CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A014300030001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 6, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2003/05/29: CIA-RDP79T00975A01430&t
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
State Dept. review completed
5Q'.
6 August 1969
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14300030001-9
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14300030001-9
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14300030001-9
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A014300030001-9
No. 0187/69
6 August 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
USSR-Romania-US: The Soviets have published their
sharpest comment on the President's visit. (Page 2)
South Korea: The National Assembly appears likely
to pass tie third term amendment. (Page 3)
El Salvador - Honduras: Domestic pressures will
keep tensions high. Page 4)
Western Europe: Some officials fear for the survival
of the European space effort. (Page 6)
Phili ines: Leading officials are concerned about
possible in relations with the US. (Page 7)
Nationalist China: The Nationalists hope to obtain
additional US military equipment to counterbalance
the planned reduction in their armed forces. (Page 8)
Hungary-US: Budapest has shown a new willingness to
resolve bilateral problems. (Page 9)
Venezuela-Colombia: Venezuela's President is visiting
Colombia to repair relations and to improve his image
at home. (Page 10)
Approved For Release 2003/08 ]&I -WDP79T00975A014300030001-9
 Approved For Release 2003//E7PR I RDP79T00975A014300030001-9
E Vietnam: A Viet Cong rallier,who reportedly
atten e a -Communist indoctrination course
has shed some light on
future Communist military and political tactics.
The rallier's account reinforces other indica-
tions that the enemy has scaled down its short-term
military objectives and intends to concentrate on
improving its political operations. The high-level
cadre who conducted the indoctrination admitted that
the Communists could not achieve a military defeat
of the allies, but he told the group that world
opinion was forcing the US to withdraw troops. He
predicted that this was the first of many similar
"political" victories to come. Despite the shift in
focus from the military to the political, the in-
doctrination group was informed that major attacks
by regular troops are planned against cities in the
western delta. The enemy has, in fact, recently re-
inforced this area.
The indoctrination course, according to the
rallier's account, also provided some general guide-
lines on preparations for eventual elections in South
Vietnam. The guidelines were vague on the timing of
elections, but it was suggested that they could occur
under any of several circumstances, such as when
there is "significant" unrest or dissatisfaction with
the Thieu regime, or after a major portion of US
troops had pulled out of the country.
Discussions of allied pacification efforts in
the course acknowledged that the Communists were
being hurt by the program, but the cadre giving the
course were relatively sanguine about being able to
cope with its long run effects. The cadre said that
government pacification forces were too spread out,
and that because they move on after a short period,
aggressive action by local Viet Cong cadres should
be able to,dnstrov what the pacification forces ac-
complish.
6 Aug 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/05129 d ~ R P79T00975AO14300030001-9
 Approved For Release 2003/0$JC 44F)DP79T00975A014300030001-9
USSR-Romania-US: The current issue of the So-
viet propaganda journal New Times contains the
sharpest comment yet publ"i-s-hed on President Nixon's
visit to Romania.
New Times charged "American ideologists" with
advocating-g the extension of trade agreements and li-
cense contracts to promote nationalist forces in
Eastern Europe. The article warned that "any mach-
ination whatever against socialism" would "inevita-
bly" evoke resistance from the Soviet Union. New
Times avoided names, but the article's applicabi"Tity
to Romania and the President's trip is clear.
The article's publication in New Times, which
is not an authoritative party or state organ, sug-
gests that the Soviets did not want to commit them-
selves to a specific position at this time. Never-
theless, a deputy editor of the journal called the
article to the attention of the US Embassy last week,
which suggests that it is meant as an "unofficial"
statement of Soviet policy.
Moscow's displeasure with Romania has also been
made clear by the protocol snub involved in the
choice of a relatively low-ranking party secretary,
Konstantin Katushev, to head the Soviet delegation
to the Romanian party congress. Katushev--a Brezh-
nev protege--will most likely bring up the Presi-
dent's trip and the general orientation of Romanian
foreign policy. The inclusion of the chief of the
Kharbarovsk regional party organization in the dele-
gation suggests that the Soviets probably will also
push privately their views of the Sino-Soviet b
conflict on the neutral Romanians. 25X1
6 Aug 69
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2003/a j c DP79T00975AO14300030001-9
 Approved For Release 2003/0?gp.Cta -IDP79T00975A014300030001-9
South Korea: President Pak now appears to have
enough Natio Nation-Assembly votes to pass a constitu-
tional amendment permitting him to seek a third term
.in 1971.
