CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A013200070001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 5, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A0132090b
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
501-
5 March 1969
State Dept. review completed
Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A013200070001-7
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO13200070001-7
Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO13200070001-7
 Approved For Release 2004 1 EII-RDP79T00975A013200070001-7
No. 0055/69
5 March 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Berlin: A last-moment diplomatic proposal by East
Germany has produced no change, and West German
electors convene today. (Page 2)
Czechoslovakia: The government is trying to in-
crease its control over the defense establishment.
(Page 3)
Rumania - Warsaw Pact: Bucharest is stepping up
efforts to forestall Pact maneuvers in Rumania.
(Page 4)
Jordan: Husayn seems to have acquiesced in a softer
pow cy toward fedayeen in Jordan. (Page 5)
USSR: Inflationary pressures in the economy prob-
ably are increasing. (Page 6)
USSR-Uruguay: A trade and credit agreement has
been signed. (Page 7)
Dominican Republic: President Balaguer hints that
he may run again in 1970. (Page 8)
USSR: TU-144 at Paris Air Show (Page 9)
Hungary: Leadership absences (Page 9)
Latin America: Labor problems (Page 9)
Approved For Release 2004,/ /Rb -RDP79T00975A013200070001-7
 Approved For Release 2004! (RRB --RDP79T00975A013200070001-7
NORTH
nVIETNAM
CAM BOD1JA
)Ben Het
Aolei Kleig
I
MILES
Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO13200070001-7
SECRET
III CORPS
Capital Special Zone
IV CORPS SOUTH VIETNAM
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/ICRDP79T00975A013200070001-7
South Vietnam: The Communists may have kicked
off phase two o eir current offensive, at least
in the western highlands.
North Vietnamese regulars continue to main-
tain pressure against two allied positions near
the Cambodian border in western Kontum Province
which they first attacked in battalion strength on
3 March,, In the attack on 3 March against the
Special Forces camp at Ben Het, enemy infantry
units were supported by at least nine PT-76 amphib-
ious tanks--the first employment of armor by the
Communists in South Vietnam in more than a year
and its initial appearance in II Corps. In the
other major action west of the Special Forces camp
at Polei Kleng, the fate of nearly 50 members of
a US Army rifle company attacked on the 3rd re-
mains in doubt, as heavy enemy resistance in the
area has thus far precluded allied rescue efforts?
Polei Kleng itself has also remained under heavy
shelling.
Elsewhere in Vietnam, enemy activity remained
at the preoffensive levels of the last few days
and consisted mostly of harassing actions against:
allied military units and installations. The rela-
tive lull in much of the country, when balanced
against the upsurge of activity in the highlands,
suggests that the Communists may attempt to stagger
phase two of their offensive region by region rather
than opt immediately for a renewed countrywide
series of coordinated attacks.
In the critical III Corps area, there has been
an increase in shelling and harassments against
allied outposts and artillery bases situated near
well-established infiltration routes in Tay Ninh
and Hau Nghia provinces. The pattern of enemy
actions suggests that a major effort may be under-
way to screen the movement of troops and supplies
estern approach corridor to Saigon.
(
5 Mar 6 9 _,,, Central Intelligence Bulletin
Map)I
Approved For Release 2004/ 08.RCJ f DP79T00975A013200070001-7
 Approved For Release 2004/o?1DP79T00975A013200070001-7
Berlin: Yesterday's last-moment diplomatic
approach by the East Germans has produced no
changes, and the West German Federal Assembly will
convene in West Berlin today to elect a new pres-
ident.
The East Germans sweetened their original
Easter wall pass proposal only with a declaration
of willingness to discuss a longer term pass agree-
ment. West Berlin Mayor Schuetz, Chancellor Kie-
singer, and other West German officials agreed that
this was not sufficient to warrant moving the
meeting from West Berlin.
The Soviets, meanwhile, are exercising careful
control over the sporadic autobahn closures that
affect Allied traffic. Yesterday's two-hour clo-
sure of the Helmstedt autobahn delayed small Brit-
ish and French military convoys. No US convoys
were scheduled. Shortly after the British convoy
was stopped, the Soviets told its commander exactly
when the closure would end. As they did on 3 March,
when a US convoy was halted, Soviet officers and
troops manned the checkpoints during the closure.
Czechoslovak Embassy officials in East Berlin
have added to rumors that there may be a closure
today of the crossing point through which foreigners
enter East Berlin. In the past, the Western Allies
have never been barred from entering the Communist
half of the city, suggesting that these rumors may
only be part of the campaign to heighten
as the Federal Assembly convenes.
