SALT II AND THE STRATEGY OF INFERIORITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400370053-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: June 1, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

SALT vt,~?Foo 2001~~CDP88-01315R00040037`00'3
SALT II and
the Strategy of Inferiority
IN THE LAST ISSUE of the Journal, we
began a two part series appraising the
strategic balance and the draft SALT II
agreement. This series advances the view
that the US will enter an era of strategic
inferiority in the 1980s, but that the SALT
II agreement is desirable as a means of
cushioning the initial transition to prolong-
ed inferiority.
This view is based on eight main theses:
Thesis One: The USSR will overtake the
US in strategic strength and capabilities
during the 1980s, regardless of whether or
not SALT II is passed.
Thesis Two: These trends in the balance,
while sharply negative, will still leave the
US with significant strategic strength.
Thesis Three: Although the USSR will not
acquire anything approaching a war-
winning capability before the mid-1980s,
the USSR will gradually acquire vastly
superior counterforce capabilities, and
superior countervalue capabilities.
Thesis Four: Given what we know about
Soviet economic behavior and the Soviet
defense effort during the last decade, any
reduction in Soviet spending on strategic
forces resulting from SALT II will be used
to enhance Soviet general purpose forces.
Thesis Five: The Soviets will progressively
exploit their advantage with steadily
growing success. The West must expect
more and more Soviet challenges as Soviet
strategic strength grows in the mid-1980s,
and as it acquires enhanced blue water,
intervention, and power projection
capabilities.
Thesis Six: The domestic political factors
that make the US unwilling to compete
with the USSR for strategic parity and
security are compounded by grave
problems in DoD's efforts to develop a
next generation of US strategic forces.
Thesis Seven: Regardless of its, many
defects, the US should accept SALT I.T. It
represent the maximum Soviet concessions
the US can hope for-indeed those con-
cessions have been made only because the
Soviets are more afraid of US willingness
to compete than is realistically justified.
US FY80 Force Improvement Plates:
Smell of Failure on SAL' II Ear
TAKEN AT FACE VALUE, the Fiscal
Year 1980 defense budget presents a long
list of key improvements in US strategic
forces. It implies that Secretary Brown was
able to wring an impressive list of con-
cessions from the Office of Management
and Budget in a tight budget year, used
every bit of the political leverage given him
by the Administration's need to obtain
political support for SALT 11, and had
strong personal support from the President
in trying to check a growing Soviet
strategic threat.
Such a budget would seem to indicate
that Secretary Brown has achieved the
limit of what US domestic politics will
allow. In fact, even the Committee on the
Present Danger estimates that a fully
successful deployment of Trident II and M-
X would largely correct the "counterforce
gap" of the 1980s, assuming that the
Soviets did not make major continuing
improvements in their own force posture.
This is illustrated in Table One, which also
provides a good picture of the importance
of the M-X and Trident II programs.
Thesis Eight: SALT II will at best offer a
few short years of added security. It will not
effectively limit the Soviet strategic build-
up and the US will then have to negotiate
progressively less favorable follow-on
treaties.
The previous issue defended these theses
in a comprehensive net assessment of the
US and Soviet strategic balance. The
concluding articles explain the arguments
behind the thesis that the US force
improvements planned in the FY 1980
defense budget cannot be executed; and
the primary thesis-that SALT 11 is an
acceptable agreement if the US must accept
strategic inferiority.
In order to put this appraisal in perspec-
tive, former Deputy Secretary of Defense
Robert Ellsworth (See p. 54) has been
asked to provide his own appraisal of the
trends in the balance, the SALT 11
agreement, and the willingness of the US to
engage in effective strategic competition
with the USSR. N* E
Unfortunately, however, Secretary
Brown's achievement will probably only
come to fruition on paper. In several
critical cases, the improvements in US
strategic forces listed in the FY80 budget
are likely to be cancelled, stretched out,
implemented only in part, or deployed in a
less effective configuration. The "strong"
strategic posture in the FY80 defense
budget is, therefore, more image than
reality. It is far better suited to selling
SALT II than meeting the Soviet threat.
. aura
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01Ji5R000400370053-3
arme orces JOURNAL international/June 1979
 T he APRrfYrJ1ftft!!0dftJk0
j
FY80 'orce Plans at Face Value
Combined with the NS-20 and the Mark
12A warhead will give these 200
Minuteman III at least some launch-under-
attack capability and, more importantly,
the range of technologies needed for
flexible retaliatory counterforce and
countervailing strategy targeting. The
remaining 350 Minuteman Ills will have a
potential capability for similar data links,
but no funding is planned.
Again, however, this presents the poten-
tial problem of narrowing the US ICBMs
the Soviets must target from a total of 1054
silos to 200-300 key silos.
? The US continues to examine M-X
basing options including Multiple Protec-
tive Structures (MPS), principally the use
of multiple hardened vertical shelters or
MAPs, a survivable air mobile system, ora
mix of land and air launched basing. A
ballistic missile defense adjunct is also
being examined.
? M-X commonality will be sought with
the Trident 11. The exact nature of
"commonality" has not been decided, and
considerable controversy has emerged
within DoD over whether commonality
makes sense. The M-X is now being studied
in 69", 83" and 92" diameter variants with
lengths ranging from 50 to 60 feet, and
?veighs from 80,000 to 190,000 lbs. Only the
83" version would have commonality for
two of three stages with the Trident C-5. It
would be suited for relatively simple road
movement, and still have potential air
launch capability. It would carry 8-10
warheads, although eight seems increasing-
ly more likely.
The 92" version would optimize the M-X
as a heavy landbased ICBM, would have a
gross weight of 190,000 lbs, and a throw-
weight of 8,000 lbs., or half that of the SS-
18. It could carry 10 to 14 precision guided
re-entry vehicles (PGRVs), and up to twice
that number of countervalue RVs. It
represents the practical upper limit for
transporter erector movement.
The 69" version would optimize it for air
launch, but potentially cut RVs to six-
eight. Both the 69" and 83" variant could
probably only carry significantly fewer
MaRVs and PGRVs. Some senior Navy
and Air Force R&D officers feel OSD's
projected savings for the 83" version are
mythical, and will ultimately lead to higher
redesign costs, and/or program delays as
the M-X and'Trident II are optimized to
take advantage of their respective launch
systems and to meet the changing mission
needs of the late 1980s.
&W ymlu 1".V
i nt li warhead. It will
develop options for advanced maneuvering
re-entry vehicles (AMaRV)
with preprogrammed evasion capability
against Soviet ICBMs, and terminally
guided RVs, known as PGRVs.
The AMaRV, and Navy M-K 500
Evader MaRV, would degrade accuracy
back to the 0.25 nm level. However, the M-
X PGRV would have a theoretical ac-
curacy of better than.02 nm, and SSKP of
"
M-X
over 95%, although even the 92
might then only be able to carry a
maximum of 6-8 warheads. The Trident II
with the MaRV or Evader would be
similarly inaccurate, but with the PGRVs it
would have full counter force capability,
and provide only limited warning from
launch stations nearest Soviet ICBM silos.
There are, however, no plans to move
either program into engineering develop-
ment, and the PGRV program would be
essential to give the Trident II counterforce
capability, and to allow the M-X to retain
counterforce capability if the ABM evasion
capability was added to its planned con-
figuration.
? A final decision on the M-X design and
basing is expected in spring or summer of
1979 (and can be timed neatly for max-
imum political impact on SALT). Full
scale development funding is sought in a
FY79 supplemental.
Plunging Ahead with Trident I and II
The FY80 budget similarly implies a
strong commitment to modernizing the
SLBM force without fully clarifying the
level of capability the US will seek for
Trident II:
? The US SSBN force now has 41 subs, 10
Polaris with 160 A-3 missiles, 27 have 432
Poseidon missiles, and 4 will carry 64
Trident I missiles. The Trident I subs will
have four missiles each.
? The first Trident or Ohio-class SSBN
submarine will be delivered in November
1980, with a planned IOC in late 1981, and
one more submarine will be delivered each
year in FY81-83, two more in FY84, and
three every two years thereafter.
Thp Ohio class displaces nearly 19,000
tons, or more than a cruiser, and is 42 feet
in beam and 560 feet long. It has 24 SLBM
tubes vs. 16 for Poseidon and Polaris
submarines. At sea availability is planned
at 66% vs. 55% for Poseidon. Twelve
Poseidon submarines will be refitted with
Trident I, with the first deployment in
October 1979. The Trident I sea-launched
ballistic missile SLBM has a 4000 nm range
vs. 2000 nm for Poseidon. This increases
the launch submarine's patrol area from
2.5 to 40-million square miles.
The Trident I missile will have only eight
warheads vs. ten for Poseidon, but its
accuracy with stellar aided inertial
guidance will be .25 nm vs. .3nm; its
reliability about 15%a better; its yield 100 kt.
vs. 40 kt; and its SSKP 0.12 vs. 0.07. The
sub will also have much better silencing,
and decoy capability.
? The Advanced Ballistic Re-entry
Systems (ABRES) program will seek to
improve the immunity of US Re-entry
to weather effects on re-
Vehicles (RV)
-which is now inferior to that of the
entry
Soviet ICBMs-and to
fourth generation
36 Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01arr5 Q 9 ,4nternational/June 1979
IT IS STILL INTERESTING, however, to
analyze the Secretary's force plans,
regardless of the probability they will be
implemented. If nothing else, they set the
bounds of what the Administration is
trying to achieve, and describe its current
thinking regarding what it must do to get
Congressional support of SALT II.
Seen in this light, the most important
aspect of the FY80 budget is that it asserts
that the Administration will maintain and
modernize each branch of the triad. It calls
for improvement expenditures of well over
$50-billion during the next decade, and is
based on planned investment in force
improvements of over $110-billion in FY80
dollars through the year 2000. This is
reflected in the following force plans:
Commitment to the ICBM and M-X
The US will continue the modernization
of the intercontinental ballistic missile
force, and will develop the M-X:
? The US ICBM force will be composed of
550 Minuteman Ills with three multiple
independently targetable re-entry vehicles
(MIRVs), 450 single warhead Minuteman
IIs, and 54 single warhead Tital IIs. These
1054 ICBMs will carry 2154 warheads
through 1985.
? The US will begin refitting 300
Minuteman Ills with the Mark 12A re-
entry vehicle and W 78 warhead to increase
its accuracy and yield. This, in combina-
tion with the NS-20 guidance im-
provements already completed, will in-
crease Minuteman Ill's accuracy from
400 to 200 yards, and its yield from 170 to
350 kilotons. This will increase its soft area
coverage by about 5b%, and double its
single-shot kill probability against Soviet
ICBMs from less than 0.4 to around 0.8.
Coupled with other systems im-
provements, this will give the US roughly
900 warheads with comparatively high
counterforce capability against improved
Soviet silos. Some experts feel, however,
that this upgtade will create new
vulnerability problems since the Soviets
will eventually learn precisely which silos
have been upgraded, and could zero in on
the three hundred targets which will be the
only US systems which can be effectively
employed in counterforce retaliation.
? The Minuteman Silo Upgrade Program
now in progress will improve protection
against electro-magnetic pulses, blast,
shock, and radiation. Ongoing retargeting
and communications improvements will
continue including links to the improved
Airborne Launch Control System.
This will equip 200 of the 550
Minuteman III missiles with an automatic
link to the E-4and EC-135 airborne system
which will report on their survival status,
and allow remote target data insertion into
their warheads.
 Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400370053-3
? If Trident deploys on schedule, the 10 improved through 1990 to try to ensure its aspects of strategic defense technology,
remaining Polaris SSBNs, dating back to penetration capability. The initial im- although DoD's FY80 plans do not call for
the 1950s, with obsolescent A-3 MRV provement program will provide an up- a significant increase in the rate of
missiles, will be withdrawn. This will leave dated offensive avionics system, greatly modernization of US strategic defenses:
the entire Poseidon; Polaris force con- improved electronic countermeasures ? Developmental work will continue on
verted to Poseidon and Trident. capability, and limited improvements in the ABM, and laser defense, ASATs, and
? Development of the Trident II missile resistence to nuclear effects. The B-52D non-nuclear ABM intercept, although
will proceed. Reports differ as to its will continue to rely on gravity bombs, and without any significant increase in real
potential configuration. Some indicate it the B-5211 and FB-I1 Is on gravity bombs funding.
will differ from Trident I only in having 14 and the short range attack missile ? The most promising of these
RVs, slightly improved yields, and a (SRAM). developments is the concept of deployinga
potential ABM evasion capability at the ? Work is proceeding on both the wide small hypersonic ABM interceptor with
cost of less accuracy. bodied Cruise Missile Carrier and variants the M-X. It would be significantly smaller
Other reports indicate that full PGRV of a "new manned bomber" including it than Sprint, be mobile with its own phased
option is being examined, and that Trident supersonic bomber and subsonic low array radar, and intercept Soviet RVs
II has the following growth potential even altitude penetrator. The 747, YC-14, C-5, below 50,000 feet. It would have inertial
without PGRV: (a) 6,000 nm + range and L-1011, DC-10, and YC-15 are being guidance and a nuclear warhead, and be
launch from base capability, (b) accuracy examined as wide bodied options, as are the able to move with the M-X missile if it were
of 0.1 nm, (c) yields of 150-350 kt, (d) B-I design, AMST, C-141 and C-5A. deployed in MAP or some other MPS
achievable SSKP against Soviet ICBMs of
0.3. Such a growth capability would
approach an effective counterforce
capability, and provide a major improve-
ment in countervalue targeting flexibility.