Pak's public threat on 25 July to resign unless
the amendment passes apparently has convinced many
holdouts that they have no choice but to acquiesce
or face political upheaval. Their support is not
without its political price, however. It is not
known just what Pak agreed to, but the dissidents'
demands included a crackdown on official corruption,
the ouster of key members of Pak's inner circle, and
a sharp curtailment of the security apparatus' in-
volvement in domestic political affairs.
25X1
6 Aug 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2003/05~~.%!2IP79T00975A014300030001-9
 Approved For Release 2003/05/WQR.VkWP79T00975A014300030001-9
El Salvador - Honduras: The two countries are
no closer to resolving their differences than before
the war, and domestic pressures can be expected to
keep tensions high.
Although hostilities have ceased and Salvadoran
troops have been withdrawn from Honduran territory,
the two governments appear to be working at cross
purposes. While Honduran President Lopez was speak-
ing on national radio and television in an attempt
to defend his country's poor military performance,
El Salvador was rubbing salt in the wounds with prep-
arations for a victory celebration today.
Difficulties have arisen also in arranging for
the release of prisoners of war. El Salvador has
decided not to go ahead with the planned exchange
unless the 13,000 Salvadoran detainees in Honduras
are released. These people have been held in part
for their own protection, and in part because the
Hondurans believe they constitute a fifth column.
The primary problem continues to be Salvadoran
emigration to Honduras. El Salvador has used Hon-
duras as an escape valve for its surplus population
and has sought OAS guarantees that Salvadorans would
receive equal treatment and full protection in Hon-
duras.
Honduran public opinion, however, is now bit-
terly anti-Salvadoran. Workers' groups have renewed
demands for deportation of the large number of Sal-
vadorans illegally in Honduras and have called for
strict enforcement of laws limiting the employment
rights of foreigners. In response, President Lopez
has already indicated that the OAS resolutions to
protect Salvadoran immigrants would not affect Hon-
duran laws.
Public antagonism toward El Salvador can be ex-
pected to grow as the extent of the pillaging done
6 Aug 69
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2003/05/W.- t' P79T00975A014300030001-9
 Approved For Release 2003/059(:fA=RUP79T00975A014300030001-9
by Salvadoran troops becomes more widely known, and
'pressure will probably mount for a massive program
of arms purchases to counter El Salvador's continued
stockpiling.
Another reaction may be a refusal to restore
commercial relations with El Salvador and a continued
boycott of Salvadoran goods. Some Honduran officials
have already threatened to withdraw from the Central
American Common Market, and efforts are already being
made to secure new markets in Venezuela and Spain for
agricultural goods that formerly went to El Salvador.
6 Aug 69
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2003/059~g -RDP79T00975A014300030001-9
 Approved For Release 2003/06EC- & bP79T00975A014300030001-9
Western Europe: A new crisis developing in the
European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO)
has caused some officials to fear for the survival
of the multilateral space effort in Europe.
ELDO recently submitted to the European Space
Conference a report which estimates that the cost
of using a European-produced launch vehicle for sat-
ellites will average $21.5 million per launch. Sub-
sequently, the committee of senior officials of the
conference requested that Hermann Bondi, secretary
general of the conference, ask US authorities what
the prospects are of an American-made launcher being
made available for the Eurovision satellite.
Bondi argues that the enormous cost makes it
foolhardy for Europe to pursue independently the de-
velopment of a launch vehicle. He believes that the
cost of the independent vehicle, by adding unrealis-
tically to the burden of space costs already being
carried by the member countries, could lead to the
strangulation of Europe's multilateral space program.
ELDO has continually suffered from serious fi-
nancial problems. Britain and Italy have recently
reduced their contributions substantially, and Brit-
ain is withdrawing entirely by the end of the year.
Of the remaining members--France, West Germany, Bel-
gium, and the Netherlands--all but the Netherlands
have been required to put up additional contributions
to substitute for the British and Italian reductions.
Bondi has asked for an early meeting with US
officials in Washin ton to discuss the use of an
American launcher.
