DEPLOYMENT OF AQUATONE TO FAR EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62B00844R000200010030-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: November 28, 1956
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2001.
;
MEMORANDUM FOR: Di
SUBJECT
Deployrn
98/45 : C1A7RDP62600844R000200010030-9
of Central
ntelligence 26 November 1956
t of AQUATONE to Far East
I. On 14 November you en me
ral Twining requesting Mr Force
UA TONE Detachment C in Japan.
General Twiningle reply to your letter.
is unable to support both AQUATONE and BLACK NIGHT in the Far East
and recommends that w* hold Detachment C in reserve to use as an augment-
ing force whenever and wherever the vrorld situation dictates.
andurn and covering note
ort in the provision of facilities
ye now received (26 November)
ct it states that the Mr Force
Z. On 15 November we had our meeting with the President In the
course of which you explained our intention of deploying a Detachment to
Japan. The President after some discussion agreed that this unit should be
based in Japan unless on further consideration the State Department expressed
objection to such *.location. He made clear by at least two remarks that he
was aware that our aircraft possessed a greater capability than the 13-57Dts
available to BLACK NIGHT and that if any choice had to be made ACJUATONh
should receive a priority. 1 would interpret this conversation not as a firm
order to us to deploy to the Far East but as a permission to do so and I
am sure the President was left with the impression that the deployment would
be carried out.
3. The more important facts that seem to me to havead
bearing on this issue are the following:
a. The AQUATONE aircraft and associated equipment is superior
to that in the hands of BLACK NIGHT in: range, altitude quality of hoto
raphy, quantity of photography per mission, and
25X1A (which the BLACK NIGHT aircraft do not
carry). Thus the U-2 aircraft is safer, can reach targets beyond the range
25X1A of BLACK NIGHT, can produce more and higher eality photography
In
25X1A addition the AQUATONE detachment as soon as operational can begin high
which is an urgently desired form of intelligence and
for which no other equipment is available at this time.
b. It will require at least two months to prepare facilities for
AC., ATONE from the date a firm favorable decision is made. By our
enforced indecision earlier in the autumn and by Air Force opposition for
TS-158611
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25X
25X
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the last last six weeks, we have already postponed the earliest possible
operational date to mid-February. Every day's further delay postpones
our operational date correspondingly.
c. The AQUATONE C Detachment's staffing and training are
complete and it. equips:pent will be complete long before it will be ready
for deployment. In other words, it is all. bought and paid for. Neither
this unit nor ite aircraft are required in the European Theater. These
resources could not be efficiently utilised there even if we were permitted
to operate virtually without restriction. While awaiting deployment the
Detachment is helping with further development work at but
eesentially this valuable and costly asset is unemployed and wilt remain so
unless and until it moves to the Fax East.
4. Although there are persuasive arguments both for and against
the actual initiation of overflights of Communist China during the winter, I
hardly need point out that there are overwhelming reasons for deploying the
Detachment just as soon as possible se as to have this Government** best
capability in place in the Far East in case it is needed. We are in the midst
of two major political crises which have given rise to a sharp renewal of
tension between East and West. Any situation in Europe or the Middle East
that conies close to boiling over carries at least a threat in the Far East.
And there is always the possibility of a new crisis arising in that area.
Under the circusnstarices, it would be criminal to keep our reconnaissance
capability. developed with such urgency and *Mort. waiting idle in the U.S.
whence it could not be moved without two months' notice, inerety because
the Air Force desires to protect its BLACK NIGHT project from competition.
S. I believe we have fooled around with this problem long enough
and I recommend just as strongly as I can:
a. That a inciting be arranged promptly with General 'Twining1
after careful consideration by you and Gemmel Cabe
composition which should be designed to maximise the chanceof
frank discussion leading to a favorable outcome.
b. That your position with them be *ubstantiatty as set forth
ve, with the one additional element that CIA should offer to finance
25X1A he amount of approximatety $350,000) the cost of preparing
facilities for AQUATONE at (or any other suitable base in
Japan).
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c. That if the Air Force will not agree to support AQUATONE
pine you invite Secretary Quart.. and General Twining to join
you and General Cabell in setting he easentlal facts before the
ident and ascertaining his desire.
I would like especially to urge upon you that, before such a wee g, you
and General Gabel determine exactly what arguments you will use and
whether you are prepare& as here recommended1 to take this issue to the
Lop if neceseary.
RMB:djrn
1-DCI
2 -
4 -Pro. Dir. Chrono
-Pro. Chrono
IA
Project
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