? A "less expensive" SSBN is under study,
and could impact on procurement as early
as the FY82 budget. (Put in less veiled
terms, this is the "Rickoverless" Trident.
Many Navy experts feel a SSBN with a less
ambitious reactor could be delivered at 50-
66% of the cost of the Trident.)
Deploying the Cruise Missile While
Searching for Its Carrier
The FY80 budget commits the US to the
ALCM, but leaves the issue of the
successor to the B-52 unresolved:
? SAC will conduct the largest alert
exercise in its history-"Global Shield
79"-in an attempt to test and improve its
uncertain ICBM and bomber readiness.
This exercise will involve over 120,000
men, although some participants question
its realism, and ability to spot real world
readiness problems when the "test" in-
volves so much rigidity and warning.
? The bomber force will continue to
consist of 316 B-52s, 60 FB-I 1 Is, and 615
KC-135 tankers. The alert rate will be 25%,
with surge capability, although there are
increasing indications that the number of
US bombers which are available with their
full avionics complement on-line is far
smaller than US force plans call for.
? The Cruise Missile will complete com-
petitive flyoff, and survivability testing in
1979-80. Although it is encountering some
minor development problems, the ALCM
is scheduled to be deployed in a squadron
of 16 B-52Gs in December 1982. The
ALCM will have a W80 selectable yield
warhead with a maximum 200 kt yield, and
TERCONI (terrain contour matching)
guidance with theoretical accuracies of 30
meters. Its'delivery range will be over 2,500
km, including an allowance for maneuver.
? The B-52G ALCM upgrade program is
encountering some configuration and
design problems, but each will carry at least
12 ALCMs. An operational strength of 135
Strategic posture in the FY80 defense budget is
... more image than reality ... far better suited to
selling SALT II than meeting the Soviet threat,
However, last minute SALT 11 variant. Such a development is, however,
negotiations may have restricted all US still in the conceptual phase.
ALCM carrying bombers to a maximum ? Aviation Week has also recently
average load of 28 ALCM for new aircraft. reported that the Army is considering non-
This could make the subsonic manned nuclear designs with terminal homing, and
bomber option more attractive than the that the Air Force is considering an
wide bodied carrier. airborne ballistic missile defense system to
? Work is proceeding on the Advanced protect the air mobile M-X/ B-52 and
Strategic Air-Launched Missile (ASALM) ALCM force with exoatmospheric ter-
to replace the SRAM, and provide a minal homing. All of these concepts are
possible technology base for an improved precluded by the ABM treaty, and it is
ALCM with supersonic dash capability. unlikely any could be deployed before the
? The KC-10A tanker is being procured, late 1980s.
and work on up-engining the KC-135A ? The US strategic air defense system will
continues. This could provide the im- continue to depend on six active Air Force
proved tanker capacity necessary to sup- F-106, and 10 National Guard F-101, F-
port the B-52G with the ALCM, and to 106, and F-106 interceptor squadrons, for a
improve ride-out capability. total of 327 increasingly obsolescent
Freeing Strategic Systems fighters. 160 F-4s, F-15s, and F-14s will
From NATO Missions normally be available as augmentation
? Development is proceeding on an forces.
extended range Pershing 11 (1,000 nm), ona ? Three relatively obsolete Nike-Hercules
new MRBM design, and on-land attack batteries remain in Alaska, and four Nike
SLCM and GLCM concepts-all to be batteries and eight Hawk batteries remain
based in Europe. These are important in Florida, although most may be phased
because they could potentially eliminate out as part of the current wave of base
the need to target Warsaw Pact targets with closings. The vulnerability of these units to
SLBMs and other US strategic forces, and electronic warfare is high, and their low
free them to strike at strategic targets in the altitude coverage is very poor to nonexis-
USSR. tent.
? The US is proceeding with Patriot, ? The dedicated forces rely largely on F-
which has a limited Anti-Tactical Ballistic 106 fighters which, while upgraded, are
Missile (ATBM) capability, and with now more than eighteen years old. Attri-
NATO C;I improvements which can be tion has forced some of these units to'
transformed into a "launch under attack" replace their F-106 with F-4. However, one
capability. F-15 augmentation squadron has been
Although of uncertain credibility, such assigned.
improvements could help preserve the ? The Air Force is also considering
steadily weakening "coupling" of NATO options to modernize these aircraft which
and US strategic forces. include the F-14s Iran would resell to the
Little Progress in Strategic Defense, US, dedicated F-15s, and improved F-15s
converted B-52Gs will be maintained, But Some Signs of Hope with better radar and the, Phoenix missile.
depending on the final 5ALT II ce T S. There ou n t~4 ii1~~f~$' 14s and F-l5sare
? Each B-52G aircrafCppirdoyeye ryRq~ea>?~S HN3lYeKs eel r t'-'iif ti
armed forces JOURNAL international/June 1979 37
 missile range, low altitude kill capability, While the Soviets have conducted 16 will be upgraded with improved UHF,
flight range andapipIrCti% dtFWrRelftse` 2K)OM* thCM>R 011314 R0W4000FOO52-21-F data links. EMP,
US against Backfire and new Soviet heavy the USSR has demonstrated it can destroy
bombers with better ECM and ALCMs. US satellites while they are behind the
? Some major and urgently needed im- earth's curve, the Soviet tests have general-
provements are planned in US air defense ly been against low orbit satellites and have
netting and warning. A joint surveillance evidently relied on relatively simple attack
system (JSS) will be established to link 83 technologies rather than more effective
FAA and Air Force radars with seven options like nonexplosive terminal homing
regional operations control centers. These warheads or high energy devices.
will replace the obsolete SAGE! BUIC As a result, the current ASAT Treaty
system, and allow reprogramming of negotiations may lead to a US-Soviet
resources to support deployment of six agreement on an anti-satellite test
AW PACs aircraft. moratorium in the next few months---the
? Work is still proceeding on an over-the- Soviets have not tested since 19 May
horizon back-scatter radar warning systems 1978 --and an effort to agree on a perma-
for the East and West coasts, and the nent ban treaty by 1981. The US has also
Southeast. This would extend warning added an evasion and warning system to
from about 200-300 nm to roughly 1,000 some of its communications satellites,
nm. The E-3a AWACs warning and although it is unclear who is ahead in
control system will replace the vulnerable overall satellite evasion, sensor self protec-
DEW line system as the primary northern tions, and electronics hardening
warning system, and study is underway for technology.
options to replace the now somewhat
obsolescent DEW line radars with a mix of An Uncertain
long range and automated short range Anti-SLBM/SLCM Capability
radars that would provide at least some ? The US will spend roughly $5-billion per
advanced landbased low altitude radar year to try to preserve its massive lead in
coverage of the Canadian-US northern AS W capability, and ability to threaten the
approaches. survivability of Soviet SLBMs and
? DARPA is examining satellite air SLCMs. However, Soviet SLBMs are
defense sensor systems, such as space borne steadily acquiring a launch from base or
phased array radars and/or multi-satellite protected waters capability. The SSN-8
distributed radars, to provide long range, with SLBM ranges of well over 4,200 nm
low altitude, and cruise missile warning was first deployed in 1978.
and air defense battle management ? There are also indications that the new
capabilities. Even the fully upgraded JSS Soviet SSBN, the "Typhoon," may have a
system will lack such capabilities, and there titanium hull which may allow it to
is little chance that OTH radar can provide operate at depths which could seriously
them because of auroral and other regional threaten the effectiveness of present and
energy problems. Such improvements are programmed US ASW forces. The
essential both to give warning to US Typhoon might also have the silencing
bomber bases in the mid-1980s onwards, capability to end the capability of the US
and to support any kind of cost-effective "SOSU.US" system to locate Soviet SSBNs
effort to improve US fighter defenses within 55 square miles under optimal
within reasonable aircraft numbers. conditions.
? DoD has begun a program to evaluate Command, Control and Warning; Moving
particle beam and high energy laser Towards "Launch Under Attack"
weapons. A Particle Beam Study Group,
formed by Ruth M. Davis, Deputy Under Although the US still has not declared
Secretary for Research and Advanced plans to improve its overall strategic battle
Technology, has recently recommended a managements to the level necessary to
five. year feasibility research and develop- implement a countervailing strategy under
rnent program, and the high energy laser transattack conditions, it will sharply
program has been accelerated. Although improve its capability to deal with the first
the FY80 effort will still be relatively major Soviet strikes against CONUS:
limited, DoD seems to be in the process ? The US will improve its tactical warning
of developing an effective long term and attack assessment system in the north
program that could begin in FY81. by giving BMEWS better reliability and
? The US seems to be developing an ICBM attack assessment support. Two
effective enough anti-satellite (ASAT) Pave Paws coastal phase array
warfare program to give the Russians some radars will replace six obsolescent FSS-7
incentive to negotiate an anti-satellite SLBM warning radars, and provide more
warfare treaty. The US now has a wide reliable warning and attack characteriza- However, the US will not be able to
range of ASAT variants under study, tion against Soviet SLBM/ SLCM attacks. effectively manage any conflict in which
ranging from the concept of satellite ? The Integrated Operational Nuclear the Soviets strike at a narrow number of its
capture using the space shuttle, to a light Detection System (IONDs) will be placed land based C3I sites or a conflict involving
aircraft launched homing missile which on NAVSTAR to provide world-wide a sequence of high intensity strategic
could strike at low orbit missiles. nuclear trans and post-attack damage exchanges through 1985. The US decision
The US could evidently test an initial assessment data and help develop a launch- in the 1960s not to harden its battle
ASAT weapon as early as FY81, and under-attack capability. management system against thermo-
effective systems by FY83-84. ? The E-4 airborne command post aircraft nuclear weapons , and a somewhat
secure voice, and anti-jam capabilities will
be improved. Missile retargeting and status
links are being added for 200 missiles. This
new system, coupled to the E?-4 and EC-135
and other sensors, will provide a limited
defacto launch-under-attack capability,
regardless of whether the US formally
declares it will create such a capability.
? The first phase of the air force satellite
communications system is partially
operational, and expansion to include the
DSCS is underway.
? The ELF communications program will
be continued to try to improve the strategic
submarine forces' ability to remain un-
detected for long periods during peacetime
while still receiving communications.
The Navy argues that without ELF, the
requirement for continuous com-
munications reception could detract from
their ability to remain undetected and their
deterring effect since they would have to
operate with antennas continuously at or
near the surface of the ocean.
Recent congressional studies have
seriously challenged the cost-effectiveness
of ELF, however, on the grounds such
vulnerability is too marginal to be impor-
tant, and that ELF can at best make an
exceedingly limited improvement in US
communications. Such studies did not,
however, examine the new targeting and
battle management need of "countervailing
`strategy."
? Study is underway of the full range of
space systems the US would need in the
1980s to ensure it had the battle manage-
merit capability and survivability necessary
to manage a strategic war which involved a
sequence of major Soviet strikes and/or
attacks on land based US strategic C3I
systems. Although the details of such a
system are not discussed in the FY80 DoD
annual report, they could include such
features as advanced shuttle-launched
communications satellites, and a range of
improved IR and radar warning sensors
using mosaic focal plane technology.
A net assessment of US and Soviet battle
management and strategic sensor
capabilities is also being briefed in the
Pentagon, and at least some study is being
given to the present lack of survivable
intelligence and nonstrategic war manage-
ment systems, the lack of hardening of US
land bases' command and control facilities,
and the massive disparity between the
USSR's 150-odd truly hard command and
control sites and the few vulnerable US
"hard" sites near Washington, DC, and at
38 Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-< ' QQQQ?Q TM5A'4rnational/June 1979
 Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400370053-3
single-minded US focus on deterrence and
assured destruction rather than battle
management has effectively left the US
equipped only to manage one all-out
retaliatory strike. Until major im-
provements take place in US capabilities,
many scenarios could occur in which even
very selective Soviet attacks on the US
rJr _W7, MTV
ek; Gratis mbfiri cry e ILYRAV
national command authority could present
the US with the agonizing option of having
to strike blind or not at all. ettir M
Taking the FY80 Force improvement
lames at Liss than Face Value
THERE IS NO QUESTION that many of
the detailed improvements in strategic
forces which have just been outlined will
occur more or less on schedule. However,
the FY80 budget has three keystones: the
M-X and improved ICBM basing, the up-
grading of the SSBN force,' and the
deployment of the cruise missile.
Critical elements of each of these three
keystones are in deep financial, political,
and technical trouble. It now seems nearly
certain that the US will not be able to
The MA and the Uncertain
Future of the Triad
THE DEBATE over M-X basing which has
surfaced in recent months has not been one
over feasibility. If the issue had been one of
finding a cost-effective means of correcting
the performance limitations and basing
vulnerabilities of Minuteman, the Carter
Administration could have committed
itself to the M-X and Multiple Protective
Structure (MPS) basing in mid-1978. All of
the basic technical problems were solved,
and it seemed probable to most defense
experts that the USSR would eventually
accept one of several techniques the US
could offer to allow the USSR to verify the
number of M-X missiles deployed in an
MPS basing pattern. Certainly, Secretary
Brown was ready to make such a commit-
ment, and at least informally proposed
MPS basing to the President.
President Carter, however, has long
taken a much more cautious view toward
the expansion of US nuclear strength. One
of his first concerns upon coming to office
was to start an analysis of how small US
forces could be and still provide deterrence.
And, as his initial SALT II proposals to the
Soviets demonstrated, he has set the goal of
trying to significantly reduce the strategic
forces on each side, rather than simply seek
to maintain a stable balance of deterrence.