6 Aug 69
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2003105hff 1 OP79T00975A014300030001-9
 Approved For Release 2003/05 9 -CA-R P79T00975A014300030001-9
Philippines-. Leading officials are perplexed
over the prospect of basic changes in relations with
the US.
Filipinos were taken aback by indications during
the recent presidential visit to Manila that the
special relationship between the Philippines and the
US was coming to an end, even though attacking close
ties with the US has been a safe, standard theme of
Philippine politicians.
The absence of commentary on recent US state
.ments by prominent Philippine political leaders sug-
gests that they have found the implications too far-
reaching to assess at this early stage. Manila un-
doubtedly will be apprehensive over the effect a
looser relationship might have on economic preferences
and security guarantees accorded by the US. The al-
most total national preoccupation with the presiden-
tial election campaign, however, may delay any early
direct reaction.
The Philippines will scrutinize US actions and
statements to try to ascertain the effect of US in-
tentions toward the Philippines on specific Philip-
pine interests. Despite ;periodic nationalistic
statements, current.indications are that Manila would
prefer a tightening, rather than a loosening,of rela-
tions with the US.
6 Aug 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/05/2bE6Rl 79T00975A014300030001-9
 Approved For Release 20038-RDP79T00975A014300030001-9
Nationalst'C'hina: The Nationalists are using
their recent decision-to reduce and modernize the
oversized armed forces as leverage for obtaining
additional US military equipment.
Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo emphasized to
Secretary Rogers last week that the changes must not
reduce combat effectiveness--a reminder that signif-
icant troop reductions will require more US equipment.
Specifically, Chiang mentioned Taipei's desire for
M-16 rifles and underscored Taiwan's recent request
for four US surplus submarines. Chiang probably will
make further requests for military aid when he visits
the US next February. He no doubt believes that more
aid will help ensure support of the proposed troop
reduction by the top levels of the government, par-
ticularly by the armed services.
Many high-ranking Nationalist officials have
opposed force. reductions in the past because this
might be interpreted as abandonment of the goal of
returning to the mainland and thereby undermine the
legitimacyf their rule on Taiwan. On the other
hand, domestic
economic priorities in part a ese officials to
recognize the need for reorganizing the expensive
military establishment.
6 Aug 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 20034 2R. ]grF RDP79T00975A014300030001-9
 Approved For Release 2003/ DP79T00975AO14300030001-9
Hungary-US: Budapest. has shown a new willing-
ness to resolve its problems with the US. This de-
velopment may reflect Soviet tactical interest in
detente.
A concession, minor in itself, on US Embassy
financial operations is the first positive response
to US requests in many years. The US ambassador sees
it as a "significant breakthrough" before the coming
joint review of the entire range of bilateral issues.
These include the settlement of long-standing finan-
cial claims, restrictions on embassy activity, and
an agreement on cultural relations.
The Hungarians undoubtedly are taking their cues
from Moscow. They have always been cautious in deal-
ing with the US acting only after coordination with
the Soviets. [7 1
6 Aug 69
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/05L2 x.04 r P79T00975A014300030001-9
 Approved For Release 2003/05/L2 t9 i Or- P79T00975A014300030001-9
Venezuela-Colombia: Venezuela's President Cal-
dera is visiting Colombia to improve relations between
the two countries and to give himself a boost at home.
Normally good relations between Venezuela and
Colombia have been suffering lately from Venezuela's
failure to join the Andean pact, from a lack of def-
inition of the coastal boundary, and from a sharpen-
ing of the perennial problem of large numbers of
Colombians who cross the border illegally to seek-
work in Venezuela.
The four-month-old Caldera administration is
feeling the effects of an economic slowdown, uncer-
tainty over prospects for its oil industry, politi-
cal opposition in Congress that has immobilized the
government's legislative program, and a power strug-
gle within the governing party. As a result, Caldera
has been criticized both for ineffective government
and for autocratic rule.
The occasion chosen for the visit is the 150th
anniversary celebration of the Battle of Boyaca
which eliminated Spanish power from Colombia. 25X1
6 Aug 69
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2003/Q,I k DP79T00975A014300030001-9
 Secrefpproved For Release 2003/05/29: CIA-RDP79T00975AO14300030001-9
Secret
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14300030001-9