CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A014200050001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 25, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
r-O
25 July 1969
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No. 0177/69
25 July 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Korea: President Pak has moved to undercut
criticism of the third term amendment. (Page 1)
El Salvador - Honduras: El Salvador continues its
arme presence on Honduran soil. (Page 2)
Bolivia: General Escobar's presidential candidacy
has increased the likelihood of a military coup.
(Page 4)
Panama: An extortion scandal has generated tension
within the national guard high command. (Page 5)
Communist China: The chief of the general staff now
appears to be the country's second most important
military figure. (Page 7)
Eur._.o~ean Communities: The meeting of the Council
of Ministers has set the stage for some hard bargain-
ing. (Page 9)
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Cuba: Commemoration of the 26th of July (Page 10)
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South Korea: President Pak has made a bold po-
litical move to undercut criticism of the third term
amendment movement.
Pak announced last night that the government
party will definitely move to amend the constitution
to permit him to run for a third term in 1971. In
his speech he emphasized that he will interpret an
affirmative national referendum as a vote of confi-
dence in him and his policies; conversely, he threat-
ened that he will "step down immediately" if the
amendment is rejected. This statement undoubtedly
is a shock tactic designed to make the South Koreans
think about the consequences of a government without
Pak.
By publicly linking the prestige of his adminis-
tration to the amendment. movement, Pak has indicated
that he and his supporters are confident that they
can obtain enough support in the National Assembly
to pass the amendment. Pak, however, continues to
try to appear to be above the squabbles and poli-
ticking of the assembly and apparently is confident
that the economic growth and political stability
during his period of national leadership are his
best assets among the general electorate.
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El Salvador - Honduras: El Salvador's armed
presence on Honduran soil continues while the Organ-
ization of American States (OAS) moves to deal with
the conflict on the diplomatic level. Salvadoran
strategy is now to obtain enough abstentions in the
OAS to avoid being condemned as an aggressor when the
foreign ministers meet in Washington on 26 July.
Most Latin American countries are reluctant to
censure El Salvador or enforce OAS resolutions with
an Inter-American Peace Force (I)NPF). Many govern-
ments are willing to impose sanctions if there is a
consensus, but few are willing to propose sanctions
in formal sessions. A two-thirds vote is required
to invoke such measures under the Rio Treaty.
Argentina and Brazil have made it clear that they
are willing to collaborate in an IAPF if necessary.
Mexico, which has traditionally opposed such a force,
recognizes that the prestige of the OAS is at stake.
If other means fail, it would go along, but. would not
send troops.
There is increasing concern that the conflict
between El Salvador and Honduras will severely set
back the cause of economic integration.
Extremely pessimistic forecasts have come from
the deputy secretary general of the Common Market
Secretariat and from Guatemalan officials. The sec-
retary general of Guatemala's National Planning Coun-
cil, one of Central America's shrewdest economists
and most dispassionate observers, has expressed doubts
that the Common Market will ever recover. He feels
that too many lives have been lost and too many at-
rocities alleged for a meaningful dialog between the
two belligerents for at least five years. He sug-
gests that two common markets--one embracing Honduras,
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the other El Salvador--might emerge. Although this
may overstate the case, the forward momentum of re-
gional integration has ceased.
Commercial relations between El Salvador and
Honduras are suspended. Both countries, however,
have agreed not to interfere with shipments between
the other three Common Market countries. Nevertheless?
delays and harassment continue to impede tradbe-
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Bolivia: Retired General Armando Escobar's de-
cision to run for president next year has increased
the likelihood of a military coup.
Escobar's announcement was not unexpected, He
has been extremely popular as mayor of La Paz since
1964? and his candidacy has been boosted by President
Sites, In a series of barn-storming appearances
throughout Bolivia, he has been generating increasing
appeal in rural areas. He is believed to .be the only
political personality who could defeat Ovando in a
legal election.
Ovando's presidential ambitions are supported
by the military high command and strategically based
units in La Paz. Despite Escobar's popularity with
civilian groups in the capital, he is not known to
have any major support from the country's professional
military cliqueswhich looks down on him as an out-
sider who came up through the ranks without attend-
ing the military academy.
Although a military coup at this time would
probably ensure Ovando's succession to the pres. --
dency, it would almost certainly usher in a period
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Panama: The arrest of two brothers of a high-
ranking national guard officer on corruption charges
has generated some tension within the high command.
The two brothers of Lt. Col. Juan Bernal, chief
of staff for G-4, had held influential government
posts since the military take-over last October.
Their arrests on 22 July followed discovery of an
extortion ring that obtained funds by promising prom-
inent businessmen that they would be granted special
privileges from high-level guard officers.
