CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A016200050001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 8, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A01620iet6
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50
8 May 1970
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A016200050001-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A016200050001-6
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A016200050001-6
 Approved For Release 2003SEII-RDP79T00975A016200050001-6
No. 0110/70
8 May 19 70
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Enemy activity intensifies in the
northern provinces. (Page 1)
Laos: Communists seek a foothold on southern portion
of Bolovens Plateau. (Page 2)
USSR-Czechoslovakia: New treaty endorses Moscow's
claimed right of intervention. (Page 3)
25X6
NATO: Differences persist on the positions to be
tarn on East-West questions. (Page 5)
Israel-Lebanon: Guerrilla attacks (Page 6)
Arab States - Fedayeen: Central committee proposed
Page 6
25X1
Honduras: New arms (Page 7)
Chile: Allende hospitalized (Page 7)
Finland: New coalition sought (Page 8)
Brazil: Mirage purchase (Page 8)
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A016200050001-6
 Approved For Release 2003/1Mt3J=fDP79T00975A016200050001-6
Communist Military Activity Intensifies
in Northern I Corps
Heavyr J, --rocket attack
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A016200050001-6
 Approved For Release 2003/1Q.1~C"DP79T00975A016200050001-6
South Vietnam: Communist military activity
continues to intensify in the northern provinces
of I Corps.
The US facility at Chu Lai was the target of
nearly 200 large-caliber rockets early this week.
In midweek, an allied artillery base in northern
Quang Tri Province was shelled and penetrated by
enemy sappers, resulting in 130 allied casualties,
including 67 Americans killed and wounded. A
nearby South Vietnamese field position and an Amer-
ican artillery base in Thua Thien Province were
the targets of 500-round mortar barrages, but only
light casualties were reported. Early yesterday,
Hue was struck by six rockets; 12 Vietnamese were
killed.
Ground fighting was reported heavy yesterday
in the vicinity of the refugee resettlement village
of Hiep Duc in north-central Quang Tin Province.
Elements of two Communist regiments, which had
previously overrun and seized most of the village's
five hamlets, are being chased back into the moun-
tains, however, and have left some 300 dead behind.
In addition, the Que Son district headquarters in
Quang Nam Province was attacked by two enemy bat-
talions following a 200-round mortar bombardment.
The headquarters was extensively damaged and 12
persons were killed.
The increase in enemy hostilities is expected
to continue through the weekend. Many enemy units
throughout I Corps are now combat ready and ground
attacks as well as mortar and rocket shellings
against Da Nang and other major targets may well
accompany the anticipated action in the more re-
mote sectors.
Aside from light shellings of the provincial
capitals of Kontum, Pleiku, and Phan Rang on 7 May,
the level of enemy-initiated activity remained
enerall low throughout the rest of the country.
8 May 70
Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A016200050001-6
 Approved For Release 2003/44 : DP79T00975A016200050001-6
Laos: The Communists appear determined to
establish a foothold in the southern portion of the
Bolovens Plateau.
Their forces have recaptured the key artillery
site overlooking Attopeu town from which they with-
drew only the day before. The Communists have also
launched rockets at an artillery position about
three miles west of this site, but no damage re-
sulted.
Reports from persons who escaped Attopeu in-
dicate that the force which captured the town con-
sisted of two North Vietnamese battalions, but that
it is now being held by Pathet Lao units. The gov-
ernment commander responsible for the defense of
Attopeu allecredly accepted an enemy offer to aban-
don the provincial capital without.a fight.
8 May 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin 2
SECRET
pprove or a ease ~W - -13
 Approved For Release 2003/RDP79T00975A016200050001-6
. USSR-Czechoslovakia: The friendship treaty
signed on 6 May represents the fullest formal en-
dorsement yet of Moscow's claimed right to inter-
vene in any country where Communist rule is threat-
ened.
The 20-year treaty makes it the formal duty of
the signatories to take "necessary measures" to pro-
tect the gains of socialism, The Soviet leaders ex-
pect with this formulation of the "Brezhnev doctrine"
to legitimize once and for all the Warsaw Pact's in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
The treaty also commits the two states to work
toward "socialist economic integration" within CEMA,
marking the first time this Soviet project has been
explicitly incorporated in an accord of this kind.
In one other innovation, it obliges the Czechoslo-
vaks to facilitate "direct ties" between the "state
organs" and public organizations of Prague and Mos-
cow. This will serve to solidify the hold the So-
viets now have over Czechoslovakia.
In not limiting mutual defense obligations to
the continent of Europe, the new treaty is similar
to pacts concluded in 1967 with Hungary and Bulgaria.
In contrast, the provisions of the Warsaw Pact and
Moscow's first postwar treaties with Eastern Europe
were specifically focused on Europe, The scope of
the new treaty, in addition to the reaffirmation
of the "Brezhnev doctrine," will add to the appre-
hensions of other East European countries over the
subordination of their interests to those of Moscow.