These views interacted with the concern of
several of his other senior advisors that the
M-X and MPS presented too serious a risk
for the SALT 11 negotiations, that MPS
basing might lead to massive Soviet strikes
against the US in war and serious en-
vironmental problems in peace, and that
the deployment of the system might
seriously erode the President's liberal and
As a result, the President did not accept
the Secretary's recommendation, and after
some intense exchanges, instructed the
Secretary that (a) the Department of De-
fense should not publicly advocate MPS,
and (b) should examine a wider range of
basing concepts. These came to include
such options as the air-launched M-X, a
split between air-launched M-X and the
use of Minuteman silos, added reliance on
SSBNs, and mobile systems which did not
require hard silo basing.
The M-X Basing Crisis
As a result, OSD and the Air Force have
had to spend much of the last twelve
months simultaneously trying to find
alternatives to MPS basing and trying to
change the President's mind. This has
presented serious problems because there
are no simple cost-effective alternatives to
MPS. The MPS concept is comparatively
easy to deploy. Unlike the sheltered tunnel
concept, which proved to have uncertain
survivability at any reasonable level of
cost, MPS would rely on sheer silo
numbers to make it impossible for the
Soviets to launch an effective first strike
against US ICBMs. There would be about
15 to 25 silos for every M-X-or about
4,000-5,000 aim points for a force of 200-
260 M-X missile with 1,600 to 2,600
counterforce capable warheads-
depending on which MPS basing concept
is chosen. While it would take several years
to build-up such a system, it could be done
without any of the risks inherent in the
other basing concepts, and would have
relatively limited operations and
maintenance costs.
implement of its FY80 plans without major
slippage, massive budget supplementals,
and the possible cancellation of at least one
of the three key planned improvements in
its delivery systems.
working on improved US ICBM basing to
favor MPS over such alternatives as the use
of aircraft to provide an airborne ride out
and launch capability. However, OSD
rigidly clamped down on any dissent with
the Presidents's views after his guidance to
Secretary Brown. went so far that Air
Force Chief of Staff, General Lew Allen,
got a personal reprimand from Deputy
Under Secretary William Perry for testify-
ing that MPS was a superior concept, and
then had to go back and eat his words
before the same committee.
At the very least, even a successful
alternative to MPS means serious delays
and additional risks. There are severe
physical limits on how quickly the M-X can
be reliably based unless it is initially
deployed in something like the present
Minuteman silos. All of the concepts which
DoD was instructed to examine as sub-
stitutes for MPS were sufficiently uncer-
tain, and involved such long lead times,
that it is unlikely that large scale forces
could have been deployed until well after
1987.
And this is so far in the future, that it is
beyond the "prediction point" for what the
Soviets can do to improve their future
counterforce attack capabilities. If US
attempts to reduce ICBM vulnerability lag
into the late 1980s or 1990s, there is no way
to be sure they will be effective or useful.
Further, even tinder all the constraints of
SALT II, the US could find itself in a high
technology C3I, basing, and PGRV arms
race which could end with only limited or
no ultimate improvement in ICBM sur-
vivability unless the US spends vastly more
than it now plans.
Airborne Presidential Basing Ideology
Such issues became all too clear as DoD
evaluated the air launched M-X option
which the President initially seems to have
favored as the alternative to MPS. The
regional political suqpqtt uj P6lWle s@ At s.c6F s~o315 j ~Q~ ' P{rr ~ s3of the air launched
campaign. NN wave-tev~rtu" aIIy' every expert TvI=Xh'a`f'ferceandOSDexamin-
 ed have not been made public nor have the
variants mixed Aparowml iNoer iel se
land basing. However, various reports
have indicated the principle alternatives
came to be (a) a force of about 300-350
STOL aircraft like the YC-14 and YC-15,
with 120-150 on alert, or (b) a smaller
force of 150-175 higher payload aircraft
the size of the 747 or C5A, but with STOL
characteristics and requiring much higher
alert and reliability rates. Both options
required about 120 added support
aircraft .-including a substantial number
of heavy tankers.
Complex trade-offs were evaluated
between aircraft configuration and missile
size and performance. There are in-
dications, however, that all variants even-
tually required the equivalent of a new
launch aircraft design, although the YC-14
and YC-15 might not have required total
redesign.
Killing More Americans
to Create an Inferior System
Various vulnerability studies in the
Pentagon produced steadily more complex
basing requirements, but the final variants
evidently involved a mix of primary bases,
and secondary and tertiary dispersal bases.
The number and mix of these bases
changed by week as the studies progressed,
but Aviation Week reported that the final
concepts called for five to eight main
operating bases, 30-40 alert bases with two
aircraft each, 100 primary dispersal bases,
and several thousand secondary dispersal
locations which could have included areas
throughout the US and even non-airbase
roads and landing sites. The cost of such
new main operating bases would have been
up to S200-million, and that of an alert base
$18-22-million. These costs would have
dropped drastically for co-location, how-
ever, and co-location with civil or military
bases would have cut such costs below one
tenth that of a new base.
Yet, the risk of Soviet SLBM and SLCM
attacks, and various cost factors forced any
primary and alert bases to be in an
approximately 14 state area roughly 600
miles away from both coasts and the Gulf
to provide 20 minutes of warning. This
meant that short of building new airbases,
dispersal sites had to be much nearer
population centers than the MPS silos.
While recent reports indicate that the
dispersal bases could have been chosen
from over 4,000 airfields in this area, and
that the M-X carrier could theoretically
have operated from unimproved strips as
short as 3,000 feet, and that the area might
be expanded on the assumption the Soviets
would not launch from the Gulf of Mexico,
it is far from clear that an M-X launch
aircraft and C3I system could have been
e tion that a Soviet attack on
Accordingly, actual basing flexibility ICBMs, (d) only single RVs would be the air lau
nchsM X force would produce at
might have been far smaller than such needed for damage limiting, (e) both the least an order of magnitude greater long
plans indicated because a less flexible bomber and M-X branches of the triad term death rate than an attack on the MPS
aircraft might have to be accepted. could be attacked simultaneously with no silo complex.
40 Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400370053-3
armed forces JOURNAL international/June 1979
es
r
c
e
y a peacetime operations of such an airfleet
developed with anything like this flexibility host of state and local pressures, (c) the would have had far worse environmental
without systems costs and deployment Soviets could use any ICBM or SLBM RV effects on people than MPS. There also
times escalating far beyond those reported. to hit such bases and not just their accurate was littl
The Critical Importance of US Force
Improvement Plans in Closing the Counterforce Gap
r
S
i
li L
tnt
e
,nen - ariore Attack Initli,tion
US Strikes Flnt/No Major CS Slrategie Force InitiaU?rs Ex tpt Trdem
USSR Strikes Fint/No Major US Strategic Fore Initiwpves Except Trident
Does Not Include Present BACKFIRE
Source: Committee on the Present Danger, Press Release, 9 March 1979.
It is also questionable that such systems warning gap. (f) the Soviets could build-up
could be deployed in a way that did not their SLBM force to 14 RVs each under
result in some predictability that would SALT II, and can build-up a tremendous
allow the Soviets to attack a finite number counterforce capability, and (8) new
of US air bases, or to combine an attack or satellite targeting and depressed trajectory
series of attacks on the launch aircraft SLBM technology could greatly improve
bases, their support facilities, and their such capability by the mid-1980s.
complex air control and warning systems. Ironically, while the M-X MPS sites
Lt. General Tom Stafford, the Air Force would have been in unpopulated areas in
Deputy Chief-of-Staff for R&D, noted in the Great Basin of Utah, Nevada, and
an interview in the Omaha World Herald, Arizona, the airborne M-X bases would
that some of the prompt casualty effects have to be scattered throughout more
from such an attack could be avoided by populated areas in Montana, Wyoming,
deploying the launch aircraft in two's from Colorado, North Dakota, South Dakota,
airports 70 miles apart; 21 miles from cities Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa,
over 25,000; and 3V2 miles from towns Wisconsin, Upper Michigan, and Illinois.
under 25,000. However, given the fact that Accordingly, the end result of an
the environmental impact statement ex- airborne M-X may be that described by Lt.
empts basing near national monuments, General Stafford in the same interview.
national parks, certain historic sites and "Every little town that has an airport is
wildlife reserves-and that basing near B- probably going to be a target. . . . for
52 and other military targets seems the Soviets] could use an air barrage,
unacceptable-the target mix may ul- They could explode a whole series of
timately not have been all that great. ICBMs in the air and cover the whole
There is also a complex mix of other area."
factors which could have greatly increased In passing, it should be noted that such
the vulnerability of an airborne M-X force: basing also made nonsense out of the en-
(a) there are strong cost reasons to disperse vironmental argument. Desirable as it
as little as possible in peacetime and to might be to preserve sagebrush, coyotes
maximize the load on main and alert bases, and cacti, there is no question that the
(b) basing could be further r
t
i
t
d b
USSR Strike, First - US Deploy, "Common Hindle" in MAPS/ALPS
Trident
t rc n__,. .._ ....... ..,.... __
USSR F-
 Degraded NAVpr&1(pgyFaR fi Vglygse 3005,'t01anc .: PIA-RDP88 01315R000400370053 3y felt this was an advan-
of Real-World Counterforce Capability air-launched version, or for the increased tage because it would give the US several
New warning and navigation systems marginal cost of larger numbers of pilots, more years in which to seek a permanent
would also be required for airborne launch, crews, etc. in an air force which already has cap or reduction in total strategic systems,
and serious questions existed about the real serious critical skill availability problems. and avoid a commitment to the mobile
world accuracy and reliability that could be They also evidently failed to allow for the ICBM. Some advocates of SALT III argue
maintained over time under such condi- complex marginal cost interaction of that this is essential and that if both sides
tions. adding air launched M-X to an improved deploy mobile ICBMs whose number can
While some reports talked about worst B-52G' ALCM force.
never be exactly established, future arms
case accuracies of 1,500-3,000 feet with The true cost of the air-launched variant reductions may become impossible.
inertial and stellar inertial options, it seems might well have ultimately cost as much as There is no question which of these two
more likely that such systems would four times that of the MPS variant if all options virtually every DoT) policy maker
eventually have to use some form of these costs were considered, and the cost of and military expert would chose: they back
PGRV, and very advanced and buffered overcoming added design risks was the "shell game." The uncertainty lies with
data links. included. the President. Some reports indicate he
Reading between the lines, this may be This made the air-launched M-X an would personally like to choose the
why Secretary Brown indicated the US exceedingly "iffy" system, particularly if "augmented dyad," but that he realizes he
may not need a countersilo capability in his the political winds should later have shifted would have to do so in the face of strong
discussion of "countervailing strategy." to make a "dyad" more acceptable. And, opposition from (a) virtually every senior
There were other problems inherent in the resulting M-X hardly served as the military officer and defense official, (b)
the size of an airborne M-X. The original paragon which land-based ICBM's were many key members of the Senate upon
baseline M-X option with a 92" diameter said to be in Brown's Annual Report. It whom he must rely for ratification of the
would have had twice the gross weight of was not a land-based leg of the triad.
sec(c) many
Minuteman III, four times the payload, an Continuing Delay and Uncertainty natinALTonal II, and
urity com key members of p the ose initial 30-50% better accuracy, and high in the M-X Program Sion could be crucial in my wn influencing the
growth potential to PGRV/MaRV The result seems to have been, that after Senate. These e. factors in ouldencig to
capability. It could probably launch the several attempts to find workable variants ractoin wolo seem to
SALT II limit of 10 RVs even with PGRV of the air-launched M-X, the White House difficult t hmpke any inclinations, n of t ie
ifficlt to make any clear prediction of the
capability, and if SALT II should fail, finally gave up on the option at a meeting
could launch up to 25 countervalue RVs. during the first week of May. Accordin to outcome.
pt
In contrast, a 69" diameter, air-launch various reports, Dr. Brzezinski, Secretary There is one this tha which M is clear
optimized M-X would have substantially Brown, and Deputy Secretary Warrestill and that is that the trouble. Ev concept
less throw weight, PGRV upgrade, and Christopher attended a meeting at which President does
Cvery ongress echoose agi en ventf the
payload fractionation flexibility than each of the options was compared, and at -the accepts-which ca given is oncepy and
Minuteman. It might be able to launch which the air-launched option was re- 'means certain-the resulting system by no
only six PGRVs or less, and would have jected. The options which did survive as owsl patleastseveral ryeas. Itseems must
little growth potential. finalists were (a) a variant of the MPS exceedingly doubtful that an MPS-based
Some senior Pentagon officials proposal, and (b) placing the M-X in force can now be fully deployed until after
questioned whethereven a 83"air-launched existing Minuteman silos while increasing 1990. At best, the build-up during the mid-
M-X would have the flexibility required to the SSBN force.
meet the needs of the 1980s. There was It is unclear which MPS variant was in Secretary Brown'srFY80tforce plans
substantially broader concern that a 69" selected. Some reports have indicated that and the situation could be much worse. If
M-X could prove totally inadequate to it might still be the "shell game" option the "augmented dyad" is chosen, the US
adapt to the demand imposed by Soviet originally selected by Secretary Brown, could end up with the same silo basing it
force improvements, and might seriously with 250 M-X missiles moving by has today, and no solution to ICBM
mortgage US capabilities to an inadequate transporter between a large number of vulnerability.
system. hard silos. Other reports indicate that it
Pricing the M-X Out of Existence might be a variant transported by rail along Summing Up the M-X Basing Crisis
Although the precise costs of the air special tracks, and which would place This situation creates a serious crisis for
launched M-X options are uncertain, it is missiles in a softer and cheaper form of US strategic planning:
also clear that the direct procurement shelter that would protect against distant ? It leaves no firm basis for evaluating
costs would have been at least $29-40- hits, but not offer the same security or the SALT II agreement. The Congress can
billion versus S l9-30-billion for the M-X in associated accuracy and C3 capability as a be expected to start its own basing
MPS. Similarly, the direct O&M costs for fixed silo. Such "soft" basing and rail evaluation once the President stops, and
the air launched system would range from transport would offer the advantage of the ratification debate may have to proceed
$700-1,100-million annually versus $400- fewer cumulative environmental effects, without being able to establish the future
500-million for the MPS based M-X. and significantly easier verifiability than capability of US ICBM forces.
