ENCODED SOVIET MISSILE DATA SEEN A THREAT BY SOME HERE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP88-01315R000400400003-4
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 9, 2004
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 21, 1978
Content Type:
NSPR
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP88-01315R000400400003-4.pdf | 187.8 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2005/01/12: CIA-RDP88-01315R00040e40006a-4
on page
`.: ~, Missi
n ,
THE WASHINGTON POST C to q l tcL' k
~
21 December 1978 C r,4 l? vs 7 2 Wiz,
By Walter Pincus " . ". `?
Washiaaton Perot stair writer . _
% hen a Soviet test intercontinental
ballistic missile is fired from the Tyu-
ratam launch site in:: Centsa1 Asia, It
sends backs to Soviet scientists on the
ground a.. constant. stream : of elec.
troni reports, on ,how=.the weapon. is
functioning. P.
`speed,. pr
This, informatioaes.
sure; temperature and otherfactors, is
calIedtelemetr7 rla thevcase of a test
malfunction, telemetry:'helps Soviet
scientists determine what 'went wrong.
From: electronic??.listening posts to
the : south of : T stain--in : Turkey
and more recently('Iiarii=U.S. intelli-
.
gence.units kisten::in:?andrecord that.
same Soviet missile..telemetry_ The lis-:
tening aids U.S._analysts in determin:
of the warheads.: *. fl ? ~-#~~~ ;;
But last= June; America:f. analysts
lemetry was being transmitted In code:
CIA. Director Stansfieid Turner; for
example;.- insisted ;thatr they: encoding
had to stop or h a waaiild t be able to
testify at future:. congressional- ,hear.
Ings that the Soviets were.liviugup to
the provisions : of? the control
treaty being negotiates.: hetween?,_the4
United States and. the Soviet ;Union.. r'
,.In Geneva-. toda7, _,5, ov% Foreigm,
- nisterAtidre 'A:-Groingko'am eor
meet to discuss- the .final :detail of a
SALT .11% accord-'. one of thi details:
barring either side- from- encoding its,
test missile telemetry::-.*- ? .i
cludes^a, provision requiring: each
er's-,'national technical. means" of; lice
telligence.gathering=suclu asd:':eIee.
sion-is ambiguous and does not state,.
:whether encoding of telemetry' constt;;
Jr. (D-Ohio) for more than a Year. had.
argued that adequate verification'-was.
Glenn pressed'' the administration. to
negotiate a clear.underktanding that
there-would be no further telemetry;
Intercepted teleatetzy is-6-ily one-of"
many, highly classified intelligence ac-
tivities that allow the United States to
keep track of the. Soviet submarine.
and... -: land-based ICBM ' missiles,
bomber deployments and their strate-
gieweapons research programs.
Before that SS18 missile launch last
IJUne,:,-- U_&11'electronic Interceptions
already had provided. advance notice
that: the, test would. take-. place.. ' ?. -
A y:l l.5. 'satellite, . which. hovers -: in
spacer"orbit continuousiyr over the' In-I,
dian; Ocean,:`has Infrared. sensors that
pick up heat emissions from the earth.
When, :?.then,,:.SS18 test..missi.le "was
l3.bnehed;;? the U.S. satellite detected
-within,,
seconds of liftoff:
Z.she infrared satellite sensor can fol-
1W. the, missile as its first stage car-
afes itrabovee the clouds, but loses itt
before it,laaves the atmosphere:-'
In- space; the Soviet. missile Is fol-
Yowed;?by'ipawrtfu] ground-based..-a-++'
day.. Faciiities:1n Diyarbakir, Turkey,
rwereused'untll July 1975, when that!
country's-e government closed down;
U.S. intell Bence-operations:.pendingi
resolution of -U.S. military assistance,
programst`
:> '.Thereafter,', a` ,temporary 'radar in.
,stallation was reportedly' built in Iran
:& follow Soviet' ICBM test-flights as
they,''went across, central-Asia. toward
an impact zone on. the.. Kamchatka
Peninsulanorth of Japan,: or into the
North, Pacific...-...,,, :. _. , ... , ? , . : .
:During the initial launch and as the
missile's upper stage travels in-space,
the telemetry' monitoring. takes place.
With a missile. containing multiple,
Independently targeted. ' reentry-vehi.
Iles (M By telemetry:'cairAndicate.'
when,: each??'Warhead Is released.. The
ground- based. radar `In.:Iran. also rec
'ords that operation. .
V rAt:.Shemya`,.'Air: Force Base in `the
Aleutian Islands oft.:=Alaska;. the
United States has a large. phased-ar
tay radar that. watches the Soviet war-
heads as they reenter the earth's at?
inosphere and.. hit the. ground" at
Kamchatka, 5500 miles away..
I The ? Shemya facility, according to
the . authoritative "Jane's. Weapons
Systems," can see something. the size
of a basketball 2,000 miles away, track
100 object simultaneously and record
detailed Information on up to 20 tar=
gets-
The United States: has also,, built a
phased-array radar
arther south In
f
]j Pacif!
?1$C& Vtlt~r% t
radar unit' is aboard a specially? de=
Signed ? ship to follow those longer'
rangy ? ghntt that!' n"r1 in the U. -,
.,missile tests is. only"one,, part. of-the-
SALT verification program.
U.S. satellites capable of taking ex-
tremely detailed photographs from
100 miles and up' regularly cover the'.
Soviet Union..
They are used. to keep track of long
:term- weapons building- programs---
such as.-missile; submarine construc-
tion and construction -of land-erased
-ICBM sites.
-Iloreihan high-realolutioa. photogra
phy,".however, ,is transmitted back by
'these satellites."
Some satellites.. turn ,colors into
'electrical signals..- and. , then digital
data. When reconstructed; they are as-'
.signed to different colors.. Such a sysa
tern makes camouflaged sites easier to
'discover, since paint gives off a differ.
: ent.. signal than the- natural. trees,.
leaves or grass it is supposed to repre
sent. 1.. .
Reco satellites also have -
Infrared sensors, and some are. equip.
,.pod to pick up radioactive material.
Newer' satellites- can beam their In-
.formation back to earth. directly by rn-
dio after turning developed film into,
-electronic impulses-. The older method
Is . also still. used-dropping exposed
film from space in: a capsule that is
recovered by aircraft
Since the early 197t1s;.the~C> b
chaired a SALT .verification- comrtsi
tee made up senior- intelitgeneeran
lyrts from the agency, State and De4
.fense departments. Using all the'ia
ligence collection- activities,; this'grou
,has attempted. to keep,: trabir'.oV
phases of.-the Soviet.`strategic'-
:gram.: t >,
The 1972~ SALT' ?- agreement.--Itke
the one now being:: negotiated-pro-
bibited deliberate concealment and,
terference'? with-'national technic
means.of verification, such as elec
tronic_and.!other collection- systems
? : Soviet ,-encoding of- teleroet
shortlyafter the ? 1972 agreement was
publicized in the United States as ,&
violation- of SALT L. The Soviets d
vied -that,'saying that the hidden in-
formation was not; relevant to tber
agreement. Thereafter, however, they
halted the encoding, and resumed i
only sporadically -overthe next sit
years.
The June incident, however,,' co
vinced U.S. negotiators that the agree.
WOM r language to de-
315
what is meant
.. . ;
by interference.
According to informed sources, that
ncm Ao4inii??i....-...:17 ____ _.-