5 Mar 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 2
25X1
Approved For Release 200(IR.-RDP79T00975A013200070001-7
 Approved For Release 2004/ ? ADP79T00975A013200070001-7
Czechoslovakia: The government has activated
a civi ian- ominated state Defense Council in an
effort to increase the regime's control of the de-,
fense establishment. This move, however, probably
will not seriously disrupt efforts by the conserv-
atives to strengthen their positions within the
security and police apparatus.
The nine-member council, headed by party chief
Dubcek, was initially proposed as part of Dubcek's
reform program early in 1968, but its formal estab-
lishment was delayed. Designed mainly to prevent
a military or a party clique from seizing power,
the council was a direct response to former party
boss Novotny's futile attempt in December 1967 to
use the army to perpetuate his rule.
Under present circumstances, Dubcek may try
to use the State Defense Council to curb the in-
fluence of pro-Soviet elements in the Ministry of
Defense. Since the invasion, a number of pro-Soviet
hard-liner military officers have been installed
in key positions and--with the assistance of Soviet
"advisers"--are said to be seeking control of the
ministry.
The majority of the council members are cen-
trist politicians opposed to the hard-liners.. De-
fense Minister Dzur, Interior Minister Pelnar, and
Chief of the General Staff Rusov--the only military
and security types on the council--are known to be
Dubcek supporters.
The conservatives, meanwhile, are also trying
to gain control of the police and security forces.
Progressive journalists have warned that it is "an
open secret" that the hard-liners have made con-
siderable inroads in the secret police, and that
the progressives in the Interior Ministry are now
on the defensive. Moreover, the conservatives re-
portedly also have made substantial progress among
the People's Militia, the paramilitary force of
the Czechoslovak Communist Party comprised largely-
of workers from factories and mines. 25X1
5 Mar 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 200ajWf? ] -RDP79T00975A013200070001-7
 Approved For Release 2004/.IU?2DP79T00975A013200070001-7
Rumania - Warsaw Pact: Bucharest. is stepping
up its efforts to forestall any Warsaw Pact plans
to hold maneuvers in Rumania.
Rumanian leader Ceausescu gave a speech on
28 February, concluding the national election cam-
paign, that was frequently belligerent in tone.
He assailed "military maneuvers and other demon-
strations of force on the borders of other coun-
tries," as he has in the past. This time, however,
he condemned similar actions on the "territories
of other states." This general theme, emphasized
in recent speeches by other Rumanian leaders, sug-
gests that details still are not settled concerning
Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Rumanian soil--which Bu-
charest has reportedly agreed to in principle.
Rightly or wrongly, Ceausescu probably believes
he still can bargain on this issue.
Apparently to undercut any possible Russian
intimidation, Ceausescu drew attention to what he
described as Rumania's improved military posture.
He also asserted that "Rumanian socialism is in
safe hands--in the hands of the Communist Party,
the working class, and all the people"--an ingre-
dient Moscow claimed was lacking when it invaded
Czechoslovakia.
The Rumanian leadership apparently also wanted
to document its independent position, just prior
to the final meeting this month in Moscow of the
preparatory commission for the international Commu-
nist conference. In addition, the wide dissemina-
tion given by Rumanian news media to the speeches
by Ceausescu and other Rumanian leaders, as well as
the new support given to them in the elections,
seem designed to re-emphasize, at home and abroad,
the message that the Rumanian leadershi is united.
and Bucharest's position is unchanged.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/RR?rR 'k RDP79T00975A013200070001-7
 Approved For Release 2004/ 4c 1LI DP79T00975A013200070001-7
Jordan: Pressures in favor of the terrorist:
movement seem to have forced Husayn to acquiesce
in a more tolerant position toward the fedayeen
presence in Jordan.
Fedayeen are being permitted to operate more
and more openly and with increasingly independent
authority throughout the country. Fedayeen groups
solicited funds in Amman during the recent Muslim
holidays, canvassing hotels and the homes of for-
eigners. They have also been harassing foreign
visitors to popular tourist sites; the US Embassy
fears that some incident involving US nationals
and the fedayeen could easily occur.
There are no indications that any direct con-
frontation between the fedayeen and the government:
is in the wind. To the contrary, Husayn appears
to have reached a new modus vivendi with the feda-
yeen groups--his internal security forces are co-
operating with the fedayeen's security units, often
in joint patrols.
Husayn appears confident that he can quash
any antiregime move from the terrorists. I
5 Mar 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/BE13R PDP79T00975A013200070001-7
 Approved For Release 2004/d CItR DP79T00975A013200070001-7
USSR: Inflationary pressures in the Soviet
economy probably are increasing despite a drive to
accelerate the production of consumer goods to
meet rising incomes.
Real income per capita has increased signif-
icantly during the past several years in the USSR.
Increased money incomes of collective farmers, an
industrial wage reform, and greater pension bene-
fits have pushed consumer purchasing power to new
heights; another rise in money incomes is scheduled
for this year.
