ROBERT C. BYRD SALT AND A 'PSEUDO-CRISIS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350070-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 70
• Publication Date: October 1, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

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ARTICLE AREB
ON PAGE
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Robert '.Byrd
THE WASHINGTON POST
1 October 1979
SALT and a 'Pseudo-Crisis'
We should not permit political myopia to ob-
scure our wider vision of U.S. national interests
in the field of central strategic nuclear systems
-which is what the SALT 11 treaty is all about.,
The stakes-establishment of limitations on
strategic nuclear weapons-are higher and far
more vital to our national security than is the
peripheral issue of 2,000 to 3,000 Soviet troops in
Cuba.
As Senate committees near the completion of
their consideration of the treaty, we find our-
selves focusing not on this issue of momentous.
significance to our national security and our
leadership in the world, but rather on.a matter
unrelated to, and far less significant than, the
treaty.
There has been a regrettable tendency to lose
right of the larger issue in an atmosphere of
near-hysteria over the question of Soviet troops
in Cuba. Let me state unequivocally that I am
not sympathetic to the presence of Soviet troops
in Cuba. But we should not lose all sense of per-
spective. We need to take a step back, examine
the matter in a broader context and recognize
how much is involved here and what is actually
at stake.
First, we should study the treaty itself, and
the hearings conducted by the Senate Foreign
Relations, Armed Services and Intelligence
committees. Those hearings have been very
thorough and valuable. I have read through the
transcripts of all the hearings. I believe that a
careful reading may lead others to conclude
that the treaty can be a modest but important
step forward, a positive contribution to our na-
tional security. I have not yet reached a final
judgment of my own position on the treaty. I
want to complete my review of the recent re-
port of the Senate Intelligence Committee on
the important issue of verification before reach-
ing that judgment.
By August, the treaty had emerged from the
Foreign Relations and Armed Services hearings
in relatively good shape, and prospects for Sen-
ate approval looked good-with the addition of
certain reservations and understandings to the
Resolution of Ratification. The hearings dealt
not only with the specific elements of the
treaty, but also served the useful purpose of fo-
cusing attention on the overall growing military
and strategic imbalance. The big question was
not whether the treaty would be approved, but
what steps should be taken, and how much i
funding should be provided, to proceed with
the necessary modernization of our strategic
But shortly before the Senate reconvened in
September, the Cuban issue emerged. I have
served in Congress since 19.52, and in my 27
years in Washington I have witnessed a few pe-
riods of genuine crisis. It has been my belief
from the beginning that the current Cuban epi-
sode is not anything near crisis proportions.
From the outset, I emphasized that we needed
to establish, as best we could,. exactly what the
situation was. It made no sense for the admin.
istration to state that "the status quo is unac-
ceptable". until we knew more precisely what
the "status quo" was.
There were some who rushed forward with
statements that the Soviets were "testing" us, as
though this were some grave new threat with
far-reaching ramifications. In fact, however, all
intelligence reports thus far indicate that the
Soviet troops in question probably have been in !
Cuba for years; indeed they may well be a resi-
due of the 2f, 000 or so S.ev'iets who were there at
the time of the 1,962 missile.crisis.
So this is-Mot a `"test" or "challenge" to the
United States. But' there were'some--and thel
administration is not litat eless in this regard-',
who contributed to such, a-perception before
looking at the realities of the situation, and thus
was created this "pseudo-crisis" in which we be-
came all too deeply immersed.
As a result ,the treaty suddenly became subju-
gated to afar less' important issue-not an "arti-
ficial" issue, as Andrei Gromyko claims, but not
one meriting a crisis`atmosphere. Certainly, the
Cuban- question . should'--not overshadow the
SALT II1 treaty-a treaty that represents the
work of nearly"-seayears of negotiations byl
three admmis ratioas;:: Republican and Demo-
cratic If. the-., eoate; after.careful judgment, re-
jects the treaty `iceits:m, lerits, that is one thing;
but if the'treaty, dies'eitYier because of delay, or
an unwarranted ei nnectien to the presence of a
relatively,: small-:xrumber of Soviet troops in
Cuba, that is ghite'aoether thing.
Neither. of these two-reasons for the treaty's'
death would reflect well-on the Senate or on the
country. Tci' effect the treaty's demise through
either of these means would send uncertain.sig-!
nals to our allies in Europe and to the nations in
the world. For the treaty to die from a sudden.
seizure of trembling delirium brought on by the
discovery of a handful of Soviet troops in Cuba
-an island on which U.S. forces are also sta-
tioned-would ill serve the image of the United
States as a powerful and mature nation. Undue
delay, in itself, would also lead, I feel certain, to
the further entanglement of SALT in politics.
particularly with next year's campaign season'
being only a short time ahead, and would lead
to its execution on the gallows of political pos-
Wring and partisan rhetoric by candidates in
both parties.
