CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A011700080001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 26, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
5Q
26 July 1968
State Dept. review completed
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No. 0218/68
26 July 1968
Centr~cl Intelligence Bulletin
co~vrENrs
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
USSR-Czechoslovakia: Soviet military movements in
East Germany could put further pressure on Prague.
(Page 2 )
Communist China: A nationwide crackdown by the mili-
tary may have been authorized. (Page 4)
Ceylon: The prime minister seeks more jobs for youth
as a way to get more votes for himself in 1970. (Page
USSR - Middle East: Another round of Soviet-Arab
arms negotiations is under way. (Page 6)
Daher omen: The army-appointed President is trying to
win a popular mandate. (Page 7)
Central America: Prospects for ratification of the
ommon Market tariff surcharge are improving. (Page 8)
Panama: The vote count to determine the composition
of the assembly is likely to resume. (Page 9)
Chile: The Christian Democratic Party has temporarily
brought under control its rebellious youth group.
(Page 10 )
Turkey: Demonstrations (Page 11)
Cuba: International youth program (Page 11)
Zambia: Copper production (Page 11)
Bolivia: Cabinet resigns (Page 12)
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C Vietnam:
South Vietnam: The pace of enemy military ac-
tion tapered o f uring the past 24 hours, but there
were continued signs of Communist intent to launch
significant new attacks over the next few weeks.
The bulk of the incidents reported on 24 July
consisted of harassing attacks concentrated in
southern I Corps and in the provinces surrounding
Saigon. There were few allied military casualties
and damage to installations was light.
Captured enemy documents from the area south-
east of Saigon indicate that enemy forces in this
area had been ordered to conduct a "third climaxing
phase" of attacks in early August. The documents
outlined tactical plans for the assaults which
suggest that a large-scale push against the capital
itself was involved.
Although the documents failed to reveal it, the
attack plans may now have been modified. The bulk
of the enemy main forces do not appear in position
to hit the city during early August, and the Com-
munists would probably be limited to harassing as-
saults conducted by local elements.
North Vietnam: Hanoi is apparently making a
vigorous bid to strengthen its SAM defenses against
any renewal of US air attacks above the 20th parallel.
Recent photography of the Hanoi-Haiphong area
shows a record number of at least 29 SA-2 sites si-
multaneously occupied in this area. These sites,
plus those detected occupied in southern North Viet-
nam, raise the estimated number of North Vietnamese
SAM battalions by at least five to a total of 35-40
units. This rise has occurred for the most part
since the end of June, although there were signs of
a radual increase in SAM units prior to that time.
2 6 Ju 1 6 8 Central Intelligence Bzslletin 1
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J
C USSR-Czechoslovakia: A movement of Soviet
troops which began in East Germany yesterday may be
another device for putting pressure on the Czecho-
slovaks, even though it is possibly part of a regu-
lar exercise.
Visual sightings on 25 July indicate that ele-
ments of possibly three Soviet divisions have been
moving south fro~.n the Berlin area. Large areas south
and-west of Berlin, and along the Czechoslovak bor-
der, have been temporarily closed to allied military
mission travel. The Soviet units could be deploying
into any of these areas for what may be previously
scheduled exercises. News reports of the activity
would nonetheless cause further anxiety in Czecho-
slovakia.
A Pravda article yesterday contained the strong-
est and broadest attack Moscow has yet leveled
against the leadership of the Czechoslovak party.
Pravda charged that the counterrevolutionary "plat-
form" of Czechoslovak "revisionists" has found "firm
supporters in the ranks of the party and among some
of its leading rE.presentatives."' The article also
linked the Czechoslovak a:nd Chinese heresies, charg-
ing them with "having in common their striving to
substitute national varia;r~ts for Leninism." The im-
plication would e~eem to be that both are beyond the
pale of the orthodox movement.
Czechoslovakia's party presidium met yesterday
in anticipation of its confrontation with the Soviet
politburo. The presidium issued a communique which
reaffirmed its dE~terminat:ion to carry out its democ-
ratization program, but which also stressed friend-
ship with the Soviet Union as the cornerstone of its
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foreign policy. The session reportedly became stormy
before reaching a decision to abolish the department
far military-security affairs of the party central
committee and to return its head, Lt. Gen. Vaclav
Prchlik, to duty in the army. This move appears to
be a concession to the Soviets, whose press has bit-
terly assailed Prchlik for his recent characteriza-
tion of the Warsaw Pact command as Stalinist.