Although the government has attempted to in-
crease the growth of consumer goods output, the
rise in money incomes has continued to outpace the
supply. As a result, substantial funds have gone
into savings accounts, which rose by 20 percent
last year for the third year in succession. This
was the equivalent of about 40 percent of the
year's increase in personal income.
The excess purchasing power is reflected also
in rising prices on the collective farm market, the
only organized free market in the USSR. During
the last half of 1968, prices on this market in
Moscow were about 8.5 percent above those during
the same period of the previous year.
An increase in the supply of consumer goods
and services is scheduled this year, but it'may
fail again to meet rising incomes, thus intensifying
the inflationary pressures already present in the
economy.
5 Mar 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 6
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/0JV1Cr. DP79T00975A013200070001-7
 Approved For Release 2004/ C DP79T00975A013200070001-7
USSR-Uruguay: On 28 February the USSR and
Uruguay signed a trade agreement, as well as a
$20-million credit agreement that has been under
intermittent discussion over the past three years.
The terms of the export credit agreement were
not spelled out in the TASS announcement, but Uru-
guay will probably purchase Soviet capital goods
to be paid for largely with traditional Uruguayan
exports over eight years at three-percent interest.
In recent years total trade between the USSR
and Uruguay, consisting chiefly of imports by the
USSR, has averaged only a few million dollars an-
nually. It remains to be seen whether the credit
agreement will lead to a substantial broadening of
trade. This has failed to occur under similar ar-
rangements that Moscow already has with Brazil and
Chile.
5 Mar 69 Central intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2004/OYKC. RI DP79T00975A013200070001-7
 Approved For Release 2004/ CRDP79T00975A013200070001-7
Dominican Republic: Reaction to President
Balaguer's first hints that he may run again high-
lights the prospects for political instability be-
tween now and the elections scheduled for May 1970..
The President, in his Independence Day speech
on 27 February, stated that his future plans would.
not be swayed by the wishes of petty political
leaders or members of his own party, but by the
will of "the people." This bid for public support.
underscores the fact that his personal popularity
is independent of the ruling Reformist Party mech-
anism.
In reaction to his speech, the leftist Revolu-
tionary Social Christian Party, the only political
party of any size to challenge the Reformist Party
in the municipal elections in 1968, reiterated its
opposition to Balaguer's re-election and hinted
that it might support a coup. The major opposition
Dominican Revolutionary Party, which boycotted the
1968 elections, has not formally announced its re-
action, but had indicated earlier that it would
withdraw again in 1970 if Balaguer ran. The Com-
munist parties are predictably condemning any re-
election attempt.
Although there is no constitutional prohibition
against a second term, the subject of continuismo- -?
extended one-man rule--is a heated public issue,
stirring memories of Trujillo's hated 31-year dic-
tatorship. Balaguer's nomination could prompt
elements of the opposition to make common cause in
an-effort to to le his government or provoke a
military coup.
5 Mar 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/% '8 f2 DP79T00975A013200070001-7
 Approved For Release 2004Y~''1'W- E174-RDP79T00975A013200070001-7
USSR: The Soviets reportedly plan to fly
their TU-144 supersonic jetliner to Paris for dis-
play at the Paris Air Show in :Late May if testing
continues satisfactorily. The aircraft. almost
certainly will be the prototype that made the well
publicized first supersonic transport flight in
Moscow last December. Because the TU-144 will be
competing for attention at the show with the Anglo-
French Concorde supersonic airliner, it probably
will not create the sensation that the giant Soviet.
AN-22 cargo transport did at the Paris Air Show in
1965. F_ I
Hungary: Foreign Minister Peter and Defense
Minister Czinege, both of whom reportedly disap-
proved openly of Hungary's participation in the
invasion of Czechoslovakia, have not appeared in
public since mid-January. They had been seen only
occasionally since November, when the leadership
last turned out in force. Kadar reportedly refused.
to take action on their resignations at the time of
the invasion in order to preserve the facade of
party unity. Their status may become clear at a
central committee meeting expected later this month..
Latin America: The planned withdrawal of the
American Federation of Labor/Congress of Industrial.
Organizations (AFL/CIO) from the International Con-
federation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) is causing
consternation American ircles.
1if the
AFL CIO goes through with this action, the umbrella.
under which it now provides funds to the Inter Amer-,
ican Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT), will
be removed. ORIT then would be more vulnerable to
the frequent allegations by Communist labor unions
that it is an organ of US im erialism and not an
international organization.
5 Mar 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 9
25X1
Approved For Release 200 C*F,- 1 -RDP79T00975A013200070001-7
 Secre proved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO13200070001-7
Secret
Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO13200070001-7