CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A017100020001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 5, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Department review completed
Secret
J
5 September 1970
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No. 0213/70
5 September 1970
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Cambodia: The Communists continue to harass govern-
ment positions south of Phnom Penh. (Page 1)
South Vietnam: Recent demonstrations by veterans ap-
parently have convinced the government to adopt
tougher measures. (Page 2)
Communist China: Peking has taken the final step in
normalizing the military high command. (Page 3)
Jordan: Amman remains generally quiet but tense.
Page 5)
USSR - Communist China - UN: Moscow has increased
its backstage efforts to keep Peking out of the UN.
(Page 6)
Chile: Congress will have to choose between Allende
and Alessandri. (Page 7)
Bolivia - Latin America: There is increasing evi-
dence of international participation with the Boliv-
ian guerrillas. (Page 8)
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Ceylon: Western-owned oil companies apparently have 25X1
agreed to nationalization of their properties. (Page 10)
Arab States: Moderates growing pessimistic (Page 12)
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Current Situation
THAILAND
KO
CN9gQ
rii'' I
Preis Tam9ak
Ayi~nn
PPenAs OPrey Veng
-Oommunist , I
scpng )attacks sway
y`{ Rieng
t I)
L
Cambodia
principal city (10,000 or over)
Population over 125 per sq. mi.
Communist-controlled area
jp Kratie
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Cambodia: The Communists continue to harass
government positions south of Phnom Penh. A Cambo-
dian military spokesman in the capital reported that
the enemy made a ground attack on the district town
of Saang, some 20 miles southeast of Phnom Penh, on
3 September. Government forces still hold the town,
however, and have suffered few losses. West of
Saang, the enemy yesterday shelled the town of Tram
Khnar, on Route 3, but damage was light. Large num-
bers of Communist troops apparently still are in po-
sition around Tram Khnar, but thus far they have
made no attempt to overrun it.
Use of Cambodian Communist Troops
villagers from the Prek Tameak area, northeast of
the city, have claimed that ethnic Cambodians made
up two thirds of the enemy force that attacked Prek
Tameak late last month. They reportedly told the
villagers their mission was to infiltrate close to
the capital. Village headmen gave them food and
shelter, and some local youths allegedly joined the
Communists because of their hostility toward both
South Vietnamese and government troops, who had en-
gaged in looting and other abuses.
At t I o time ot e a a tor Pre ame , the Cam-
bodians apparently believed that the attacking force
was made up primarily of Vietnamese Communists.
According to a press account, however, a Cambo-
dian Army officer said yesterday that a recent enemy
attack east of Phnom Penh was carried out by Cambo-
dian Communists. He possibly was referrin to Prek
Tameak.
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South Vietnam: Recent demonstrations by vet-
erans in Saigon apparently have convinced the gov-
ernment that it must adopt tougher measures to deal
with them.
On 3 September, shootings between the police
and veterans occurred twice, resulting in several
wounded on each side; three US military policemen
were also wounded. Army troops had to be called in
to augment police forces and to help push the vet-
erans out of an abandoned government building they
had seized earlier this week. Those involved in
this demonstration apparently belong to the more
militant of the disabled veterans' groups, whose
activities have become progressively more lawless
in recent weeks,.
The government had been reluctant to adopt a
forceful stand toward agitating veterans because it
knew the were likely to have the sympathy of the
army.
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Communist China: Peking has taken the final
step in normalizing its military high command in the
wake of the Cultural Revolution by appointing a new
director for the army's top political organ.
At a reception in Peking this week, alternate
politburo member Li Te-sheng was identified as the
director of the General Political Department, once
the primary overseer of the army's fealty to the
Chinese Communist Party. During the Cultural Revo-
lution the department had become a battleground for
forces seeking to purge high military officers, and
it has not functioned normally since 1967.
Li Te-sheng's appointment reinforces other in-
dications within the past few months that the General
Political Department is beginning to resume at least
some of its pre-Cultural Revolution duties, which
included political control over all personnel in
China's armed forces.
Li's appointment comes at a time when the cen-
tral authorities have been showing signs of dissat-
isfaction with the performance of many of the local
military officers who dominate the present adminis-
trative machinery in China's provinces. Only last
month, for example, Peking radio harshly condemned
indications of "irresponsibility toward the party's
cause" and weak political indoctrination among many
local army men. These strictures seemed to question
the fitness of some military officers for holding
party posts within the army and by implication cer-
tain officers on the new party committees that are
gradually being formed throughout the country. Such
public criticism of the army's performance suggests
that the new director of the General Political De-
partment may come under considerable pressure from
forces within the top leadership who are at odds
over the extent of the army's future responsibili-
ties in provincial administration..
(continued)
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Nevertheless, as both local army commander and
head of the government of Anhwei Province, Li's ac-
ceptability in his new post to China's powerful pro-
vincial military figures was probably an important
consideration in his appointment. Relatively little
is known of Li's personal political inclinations,
and he may be something of an opportunist. His back-
ground, however, as a tactical commander rather than
as a political officer, and his record of opposing
Cultural Revolution excesses in his bailiwick sug-
gest that his appointment does not signal a down rad-
ing of professional military concerns. F7 I
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Jordan: Amman remains generally quiet but tense
following King Husayn's appeal for order Thursday
night.