While these figures are anything but vehicle transporters, but would also offer ? It leaves the US without a clear
concrete, Pentagon officials privately agree far less protection and flexibility in basing. strategy for improving its strategic forces.
that the direct life cycle costs of the air The SSBN variant seems to have been Regardless of the concepts Secretary
launched M-X would have been almost the "augmented dyad." This would mean Brown articulated in his FY1980 annual
twice those of an MPS based force. standardizing on the Trident II missile, and report, it is all too clear that the US remains
This alone could eventually havejeopar- deploying it in both SSBNs and the undecided about the level of strength it
dized procurement of the M-X in an era existing Minuteman silos. It would not, of needs, the need for the triad, the amount of
when the US will also have to cope with course, solve the ICBM vulnerability counterforce capability it requires, and the
massive on-going cost escalation in the problem, and it is uncertain whether it desirability of given levels of post-attack
Trident program, but it is only part of the would result in a fully effective counter- survival. Further, given the incredible
story. The air-launched system would also force capability for even the land-based variations in missile and warhead numbers
have involved far more technical risk, and portion. As is discussed later, it is even which are now possible, it would seem that
far higher indirect support costs. The more questionable that it would actually both our targeting strategy and "counter
previous figures evidently made no lead to any more SSBNs within the 1980s. vailing strategy" capability remain equally
allowance for the added tanks , uppt~rt At 1
Approved eor-KeIease 26b67 f/ly "' f 1~tl9P~ ~f 15P ~S4~370053-3
armed forces JOURNAL international/June 1979
 ? The long s k th t Vhe 00 (YON 3 e M X could become
has done marl i r t e it once e ore 1 9 and as to ha
wt level of involved in a complex race of improved
management of the ICBM effort and US capability will ultimately be required. The targeting,. battle management, and C31
strategic planning, and has been IOC for the M-X will slip from a period in systems,
demoralizing for all concerned. It was a which the NS-20/MK-12A would lead What is certain is that all the neat curves
major contributing factor in the resigna- warhead technology to one where PGRV showing the future size of US and Soviet
tion of Secretary of the Air Force, John C. and MaRV capability may be the rule. strategic forces, and the impact of M-X, are
Stetson, and has left many DoD officials There is no way to predict whether the M-X now promises which may never be kept.
and officers with the impression that a will now be adequate once the force finally However desirable the trends in Table One
serious gap is growing between their builds-up, what Soviet missile and missile may be. there is no assurance that such US
perception of the Soviet threat and that of basing capability will be, or what com- force improvements will occur. $ r s
the White House. binations of active and passive missile
o It creates real and serious uncertain- defense may then be necessary. It is equally
/~ program has lagged badly, escalated in
..A_ lunte Trident cost, and has now been sent back to the
drawing board in the search for com-
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRIDENT possibly after six, It is virtually certain, monality with the M-X.
I AND 11 already has become a horror therefore, that (a) 14 Trident SSBNs will It is thus uncertain that Trident 11 will be
story that makes the development of the C- never be built and will be replaced by a available before 1990, or what its ultimate
5A look like a pardigm of good manage- cheaper and less capable submarine. (b) configuration may be. It is increasingly
ment. It has evolved from the relatively low that the Trident program will be stretched unlikely it can have performance even
cost 8,240 ton SSBN, and 6,500 nm SLBM out even further or terminated with fewer roughly equivalent to the level of accuracy
that emerged from the "Strat X" deliveries without a quick follow-on, or (c) now achieved by the MK-12A/NS-20
study and ULMS proposal to a 18,700 ton that some other element of the Triad or ICBMs before the early 1990s unless the
submarine with a 4,000 nm missile. This cut Navy will have to be cut back to pay for the US commits itself far more firmly to
in missile range alone assured a vastly Trident. developing an SLBM with "surgical"
reduced patrol range and area, and In fact, such probabilities have sharply accuracy than Administration plans now
increased the risk of future ASW deter- increased just as this issue goes to press. permit. This, coupled to other problems in
tability within the smaller area. The Navy has just completed a six volume the Navy's strategic C3 system, may mean
In fact, Trident's evolution has been a study in response to pressure from the the US will lack the option of upgrading
model of unmanaged management by the Senate Armed Services Committee that the SLBM to help counter any failure to
Navy. The real cost of the lead ship has indicates that a new SSBN could be built reduce the vulnerability of its ICBMs.
doubled in cost from a 1974 estimate of which would still have 24 missile tubes but It also means that whatever happens to
$800-million, although $1.5-billion is the save up to 30% of the cost of Trident by ,the Navy's present SSBN; SLBM program,
latest official figure, follow-on ships going to a smaller hull and different there are exceptional risks in the recent
could cost 3-4 times their initially reactor. Other more radical and risk-filled pressures to replace the M-X by relying on
programmed price. The total program cost concepts such as Jason, are also getting an "augmented dyad" of Trident missiles in
for 14 submarines, planned at $12.4-billion serious study, and senior Naval officers are Minuteman silos and more SSBNs. This
in 1974, and now at $25.1-billion, is almost quietly letting the press know they would concept received a sharp push by some
certain to really be $36-48-billion. like a different SSBN if Admiral Administration officials when the 5 May
Trident annual deliveries have also Rickover's influence could somehow be White House meeting on the M-X made
slipped from an original 1-3-3-3 schedule overcome. the impracticality of the air-launched M-X
for the 10 submarines (4 years), to 1-2-2-2- There are also rumors-which DoD has all too clear. It should be equally clear,
2-1 (6 years), to 1-2-1-1-2-1-2 (7 years), and denied -that the Trident I missile will have however, that the risks of tying the nation's
now 1-1-1-1-2 for only 6 submarines. The to be deployed with serious questions still strategic future to a faltering SSBN
initial deployment date has slipped from existing about its total system perfor- program are even greater, and might well
the late 1970s to the 1980s. mance, and with some sacrifice of range end in defeating success by reinforcing
As a result, Polaris and Poseidon sub- below 4,000 nm and in reliability. failure. The "augmented dyad" is a tidy
marines must be expensively extended However, Secretary Brown claims 14 suc- concept from the view point of SALT II,
beyond their design life. cessful launches out of 17, and it should but it could end in (a) a totally disorganized
Not surprisingly, Secretary Brown- probably be assumed for the time being US force posture after the Protocol expires
who was publicly embarrassed by the that the Trident I missile program at least is and just as the US is seeking SALT III, (b)
weakness of the Navy's senior managers of successful. Reports also indicate that work a lack of any survivable US systems with
the Trident program in late 1977-has (although it is slipping) is proceeding on prompt counterforce capability, (c) a
already committed DoD to trying to find the MK 500 "Evader" MaRV warhead for serious destabilization of deterence in the
lower cost alternatives in his FY80 posture Trident I. Such a warhead will degrade the mid-1980s and/or (d) an incredibly costly
statement. accuracy and reliability and lacks any effort to somehow fix Trident by throwing
More quietly, he is seeking to end the PGRV upgrade capability. enough money at it. ^*
program after seven submarines and What is certain is that the Trident II
The Cruise Missile:
Uncertain Delivery Platforms
and Survivability for the Late 1990s
SOME DoD officials who have reviewed tankerage such aircraft require, whether compared to the problems of the M-X and
the present program for the initial deploy- the cruise missile will achieve its planned Trident, and that the possibility of a
ment of the B-52G Cruise Missile carrier reliability, and whether total systems costs program cost escalation of 100% is an
privately question whether the US will can be properly controlled. However, such acceptable norm during this phase of cruise
quickly deploy the increase in refueling officials indicate these risks are limited, missile develo e t
42 Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-013158000400370053 3
armed forces JOURNAL international/June 1979
 Approved
Accordingly. it seems likely that the
upgraded B-52G can be a successful cruise
missile carrier at least through some period
in the mid-1980s, and that the US will be
able to deploy the planned cruise missile
force of 135 aircraft at some point near the
time that Secretary Brown has promised.
What is far from clear is that the US will
produce the overall cruise missile force it
needs. Serious problems do exist in
the rideout survivability, force configura-
tion, future carrier, and slow reaction time
of this third keystone in the triad of the
1980s.
The uncertainties regarding the B-52G's
survivability were discussed in the last
issue. It is impossible at this point to
estimate how serious they will become in
the future, or how much they will be
compounded if the President opts for an air
Uncertain Forces for a Strategy
of Inferiority
IT IS DIFFICULT to predict how many of
these problems in the three keystones of U S
strategic force improvement plan will turn
into real crises. However, it now seems
virtually certain that the US will not meet
all its key FY80 force improvement goals,
and will slip into strategic inferiority and
SALT 11 with significantly less military
launched M-X. It does seem likely,
however, that even if Soviet strategic
defenses do not improve to the point where
they threaten the B-52G, the Soviets will
steadily improve their ability to destroy the
basing and infrastructure necessary for the
B-52G to ride out successive exchanges.
This potential increase in vulnerability
may be further complicated by the SALT 11
treaty. SALT' 11 places no limits on missile
range, performance, or speed, but does
evidently limit heavy bombers in the
number of missiles they can carry. The
limit on new aircraft is an "average" of 28,
and the limit on existing aircraft is 20.
This leaves the future of the wide body
carrier, and future manned bomber, highly
uncertain in a year when the USSR could
roll out two new heavy bombers, and has
been testing its own ALCM improvement
capability than the Pentagon now projects.
These problems also have obvious
implications for SALT II. The long term
US bargaining position will be weaker than
current Administration estimates imply,
and US ability to compete with the USSR
under "SALT I" or "no-SALT" conditions
will be far more limited.
SALT Id:
Accepting Strategic Impotence
with Dignity and Style
ONCE ONE ACCEPTS THE
PROSPECT of US strategic inferiority,
SALT II takes on a different character. Its
potential value consists of its short term
ability to stabilize and limit the growth of
Soviet strategic capabilties while the shift
towards US strategic inferiority is still
uncertain, and is still in its early stages. It
can neither be condemned for enshrining
an avoidable US inferiority, or be expected
to provide the US with more than an
ephemeral increase in security. SALT It
must be judged as only the first step in a
long series of SALT negotiations which the
US will have to conduct under progressive-
ly less favorable conditions.
There also can be little hope that a
revised SALT II agreement can be used to
constrain the USSR-so that SALT II
arrests the US shift towards inferiority-
and even less hope that the US will
somehow regain the will to compete
directly with the USSR if SALT II is not
passed. We must prepare to negotiate from
the weakness we have bought, rather than
try to bargain from the strength we might
The Nature of SALT II
IT IS, HOWEVER, well worth reviewing
the provisions of the agreement reached on
May 10 to see how they will impact on the
balance in the early 1980s, and what kind of
Soviet forces improvements might logical-
ly occur if the agreement is ratified. The
broad structure of the
? A six year treaty to remain in force
through December 31, 1985, unless replac-
ed earlier by an agreement further limiting
offensive strategic weapons.
? Aprotocol, an integral component of the
Treaty, which would be of only three years
on the Backfire. It also deprives the US of
the option of using heavy individual
aircraft ALCM loads to counter air base
vulnerability.
The work on the next generation of US
cruise missiles also seems to be facing very
severe delays and lacks any clear concep-
tual direction.
Accordingly, the US faces an uncertain
future with the ALCM. This is com-
pounded by the problems in the future of
the Navy's Tomahawk SLCM program,
and the uncertainty as to whether the US
will develop a peripheral attack option that
could match the probably Soviet SSGN
capabilities. The US will certainly pioneer
the development of effective ALCMs, but
it is far from clear it will produce the cruise
missile force needed for the late 1980s.
N*s
It is also clear that it would take vast
increases in US expenditures on strategic
forces to correct these problems, and that
even then, serious management and con-
ceptual problems would remain in our
ability to deploy new strategic forces. It will
take major-arid now highly unlikely
changes in American politics and military
leadership to overcome the reality behind
the promises of the FY80 budget. u* m
have purchased.
Similarly, it makes little sense to get
involved in the theology of SALT 11, given
its reality. The most that advocates of
strong US strategic forces can hope for is to
pressure the Administration to adhere as
closely as possible to the force goals in its
FY80 budget, and to fine tune some of
SALT It's individual provisions and
protocols. There is no point in debating
what might be, when the US is unwilling to
pay the cost of competing with the USSR.
a*a
? A Joint Statement of Principles which
would provide the basic guidelines of
possible SALT II negotiations.
While a great deal of discussion has
taken place regarding the de jure
differences between the treaty, protocol,
and joint statement of principles, the de
facto differences are becoming increasingly
blurred as (a) the delays in ratification
bon t@~T8 e1 UX-ROP89 31
minish the,importan 'e of the difference
armed forces JOURNAL international/June 1979 43
 i ecomes
l '' ` C
make the impr masts pro i ate ~n t e
protocol before 1985, (c) it becomes clear
the Senate will only ratify the treaty if it
"ratifies'" the protocol and agreement, ana
(d) it becomes clear that the entire package
is the de facto "negotiating precedent," and
that the US cannot decouple one element
of SALT II from another of its future
dealings with the Soviets.