2 6 J u l 6 8 Certtrul Intelligence Bzslletin 3
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Communist China: Authorities in Peking may
have authorized a nationwide crackdown on unruly Red
Guards by the military.
the recent forceful: military action against
actionalists in the southern provinces of Kwangtung
and Kwangsi reflects a rye.w mandate to restore order
throughout China. Othez? evidence indicates. that the
army is continuing to usE force against unruly Red
Guards who have kept Kwangtung in turmoil for over
three months and that a r..umber of factional leaders
have been arrested.
Although there are a.s yet no reports of mili-
tary action against. factionalists in other troubled
parts of China, in the past few days there have been
indications that nationally disseminated propaganda
is beginning once again t.o attack "anarchism"--a
euphemism for uncontrolled Red Guard activities.
This theme was prominent: last autumn, when the army
was also ordered to bring Red Guard disturbances
under control. Some provincial broadcasts have been
takin this line since t:he middle of the month.
2 6 J u l 6 8 Central Izatellzgence Bztlletin
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Ce~lo~n: Prime Minister Senanayake is moving
to re use unemployment among youth in an effort to
strengthen his election prospects in 1970.
Senanayake plans to set up a "National Youth
Council" to relieve unemployment by sponsoring a
variety of local public works projects. The pro-
gram, which would cost over $10 million during the
fiscal year beginning in October, aims to provide
at least part-time employment for 125,000 to 150,000
young people. Primary emphasis is to be on agricul-
tural development.
Ceylon's unemployed youth account for about
one third of the entire unemployed working-age group.
If the program can furnish jobs for most of these
youths, the prime minister would greatly improve his
chances of winning the elections in 1970. Unemployed
youth make up over 25 percent of the registered vot-
ers and probably were an important factor in defeat-
ing the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party in the
1965 elections.
The major drawback to the scheme is the burden
it will place on the government's deficit budget.
Senanayake hopes, however, that savings from the
reduction of food imports, made possible by the
agricultural development program, will ease the fi-
nancing problems. He also hopes there can be off-
setting reductions in expenditures by regular govern-
ment ministries on land, public works, and agricul-
ture projects. Administrative costs presumably
would be low because existin overnment channels
could be used.
2 6 Ju 1 6 8 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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USSR - Middle East: The second round of Soviet-
Arab arms negotiations since last year's Middle East
war is in full swing.
A military delegation headed by Syria's chief
of staff arrived in th.e USSR on 23 July, and an
Iraqi military group is scheduled to go to Moscow
later this month. The Egyptians have already ex-
changed military delegations with the Soviets. Mar-
shal Grechko's visit to Algeria last week probably
reflects renewed interest in the Soviet military
aid program to that country.
These vis:~ts may lead. to a new series of arms
agreements. Moscow is not expected to deliver to
the Middle East any equipment more sophisticated.
than the types now on order. The Soviets probably
will, however, continue their active participation
in the stepped--up training program for the armed
forces of Arab states.
2 6 Ju 1 6 8 Cavntral I~ztelligence Bulletin
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Dahome Newly inaugurated President Zinsou,
who was appointed President by the army, is now try-
ing to win a popular mandate.
Zinsou is stumping the countryside in order to
win a referendum on 28 July which is to confirm his
appointment as head of state. With ballot rigging
and ample military backing, Zinsou should garner a
majority of the votes cast.
Zinsou's primary opponents are the country's
three exiled political kingpins, who from neighboring
Togo and Niger have been urging their respective fol-
lowers to vote against him. Some trade unionists--
a group instrumental in provoking the military coup
last December--also oppose Zinsou.
Ultimately, however, it is not how the votes
are cast, but who counts them that will determine the
election outcome. Nevertheless, the dramatic return
to Dahomey in defiance of the military authorities
by one or all of the exiled politicians--as farmer
president Maga has threatened t do--could u set
Zinsou's carefully laid plans. 25X1
26 Jul 6 8 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Central America: 7?rospects for early ratifica-
tion of-the Central American Common Market tariff
surcharge are i.mpr_oving?
The furor over Nicaragua's early passage of the
30-percent surcharge on imports from outside the
market and over PresidE~r~t Somoza's pressure against
the other four Members c>f the market has subsided
since the summit rneetinc~ in San Salvador, and the
governments have been ~~r?essing their legislatures
for approval. In Guatemala, independents joined
government deputies to ~~ush the measure through on
23 July. -The Honduran legislature, which was wait-
ing only for Guatemalan action, should-now proceed
to ratify. The agreement will take effect in these
three countries after ~[onduras acts.
