CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A015000050001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 21, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
51
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No. 0279/69
21 November 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Enemy intent to test South Vietnam-
ese fighting effectiveness is apparent. (Page 1)
Laos: The Communists are calling their road build-
ing a Pathet Lao program. (Page 3)
Japan -.Communist China: The Sato leadership plans
to re-examine its policy toward China. (Page 5)
Yugoslavia - Communist China: The countries have
agreed in principle to exchange ambassadors. (Page 6)
USSR - West Germany: Moscow is advocating a European
security conference. (Page 7)
Eastern Europe: Interest in Iranian oil has revived
proposals for extending a pipeline. (Page 8)
European Communities: The Commission has proposed
a change in agricultural policy. (Page 9)
Chile: Rumors of an imminent coup continue. (Page 10)
Brazil: Radical priests probably will continue to
support opponents of the government. (Page 11)
Somali Democratic Republic: Signs of potential op-
position have emerged. Page 12)
Zambia: President Kaunda's initiatives have at least
temporarily subdued unruly elements. (Page 13)
Czechoslovakia: Refugees (Page 14)
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Uruguay: Terrorism (Page 15)
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'DAP PHU
QUOC
O
Chau Phu
(Chau Doc)
IV Corps
''Moc Hoa
KIEN TLDONG
CaoLanh
p ARVN receives high
Nlrf
catt
lti
le ski ~8 h{?tY C1 N G
battle
My Tho GO s
?~ r:r,* a~ G0 Cong
Sa Dec. ? Doing r c) N
SA. DEC VinhL'Onp TrucGiang
(Ben Tre)
Long (01
Xuyen
A N G I A N G
G I A N G
\ Rach Gin
n
Vi Thanh
V I N H
LONG
Phu Vinh?
(Tra Vinh)
BA XUYEN\\\
Khanh.Hung~l
(SocTrang) V)'
Ba.J c Lieu
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Quan Long
(Ca Mau)
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South Vietnam: The enemy's intent to test the
effectiveness of South Vietnam's fighting forces
was again apparent in a sharp battle on 18 November
in the delta province of Dinh Tuong.
Elements of three Viet Cong main-force battal-
ions, strengthened by North Vietnamese replacements,
killed 68 South Vietnamese while losing only 30 of
their own men. Air support, which was delayed by
bad weather, proved ineffective because the two US
advisers to the South Vietnamese forces had been
killed by the time it arrived on the scene. This
is the second action in recent weeks in which South
Vietnamese casualties have been quite heavy. On
6 November, an attack on a South Vietnamese naval
headquarters in Kien Giang cost the defenders 23
killed and 98 wounded.
The battle on 18 November took place less than
ten miles west of the former US.9th Infantry Divi-
sion headquarters at Dong Tam, which was recentl
turned over to the South Vietnamese.
21 Nov 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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a
NORTH
VIETNAM
,BURMA;:;,
Communists Claim Road Construction in Northern Laos is Local Effort
32d T9
B }te Muong,
a F 412 `J -7_ oua
Motorable road built /
NamTha _S. pt. s8-Apr.
$ Little progress
\ observed
uong La
.mar/
Statute Miles
Intermittent survey
traces and clearing
activity observed.
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Laos: The Communists are presenting their
road construction in the northwest as a Pathet Lao
program.
Peking's charge in Vientiane, when asked
to explain the meaning o
Chinese road building activities, denied any knowl-
edge of Chinese involvement. The Pathet Lao spokes-
man in Vientiane recently told a local reporter
that the road building south of Muong Sai was en-
tirely a Lao Communist effort.
There is only tentative evidence to back up
this claim. A local villager, who claims to have
worked on the road, has told a government patrol
that the work force, although under the direction
of Chinese engineers, is composed of North Viet-
namese and locally conscripted Lao. The North Viet-
namese were reported to be operating heavy equip-
ment while the villagers were clearing brush. If
confirmed, this would be the first known instance
of local villagers working on the current round of
Chinese road building in Laos.
The Chinese involvement in north Laos has
caused a great deal of concern within the Lao Gov-
ernment. Prime Minister Souvanna might, however,
elect to accept the road building in the Nam Beng
Valley as Lao rather than Chinese activity in order
to head off a diplomatic clash with China.
Lh construction has gone forward at a good
pace this year. According to a Lao aerial observer,
construction crews had completed some 11 miles of
motorable road southwest of Muong Sai by 18 Novem-
ber. Aerial photography shows that intermittent
survey traces and clearing activity have now reached
Muong Houn, some 50 miles south of Muong Sai. The
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Communists could have a rough motorab.le road to Pak
Beng within three or four months if they continue
their present pace. Judging from the lack of prog-
ress on the other branch of the road, being built
northeast of Muong Sai, it would appear that the
current effort toward g has a higher priority
Map)
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Japan - Communist China: Th Sato leadership
plans to re-examine its policy toward China after
resolving Okinawan revers n, but does not contem-
plate any shift in policy
Sato, who is supported by Foreign
Minister Aichi, reportedly believes that a "two
China" policy is the most realistic course for Ja-
pan, with any expansion of contacts_ 4mited to un-
official trade and cultural exchanges.