Berne might see an appointment abroad to mitigate
repercussions of the scandal.
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Communist China's Military High Command: The General Staff Department
Date first Other active military
Chief: identified: positions:
Huang Yung sheng March 1968 Probable Canton MR
(;ctr,rtaander (concurrent)
Deputy chiefs: (in order of prominence)
Wu Fa-tisien iUla:Y 1 16#3
U Tso peng 1 aiy 1 ` iiy
Chits Hui=tso l=ettruarv 1969
Commander. Ai' Force
Political Cornmissar, Navy
Director, General Rear
S,,vices l)Li)artrne;tt
Wen Yu-cheng December' 19137 Cornmander, Peking
L Tien yu 1963
Wang Hsin-tinq 1963
Pend Shao-hui 1955
Han Hsien-chu 1965
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Communist China: Recent personnel assignments
in the military high command appear to have enhanced
the position of chief of the general staff Huang
Yung-sheng.
Over the past year the top officers of the Air
Force, Navy, and General Rear Services (Logistics)
Department have been officially designated as depu-
ties to Huang in his role as head of the General
Staff Department. Although the General Staff De-
partment presumably has always exercised a degree
of operational control over the air and naval arms,
this is the first time that the service chiefs have
been given formal positions under the chief of staff.
In part this move probably reflects the increasing
growth and modernization of the air and naval compon-
ents of China's predominantly ground force - oriented
military establishment.
Subordination of the director of the General
Rear Services Department to the chief of staff, how-
ever, is another matter. Previously these two de-
partments, along with the General Political Depart-
ment, were treated more or less as equals under the
over-all supervision of Defense Minister Lin Piao.
The General Political Department, however, was
quietly abolished during the Cultural Revolution
and its responsibilities were absorbed by the Mili-
tary Affairs Committee. Thus, as chief of staff,
Huang now apparently stands second only to Lin Piao
as a military figure.
It also seems likely that Huang's enhanced
stature derives not only from the gradual upgrading
of the chief of staff post but also from his own po-
litical credentials. Since assuming office in March
1968, Huang apparently has succeeded in winning gen-
eral acceptance from most elements in the central
leadership.
(continued)
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Nevertheless, the recent high rate of turnover
in chiefs of staff suggests that the position is ex-
tremely sensitive. The demands and pressures on
Huang are likely to increase sharply as Peking be-
gins to grapple with the thorny issue of withdrawing
the army from the wide range of political duties it
has been obliged to assume during the course of the
Cultural Revolution. (Chart)
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European Communities: The meeting of the Coun-
cil of Foreign Ministers this week appears to have
set the stage fs~r some hard bargaining later this
year on the Communities' future.
At. the meeting--the first since Pompidou's elec-
tion and the last before the summer recess--the other
five members of the Communities agreed in principle
to the French proposal that a summit conference be
held before the end of the year. The foreign min-
isters will meet in September to decide the agenda.
Meanwhile, the permanent representatives to the Com-
munities have been instructed to discuss the consol-
idation and enlargement of the Communities, and the
Commission has been invited to update its September
.1967 opinion on British entry.
The proposal for a summit leaves the objectives
of the French in doubt, although they are now appar-
ently willing to discuss concurrently the enlarge-
ment and the strengthening of the Communities. The
French remain primarily interested in obtaining fa-
vorable resolution of such issues as agricultural
financing, and some of France's Community partners
are wary of what the French mean by "strengthening."
The Belgians, for instance, fear that holding peri-
odic summit meetings, as the French have suggested,
could be a threat to the existing Community insti-
tutions.
Some of the issues to be faced this fall will
test how far the French will go in supporting prog-
ress toward integration. Commission President Rey
indicated that the Commission may try to obtain some
real commitment by the member states to complete the
common commercial policy. The president of the Eu-
ropean Parliament has also requested a decision by
late fall on the long-outstanding question of popu-
lar election of the Parliament.
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NOTES
Cuba: The 26th of July--a major holiday in
the Cuban revolutionary calendar--will be marked
only by minor celebrations this year. As happened
on other festive occasions earlier in the year,
Havana has decided to turn the day into a "great
work event" so that there would be no slackening
of the pace of the current sugar harvest. The
fact that Cuban propaganda organs have been di-
rected to give broad publicity to a speech Castro
made in 1953 suggests that the Cuban premier may
dispense with his traditional address in Havana's
Revolutionary Square. The holiday commemorates
the abortive attack that Castro led against the
Moncada military barracks in Santiago de Cuba on
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The United States Intelligence Board, on 23
July, approved the following national intelligence
estimate:
NIE 60/70-1-69 "Black Africa's Prospects
for Modernization"
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Secret
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