FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND MR. KENNEDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01350R000200110005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 13, 1967
• Content Type: NSPR

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By J. F. Saunders /
Offhand, a 532-page book on American foreign policy
would not seem to qualify as light summer reading but
size and topic can fool the reader who uses them alone as I
a yardstick for choosing written entertainment for back-
yard enjoyment,
nud do orC cal of
Roger Hilsman, one of the
stalwarts of the John F. Ken-
nedy administration, writes
with such authority and from
such an select vantage point
of thu Cuban fissile crisis,
tie CIA's a ;ori:s, the Bay
u :>Culs the oul -
r:r k'ao.n tale heat
l`l' iaten's nmagnifi-
lip>L ing cf the Cuban
S. crisis was a power-
'u1 e!:amplo of action' by a
:-n:;n who had learned much
rom embarrassing experi-
::ce. He listened to all
;s::ades of opinion and to all
sources cf information. Then
he moved with unmistakable
esst:r,uce on a decisive
cUurse Gi action.
hsnian reveals the little-
nr; fact that the main
cs:;act ; is:n between the So-
viet embassy and the State
Department in the missile
affair was John Scali, a cor-
aaspondeai for the Ameri^a
Co.,? v'hi00 .S
d ' the .l '`OI $ 4o
that the incredible errors
made in the Bay of Pigs de-
bacle became invaluable to
President Kennedy in that he
never again depended on one
set of advisers in making
aajor decisions and from
;hat point on his administra-
c tivas fre of major inter-
:.:... '.:;_seders.
HILS11AN IS convinced
isc smarm sea-
dealt delivered .ciiu
administration's .answer to
Aleksander Fomin, the se-
litter Soviet -intelligence offi- 4
cer in the United States, in
the coffee shop: of the Statler
Hotel in Washington, Fomin
was in. such a state of excite-
ment he paid the 30-cent l
c h e c k with a ;t5 bill and
rushed off without his
change.
IN IUS COMMENTS on.
Vietnam, Hilsman clears up
a lot of confusion clouding i
the path of ascendency to :
power of Ngo Dinh Diem to
the premiership of south,
Vietnam.
At the time of the 1954
Geneva agree .dents, Diem
was one of the few dominant
Vietnamese figures who.
could not be accused of be-
ing either pro-French or pro-
Communist. By. the fall of
1055, he was able to hold. a
referendum in which Em-
Bao Dal was unseated'
peror
and Diem was established
,as president and chief of
state.
The Geneva accords had
called for elections leading
to the unification of North
and South, Vietnam In 1056
but Diem rejected the order
because no said the Commu-
nists were blocking any free
electioneering in the . North
and because South Vietnam
had never signed the Geneva.
accord.
Because of Diem's stature
and the job ho had done in
stabilizing South Vietnam,
the Eisenhower administra-
tion concurred. IIilsinan is
convinced that Diem's down-
fall, was triggered by his
ceding too much authority to
his arrogant brother, .Ngo
Dinh Nhu, and Nhu's acid-
tongued wife.
In addition to being a
treasured contribution
to American history,
To li'love a i~rati is a Ils'r;}S!
i LLv yaI
2004/10113: CIARDP88--013 OOd~ 004'tOOO5-7
ifis back. '1'o 14":eve a Na-
iian (Doul)leday $3.05), has
to be racked as just about
the best of the appraisals of
the Kennedy approach to
world affairs. It is made by
a man of the highest coin-
potency from a seat in the
inner circle of the Kennedy
. `r strategy council. It pulls, no
punches. It is ruthless in, ex-
posing mistakes and weak-
nesses of the Kennedy ad-
visers