CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A013700060001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 13, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
,- 1,
State Department review completed
13 May 1969
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No. 0114/69
13 May 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Communist China - USSR: Peking has accepted a Soviet
proposal for a :border river navigation meeting. (Page 2)
Hong Kong: The government apparently will try to se-
cure the release of correspondent Anthony Grey. (Page 3)
Brazil: Student discontent is again troubling the
government. (Page 4)
Chile: Some Christian Democratic left-wing leaders
seek a link with the Marxist left. (Page 5)
Finland-Europe: The initiative on a European security
conference is receiving a varied response. (Page 6)
Hungary: The first details of the regime's planned
political reform have been made public. (Page 7)
Czechoslovakia: Price increases will be the first
step in a program to stabilize the economy. (Page 8)
Pakistan: An opposition leader displays conflicting
views on the government. (Page 9)
Western Europe: Currency situation (Page 11)
USSR: Interplanetary probe (Page 11)
Algeria: Ministerial shifts (Page 12)
Guinea: Campaign against "conspirators" (Page 12)
Dahomey: Student strike (Page 13)
Dominican Republic: University student elections (Page 13)
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NORTH
^VIETNAM
Can Thi,
AVERAGE STRENGTH
OF ENEMY UNITS
Battalion: VC 200- 400
NVA 300- 500
Regiment: VC 1,000-1,500
NVA 1,200-2,000
I
140
MILES
$;sedai Zone
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E South Vietnam: The Communists have launched
a new round of military action, described by several
recent sources as the "May action phase."
This phase may last through May and probably
will be divided by several periods of lull, similar
to the pattern during the enemy's February-March'
"offensive."
point to a larger military effort
to follow within the next two months. So far, the
shellings have been directed against allied military
positions, perhaps in the hope of driving up the
rate of US casualties and thus generating further
domestic pressure on the US to seek an early end to
the war.
Over 200 targets in South Vietnam have been
hit by enemy mortar and rocket fire since the early
morning hours of 12 May. There have been only a
few follow-up ground attacks, but two in Tay Ninh
Province northwest of Saigon left more than 250
enemy soldiers dead. There has been a sharp in-
crease in terrorist attacks in the capital, with a
dozen reported on 11 May. These incidents have
been aimed primarily at police, government, and
public utilities.
Communist guerrillas and local force units
have been involved in most of the ground fighting.
It is likely that the Communists will commit certain
first-line units in concert with harassing shellings
against key allied targets during this new offensive
phase.
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Communist China - USSR- Peking has accepted
a Soviet proposal for a meeting of the joint border
river navigation committee in Khabarovsk next month.
The Chinese presumably hope to use this forum to
revive their claims to disputed islands in the Us-
suri River.
The Chinese! had not responded to two earlier
Soviet proposals to renew talks on border demarca-
tion which had broken down in 1964. Peking prob-
ably intends to manipulate discussion of navigation
issues to press its claim that, under the treaties
of 1858 and 1860 and "established principles of
international law," Chen Pao (Damansky) and other
Ussuri River islands are legally Chinese.
After the Sino-Soviet clash on 2 March, Peking
charged that the 1964 border talks had foundered on.
Soviet unwillingness'to recognize the 19th century
treaties as "unequal treaties." Peking had offered
to take these treaties as the basis for determining
the boundary and. resolving territorial disputes,
but Moscow refused to give the Chinese an opening
obviously aimed at legitimizing China's claims to
vast territories in Siberia.
The agreement by the Chinese to hold navigation
talks suggests that they believe they have a strong
legal and geographic case on the disputed Ussuri
islands. Moscow has not yet: commented on the Chinese
acceptance, but it would probably welcome agreement
on practical measures that would ease river traffic
problems. The Chinese almost certainly expect the
Soviets to reject the broadening of navigation talks
to include territorial issues, however, and they
will seek to exploit this stand as further evidence
of the USSR's "great power chauvinism" and of Mos-
cow's attempts to per etuate illegal occupation of
Chinese territor .
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Hong Kong: The.government apparently is taking
further steps to help secure the release of British
correspondent Anthony w1lo has been detained
by Communist China since 1967.)
The sentences of 13 leftists and Communists
imprisoned for offenses committed during the Commu-
nists' "confrontation" in Hong Kong in 1967 were
reduced by the governor on 9 May. Hong Kong Commu-
nist leaders have linked the imprisoned men, partic-
ularly 11 leftist newsmen, to the confinement of
Grey. By the end of this year the Hong Kong govern-
ment may release all 276 leftists and Communists
imprisoned as at result of the disturbances.
Hong Kong authorities heretofore have been re-
lucta o release any of the prisoners prematurely
in order to secure Grey's release because they be-
lieved such action would sanction Peking's "black-
mail." Tensions have abated considerably in recent
months, however, as a result of instructions from
Peking that local Communists should avoid provoking
the colonial authorities. The apparent decision
by the Hong Kong authorities to act to help Grey
may also have been induced b r ure from London
to relax S' o-Br' h ons.