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So the Senate should proceed, in a deliberate treaty. The Soviets could proceed with no Ilmit
and rational way, to make its judgment. The I on fractionation-putting more than 10 war-
committees have conducted their hearings in a heads on an SSI8 missile, for example. Under
most responsible fashion. Proponents and oppo- the treaty, the Soviets would be limited to 10
nents have been heard in the committees, and warheads per SS13, whereas the missile has the
there is ample time for a full-scale Senate de- capacity of carrying up to 20-even 30-war-
bate later this year- heads, and this would greatly expand their of-
When the Senate makes that judgment, it fensive capacity. Moreover, instead of being
should come down to a simple question-a ques- limited to the production of 30 Backfire bomb-
tion not simply answered, but still a simple ers per year, the Soviets could greatly-increase, 1
question: is this treaty in the best interests of their production rate. Further, there would he
the United States? This should be the bench- no restriction on telemetry encryption or other
mark by which the Senate measures its deci- concealment practices, thus making our verifi-
sion. Let us not cloud the environment with a cation of Soviet missile testing, development
totally unrelated issue-one that is clearly not a and deployment much more difficult. Addition-
threat to U.S. security. If the treaty is not in our ally, instead of being restricted to a single new-
own interests, it ought to be rejected, Con- ! type missile, as provided in the treaty, the
versely, if it is in our country's interests, then Soviets would be free to deploy as many new
the treaty should be approved, with any ap- types as they choose-and they have the capa-
p.ropriate reservations and understandings. bility, the technology and the momentum to de--
relop several new missiles in the neaeititure.
Now, it could he correctly pointed out that the Also, whereas the treaty establishes a limit of
United States should long ago have devised a 2,250 strategic launcher systems and heavy
strategy to deal with Soviet adventurism around bombers by Jan. 11 1982, the Soviets could have
the world. Clearly, Moscow has developed and 3,000 such systems by 1985. Sub-limits, likewise
deployed-in some cases in conjunction with Cu- would not exist and; instead of being held to 820
bans military capabilities well beyond the 1e- MIRVed land-based ICBMs, the Soviets could de
gitimate needs of its own territorial security. The ploy from 1,100 to 1,300. In other words, without
already overdue need to develop a viable and ef- the treaty all caps are gone and all bets are off.,Y,
fective strategy of dealing with Soviet adventur- With or without SALT II, we are going'to have
ism, however, will not be'achieved by holding to proceed with the strengthening of-our strate--
the treaty hostage. After all, no one in his right vic and conventional forces, as well.astheater
.mind would suggest that the treaty be ratified as I nuclear forces in Europe. But without SALT.II,,,
a favor to the Soviet Union. we face a much less predictable strategic situa-
To those who advocate that Senate debate on { tion and the need for much greater, military'
the treaty be put off until late into next year or spending than- would be necessary with the
thereafter, the question should he addressed: treaty. Much of the money that is needed for =j
what happens to our national security in the building up our conventional forces would be
meantime" The SALT process would be stopped siphoned away to match the Soviets in. an un-
dead in its tracks, and the prospects for achiev- controlled strategic nuclear armaments race.
ing significant reductions in nuclear armaments We must retain a sense of reason and perspec-
in the future, and for limiting the proliferation tive. We have to he aware of the consequences
of nuclear weapons, would become increasingly of delaying the treaty inordinately. A matter of
dim. In. the meantime, the Soviets, having al- this significance must not become a political
ready built considerable momentum, would be football. The Senate deserves the opportunity to
free to go ahead with the development, deploy- vote on the treaty. The country deserves to have
ment and expansion of systems that would other- the treaty judged on its merits.
vise be prohibited under SALT II. The truth is that any lengthy delay,in Senate
For example, there would be no constraint on consideration of SALT II effectively kills the
Soviet development of the SS16 mobile inter- treaty. I believe it should be debated in the Sen-
continental missile, which is banned under the ate and- stand or fall on the basis of-its value to
U.S. national security?and not on the basis of alt
issue not relevant to.the treaty.
As one who voted against the 1963 Test Ban.
Treaty, who has voted for increased 'defense'.!
spending, who has sharply criticized. the,Soviets .
for adventurism and suppression of dissidents. I
am constrained to say that holding the treaty
hostage to 2.000-3.000 Soviet troops in Cuba-
apparently long existent, but only recently iden
tified-would he much like throwing an antique
chair,brought over on the Mayflower, at a-
mouse that suddenly appears on the drawing
room floor: the chair is reduced to splinters, but,J
the mouse escapes untouched. In other words,
we can end up with the treaty down-the drain,
while the Soviet troops-long in Cuba---remain
there.
Let us return to a steady course and bring our
best judgment to bear, in a realistic way, on the
problems that confront our national security in-
terests.
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The writer is the Senate Majority Leader