CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A015600100001-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
10
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 29, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 25, 1970
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T00975A015600100001-7.pdf | 264.34 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2003/05/29: CIA-RDP79T00975A0156S J *-7
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50
25 February 1970
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STATE review(s) completed.
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No. 0048/70
25 February 1970
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Arab States - Israel: Arab terrorists appear clearly
implicated in at least one of the airliner explosions.
(Page 1)
Chile-Cuba: There are mixed political motives be-
hind the sale of foodstuffs to Cuba. (Page 2)
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USSR - West Germany:. A West German firm has obtained
a dealership for Soviet civil aircraft. (Page 4)
Dahomey: National elections are unlikely to solve
the continuing political crisis. (Page 5)
India-US: Cultural centers (Page 6)
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A Arab States - Israel: Arab terrorists appear
to e clearly implicated in at least one of the air-
liner explosions last weekend.
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In regard to the crash of the Swiss airliner on
the same day, spokesmen for the several associations
of fedayeen groups have been categorical in denying
over-all fedayeen responsibility. They have, how-
ever, dodged the point of a specific retraction by
the PFLP General Command, the terrorist group that
initially claimed credit for the bombing.
The Israelis have so far bent all their efforts
toward engendering international action against an
international threat, drawing on the worldwide re-
vulsion against the two incidents. The reaction of
foreign air carriers strikes a particularly sensi-
tive Israeli nerve--the threat of a de facto aerial
blockade of Israeli territory, which is the avowed
object of several fedayeen action groups. Should
diplomatic efforts be unavailing., the Israeli in-
stinct for retaliation could take the form of a
counterblockade against civil airports in the Arab
states or some other impressive military action.
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Chile-Cuba: There are mixed political motives
behind the s e of Chilean foodstuffs to Cuba.
Chile announced officially last week that $3
million worth of food will be sold for cash to Cuba
this year and $8 million worth in 1971. While not
claiming the "humanitarian" motives permitted as an
exception to OAS sanctions, the Chilean officials
claim that the sale breaks no international pact.
The US ambassador points out that Chilean officials
have consistently prevaricated in answering queries
on the subject from US officials.
President Eduardo Frei's expressed reservations
on Cuba have not deterred some of his subordinates
from moves they see as politically advantageous for
the Christian Democratic candidate in the September
presidential election. Chile voted against imposing
the OAS sanctions, but accepted the resolution as
binding when it passed anyway. Most Chileans
probably still do not support the sanctions. Chile
was the chief Latin American supplier of agricultural
commodities to Cuba before the sanctions were imposed.
The major architect of the Chilean policy is
Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdes, who believes that
this initiative will advance his ambition of leading
the Latin American countries into a policy more
independent of the US.
a es' claims that consultations
wi o er in erican governments had shown
support for moves to reintegrate Cuba into the inter-
American system have not been borne out.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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USSR - West German : A West German firm has
obtained the dealership for Soviet civil aircraft
in West Germany and Austria, according to a German
press article.
Under the agreement, the newly formed German
firm will serve as dealer for the twin-engine KA-26
helicopter and the tri-jet YAK-40 transport aircraft.
They are expected to be displayed for the first time
in West Germany this spring at the Hannover Air Show.
Soviet-registered aircraft, however, must be cleared
for entry into the country through diplomatic channels
of the three Western allies, and the Soviets appar-
ently have not yet sought such approval.
According to the article, the YAK-40, which can
carry 24 to 31 passengers, will cost 40 percent less
than comparable Western aircraft, but operating costs
may be higher because of the limited seating capacity.
The article further stated that the KA-26 helicopter,
which has twin rotors and piston engines and can
carry seven passengers, will cost less than a US
single-engine Bell Jetranger. Most modern Western
helicopters, however, are powered by turboshaft
rather than piston engines. The German firm is
hoping for government purchases of the helicopter for
road rescue operations as well as for sales to private
firms.
The Soviet Union has been trying to sell its air-
craft to several West European countries with little
success thus far. In late 1969, it sold two YAK-40s
to a small, private, newly formed Italian airline
that subsequently acquired the dealership for selling
YAK-40s in Italy and possibly in other European
countries.
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Dahomey: The national elections scheduled for
next month are unlikely to solve the continuing po-
litical crisis.
The army officers who have been running the gov-
ernment since they ousted the Zinsou regime last De-
cember have announced that national presidential and
parliamentary elections will be held, by district, be-
tween 9 and 31 March. Four former government heads--
Maga, Ahomadegbe, Apithy, and Zinsou--have filed for
the presidency. Although the official campaign open-
ing date is not until. 2 March, the country is'already
flooded with scurrilous campaign literature.
Each of the four candidates has a fairly solid
personal or regional following, making it virtually
impossible for any one of them to win a clear major-
ity. If the elections are held, and there is no
military interference, the most likely outcome would
be a shaky coalition government ultimately dependent
upon the badly divided army. Such a result would
return the country to the pattern of the early 1960s
and a repetition of the crises, confusion, and coups
witnessed-during that, period.
Despite its divisions, the army appears to be
moving toward the elections with determination. It
is still possible, however, that one faction or an-
other will stage a coup or otherwise force a can-
cellation
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India-US: New Delhi plans to close five US
cultural centers by 18 May. During the 1950s, India
banned the establishment of such centers in cities
where there was no consulate or trade mission, but
allowed previously established ones to remain. Last
December, the entire issue came up for review when
the government halted a Soviet attempt to build a
center in a.nonconsular city. The Indians have now
concluded that the easiest solution is to ban all
foreign centers regardless of when they were estab-
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25 Feb 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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