BRIEFING PAPER FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61S00750A000200080014-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: August 26, 1957
• Content Type: LETTER

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26 Au Rust 1957
BRUW1NG PA OR THE JOINT CHIE7S 07 sTArr
0.ntkme
Our object in this presentation is to outline for you intelligence
of critical value to major national intelligence objectives which we
anticipate will result from the coverage of certain Soviet targets within
the range of U.2 aircraft. Whereas we are vitally interested in acquiring
precise target information for the application of our strategic weapons,
this is not one of the critical objectives of this briefing,
We propose to attempt to define for you the unique role which
AQUATONE.type photography plays in the production of National Intel.
ligence estimates, which provide the basis for important decisions
effecting the National security. All of the principal targets we will
discuss fall into those strengths that have been determined by the
National Intelligence Community to be the most significant in the Soviet
ability to strike at the United States.
These are: The Soviet guided missile system t long
range bomber force, and Soviet nuclear energy production system.
Our present intelligence on all of these critical Soviet capabilities
still contains major area* of ignorance. A significant quantity of our
existing information on these strengths is fragmentary, and, consequently,
our present estimates, in some cases, admit to significant margins of
error.
US defense plans, and budgets to support them, involve vast sums
of money and allocation of effort, and, admittedly, are at present based
on information having these significant margins of error. Accordingly,
such plans and budgets can be materially affected by reducing the margins
of error. And we feel that in the AOUATONE system we have an important
tool in reducing these error..
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In the critical field of Soviet guided missiles development, we
find some of our major intelligence gaps. Until ten days ago, we had
no direct observation of any part of the Soviet ballistic missile effort
though we had, from other intelligence sources knowledge of several
hundred firings on the KAPUSTIN TAR range. We have had no inform
motion regarding launching pads, erection and handling equipment,
guidance installation and equipment, test steads, fuel storage, and
other associated launching devices. Data on these item, are essential
for any firm statement as to the Isis*, type, and pay load of missiles.
guidance systems, and types of engines used for propulsion. This
admitted undramatic type of information is vital for the production of
precise estimates of present and potential Soviet missile capabilities.
Now, at TYURA, TAM, we have photographed and can study in
detail a relatively new range still under construction and thus far reliably
known to have fired at least twice,. The overcast on the far oblique in
this display obscures our ability to identify what is probably the actual
launching areawith its associated equipment, andm-conceivably.mactual
longmrange missiles. There is, however, convincing information on the
range support elements. We intend to go back if possible to clarify the
launching site at TTURA TAM, it is our expectation that comparable
coverage of KAPUSTIN TAR would be extraordinarily rewarding in
establishing for the first time a set of basic data against which further
intelligence coverage from all sources could lead us to improve signifi
cantly our estimates on the state of GM development in the Soviet Union*
This photograph on TTURA TAU leads some experts to suspect that the
Soviet is two years ahead of our current estimate of their progress.
There are other significant targets in the Soviet missiles system
that also probably will enable us to increase the value of Soviet missile
estimates as a basis for National policy and planning.
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Our knowledge of the true stature of the Soviet heavy bomber force
has been Umit,d by not only lack of precise information an production
facilities but equally by the lack of first hand comprehensive and exact
observation of the home bases of this force. Photography of the BISON
base at SARAMOWENOELS and the BEAR turboprop heavy bomber basis
at CHERELEVKA and BELAYA l'ISERKOV in the KIEV area would enable
us to ascertain far more precisely than now is poseible the eine and
deployment of its heavy bomber force and thereby open the way to the
production of capability estimates regarding this force that would be more
valuable than those possible at present.
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Photography of these bagels, together with other home bases of
? medium bomber components of the Soviet long.rangis bomber force,
would permit us to prepare more precise estimstes of the nuclear dative y
capability of this force than we now can. During previous AQUATONE
operations, special weapons storage and handling sites, such as are
shown here, were discovered at eight out of nine long-range home bases.
Further photography of the long-range base system probably would reveal
additional sites and consequently result in an upward revision of our
esti/notes of the threat represented by this force.
The point must not be overlooked that valuable intelligence by-products
can be anticipated as a result of the coverage of the primary systems
are discussed. Route photography can be expected to yield significant
details of other Soviet air installations, transportation systems, industrial
facilities, and other economic and military targets which could be of a
significance only slightly less than the information we anticipate on primary
objectives. One of the outstanding bonus effects that we know will be
derived by future exercise of the AQUATONE capability will be an increase
in our knowledge of Soviet air defense capabilities. This increase in
knowledge can only result in a firmer basis for National plans and decisions
that involve consideration of the Soviet capabinty to resist our own strategic
operations. Fairly precise data on the general deployment and characteristics
of Soviet defensive electronic sites in otherwise inaccessible areas of the
Soviet Union can be obtained through the existing capability of AQUATONE
equipment to detect and record electronic intelligence data. And it also
must be noted that the exercise of the AQUATONE capability over otherwise
largely inaccessible areas of the Soviet Union could reveal installations
and activities of a completely unknown but highly significant nature. One
striking example of this is contained in this photograph. It shows an air-
field in the TASHKENT area of the Soviet Union, close to the Afghan border
where we had previously known only of the deployment of Soviet tactical
aircraft. However, this photography revealed that an Mr strip of approxi-
mately 15, 000 feet in length is under construction. The establishment of
such a facility in an area not normally considered to be the site of long",
range air force operations opens up a new region of rooms:eh into possible
Soviet plans for employment of its long?range aircraft.
It would be remiss to contend that even completely satisfactory
photography of all of the installations we have mentioned would completely
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eliminat, all of our areas of uncertainty In existing estimates of these
critical Soviet ati-ength., However, it can be said that satisfactory
photography of ese installations would provide new information of a
quality and quantity not now obtainable from any other source en these
primary targets, This information, properly exploited, would enable
us, first, to establish the degree of validity of our existing eatimates
and, second, to refine, and probably expand, these estimates en the
basis of a larger, more factual, and more complete body of information
bearing on the specific strengths concerned.
We also must point out that it is not the belief of the intelligence
unity that a photographic/electronic reconnaissance program even
widest scope would in itself enable us to bring our basic National
gene. estimates to perfection. Other sources of information must
constantly be exploited to derive those types of information that cannot be
reveeled by a photograph*
However, the AQUATONE capability gives us the opportunity to
pen trate otherwise inacceseible areas of the Soviet Union and to obtain
data.-not otherwise obtainable from any other Source...that, in conjunction
with other intelligence. will enable us to furnish the national planners,
policy makers and decision makers with more valid estimates of primary
Soviet strengths, existing and potential. And we feel it is axiomatic that
given these higher quality estimates national planners and policies to
counter the pre.emptive and resistive !strength of the Soviet Union can
be formulated on a more positive, more efficient, more economical,
and more timely bests than now is possible.
JOHN IC, BRIDGE
Lt. Col. ihirCIN
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