CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A018600010001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 20, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Secret
Np 40
20 March 1971
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No. 0068/71
20 Mar 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
LAOS: The Communists have yet to make major gains
west of the Plaine des Jarres. (Page 1)
TURKEY: The political crisis appears to be ebbing.
(Page 3)
BOLIVIA: The government's stability is threatened
by the disclosure of a plot. (Page 4)
ARMS CONTROL: The prospects remain poor for agree-
ment on limits on CBW. (Page 5)
YUGOSLAVIA-BULGARIA: The new Yugoslav ambassador's
arrival underscores the uneasy state of relations.
(Page 7)
INDONESIA: The country's austerity program seems
to be going well. (Page 8)
PAKISTAN: Yahya-Mujib talks (Page 9)
PORTUGAL-ZAMBIA: Dispute over kidnapings (Page 9)
VENEZUELA-GUYANA: Economic relations (Page 10)
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LAOS: The Communist offensive west of the
Plaine des Jarres is now nearly two months old and
has yet to make any major gains.
The major parts of two North Vietnamese Army
divisions--the 316th and the 312th--are still en-
circling government positions at Ban Na, Phou Long
Mat, and Phou Pha Sai, and they are close enough to
the main complex at Long Tieng to harass it on a
regular basis. On 18 March, for example, they
launched four rockets into Long Tieng, closing the
airstrip for an hour but doing only relatively minor
damage. Incidents of this type--rocketings, shelling
attacks, small-unit clashes, and probes--are a daily
occurence, but of late no important positions have
changed hands.
Since their damaging sapper attack on Long
Tieng in mid-February the North Vietnamese have ap-
parently concentrated on resupplying and reposition-
ing their units. Although the Communists have
largely avoided large-scale ground assaults against
fortified positions, some units have suffered sub-
stantial casualties from air strikes and government
artillery bombardments. For its part the govern-
ment has significantly reinforced the Long Tieng
area--irregular combat forces there now number
something over 10,000--and aggressive patrolling
in recent weeks has helped to keep the Communists
off balance.
Although the North Vietnamese offensive has
lost some of its momentum, there is no evidence
that the enemy is disengaging. As in the past,
the Communists have the capability of striking
swiftly and in force with little warning. Only
about two months of good weather. remain, however,
and if the North Vietnamese intend to try to take
Long Tien g, they should begin pressing harder soon.
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Nihat Erim, Turkey's new prime minister - desig-
nate, a political moderate and an outstanding legal
authority, appears to be a reasonably good choice to
head the government during this troubled period. He
has had wide experience in both domestic and
foreign affairs and in balancing divergent political
forces. Reformist in outlook, Erim is also one of
Turkey's foremost authorities on the thorny Cyprus
problem.
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TURKEY : The week-old political crisis appears
to be ebbin
The new government, to be formed by Nihat Erim
during the next few days, presumably will consist
largely of representatives of the four largest pol-
itical parties but may include some independents
from the Senate. Neither former prime minister
Demirel, as head of Justice Party, nor Ismet Inonu,
the head of the Republican Peoples Party, is ex-
pected to participate in the government.
Under the constitution, Erim's regime, as an
interim or provisional government, will not be sub-
ject to a vote of confidence. Its mandate, however,
appears to be somewhat broader than normal for an
interim government. The question of new elections
is yet to be resolved but there have been suggestions
that they may be held in October 1971.
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BOLIVIA: The stability of the Torres govern-
ment is neatened by the disclosure of a plot that
allegedly culminated in the death of President Bar-
rientos in 1969.
On 14 March, the La Paz daily Hoy began a sensa-
tional expose linking Barrientos' death in a heli-
copter crash to an arms deal and to machinations by
his eventual successor, Alfredo Ovando, currently
ambassador to Spain. According to the US Embassy,
there is no real proof that a plot actually existed,
although an -arms deal probably was in the works at
that time. The embassy points out that the scenario
ties into rumors that have circulated in La Paz for
several months.