The "Unofficial" Provisions of
the SALT II Agreement
The sensitivity of the Treaty negotiations
has led the Administration to publicly
disclose some provisions of the SALT 11
agreement while withholding others.
Nowever, various sources such as
Secretary Brown, the SALT Panel of the
House Armed Services Committee, and
John Collins of the Congressional
Research Service have provided a fairly
complete list of the provisions of the treaty.
Probable Treaty Terms
? US and Soviet strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles (SNDVs), consisting of ICBM
launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy
bombers, and air-to-surface ballistic mis
siles (ASBMs) will not exceed an
aggregate number of 2,400 within six
months of the time both nations enter into
the treaty.
e The SNDV aggregate is to be reduced to
2,250 by 31 December, 1981. Each nation
can determine the composition of the
aggregates within the constraints of the
following sublimity:
? A limit on MIRVed (Multiple In-
dependently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle
Systems), of 1,320 within the SNDV
aggregate, consisting of MIRVed ICBMs,
SLBMs and air-launched, cruise missile-
carrying bombers, and to be reduced to
1,200 by June 30, 1981.
? MIRV US systems limited by this
provision are the Poseidon SLBM,
Minuteman 11, Trident SLBM, MX, B-52,
B-1, and any other ALCM carrier.
? A ceiling of 1,200 MIRVed ICBMs and
SLBMS.
? A ceiling of 820 MIRVed ICBMs.
Within this ceiling no more than 308
MIRVed ICBMs may consist of modern
large ballistic missiles (the Soviet SS-18
ICBM).
? No "light," ICBMs can be converted to
"heavy" ICBMs. No "heavies" built before
1964 (Titan 11, SS-7, SS-8) may be moder-
sized.
? Both parties agree not to develop, test or
deploy ICBMs which have a launch weight
or throw weight exceeding that of the
heaviest deployed by either party at the
date the treaty is signed. (The Soviet SS-18
is now the heaviest ICBM deployed by
either party.) This provision, in combina-
lion with other proposed restrictions,
limits the US to ICBMs with a throw
weight less than half of that of the Soviet
SS 18 in a fixed-silo basing mode.
? General agreement reportedly has been
reached that improved SLBMs, including
n ] s direct violation.
E1~f1 Kk f~8$' G M 0400M5
3 3
20C
ile a l
I M wowedIAU4or each side which is ? A de facto upper limit of 17,000 is placed
no heavier than the "destructive capacity" on the.number of nuclear weapon each
of the SS-19, or a throw weight of 3,500 side's missile forces can carry. The US now
KG. This permits deployment of all has about 9,200 and the USSR about
variants of the M-X. Existing ICBMs may 5,000. However, the Soviet total is rising
be modernized within limits not yet of+5%. rapidly and should exceed 10,000 in 1985
The Soviets wanted to allow lengths, versus a US maximum of 11,400-12,000.
diameters, launch weights, throw weights, ? Both parties agree not to undertake
propellants, and other characteristics to be initiatives, either directly or through third
5% greater or 10%e less than for systems countries, which would circumvent or
being modified. US negotiators evidently undermine the viability of the treaty. Both
got agreement that any variation greater or parties agree not to interfere with the
less than plus or minus 5clc would con- national technical means of verification of
stitutea"new"ICBM. the other, and not to take deliberate
? Both parties agree not to begin construe- concealment measures which would im-
tion of additional fixed ICBM launchers; pede the monitoring and verification of
and not to supply ICBM launcher deploy- compliance with the terms of the agree-
ment areas or storage facilities with ment.
missiles in excess of normal deployment, ? Each party will provide an accounting of
maintenance, training, and replacement its deployed strategic forces.
requirements. One missile for each Probable Protocol Terms
launcher will be defined as normal deploy-
ment practices. ? Both parties agree not to deploy mobile
? Both parties agree not to significantly ICBM launchers, flight test ICBMs from
increase (defined to be in excess of 15 such launchers for the duration of the
%) the number of ICBM and SLBM test Protocol, and develop C31 links for launch
and training launchers. No silos may exist away from silos.
over the agreed limits. ? Neither side will flight test or deploy any
? Both sides agree not to develop, test, or new types of ICBMs, with one exception
deploy systems for a rapid reload of ICBM for each side to be negotiated. No limit will
launchers. "Cold launch" is permitted. be placed on missile stockpiling or produc-
? Carriers that accommodate tion per se. The Soviets have agreed not to
intermediate-range, air-launched cruise produce, test, or deploy the SS-16.
missiles (AL.CMs) implicitly are confined ? Both sides agree not to deploy cruise
to 120, unless one or both participants elect missiles from sea-based or land-based
to employ fewer than 1,200 ballistic launchers with a range in excess of 600
missiles. Exactly how many ALCMs kilometers.
each aircraft will be allowed to carry is still ? Both sides agree not to fractionate the
not clear. An average of 28 per aircraft is payloads and increase the numbers of
permitted, but no more than 20- on an warheads on each missile over the numbers
existing aircraft. The US now plans to now on existing deployed systems.
deploy 135 B-52G ALCM carriers, and ? The proposed freeze on ICBM warhead
give up ! 5 SLBMS. deployment would mean the Soviet Union
? Cruise missiles with ranges in excess of could not deploy more than 10 warheads
600 kilometers (372 miles) will be limited to on the SS-18 while the US Minuteman III
heavy bombers. Heavy bombers are ICBM would be limited to 3 warheads for
defined as the Soviet Bear and Bison and each missile. The Soviet SS-17 and SS-19
the US B-52 and B-1. ICBMs would carry 4 to 6 warheads
? Heavy bombers carrying cruise missiles respectively. All SLBM missiles will be
will have externally observable differences permitted to carry up to 14 MIRVed
(EOD) from those bombers which do not warheads.
carry cruise missiles. ? Some limit, possibly 20, may be placed
? Possible future ALCM carriers will have on ICBM tests during the period.
functionally related observable differences ? Prohibits ballistic missiles launched
(FROD), from other similar planes and from surface ships.
will be decided upon a case by case basis ? Prohibits test and development of
through the Standing Consultative Com- fractional orbital bombardment systems
mission (SCC). Externally observable and (FOBS), and seabed and/or missiles
functionally related observable differences launched from fixed or unmanned sites on
refer to the ability of the United States and the ocean floor.
Soviet Union to determine, through the use ? Both sides recognize that the other may
of each country's national technical means proceed with mobile ICBMs (the M-X),
of verification, whether aircraft of the same and long range GLCMs, and SLCMs when
type (the B-52 and Backfire bombers, for the protocol expires.
example) are, or are not, capable of
delivering cruise missiles. The Joint Statement of Principles
? Both sides have agreed to a "breakout" The Joint Statement of Principles to
provision which bans sudden departures accompany a possible treaty, and which
from past deployments or practices that looks forward to possible SALT III
might later allow either side to rapidly negotiations, states that the objective of
build-up its capabilities after the treaty SALT III will be to:
44 Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400370053-3
armed forces JOURNAL international/June 1979
 Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400370053-3
? Achieve further reductions in the
number of offensive strategic forces
deployed and to provide qualitative
limitations on those forces.
? Address Soviet "gray area" systems and
so-called US forward-based systems. These
include, intermediate range ballistic mis-
siles, ground-launched and sea-launched
cruise missiles, theater based FB-111
bombers and carrier based aircraft.
? Strengthen strategic stability through
the maintenance and enhancement of the
survivability of those strategic weapons
permitted under SALT II.
The Agreement
The agreement also provides that:
? Both parties agree SALT II is not a
"precedent" for SALT III.
? An exchange of statements
place on the Backfire bomber.
? Soviet Backfire can be excluded from the
aggregate of delivery systems if the Soviets
inhibit effective use in an intercontinental
role, and impose limits on production rate
of about 30 per year.
? Both sides must notify the other of long
range land based missile tests unless it
occurs within the boundaries of Soviet
territory.
? Both sides will exchange a data base of
facts and figures on its nuclear arsenal.
Exemptions
The agreement excludes theater, Naval,
and Allied nuclear delivery systems and
weapons that can strike rival homelands
from the restrictions in the primary- pact
and protocol. It also excludes US forward-
based tactical aircraft, ashore and afloat;
medium-range bombers, such as US FB-
I 11 Is and Soviet Badgers and Backfire; and
land and submarine strategic missile
launchers belonging to Britain, France,
and China.
Medium and intermediate-range
ballistic missiles (MRBMs, IRBMs) are
also exempt, even though both super-
powers brought such systems to bear
directly on each other in the past (from
countries like Turkey and Cuba), and
could do so again.
Unresolved Issues
At this writing, the result of the
negotiations is still uncertain regarding:
? Exactly what form of US MPS basing, if
any, would meet the verification re-
quirements;
? The nature of the declaration the Soviets
have agreed to make regarding the size and
capability of their forces, and over what
kinds of "relevant" telemetry may and may
not be encrypted. The US is arguing for
none; the Soviets are arguing that non-
encryption applies only to the force
capabilities covered in the agreement, and
factors like accuracy and throw weight may
be encrypted.
? The meaning of the non-circumvention
provisions. The US has privately assured
the UK it will provide weapons to moder-
nize British strategic forces, but the Soviets
SALT II. Better Than Alter-
native Forms of US Inferiority
have not agreed,
? Whether the definition of "new type" of
ICBM will or will not prohibit the Soviets
from both replacing their single warhead
SS-l Is with a smaller system with more
reliability and counterforce accuracy, and
deploying one of the several types of 5th
generation ICBM they have under
development---at least one of which is
twice the size of the largest variant of the
M-X. The US seems to have gotten a limit
on changes to the size of existing ICBMs
that would prevent the USSR from, in
effect, being able to deploy two new types
of missiles.
? The exact wording of the limits on
ICBM fractionation to 10 RVs, and SLBM
fractionation to 14 RVs.
? Whether non-strategic cruise missiles
such as reconnaissance RPVs should come
under the 600 km range ceiling. The US
says no, the Soviets say yes.
? The exact wording of the letters to be
exchanged on Backfire.
While some of these issues are potential-
ly serious, most negotiators seem to feel
they can be resolved in a way which
conforms with the letter and spirit of the
basic agreement. The most potentially
dangerous issues seem to be (a) the risk of a
prohibition of MPS basing for the M-X,
and (b) a definition of "new type" of ICBM
that would let the USSR deploy two new
types instead of one. ^z at
able to fund.
No Credibly Negotiable Agreement Can
Deal with the Real Arms Control Issues
There are, of course, a hundred possible
variations on the agreement reached this
May, and countless uncertainties inherent
VARIOUS COMMENTATORS such as strategic balance is illustrated in Tables in the present treaty and protocol. The key
Richard Burt have done a good job of Two and Three. Table Two, shows the potential variations of the present SALT II
publicizing how the provisions of SALT II agreement's impact on total US and Soviet agreement which are now being debated
have evolved since Vladivostock. force levels. Table Three, modified from an include:
Spokesman like Les Aspin and Jan Lodal article in Congressional Quarterly, shows ? Seeking a cap on Backfire, and possibly
have argued the wisdom of the US how the agreement will affect planned US on related US FB-111 and strategic mission
negotiating posture; spokesmen like Paul and Soviet force improvements. capable theater aircraft. This is probably
Nitze and Jack Kemp have argued its Although the precise details of SALT II now unnegotiable, but the Soviet agree-
weakness. At a given point, however, the are more complicated than these tables can ment now in SALT II-to not deploy
debate over how SALT II has evolved display, they show that SALT II would Backfire to artic bases where they could be
takes on many of the weaknesses of probably place a tigher cap on the growth used for strategic missions or train for
medieval scholasticism: the issue is not of Soviet strategic forces in the early 1980s simulated strategic missions-has already
what might have been or what might be, than would unconstrained competition or become meaningless. Improvements in the
but rather what is. continuing under the limits of SALT I and Backfire's range, refueling, and avionics
The key test of SALT 11 is now, the Vladivostock ceiling. will allow it to be used as a strategic
therefore, whether it provides a better The main advantage of SALT II for the bomber without any peacetime operational
starting point for strategic inferiority than US will be the limits on Soviet conversion experience from arctic bases, and training
indefinite negotiatiorl under ground rules to a fifth generation of ICBMs, and on the for theater missions is becoming so
of SALT I and the Vladivostock accords, rate of growth in Soviet counterforce sophisticated that no observable
or unconstrained competition with the capabilities against Minuteman. SALT II differences will exist between simulated
USSR. Given US and Soviet expenditures, will not otherwise prevent the USSR from strategic and theater nuclear missions.
US and Soviet force trends, and the exploiting its vastly superior spending to The whole bomber variant issue is moot
weaknesses in US force improvement achieve superior capabilities within the in any case because the Soviet testing of
plans-the answer is obvious. SALT II ceiling imposed, or in easing the ALCMs with ranges 750-1,500 km on
seems to be about the best the US can Minuteman vulnerability problem. Its Backfire effectively precludes a "strategic"
expect. merit is only that it will set some useful "non-strategic" distinction.
The SALT II Bargain is Slightly Better term limits on some aspects of the growth ? Giving the US greater flexibility to
Than SALT I or None of Sovi t fo c~ s wi hou a I d' th se de to crui 4~, 'sgit carriers with
The impact of SALAtpIIPWRA Fuutrrpelf fb i~ th - 4i7Cewle~d bsd~u missiles. The
 (CMC) can carAPpPXChV94IFgMfiIRqJaS
relative to the Soviet concession on range.