The King's brief speech, full of praise for the
army and sympathy for the ordinary Jordanian citizen,
seems to have been largely designed to buy time. As
he has often done in times of crisis in the past,
the King sought to adopt a position of impartiality
and placed actual responsibility for handling the
situation on the shoulders of the cabinet.
He asked the cabinet to get in touch with the
fedayeen central committee to urge it to exert con-
trol over the commando groups--an indication that
the fedayeen will probably continue to have consid-
erable leeway for self-discipline. According to the
King, the government and the fedayeen leadership
were to work jointly to "contain the sedition" and
ensure public safety.
After the situation is under control, the cabi-
net is to turn to implementing the agreement of 10
July between the government and the fedayeen. Be-
cause that agreement included provisions prohibiting
the presence of armed fedayeen or fedayeen bases in
cities, its enforcement could well be impossible
without a major military operation. The King made
no threats indicating that he might be considering
such a step, but he went out of his way to heap
praise on the army and on his chief of staff, which
was probably intended to serve as a warning to the
fedayeen.
According to Radio Amman, talks were held be-
tween government and fedayeen leaders Thursday night
and Friday, but no results were announced. Although
isolated incidents will probably continue--any of
which could easily get out of hand--negotiations
could drag on for some time without concrete results.
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USSR - Communist China - UN: Moscow has in-
creased its backstage efforts to keep :Peking out of
the UN.
I
the
USSR nas warned Brussels not to advance its "two
Chinas" draft resolution at the coming session of
the General Assembly. The Belgian proposal would
give Taiwan's seat on the Security Council to Commu-
nist China, while allowing the Nationalists to re-
main in the Assembly. The Soviets have told the
Belgians, perhaps through an intermediary, that they
would be "embarrassed" by Peking's presence on the
Security Council. Moreover, Moscow made it clear
that it would consider the initiative an affront and
threatened to work against Belgium's candidacy for a
seat on the Security Council should Brussels persist
with its proposal.
For the last few years, Soviet diplomats have
used low-key tactics in making known Moscow's opposi-
tion to Peking's possible admission. Last year, for
example, the Soviets voted for the Albanian resolu-
tion, which called for the complete removal of Taiwan
from the UN in favor of Peking, but for the first
time did not speak in favor of its admission.
The Soviet. representations--even if indirect--
demonstrate Moscow's concern over the potential ap-
peal of the Belgian proposal, which in, fact has
generated little support so far and may not even be
formally introduced this year. Moscow probably
wants to ensure that it is not presented in order
to avoid the need to lobby more aggressively against
Peking's admission. Moscow probably is also con-
cerned that the Belgian proposal might stimulate
other troublesome approaches to the China problem.
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C Chile: Marxist candidate Salvador Allende was
holding a slight lead in a very close race over in-
dependent conservative candidate Jorge Alessandri
with about 75 percent of the vote counted.
Christian Democratic candidate Tomic has offi-
cially conceded defeat. Neither Allende nor Ales-
sandri will win a plurality. Allende is receiving
about 36 percent of the vote to Alessandri's 35 per-
cent. Congress, therefore, will have to choose be-
tween the two when it meets on 24 October. Inaugura-
tion of the new president is to take place on 4 No-
vember.
Allende's coalition has 82 votes in the 200-mem-
ber congress, and Alessandri can be assured of at
least 43 votes. How the 75 Christian Democrats will
vote is uncertain. In order to win, a candidate
must receive a majority of the votes of at least 101
members on the first ballot. If neither of the can-
didates receives such a majority, another vote is
taken and the candidate need win only a ma'orit of
those attending and voting.
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Bolivia - Latin America: There is increasing
evidence of international participation with the Bo-
livian guerrillas.
A Bolivian Army communique states that in a
clash with the Army of National Liberation (ELN) on
1 September a Chilean was killed. The dead guer-
rilla, the second Chilean killed in the guerrilla
area, was identified as a former member of Chile's
national police.
The ELN has made no secret of the many non-Bo-
livians who have joined them and has stressed the
importance of collaboration among Latin American
revolutionaries.
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Ceylon: The recent nationalization of Western-
owned oil properties apparently results from an agree-
ment between the government and the companies.
The Bandaranaike government announced on 2 Sep-
tember that it had nationalized the remaining proper-
ties of an American and a British oil company. The
properties were used only for bunkering, as domestic
petroleum distribution facilities were nationalized
in 1962-63. The announcement added that.the compa-
nies would be paid following determination of the
amount by a compensation board.
Developments were far different during the oil
nationalizations in the early 1960s. The government
at that time, also led by Mrs. Bandaranaike, failed
to compensate the Western companies, which led to
a suspension of US economic assistance in February
1963 and a crisis in US-Ce lonese relations.
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NOTE
Arab States: Arab moderates in Lebanon are in-
creasingly pessimistic over prospects for a Middle
Eastern settlement, according to the US Embassy in
Beirut. Factors contributing to the gloomy assess-
ment include the Israeli allegations of Egyptian
cease-fire violations, which the Lebanese view as
merely a prete}:t to avoid negotiations, and Tel
Aviv's newly acquired military hardware. Although
the US peace initiative is regarded in moderate
circles as the most "even-handed" US action since
the 1967 war, there is also "almost unanimous" spec-
ulation that Washington will supply Israel with ad-
ditional offensive military equipment. The Lebanese
attitude probably typifies moderate opinion through-
out the Arab world, and is a measure of the fatalis-
tic feeling on both sides of the Arab-Israeli strug-
gle.
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