CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A012100080001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 18, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.
Secret
., 51.
18 September 1968
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No. 0264/68
18 September 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Czechoslovakia-USSR: Dubcek may go to Moscow later
this week. Page 2)
Poland-Czechoslovakia: Gomulka and most of his col-
leagues are holding publicly to the line that inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia was necessary. (Page 4)
Israel - Arab States: Border incidents continue.
(Page 6)
Japan: Unresolved leadership differences have seri-
ously impaired the Japan Socialist Party's prospects.
(Page 7)
Senegal: Government and students reach compromise
agreement. (Page 8)
Jamaica: Prime Minister Shearer's political problems
are increasing. (Page 9)
East Germany - Berlin: Travel restrictions (Page 11)
USSR-Czechoslovakia: AN-22 in service (Page 11)
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Nigeria: Military developments (Page 13)
Latin America: Cuba and the OAS (Page 13)
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92060 9-68 CIA Approved For Release 2004/0 l&1-'kDP79T00975A012100080001-8
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[South Vietnam: The Communists yesterday hit hard
at allied positions in I Corps and north of Saigon.
A US Marine company in northwestern Quang Tri
Province lost 25 killed and 126 wounded from an in-
tensive mortar and ground attack northwest of the
"Rockpile." A South Vietnamese command post near
Hai An in Quang Nam Province was overrun, but the
Communists were routed after 24 hours with losses
of 186 killed compared with government casualties
of 37 killed and 101 wounded.
The fighting near the "Rockpile," where large
enemy weapons caches continue to be uncovered, could
indicate enemy plans to lay siege to this US strong-
point. On the other hand, the heavy combat losses
suffered by enemy forces in the Da Nang - Hoi An area
in the past two days should further limit the Commu-
nist potential against the populated centers in Quang
Nam.
In the III Corps area, meanwhile, attacks on US
positions in Binh Duong, Tay Ninh, and Hau Nghia
provinces were beaten off with Communist losses of
over 200 killed. The Communists' latest upsurge
could reflect efforts to position their forces closer
to Saigon. Agents report the capital may be subjected
to shelling and ground probes this weekend. 25X1
18 Sep 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Czechoslovakia-USSR: Czechoslovak television
is portraying Dubcek as a "national hero," apparently
hoping to convince the Russians that replacing him
might generate strong public reaction.
Dubcek, and other Czechoslovak leaders will go
to Moscow "late this week," according to an uncon-
firmed press report. While there has been no official
announcement of the trip, Premier Cernik stated after
returning from his 10 September visit to the Soviet
capital that a high-level delegation would soon go to
Moscow to negotiate the withdrawal of occupation
troops.
Should such a trip materialize, the Soviets
probably will take the Czechoslovaks to task for
their efforts to depict the Soviet-imposed restric-
tive measures as "temporary." One topic sure to
come up in such a meeting would be the failure of
Czechoslovak media to submit fully to restrictions.
Another likely topic is the 14th congress of the
Czechoslovak Communist Party, which, according to
an unconfirmed report, is scheduled for December
and will elect a new party leadership.
The occupying powers appear to be permitting a
resumption of tourism, which is important to Czecho-
slovakia's economy. The Soviets, however, will at-
tempt to limit the influx of tourists under the pre-
text of preventing the entry of "counterrevolutionary
elements." According to a censored version of Rude
Pravo, the party daily, the occupying powers will
not impose new restrictions on Czechoslovaks who
want to travel to the West.
The US military attache in Czechoslovakia, who
visited Prague's Ruzyne airport on 15-16 September,
has reported that most of the estimated 7,500 Soviet
troops encamped there last week have left. There is
no evidence available that the Soviets are making a
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large airlift out of Czechoslovakia. Some of the
troops at Ruzyne, however, may have been flown out
of the country on supply transports returning to the
USSR. No other significant change in the situation
of the occupying forces has been detected.
18 Sep 68
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Poland-Czechoslovakia: Party leader Gomulka
apparently has persuaded most of his colleagues and
at least one of his rivals to hold to the line pub-
licly that intervention in Czechoslovakia was neces-
sary.
Gomulka and Premier Cyrankiewicz, in speeches
over the weekend to factory party organizations in
Warsaw, echoed the standard line. They pointed out
that intervention was necessary because the alliance
between "revisionism" and "imperialist subversion,"
encouraged mainly by West Germany, had undermined
the-leading role of, the Czechoslovak. party. Both
claimed that the Polish party, subjected to the same
"challenge" earlier this year,, had repulsed these
efforts, but that it must remain vigilant.