Although the top level of the Foreign Ministry
reportedly supports this position, many in the lower
ranks in the ministry favor a more flexible approach.
The view of these officials is supported in varying
degrees by all of the opposition parties, primarily
because of their desire to capitalize on the senti-
mentamong many Japanese for a "rapprochement" with
Peking.
h~.elements backing maintenance of the "status
quo" undoubtedly will prevail as long as the US main-
tains its present policy toward China and Peking
holds to its uncompromising attitude toward Tokyo.
Over the short term, the government does not want to
complicate its handling of the sensitive US-Japan
mutual security issue next year by introducing any
controversial new policy initiatives. Furthermore,
Japan's rapidly growing investment in and trade with
Taiwan also works against any de-emphasis of ties
with Taipei. The ruling conservatives are also well
aware of the strategic importance of having Japan's
southern flank prot ted._by a friendly non-Communist
government on Taiwan.
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Yugoslavia - Communist China: The two coun-
tries have moved to improve relations by agreeing
in principle to exchange ambassadors.
The agreement, announced yesterday by a Yugo-
slav foreign affairs spokesman, ends an 11-year in-
terval during which relations were bitter because
of the opposite approaches the two parties took in
building Communism. Both embassies have been largely
inactive and have been headed by charges..
Sino-Yugoslav relations have been improving,
particularly in the economic sphere, since the in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia. last year. Peking, faced
with mounting Soviet political and military pres-
sure, has been giving high priority to improving
its diplomatic position within the Communist world.
The exchange of ambassadors with Belgrade comple-
ments recent Chinese efforts to establish closer
relations with independent-minded Communist states
such as North Vietnam, North Korea, and Romania.
For the Yugoslavs, the agreement is consistent
with their foreign policy principle of forging
good ties with all countries without regard to
their ideological bent. It also reflects Yugosla-
via's continuing neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute. Belgrade has no illusions about the severe
limitations the ideological gulf between the two
countries places on the relationship.
21 Nov 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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USSR - West Germany: The- USSR has followed
up the Prague declaration on preparations for a
European security conference by parallel approaches
to the US, the UK, and West Germany.
A statement was made to West German Foreign
Minis er 'Scheel by Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin on
17 November, followed two days later by similar
declarations to the US and UK. The three state-
ments, which suggest that the proposed conference
could be held in Helsinki during the first six
months of 19 70 , convey a. sense of urgency on Mos-
cow's part. Moscow claims that the possibilities
of the conference have increased because of West-
ern Europe's allegedly better understanding of the
East's intentions
_,
e presentations suggest that the USSR has'no
objection to US and Canadian attendance at the Eu-
ropean meeting, but add that holding thy,-.gnference
is contingent on East German participation.
Tsarapkin said that Moscow had noted the Brandt
government's "constructive spirit" and now hoped
that Bonn would follow through with "practical
steps." His comments add to the impression that
the Soviets are trying to encourage Bonn'Ao be as
forthcoming as possible on these "steps."
Inreply, Scheel again stressed.Bonn's long-
standing insistence on the need for careful prepara-
tion of a possible security conference. Bonn hopes
especially for at least some improvement in inter-
German relations prior to such a conference and re-
gards progress in this area as a prerequisite to a
successful conference.
Scheel said that Bonn would study the Soviet
ositibnarefull and
P y give its response during the
German-Soviet talks it has proposed for next month
on the renunciation of force. Tsarapkin, however,
did not mention the German proposal,
17
NOV
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Eastern Europe: East European interest in
obtaining Iranian crude oil has revived long-stand-
ing proposals to extend a pipeline under construc-
tion in Yugoslavia through Hungary to Czechoslo-
vakia.
Such a pipeline would be needed to transport
Middle East oil to land-locked Czechoslovakia and
Hungary. According to the Hungarian press, an
agreement in principle has been reached between
Hungary and Yugoslavia for construction of the
pipeline. Final arrangements are expected to be
reached in 1970. Czechoslovakia, meanwhile, has
been discussing possible assistance in building
the more difficult parts of the pipeline. Poland
reportedly is also interested in the project.
Czechoslovak and Hungarian agreements to im-
port Iranian crude oil probably will not be imple-
mented until a suitable method of delivery is found.
Even with the pipeline, the venture will be costly
unless the East Europeans acquire large tankers to
make the haul around Africa. The participants may
be hoping, however, that the Suez Canal will be re-
opened by the time the pipeline is completed in
1974. Use of the nearly completed Israeli pipeline___,
s unlikely for political reasons.
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European Communities : (The Commission has
proposed a far-reaching approach to the problem
of agricultural surpluses`.hat has plagued the
Common Agricultural Policy.
The Commission suggests a radical change in
the wheat intervention system and other measures
that would in effect substantially reduce price
supports for wheat, sugar, butter, and nonfat dry
milk. The money which would have gone to support
prices in these areas would be used to help finance
some of the structural reforms of European agricul-
ture recommended in the December 1968 Mansholt Plan.