The worst fears of Moscow's European allies undoubt-
edly were relieved, however, since the new treaty
did not explicitly sanction the presence of Soviet
troops in Czechoslovakia or provide for the "joint
defense" of Czechoslovakia's western frontiers,,,
8 May 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A016200050001-6
 25X6 Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A016200050001-6
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A016200050001-6
 Approved For Release 2003! , R DP79T00975A016200050001-6
NATO; Differences persist within the Alliance
concerning the positions on East-West questions to
be taken in the communique of the ministerial meet-
ing on 26-27 May.
.The principal issue is how the Allies should
react procedurally and substantively to the Warsaw
Pact proposals for a Conference on European Security
(CES), At the last ministerial meeting five months
ago, the NATO communique turned aside Warsaw Pact
proposals for an open-ended conference on European
questions. It noted, however, that negotiations
might be held on mutual and balanced force reduc-
tions (MBFR) of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.
Most of the Allies now favor a stronger NATO
signal on MBFR, and believe that the wording the
US has proposed for the communique in May regarding
MBFR and European security generally does not go far
enough. West Germany wants a separate statement on
MBFR to carry the Allies past their previous posi-
tion, while many Allies believe that some other in-
itiatives on detente should be taken. The UK has
proposed the establishment of a standing committee
to serve as a contact point between East and West.
The strongest objections to NATO initiatives
regarding a CES or MBFR are now coming from France.
The French believe that more progress must be evi-
dent in negotiations such as SALT and the current
four-power Berlin talks before the Alliance makes
any move toward a CES. France objects to an MBFR
initiative because of its continuing opposition to
bloc-to-bloc negotiations.
8 May 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin 5
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A016200050001-6
25X1
 Approved For Release 2003/$(F.3 RDP79T00975A016200050001-6
NOTES
Israel-Lebanon: Three Arab guerrilla attacks
against Israel on-6 May have invited a strong Israeli
military response. The fedayeen strikes in the west-
ern and northeastern sections of the Israel-Lebanon
border area resulted in the death of. several Israeli
civilians and soldiers, and the wounding of a number
of others. Public feeling in.Israel is running high,
according to the US ambassador.. The Beirut govern-
ment has attempted to maintain some control over the
guerrillas based in its territory in order to ward
off Israeli countermeasures. Nevertheless, the Arab
commandos have managed to carry out a steady series
of small-scale attacks against Israeli border settle-
ments.
Arab States - Fedayeen: A major step has ap-
parently been taken toward unifying the Palestinian
resistance movement. The Unified Fedayeen Command
formed in Amman last February has announced agree-
ment on guidelines for the formation of a central
committee within the framework of the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization (PLO). The committee, which
is to replace the Unified Fedayeen Command, plans to
establish common political and military policies for
the fedayeen. The announcement did not state whether
the new body will be headed by PLO executive Yasir
Arafat, who may face a political challenge from
George Habbash, head of the Popular Front for the
.Liberation of Palestine.
(continued)
8 May 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin 6
SECRET
25X1
 Approved For Release 2003/SIM p9JRDP79T00975A016200050001-6
Honduras: Reorganization and re-equipment of
the armed forces is continuing. Honduras recently
acquired new mortars and howitzers, and over 300 tons
of munitions were observed being trucked through the
capital within the past ten days. The country's
military capability has probably not been signifi-
cantly increased, however. Despite Salvadoran fears,
there is no evidence that Honduras is planning any
aggressive action against its neighbor. The US Em-
bassy is still unable to locate the jet fighters
which Honduras reportedly obtained in March and is
convinced that, if the lets are in Honduras they
are not operational.
Chile: The Marxist candidate in the hotly-con-
tested three-way presidential race reportedly is bed-
ridden after a heart attack. The commander of the
Chilean police told the US Embassy on 7 May that pro-
Castro Senator Salvador Allende will now withdraw
from the campaign for reasons of health. He was
nominated by the far left at the insistence of the
influential Chilean Communist Party after a long
wrangle and will be difficult to replace. If he can-
not return to the campaign, Christian Democrat Rad-
omiro Tomic's candidacy for the 4 September election
will be strengthened.
(continued)
8 May 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin, 7
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A016200050001-6
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 200351/lt1RR4,RDP79T00975A016200050001-6
25X1
Brazil: The long-delayed purchase of French
Mirage supersonic jet fighters is on the point of
completion, according to Foreign Minister Gibson.
He told Ambassador Elbrick that he personally re-
gretted the necessity of purchasing the French air-
craft because it would adversely affect the tradi-
tional ties between the US and Brazilian military.
DIA 25X1 President
Medici has given approval tor e acquisition of 16
Mirages at a price of $59 million and that an air
force team is ready to co to Paris to complete the
25X1 contract. F77 I
8 May 70
Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Finland:. The leader of the conservative Na-
tional Coalition Party, Juha Rihtniemi, was asked
by President Kekkonen on 5 May to make a second at-
tempt to form a new government. Social Democratic
Party chief Paasio earlier failed to find any com-
mon ground on which to base a coalition. Rihtniemi
will approach the parties which gained or held their
own in the mid-March elections, as well as either
the Center or Social Democratic party. Both of
these key parties have strong reservations about
joining such a grouping, however, and Rihtniemi's
prospects for forming a government are not good.
prove or ease nO
 Secr&proved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A016200050001-6
Secret
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A016200050001-6