On 15 September, party secretary and hard-line
factional leader Moczar, in his first public address
since the Warsaw Pact intervention, took much the
same line. Provincial party leader Gierek, Moczar's
rival for Gomulka's mantle, has also spoken on the
Czechoslovak issue within past weeks. None of his
remarks have been reported in full by Polish media?
suggesting that he may not have taken the official
line, even in public
Gierek and Moczar;, who are both nationalisti-
cally oriented,: are not likely to have favored Polish
participation. in the Warsaw Pact intervention.
Others within the leadership also reportedly were of
two minds about the move. Recent speeches by most
of these party leaders however;, have also endorsed
the official line.
Dissension within the leadership over the Czech-
oslovak issue undoubtedly continues despite the fa-
cade of solidarity. In a private interview with
lacting
Foreign Minister Winiewicz hinted "off the record"
that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was a "mistake."
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Winiewicz, like others within the regime who are
close to foreign political and economic affairs,
fears the impact of Polish participation in the in-
vasion on Warsaw's relations with the non-Communist
wo
d d
r
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Israel - Arab States: Incidents are continuing
along the Arab-Israeli borders, but no major new
Israeli reprisals have yet occurred.
Israeli forces on 16 September again used the
Soviet 130-mm. artillery captured during the June
1967 war to shell the Jordanian town of Irbid after
an exchange of fire. The Israelis claim the Jor-
danians fired first on Israeli settlements. The
Israelis have openly declared that their move was
retaliatory. This shelling incident was limited in
comparison to earlier retaliatory strikes, however.
For the first time in several months, Arab ter-
ve along the Lebanese frontier,
have
The Lebanese
have consistently attempted to tamp down terrorist
activity, fearing Israeli reprisal raids over their
borders.
The Suez Canal area has been comparatively quiet,
despite reports last week that either the Israelis
or the Egyptians would mount some major attack there.
Israeli Minister of Defense Dayan reiterated on
16 September, however, that it would be a fatal mis-
take for the Egyptians to try to launch an offensive
across the canal, an unlikely prospect at this time.
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Japan: The Japan Socialist Party's inability
to resolve leadership differences at a convention
last week has dealt another serious blow to its
prospects.
The convention was called following the Social-
ists' poor showing in the upper house elections last
July to choose a new leadership and to modernize the
leading opposition party's doctrinaire Marxist plat-
form. It recessed inconclusively on 14 September
after an all-night display of factional infighting,
unprecedented even for the Socialists.
An impasse was reached when the dominant far-
left factions allied to hard-line former chairman
Sasaki refused to accept the nomination of a moderate
reformist to the post of secretary general. Party
leaders will now seek to break the deadlock outside
the heated convention atmosphere. They may hope to
reach a compromise by emphasizing issues that com-
mand wide support in the party, particularly oppo-
sition to the US presence in Japan and the Far East.
The convention fiasco, which was well covered
by news media, has reinforced the Socialist Party's
image as one of warring factions unwilling to reshape
the party constructively. Continuing ultraleftist
intransigence on the leadership issue could in time
induce major defections to the moderate Democratic
Socialist Party or lead to the formation of a new
splinter Socialist party.
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Senegal: The government has reached a compromise
agreement with dissident students that should avert
another major student uprising this fall.
The two-part agreement, announced on 6 and 16
September, follows long negotiations in which repre-
sentatives of the government, the radical student
group that fomented the May 1968 student rebellion,
the national parents' association, and the national
labor union participated. Among concessions to major
student demands is the dropping of the controversial
scholarship reform that was a key issue in the
student protest last spring. Other moves include
reopening several of the schools which were to have
remained closed this year at the largely French-
funded and administered University of Dakar, and a
guarantee of continued academic freedom.
In return for the government concessions, the
student group agreed to accept partial rather than
complete reopening of the university, which was
closed during the crisis, in order that academic
reform--including Africanization of the curriculum
and administration--can be accomplished. It also
commits itself not to engage in a general strike
against the university, or a boycott of examinations
and scholarships abroad. Both sides agree to work
toward a "social detente" and to create conditions
for normal operation of the university and lycees.
President Senghor has gone to great lengths to
defuse the potentially explosive student situation
in order to gain the calm he will need to deal with
other major problems facing his government. Al-
though there are indications that a minority faction
within the student group opposes the agreement, his
concessions, coupled with generous financial as-
sistance, will probably discourage the general
student population from supporting the radicals.
