CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A013500020001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 12, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved Rod Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP79T0ft6A0135
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Secret
51
12 April 1969
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No. 0088/69
12 April 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Czechoslovakia-USSR: The Soviets are keeping up
pressure in anticipation of the coming Czechoslovak
plenum. (Page 2)
Rumania: Ceausescu apparently is tightening his
control and supervision of the economy. (Page 4)
USSR: The merchant fleet continues to expand but
does not pose a serious challenge to Free World
shipping. (Page 5)
Nationalist China: President Chiang has taken
steps to strengthen Kuomintang policy making
machinery. (Page 6)
South Korea - Okinawa: Seoul is concerned that re-
version of Okinawa to Japan will impair US ability
to aid in Korea's defense. (Page 7)
Turkey: A rash of student strikes may herald a new
wave of unrest. (Page 8)
Morocco-USSR: Rabat apparently balanced the effects
of President Podgorny's recent visit with pro-
Western gestures. (Page 9)
USSR-Rumania: Manescu's visit to Moscow
(Page 10)
Chile: Presidential election maneuvering
(Page 10)
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C Vietnam: A surge in Communist military activ-
ity occurred in the southern half of the country on
11 April.
Heavy enemy action in III and IV Corps again
consisted of widespread spellings with no signifi-
cant ground follow-up. At least 20 separate rocket
and mortar attacks occurred in III Corps, with al-
lied positions near the provincial capital of Tay
Ninh among the hardest hit. Particularly heavy
damage and casualties to allied personnel were
caused by Communist shellings of a major base near
Tay Ninh city.
Enemy activity also increased markedly in IV
Corps, where four provincial capitals and at least
eight district towns were shelled. The heaviest
civilian casualties occurred in Vinh Long city when
Communist mortar rounds hit a central market area.
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Czechoslovakia-USSR: The Soviets are keeping
up pressure on the leadership in Prague in antici-
pation of the opening of a party plenum there on
17 April?
The presence in Prague of Soviet Deputy Foreign
Minister Semenov, may be intended to emphasize that
the Soviets are unwilling to tolerate the Dubcek
leadership's procrastination in carrying out their
demands. He probably is prodding the leadership to
make certain that the central committee endorses
literally Moscow's demands to ensure control of the
situation. At the plenum, the central committee
will debate the measures--some reportedly still se-
cret--and presumably will endorse them, particularly
since they already have been accepted by the presidium.
The Soviets seem to be playing a role in the
precautions taken by the Czechoslovaks to avert
strikes that have been threatened over several is-
sues. Semenov met with tirade union chief Polacek
yesterday, probably in an attempt to figure out the
position of the liberal unions in respect to new re-
strictive domestic measures. If the workers stage
a general strike when planned price hikes are an-
nounced, the students and other sectors of the pop-
ulation might join them. One Soviet objective
may be to coordinate security measures with the
Czechoslovaks in case the situation should get out
of hand.
Meanwhile, the Dubcek leadership may have worked
out a compromise that will avert a strike which stu-
dents in Prague threatened to call because of press
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censorship. The students have announced that they
will hold only a relatively harmless one-day "teach-
in"--a solution that may be acceptable to the Rus-
sians.
There are widespread rumors that some top party
leaders, including Dubcek and the popular progres-
sive;,,Josef Smrkovsky, will be ousted at the forth-
coming plenum. The Russians allegedly are pressing
for Smrkovsky's removal, even though they are aware
that this action, as well as other retrogressive
measures, could generate a new crisis. 25X1
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Rumania: Party and. government chief Ceausescu
appears to be tightening his direct control and
supervision of the economy.
Last month the government's Economic Council
was elevated to the level of a quasi-superministry
reporting directly to Ceausescu and the newly
strengthened State Council.. The Economic Council
evidently will have broad authority to oversee
party and government policies in the economic sphere.