It is difficult to postulate a credible
sequence of strikes and counter-strikes
where a higher average aircraft load than
28 ALCMs would make much difference.
0 Establishing a limit on ICBM missiles
rather than on fixed launch sites. While
desirable, such a limit is impractical and
unverifiable. Even when it had far better
access, US intelligence was never able to
count Soviet missiles as distinguished from
fixed launchers, and massively un-
derestimated inventories of Soviet IRBMs
and SRBMs. Unlike the US, the Soviets
continuously produce ICBMs, and con-
stantly move them around the USSR, often
with transport units which cannot be
distinguished from a launch capability
unless their ELINT profile reveals a C31
test. There is no way the US can constrain
the USSR from building up a major cold
launch reload capability. (Experts provide
estimates for reloading Soviet silos of 2 to 8
hours, or less than the time it would take a
US ALCM to arrive at a counterforce
target.) Or, from covertly establishing
battle management data links to ICBMs
not at fixed launch locations.
Recent intelligence studies have also
shown the USSR could have stockpiled
900 or more of the older missiles it has
phased out of its silos, and there is no clear
picture of how many additional ICBMs it
could have produced. Further, the Soviets
have long moved their ICBMs from the
production plants at Moscow, Gorki,
Knepropetrovsk, and Bik in random
batches, and full coverage of such
movements is impossible because of night
and weather conditions. The Soviets also
regularly move ICBMs out of their silos for
maintenance-key warhead components
like gyros must be regularly replaced-and
this makes it impossible to verify the
"float" of missiles used as maintenance
replacements.
It is thus possible that the Soviets could
already have well over 1,000 more missiles
than silos, and most of these could now be
fired with countervalue accuracy with only
limited and unobservable data links from
any pre-surveyed site.
It is more doubtful that such in-
stallations could now achieve total system
counterforce accuracies even with the SS-
17, SS-18 and SS-19. However, Soviet data
link systems will almost certainly improve
by the early 1980s to the point where first
strike counterforce battle management
capabilities could be rapidly set up at
improvised launch locations with virtually
no chance of advance detection.
? Setting limits on the SS-20 and/or
removing restrictions on the range of
NATO based cruise missiles. This also is
probably now unnegotiable. It is also
probably no longer possible to verify SS-20
missile numbers, as distinguished from
launchers at fixed sites, and the Ad-
ministration is probably more of a barrier
1,054
ICBM's
656
SLBM's
Major SALT 11 Constraints on Total
US and Soviet Force Growth
1,054
ICBM's
SLBM's
656
2,500
J2,400
348?
Bombers
2,250 1987 ~a l.lsas)
1,320
rof to -i 1,200
I ; t,up o"I
t up
I t 320
anal a ' ICIM'e up to . 9
wnhM s 15 BM's I of the I
MIRY'S with It. erred MIRV'e w, IC~BM'e
with
I x,xaa I i MIRY'a
Source: Reprinted with permission from The New York Times, May 10, 1979, p. A 13.
2058 2500
Source: Reprinted with permission from "Trying to Slow the Superpower Arms Race," by
Robert G. Kaiser, The Washington Post, May 10, 1979, p. A 17.
to developing effective NATO theater
nuclear systems than the SALT II agree-
ment. In any case, the agreement will
expire before an effective GLCM could be
deployed, and the "fog of peace" in NATO
nuclear planning is so dense that there
seems little prospect NATO could create a
balanced and less vulnerable mix of TNW
systems to compensate for its present range
limitations and first strike vulnerability.
? Setting limits on mobile ICBM
developments. For similar reasons, it is
simply too late to set effective limits on
mobile ICBMs. First, there is reciprocity:
the M-X must be mobile in either the air-
launch or MAP mode, and advances in the
US strategic C31 and battle management
Projected 1979 Treaty
11 (Would extend to the end of 1981
the 2.400 ceiling adopted in 1974)
QUO
P
L
l
S
l
resent
eve
s
t II br t
a
1u8; a,;dr al B
t. s.
L.S .lt.
.
-
L's
550
500
a C =~ `- -r-
820
MIRVedlnrsrmminmfd
Maximum
4x54
s2a
Bolllsnc Atisvl., (I[gM?.)
p
1200
496
100
_ C
r_ -
Maximum
1320
736
352
MIRY .d SA-- laorxh,d
Bash, i, M,, 9, (SLBM?s)
Maximum
a
b
A [
n
am
.n -
.
,,
Mis 1nIAL[M'il
2250
135
0
Maximum
504 900
I"'xl I` 3
504 360
`v:r?ts
160
wrl
850
load and Sea-bored
5ia.l
f. ?wa.h.adMn+a?`
,:~ x.l
_
~l
including some MRV's
0 624
'
==
~
348
150
225
90
_
Taal.
system, and the M-X's retargeting and
navigation system, will make it impossible
for the USSR to verify whether M-X
missiles away from silos or launch aircraft
can be used as mobile ICBMs as it is for the
US to verify this for Soviet ICBMs.
Second, the combination of the SS-20
(which can be given ICBM range by using
one 200 KT RV rather than three); and the
uncounted float of Soviet ICBMs in
storage, reload, or transit status; means the
US can never verify the number of Soviet
mobile ICBMs. Third, the stage of the SS-
16 mobile ICBM can be added to the 20,
they use canisters so similar as to be
undistinguishable. Even without such
deception, there are some
2064 2246
46 Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-0131 R000400370053-3
armed orces JOURNAL international/June 1979
 Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400370053-3
indications the SS-20 has been tested with
ballast weight whose removal might allow
them to be fired as ICBMs even without a
reductior in RVs.
0 Freezing SSBN and/or SLBM Numbers
and Types. The USSR will never agree to
the freeze of its mix of SSBN and SSCN
numbers and types. This will always give
the USSR come capability to be (a) slightly
over its permitted number of SSBNs
(because of commission, R&D test bed,
and de-commissioning shifts), and (b) able
to improve its SSCN force to extend its
strategic mission capabilities. (The Soviet
SS-N-3; 12 SLCM has a range of 150-250
nm, which does not count as strategic given
the 600 [372 nm] limit on cruise missiles
in SALT II, but which could hit half the US
population from beyond the Continental
shelf.) Further, such a freeze on SSBNs and
SSCNs would be largely meaningless since
it would not affect Soviet ability to deploy
SLBMs with counterforce (PGRV) ac-
curacies, or depressed trajectory
capabilites, which could cut warning to US
bomber bases far below the 15 minutes
needed for the takeoff of alert aircraft.
The lack of such controls may, however,
be critical in shaping the future strategic
balance. The USSR already has 950 launch
tubes (62 submarines) to 656 (41 sub-
marines) for the US. At present, the US
compensates for this by having 496
MIRVed SLBM launchers out of 565
launch tubes with 4,960 warheads vs. only
130 Soviet MIRVed launchers with 380
MIRVed SLBMs. This means the Soviets
could deploy up to 5,320 warheads under
SALT II vs. 390 today. Even with counter-
value accuracy, such a force could poten-
tially destroy all US bombers on off alert
status and much of the airborne M-X force.
With counterforce or PGRV accuracy,
they might eventually threaten even an
MPS based M-X force, as well as the US
bomber CMC force.
0 Freezing Actual RV or Warhead
Numbers. When the US stopped producing
weapons grade uranium, the USSR actual-
ly increased its production. Coupled to the
severe uncertainties in estimating Soviet U-
239 production, there are virtually no
nuclear material i,its on Soviet capability
to fractionate the total number of ICBM
and SLBM warheads permitted by SALT
H.
In the past, this would not have mattered
because Soviet MIRVing capability was so
limited that the USSR could not take
advantage of its high throw weights to
deploy large numbers of RVs on each
missiles; and because Soviet re-entry, post-
boos"t vehicle, and accuracy technology
had not approached the stage where it was
remotely credible the Soviets would deploy
a highly fractionated warhead they had not
repeatedly tested. However, the Soviets
may already have virtually caught up with
the US, and can test 14 RV warheads for
their SLBMs under the SALT 11 agree-
ment.
It seems likely, therefore, that they could
deploy warhead packages for the SS-18
and SS-19 without having tested the full
RV load, and still have reasonable con-
fidence of success in countervalue strikes.
Similarly, successful Soviet development
of PGRVs might allow them to similarly
"pack" their heavy ICBMs and SLBMs
with counterforce weapons without prior
Table Three
Impact of SALT H Treaty on Major US and. Soviet
Force Improvement Options of the Early to Mid-1980s
Provision
Treaty [effective through 19851
? Ceiling of 2.250 on all strategic
launchers [effective as of 1982-
limit is 2,400 until thenl.
Effect on Announced
US Programs
? None. US would not fund such
improvements in any case.
Effect on Reported
Soviet Programs
? By 1982 must scrap about
150.200 older launchers. More
would have to. he scrapped
sooner if additional missile sub.
marines were built.
? Ceiling of 820 on ICBMs
? Indirect. M.X [only new ICBMI
? If ICBM production continues
with MIRVed warheads.
will not he deployed .mtil after
at rate of about 100.150 annual-
1987.
ly. replacement of older missiles
in fixed launch sites with new
MIRVed ICBMs would have to
stop about 1982.
? Ceiling of 1,200 on ICBMs and
? None until the 7th Trident sub.
? Apparently would prevent re-
SLBM,s with MIRVed
marine goes to sea [post-851.
placing SSN-6 sea-based missile
warheads.
Then, it could force retirement
with MIRVed missile.
of Minuteman Ills or Poseldons
to allow for more Tridents.
? Limit of 20-28 ALCMs per
bomber.
? Ceiling of 1,320 on all MIRVed
missiles plus bombers carrying
long-range cruise missiles.
Bombers with ALCMs with
range over 600km must count
in ceiling.
Limit of 10 RVs on ICBMs, and
14 on SLBMs.
? No new land-based launchers
for missiles larger than the
Soviet SS-19.
? May halt US wide bodied
carrier.
? Could limit to 120 the number
of B-52s modified to carry
cruise missiles unless MIRVed
missiles are retired to allow
more. At the planned rate, the
120th plane would be modified
at about the same time the
treaty expired.
? None. M.X limited to 10
warheads by Trident
compatibility.
? None. M-X is projected to be
slightly smaller than the SS-19.
US will have no missiles the size
of the Soviet SS-18.
? Uncertain. Existing Soviet
cruise missiles apparently have
short ranges [less than 600kml.
These include one type trans-
ported by air, one.to.a-bomber,
and about 300 of another type
carried on 46 older submarines.
But have recently, tested ALCMs
with 750.1,500km ranges.
? Soviets more likely to pursue
MaRV, PGRV options for post
treaty period, but SS-18 and
SS-19 could launch 20.40 MJRVs
each.
+ Limits the number of launchers
for SS-18s to 308. Unlikely Sovi-
ets would need more given cur.
rent MIRV technology. SS-19 Is
a "Heavy" ICBM by SALT I defi-
nition.
? Only one new type of ICBM
? None. Only M-X is under devel-
? Allows only one of four "5th
could he tested or deployed
opment. [Theoretically limits
Generation" new missiles under
during the life of the treaty.
MIRVed ICBM warheads to
development. [Theoretically
1,650 and bars more accurate
limits MIRVed ICBM warheads
single warheads.)
to 6,084.1 Soviets will probably
also seek, to replace 55.11.
? No circumvention of treaty by
+ Depending on final wording,
? None. No Soviet allies have ever
transferring controlled weapons
could bar assistance to British
been given nuclear launchers
to any third country.
strategic forces and to NATO In
with a range of more than a few
developing cruise missiles, includ-
hundred miles.
Ing non-nuclear armed version.
? No interference with techniques
? None, but may have limited
? Would bar coding of telemetry
each country currently uses to
value if facilities in Turkey and
information radioed from test
verify other's compliance with
Iran are both lost in 1980s.
missiles. Can still bide many key
treaty provisions.
Improvements.
Protocol (effective through 19811
? No test or deployment of mobile
? Indirect. M-X would not be
? Prohibits deployment of mobile
ICBM.
tested until after 1982, but sets
version of SS-16, testing of
precedent.
which has been completed.
? No deployment of ground- ? Depending on final wordin , ? Indirect. Backfire has tested
launched or sea-launched cruise could bar [or at least delny# de. ALCM with 750km plus ranges.
missiles with more than a 600km velopment of long range cruise Status unclear.
range, missiles for use in NATO.
Implies limits on NATO
MRBM options.
Source: Adapted with major revisions from Congressional Quarterly. "Nuclear Hardware
Debate Masks SALT Political Issues", Jan. 6, 1979, p. 9.
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01et Oe4@OOPB0N-8iternational/June 1979
 testing of the full fracti44apfiavedbfateReljeavspr2QQst/0flMd2rtiiCg1A-RDP8& 13 0@84O03i770@153e3bases in Iran.
late 1980s. Short of on-site inspection and
physical disassembly, there would be no
way to detect this, and the potential build-
up in Soviet ICBM and SLBM warhead
numbers could he incredible.
,Accordingly, there seems to be essential-
control on Soviet warhead numbers. or
Soviet damage capability to the US.
Further, even a few "illegal" Soviet tests
could greatly enhance such a warhead
breakout capability, and it is unclear the
LIS could have fully characterized such
There Are Some Negotiable Issues, But
Their Real Impact is Marginal
As has been discussed earlier, there are
some more technical issues which may still
be negotiable and which do need resolu-
tion. The key issues involved include:
Table Four
US Verification Capability for the Major
Soviet Force Improvements Constrained in SALT II
Aspin Estimate of
Part I: Treaty
Potential for Actual Level of
Provision Cheating Method Undetected Activity Current and Potential Uncertainty
Deploying new strategic systems
None
Some. Can upgrade existing SI.BMs, ICBMs, SLCMs,
MRBMs, to "new" level of capability.