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Jamaica: Prime Minister Shearer's extended po-
litical honeymoon seems to be over.
Shearer's first year in office following the
death of Prime Minister Sangster in April 1967 was
free from major political challenges. In the past
few months, however, a number of difficult political
problems have surfaced. Shearer had to cancel a
planned vacation and hurriedly return from an official
visit to Canada on 12 September to pressing problems
at home.
Increasingly serious labor discontent has led
to a rash of strikes. Even the police walked out
briefly earlier this month in a dispute over pay.
Shearer's ability to deal with labor unrest appears
to have been seriously limited by fears in his Ja-
maica Labor Party that opposition-linked unions will
benefit from government action to halt the strikes.
Shearer is also faced with differences in his
cabinet over Jamaican membership in the organization
of American States, participation in Caribbean re-
gional organizations, the establishmeiht of a consulate
in Cuba, and financial relations with Britain. Di-
vision over these issues has been compounded by long-
standing rivalries in the cabinet, particularly be-
tween ambitious Minister of Finance Seaga and Minis-
ter of Trade and Industry Lightbourne.
Public discontent with the government was illus-
trated by the demonstrators who greeted Shearer's re-
turn with complaints about increased living costs,
unemployment, and the breakdown in public services.
Shearer's problems will be exploited by the opposi-
tion, which has been increasingly effective in recent
months. F_ I
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Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Soviet AN-22 Transport Being Used in Czech Operation
AN-22 AT MOSCOW Al RSHOW - 1967
The AN-22 can carry 176,000 lbs or 500 troops
The normal load is 99,000 lbs for 5,000 miles
SOVIET Fuselage Length - 187 ft.
AN-22 Diameter - 19.5 ft.
Wing Span - 210 it.
US
Fuselage Length- 139 ft.
BOEING-707 Diameter -12 ft.
Wing Span - 131 ft.
US
LOCKHEED-
C-5A
Fuselage Length - 230 ft.
Diameter - 22 ft.
Wing Span - 222 ft.
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NOTES
East Germany - Berlin: In another apparent move
to emphasize its "sovereignty," Pankow has imposed
new controls on the access of West Berliners and West
Germans to East Berlin. On 13 September the East Ger-
mans ruled that, unless physically handicapped, resi-
dents of West Berlin who have "hardship passes"--
such as for visiting sick relatives--can cross the
Wall at only one rather than the four crossing points
allowed previously. Earlier,on 9 September, Pankow
had eliminated four of the original six crossing
points for the very limited number of West Germans
with permanent passes. Allied access to East Berlin
is not affected by these new control measures.
L
USSR-Czechoslovakia: The AN-22, the world's
largest operational transport aircraft, has been de-
tected for the first time being used in its role of
supporting Soviet military forces. Western attaches
have reported seeing AN-22s on several occasions at
the Prague airport. The Soviets have built 12 AN-22s,
and as many as five of the heavy transports are op-
erating with Soviet Military Transport Aviation.
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Federal Forces Report Capture of Owerri
Lip Federal advance
--- Biafran counterattack
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
FERNANOO P0.
(Sp.`,
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STATUTE MILES
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Nigeria: Owerri, one of the few towns remaining
in Biafran hands, was captured by federal forces on
16 September. Colonel Benjamin Adekunle, the most
successful federal military commander, whose Third
Marine Commando Division has overrun most of southern
Biafra, will probably head next for the capital of
Umuahia. The Biafrans, however, still show no signs
of giving up and continue to inflict heav casualties
on federal forces.
Latin America: Cuba's readmittance to the Or-
ganization of American States is again being dis-
cussed, but early action on the matter seems unlikely.
Chilean Foreign Minister Valdes, who is a freewheeler
on foreign policy issues, recently suggested that
Uruguay and Chile consider ways to bring about Cuba's
re-entry in the organization, but the initiative was
received coldly by the Uruguayans. Chilean President
Frei, on the other hand, said during a visit to Bra-
zil earlier this month that he did not want to see
"the Cuban experiment" repeated in Latin America and
that Cuban integration would depend on Cuba's accept-
ing "the rules of the game." Valdes subsequently
stated that Chile would not oppose Cuba's readmission
if that country adopted a "system of friendly rela-
tions" and all countries of the hemisphere agreed.
Neither condition is likely to be fulfilled in the
near future.
18 Sep 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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