The burden of the changes would be heaviest
on West Germany, and opposition can be expected
from various farmers' groups there. The French
Government will probably react favorably to the
Commission's general approach, but opposition can
also be expected from certain groups of French
farmers. Debate on the proposal is scheduled to
begin at the EC Council meeting next week
If the Commission's suggestions win Council
approval, competition between the EC and other ma-
jor agricultural producers in third country markets
may be reduced in the long run. Opportunities for
the US and others to increase significantly agri-
cultural exports to the EC are .Qt likely to im-
prove for some time, however.
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Chile: Government moves to forestall renewed
defiance by mT it.ary malcontents have not stopped
rumors that a coup is imminent
The armed forces and police in Santiago and
some other areas were placed on alert Wednesday,
and a state of emergency was declared in the cap-
ital. Both the National Security Council and the
Army General Staff met in emergency session. These
actions followed reports that some armed forces
supporters of rebellious General Roberto Viaux in-
tend to refuse their pay this week because they
are C~vinced the promised pay raise will be inad-
equate
Efforts to appease the military since last
month's revolt have been bungled and have actually
increased tensions. Rumors of a coup attempt are
rife, and the Marxist press is printing provocative
stor -ghat are contributing tsZthe charged atmos-
phere.
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Brazil: Radical priests probably will con-
tinue to support groups opposing the o ernment,
despite the arrest of several clergymen.
Security forces continue to round up Catholic
clergymen charged with collaborating with extreme
leftist terrorist organizations, such as that led
by the late Carlos Marighella. Some Dominican
priests have admitted that they were deeply in-
volved with the Marighella group. Attempts by the
national and international Catholic hierarchy to
contact the arrested clergymen have met a hostile
response from the government. One security officer
insists they must face trial like any Brazilian ac-
cused of subversive activities. One archbishop has
excommunicated a police chief whom he accused of
torturing the mother superior of a convent alleg-
edly used as a terrorist refuge
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Ia grow-
ing number of priests are reaching the conc usion
and' oppressed majority is through the use of fore.
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The Supreme Revolutionary Council has decided
to transfer out of the country four high-ranking
army and police officers who are suspected of suspect
governmamtF
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tial opposition to the new government have emerged
Somali Democratic Republic.: (igns of vote
police--neither of whom is on the council---are to
be appointed ambassadors. In addition, two army
field-grade offers are to be given diplomatic
e ormer deputy commandant
e army and e ormer chief of staff of the
(This action has,
r voxea serious concern among other
flig -ran ~.ng officers who fear they may be forced
out of the army or transferred from the country.
council president
antagonism is ase
an regional loyalties, and may also be
motivated by p~,rssZnal dislike of General Siad, the
chere is no indication that this group is now
a cohesive one, but it could become a focus of op-
position in the ar--~,, if -further discontent: with-
the council develops.
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Zambia: Personal initiatives by President
Kaunda have at least temporarily subdued the more
unruly elements that threaten the country's polit-
ical stability.
Kaunda assumed direct control of Zambia's
political system after a meeting of the ruling
United National Independence Party in August de-
generated into a contest for political power among
tribal factions. The maneuvering threatened to
split the party and led to the resignation of party
vice president Kapwepwe a few days later.
Kaunda, who is popularly accepted as a national
leader above tribalism and factionalism,began to
direct party affairs and to campaign against unruly
political behavior. He made positions within the
party's policy-making body appointive rather than
elective so as to reduce jockeying for power among
its members. In mid-September, he formed a commit-
tee to control party appointments and to exercise
broad disciplinary powers. He also has issued more
explicit instructions on party responsibilities.
Giving teeth to these measures, the party has
begun to punish offenders of its rules. Perhaps
more significantly, for the first time the police
are arresting members of youth groups and party
officials who break the law, and the courts are
convicting and levying stiff penalties on law-
breakers.
Political and racial tensions -remain strong,
however, and further infighting and unruly behavior
seem inevitable. Kaunda will have to continue to
exercise strong control and curb his tendency in
the past to vacillate if renewed political turmoil
is to be avoided.
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Czechoslovakia: The number of Czechoslovaks
who have fled their country since the Soviet in-
vasion has reached impressive totals. An exact
figure, however, can not. be determined. More than
65,000 refugees are presently interned in "asylum
areas" in the West, and many of the nearly 20,000
Czechoslovak "tourists" in Yugoslavia eventually
will seek refugee status in Western countries. In
addition, thousands of Czechoslovaks have already
processed through refugee centers and are estab-
lishing permanent residence abroad. A recent in-
crease in the number leaving the country, espe-
cially to West Germany, doubtless is a response to
the increasingly retrogressive domestic policies
being implemented by the Husak reciimP_
(continued)
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Uruguay: Urban terrorism continues in Monte-
video despite recent successful police operations.
Thus far this month, the Tupamaros, a Marxist-Len-
inist terrorist group, have robbed a bank of $60,000
and have had two firefights with police. Two police-
men and one terrorist were killed. Over the years
the Tupamaros have tried to cultivate public sym-
pathy by staging well-planned operations that
avoided indiscriminate violence. The violence this
month suggests, however, that their capability to
mount such operations has diminished, but that they
are still determined to keep their revolutionary
image intact.
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Secret
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