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Brazil: rumblings of student disconte are
again troubling the Costa e Silva government
The government's expulsion or dismissal of many
studen s and respected faculty members has begun to
rouse normally apathetic student moderates to join
protests organized by leftist activists. In Sao
Paulo, a student strike has forced the suspension
of most university classes. In the northeastern
city of Recife, members of the medical faculty at
the federal university have decided to defy the
military by rejecting a list ostudents selected
to be expelled for "subversion."
In order to forestall renewed student activity,
the government is taking a tough line. For example,
all 800 engineering students at the federal univer-
sity in Recife have been required to submit a written
defense by today or face expulsion.
?-.-
Although the government's actions may swell
the ranks of the protesters, factionalism among
student leaders and the government's determination
to stamp out student "subversion" will probably for
the time being prevent effective protests on a na-
tionwide scale. The evidence of growing dissatis-
faction irritates military leaders, however, and
may well cause them to renew their pressure on the
r sident for more sweeng purges and punishmensj
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Chile: Strains within President Frei's Chris-
tian Democratic Party are reaching serious propor-
tions.
Leaders of the leftist wing of the party and
of the youth group resigned last week. They stated
that they do not plan to form a new political party
but will start a "movement," open to the Marxist
left, for the establishment of "popular unity."
These leftists, who include several members of
Congress, have left the party in part because they
hope that a candidate from their group could con-
solidate support; from the Communists and Socialists
for the presidential election in 1970. Ten days ago
the Christian Democratic Party assembly voted 233
to 215 to run its own candidate rather than try to
form an alliance with one or more of the leftist
parties.
Although defectors are not numerous at present,
their action is symptomatic of the disarray within
the party little more than a year before the presi-
dential election,
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Finland-Europe: e Finnish initiative con-
cerning a European security conference is receiving
a varied responsE~_)
West European governments do not believe the
time is ripe for preparatory meetings leading to
such a conference. They do not, however, want to
appear too negative. Two NATO sessions this week
will be devoted to discussions of the Finnish pro-
posal. The UK is-, pushing for an agreed Allied po-
sition on the issue.
East European countries have welcomed the Finn-
ish proposal but have thus far not commented exten-
sively on it. The East Germans were pleased with
the equal treatment the proposal accorded Pankow
and Bon?
Domestic Finnish reaction to the new call for
a European security conference has been uniformly
favorable. Parties in all parts of the political
spectrum approve of the proposal as appropriate for
neutral Finland to have made. Although foreign of-
ficials have speculated that Helsinki acted with
Soviet prompting, the initiative no doubt reflects
President Kekkonen's desire to play a larger role
on the international stage as well. It also stems
from his government's desire to deflect domestic
leftists' criticism that it has been too passive
on problems of world peace and securi
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Hungary: The first details of the regime's
closely controlled political reform have been made
public. The new proposal appears aimed largely at
forestalling dangerous side effects of last year's
economic reform..
Party politburo member Gyula Kallai, who is
president of the National Assembly and a leading
exponent of democratization from above, outlined
proposed changes in a speech to party activists on
7 May. In essence, Kallai said the time has come
for the party to give some content to "representa-
tive democracy" as practiced in Hungary.
Specifically, Kallai recommended strengthening
the National Assembly and local governments, and
suggested national and regional referenda on ma-
jor issues. He called for a new advisory role for
mass organizations, such as trade unions and the
Popular Front, which might "assist in perfecting"
party policies. Kallai also recommended paying
higher salaries to fewer but better qualified peo-
ple in order to obtain a cheaper, more responsive
government apparatus. Such a move would strike at
party hacks in the provinces. None of these pro-
posals, however, allows any latitude for non-Commu-
nist political activity, nor do they entail signif-
icant loss of party control. Thus, the Hungarians
apparently hope to escape the consequences of the
runaway reform in Czechoslovakia.
Many aspects of this plan will be unpopular
with conservatives in Hungary and elsewhere. Kallai
recognized this when he attacked the hard-liners
for insisting that democratization would weaken
party control. How this argument is resolved will
determine the future of the reforms.
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Czechoslovakia: Price increases, which may be
introduced as early as tomorrow, are the first step
in Prague's program to stabilize the economy.
The government has, however, acceded to a trade
union demand that prices of certain goods and ser-
vices--including basic foodstuffs, children's cloth-
ing, rents, basic fuels, and special commuting fares--
will be frozen through this year.
The regime hopes the price increases will curb
the current consumer buying spree and channel fu-
ture wage increases into savings. Thus Prague ex-
pects to help check inflationary pressures and to
keep the labor force reasonably content.
Government leaders have also announced a re-
duction in budgetary outlays and the introduction
of limited wage and salary controls in inefficient
enterprises as additional stabilizing measures.
The current: truce between the trade unions and
the government nonetheless appears to be an uneasy
one. The trade unions are reported to be suspicious
of official price statistics and have suggested us-
ing their own index of living costs. Moreover, the
government has riot promised that real wages will con-
tinue to increase or that the line will be held on
prices other than those in its agreement with the
trade unions for 1969. It is likely that living
standards this year will rise more slowly than in
1968.