Rumania's leaders have stressed that although
the economy does not need basic structural reform,
it does require administrative and organizational
streamlining to increase efficiency. In 1967 Ruma-
nia embarked on a program of limited experimentation
with an expanded role for managers in selected in-
dustrial enterprises. The results, however; have
been mixed and generally negative, which may have
caused Ceausescu and other officials to re-evaluate
their economic policies.
The program outlined in 1967 also included a
proposal for the creation of "industrial centrals,"
or amalgamations of enterprises within a given in-
dustry or within a specific geographic area. It
now appears that industrial centrals will be created
on a gradual and experimental basis.
It was hoped that the centrals would be better
able to supervise industrial operations. The just-
published statutes for guiding the centrals' opera-
tions indicate, however, that they will act mainly
as a watchdog for central government ministr;PG
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USSR: The Soviet merchant fleet is continuing
to expand, but it does not pose a serious challenge
to Free World shipping in the near future.
According to Soviet Merchant Marine Minister
Bakayev, the USSR's maritime fleet is expected to
grow by more than 50 percent between 1970 and 1975.
Although the fleet's tonnage has tripled during the
past decade, its rate of growth has slowed from an
annual rate of increase of 21 percent in 1964 to
7 percent last year. The fleet now totals 10.5 to
11 million deadweight tons.
The USSR probably will not reach its Five-Year
Plan (1966-70) goal of a fleet of 13 million dead-
weight tons unless deliveries from domestic ship-
yards and purchases from the Free World and Eastern
Europe increase considerably this year and next.
At the present rate of deliveries, achievement of
Bakayev's 1975 target--at least 17 million dead-
weight tons--is unlikely.
Even if this goal should be attained, the USSR
would move only from seventh to sixth or fifth posi-
tion in the rank of national fleets, displacing
Greece and possibly the US, whose fleet tonnage is
declining. The leading Free World fleets, including
the Japanese, Norwegian and Liberian--a flag of
convenience for US and other Free World owners--are
growing faster than that of the USSR.
The ability of the Soviet fleet to compete with
Free World shipping is limited by the USSR's lack of
supertankers, large bulk carriers and container
ships. The Soviet fleet is designed primarily to
meet Soviet port conditions and to carry Soviet
trade. Close to 50 percent of the USSR's seaborne
foreign trade has moved on foreign carriers since
1964. By 1970 this figure may decline to 40 percent.
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Nationalist China: LIP-resident Chiang's recent
moves to revitalize the leading organ of the Kuo-
mintang appear designed both to strengthen the
party's policymaking machinery and to prepare the
way for his chosen successQr
At the Kuomintang's recent tenth congress,
Chiang named six new members to the central stand-
ing committee, the party's senior policymaking
body. Most of them are young, economist-oriented
technocrats. The virtual exclusion of such ex-
perts in the past contributed to a gradual decline
in the committee's importance and reinforced the
government's emphasis on military priorities at
the expense of economic investment and growth.
Chiang's action may reflect a recognition
that is son and chosen successor, Defense Min-
ister Chiang Ching-kuo, will not be able to com-
mand the unchallenged authority that the General-
issimo possesses. President Chiang apparently
believes the presence of a group of energetic
and competent officials in top policymaking posi-
tions will help balance the influence of old-line
Kuomintang hierarchs and. enhance the regime's abil-
ity to deal with pressing economic problem
The President. also used the party congress
to announce his decision, to abolish the post of
party deputy director-general, which many members
had assumed would go to his son. Chiang probably
wished to avoid not only the "dynastic" implica-
tions of appointing his son to this post but also
the potential risk of creating a challenger to an
orderly succession if someone else had to be named.
The President, in any event, appears confident that
Chiang Ching-kuo already has sufficient control of
the party, military, and s rit apparatus to as-
sure a smooth transition.
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South Korea Okinawa: Seoul is showing con-
cern that the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese con-
trol may impair the usefulness of US bases there
for the defense of Koren
President Pak's government has formally re-
quested that it be fully consulted by the US re-
garding any change in the present status of the
Ryukyuan Island chain, of which Okinawa is a part.