SLBM
None
Moderate. Considerable uncertainty in total commissioning'
decommissioning balances in past.
Deploying more
of existing
Bombers
None
irrelevant. Issues are mix of new and existing homers, and
systems
exact capability of existing Bear and Bison.
ICBMs
Maximum of 100
High. Can verify fixed launch sites, not missile numbers.
Uncertainty could exceed 1,000.
Backfire, new
production and
None
Marginal. Could conceal at least some in "float."
deployment
1. Ceiling on total
number of launchers
Backfire,
(2,400-2,2501
employing tankers
ALCM and existing range improvements make somewhat
for in-flight
Minor
moot issue.
refueling
Converting
Backfire,
nonstrategic systems
upgrading range
Sizable
Has already occurred.
to strategic systems
and payload
SS-20, upgrading
Minor
High. SS-20 is an ICBM if it has only one RV rather than
to SS-16
three, and possibly If "ballast" Is removed.
Converting
reconfigured
Maximum of 12
Real issue will be total number of bombers if new heavy
bom
bombers
bombers are deployed. Could be significant uncertainty.
Constructing new missile silos
None
Some for SLBM "stretchouts." High for ICBM/SLBM
or submarine launching tubes
launch from erectors or non-fixed launch points.
Substituting MIRVed missiles
for unMIRVed ones in existing
None
Uncertain. Soviets probably now have technical capability.
2. Ceiling on MIRVed
silos or submarines
Would be reliability and detection risks. Easiest forSSBNs.
ICBMs and SLBM% plus
.
bombers armed with
Deploying MIRVed payloads
None with present systems;
ALCMs 11,320-1,2001
on unM]RVed missiles in
potentially large with
Agreed.
existing silos or submarines
future systems
Placing ALCMs on strategic
None in near future; minor
Highly uncertain. Depends on whether and how new heavy
bombers
in early 1980%
bomber is deployed.
3. Ceiling on MLBM%
13061
Upgrading non?MLBMs to MLBMs
None
Irrelevant. The SS-19 is a "heavy" ICBM In throw weight.
Distinction meaningless.
4. Ban on rapid.
Definitional problem. Do not need to reload silos to fire.
reload systems
Deploying rapid reload systems
None
Can probably reload many now before ALCM
counterstrike hits.
Part H: Protocol
Meaningless. SS-20 is a "mobile ICBM." C31 systems will
1. Ban on mobile ICBMs
Deploying mobile ICBMs
None
improve to point to where can erect and launch virtually
all ICBMs and SLBM% from any location.
2. Ban on Strategic
Deploying cruise missiles on land-
based or sea-based launchers with a
None
Uncertain and misleading. Half US population on coast less
cruise missiles
range In excess of 600km
than 600km from SLCM launch point.
3. Limitations on
new types of ballistic
Flight testing and deploying
new
types of ICBM
Probably none
May permit enough tests (20-301 as to make violation on-
missiles
mi
ssiles
necessary. SLBM and MRBM tests can be used.
Source- Adapted from Les Aspin, "Verification of The SALT II Agreement," Scientific
American, February 1979.
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400 700 -
armed forces JOURNAL international/June 1979 49
 ? Clarificatio,aAPPcihlflrciiFi4rc&ga$e 20Q111 ariliglAnRQPU-o13JISR000400370053-3
replacement can be deployed as the one
permitted new Soviet ICBMs, and whether
the Soviets can deploy one"new" ICBM or
two. Although the US evidently won the
argument over size, and set lower limits of
5'cl when the USSR evidently needed 10%
for its SS-i I replacement, it is absolutely
essential that the Soviets should not be able
to deploy both a new "5th generation"
ICBM and an SS-II replacement with
counterforce accuracy.
? Exactly clarfying the number of ICBM
choose their new type. The number may
already be 20. Larger numbers, however,
their fifth generation types to "breakout"
readiness for rapid deployment after the
agreement expires.
the Soviets can test. The argument over
18 with 12 to 14 warheads is largely
meaningless unless better limits are placed
ICBMs. and on SLBM warhead tests.
more symbolic than real, there should be a
precise understanding of the risks involved,
M IRV packages on the SS-18 and SS-19 to
20-25 RVs.
52s and the four B-I prototypes should not
be counted in the ceiling. While it is too late
to constrain the Soviet Backfire build-up,
the US can credibly distinguish active from
inactive US bombers where there are
observable differences.
? Explicit permission of US MPS deploy-
ment. The US can seek explicit agreement
that MPS-type deployment of the M-X is
permitted. As has already been discussed,
the Soviets now have a mobile ICBM
capability, and planned improvements in
US forces will give the M-X missile an
unverifiable mobile ICBM upgrade
capability regardless of whether it is land or
air launched.
Some other issues seem largely
meaningless. The demand that the US be
given explicit permission to deploy equal
numbers of heavy ICBMs is largely
pointless since (a) the US cannot develop
and deploy a new system during the life of
the treaty, (b) the M-X could be upgraded
to carry large numbers of countervalue
RVs in the mid-1980s if it is MPS based, (c)
the US would do better to raise the RV
limit on its SLBMs to the permitted level of
14.
Thus, depending on the final "official"
SALT II package presented to Congress,
there are some points worth debating and
possibly even worth retabling with the
Soviets. None, however, really have much
impact on the future balance in terms of
deterrence, associated political influence,
or war fighting capability. They are not real
tests of the SALT 11 agreement, but rather
debating points for those unwilling to
Table Five
Unconstrained Areas of Soviet Force Improvement
and Uncertain US Intelligence Capabilities
Area of Permitted Improvement
Missile Accuracy
and Performance
? Intention behind MIRV and warhead
configuration
? Accuracy
? MaRV and Evader capability
? PGRV capability
? Warhead yield
? Reliability
? Number of RVs actually deployed within
limit of 10 on ICBM, 14 on SLBi4t.
? Silo and Shelter hardness
? Time on Target
? SLBM range and performance
? Depressed trajectory SLBM
? SSBN performance
? New ICBM and SLBM basing.
? New bomber IOC and performance
? Improved ALCM performance
? SLBM, SLGM performance and targeting
Estimated Intelligence Collection
and Analysis Capability
Limited. Payload fractionalization very difficult to
establish.
Difficult for ICBM CEPS below 0.1 nor, and
SLBMs below 0.25 mu.
Difficult to predict. Level of performance uncertain.
Detectable, but prediction, reliability, and perfor-
mance uncertain.
Limited. Major error possible.
Controversial even for US systems.
Prediction difficult. Capabilities could drop
sharply as Soviet technology improves.
Limited.
Uncertain. Controversial now. Must assume Sovi-
ets will fully solve all systems problems for one
ground burst, one air burst, and reprogramming
by raid-1980x.
Poor to Moderate. Poor prediction. -
Controversial, should be good.
Prediction of development and deployment good.
Performance difficult to predict.
Poor detectability unless SSBN or silo based. Predic-
tion of new basing concepts very uncertain.
Prediction of IOC and deployment rates poor. Detec.
tion good. Performance uncertain,
Uncertain. New configurations are easy to detect,
but total systems performance is difficult.
Deployment good at least through mid-1980,.
"Theater" systems could have significant strategic
capability if not limited by SALT III. Performance
uncertain.
Limited.
Command, Control, and Intelligence Capability
? Simultaneous strike capability, Time on Target Difficult. Even Soviets may not know until they try.
? LNO, RNO, countervailing targeting and Actual level of capability almost impossible to
trans-attack conflict management establish.
Probably already exists. Improvements in perfor-
mance will be extremely difficult to verify.
? ASAT technology Highly controversial.
? Command and control survivability Good with Inevitable lag times.
? Battle management systems Vary sharply by activity. Increasingly subject to ad-
vanced encryption or deception. Performance attained
very difficult to evaluate.
? Targeting, re-targeting, and re-programming Difficult to evaluate except for broad technical capa-
capability bilities. Subject to concealment and deception.
Strategic Defense
? ASW
? Air defense fighter
? AWACs
? SAM capability, and radar netting
? ECM/ECCM
? Anti-ALCM capability
? ABM technology
Good.
Moderate to good, as to basic features and capa-
bilities. Actual system performance and lethality poor.
Detection good, performance uncertain.
Prediction poor. Detection good, performance uncertain.
Increasingly uncertain as Soviet technology improves.
Controversial. Should be good until mid-1980x.
Already area of public controversy-, e.g. Hen House
and ABM-X-3.
Probably easy to detect. Hard to predict. Difficult
to evaluate performance.
Source: Adapted from various sources including the articles of Col. Asa Bates, Jr.; Jack F.
Kemp, "Congressional Expectations of SALT II," Strategic Review, Winter '79; and
Les Aspin, " Verlncation of the SALT 11 Agreement," Scientific American. February'79.
2
50 armed forces JOURNAL international/June 1979
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400370053-3
. I
 Approved For Release 2005/0_Y/jaI~DP88-01315R000400370053-3
Playing the "Pros" and "Cons" Game with SALT If
? Set some tangible constraints on the rate of improvement in Soviet strategic
delivery systems.
? Puts far more restraint on Soviet build-up than Vladivostock accords, orno
agreement.
? Avoids all-out competition with USSR. Encourages Soviet "moderates."
Avoids "hi-polar" USSR vs. US and PRC world.
? Establishes equal ceiling for delivery systems, ICBM and Si.BM launchers,
MIRVed launchers; and MIRV ICBM/SLBM launchers.
? Affords equal freedom to mix systems, except for ICByls.
? No majorconstraint on current US FY 1980 Improvement plans, or Committee
on the Present Danger program for restoring real and perceived strategic ade-
quacy In the 1980s.
? No practical constrain on deployment of 13.52 with ACLM, M-X, Trident I
and Trident II.
? Preserves -Essential Equivalence" In "Functionally Related Observable Dif-
ferences" [FRODS].
? Soviets dismantle I50 older systems; no effect on US force levels.
? No threat of Soviet"war-winning" capability during lifeoftreaty.
? Post recovery acceptable and does not credibly threaten deterrence.
? US will be able to cover all key Soviet targets under worst case assumptions In
second or follow-on strike mode.
? US has "launch underattack option".
? Creates equal ceiling on total launchers, MIRVed missile launchers, and total
MIRVed ICBM/SLBM launchers.
? Sets limit on MIIRV warheadsof lOon 1CBMs and 14 on SLUMS, but will not
affect Trident I. Trident II, orM-X programs.
? Does not force US to count Minuteman D as MIRVed system.
? Limits Soviets to 350 heavy ICBMs no larger than SS-18. No evidence Soviets
will deploy more than 150 heavy ICBMs.
? New sub-Limitof820 on land based MJRV5 will put practIcal limit on growth
of Sos let warheads.
? Nu merical limits on missile launchers now equal for both sides.
? Soviets terminate SS-16 ICBM deployment In mobile or fired sites.
? Leaves US option of eliminating Minuteman vulnerability problem. MAPS,
MPS, and most US basing variants permitted.
? Forbids fractional orbital bombardment testing and development.
? No credible threat to US SSBM force during life of treaty.
? No constraint on US SSBN improvement plans.
? No limit on Trident I and Trident II SLBM deployments.
? May prevent Soviet actions to cover SSBN production from PHOTOTINT verifi-
cation.
? No seabed testing and development.
? No surface ship based strategic i3aBiatlc missiles.
? No critical range limitations on permitted strategic ALCMs. Little threat to
B-52 ALCM force.
? Restricts Soviet bombervarlants.notIncluded intreaty ceilings.
? US can deploy up to 3,000 cruise missiles without cutting other strategic
forces.
? Does not consirain or limit actual warflghtlng capabilities,
? Expires at point when US lead in technology Is likely to have vanished, and US
may have been overtaken. Could give Soviets ICBM, and ABM breakout
capability.
? Allows Soviets to exploit superiorpayloads to build-up massive advantage in
MIRVs, MaRVs, and PGI(Vs in mid-I980s. and lead In prompt ccunterforce
kill.
? No effective constraint on Soviet advantage in soft target kill capability.
? No effective limit on Soviet ability to shift superior expenditures to upgrade
upgrade unconstrained aspects of strategic force structure.
? No limits on Soviets deploying new type of heavy bomber, new SSBNS,
ALCMs, ICBM basing, or on Improved civil defense, recovery capability,
strategic air defense, ABM technology, and ASAT capability.
? Sov iris could create serious post recovery gap by mid-1980s.
? Excludes many systems Including GLCMs, SLCMs, and SS.20.
? Pushes US towards "doomsday" option of launch under attack.
? Force levels allowed so high SALT II has little warfighting Impact.
? Tends to institutionalize US Inferiority in total fixed site ICBM launchers and
modem heavy ICBMs.
? US can only have3 warheads on each ICBM. and cannot upgrade Minuteman
III to a maximum of 6 counterforce warheads or 7 "Pave Pepper" counter.
value warheads. USSR will have 4 warheads on the SS-17, 6 on the SS-19, and
10 on the SS-18.
? Ineffective limits on Soviet ability to fractionate andMiRV.
? Soviets retain monopoly of 308 heavy ICBMs, and maximum US throw weight
must be less than half that of SS-18. Soviets have delayed build-up in SS-18
only until they could develop accurate RVs. Limit of 10 RVs would allow
them to deploy 3,500 counterforce weapons on this one system.
? SS-19, with 6 warheads tested, Is a "heavy" ICBM by SALT I definition.
Could increase warheads to 10 under treaty. Can carry up to 25 countervalue
warheads, and SS-18 up to 40.
? USSR will have full limit of 820 MIRVed ICBM launchers when treaty
expires. US will have 550of permitted 820.
