MX DECISION CAN MAKE BREAK SALT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400380049-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: May 18, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

P_ ivl d y-?7;'
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CI ;ffD~J~~1t1~5 0040038004914 ..
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I, ILI l
18 May 1979
:3aliittiGiOt'i - The restraints of
SALT 1 did both prevent the : Soviets
frn;tt spendin ;-about :j100 billion more
t^_en the U.S. on .military preuarations
in the last decpde, and. the resulting
decline in our strategic leverage is
reflected in ountcurrent dealings with
Cuba. Y
Carter `offic'ials are frank to admit-.
that the real reason why the U.S. does.
not insist on the immediate removal of,!
I,41G 23s and Russian attack subma-
rites from Cuba is not our uncertainty
as to their presence. Rather, they fear
such a_ demand would provoke a
bru .rut joviet.rejectiOit which would
only.dramatize our humiliating inabil-
it to -react.
Sen. Sao `wean, D.-Ga., is urging that
the U.S- r_nnst. now substantially
increase its spending on strategic and
conventional armament to reverse the
existing tr2r44 toward Russian superi-
ority. Hel
necessity;
ratified.
The ve
SALT II sets on ;,MIRtled ICBM launch-
ers meats `what the Soviets-can con-
tinue the,!depiovmert of enough heavy
missiles ;with multiple warheads to
threaten the survivability of our Min-
uternan missiles. Two thirds of our
land-hash! missiles are already vulner-
BY CORD ME"' ER ~
George Ball, former under secretary
of stated 1.as ridiculed the; argurnent
Em t we.'s :ould be seriously conceroei
by t.`-,e- 4owing vulnerability of, our
land-,'?as llrrissiles. The capacity of
our submarines at sea and bombers on
alert td destroy Russian Cities corn--'
bine.i vi)th the basic uncertainty of
nuclear- war -would be enough, he
inaintain;'to deter the Soviets from
launching a first strike.
Having set up a straw man, Ball
effective!v knocks liim down. The
danger 'not. that the Soviets wil.
pr ornprl,--'launch a pre-emptive strike
as s ou.ri a; they see that our-land-based rtissiies ire hi;ibly vulnerable aril t` at
at?:: not. The real danger is that
t eir per eption of American nuclear
iniiority.wil tempt t eth to threaten
ei :? advantage in conven. !
the ---of ti
.
tional forces in any serious. confronts-J
tion or regional crisis. -- -
-I;
During the seven years of .S ALT
the U.S. has.. allowed the situation that.
prevailed at the: time of .the-Cuban'
missile crisis in ? 9b?- to be completely:
reversed. Then, the U.S. had both local
conventional superiority and: over-
whelming nuclear advantage, and the:
Russians were forced ? to' back iiown 1
Now the shoe is shifting to the other'
foot; and by their buildup: in . Eurcpy!
and use of proxy armies in the Third
able, and by as early as 1981 the World the Soviets are: presenting. use
Soviets are judged to be able to take with a mounting challenge.. .. ..
out 90 percent of our ICBiyls- while These dark. lie behind
retainin ' two-thirds of their warheads the demand of San. Nunn and "other
t, SALT debate that'
tt
e
to hold our urban population
in rever
hostage.
The c fiance to protect the survivabi-.
Iity of our silt-based missiles was lost
,w hen t .a Soviets in early 19.77. turned.
do ci F wider. Carter's proposal to
tit is -'alt the ,umber' of:. heavy
l,v chcosin~ to proceed with the till.
Carter will str~ n ;teen the ehaoce_s for
SAL: ratification btw w e ;:e will gain
many r.i)re Vote than *.1e will lose'. $v
deciding against the POX, he will'
almost certainly doors SALT and
seriously weaken our defense posture..;
in the bargain.
missiles w, be- allowed them tinder Carter's intentions - on which their'
SALT I From that time 0n,...it was support of SALT may-well stand or
clear t at only a crash program to get fall.
our ICEMs out of their. doomed silos Faced by a. budge'ta'ry deadline5
and to :make Chem mobile coaid save Carter most make next: month.. a
the lani.jiased leg of our strategic decision that he has dangerously
triad. delayed for two years; so that at Wit:
Mrlorer er, the grim. ar*thrrietic pro- the new missile will not be available in!
vide'l b Intelligence proved. that we . significant numbers until. 19$7.: His
;
would peed a heavier:and -more delay has widened to at least live Years
accurat .ICBM if the U.S. was to be I .the window of opportunity that -the?
able :'o rut~liate eA r vvdg5VA ease O1)5IO4U12 O1A>aR 6-11 000400380049-7
Large rnsrtaez' of missiles the Russians bility..
would hl-4 in reserve in hardened silos
yt . high- upper limits. that
ers ir, t.e . .
?ence si
Carter move promptly- to construct the
large and more accurate MX missiles
and deploy it in a mobile basing mode.,
These senators want across-the-hoard-
strengthening of our defenses, but. they
see the iMX decision asla critical test of
r -c