An aide memoire handed to the US ambassador on
8 April asserts that the island's "indispensable"
role in the defense of the area makes its disposi-
tion a matter of concern to more than just the US
and Japan.
The South Koreans have made a similar repre-
sentation to the Japanese Government. An aide
memoire handed the Japanese ambassador on 10 April
did not refer directly to the reversion problem
but stressed the hope that nothing would be done
to reduce the strategic value of the Okinawa bases.
Subsequently the foreign minister suggested to the
Chinese Nationalists that Seoul and Taipei along
with other concerned goy rnments work out a joint
approach to the Japanese
LT-h
Tokyo government understands the Koreans'
strategic interest in Okinawa. Prime Minister Sato,
however, is not likely to be greatly influenced by
South Korean representations although the Foreign
Ministry probably will quietly try to soothe Korean
fears. Sato will continue to respond primarily to
the considerable internal political pressures on
the Okinawa J_ssue as well as to Japanese se urit
interests
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Turkey: The rash of student strikes spreading
across Turkey may herald a new wave of student un-
rest and violence.
Although the strikes appear to be prompted by
the slow pace of academic reform since the student
strikes of last spring, leftist youth leaders have
been quick to exploit the situation to revitalize
their anti-American campaign. Some striking stu-
dents appear to be weakening, however, in the face
of an ultimatum that at least one university will
be closed unless the students end their occupation
of university buildings by tomorrow.
As the campaign for the national elections next
fall gets under way, the tone of student action will
almost certainly become more antiregime with anti-
American overtones. Several clashes between student
extremist groups have occurred, during which a va-
riety of weapons, including revolvers and molotov
cocktails, were used,according to the press.
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Morocco-USSR: Moscow may derive some po-
tential benefits from President Podgorny's re-
cent visit to Rabat, but Moroccan officials ap-
pear to have balanced the effects of his tour
with pro-Western gestures.
Most Western diplomats in Rabat believe
that the Podgorny visit improved the popular
image of the Soviet Union and even of Commu-
nism, which has had little reality for most
Moroccans. For his part, King Hassan may have
received no immediate tangible benefits, but
there is at least a possibility for increased
Soviet economic aid, and even military aid.
Speculation that new major economic projects
were discussed cannot be confirmed.
Podgorny's open appeal to the Moroccan
people over the head of the monarchy may have
deepened the government's suspicions regard-
ing Soviet intentions. The Soviet counselor
reportedly has protested the Moroccan press'
handling of the visit. Also, the basic pro-
Western preferences of the King and his gov-
ernment were pointed up by Morocco's signing
an accord for associate membership with the
EEC on the eve of Podgorny's arrival, and by
recent visits by high-level Italian and West
German economic delegations,
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USSR-Rumania: Three days of meetings in Moscow
between Soviet leaders and Rumanian Foreign Minister
Manescu ended on 9 April with only a barebones state-
ment regarding the outcome. TASS characterized
Manescu's discussions with Brezhnev, Kosygin and
Foreign Minister Gromyko as a "useful exchange of
opinions,"--a phrase usually used to indicate :Lack
of agreement. Yugoslav and Western press services
have reported that the Russian leaders accepted
Manescu's invitation to visit Bucharest to sign
a new friendship treaty--presumably a prime topic
of the discussions. Formal announcements from
Moscow and Bucharest, however, failed to mention
either a visit or the treaty, stating only that
bilateral relations, European security, and "to~p-
ical international problems" were discussed.
Chile: Radomiro Tomic has withdrawn "ir-
revocably" from the contest for the presiden-
tial nomination of President Frei's Christian
Democratic Party. Tomic, who resigned as am-
bassador to the United States a year ago to
return to Chilean political life, has generally
been considered Frei's heir apparent in the elec-
tion scheduled for September 1970. He said re-
cently, however, that he would not run unless
he received support from the forces of the left,
meaning the Communist and Socialist parties,
which have now rebuffed his overtures. He may
be raising the ploy of an "irrevocable" with-
drawal to rally support for his candidacy.
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