In Costa Rica, where Nicaragua's moves had
stif_f_ened potential oppasition, formal hearings- on
the measure have begun. The US Embassy in San Jose
comments that a special assembly session will prob-
ably be called :in .August and there is a good chance
of ratification by rnid-September at the latest.
These moves will bring increasing pressures on the
remaining member, El Salvador. The Salvadoran Gov-
ernment will probably work out some arrangement with
the opposition Christian Democrats, who are resist-
ing the bill as a tactic to ai ions on other
matters.
2 6 Ju 1 6 8 Central .Intelligence B~rlletin g
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Panama: Resolution of a legal conflict over
control of the electoral tribunal paves the way for
the electoral board to resume vote counting to de-
termine the composition of the new National Assembly.
The national guard intervened on 23 July to en-
sure the seating of a newly appointed tribunal mem-
ber who supports President-elect Arias; this ended
a two-month-old legal deadlock that had halted the
count.
The tribunal, which has the final word in dis-
puted elections, now presumably will rule in favor
of Arias and his National Union in contested assem-
bly races. Although Arias already has a simple ma-
jority of the assembly seats, he is trying to ar-
range the `?election" of a two-thirds majority and
thereby assure passage of his le islative ro osals
and possibly a new canal accord.
2 6 Ju 1 6 8 Central Intelligence Bzslletin 9
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Chile: TY~e :Leade:r:~hip of. President Frei's
Christian Democrai~ic Pax-ty has temporarily brought
under control its rebe:L~_ious youth group.
The recent.l.y elected president of the Christian
Democratic Youth, Enriclt~e Correa, made a number of
statements calling for cooperation with leftist par-
ties and repudiating ttic~ present policies of the
government. He was thE?ri suspended from his privi-
leges and called befor.E~ the party's national coun-
cil, which was to confa_rm his election. Correa was
forced to make a declax-a.tion of loyalty to the party
and to agree to act in accordance with its statutes.
Any breach of these regulations in the future could
lead to swift disciplinary action against him.
The moderates presently in control of the
Christian Democrats have indicated that they will
enforce party discipline more strictly than in the
past. They are unlikely to permit Correa or others
of the "rebel?' group to get too far out of line as
the party prepares its campaign for the con res-
sional elections next March.
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Turkey: Clashes between Istanbul security
forces and students are continuing. Approximately
50 more students have been arrested and several po-
lice have been injured. Police have again entered
the students' dormitories in Istanbul University.
Civilian and military police yesterday surrounded
the university campus and tried to prevent students
from leaving. Ankara has reportedly ordered that
no student marches be permitted today, Student
leaders have offered to negotiate with the military
but have presented demands which are not likel to
be accepted,
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Cuba: About 200 West German and Italian youths
may soon join the international youth camp in west-
ern Cuba, Several hundred other youths--mainly stu-
dents from France and Sweden--are already participat-
ing in Fidel Castro's summer program of volunteer
agricultural work and political study, Havana has
made no public announcement about the camp, but
Castro is likely to discuss themes of youth and rev-
olution when he speaks today in Santa Clara to mark
the 15th anniversar of the be innin of his revolu-
tion.
Zambia: Copper production may soon be cut back
because of a decline in coal deliveries. Since
early June, coal shipments to the copperbelt have
supplied less than two thirds of the copper indus-
try's needs, and full copper production was main-
tained only by drawing heavily on existing fuel sup-
plies, Unless coal shipments increase markedly,
copper production will have to be reduced by late
August or early September. The shortfall in fuel
deliveries results mainly from the poor performance
of Zambia's railways. The system has deteriorated
considerably over the past year or so primarily be-
cause of the departure of ex erienced white ex atri-
ate railway workers.
26 Jul 6 8 Central Intelligence Bulletin 11
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Bolivia: President Barrientos' cabinet re-
signed yesterday after a week of political tension
stimulated by thE: "the" Guevara diary scandal.
Barrientos had the supporlt of the military in de-
claring a state of~ siege Earlier this week to sup-
press the attempts of political opponents to arouse
the public again~at his ru:Le. In reorganizing his
cabinet, the President may try to include members
of the military, despite t=heir earlier reluctance
to accept a ma~or? role .in aovernina the country.
2 6 Ju 1 6 8 Ventral Intelligence Bulletin
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Secret
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