaries. After the 1964 reform, the US President re-
ceives all his intelligence information from one person. It would be diffi-
tive share
h
h
l
i
e re
t
a
c
to present a clearer picture of the extent to wh
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The expansion of functions and the sharp increase in the influence of the
CIA, whose leaders have tried to exceed the limits of their official activi-
ties and, who in addition to supplying the government with information, have
tried to influence directly the entire US government machine, have evoked and
inue to evoke great concern among the American public. As far back as
1955, Senator Mansfield proposed the establishment of a joint congressional
committee to keep a check on CIA activities. Initially, Mansfield's legisla-
tive proposals gained the signatures of 34 Senators, including future presi-
dents J. F. Kennedy and L. Johnson. But the military-industrial complex was
not asleep. At the last moment, the majority of the Senators withdrew their
signatures and the draft bill collapsed resoundingly.
In his polemics with American opponents of the CIA, Kirkpatrick also makes
another curious admission: he calls the CIA the "world's greatest research or-
ganization on problems of communism." Of course it would have been more cor-
rect to say on problems of anti-communism. Nonetheless, both the substance of
the author's declaration and the entire orientation of CIA activities are cha-
racterized rather clearly. The main task, the wain goal of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency is not to collect information about the situation in foreign
countries but rather to combat the most progressive order in the history of
mankind -- socialism. It is for this very reason that the CIA enjoys such
active support from US ruling circles and why the prestige, influence, and
material well-being of its leaders are continuously on the rise. However, one
cannot but note that the numerous failures of American intelligence are evidence
of the fact that resources from the American treasury, which are in fact allo-
cated on an unchecked basis for the maintenance of the CIA and to pay the high
s."laries of its directors, are clearly being spent in a way that is detriment-
al to the interests of the American people.
The concluding chapter of Kirkpatrick's book is entitled "The Future of
United States Intelligence." In 1965, on the eve of his departure from the
CIA and of becoming a Professor of political science at Brown University, act-
ing on orders from the leadership, Kirkpatrick drew up a 15 year plan of CIA
activities, of which he naturally reports no details. Nonetheless, the very
fact that there is such painstaking and long-range planning of espionage and
sabotage is very noteworthy. Kirkpatrick attacks critics of the CIA from the
American liberal camp, who in recent years have stepped up their demands to
sharply limit the functions of this institution, to reduce these functions to
the collection of information in foreign countries, and to cease its inter-
ference in US foreign policy matters. He indignantly mentions the five lengthy
articles published in the New York Times in April 1966, which contained sharp
criticism of the CIA ane which repeatedly made mention of 150 bills drafted in
recent years in the congress, containing the demand to place strict controls
over American Intelligence. Kirkpatrick emphasizes that 1) these were not
150 separate resolutions but, to a considerable extent, the repetition of an
old draft bill at different sessions of the Senate and House of Representatives
and 2) that these bills did not gain the required majority of votes.
However, even such impassioned defense of the CIA does not reach its goa
The fact that even the now York Times, which is known. for its very close ties
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with the leading US monopolies, was compelled to publish a series of articles
exposing the CIA is rather notable. No less characteristic are the sharp pro-
nouncements of leading US Senators -- Mansfield, Fullbright, and others, against
the omnipotence of the intelligence service. In the history of the American
Congress, there has never been another issue that prompted so many critical
resolutions.
In the heat of the polemics with CIA opponents, the author blurts out two
very important and very piquant facts. The first relates to one of the very
dark episodes in the dirty policies of the USA with respect to Vietnam. This
refers to the Fall of 1.963 when the US ruling circles, having reassessed the
values, decided to sacrifice their puppet of long standing -- Ngo Din Diem and
his brother and actual co-ruler Ngo Din Nu (the author erroneously relates
these events to the year 1962). Kirkpatrick admits that the CIA and its local
representatives in Vietnam exceeded their rights and authority in Vietnamese
affairs 4cd attempted to influence US policies on Vietnam. Between the State
Department and CIA, between the Ambassador and the intelligence service in
Saigon there were sharp altercations surrounding problems connected with the
future orientation of American policy. As a result of this conflict, Ambassa-
dor Molting was initially recalled and replaced by Henry C.. Lodge and subse-
quently, at the insistence of the latter, John Richardson, CIA resident agent
in Saigon was also recalled. On 1 November 1963, in an effort to lessen anti-
American sentiment and acting upon orders from American intelligence, a mili-
tary junta headed by Zyong Van 'gin, overthrew the government. Ngo Din Diem
d Ngo Din Nu were killed. Two weeks before this, the latter had accused the
CIA, of preparing an overthrow. After the overthrow, Nurs wife, after arriv-
ing in America, openly accused American authorities of murdering her husband
and brother-in-law.
Kirkpatrick energetically defends the machiavellian policies of the CIA
in Vietnam and proudly states that the President awarded one of the highest
American medals to Richardson, who was recalled from Saigon.
Kirkpatrick cites even more interesting facts in connection with press
disclosures of relations between the CIA and American student organizations,
in particular, the National Students Association of the USA. As is known,
word that the CIA was systematically subsidizing American student organiza-
tions with the aim of creating anti-communist groups and of carrying out dovi--
sive activity in democratic organizations evoked great dissatisfaction among
the American public. Attacks in the press on the CIA were stepped up. There-
fore, Kirkpatrick hurries to the defense. He know'edgeably asserts: "The
:payment of subsidies to the National Students Association by the CIA. was first
approved at the highest government level. Each year, this approval was con-
firmed at the same level." As the saying goes, co ntary on such an admis-
sion is superfluous.
Comparing the activities of the CIA and the State Department, the author
decisively speaks favor of the former, stating that it is better informed
and operates more effectively than, does the US diplomatic machine. Exhorting
US ruling circles and the American public against interfering in the multi-
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faceted activities of the CIA and against hindering its leaders with all manner
of congressional committees and financial obstacles, in the conclusion of his
book, Kirkpatrick once again strikes the worm-out anti-communist gong. By way
of frightening the American common man, he claims: "If the CIA becomes weak
and ineffective, then the communists will win a great victory in the cold war
and the security of our nation will be seriously menaced."
Such are the contents of this unique book which is filled with apologetics
for American espionage and intelligence. Such is the banner that Lyman Kirk-
patrick, a spy and saboteur with 20-25 years of experience, passes on to his
successors in the CIA leadership. While increasing our understanding of the
structure of various American intelligence organs and while revealing the close
ties that exist between the CIA and US ruling circles, Kirkpatrick's book in-
dicates that not only is there a process of capital concentration in the USA
but that there is also a process whereby intelligence organizations are also
becoming concentrated; that the CIA is becoming part of that sinister indus-
trial-military complex in the USA, that presents such a serious threat both to
the American people and to all mankind.
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