? Limits launchers, not ballistic missiles.
? USSR may be able to replace SS-Its with single warhead 5th Generation
ICBM. `
? We have no knowledge of current Soviet ICBM re-load or erect and launch
capability.
? Battle/management and retargeting/navigation technology advancing to
where any missile not In silo can be used as "mobile" ICBM. SS-20can be
used as mobile ICBM.
? No meaningful limits on Soviet SSBN upgrade capability.
? Soviet SLCMs can already threaten 50% of US population. Not covered.
? Permitting MiRVIngofSoviet SLBMforce allows growth from 390MIRVed
warheads to any desired mix of 1,200 ICBMs and SLBMs with 14 RVs per
SLBM. PGRVs could give USSR massivelead.
? Does not limit SLBM improvements such as depressed trajectory firings tore.
duce warning, or Improvements In accuracy that would give SLUMs a coun-
terforce capability.
? May prevent US from deploying as wide-bodied cruise missile aircraft with
more than 2535 ALCM.
? Weak constraints on Backfire. USSR will have 300-400 by 1985. US will have
12 F-111 squadrons.
? "CountervailIng Strategy" preserves coupling of NATO and US strategic
forces.
? Leaves USSR facing additional threat from PRC and NATO theater forces.
? US has assured UK it will help update its Independent deterrent.
? Nospecific limitsonPershing 11,oraNATO MRBM.
? Implies decoupling of US strategic forces from NATO and allies.
? Tends to institutionalize NATO inferIority inTNW.
? Limits US ability to deploy GLCM.sin support ofNATO. Implies limit on any
deployment of MRBM with ranges beyond 1,000 NM, or strike bomber
superior to F-I11.
? Soviets have not agreed US can provide aid to UK.
? Specific, if still undisclosed, ban on visual and encryption barriers to ? Does not solve such critical verification problems as MIRVsper missile, cruise
verification. missiles per aircraft, cruise missile performance, mobile ICBMs and total
missiles.
? Largely limits quantitative, not qualitative, Improvements. Verification pro-
visions strongest where matter least.
? Soviet.scanorganize unencrypteddata inways UScandotInterpret, oruse
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-11 ME -315R000400370053-3
 AC cued For Releas 2 01/12: CIA-FIDP88-01315R000400370053-3
The mate o r certainty:
Verification and Permitted Force Improvements
THE UNCERTAINTIES inherent in
SALT 11 are considerably more important
than the negotiable and unnegotiable
changes now being debated. While there is
nothing the US can do to reduce most such
uncertainties, it is essential to understand
how little SALT II can do to arrest the
shifts taking place in the balance. Above
all. SALT 11 must not be judged on the
basis of unrealistic expectations regarding
our ability to predict or verify the changes
that take place in Soviet strategic forces, or
that the quality of verification will make
much difference.
The Classic View of Verification
The classic view of verification is that US
photo and signals intelligence can monitor
all critical changes in the size and quality of
Soviet strategic forces, and can verify any
significant violations as they occur. There
are, however, several major problems with
this approach to the role intelligence can
and should play:
? US Intelligence has consistently failed to
predict the rate of improvement in Soviet
strategic nuclear capabilities during the last
decade. As Albert Wohlstetter
documented in "Legends of the Strategic
Arms Race", the US Intelligence
Community consistently failed to predict
the rate of qualitative and quantitative
improvement in Soviet ICBM forces in the
period up to 1975. Its record has, if
anything, been worse since 1975, and has
been no better in regard to Backfire, SS-20,
and Soviet SLBMs. Long before the loss of
Iran, and Soviet telemetry encryption, the
US Intelligence Community demonstrated
that it could not predict the trends in Soviet
forces with a far simpler Soviet force to
monitor, and far better strategic recon-
naissance access to Soviet forces and R&D
efforts.
? The nature of the strategic arms race
hinges more and more on "breakout"
capability to rapidly deploy new systems,
on the exact capability of battle
management capability, on the precise
number and type of RVs on Soviet ICBMs
and SLBMs, and on ICBM and SLBM
accuracy. Barring massive technical or
Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
breakthroughs, photo and signals
intelligence cannot track such aspects of
the arms race with accuracy and
confidence. For complex technical
reasons, SLBM accuracy below 0.25 rim,
and ICBM accuracy below 0.12 nm, would
be-extremely difficult to verify with any
accuracy -even if the US retained all of its
past foreign collection assets, and the
Soviets did not encrypt.
? Capability to verify--even when it
exists -is not capability to predict or
interpret. There is no reason to assume that
even the best verification capability would
allow us to predict Soviet actions. and the
"A Team-B Team" debate over the 1976
NIE on Soviet strategic forces (NIE-l 1-3-
8) publicly revealed that no agreement
exists in the US Intelligence Community
regarding Soviet strategic tactics, war
plans, and intentions.
The extent of the gap between the classic
view of verification and reality is further
illustrated in Table Four. It compares
Congressman Les Aspin's "pro" verifica-
tion view of SALT II, in the Scientific
American against what verification can
realistically be expected to accomplish.
Yet, the fact this chart somewhat haplessly
exaggerates US verification capabilities is
not an argument against SALT II. No arms
control agreement or possible future agree-
ment could guard the US against massive
uncertainties even if the US had the
strength and will to maintain a qualitative
lead and technical parity.
"Verification vs. Prediction"
CIA Director Stansfield Turner recently
ran into a buzzsaw with both the Congress
and the Administration when heattemlited
to distinguish between the ability to
"monitor" -that is detect broad changes in
Soviet strategic capabilities-and the
ability to "verify" --which requires suf-
ficient proof to establish a violation by
some politically defined criteria. In fairness
to Turner, however, he was making a valid
distinction. Intelligence is not an extension
of an international court, it is organized to
make estimates which invariably have a
significant degree of uncertainty and
potential error.
There is an even greater difference
between the Intelligence Community's
capability to "verify" and its capability to
"predict." In many critical aspects of Soviet
strategic forces, there are no firm in-
dicators an improvement is taking place
until new systems are on the edge of
deployment. In such cases, intelligence can
systematically guess or estimate, but has no
privileged insight into Soviet actions or
intentions. This is the explanation behind
the intelligence "failures" just listed, and it
becoming obsessed with "verification".
The US may end up focusing a massive
amount of its intelligence resources on
trying to be able to establish the exact
nature of any violations after they occur,
and fail to focus on the overall trends in the
balance or on other options for Soviet
force improvements and may fail to
provide coverage of other more important
a"cas.
An Unverifiable and Unconstrained
Future With or Without SALT II
Unfortunately, the USSR can also make
virtually all the improvements it. could
desire in its strategic forces without
violating SALT 11, or being subject to
"verification." The SALT 11 agreement
provides comparatively little incentive to
cheat, because it provides so many
legitimate and quasi-legitimate force im-
provement options. The Soviets can thus
steadily improve their forces without
taking the risk of actions which, if
discovered, could shake the US out of its
present strategic lethargy.
Ironically, just as the Washington Naval
Arms Treaty failed to constrain the
development of the aircraft carrier, which
became the key Naval weapon of World
War 11; and just as SALT I became tech-
nically obsolete before it was accepted
because of MIRVing; SALT II also lags
reality. The strategic arms race is so
important that it technologically outpaces
any negotiable and verifiable process of
arms control.
This is illustrated in Table Five, which
highlights the absurdity of the present
narrow debate about verifiability. While
some of the conclusions in this table are
debatable, it should be clear that it makes
little real difference whether the US can
restore the exact SIGINT collection
capability of its bases in Iran in one, three,
or five years.
Quite simply, we are moving out of the
era in which Soviet strategic technology
was so limited that photo and signals
intelligence could allow us to plan our
forces as if we had a reasonable precise
picture of at least current Soviet
capabilities.
will be equally true with or without a SALT But, this is not a valid argument against
II treaty, and with or without encryption. SALT If. It is as unrealistic to argue for a
But, "prediction" is inevitably more SALT II agreement that will open up the
important than both "monitoring" and USSR to US eyes as it is unrealistic to
"verification." It may do little good to argue that the current SALT II agreement
verify a drastic increase in permitted or does this now. This simply is not a feasible
unpermitted Soviet capabilities after it future. Like it or not, it is not the agreement
occurs: the US may never have time to which will be unverifiable, but Soviet
react. It is essential that the US have the forces, and they will be ever harder to
lead time in which to act, and this requires predict. N * R
"prediction."
Further, there
52 armed forces JOURNAL international/June 1979
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400370053-3
 Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400370053-3
Playing "Pros" and "Cons"
IN BROADER TERMS it is unfortunate
that the President has attempted to invest
the SALT II agreement with a moral
significance which goes far beyond its
potential impact, and that his opponents
have tried to make the agreement the
scapegoat for US strategic inferiority. It is,
after all, only a treaty. It is not the cause of
the trends in world power and US and
Soviet competition, but rather the symp-
tom. It neither binds the US to weakness,
nor prevents the USSR from increasing its
strength. All it does is establish some fairly
broad short-term ground rules for both
powers which are based on temporary
mutual interests.
The "Pro" and "Con" Garne is Not a Valid
Basis for Assessing the Treaty
Accordingly, one should not assign too
much importance to playing the SALT II
"pro" and "con" game. Like verification,
the game is a bit phoney, and it certainly
suffers from an acute case of tunnel vision.
The issue is not whether SALT 11 is the
perfect agreement, but whether it is an
acceptable modus vive,idi given the trends
in US and Soviet capabilities with and
without such an agreement. Given the
trends in the balance, the agreement seems
a better basis for the early 1980s than an
unlimited and even more uncertain future.
This does not mean, however, that the
"pros" and "cons" game can be ignored,
and the mix of arguments on both sides is
summarized in Table Six. The "cons" are
exceedingly important if they are properly
recognized as being arguments against US
strategic weakness, and the uncertainties in
US strategic force improvement plans,
rather than arguments against the SALT II
agreement per se.
The "Cons" Are Really Arguments Against
US Strategic Inferiority
Thus, while the "cons" in Table Six do
seem to strikingly outweigh the "pros" such
an analysis of the merits of SALT 11 is
highly misleading. Most of the "cons" are
really complaints about the trends in the
balance that fall into one of two extraneous
categories:
? First, there is a long list of "cons" which
reflects the shift towards US weakness.
These, however, are not valid results of the
SALT II agreement, but rather of US
unwillingness to fund such improvements
and implement them. No agreement can be
expected to protect the US from the
consequences of its plans and budgets, and
SALT 11 does not preclude the US from
carrying out -the improvements which are
necessary.
? Second, most of the other "cons" reflect
the fact that the USSR can continue to
exploit its vastly superior spending to
improve its forces. Again, however, no
treaty can be expected to achieve more
when the US is committed to negotiating
from a position of weakness. If anything,
the current agreement probably owes far
more to Soviet fears of what the US was
than what it is. There is a considerable risk
that any effort to renegotiate would simply
expose the growing extent of US weakness,
the problems in US force improvement
plans, and the unwillingness to fund future
competition at parity.
Accordingly, the "pros" and "cons"
game in Table Six is really an argument
against our strategic posture. Playing this
game has merit as a rearguard action
against our retreat into strategic inferiori-
ty, and there is much to be said for trying to
use the ratification of SALT II as a lever in
such a fight. It should be recognized,
however, that such a game is not really a
valid argument against the agreement. As
Tables Two and Three show, SALT II does
what can be done, and beggars can't be
choosers. a* ^
Learning to Live With Strategic' Inferiority
THERE IS ENOUGH UNCERTAINTY
in these conclusions to hope that the US
may yet react more strongly and efficiently.
And, that the eight theses supported by
these articles may be proved incorrect.
Nevertheless, US inferiority is by far the
most likely future, and SALT II seems like
an acceptable treaty for a bad world.
It is, of course, tempting to pontificate
on the factors which have led to this shift
AFFIX
LABEL
HERE
to US inferiority; on the problems a liberal
democracy faces in competing with a
totalitarian and highly militaristic state,
and on the general cultural unwillingness in
the West to accept the fact that if the USSR
continues to spend more, it will get more.
It also sticks in the craw to make such
predictions, or argue such a case for SALT
II. But, the acceptance of prolonged
strategic inferiority is probably the real
Subscription Inquiry?
Identification number on your label helps locate
your files quickly. Please attach a label to all cor-
respondence for a faster response to your re-
quests.
Moving?
Please let us know one month in advance. Be
sure to attach your address label from a recent
issue for:
Send to: AFJ
1414 22nd St., N.W. 603
Washington, D.C. 20037
Approved For Release 2005/01/12: CIA-RDP88-0131
armed forces JOURNAL international/June 1979
message behind the FY80 defense budget,
and no amount of additional debate over
SALT II is likely to change it. Further,
defeating SALT II is likely to do little more
than make the initial period of transition to
inferiority even worse. 0* 111
Justin Galen is the pen name of a former
senior Department of Defense civilian
official.
Index to Advertisers
Aerospatiale .............. .. 20
American Enterprise Institute . 57
Bell Helicopter . 15
Boeing Vertol 26
Creusot Loire 2
E-Systems ... ... 25
Emerson Electronics & Space Div.... 14
Euromissile .... ......... 64
Fairchild ....... .......... 29
Ford Aerospace .,.. 61
General Dynamics . 47
Gould Inc. ..... . , . , 32,33
Hughes Aircraft .... 35
Hughes Helicopters ..._. ........ . , 13
Long & Foster .............
... ... 20a,b,45a,b
Panhard 4, 5
Siemens ....... .....:.:....... 63
Teledyne Ryan .... .. . . .. 7
22,23
`~ -3' .......
..... 9