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Pakistan: An important East Pakistani opposi-
tion leader is demonstrating conflicting attitudes
toward the martial law administration.
Speaking to 'US officials on 8 May, Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman, a spokesman for East Pakistani au-
tonomy, took a moderate approach toward the govern-
ment. He conceded that his entire program, includ-
ing the demand that East Pakistan have 56 percent
of the representatives in any future parliament,
was negotiable. The essential element, he pointed
out, was that East Pakistan control its own finances.
Mujib explained that if West Pakistan were
broken up into four separate administrative units
as demanded by many opponents of the former Ayub
government, East Pakistan would gain relative
strength in the legislature. Mujib envisaged that
representatives from the West. Pakistani regions of
Sind, Baluchistan, and the Northwest Frontier would
often side with the Bengalis to prevent continued
domination of the government by the Punjab region.
Earlier, however, Mujib, in giving a US Embassy
official an account of his recent meeting with
President Yahya Khan, had criticized the new govern-
ment as a foreign military occupation of East Pak-
istan and declared that the Bengalis would fight if
their demands were not met. He also said he had
protested the alleged preparation of cases against
members of his party for their actions during the
disturbances which led to the imposition of martial
law.
Mujib's tougher attitude, echoed by one of his
lieutenants, may have been intended to prompt the
US to pressure the Yahya administration to accommo-
date Bengali grievances. On 8 May, for instance,
Mujib told an American that the timing of elections
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would depend on Washington, because the martial law
government needed American monej
Meanwhile, there have been no political devel-
opments of overriding importance in West Pakistan
since the completion early this month of Yah a's
nationwide fact-finding tour.
13 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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3WRVT
NOTES
I Western Europe: Uncertainty prevails in the
foreign exchange: mark espite the opening of the
week on a hopeful note.
Dealers are awaiting the re-
lease today of Britain's monthly trade figures for
April and the announcement tomorrow of Germany's
promised official controls on capital flows. Judg-
ments about whether the recent round of speculation
has been successfully blunted must await the mar-
ket's reaction to these events later in the week.
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USSR: The two Soviet planetary probes launched
last January will arrive at Venus this week. The
probes probably are programed to send back informa-
tion on the Venusian environment during their para-
chute descent to the surface on 16 and 17 May. The
Venus 5 and 6 spacecraft--each weighing about 2,400
pounds--are believed to be improved versions of
Venus 4, which penetrated the planet's atmosphere
in October 1967, but stopped transmitting data dur-
ing its descent. Prior to Venus 5 and 6 the Soviets
were successful only once--with Venus 4--in reaching
the planet,
(continued)
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Algeria: Some important ministerial shifts
may be in tie offing. A press announcement that
Interior Minister Medeghri has assumed "interim re-
sponsibility" for finance adds substance to earlier
rumors that Finance Minister Cherif Belkacem would
be replaced. Belkacem is one of the original mem-
bers of Boumediene's inner clique, but has disagreed
with some aspects of Algerian economic policy. An-
other change involves the minister of commerce, who
recently was named ambassador to Morocco. There is
also a possibility that the minister of agriculture,
whose post has had a rapid turnover rate, may be on
Guinea: President Toure`'s latest campaign
against alleged imperialist-inspired conspirators,
in progress since February, is scheduled to wind up
tomorrow with a spectacle at the Conakry stadium.
Details of the conspiracy will be disclosed to party
militants; and sentences, possibly including death
penalties, will. presumably be announced.
The campaign already has resulted in the arrest
of approximately 30 critics of the regime and some
tightening of Toure's control over the military.
Faced with continued consumer shortages, Guineans
are increasingly skeptical of the regime's perennial
charge that imperialism lies at the root of all
troubles.
(continued)
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Dahomey: The Zinsou government, already beset
by intractable financial problems, a growing split
within the army, and active coup plotting by its
numerous civilian opponents, is now involved in a
potentially dangerous imbroglio with students. On
10 May, following a one-day student strike, Presi-
dent Zinsou closed secondary schools in the country's
two major cities and reportedly decided to expel a
number of students. The strike ostensibly began
over student grievances, but. quickly developed into
an attack on the President, who was charged with
selling out to "French imperialism." There remains
a threat of disruptive student demonstrations and
sympathy strikes by workers, particularly government
employees, who already are angry over Zinsou's at-
tempts to cut some of their fringe benefits. I
Dominican Republic: The student arm of Juan
Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) ousted
Communists from control of student elective offices
at the national university on 7 May. The PRD group,
profiting from deep ideological divisions among its
opponents, based its campaign on Bosch's "popular
dictatorship" thesis. The success of the PRD, how-
ever, is probably not indicative of any long-term
campus trend toward a less radical stance. As na-
tional politicking intensifies in anticipation of
presidential elections next year, the university
is again likely -to be a major headache of
uer administration.
13 May 69
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