The cabinet reshuffle of 17 March, which had
been brewing for some weeks, now is being linked to
the plot. It is alleged that the cabinet resigned
because some ministers were involved in the death
of Barrientos and several others. There is also
speculation that President Torres was somehow im-
plicated. Ovando has been recalled to answer the
charges against him.
The armed forces and the police forces of the
Ministry of Interior are on alert status. If the
public comes to believe that the scandal extends to
those currently holding high government and military
positions, Torres' hold on the presidency will become
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ARMS CONTROL: The prospects for agreement on
new limits on chemical and biological weapons (CBW)
at the current session of the Geneva disarmament
talks continue to look poor.
The debate since the session resumed last month
suggests that the USSR is still wedded to its draft
convention, which would. ban the development, produc-
tion, and stockpiling of all CBW agents. In addi-
tion to the other bloc countries, the nonaligned
nations also favor comprehensive treatment of CBW,
but the nonaligned dislike the verification pro-
vision in the Soviet text, which merely provides for
the UN Security Council. to investigate complaints.
The UK draft convention confined to BW and supported
by the US is still favored by the other NATO govern-
ments, but their support this year has been rather
lukewarm.
Delegates of the nonaligned group have begun
searching for ways to break this deadlock. Sweden,
for example, has proposed that attention be focused
on the verification problems associated with the
various CBW agents. Separate international agree-
ments might then be made to deal with each agent.
Swedish delegate Myrdal claims that the nonaligned
states could push such an approach through the Gen-
eral Assembly if the superpowers do not soon recon-
cile their differences, but the nonaligned camp
presently appears to lack the necessary unity to
do this.
Senate hearings on US ratification of the Geneva
Protocol, which bans the use of CBW in war, are being
followed closely at the disarmament talks. Many non-
aligned delegates believe that US ratification could
permit the Soviets to move toward a compromise on
CBW. Should the US ratify with the understanding
that the protocol does not ban the use of tear gas
and herbicides, however, Moscow may see greater ad-
vantages in sticking to its draft and continuing to
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propagandize against US use of these agents in Viet-
nam. Japan and the UK want the US to ratify with
such an understanding since their governments agree
with the traditional US position. 25X1
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YUGOSLAVIA-BULGARIA: The arrival of Ante Drndic
in Sofia as Yugoslavia's new ambassador underscores'
the uneasy state of relations caused by the two
countries' dispute over Macedonia.
Drndic, a former assistant foreign minister
for Western Hemisphere affairs, also headed the ana-
lytical and operational section of the intelligence
service in the Foreign Ministry before being tapped
for the Sofia post. Presumably the Bulgarians are
aware of this. On the other hand, Drndic is a Croat
and probably less emotionally involved in the Macedon-
ian argument, as well as less objectionable to the
Bulgarians than his predecessor who was a Yugoslav
Macedonian.
From his vantage point in Sofia, the Yugoslavs
hope Drndic's professional eye will give them a
better indication of Bulgarian intentions in Macedonia,
as well as a reading on what role, if any, the Soviets
play in Bulgarian actions. The Macedonian issue re-
cently has reached its most serious proportions in
years because of Bulgaria's refusal to recognize the
existence of a separate Macedonian nation. Belgrade
interprets this stand as a latent claim to the Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia.
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INDONESIA: Indonesia's continuing austerity
program, although under pressure from both the mil-
itary and the local business sector, does not appear
to be in any major trouble.
The stabilization program of the last five
years has been highly successful in correcting the
country's monetary and fiscal woes. Some military
leaders, perhaps partly because of this progress,
now feel justified in arguing for larger budgetary
appropriations and are stressing the necessity of
developing Indonesia's defense and security capa-
bilities parallel with economic development efforts.
A significant number of local businessmen and poli-
ticians, who have consistently demanded an easing
of credit restraints, have raised their voices again
and have also expressed their resentment over op-
portunities offered foreign investment.
President Suharto, who has made economic im-
provement the nation's priority policy and has given
the civilian economists who direct the effort his
consistent support,-seems likely to continue to
proceed along these lines. He may order some minor
adjustments as he has in the past, to placate those
who are protesting. He looks to the military for
his major support, and he would wish to encourage
domestic business when this can be done without
seriously diverting the overall program.
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